# Appendix — Skakel v. Connecticut (No. 06-52) > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386016_1162%3A2 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Appendix - **Published:** January 1, 2007 ## Text Suge Co Court, U.S. mn Supreme Court, US. LED Q6-52 JuL12 2006. 06-52 Ui lu 2006 OFFICE OF THE CLERK OFFICE OF THE CLERK No. IN THE Supreme Court of the United States MICHAEL SKAKEL, Petitioner, Vv. STATE OF CONNECTICUT, Respondent. On Petition for a Writ Of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Connecticut APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI THEODORE B. OLSON HUBERT J. SANTOS Counsel of Record Hope C. SEELEY DAVID DEBOLD SANTOS & SEELEY P.C. GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP 51 Russ STREET 1050 CONNECTICUT AVENUE, NW HARTFORD, CT 06106 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036-5306 (860) 249-6548 (202) 955-8500 Counsel for Petitioner Michael Skakel APPENDICES ETS scerasweseneosevonaseooeosovovess la ai iccsrstescnserersveeceserecscesceseesoeseee L58a C Constitutional Provisions .............:ccccecseceseeeeeeeerees 160a Be NOENEINS CHENO DUMTIIIOS......csccsvcesvcocessevessveseevecesees 162a E_ Proceedings Before The Honorable i cccsnnnenconcens 167a F_ Brief of the State of Connecticut- Appellee........... 235a G Motion for Reconsideration, To Reargue And For Reconsideration and Reargument En Banc .... 260a H_ State’s Opposition To The Defendant’s Motion For Reargument and Reconsideration or Reargument and Reconsideration En Banc............ 288a la APPENDIX A Supreme Court of Connecticut. STATE of Connecticut V. Michael SKAKEL. No. 16844. Argued Jan. 14, 2005. Decided Jan. 24, 2006 SULLIVAN, CJ. and KATZ, PALMER, VERTEFEUILLE and ZARELLA, Js. Opinion PALMER, J. On October 31, 1975, fifteen year old Martha Moxley was found bludgeoned to death in a wooded area on the grounds near her family home in Greenwich. No one was charged in connection with her murder until twenty-five years later, when the defendant, Michael Skakel, a fifteen year old neighbor of the victim at the time of her death, was arrested and charged with the crime. The case initially was brought in the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters and, thereafter, transferred to the regular criminal docket of the Superior Court. Thereafter, the case was tned to a jury, which found him guilty of murder in violation of General 2a Statutes (Rev. to 1975) § 53a-54a (a).! The trial court ren- dered judgment in accordance with the jury verdict,2 from which the defendant appealed. On appeal, the defendant claims that: (1) his case improperly was transferred from the docket for juvenile matters to the regular criminal! docket of the Superior Court; (2) his prosecution was time barred by the five year statute of limitations for felonies that was in ef- fect when the victim was murdered in 1975; (3) the state failed to disclosé certain exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), thereby depriving him of his right to a fair trial; (4) the state’s attorney engaged in pervasive misconduct dur- ing closing argument in violation of the defendant’s right to a fair trial; (5) the trial court improperly permitted the state to introduce into evidence the prior sworn testimony of a certain witness in violation of the defendant’s constitutionally pro- tected right of confrontation; and (6) the trial court improp- erly permitted the state to present evidence of several in- criminating statements that the defendant made while a resi- dent at a school for troubled adolescents in Maine. The de- fendant also challenges the propriety of several other eviden- tiary rulings of the trial court. We reject each of the defen- dant’s claims and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court. 1 General Statutes (Rev. to 1975) § 53a-54a provides in relevant part: “(a) A person is guilty of murder when, with intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of such person....” 2 The trial court sentenced the defendant to a term of twenty years to life imprisonment. 3 The defendant appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the — Appellate Court. Because the defendant should have taken his appeal directly to this court; see General Statutes § 51-199(b)(3); his case was transferred to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 65-4. 3a The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. Sometime between 6:30 and 7:30 p.m. on the evening of Thursday, October 30, 1975, the victim left her home on Walsh Lane, located in the Belle Haven section of Green- wich, with a friend, Helen Ix, to play and socialize in and around the neighborhood. It was the night before Halloween, commonly referred to as “mischief night,” an evening when the neighborhood children were known to engage in playful mischief. The victim and Ix soon were accompanied by other friends who lived nearby. Several times that night, the group stopped by the Skakel home, which was located on Otter Rock Drive.4 The first time they did so, the defendant was dining at the Belle Haven Club with his siblings, Rush- ton Skakel, Jr., Julie Skakel, Thomas Skakel, John Skakel, David Skakel and Stephen Skakel, their cousin James Dowdle,> their tutor Kenneth Littleton, and Julie Skakel’s friend Andrea Shakespeare. The Skakel group arrived home from dinner before 9 p.m., at which time the victim and her friends again visited the defendant’s house. Shortly thereafter, the defendant, joined by the victim, Ix and Jeffrey Byrne, a friend of the victim, entered one of the Skakel family vehicles, a Lincoln Continental, which was parked on the Skakels’ side driveway, to talk and listen to music. Thomas Skakel, the defendant’s then seventeen year old brother, soon joined the group. Sometime before 9:30 p.m., the group was interrupted by Rushton Skakel, Jr., and John Skakel, who needed to use the Lincoln Continental to drive Dowdle home, where they planned to watch a televi- sion program scheduled to air at 10 p.m. Consequently, Thomas Skakel, Ix, Byrne and the victim exited the car. As 4 The victim’s home was located on Walsh Lane, diagonally across the street from the defendant’s home, which faced Otter Rock Drive. 5 Dowdle also was known as James Terrien. 4a Ix began to leave the Skakel property with Byrne, she ob- served Thomas Skakel and the victim engaging in flirtatious horse play at the other end of the driveway. Feeling “a bit embarrassed by the flirting,” Ix left to go home.® The victim’s mother, Dorothy Moxley, expected that the . victim would be home that evening by 10:30 or 11 p.m. At about 1:30 or 2 a.m., upon discovering that her daughter had not returned home, she sent the victim’s brother, John Mox- ley, out to look for her. Dorothy Moxley thereafter tele- phoned anyone who she thought might know the victim’s whereabouts, including the defendant’s family, whom Doro- thy Moxley called several times. Dorothy Moxley’s efforts to locate the victim were unsuccessful, and she eventually contacted the Greenwich police department, which dis- patched an officer to the Moxley home. The officer made a missing persons report and briefly searched the surrounding area. The next morning, at about 8:30 a.m., Dorothy Moxley, believing that the victim may have fallen asleep in the Skakel family motor home that usually was parked in the Skakels’ driveway, went to the defendant’s house. The defendant an- swered the door, appearing “hungover” and dressed in jeans - and a T-shirt. The defendant informed Dorothy Moxley that 6 The trial testimony was less than definitive as to whether the defen- dant had accompanied his brothers when they drove Dowdle home or whether he had stayed behind with the victim and the others. For exam- ple, Shakespeare testified