# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Sibley v. Florida Judicial Qualifications Commission (No. 06-347)

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 2006

## Text

Supreme
06-347 SEP 8 - 2006

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNI FIGE OF THE CLERK

MONTGOMERY BLAIR SIBLEY,

PETITIONER,
VS.

THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT,

RESPONDENT.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
FLORIDA SUPREME COURT

PETITION FOR WRiT OF CERTIORARI

MONTGOMERY BLAIR SIBLEY

50 WEST MONTGOMERY AVENUE
SUITE B-4

ROCKVILLE, MARYLAND 20850

PETITIONER

YS
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

The Florida Supreme Court has entered an order sanctioning
Petitioner by denying him access to the Florida Supreme Court.
Accordingly, presented for review are three questions:

WHETHER, this Court’s holding in Donovan v. City of Dallas
prevents the Florida Supreme Court from so sanctioning
Petitioner.

WHETHER, the Florida Supreme Court’s finding that
Petitioner’s claims were “meritless”, “abusive” and “frivolous”
was so disingenuous as to violate federal guarantees of due
process.

WHETHER, it is constitutionally permissible for Florida to
limit access to court absent a finding of “frivolousness”.

oii «

TABLE OF CONTENTS
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Constitutional Provisions and Statutes Involved

Senpeied OF CO gc Oe ee eee

Reason for Grenting the Wet 2... on eve scccscascvves

i. Donovan v. City of Dallas Precludes the Florida
Supreme Court From Sanctioning Petitioner .....

II. Due Process Requires Undisputed Credibility ....
III. Litigiousness is a Coiws.tutional Right ..........

Comat ong kas bia ee ee ee

- lil -

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Castro v. United States, 775 F.2d 399 (1st Cir. 1985) ..... 13
Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408 (1964) ........ 4,5
In Re Demos, 500 US. i. 5 ee ee ae 14
In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180 (1989) ................. 15
In re Oliver, 682 F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 1982) .............. 13

Pavilonis v. King, 626 F.2d 1075 (ist Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
Ip ag a Ot ed .

Peters v. KG, 407 U.S. 493 (1972) . ccc ccc ccweccccces 12
Sibley v. Sibley, 885 So. 2d 980 (Fla.3d DCA 2004) .......
Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 (1981) ...............
Withrow. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975) ...... 6.6622 eee.
OTHER AUTHORITIES

Pe ee Lee eT Lor ee re re

—.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT

Petitioner, Montgomery Blair Sibley, prays that a writ of
certiorari issue to review the judgment and opinion of the Florida
Supreme Court entered on April 27, 2006, and upon which
rehearing was denied on June 15, 2006.

Review is appropriate as the Florida Supreme Court has (i)
decided an important question of federal law that has not been,
but should be, settled by this Court, and (ii) has decided an
important federal question in a way that conflicts with relevant
decisions of this Court.

OPINIONS BELOW

The April 14, 2005, order of the Florida Supreme Court
Dismissing the Petition and to Show Cause is reprinted in the
Appendix hereto, Appendix -2

The April 27, 2006, order of the Florida Supreme Court
Sanctioning Petitioner is reprinted in the Appendix hereto,
Appendix-4.

The June 15, 2006, order of the Florida Supreme Court

denying rehearing is reprinted in the Appendix hereto, Appendix-
8.

JURISDICTION

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under Article III and
the Ninth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 28
U.S.C. §1257(a).

9.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, TREATIES, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED

U.S. CONSTITUTION ARTICLE III, § 2

The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity,
arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and
treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority;--to
all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls;--to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction;--to
controversies to which the United States shall be a party;--to
controversies between two or more states;-- between a state and
citizens of another state;--between citizens of different
states;--between citizens of the same state claiming lands under
grants of different states, and between a state, or the citizens
thereof, and foreign states, citizens or subjects.

In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, and those in which a state shall be party, the Supreme
Court shall have original jurisdiction. In all the other cases before
mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction,
both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such
regulations as the Congress shall make.

U.S. CONSTITUTION, FOURTEEN AMENDMENT

Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.

