# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — District of Columbia Water and Sewer Authority Authority Authority v. Friends of the Earth, Inc. (No. 06-119)

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386016_1222%3A1

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 2006

## Text

SL "Supreme COUT. on
FILED

“\
No. 05-5015 {6-119 JUL 21 2006

In T he OFFICE OF Tine CLEAK
Supreme Court of the Anited States

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
WATER AND SEWER AUTHORITY,

Petitioner,
Vv.

FRIENDS OF THE EARTH, INC.,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Avis Marié Russell David E. Evans |
General Counsel E. Duncan Getchell, Jy.
District of Columbia Water Stewart T. Leeth
and Sewer Authority (Counsel of Record)
5000 Overlook Avenue, SW MCGUIREWOODS LLP
Washington, D.C. 20032 One James Center

901 East Cary Street
Richmond, Virginia 23219
(804) 775-1000

Counsel for Petitioner

LANTAGNE LEGAL PRINTING
801 East Main Street Suite 100 Richmond, Virginia 23219 (800) 847-0477

Se ee I ee eee ee ingest

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Zs Whether the decision below. barring the
Environmental Protection Agency and the states from
establishing TMDLs on an annual, seasonal or other
appropriate basis, which rests on the appearance of the
word “daily” in the undefined term “total maximum daily
load,” contravenes. basic principles of statutory
interpretation as reflected in the decisions of this Court and
those of other circuit courts.

é Whether the decision below _ barring the
Environmental Protection Agency and the states from
expressing maximum pollution loads for impaired water
bodies on an annual, seasonal or other appropriate basis
leads to absurd and unjust results.

ii
PARTIES TOC THE PROCEEDINGS

Friends of the Earth, Inc. appeared as plaintiff in the
proceedings below, the judgment in which veview is sought.
The United States Environmental Protection Agency
appeared as defendant. The District of Columbia Water and
Sewer Authority (“WASA”) appeared as_ intervenor-
defendant. National Association of Clean Water Agencies
and the CSO Partnership appeared as amici curiae. All
parties, intervenors and amici appearing before this Court
are the same as those before the courts below.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
RFE FI Fe OU viiicessctcvnsdstsicesedssvigcnocs cedtaeusosesonsenhass i
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS ..00...oeccececccetseteeteeeeeeees il
TABLE CF AUTHOR i oi vcstisciscccvecsivccsssocsesescencevosonooesaveneas iv
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI ..........000. 1
TURE CURR OY caisccshcesiinsiessuncdaicesvcecsvnssenidenhsdopssinnvijensdsodes aac
Re GE piste sep ccc soessad sacieadaphata ne WicbinvelicereceiaeainesetsGieuss ]

CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY, AND
REGULATORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED IN THE CASE

siesci stein pelcbiuls <aivias-oh saascpuonedeeebuaoeanckddap Gag uen senna nibebeluarmeieal pd cxeoeaeid GA 2
EA REI COP DERE CADE occ secisnscctiieccssarcccosvensssntuascagses 6
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION ................. 10

I. The D.C. Circuit’s Decision Barring The Environmental
Protection Agency And The States From Establishing
TMDLs On An Annual, Seasonal Or Other Appropriate
Basis Conflicts With Principles Of Statutory Interpretation
Adopted By This Court And Is In Direct Conflict With A
Decision of the Second Circuit. ....................ccccsccseseesesencesseee 10

II. The D.C. Circuit’s Decision Barring The Environmental
Protection Agency And The States From Establishing
TMDLs On An Annual, Seasonal Or Other Appropriate
Basis Leads To Absurd Results As Concluded By The
UN COMIN ens icsiesSsi ces cisiv aside naira stasis Neebensisactpinvicsanconss 17

III. This Case Involves An Important Question of Federal
Law Concerning the Breadth and Scope of the TMDL
Requirement That Has Not Been, But Should Be, Settled
si Shes meth gach eS A ISIE ESCA LOVE SR GMACOSOR 2}

iV

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES
Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization,

MMS NTs QR) CIE Oh inenacoxisonstnosiccastenaovaconeplinienongindnginusaespinobon 21
Chem. Mfrg. Ass'n. v. NRDC,

META dhe AO ENDO E scretocitncs eoiiucsonnicepasotban oereciominbagones iSopnetion 22
Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States,

RR i BOT Ce vsisgnackicccssssca bea tuctdinksecelsuesssoontocsdastarniesavss 17
Comm'r. of Internal Revenue v. Engle,