that the defendant had stayed behind and did not accompany his brothers to Dowdile’s home that night. Shakespeare, however, was unable to articulate the basis of her recollection and con- ceded that she had no specific memory either of the Lincoln Continental leaving without the defendant or seeing the defendant in the house after the car had departed for Dowdle’s home. Rushton Skakel, Jr., John Skakel and Dowdle all testified that the defendant had accompanied them to Dowdle’s home that evening. Sa the victim was not at his home, and an inspection of the mo- tor home by a Skakel employee confirmed that she was not there either. Later that day, at about noon, a neighborhood friend dis- covered the victim’s dead body under a large pine tree in a wooded area on the Moxley property. The victim was lying facedown, with her pants and panties pulied down around her ankles. Forensic tests revealed that the victim had died from multiple blunt force traumatic head injuries. A large quantity of blood was discovered in two areas in a grassy region ap- proximately seventy feet from the victim’s body, with a dis- tinct drag path leading from the pools of blood to the location where the victim’s body was found. The victim likely was assaulted at or near the farther end of her circular driveway and then dragged approximately eighty feet to the pine tree under which her body subsequently was discovered. Rem- nants of the murder weapon, a Tony Penna six iron golf club, also were found at the crime scene. The head of the golf club and an eight inch section of its shaft were found on the circu- lar driveway, approximately 116 feet from the area where the large accumulation of the victim’s blood was found. Another piece of the shaft was discovered on the grassy area near the two large pools of blood. The remaining part of the shaft at- tached to the club handle never was found. Harold Wayne Carver II, a forensic pathologist and the state’s chief medical examiner, testified regarding the find- ings of the original autopsy performed by then chief medical examiner Elliot M. Gross, also a forensic pathologist. Carver stated that the victim’s injuries appeared consistent with hav- ing been inflicted by a golf club. In addition to the fatal head injuries, the victim had been stabbed in the neck with a piece of the golf club shaft. According to Carver, Gross had used an ultraviolet light to detect the presence of semen on the vic- tim’s pubic region and also had taken vaginal and anal swabs. No semen was found in those areas, however. Noth- 6a ing in the autopsy report indicated that the ultraviolet light had been applied to the victim’s buttocks or to other parts of the victim’s body. With respect to the time of death, Carver testified that the victim had been dead for some time before her body was found. He further opined that the time of death more likely was closer to 9:30 p.m. on October 30, 1975, when she was last seen alive, rather than noon the following day, when her body was discovered. Because the autopsy was conducted twenty-four hours after the discovery of the victim’s body, a more precise time of death could not be as- certained. 7 Henry Lee, a forensic scientist and the former state chief criminalist, reviewed the documents, photographs and physi- cal evidence compiled by the investigators and performed a partial reconstruction of the crime scene. On the basis of his investigation, Lee testified as to the likely nature and se- quence of events leading up to the victim’s death. In particu- lar, he indicated that the golf club that was used to assault and kill the victim probably had broken into pieces from the force with which the victim had been struck. This force, ac- cording to Lee, likely propelled the head of the golf club, and a piece of its shaft, over seventy feet, from the location of the fatal assault to the location inside the circular driveway where those pieces subsequently were discovered. Accord- 7 The evidence revealed that residents in the neighborhood heard a disturbance between 9:30 and 10 p.m. on October 30, 1975, near the Moxley property. Dorothy Moxley testified that, around that time, she heard a commotion coming from the general direction of the area where the victim’s body subsequently was discovered. She recalled hearing dogs barking and what sounded like excited young voices. Ix testified that her dog began to bark incessantly shortly after 9:30 p.m. David Skakel also recalled hearing dogs barking at approximately 10 p.m. that night. 7a ing to Lee, the remaining piece of the golf club shaft then was used as a sharp weapon to stab the victim. Lee further testified that, in light of the amount of blood found on the inside of the victim’s jeans and panties, those garments likely were pulled down before the assault occurred. Lee also stated that the absence of vertical blood drippings on the vic- tim’s shoes and jeans indicated that the victim was lying on the ground when the perpetrator inflicted the injuries to her head and neck. James Lunney, a detective with the Greenwich police department in 1975, testified that, on the day that the victim’s body was discovered, he briefly visited the defendant’s home and noticed a barrel containing several items, including golf clubs, in a hallway near the rear of the home. Lunney testi- fied that one of the golf clubs, a Tony Penna four iron, later was seized from the property with the written consent of the defendant’s father. Thomas G. Keegan, a captain in the de- tective division of the Greenwich police department in 1975, testified that an examination of thé seized golf club and the golf club parts found at the crime scene revealed that the murder weapon came from the defendant’s home.® In the days and months following the victim’s murder, the Greenwich police conducted numerous interviews in fur- therance of its criminal investigation into the victim’s death. 8 The seized golf club had two labels affixed to the shaft just below the handle of the grip. One label, from the Greenwich Country Club, indi- cated that the club had belonged to “Mrs. R.W. Skakel” of “Greenwich, ~ Conn.,” the defendant’s deceased mother. Keegan testified that, along with the visible similarities between the murder weapon and the club seized from the Skakel home, namely, the brand and the make, a crimi- nalist’s examination of the murder weapon and the seized club revealed that the markings on the heads of the clubs were consistent with the two clubs previously having come in contact with one another. 8a The defendant and his siblings were among those interviewed in the early stages of that investigation. On November 15, 1975, the defendant, who was accompanied by his father, gave a tape-recorded interview to the Greenwich police at the police station. Responding to inquiries concerning his whereabouts on the night of the murder, the defendant ex- plained that he had accompanied his brothers and Dowdle to Dowdle’s home, which was about twenty minutes away, and watched the television show “Monty Python’s Flying Cir- cus.” According to the defendant, he returned to his home around 10:30 or 11 p.m.,? and went to bed about fifteen min- utes later. When asked specifically about whether he left the house after he went to his bedroom that night, the defendant responded, “no.” The defendant acknowledged, however, that, on other occasions, he had left his home after ostensibly retiring to his room for the night. In 1977, two years following the victim’s murder, the defendant revealed certain feelings of guilt and remorse to Larry Zicarelli, who then was employed by the defendant’s family as a driver and general handyman. While being driven by Zicarelli to an appointment in New York City, the defendant, distraught from an earlier altercation with his fa- ther, told Zicarelli that he “had done something very bad” and that he “either had to kill himself or get out of the coun- try.” On another occasion, Zicarelli and the defendant were stopped in traffic on the Triborough Bridge in New York on their way home when the defendant “opened the [car] door, started to jump out of the car and ran to the side ... of the 9 Dowdle and oe Skakel, Jr., corroborated the defendant’s state- ment that he had spent part of that evening at Dowdle’s home watching television. Shakespeare, however, recalled seeing the defendant at his home after Dowdle and Rushton Skakel, Jr., departed for Dowdle’s home in the Lincoln Continental. 