~

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On November 4, 2004, Petitioner filed a petition with the
Florida Supreme Court seeking review of the Florida Judicial
Qualification Commission’s (“JQC”)' conclusions that there was
no evidence of inappropriate conduct on the part of:

(i) A trial judge for holding an ex parte hearing
upon an un-noticed ore tenus motion that was not
made on an emergency basis and concerned a
substantive matter and issuing a ruling without
affording Petitioner an opportunity to be heard;

(ii) Two intermediate appellate judges for engaging
in ex parte communication with Petitioner’s opposing
counsel immediately prior to oral argument before
them and their subsequent refusal to disclose the
nature of that ex parte communication when
specifically requested by Petitioner; and

(iti) The entire Florida Third -District Court of
Appeals for regularly meeting ex parte with certain
chosen counsel informally before and after oral
arguments and refusing to disclose the nature of those
communications.

On April 14, 2006, the Flor'da Supreme Court issued its
order (i) dismissing the petition of Petitioner and (ii) directing
Petitioner to show cause why “the Court should not impose upon
him a sanction for his litigiousness . . .”.. Appendix-3.

Petitioner timely filed a response to that order to show cause

The Judicial Qualifications Commission is an independent

agency created by the Florida Constitution solely to investigate
alleged misconduct by Florida state judges.

on April 26, 2005.

A year later, on April 27, 2006, the Florida Supreme Court
issued its order sanctioning Petitioner by directing the Clerk of
the Florida Supreme Court to “reject for filing any future
pleadings, petitions, motions, documents or other filings”
submitted by Petitioner “in any way related to his domestic
disputes unless signéd by a member in good standing of the
Florida Bar.” Appendix-6.

This timely Petition followed.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

First, this Court’s holding in Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377
U.S. 408 (1964) prevents the Florida Supreme Court from
sanctioning Petitioner for exercising his right to access federal
court as was done here.

Second, the Florida Supreme Court’s finding that Petitioner’s
claims were “meritless”, “abusive” and “frivolous” is so
disingenuous as to violate federal guarantees of due process. As
detailed below: (i) Petitioner did not file three of the eight
petitions which the Florida Supreme Court found “meritless”, (ii)
two of the petitions were denied as “moot” thus their “merit”
was never determined and (iii) the remaining three petitions
were all filed as part of Petitioner’s state and federal guarantees
of the right to appeal and in all events were not
contemporaneously deemed “meritless”, “abusive” or “frivolous”.

Last, whether it is constitutionally permissible for Florida to
limit access to court absent a finding of “frivolousness” as the
Florida Supreme Court has done to Petitioner here.

x 2

I. DONOVAN v. Clry OF DALLAS PRECLUDES THE FLORIDA
SUPREME COURT FROM SANCTIONING PETITIONER

In Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408, 413 (1964), this
Court unequivocally stated:

Petitioners being properly in the federal court
had a right granted by Congress to have the
court decide the issues they resented, and to
appeal to the Court of Appeals from the District
Court's dismissal. They have been punished
both for prosecuting their federal-court case
and for appealing it. They dismissed their
appeal because of threats to punish them more
if they did not do so. The legal effect of such a
coerced dismissal on their appeal is not now
before us, but the propriety of a state court's
punishment of a federal-court litigant for
pursuing his right to federal-court remedies is.
That right was granted by Congress and cannot
be taken away by the State. The Texas courts
were without power to take away this federal
right by contempt proceedings or otherwise.
(Emphasis added).

Here, in the order of April 14, 2005, the Florida Supreme Court
stated: “The Court notes that the Third District Court of Appeal
has already imposed such a sanction on petitioner. See: Sibley v.
Sibley, 885 So. 2d 980, 988 (Fla.3d DCA 2004).” Appendix-3.

In Sibley v. Sibley, 885 So. 2d 980, 988 (Fla.3d DCA 2004),
the Florida Third District Court of Appeal in entering the
referenced order stated: “In addition, the former husband has
filed at least twelve actions in federal court against judges who
have been assigned to his cases, the court system, and the former

wife.” Jd. at 988.’

Accordingly, for being “properly in the federal court”,
Petitioner was sanctioned by the Florida Supreme Court — a
result prohibited by Donovan. Implicit in such action is that “The
[Florida] courts were without power to take away this federal
right by contempt proceedings or otherwise.” Here, the
“otherwise” is the denial to Petitioner of access to the Florida
Supreme Court as a result in part of having properly accessed
federal court without a single finding there of frivolousness.

Given that this Court has yet to open up the federal district
courts for redress of this wrong’, Petitioner now enjoys a right
under Donovan without a /ocus to pursue a remedy.

Accordingly, this Court must accept certiorari of this matter
to breathe life into Donovan and secure the right of litigants to
access federal court without fear of state court reprisal.