Te, De CEI is icin tases cies Ue bccpc cents tiopleschlpsecdaspeteecaedaaen 21
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Costle,

is 2g) fos ge egos ¢ BA te Mes oe 8 8 Menon ceoerammrinc ore pier rn 754)
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,

Rt ADs RAAT MMO Fo oserrscdns icons cuanlssogapanentadesaneunseaesanneoians 11,5

Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency,
De Me LEIS CAE ZIG) crc crcsscnsisssatsenennssinvicnevaipbintbovenies 8

Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency,
346 F. Sapp. 2d 182 (DDC. 2004) vnecsovesessissdeotasssiorsencone 9, 12

Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency,
446 F.3d 140 (D.C. Cir. 2006).......:ccceccseesees 159, 10; 32, 35, 23

Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc.,
UES Oink cacecec ecsestdes Sane anicas ides 18

Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Muszynski,
268 FS 92 (28 Cir, 2OG1) ac scsicssesecossnsossorsannis 9, 10, 16, 18, 22

Vv

United States v. Haggar Apparel Co.,
SD Bris TER CRP) visveiivoesniisinendtinmsbaitirnccecedtcenbiveiectinnenteelianes 12

United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. 482 (1869).........cecsccseeseees 17-18

United States v. Riverside Homes, Inc.,
eth BR CAD ich chscntesaia canis hicavceadinsabeoieadscbcludbadiaustscisois 22

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS

ng oe LCR Eee ene MMe OEE See Se RG Ee: 1
58 Ch, RD a Maca ID Oe MOR ASE 1
BUG C0 2
SGRISO GISUMY) oe ee 2
SEUSS Ot 6, 21
MUSt BO. 7
SSUSC. CIDINOIION) se 7
WOUGC BUS 27
BUC CsA)... 7
PRESS: 6 Usa 8, 12, 16
SURO BS 6
US. Daa Boos AR Sr arses Reco Sata 13, 15

SC. S190. 8

vi

Peck FE 6 | Ae nara een he ie ears pe ree 8

MISCELLANEOUS

Combined Sewer Overflow Control Policy,
59 Fed. Reg. 18,688 (Apr. 19, 1994).......c.cvczsessssssesseesss 13, 14,15

U. S. Environmental Protection Agency, Report to
Congress -- Implementation and Enforcement of the
Combined Sewer Overflow Control Policy at ES-5,

EPA B33-R-O1-00S, (Dec. 2007) onic ce scceossancinssnsshccoocscacsvencs 13

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

WASA petitions for a writ of certiorari to review the
decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columb*a Circuit in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.
Environmental Pr » on Agency, 446 F.3d 140 (D.C. Cir.
2006). WASA .. an independent authority of the
Government of the District of Columbia created in 1996 by
the United States and the Government of the District of
Columbia to distribute drinking water and _ provide
wastewater collection and treatment to citizens and
businesses in the metropolitan Washington, D.C. area.
WASA operates the wastewater collection and treatment
system for the District of Columbia, including the Blue
Plains advanced wastewater treatment plant. Blue Plains
serves portions of surrounding areas, including Fairfax
County, Virginia, Loudoun County, Virginia, Montgomery
County, Maryland, and Prince Georges County, Maryland,
in addition to the District of Columbia. The service area for
Blue Plains covers approximately 735 square miles.

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (App. 1a-13a) is
reported at 446 F.3d 140. WASA did not request panel and
en banc rehearing. The court of appeals’ mandate is
included in the Appendix (App. 1c).

JURISDICTION

This case was filed in the district court pursuant to
the Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551, et seq.
The APA entitles “[a] person suffering legal wrong because
of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by
agency action . . . to judicial review thereof.” Id. § 702.
Under the APA, a reviewing court must set aside an agency

2

action only where it is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” Id. §
706(2)(A). Jurisdiction was under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Friends of the Earth appealed the district court's
decision to the court of appeals, which entered its judgment
on April 25, 2006.

This Court has jurisdiction to review the decision of
the court of appeals by way of certiorari pursuant to 28
~ USC. § 1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY, AND
REGULATORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
IN THE CASE

Article I, § 1, of the United States Constitution
provides in pertinent part that “{alll legislative Powers
herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United
States...”

Clean Water Act § 303(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)
provides:

(d) Identification of areas with insufficient
controls; maximum daily load; certain
effluent limitations revision.

(1)(A) Each State shall identify those waters
within its boundaries for which the effluent
limitations required by section 1313(b)(1)(A)
and section 1313(b)(1)(B) are not stringent
enough to implement any water quality
standard applicable to such waters. The State
shall establish a priority ranking for such
waters, taking into account the severity of the

3

pollution and the uses to be made of such
waters.