9a bridge.” Zicarelli ran after the defendant and forced him back into the car. As Zicarelli was proceeding to the driver’s side door, the defendant again exited the car and ran toward the other side of the bridge. Zicarelli once again hurried to- ward the defendant and forced him back into the car. Just before Zicarelli and the defendant arrived at the Skakel home, Zicarelli asked the defendant, “[W]hy would [you] want to do what [you were] trying to do?” The defendant responded that, “if [you] knew what [I] had done, [you] would never talk to [me] again.”!© Immediately following this incident, Zicarelli terminated his employment with the Skakels.!! From 1978 to 1980, the defendant was a resident at the Elan School, a residential facility for troubled adolescents located in Poland Springs, Maine. Several former Elan resi- dents testified about the deplorable conditions at the institu- tion, which employed a behavioral modification approach predicated on controversial techniques of intimidation, con- frontation and humiliation of its residents. As a result, Elan 10 On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Zicarelli whether he was aware that, on the night before this incident, the defendant “had slept in his dead mother’s dress and felt bad about it ....” Zicarelli responded that he had been unaware of any such incident. Julie Skakel testified that the defendant had contemplated jumping off the Triborough Bridge be- cause he felt guilty about having slept in his deceased mother’s dress. 11 The state also introduced the testimony of Matthew Tucharoni, who stated that, in the spring of 1976, the defendant, accompanied by Rushton Skakel, Jr., and Julie Skakel, came to the barbershop in Greenwich where Tucharoni then was employed and inquired about a haircut. Tucharoni testified that while he was preparing to cut the defendant’s hair, he over- heard the defendant say, “I am going to kill him.” According to Tu- charoni, Julie Skakel responded, “you can’t do that,” and the defendant replied, “Why not? I did it before....” 10a residents regularly endured mental and physical abuse at the hands of their peers and Elan staff members. While a resident at Elan, the defendant frequently was confronted and interro- gated about his involvement in the victim’s murder. For ex- ample, Charles Seigen, who was enrolled at Elan with the defendant from 1978 to 1979, testified that he recalled at- tending two or three group therapy sessions, supervised by a staff member and typically attended by eight residents, dur- ing which the defendant was confronted about the victim’s murder. According to Scigen, the defendant sometimes re- sponded to such probing with annoyance. On other occa- sions, however, the defendant became very upset, cried and stated that he did not know if he had done it. The defendant also stated in these group sessions that, on the night of the victim’s murder, he was “blind drunk” and “stumbling.” !2 12 Seigen also described the nature of the “general meetings” at Elan, which were convened to confront residents about specific issues. Accord- ing to Seigen, “[a] general meeting was probably the scariest word that you would hear when you were at Elan.” A typical general meeting, which was attended by 100 or more Elan residents and staff, focused on one or two residents who were singled out for violating Elan rules. Sei- gen recalled that the defendant was the subject of a general meeting as a result of his failed attempt to run away from the facility. Seigen stated that he first learned of the defendant’s possible involvement in the vic- tim’s murder when it was announced at a general meeting by Joseph Ricci, Elan’s executive director. Elizabeth Arnold, another former Elan resident, testified that, at that particular genera] meeting, which lasted approximately three hours, Ricci continuously had confronted the defen- dant about various issues and that four or five Elan residents “brutalized” the defendant in a boxing ring. Other former residents of Elan also testi- fied about the details of the torment that the defendant had endured at this meeting, including accusations leveled against the defendant that he had killed the victim. The defendant’s initial response to this interrogation [Footnote continued on next page] lla Dorothy Rogers, another former resident of Elan, testi- fied that, on one occasion, when she and the defendant were talking at an Elan social function, the defendant told her that he had been drinking on the night of the murder and that he could not recall whether he was involved in the victim’s death. The defendant further explained to Rogers that his family had enrolled him at Elan because they feared that he may have murdered the victim and wanted him in a location far removed from the investigating officers. Gregory Cole- man, a resident at Elan from 1978 to 1980, testified about an exchange that he had had with the defendant while Coleman stood “guard” over the defendant following the defendant’s failed escape attempt from Elan. During this conversation, the defendant confided in Coleman about murdering a girl who had rejected his advances. According to Coleman, the defendant had admitted killing the girl with a golf club in a wooded area, that the force with which he had hit her had caused the golf club to break in half, and that he had returned to the body two days later and masturbated on it. John Hig- gins, another former resident of Elan, recounted certain emo- tional admissions that the defendant had made to him while the two were on guard duty one night on the porch of the men’s dormitory at Elan. In particular, Higgins testified that the defendant had told him that, on the night of the murder, there was a “party of some kind or another” at the defen- {Footnote continued from previous page] was to deny his involvement in the murder. After several rounds in the boxing ring, however, the defendant stated, “I don’t know” or “I don’t remember” in response to questioning regarding his involvement in the murder. During the course of his enrollment at Elan, the defendant also was forced to wear a large cardboard sign around his neck, another form of punishment at Elan. The sign read, “Confront me on why I murdered Martha Moxley,” or words to that effect. 