II. DUE PROCESS REQUIRES UNDISPUTED CREDIBILITY

Second, the Florida Supreme Court’s finding that Petitioner’s
claims were “meritless”, “abusive” and “frivolous” is so
disingenuous as to violate federal guarantees of due process.

Obviously, there is a presumption of honesty and integrity
in those serving as adjudicators. Cf Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S.
35, 47 (1975). That presumption is based upon the realization
that without “honesty” and “integrity” the judicial system would
be one of form without substance.

. This Court declined review of that matter in No. 04-1411.

3

Pending before this Court is No. 05-1625 which raises this
issue. This Court has also refused to review this issue in No.
04-1309.

”

Here, incredible as it sounds at first, the Florida Supreme
Court was neither “honest” nor demonstrated “integrity” in their
opinion of April 28, 2006. *

The Florida Supreme Court’s ex cathedra pronouncement of
“clear abuse of judicial process” was without evidentiary support
in the record. When this was pointed out to the Florida Supreme
Court by Petitioner, this inconvenient fact was ignored on two
occasions and oral argument was denied to Petitioner by the
Florida Supreme Court though specifically requested.

The Florida Supreme Court premised its April 14, 2005,
Order to Show Cause upon its apparently foregone conclusion
that “petitioner has abused the processes of the Court with his
numerous meritless filings” and that “[g]liven the petitioner’s
clear abuse of judicial process in the Court... .”. Appendix-3.

However, a review of the eight cases the Florida Supreme
Court cited to justify its conclusion of Petitioner’s “abuse” reveal -
that no such “abuse” was present. Apparently, the Florida
Supreme Court was motivated by matters outside the record as
an honest, full and public review of those cases cannot possibly
support such a finding of “abuse”.

Those cases by the Florida Supreme Court in chronological
order with descriptions are:

1. Sibley v. Sibley, SCO2-1309 (Fla. Nov. 22, 2002) - In this
case Petitioner claimed that the Third District Court of Appeals,

4

“Perhaps the sentiments contained in the following pages,
are not YET sufficiently fashionable to procure them general
favour; a long habit of not thinking a thing WRONG, gives it a
superficial appearance of being RIGHT, and raises at first a
formidable outcry in defense of custom.” Common Sense,
Thomas Paine, Introduction to the Third Edition.

eS

in direct conflict with the Florida Supreme Court and the First,
Second, Fourth and Fifth District Court of Appeals, held that two
days notice for (i) a hearing and (ii) for deposition to out-of-state
parties comports with both due process and Florida Rules of Civil
Procedure, Rule 1.090(d). The Florida Supreme Court denied
review but noteworthy found nothing frivolous, abusive or
incomprehensible in the petition.

2. Sibley v. Spears, SC02-2644 (Fla. May 27, 2003) - In this
case, Petitioner — who was incarcerated at the time — was
represented by attorney Bart Billbrough. Mr. Billbrough, not
Petitioner, filed this action - against Petitioner’s express wishes
to the contrary based upon the Florida Supreme Court’s holding
in Stallworth v. Moore, 827 So. 2d 974 (Fla. 2002) which plainly
prohibited such a suit. Hence, for the Florida Supreme Court to
impose upon Petitioner responsibility for this patently improper
filing which he opposed is simply beyond the pale. And again,
nothing frivolous, abusive or incomprehensible was found in the
petition at that time.

3. Sibley v. Sibley, SCO03-8 (Fla. Aug. 18,2003) -Fc swing
upon his incompetent pleading in SCO2-2644, Mr. Billbrough
continuing to represent Petitioner who was still incarcerated and
again filed his petition over Petitioner’s objections in this matter.
This matter was likewise dismissed though nothing frivolous,
abusive or incomprehensible was found in the petition at that
time. Accordingly, responsibility for this filing cannot be placed
upon Petitioner.

4. Sibley v. Spears, SC03-261 (Fla. Feb. 18, 2903) -
Continuing his litany of incompetence and again over Petitioner’s
express direction that Mr. Billbrough continue litigating this
habeas corpus matter in Federal Court as state court remedies
had been exhausted, Mr. Billbrough filed this matter only to see
it suffer the same fate as SCO2-2644 and SCO3-8. Hence and
again, to seek to impose responsibility for this filing on Petitioner
is simply unfair. Notably, nothing frivolous, abusive or

~

incomprehensible was found in the petition at that time.