(B) Each State shall identify those waters or
parts thereof within its boundaries for which
controls on thermal discharges under section
1311 of this title are not stringent enough to
assure protection and propagation of a
balanced indigenous population of shellfish,
fish, and wildlife.

(C) Each State shall establish for the waters
identified in paragraph (1)(A) of this
subsection, and in accordance with the
priority ranking, the total maximum daily
load, for those pollutants which the
Administrator identifies under section
1314(a)(2) of this title as suitable for such
calculation. Such load shall be established at
a level necessary to implement the applicable
water quality standards with seasonal
variations and a margin of safety which takes
into account any lack of knowledge
concerning the relationship between effluent
limitations and water quality.

(D) Each State shall estimate for the waters
identified in paragraph (1)(B) of this
subsection the total maximum daily thermal
load required to assure protection and
propagation of a balanced, indigenous
population of shellfish, fish and wildlife.
Such estimates shall take into account the
normal water temperatures, flow rates,
seasonal variations, existing sources of heat
input, and the dissipative capacity of the

identified waters or parts thereof. Such
estimates shall include a calculation of the
maximum heat input that can be made into
each such part and shall include a margin of
safety which takes into account any lack of
knowledge concerning the development of
thermal water quality criteria for such
protection and propagation in the identified
waters or parts thereof.

(2) Each State shall submit to the
Administrator from time to time, with the
first such submission not later than one
hundred and eighty days after the date of
publication of the first identification of
pollutants under section 1314(a)(2)(D) of this
title, for his approval the waters identified
and the loads established under paragraphs
(1)(A), (1)(B), (1)(C), and (1)(D) of this
subsection. The Administrator shall either
approve or disapprove such identification
and load not later than thirty days after the
date of submission. If the Administrator
approves such identification and load, such
State shall incorporate them into its current
plan under subsection (e) of this section. If
the Administrator disapproves such
identification and load, he shall not later than
thirty days after the date of such disapproval
identify such waters in such State and
establish such loads for such waters as he
determines necessary to implement the water .
quality standards applicable to such waters
and upon ‘uch _ identification and
establishment the State shall incorporate

5

them into its current plan under subsection
(e) of this section.

(3) For the specific purpose of developing
information, each State shall identify all
waters within its boundaries which it has not
identified under paragraph (1)(A) and (1)(B)
of this subsection and estimate for such
waters the total maximum daily load with
seasona] variations and margins of safety, for
those pollutants which the Administrator
identifies under section 1314 (a)(2) of this title
as suitable for such calculation and for
thermal discharges, at a level that would
assure protection and propagation of a
balanced indigenous population of fish,
shellfish and wildlife.

(4) Limitations on revision of certain effluent
limitations. )

(A) Standard not attained. For waters
identified under paragraph (1)(A) where the
applicable water quality standard has not yet
been attained, any effluent limitation based
on a total maximum daily load or other waste
load allocation established under this section
may be revised only if (i) the cumulative
effect of all such revised effluent limitations
based on such total maximum daily load or
waste load allocation will assure the
attainment of such water quality standard, or
(ii) the designated use which is not being
attained is removed in accordance with
regulations established under this section.

6

(B) Standard attained. For waters identified
under paragraph (1)(A) where the quality of
such waters equals or exceeds levels
necessary to protect the designated use for
such waters or otherwise required by
applicable water quality standards, any
effluent limitation based on a total maximum
daily load or other waste load allocation
established under this section, or any water
quality standard established under this
section, or any other permitting standard
may be revised only if such revision is subject
to and consistent with the antidegradation
policy established under this section.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case involves the important question of the
EPA’s and the states’ statutory authority to control the levels
of pollutants that may be released into lakes, rivers and
streams where Clean Water Act permit limitations and other
controls imposed on localities and commercial activities do
not bring those water bodies into attainment with the water
quality standards.

Congress adopted the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1251, et seq., “to restore and maintain the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters,”
id. at § 1251 and, to that end, created two overarching, but
complementary, strategies within the statute. The primary
strategy focuses upon limiting the amounts of pollutants
discharged from a pollution source through the issuance of
permits containing technology-based effluent limitations.
Id. at § 1342.

7

The other, secondary, strategy is the Act’s focus on
water quality standards. See Environmental Defense Fund,
Inc. v. Costle, 657 F.2d 275, 279 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (noting that
the Clean Water Act “assigned secondary priority to the
standards and placed primary emphasis upon both a point
source discharge permit program and federal technology-
based effluent limitations”). Sections 303(a) through (c) of
the Act direct the states, with federal approval and
oversight, to adopt and maintain water quality standards for
surface waters. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1313(a)-(c). States designate the
use or uses for which each waterway is to be protected (e.g.,
recreation, propagation of fish) ai d determine the levels of
water quality need to support the designation. Id. at §
1313(c)(2)(A).