12a dant’s home. The defendant also told Higgins that he re- membered rummaging through his garage looking for a golf club, running through the woods with the club and seeing pine trees. Higgins further stated that, as the conversation continued, the defendant’s acknowledgment of his culpability in the victim’s murder progressed from “he didn’t know whether he did it” to “he may have done it” to “he must have done it,” and finally to “TI did it.” Elizabeth Amold and Alice Dunn, both of whom had at- tended Elan during the defendant’s stay at the facility, also testified about certain inculpatory statements that the defen- dant had made to them. Both testified that the defendant had expressed uncertainty as to whether he or his brother had murdered the victim. Amold also recalled a group therapy session in which the defendant, upon being questioned about the victim’s murder, stated that “[h]e was very drunk and had some sort of a blackout” that night, that his brother had “fool[ed] around” with his “girlfriend,” and that his brother had stolen her from him. Dunn, who graduated from Elan in 1978 and subsequently became a staff member there, testified that while she was employed at Elan, the defendant stated that he was not in “his normal state” on the night of the mur- der. Thereafter, in the summer of 1987, the defendant told Michael Meredith, a former Elan resident who was staying temporarily in the defendant’s home, that, on the night of the victim’s murder, he had climbed a tree on the Moxley prop- erty and masturbated in the tree while watching the victim through her window. According to Meredith, he first learned of the victim’s murder in this conversation. The defendant also told Meredith that while he was in the tree, he saw his brother Thomas Skakel walk across the Moxley property to- ward the victim’s home but that Thomas Skakel had not seen him in the tree. The defendant related a similar story to An- drew Pugh, a close childhood friend, when the two saw one 13a another in 1991. The defendant had expressed a desire to renew their friendship, which gradually had faded following the victim’s murder. In an effort to ease Pugh’s concerns about the defendant’s involvement in the victim’s death, the defendant assured Pugh that he did not kill the victim but mentioned that he had masturbated in a tree on the night that she was murdered. Pugh understood that the tree to which the defendant referred was the tree under which the victim’s body was discovered. The most descriptive account of the defendant’s activi- ties on the night of the murder came in 1997 from an taped- recorded conversation between the defendant and Richard Hoffman, a writer who was collaborating with the defendant on a book about the defendant’s life. On that tape, the defen- dant explained to Hoffman that, earlier in the evening of the victim’s murder, he had invited the victim, who was seated with the defendant in his father’s car, to accompany him to his cousin’s house to watch the Monty Python Flying Circus television show. The victim declined the invitation because of her curfew, and the two instead made plans to go “trick or treating” the next night. The defendant thereafter left for Dowdle’s home with his brothers Rushton Skakel, Jr., and John Skakel, as well as Dowdle. The defendant told Hoffman that, after returning to his own home from Dowdle’s house, he had walked through the house in search of various people. Upon observing that the door to his sister’s room was closed, he had “remember{ed] that [his sister’s friend, Shakespeare] had gone home ....” He then indicated that he had gone into “the master bedroom {but] there was nobody there, the [television] was on but no- body was there.” The defendant went upstairs to bed shortly thereafter, but he became “horny” and decided to spy on a “lady” who lived on Walsh Lane. The defendant then “snuck out” of his house and went to this person’s home, hoping to see her through her window. Unsuccessful in that endeavor, 14a he thought, “[f]uck this ... Martha likes me, I’l] go, Ill go get a kiss from Martha.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The defendant then proceeded to the victim’s home, climbed a tree near the victim’s front door and masturbated in the tree for about thirty seconds. Shortly thereafter, “a moment of clarity came into [his] head,” and the defendant climbed down from the tree and walked back home. On his way home, he threw rocks into the dark, repeatedly yelling, “Who’s in there?” He and his friends previously had done this while shooting BB guns into the dark. The next morn- ing, the defendant awoke to “[Dorothy} Moxley saying ‘Mi- chaei ... have you seen Martha?’” The defendant thought to himself, “Oh my God, did they see me last night?” At that moment, the defendant told Hoffman, he “rememberj[ed] just having a feeling of panic.” The state also adduced evidence establishing that the de- fendant, who was infatuated with the victim, had grown re- sentful of her flirtatious friendship with his older brother Thomas Skakel, whom he considered his nemesis. According to Pugh, who in 1975 was friendly with the victim and the defendant, the defendant had “told [him] that he liked Martha quite a bit and had a crush on her.” Pugh also testified that the defendant had told him that “he would have liked to have a relationship with her.” Pugh testified that he had observed the defendant and the victim engage in “horseplay, rough- housing, fooling around ... [and] kissing one time in the [Skakel family motor home].” With respect to Thomas Skakel’s relationship with the victim, Jacqueline Wettenhall O’Hara, a neighborhood friend of the victim, recounted ob- serving flirtatious conduct between the victim and Thomas Skakel in the months leading up to the victim’s death. En- tries recorded in the victim’s diary in the two months preced- ing her murder disclosed the victim’s fnendship with the de- fendant and Thomas Skakel, and also revealed the sometimes 15a flirtatious nature of her relationship with Thomas Skakel.!3 In addition, Ix testified that she had observed the victim and Thomas Skakel engaging in flirtatious horseplay the last time she saw the victim alive. Moreover, one of the sneakers that the victim was wearing when her body was recovered had the name “Tom” written on it. The defendant raised an alibi defense at trial. In particu- lar, he claimed that the victim had been murdered at ap- 13° For example, the victim made an entry in her diary on September 12, 1975, in which she stated that, while she was out driving in Thomas Skakel’s car with several other teenagers, including the defendant, “I drove a little then ... | was practically sitting on [Thomas Skakel’s] lap [be]cause I was only steering. He kept putting his hand on my knee.... {T}jhen we went to Friendly’s [restaurant and] Michael [the defendant} treated me [and] he got me a double but I only wanted a single so I threw the top scoop out the window. Then I was driving again [and Thomas Skakel] put his arm around me. He kept doing stuff like that.” A diary entry from September 19, 1975, recounted the victim’s activities with other neighborhood friends that day. In that entry, the victim stated that “Michael was so totally out of it that he was being a real asshole in his actions [and] words. He kept telling me that I was leading [Thomas Skakel) on when I don’t like him (except as a friend) [and] | said, well how about you [and] Jeckie. You keep telling me that you don’t like her {and} you are all over her.... Michael jumps to conclusions. | can’t be friends [with Thomas Skakel] just because I talk to him, it doesn’t mean I like him.” In a subsequent entry, dated October 4, 1975, the victim de- scribes events that had occurred at a school dance and at a party after the dance at a neighbor’s home. The entry included the following: “After- wards | went to Mouakaud’s for a party! I saw everybody. [Thomas Skakel] was being an ass. At the dance he kept putting his arms around me [and] making moves.” l6a proximately 10 p.m. on October 30, 1975,!4 and that he was at Dowdle’s home, some twenty minutes away from the mur- der scene, at that time. The defendant also raised a third party culpability defense, pointing to Littleton as a likely perpetrator of the victim’s murder. In fact, Littleton, who had been hired as a parttime tutor by the Skakel family, had taken up residence at the Skakel home on October 30, 1975, the day that the victim was last seen alive, and had slept there with the Skakel children that night. Littleton testified that, after returning home from dinner at 9 p.m., he remained at the house all night, stepping outside briefly at approximately 9:30 p.m. only to investigate a disturbance.'