5. Sibley v. Sibley, SCO3-1070 (Fla. Sept. 20, 2004) - On
June 11, 2003, Petitioner filed a petition seeking an order (i)
staying all the Circuit and District Court proceedings below
pending disposition of the petition, (ii) issuing an writ of
mandamus directing that the Circuit Court Judge to rule on the
seventh, eighth and ninth motions to disqualify her and (iii)
changing the District Court of Appeal hearing these matters from
the Third District Court of Appeals which has regularly and
systematically shown a bias sufficient to warrant disqualification
of the entire Third District Court of Appeal. Fourteen months
later, on August 18, 2004, this Court entered its order in SCO3-
1070 that “this proceeding appears now to be moot given that
the Third District issued a ruling on the petition for writ of
prohibition in Sibley v. Sibley, Case No. 3D03-1392, on August
_6, 2003, and denied petitioner's motion for rehearing,
clarification, and request for written decision on September 26,
2003.” Accordingly, on September 9, 2004, the Florida Supreme
Court dismissed SC03-1070 as “moot”. Hence, the merits of this
petition were never addressed due to the Florida Supreme
Court’s delay of over 14 months in addressing the substance of
this petition. And again, the Florida Supreme Court found
nothing frivolous, abusive or incomprehensible in the petition.

6. Sibley v. Sibley, SCO3-1953 (Fla. Sept. 3, 2004) - In this
case Petitioner sought review of the Third District Court of
Appeal’s opinion in 3D03-1392 which declared moot the circuit
court judge’s refusal to rule upon three outstanding motions to
disqualify her while she continue to conduct hearing and issue
orders in Petitioner’s family court case. On September 24, 2004,
the Florida Supreme Court simply declined to exercise its
jurisdiction to review and barred any motion for rehearing. ©
Noteworthy is that the Florida Supreme Court found nothing
frivolous, abusive or incomprehensible in the petition.

7. Sibley v. Sibley, SCO04-178 (Fla. Apr. 14, 2004) - On

. -

February 16, 2004, Petitioner filed a petitioner seeking (i) a writ
of prohibition restraining the Honorable Alan Schwartz, Chief
Judge of the Third District Court of Appeal and the Honorable
Juan Ramirez, Jr and David L. Le.v, Associate Judges of the
Third District Court of Appeal from presiding as judges in Case
No. 3D03-2083 pending in the Third District Court of Appeal or,
alternatively, (ii) a writ of mandamus directing a-ruling with
written decision upon Father’s un-resolved motions to disqualify
(i) Judge Schwartz and (ii) Judges Juan Ramirez, Jr and David
L. Levy. This petition arose from the failure of the Florida Third
District Court of Appeal to rule upon a motion to disqualify filed
by Petitioner pending in 3D03-2083. The Florida Supreme Court
denied the petition on April 14, 2004, after learning that it was
moot as those judges had entered orders granting Petitioner’s
motion to disqualify them on March 23, 2004, in Case No.: 3D03-
2083. Anon, the Florida-Supreme Court found nothing
frivolous, abusive or incomprehensible in the petition.

8. Sibley v. Sibley, SCO5-11 (Fla. Mar. 15, 2005) - In this
case, Petitioner sought review of the June 18, 2004, opinion of
the Third District Court of Appeals in Case No.: 3D04-1466
which he maintained expressly and directly conflicted with the
Florida Supreme Court and District Court decisions: (i) under
Florida Family Law Rules, Rule 12.440(a) and Florida Rules of
Civil Procedure, Rule 1.440, that “within a reasonable time from
the service of the notice for trial” the court “shall enter an order
setting the action for trial, fixing a date for trial, and setting a
pretrial conference, if necessary”; (ii) that mandate that a motion
to disqualify be granted when a trial judge enters an order
prohibiting a litigant from asserting federal and Florida
constitutional rights to appeal any of the trial judge’s orders; and
(iii) that mandate that a motion to disqualify be granted when
the trial judge has engaged in ex parte discussions with opposing
counsel on a substantive, non-emergency matter. On March 15,
2005, the Florida Supreme Court declined to review citing lack
of jurisdiction and prohibited any motion for rehearing but once
again found nothing frivolous, abusive or incomprehensible in

-li-
the petition.

Accordingly, of the eight cases cited by the Florida Supreme
Court that it considers “meritless”, “abusive” and “frivolous” to
the extent that collectively they warranted barring Petitioner
from the Florida Supreme Court:

(i) Three were not filed by Petitioner but his
counsel over Petitioner’s express wishes (SC02-2644,
SCO03-8 and SC03-261);

(ii) | Two were disposed of as “moot” due to the
lethargy of the Florida Supreme Court’s addressing the
claims in those_petitions (SCO3-1070 and SC04-178)
and hence the “merits” were never addressed by the
Florida Supreme Court; and

(iii) In three review was denied for lack of
jurisdiction (SC02-1309, SCO3-1953 and SCO5-11)
over a four year period.