Section 303(d), the provision at issue in this case,
requires each state to identify those waters that will not
achieve water quality standards after application of
technology-based controls and effluent limitations. Id. at §
1313(d). For such waters (known as “water quality limited
segments” or “WQLS”), states must establish pollutant
loadings - called “Total Maximum Daily Loads” (“TMDLs”)
- for each pollutant of concern at a level necessary to
implement the applicable water quality standard. Id. at §
1313(d)(1)(A), (C).

Congress did not define the term TMDL but did
recognize that it equals the maximum concentration of a
pollutant in a waterbody and is calculated “at a level
necessary to implement the applicable water quality
standards with seasonal variations and a margin of safety
which takes into account any lack of knowledge concerning
the relationship between effluent limitations and water
quality.” Id. at § 1313(d)(1)(C). EPA's regulations define a
TMDL for a pollutant as the sum of (1) the “wasteload

8

allocations” allocated to point sources;! (2) the “load
allocations” allocated to nonpoint sources or natural
background; and (3) a margin of safety. 40 C.F.R. § 130.2(i).
EPA regulations allow TMDLs to be expressed “in terms of
_ either mass per time, toxicity, or other appropriate
measure,” 40 C.F.R. § 130.2(i), including, for example,
annual or seasonal measures. EPA’s approval of TMDLs is
based upon a detailed scientific analysis and modeling of
the particular pollutants of concern and water bodies at
issue.

In 1998, the District of Columbia determined that the
Anacostia River was in violation of the District’s water
quality standards for dissolved oxygen and_ turbidity
(muddy or cloudy conditions). After assessing the
conditions of the river, the pollutants of concern -
biochemical oxygen demand (“BOD”) and total suspended
solids (“TSS”) - and after complex scientific modeling, the
District adopted, and EPA approved, a BOD TMDL
measured on an annual basis and EPA established a TSS
TMDL measured on seasonal average daily concentrations.

In 2003, Friends of the Earth filed suit against the
EPA in the D.C. Circuit, claiming that both the BOD and the
TSS TMDLs were insufficient for achieving the District's
water quality standards and that EPA acted arbitrarily in
approving them. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Environmental
Protection Agency, 333 F.3d 184 (D.C. Cir. 2003). The D.C.
Circuit dismissed the action for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction. Friends of the Earth then filed suit in the
district court for review pursuant to the APA. On
consideration of that complaint and of the parties’ cross-

' A “point source” is “any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance
... from which pollutants are or may be discharged.” 33 U.S.C.

§ 1362(14). “Nonpoint sources” are sources of pollutants that are not
“point sources,” such as runoff from fields.

9

motions for summary judgment, the district court held the
“TMDL locution ambiguous in the context of the Clean
Water Act as a whole” and, “because sufficient evidence
exists [in the Administrative Record] that the TMDLs [at
issue] were reasonably calculated to achieve daily water
quality standards,” EPA and WASA’s motions for summary
judgment should be granted. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.
Environmental Protection Agency, 346 F. Supp. 2d 182, 185
(D.D.C. 2004).

On appeal of the district court’s decision, the D.C.
Circuit found that all TMDLs must be expressed only as a
quantity of a pollutant over a 24-hour day, despite the
recognition in the Act that some events are seasonal and

despite EPA’s and the States’ longstanding and previously _

unchallenged interpretation of the TMDL requirement,
reversing the district court. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.
Environmental Protection Agency, 446 F.3d 140, 148 (D.C. Cir.
2006).

As discussed below, the D.C. Circuit’s decision is in
direct conflict with basic principles of statutory construction
as reflected in prior decisions of the Supreme Court. The
decision is also is in direct conflict with the decision of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Muszynski, 268 F.3d
91 (2d Cir. 2001). There, the Second Circuit held on virtually
identical facts that the application of pollutant load on a
strictly daily basis, based merely on the use of the word
“daily” in the phrase “total maximum daily load,” is
“absurd.” Id. at 99. The Second Circuit held that TMDLs
may be “expressed by another measure of mass per time,
where such an alternative measure best serves the purpose
of effective regulation of pollutant levels in waterbodies.”
Id. Of course, any such alternative expression results in a

10

daily average even though that daily average is too blunt an
instrument to itself serve as an effective regulatory standard.