> In addition, testimony adduced by the defendant revealed that Littleton, who began to manifest serious psychiatric and behavioral problems in the years following the murder, may have made a statement, several years after the killing, in which he impli- cated himself in the crime. Littleton emphatically denied that he had had anything to do with the victim’s death, however. — At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found the defen- dant guilty of murder. The trial court denied the defendant’s posttrial motions and, thereafter, sentenced the defendant to a period of incarceration of twenty years to life imprisonment. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary. 14 Defense counsel adduced testimony from Joseph Alexander Jachimczyk, a forensic pathologist from Houston, Texas, who concluded that the time of the victim’s death most likely was around 10 p.m. on Oc- tober 30, 1975. Jachimczyk’s testimony was bolstered by the testimony of several people, including Dorothy Moxley, Ix and David Skakel, tha: they had heard dogs barking in the vicinity of the crime scene at ap. proximately that time. See footnote 7 of this opinion. 15 According to Littleton, he was unable to discern the cause of the dis turbance. 17a I We first address the defendant’s claim that the court, Dennis, J. (juvenile court), improperly transferred fis case from the docket for juvenile matters to the regular criminal docket of the Superior Court. Specifically, the defendant claims that the juvenile court improperly: (1) failed to re- quire a complete investigation into the defendant’s personal history and background in accordance with General Statutes (Rev. to 1975) §§ 17-60a!® and 17-66,!7 which, at all times 16 General Statutes (Rev. to 1975) § 17-60a provides: “The juvenile court shall have the authority to transfer to the jurisdiction of the superior court any child referred to it for the commission of a murder, provided any such murder was committed after such child attained the age of four- teen years. No such transfer shall be valid unless prior thereto the court has caused a complete investigation to be made as provided in section 17- 66 and has found, after a hearing, that there is reasonable cause to believe that (1) the child has committed the act for which he is charged and (2) there is no state institution designed for the care and treatment of children to which said court may commit such child which is suitable for his care or treatment or (3) the safety of the community requires that the child continue under restraint for a period extending beyond his majority and (4) the facilities of the superior court provide a more effective setting for disposition of the case and the institutions to which said court may sen- tence a defendant are more suitable for the care or treatment of such child.” Hereinafter, all references to § 17-60a in this opinion are to the 1975 revi- sion. 17 General Statutes (Rev. to 1975) § 17-66 provides: “Prior to the dis- position of the case of any child found to be delinquent, investigation shall be made of the facts as herein specified by the probation officer, and until such investigation has been completed and the results thereof placed before the judge, no disposition of the child’s case shall be made. Such [Footnote continued on next page] 18a relevant to this appeal, governed the transfer of a juvenile matter to the regular criminal docket of the Superior Court; (2) relied on the current regulations of the department of children and families (department) in concluding that there was no State institution suitable for the care and treatment of the defendant within the meaning of § 17-60a(2); and (3) failed to explore the existence of facilities outside the state suitable for the care and treatment of the defendant. We re- ject the defendant’s claim that the juvenile court improperly transferred his case to the regular criminal docket of the Su- perior Court. !8 The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this claim. Because the defendant was fifteen years old at the time of the offense, he initially was charged as a delinquent in the Superior Court for Juvenile [Footnote continued from previous page] investigation shall consist of an examination of the parentage and sur- roundings of the child, his age, habits, and history, and shall include also an inquiry into the home conditions, habits and character of his parents or guardians. Where a child is or legally should be in attendance at school, it shall further contain a report of the child’s school adjustment, which shall be furnished by the school officials to the court upon its request. The court shall, when it is found necessary to the disposition, cause a complete physical or mental examination, or both, to be made of the child by persons professionally qualified to do so.” Hereinafter, all references to § 17-66 in this opinion are to the 1975 revi- sion. 18 The state contends that the defendant is not entitled to appellate re- view of these claims because he failed to raise them in the juvenile court. We reject the state’s contention because our review of the proceedings in the juvenile court indicates that these claims were raised, with adequate specificity, in that court. 19a Matters. The state subsequently filed a motion under § 17- 60a to transfer the defendant’s case to the regular crimmal docket. The juvenile court thereafter conducted’a hearing to determine whether, pursuant to § 17-60a, there was reason- able cause to believe that the defendant had committed the murder with which he had been charged. Following the presentation of evidence on that issue, the juvenile court con- cluded that there was reasonable cause to believe that the de- fendant had committed that offense.19 The juvenile court also issued an order pursuant to § 17-60a directing that an investigation be conducted in accordance with § 17-66. After the investigation was complete, the juvenile court reconvened the defendant’s statutorily mandated transfer hearing for the purpose of addressing the remaining elements of § 17-60a. At the hearing, the parties elicited testimony from the supervisor of juvenile probation, Joseph Pacquin, who had been assigned to conduct the investigation required by § 17-60a. Pacquin acknowledged that his investigation had focused primarily on the possible availability of a state facility that would be suitable for the defendant, and not on the defendant’s personal, family and educational background. See General Statutes (Rev. to 1975) § 17-66. Pacquin gave several reasons for failing to investigate the defendant’s per- sonal history and family background, notwithstanding the dictates of § 17-66, including the fact that the defendant was forty years of age at the time of the transfer hearing. With specific regard to the defendant’s education, Pacquin testified that he had not looked into that facet of the defendant’s back- ground because § 17-66 does not require such a review unless the child is or legally should be attending school. Ad- ditionally, Pacquin testified that he had not sought a physical 19 The defendant does not challenge the juvenile court’s reasonable cause finding on appeal. 