Hence, in sum, the Florida Supreme Court sanctioned
Petitioner for filing three petitions in four years upon the sole
basis that it declined to review citing lack of jurisdiction.

Thus it is with a demonstrable basis in fact that Petitioner
now claims that the Florida Supreme Court has abandoned its
obligations to be honesty and operate with integrity in its
adjudications.

Federal guarantees to Due Process imposed upon the states
require more. It is not novel to maintain that if “due process is
violated when the prosecutor's actions treat a defendant unfairly
or impugn the integrity of the judicial process”. Likewise, the
same result attends when the judiciary itself so “impugn[s] the
integrity of the judicial process.” Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S.
209,f/n #5 (1981) citing United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97

82.
(1976). Either way, due process cannot countenance the result.

To misrepresent the record to justify sanctioning Petitioner
— who truth be told was only properly complaining to the Florida
Supreme Court of egregious ex parte judicial behavior in the
lower courts — violates the tenants of due process just as a
prosecutor does who misrepresents the record by withholding
evidence. In either case, the judicial process has been impugned
to the extent that due process has been denied.

Given that “even if there is no showing of actual bias in the
tribunal, this Court has held that due process is denied by
circumstances that create the likelihood or the appearance of
bias”, due process is likewise denied by the appearance — if not
the reality —- of bias so great as to cause the Florida Supreme
Court to dispense with intellectual honesty in their decision.
Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 502 (1972).

Accordingly, this Court must accept this petition to review
the significant departure from the requirements of “honesty” and
“integrity” by the Florida Supreme Court in this matter.

Ill. LIiITIGIOUSNESS IS A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT

Significantly, the Florida Supreme Court initially premised
its order to show cause upon a query as to whether “the Court
should not impose upon [Petitioner] a sanction for his
litigiousness.” Appendix-3. _

Thereafter, in the April 27, 2006, order the Florida Supreme
Court - for the first time — stated: “However, petitioner’s
frivolous and abusive filings must immediately come to an end.”
Appendix-6. This ex post facto and gratuitous finding of
“frivolous” — while contributing to the intellectual dishonesty of
the Florida Supreme Court’s orders in this matter — is even more
significant because of this simple fact: Not one of the eight
Florida Supreme Court cases cited were found to be “frivolous”
at the time they were determined. Moreover, not one of the

43.

twenty-five appellate proceedings in the Florida Third District
Court of Appeal was found to be frivolous. Finally, not one of
the twelve federal district court proceedings was found to be
frivolous.

Patently then, for the Florida Supreme Court to claim that
Petitioner’s filings were “frivolous” is at best a prevarication.
Indeed, by this loose leap of language, the Florida Supreme
Court has expanded its power to deny access to it to those who
though demonstrably not “frivolous” are simply being punished
for being “litigious”.

While this Court has not expressly recognized “litigiousness”
as a federally guaranteed right, several federal circuit courts have
so expressly stated. Accord: In re Oliver, 682 F.2d 443, 446 (3d
Cir. 1982)(“It should be made clear that Oliver's litigiousness
alone would not support an injunction restricting his filing
activities. Pavilonis v. King, supra at 1079; Ruderer v. United
States, 462 F.2d 897, 899 (8th Cir. 1972) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1031 (1972). Access to the courts is a
fundamental tenet of our judicial system; legitimate claims
should receive a full and fair hearing no matter how litigious the
plaintiff may be.”); Pavilonis v. King, 626 F.2d 1075, 1079 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 829(1980) (“Although upholding the
district court in this instance, we emphasize that litigiousness
alone will not support an injunction against a plaintiff, Kane v.
City of New York, 468 F.Supp. 586, 590 (S.D.N.Y.), affd without
op., 614 F.2d 1288 (2d Cir. 1979), and that the use of such
measures against a pro se plaintiff should be approached with
particular caution, Ai// v. Estelle, 423 F.Supp. 690, 695
(S.D.Tex.1976). Generally, this kind of order should not be
considered absent a request by the harassed defendants”); Castro
v. United States, 775 F.2d 399, 408 (1st Cir. 1985)(“We have
recognized that, in extreme circumstances involving groundless
encroachment upon the limited time and resources of the court
and other parties, an injunction barring a party from filing and
processing frivolous and vexatious lawsuits may be appropriate.
Gordon v. United States Department of Justice, 558 F.2d 618 (Ast

—"o

Cir.1977) (per curiam). Other circuits have similarly held that
district courts have the power under 28 U.S.C. 1651 (a) to enjoin
litigants who abuse the court system by harassing their
opponents. . . . As the district court properly noted, appellants’
apparent “affinity for litigation,” standing alone, would not
provide sufficient justification to issue an injunction.”) (Citations
omitted).