The D.C. Circuit’s decision creates an intercircuit
conflict on an issue of substantial public importance —- the
ability of EPA and each State to regulate literally “hundreds
of different pollutants in thousands of different
waterbodies” in the United States. Id. at 97. The decision
also places into irreconcilable dispute the ability of
businesses and government agencies that treat and
discharge wastewater to obtain consistent and reasonable
regulation. In particular, requirements imposed upon
dischargers in the District of Columbia could be different
from those imposed by neighboring states for the very same
water bodies.

WASA now seeks the review of this Court.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

I. The D.C. Circuit’s Decision Barring The
Environmental Protection Agency And The States
From Establishing TMDLs On An _ Annual,
‘Seasonal Or Other Appropriate Basis Conflicts
With Principles Of Statutory Interpretation
Adopted By This Court And Is In Direct Conflict
With A Decision of the Second Circuit.

The panel below found that the appearance of the
word “daily” in the phrase “total maximum daily load”
means that Congress expressly intended that all TMDLs be
measured on a 24-hour basis. 446 F.3d at 146 (App. 2a). This
semantic assessment violates basic principles of statutory
construction espoused by the Court. When read in context,
the circuit court’s decision cannot be sustained.

11

This Court has held that “i]t is a ‘fundamental canon
of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be
read in their context and with a view to their place in the
overall statutory scheme.” FDA v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000) (citation omitted). “In
determining whether Congress has specifically addressed
the question at issue, a reviewing court should not confine
itself to examining a particular statutory provision in isolation.
The meaning - or ambiguity — of certain words or phrases
may only be evident when placed in context.” Id. at 132
(emphasis added). For example, in Brown & Williamson, the
Court looked at the “core objectives” of the Food, Drug &
Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”) before finding that the FDA did not
have jurisdiction or authority to regulate tobacco as a
“drug” under the FDCA. Id. at 133, 161. Both this Court
and the D.C. Circuit have held that the complexity of the
Clean Water Act militates in favor of judicial deference to
EPA's statutory construction. Environmental Defense Fund,
Inc. v. Costle, 657 F.2d 275, 292 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (“Courts have
held that the Clean Water Act is to be given a reasonable
interpretation which is not parsed and dissected with the
meticulous technicality applied in testing other statutes and
instruments.”).

Contrary to these principles, the D.C. Circuit
plucked a single word - “daily”- from its context as an
undefined term in § 303(d) and elevated it to the definitive
standard. When placed in context with the rest of § 303 as
well as the entire Clean Water Act, and not reviewed in
isolation, the word “daily” cannot have the seminal
meaning and importance attached to it by the circuit court.
As the district court correctly concluded, “the term ‘daily’
from ‘total maximum daily load’ should not be read in
isolation as a sacred signifier and bring an end to judicial
review.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Enviremental Protection
Agency, 346 F. Supp. 2d 182, 190 (D.D.C. 2004).

12

When read in context with of the rest of section
303(d)(1)(C), a TMDL must be established at a “level
necessary to implement the applicable water quality
standards” and must take “seasonal variations and a margin
of safety” into account. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(C). Thus, the
statute expressly provides that TMDLs must be expressed in
terms that are appropriate for the characteristics of both the
waterbody at issue and the particular pollutant(s) of
concern. This simply does not ordain that “daily” is the
exclusive measurement for all possible pollutants for all
waterbodies throughout the United States.

The D.C. Circuit did not directly address this
argument. Instead, it said only that this “cannot be night.”
Friends of the Earth v. Environmental Protection Agency, 446
F.3d 140, 145 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (App. 6a). On the contrary,
when placed in context with the rest of the section, EPA’s
interpretation is reasonable. An agency's construction of its
governing statute is given “controlling weight” not only
where the agency attempts to “fill{] a gap” in the statute, but
also where the agency “’defines a term in a way that is
reasonable in light of the legislature's revealed design.’”
United States v. Haggar Apparel Co., 526 U.S. 380, 392 (1999)
(citations omitted). The Haggar Court observed that a
statute may still “be ambiguous, for purposes of Chevron
analysis, without being inartful or deficient,” noting that
“Congress need not, and likely cannot, anticipate all
circumstances in which a general policy must be given
specific effect.” Id.

Also, when read in context with other sections of the
Clean Water Act, the D.C. Circuit’s new, judicially-created
TMDL definition could preclude implementation of
substantial portions of that Act. For example, Congress
adopted section 402(q) of the Clean Water Act to regulate

13

discharges of pollutants from combined sewer systems? and
directed that each permit, order or decree issued pursuant
to the Clean Water Act for a discharge from a combined
sewer must conform to the Combined Sewer Overflow
Control Policy (“CSO Policy”).3 33 U.S.C. § 1342(q)(1). The
D.C. Circuit’s decision, if sustained, is fundamentally
inconsistent with Congress’ approach to combined sewer
overflow (“CSO”) control, as reflected in the CSO Policy.