20a or mental examination of the defendant because the court had not ordered such an examination to be conducted pursuant to § 17-66. With respect to possible residential and treatment alternatives, Pacquin testified that the department is the state agency solely responsible for the detention and treatment of juveniles, and that the department cannot lawfully accept for placement persons over the age of eighteen. Pacquin’s testi- mony in this regard was consistent with the testimony of Ju- dith Kallen, a program director employed by the department, who testified at the defendant’s reasonable cause hearing that department regulations prohibited the commitment or place- ment of individuals over the age of cighteen into the care and ~ custody of the department. In support of his objection to the state’s motion to trans- fer, defense counsel adduced testimony from Clinton Rob- erts, a former state probation officer and president of Alterna- tive Sentencing Consultants, Inc., a private sentencing con- sulting firm. Roberts indicated that, contrary to the testi- mony of Pacquin, there is a private, nonprofit facility located in Newtown that admits both juveniles and adults, and that the Newtown facility might serve the residential treatment needs of the defendant. On cross-examination, however, Roberts conceded that the facility operated primarily as a substance abuse treatment center, and he could not say whether the facility was appropriate for the defendant. De- fense counsel also elicited testimony that the state juvenile justice system occasionally places juveniles in programs lo- cated in other states, but that these placements are reserved for juveniles with special needs that cannot be met in pro- grams located within the state. In a memorandum of decision issued after the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court noted that, under the par- ticular circumstances presented, the provisions of § 17-66 “are not totally applicable ....” The court further observed that department regulations prohibit the placement with the 2la department of anyone over the age of eighteen. The court also noted that, although General Statutes (Rev. to 1975) § 17-68(c)2° provides for the commitment of a child directly to a hospital or other appropriate institution if the child is de- termined to be mentally ill, the issue of mental illness never was raised at any time by the defendant, and the record oth- erwise was devoid of any indication that the defendant suf- fered from any such illness. The court thereafter concluded that “there [was] no available or suitable state institution de- signed for the care and treatment of children to which the ju- venile court could commit the ... forty year old [defendant] that would be suitable for his care and treatment, should he be adjudicated delinquent for the murder of [the victim],” and that “the facilities of the adult criminal division of the Supe- rior Court afford[ed] and provide[ed] a more effective setting for the disposition of this case, and the institutions to which the adult criminal division of the Superior Court may sen- tence a defendant [were] more suitable for the care and treatment of this [defendant], should he be found guilty of the murder of [the victim].” Accordingly, the juvenile court transferred the case to the regular criminal docket.2! 20 General Statutes (Rev. to 1975) § 17-68 provides in relevant part: “(c) Any child coming within the jurisdiction of the court, who is found to be mentally ill, may be committed by said court to a hospital or other institution empowered by law to treat mentally ill children; and, if the court adjudges a child to be delinquent and finds him to be mentally defi- cient, it may commit him to an institution for mentally deficient children or defective delinquents....” Hereinafter, all references to § 17-68 in this opinion are to the 1975 revi- sion. 21 We note that the defendant filed an interlocutory appeal to the Appel- late Court from the transfer order of the juvenile court, and we transferred the case to this court upon the joint motion of the parties. On appeal, we [Footnote continued on next page] 22a Before addressing the defendant’s claims, we set forth the legal principles that govern our resolution of those claims. “There is no dispute that adjudication as a juvenile rather than prosecution as an adult carries significant bene- fits, chief among which are a determination of delinquency rather than criminality ... confidentiality ... limitations with respect to sentencing ... erasure of files ... and isolation from the adult criminal population.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Angel C., 24S Conn. 93, 103, 715 A.2d 652 (1998). Accord- ingly, “a juvenile in whom a liberty interest in his or her ju- venile status has vested, has a substantial liberty interest in the continuation of that juvenile status and that the juvenile cannot and should not be deprived of that status without [proper] procedural protections ....” J/d.; see also Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 557, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84 (1966) (juvenile court’s failure to conduct full investiga- tion, as required by statute, prior to juvenile’s transfer to regular criminal docket resulted in deprivation of liberty without due process of law). Importantly, however, “[a]ny [special treatment] accorded to a juvenile because of his [or her] age with respect to proceedings relative to a criminal offense results from statutory authority, rather than from any inherent or constitutional right.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Angel C., supra, at 104, 715 A.2d 652. Ac- cordingly, in the present matter, to the extent that the defen- dant possesses a liberty interest in his juvenile status, that interest derives from, and is limited by, the statutory provi- {Footnote continued from previous page] agreed with the state that the order of the juvenile court transferring the case to the regular criminal docket was not a final appealable judgment; In re Michael S., 258 Conn. 621, 631, 784 A.2d 317 (2001); and, there- fore, we dismissed the appeal. /d. 23a sions governing the transfer, adjudication and commitment of juveniles. We turn next to the relevant statutory provisions. Under the statutory scheme in effect in 1975,22 the juvenile court had original and exclusive jurisdiction “over all proceedings concerning uncared-for, neglected, dependent and delinquent children within this state ....” General Statutes (Rev. to 1975) § 17-59. Statutes governing the authority and proceedings of the juvenile court define a “child” as “any person under six- teen years of age,” who may be found “delinquent” by the court if, inter alia, the child “has violated any federal or state law or municipal or local ordinance ....”. General Statutes (Rev. to 1975) § 17-53. With respect to a child who has been referred to the juvenile court because that child allegedly had committed the crime of murder, § 17-60a authorizes the court to transfer the child to the regular criminal docket of the Su- perior Court provided that the child was at least fourteen _ years of age when the murder was committed. Such a transfer is not permitted by § 17-60a, however, unless an investiga- tion of the child’s personal and family background has been completed in accordance with § 17-66, and the juvenile court has determined, after a hearing, that there is reasonable cause to believe that: (1) the child has committed the crime charged; (2) there is no available state institution designed for the care and treatment of children that would be suitable for the child, or community safety requires that the child be detained in a custodial setting for a period extending beyond majority age; and (3) the facilities of the Superior Court pro- vide a more effective setting for disposition of the case and 22 As we previously have explained, the juvenile court applied the law in effect at the time of the commission of the offense. See, e.g., In re Daniel H., 237 Conn. 364, 377, 678 A.2d 462 (1996). That determination has not been challenged by either party to this appeal. 