Likewise, the Florida Supreme Court’s conclusion that
Petitioner’s pleadings were “abusive” is simply false. This Court
has identified the meaning of “abusive” in /n Re Demos, 500 U.S.
16 (1991). In that case, abusive filings which justified a sanction
of denying access occurred when Demos had “made 32 in forma
pauperis filings in this Court since the beginning of the October,
1988, Term, many of which challenge sanctions imposed by
lower courts in response to petitioner's frivolous filings.
Petitioner's method of seeking relief here -- filing three petitions
for relief from a single order of a lower court -- could only be
calculated to.disrupt the orderly consideration of cases.” /d. at
16-17.

Plainly, Petitioner pleadings do not fall in the category of
litigants such as in Demos. As such, the Florida Supreme Court
may not sanction Petitioner under a theory of “abusiveness”.

Simply stated, as the dissent in Demos postulated: “More
likely, the Court's ban on Demos’ in forma pauperis requests for
extraordinary writs is but a poorly disguised penalty for his more
numerous petitions for certiorari. See also In re Sindram, 498
U.S. 177, 183 (1991) (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting, joined by
Marshall, J. (noting that Court's ban upon petitioner's in forma
pauperis filings for extraordinary relief ‘appears to be nothing
more than an alternative for punishing [petitioner] for the
frequency with which he has filed petitions for certiorari and
petitions for rehearing’).” /d. at 19.

Accordingly, to stop the Florida Supreme Court from “setting
sail on a journey whose landing point is uncertain”, this Court

7%.

must act to review the practice of the Florida Supreme Court in
denying court access to those who it finds objectionable.

CONCLUSION

The implications of denying this petition are substantial.
First, the right to access federal court is meaningless if a litigant
can be “chilled” from doing so by threat of state court sanctions.

Second, if a tribunal is at liberty to ignore and misrepresent
the record and the law to achieve a desire result, the rule of law
is nO more.

Last, in those rare cases where access to court must be
denied to a litigant after a pattern of “frivolous” filings which
implicate a “Court's responsibility . . . to see that [judicial]
resources are allocated in a way that promotes the interests of
justice”, such a pattern must be present. /n re McDonald, 489
U.S. 180, 184 (1989). Here, that pattern is not present and as
such to sanction this expansion of judicial control of access to
court by denying this petition renders void the access to court
guarantees secured by King John’s signature on the Magna
Charta in 1215.

-Accordingly, this petition for a writ of certiorari should be
granted.

Respectfully submitted,

Montgomery Blair Sibley
Petitioner

A-1
CONTENTS OF APPENDIX
Opinions Below

The April 14, 2005, order of the Florida Supreme Court
Dismissing the Petition and to Show Cause...... Appendix -2

The April 27, 2006, order of the Florida Supreme Court
SP owned ves wew una n daca Appendix-4

The June 15, 2006, order of the Florida Supreme Court denying
NEE eed cha heed ceday en sane cea ere Appendix-8

A-2

SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA
APRIL 14, 2005

CASE NO.: SC04-2129

MONTGOMERY BLAIR SIBLEY vs. FLORIDA JUDICIAL
QUALIFICATIONS
COMMISSION

Petitioner(s) Respondent(s)

The all writs petition is hereby dismissed. Cf Tyson v.
Florida Bar, 826 So.2d 265 (Fla. 2002) (disciplinary proceedings
against attorneys are instituted in the public interest and to
preserve the purity of the courts, no private rights except those
of the accused attorney are involved, and the complaining
witness is not a party to the disciplinary proceeding and has no
right to appeal). This Court does not investigate a determination
by the Judicial Qualifications Commission that no formal charges
should be instigated against a member or members of the
judiciary. See Fla. Jud. Qual. Commn’n R. 6(a).