The CSO Policy provides that each local government
with a combined storm and sanitary sewer system - like the
District - must develop and implement a Long Term CSO
Control Plan (“LTCP”) that achieves compliance with
applicable water quality standards. Combined Sewer
Overflow Control Policy, 59 Fed. Reg. 18,688, 18,691 (Apr.
19, 1994). The CSO Policy recognizes that CSO discharges
are intermittent, rainfall-driven events, and, therefore, the
CSO Policy promotes and encourages a flexible, site-specific
approach to CSO control. Id. This approach is designed to

2 A combined sewer system (“CSS”) carries both sewage, and during wet
weather, storm water run off. Like many older cities in the United States,
the District’s sewer system consists of both separate and combined
systems. Approximately one-third of the District (12,487 acres) is served
by the CSS, which is located mostly in the older, central portion of the
city.

3 The Record before the lower courts showed there are nearly 800 CSO
communities nationwide, including the District of Columbia. U. S.
Environmental Protection Agency, Report to Congress -- Implementation
and Enforcement of the Combined Sewer Overflow Control Policy at ES-
5, EPA 833-R-01-003, (Dec. 2001) (“CSO Report to Congress”). When EPA
developed the CSO Policy, it acknowledged that CSOs were a substantial
water quality challenge which had been in existence for well over a
century in most older, urban areas in the United States. The CSO Policy
established for the first time a consistent national framework that
recognized the site-specific controls needed to address CSO impacts on
local waterbodies, and the financial challenges facing cities to cost-
effectively control CSOs. Combined Sewer Overflow Control Policy, 59
Fed. Reg. 18,688 (Apr. 19, 1994).

14

take into account site-specific conditions such as individual
sewer system characteristics, topography, geology, and
rainfall that affect CSO discharge volume, frequency,
duration, intensity, and pollutant loads. See, e.g., id. at
18,691-92.

The D.C. Circuit’s decision requiring that TMDLs be
expressed only on a daily basis directly conflicts with the
CSO Policy. For example, a basic element of the CSO
Policy’s permit provisions is a requirement that permits
issued after LTCP development include “numeric
performance standards for the selected CSO controls, based
on average design conditions.” Id. at 18,696. (Emphasis added).
Further, the CSO Policy’s long term control planning
process requires an evaluation of control alternatives
leading up to the selection of a final control plan:

[T]he long-term CSO control plan [should]
consider a reasonable range of alternatives.
The plan should, for example, evaluate
controls that would be necessary to achieve
zero overflow events per year, an average of
one to three, four to seven, and eight to
twelve overflow events per year.
Alternatively, the long-term plan could
evaluate controls that achieve 100% capture,
90% capture, 85% capture, 80% captuze, and
75% capture for treatment.

Id. at 18,692. Also, the CSO Policy gives CSO communities
the option of developing a LTCP that, when implemented,
provides for (1) no more than an average of four overflow
events per year; (2) elimination or capture for treatment of
no less than 85 percent by volume of the combined sewage;
or (3) elimination or removal of no less than 85 percent of
the mass of pollutants in the combined discharge. Id. at

15

18,692-93. Nationwide, only one half of the documented
LTCPs identify sewer separation as one of the anticipated
CSO control measures to be implemented. More than 200
CSO communities will employ CSO control measures that,
consistent with Congressiona] intent, contemplate some
continued CSO discharges after LTCP implementation. See
CSO Report to Congress at 6-19 and 6-20.

Thus, the control alternatives and options in the CSO
Policy authorize continued CSO discharges following LTCP
implementation provided water quality standards are
attained. None of these alternatives are consistent with the
concept of a 24-hour load because they recognize that in the
case of wet weather-driven discharges such as CSOs, water
quality standards compliance is not dependent on the
amount of pollutants discharged over a 24-hour period.