24a the adult institutions to which the child may be sentenced are more appropriate for his or her care or treatment. With re- spect to the mandated investigation, General Statutes (Rev. to 1975) § 17-66 mandates that the required investigation in- clude an examination of “the parentage and surroundings of the child, his age, habits, and history, and ... also an inquiry into the home conditions, habits and character of his parents or guardians.”23 The defendant first claims that his transfer from the docket for juvenile matters to the regular criminal docket was improper because Pacquin did not conduct a complete inves- tigation into the defendant’s personal and family background as required by §§ 17-60a and 17-66. We agree with the de- fendani that Pacquin’s investigation did not satisfy the re- quirements of § 17-66, and that, normally, a failure to meet those requirements wuld render invalid the transfer of any case from juvenile court to the regular criminal docket pursu- ant to § 17-60a. It also is clear, however, that a § 17-66 in- vestigation is mandated by § 17-60a solely for the purpose of assisting the juvenile court in its determination of whether, under the circumstances, there exists a suitable state institu- tion to which the child may be committed in preference to the facilities otherwise available for the treatment and punish- ment of adult offenders. In the present case, however, testi- mony adduced at the transfer hearing established that the age of the then forty year old defendant foreclosed his adjudica- tion in juvenile court because the department was prohibited by state regulations24 from accepting for placement anyone over the age of eighteen, regardless of whether such place- 23 Section 17-66 identifies other potential areas of investigation. See footnote 17 of this opinion. Those other areas, however, are not impli- “cated by this appeal. 24 See Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 17a-145-48(e). 25a ment would involve a custodial or noncustodial setting. Thus, the juvenile court necessarily would have concluded, irrespective of the results of a complete investigation in ac- cordance with § 17-66, that the defendant’s age mandated the transfer of his case to the regular criminal docket. Conse- quently, Pacquin’s failure to complete the investigation con- templated by § 17-66, and the juvenile court’s failure to con- sider facts that might have been brought to light upon the completion of that investigation, had no bearing on that court’s ultimate decision under § 17-60a to transfer the de- fendant’s case to the regular criminal docket.2> The defendant next claims that the juvenile court im- properly relied on regulations of the department that were in effect at the time of the transfer hearing in concluding that 25 For the first time on appeal, the defendant claims that, if a complete § 17-66 investigation had been performed, the juvenile court might have concluded that the defendant suffers or suffered from a mental illness or deficiency and, on that basis, the juvenile court reasonably might have committed the defendant to a mental health facility pursuant to § 17- 68(c). See footnote 20 of this opinion. We are not persuaded by this con- tention. First, at no time during the transfer stage of the proceedings in juvenile court did the defendant ever claim that he was mentally ill or deficient, and he never challenged the express finding of the juvenile court that there was nothing in the record to suggest that a mental health commitment was warranted. Second, the defendant concedes that the juvenile court could not have ordered him to undergo a physical or mental evaluation because the court was barred from doing so by Practice Book, 1963, § 1125(2) (Cum.Sup. 1974) (effective July 1, 1974), which pro- vides that, subject to certain exceptions not applicable to the present case, “[nJo such examination ... shall be made of any child denying responsibil- ity for [his or her allegedly] delinquent behavior ....” In such circum- stances, the defendant’s belated attempt to raise the possibility of a com- mitment under § 1 7-68(c) is unavailing. 26a there was no state institution suitable for his care and treat- ment. In particular, the defendant claims that the juvenile court’s reliance on the regulations prohibiting the placement with the department of anyone over the age of eighteen thwarts the will of the legislature as expressed in the statutory scheme that was in effect in 1975, because that age limitation on placements with the department was not a part of the statutory scheme at that time. General Statutes (Rev. to 1975) § 17-60a provides in relevant part that no transfer shall be valid unless the juvenile court finds that “there is no state institution designed for the care and treatment of children to which [the] court may commit such child which is suitable for his care or treatment ....” (Emphasis added.) We agree with the juvenile court that this statutory provision “narrowly focus[es] on the availabil- ity and suitability of state institutions ‘designed for the care and treatment of children’ to which the juvenile court has authority to ‘commit such child.’” (Emphasis added.) Thus, under § 17-60a, the commitment alternatives available to the juvenile court are those alternatives available at the time of the transfer hearing.26 Because the juvenile court properly considered those commitment options, and not the commit- ment options that might have been available in 1975, the de- fendant’s claim must fail. We also disagree with the defendant’s final claim, namely, that the juvenile court improperly failed to explore the suitability of placing the defendant in an out-cf-state in- stitution. Under General Statutes (Rev. to 1975) § 17-420, 26 We note, moreover, that, in 1975, the legislature necessarily contem- plated that the department would adopt and enforce regulations for the purpose of effectuating the statutory scheme relating to children because the legislature expressly had authorized the department to do so. See Gen- eral Statutes (Rev. to 1975) § 17-415(b). 27a the commissioner of children and families (commissioner) may transfer “any person committed, admitted or transferred to the department ... to any private agency or organization within or without the state under contract with the depart- ment,” provided that certain conditions are satisfied. Thus, a necessary prerequisite to the out-of-state transfer of a juve- nile found to be delinquent is that the juvenile first must be “committed, admitted or transferred” to the care and custody of the department. As the trial court properly determined, however, under state law, no person over the age of eighteen may be committed to the care and custody of the department. Because the defendant could not be placed with the depart- ment, he could not be transferred by the commissioner to an out-of-state institution and, accordingly, the juvenile court properly declined to explore out-of-state placement alterna- tives for the defendant. For the foregoing reasons, the defendant has failed to es- tablish that the juvenile court improperly transferred his case to the regular criminal docket. Because that transfer was proper, the state’s prosecution of the defendant as an adult was lawful. il The defendant next claims that the trial court improperly concluded that his prosecution for murder was not barred by the applicable statute of limitations. We disagree, albeit on the basis of an analysis that differs from that of the trial court. The following factual and procedural background is nec- essary to our resolution of this claim. The defendant was ar- rested on January 19, 2000, for the October, 1975, murder of the victim and, as we have explained; see part I of this opin- ion; his case was transferred from the docket for juvenile matters to the regular criminal docket. Prior to trial, the