Since June 6,2002, petitioner has initiated numerous pro se
cases with the Court, all of which appear to emanate out of his
1994 dissolution of marriage proceedings in the Circuit Courtof
the Eleventh Judicial Circuit, in and for Dade County, Florida.
None of petitioner's filings have resulted in any relief. See Sibley
v. Sibley No. SC02-1309 (Fla. Nov. 22, 2002)(denying review
based on alleged direct conflict of decisions); Sibley v. Sibley,
No. SC03-8 (Fla. Aug. 18,2003)(same); Sibley v. Sibley, No.
SC03-1953 (Fla. Sept. 3,2004)(same); Sibley v. Sibley, No.
SCOS5-11 (Fla. Mar. 15, 2005) (same); Sibley v. Spears, No. SCO2-
2644(Fla. May 27,2003) (dismissing alleged direct conflict of
decisions); Sibley v. Spears, No. SCO03-261 (Fla. Feb. 18,2003)
(same); Sibley v. Sibley, No. SCO3-1070 (Fla. Sept. 20,2004)
(dismissing petition for writ of mandamus as moot); Sibley v.
Sibley, No. SC04-178 (Fla. Apr. 14,2004) (denying extraordinary

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writ petition).

Because petitioner has abused the processes of the Court
with his numerous meritless filings, the Court finds that a
limitation on-petitioner's ability to initiate any further pro se
proceedings in this Court may be necessary in order to further
the constitutional right of access of other litigants in that it would
permit this Court to devote its finite resources to the
consideration of legitimate claims filed by others. See in Re
McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 184 (1989) (noting that "[e] very paper
filed with the Clerk of this Court, no matter how repetitious or
frivolous, requires some portion of the institution's limited
resources"). The Court notes that the Third District Court of
Appeal has already imposed such a sanction on petitioner. See:
Sibley v. Sibley, 885 So. 2d 980, 988 (Fla.3d DCA 2004)
(directing the clerk of court to “reject any further filings in this
court on the former husband's behalf unless signed by a member
of The Florida Bar (other than the former husband)”).

Given petitioner's clear abuse of the judicial process in the
Court, petitioner is hereby directed to show cause on or before
April 29,2005, why the Court should not impose upon him a
sanction for his litigiousness, such as directing the Clerk of Court
to reject for filing my future pleadings, petitions, motions,
documents, or other filings submitted by him related to his 1994
dissolution of marriage proceedings unless they are signed by a
member in good standing of The Florida Bar other than
petitioner.

ANSTEAD, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANTERO and BELL, JJ., concur.

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SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA
APRIL 27, 2006

CASE NO.: SC04-2129

MONTGOMERY BLAIR SIBLEY vs. FLORIDA JUDICIAL
QUALIFICATIONS
COMMISSION
Petitioner(s) Respondent(s)

PER CURIAM.

Petitioner, Montgomery Blair Sibley, an attorney licensed in
Florida, has previously filed a “Petition to Review the Actions,
Policies and Procedures of the Florida Judicial Qualifications
Commission,” which this Court dismissed on April 14, 2005.
Since that original filing attorney Sibley has filed numerous other
filings which culminated in the issuance by this Court of an order
directing Sibley to show cause why we should not limit his filings
or otherwise impose sanctions upon him for filing frivolous
proceedings in this Court. We now sanction Sibley.

On November 4, 2004, Sibley, a licensed Florida attorney
representing himself, filed in this Court a “Petition to Review the
Actions, Policies and Procedures of the Florida Judicial
Qualifications Commission.” In this filing, Sibley sought -to
challenge the Judicial Qualifications Commission's decision not
to pursue formal charges against several judges about whom
Sibley had filed complaints in relation to his ongoing child
custody and child support disputes with his ex-wife. The petition
was dismissed by order of the Court, which explained its lack of
jurisdiction over the Commission, and that “[t}his Court does not
investigate a determination by the Judicial Qualifications
Commission that no formal charges should be initiated against a
member or members of the judiciary. See Fla. Jud. Qual. Comm'n
R. 6(a).” Sibley v. Fla. Judicial Qualifications Comm'n, No.
SC04-2129, order at ] (Fla. Apr. 14, 2005).