The D.C. Circuit discounted § 402(q) as “’post-
enactment legislative history’” because it was not part of the
original enactment of the Clean Water Act. Friends of the
Earth, Inc., 446 F.3d at 147 (citation omitted) (App. 11a). In
fact, § 402(q) is not legislative history; rather, it is a part of
the fabric of the Clean Water Act. Moreover, the court’s
interpretation runs directly contrary to this Court’ analysis
in Brown & Williamson, where the Court examined several
statutes governing tobacco products enacted subsequent to
the FDCA in order to determine whether the FDCA
provided authority to regulate tobacco as a “drug.” Brown
& Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 137-38.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit has rejected the interpretation of the term “daily”
adopted by the D.C. Circuit and the notion that TMDLs can
only be expressed in terms of a 24-hour day. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., v. Muszynksi, 268 F.3d 91, 98
(2d Cir. 2001). There, the Second Circuit said:

16

We believe, however, that the term “total
maximum daily load" is susceptible to a
broader range of meanings. Indeed,
NRDC’s overly narrow reading of the
statute loses sight of the overall structure
and purpose of the CWA. The CWA
contemplates the establishment of TMDLs
for an open-ended range of pollutants that
are susceptible to effective regulation by
such means. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(c)
(noting that states must establish TMDLs
for all "pollutants which the Administrator
identifies . . . as suitable for such
calculation"). In the case of each pollutant,
effective regulation requires agencies to
determine how the pollutant enters,
interacts with, and, at a certain level or
under certain conditions, adversely impacts
an affected waterbody. In the case of highly
toxic pollutants that may work harmful
effects upon a _ waterbody almost
immediately when present at small levels,
close regulation at a daily level may be most
appropriate. In the case of other pollutants,
like phosphorus, the amounts waterbodies
can tolerate vary depending upon the
waterbody and the season of the year, while
the harmful consequences of excessive
amounts may not occur immediately. In
short, the CWA's effective enforcement
requires agency analysis and application of
information concerning a broad range of
pollutants. We are not prepared to say
Congress intended that such far-ranging
agency expertise be narrowly confined in

17

application to regulation of pollutant loads
on a Strictly daily basis. Such a reading
strikes us as absurd, especially given that
for some pollutants, effective regulation
may best occur by some other periodic
measure than a diurnal one.

Id. at 98-99. WASA submits that the Second Circuit's
analysis is correct and, unlike the D.C. Circuit’s opinion
below, is consistent with this Court’s rules for statutory
construction.

Il. The D.C. Circuit’s Decision Barring The
Environmental] Protection Agency And The States
From Establishing TMDLs On An Annual,
Seasonal Or Other Appropriate Basis Leads To
Absurd Results As Concluded By The ‘Second
Circuit.

Another basic principle virtually ignored in the D.C.
Circuit’s opinion is that a court must avoid statutory
interpretations that lead to absurdities or unjust results, if
alternate, reasonable interpretations may be found. See
Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 460
(1892). “General terms should be so limited in their
application as not to lead to injustice, oppression, or an
absurd consequence. It will always, therefore, be presumed
that the legislature intended exceptions to its language,
which would avoid results of this character.” United States
v. Kirby, 74 U.S. 482, 486-87 (1869). See Griffin v. Oceanic
Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 575 (1982). (“It is true that
interpretations of a statute which would produce absurd
results are to be avoided if alternative interpretations
consistent with the legislative purpose are available.”) As
explained above, the Second Circuit has already found that

18

a 24-hour interpretation is “absurd.” Muszynski, 268 F.3d at
99.

Here, the D.C. Circuit’s decision leads to the same
absurd and unjust results described by the Second Circuit.
In particular, the decision could result in drastically
different water quality-based requirements for discharges in
the District of Columbia (which is in the D.C. Circuit) from
those originating in adjacent states (which are in the Fourth
Circuit) for the very same water bodies.

Moreover, the decision could lead to dramatically
increased costs for ratepayers, extended and widespread
disruptions, and poorer water quality if it is applied to require
daily load caps on CSO discharges. For example, the
Administrative Record before the lower courts in the
present case demonstrated that, in accordance with the CSO
Policy, WASA identified a number of control alternatives
during the development of its LTCP. Studies conducted in
connection with preparation of the LTCP found that in order
to totally eliminate CSO discharges and thereby achieve a
BOD waste load allocation which imposed a daily load cap,
the combined sewer system would have to be completely
separated. WASA’s LTCP also concluded that complete
separation of the combined sewer system would not be
economically or technically feasible as it would lead, in part,
to the following.

° Disruption — Separation essentially
involves constructing a duplicate
sewer system for the central one
third of the District. Sewer
construction would be necessary in
every neighborhood and in the vast-
majority of streets in each
neighborhood. Disruption
associated with construction would

19

be significant, widespread, and long
lasting...

Impacts to Private Property — the
majority of buildings in_ the
combined sewer area have roof
drains and gutters discharging to the
building sanitary system, which in
turn discharges to the combined
sewer system. Separation on private
property would thus be required.
Past separation experience in the
District and in other cities has
shown that obtaining access and
permission from private property
owners can be difficult, time
consuming, and, in some cases, not
achievable....