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In our order of dismissal, the Court noted that since 2002,
Sibley had submitted numerous meritless filings in this Court, all
related to or emanating out of his 1994 dissolution of marriage
proceedings. Id.; see Sibley v. Sibley, 900 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 2005)
(table) (review denied); Sibley v. Sibley, 885 So. 2d 388 (Fla.
2004) (table) (mandamus petition dismissed); Sibley v. Sibley,
884 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 2004) (table) (review denied); Sib/ey v.
Sibley, 872 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 2004) (table) (prohibition petition
denied); Sibley v. Sibley, 854 So. 2d 660 (Fla. 2003) (table)
(review denied); Sibley v. Spears, 846 So. 2d 1149 (Fla. 2003)
(table) (review dismissed); Sibley v. Spears, 839 So. 2d 699 (Fla.
2003) (table) (review dismissed); Sibley v. Sibley, 833 So. 2d
774 (Fla. 2002) (table) (review denied). Subsequent to the
issuance of the order to show cause, the Court denied review in
yet another case filed by petitioner in this Court, Sibley v. Sibley,
901 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 2005) (table). Accordingly, based on his
prior abuse of this Court’s processes, Sibley was directed to show
cause “why the Court should not impose upon him a sanction for
his litigioushess, such as directing the Clerk of Court to reject for
filing any future pleadings, petitions, motions, documents, or
other filings related to his 1994 dissolution of marriage
proceedings unless they are signed by a member in good
standing of The Florida Bar other than petitioner.” S/bley v. Fia.
Judicial Qualifications Comm'n, order at 2.

In his response, Sibley rejects the notion that his numerous
filings constitute an abuse of judicial process and argues that this
Court lacks the authority, constitutionally and otherwise, to
impose a sanction upon him and restrict his access to this Court.
We disagree. This Court and the United States Supreme Court
have, when deemed necessary, exercised the inherent judicial
authority to sanction an abusive litigant. See, e.g., Martin v.
District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U.S. 1 (1992); In re
Sindram, 498 U.S. 177 (1991); Jn re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180,
184 (1989); Armstead v. State, 817 So. 2d 841 (Fla. 2002);
Peterson v. State, 817 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 2002); Jackson v. Fla.
Dep't of Corr., 790 So. 2d 398 (Fla. 2001); Rivera v. State, 728
So. 2d 1165 (Fla. 1998); Attwood v. Singletary,661 So. 2d 1216

A-6

(Fla. 1995). One justification for such a sanction lies in the
protection of the rights of others to timely review of their
legitimate filings. See Martin, 506 U.S. at 3 (imposing sanction
where petitioner’s filings for certiorari review had a deleterious —
effect on the Court's fair allocation of judicial resources); see also
Peterson, 817 So. 2d at 840 (“This Court has a responsibility to
ensure every citizen’s right of access to the courts. ...A
limitation on [the petitioner’s] ability to file would further the
constitutional right to access for other litigants because it would
permit this Court to devote its finite resources to the
consideration of legitimate claims filed by others.”). As noted by
the United States Supreme Court, "[e]very paper filed with the
Clerk of this Court, no matter how repetitious or frivolous,
requires some portion of the institution's limited resources. A part
of the Court's responsibility is to see that these resources are
allocated in a way that promotes the interests of justice." Jn re
McDonald, 489 J.S. at 184.

Upon a thorough review of the filings of Sibley in this Court,
we conclude that Sibley has abused the processes of the Court
and has hindered the ability of this Court to properly resolve
those matters which are properly before the Court. We conclude
that sanctions are merited on this record. Accordingly, in order
to preserve the right of access for all litigants and promote the
interests of justice, the Clerk of this Court is hereby instructed to
reject for filing any future pleadings, petitions, motions,
documents or other filings submitted by Montgomery Blair Sibley
in any way related to his domestic disputes, unless signed by a
member in good standing of The Florida Bar other than
Montgomery Blair Sibley. Under the sanction herein imposed,
Sibley is not wholesale being denied access to the courts. He may
petition the Court through the assistance of counsel other than
himself, whenever such counsel determines that the proceeding
may have merit and can be filed in good faith. However,
petitioner’s frivolous and abusive filings must immediately come
to an end. Further, if Montgomery Blair Sibley submits a filing in
violation of this order, he may be subjected to further contempt
proceedings or other appropriate sanctions.

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It is so ordered.

PARIENTE, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, LEWIS, QUINCE,
CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., concur.

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING
MOTION, AND IF FILED, DETERMINED.

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SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA
THURSDAY, JUNE 15, 2006

CASE NO.: SC04-2129

MONTGOMERY BLAIR SIBLEY vs. FLORIDA JUDICIAL
QUALIFICATIONS
COMMISSION

Petitioner(s) Respondent(s)

Petitioner's Rule 9.330 Motion for Rehearing is hereby
denied.

ANSTEAD, LEWIS, CANTERO and BELL, JJ..

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386016_1440%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.