Technical Difficulty - Other cities
have discovered some separation
projects to be much more difficult to
construct that [sic] originally
anticipated. In some cases, the
efforts to separate sewer systems
have been abandoned. Part of the
reason for this is that there are many
unknowns involved in working with
sewer systems which have been
constructed over a long period of
time. Records showing the location
and nature of existing facilities may
not exist. Costs and difficulties of
construction can be much greater
than originally anticipated
depending on what is actually

20

discovered. Public opposition to
such a. program may increase as
actual construction proceeds.

JA 529-530; pp. 8-23 to 8-24.

WASA’s LTCP found also that complete separation
of the combined sewer system would provide less water
quality benefit to the Anacostia than the final plan because
separation diverts more water to the storm water system.
The LTCP explains how this, in turn, can adversely affect
water quality.

[T]he separate storm water system delivers
pollutants to the receiving waters
practically every time it rains, thereby
adversely impacting water quality a great
many times per year. With a high degree of
CSO control, the loads is [sic] only delivered
to the receiving water between 2 and 12
times per year (depending on the degree of
control selected). Even though the overall
load may be somewhat higher, CSO
discharges have a more limited impact
because they are occurring far less
frequently than storm water discharges
which occur more than 70 times per average
year.

JA 530; p. 8-24.

Thus, the D.C. Circuit’s interpretation could result in
increased pollutant loadings to the Nation’s waters and
contravene the basic purposes of the Clean Water Act,
which is “to restore and maintain the chemical, physical,
and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters,” 33 U.S.C. §

2)

1251. See, e.g., Comm'’r of Internal Revenue v. Engle, 464 U.S.
206, 217 (1984) (internal citation omitted) (“Our duty then is
‘to find that interpretation which can most fairly be said to
be imbedded in the statute, in the sense of being most
harmonious with its scheme and with the general purposes
that Congress manifested.’”); Chapman v. Houston Welfare
Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 608 (1979) (“As in all cases of
statutory construction, our task is to interpret the words of
[the statute] in light of the purposes Congress sought to
serve.”).

The D.C. Circuit ignored the Administrative Record,
_holding that its own prior decisions for demonstrating an
absurdity apply an “exceptionally high burden.” Friends of
the Earth, Inc. , 446 F.3d at 146 (App. 9a). And, according to
the court, EPA failed to meet that burden because it
conceded that daily loads make sense in some
circumstances. This analysis circumvents this Court’s long-
standing requirement that statutory interpretations should
not result in an absurdity.

Iii. This Case Involves An Important Question of
Federal Law Concerning the Breadth and Scope of
the TMDL Requirement That Has Not Been, But
Should Be, Settled by this Court.

This Court has determined that the Clean Water Act
should be liberally construed in conformance with its
remedial purposes to avoid harsh and incongruous results
and that the complexity of the Clean Water Act militates in
favor of judicial deference to EPA's statutory construction.
See Chem. Mfrg. Ass'n v. NRDC, 470 U.S. 116, 125 (1985);
United States v. Riverside Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 131-134
(1985).

22

The Court has yet to address the issue of what
properly constitutes a valid TMDL. As such, the issue
remains unsettled and the circuits have now created
disparate interpretations in an effort to resolve the issue.
The immediate case presents this Court with an opportunity
to resolve the important federal question of what constitutes
the appropriate measure for a TMDL, which will effect how
each state and EPA will control literally “hundreds of
different pollutants in thousands of different waterbodies”
in the United States. 268 F.3d at 97.

23

CONCLUSION

The D.C. Circuit’s decision that TMDLs must be
expressed only as a quantity of pollutant over a 24-hour day
fails to apply basic principles of statutory construction
required by this Court and is in direct conflict with the
Clean Water Act. If allowed to stand, there will remain an
intercircuit split that could undermine CSO control planning
and implementation to the detriment of water quality.
Therefore, WASA requests that this Court grant WASA‘s
petition and resolve this conflict between the circuits.

Respectfully Submitted,
AVIS MARIE RUSSELL David E. Evans
General Counsel E. Duncan Getchell, Jr.
District of Columbia Water Stewart T. Leeth
and Sewer Authority (Counsel of Record)
5000 Overlook Avenue,S.W. McGuireWoods, LLP
Washington, D.C. 20032 One James Center
901 East Cary Street

Richmond, VA 23219-4030
(804) 775-1000

Counsel for~ District of
Columbia Water and Sewer
Authority

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386016_1222%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