de- fendant filed a motion to dismiss the information on the ground that his prosecution for murder was barred by the five 28a year limitation period of General Statutes (Rev. to 1975) § 54-193,27 the statute of limitations that was in effect at the time of the victim’s murder. The trial court, Kavanewsky, J., denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss, concluding that the five year limitation period of § 54-193, although facially ap- plicable to all felonies, including murder and all other class A felonies, was inapplicable to the crime of murder.2® The trial court acknowledged that § 54-193 contains no express excep- tion for murder and that this court, in State v. Paradise, 189 Conn. 346, 350, 456 A.2d 305 (1983), had concluded that the 1976 amendment to § 54-193; Public Acts 1976, No. 76-35, 27 General Statutes (Rev. to 1975) § 54-193 provides: “No person shall be prosecuted for treason against this state, or for any crime or misde- meanor of which the punishment is or may be imprisonment in the Con- necticut Correctional Institution, Somers, except within five years next after the offense has been committed; nor shall any person be prosecuted for the violation of any penal law, or for other crime or misdemeanor, except crimes punishable by death or imprisonment in the Connecticut Correctional Institution, Somers, but within one year next after the of- fense has been committed; but, if the person, against whom an indict- ment, information or complaint for any of said offenses is brought, has fled from and resided et of this state, during the period so limited, it may be brought against bis» at any time, within such period, during which he resides in this stat, after the commission of the offense; and, when any suit, indictment, ‘feriation or complaint for any crime may be brought within any other time than is limited by this section, it shall be brought within such time.” Hereinafter, all references to § 54-193 are to the 1975 revision unless otherwise indicated. 28 The defendant filed a similar motion while his case was pending in the juvenile court. The juvenile court, however, concluded that the de- fendant’s motion was premature because § 54-193 applies to prosecutions under the regular criminal docket of the Superior Court. 29a § 1 (P.A. 76-35); which excepted all class A felonies, includ- ing murder, from the purview of § 54- 193, did not apply ret- roactively to offenses committed prior to April 6, 1976, the effective date of P.A. 76-35. The trial court further recog- nized that, in Paradise, we ultimately had determined, on facts materially identical to the facts of the present case, that the prosecution of the defendants for murder in that case was barred by the five year limitation period of the pre-1976 amendment version of § 54-193, the same version of § 54- 193 that was in effect at the time of the murder of the victim in the present case. The trial court explained, however, that our determination in Paradise must be considered in light of two subsequent cases, State v. Ellis, 197 Conn. 436, 460, 497 A.2d 974 (1985),29 and State v. Golino, 201 Conn. 435, 438- 39, 518 A.2d 57 (1986), the holdings and rationale of which, in the trial court’s view, lead to the conclusion that the five year limitation period of the pre-1976 amendment version of 29 The defendants in Ellis were Brian Ellis and Wilmer Paradise, the same defendants who, in State v. Paradise, supra, 189 Conn. 346, 456 A.2d 305, successfully had defended the trial court’s dismissal of the murder charges that had been lodged against them. /d., «t 347, 456 A.2d 305; see State v. Ellis, supra, 197 Conn. at 438, 497 A.2d 974. The ap- peal in Ellis followed the decision by the state, after our decision in Paradise, to charge Ellis and Paradise with capital felony arising out of the same murder that had been the subject of the appeal in Paradise. Fol- lowing the trial court’s dismissal of the capital felony charges against Ellis and Paradise, the state appealed, and we reversed the judgment of the trial court, concluding, inter alia, that the prosecution of Ellis and Paradise was not barred by the five year limitation period of the pre-1976 amendment version of § 54-193. State v. Ellis, supra, at 460, 497 A.2d 974. 30a § 54-193 was inapplicable to the crime of murder.3® The trial court therefore denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss, 30 In Paradise, the sole issue presented was whether P.A. 76-35, which, as we have explained, expressly excepted all class A felonies, including murder, from the five year limitation period otherwise applicable to felo- 1ies, applied retroactively to offenses committed prior to the effective date of that amendment, that is, April 6, 1976. State v. Paradise, supra, 189 Conn. at 347, 456 A.2d 305. After concluding that the amendment aad prospective effect only; id., at 350, 456 A.2d 305; we affirmed the judgment dismissing the murder charges, which was based on the trial ourt’s application of the five year limitation peried of the pre-1976 amendment version of § 54-193. In light of the narrow issue raised by he parties in Paradise, we had no occasion expressly to consider, in that ase, whether the legislature had intended to subject the offense of mur- jer to the five year limitation period of the pre-1976 amendment version of § 54-193; rather, we assumed, like the parties, that the limitation pe- iod applied equally to murder as to all other felonies. Thereafter, in Ellis, we were required to decide whether the five year limitation period of the pre-1976 amendment version of § 54-193 applied to the offense of capital felony. See State v. Ellis, supra, 197 Conn. at 441, 497 A.2d 974. After undertaking a detailed historical analysis of this state’s criminal statutes of limitation, we concluded that the statutory scheme governing capital felonies was not intended to upset the “deep-rooted understand- ng”; id., at 459, 497 A.2d 974; that capital crimes, because of their grav- ty, are not subject to repose. /d., at 459-60, 497 A.2d 974. We reached a similar conclusion in State v. Golino, supra, 201 Conn. 435, 518 A.2d 57. n Golino, this court considered the claim of the defendant, Anthony Go- ino, that his prosecution for a 1973 murder in violation of General Stat- ites (Rev. to 1972) § 53a-54(a) was barred by the five year limitation veriod of the pre-1976 amendment version of § 54-193 because Golino iad not been charged with that murder until 1984. In contrast to the 1975 ‘evision of the murder statute under which the defendants in Ellis were charged, the 1972 revision of the murder statute under which Golino was [Footnote continued on next page] 3la and the case proceeded to trial, following which a jury found the defendant guilty of murder. In support of his claim that the trial court improperly de- clined to dismiss the information as time barred, the defen- dant maintains that this case is both factually and legally in- distinguishable from State v. Paradise, supra, 189 Conn. 346, 456 A.2d 305; which, the defendant asserts, is therefore controlling and requires the dismissal of the information in the preseni case. The state asserts that we should overrule our holding in Paradise that P.A. 76-35, § 1, did not apply retro- actively, a conclusion that was predicated on our determina- tion that criminal statutes of limitation presumptively have prospective applicability only. See id., at 351-53, 456 A.2d 305. Alternatively, the state maintains that the trial court cor- (Footnote continued from previous page] charged effectively had been declared unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972). As we explained in Golino, the then appli- cable murder statute carried a possible penalty of death; State v. Golino, supra, at 439, 518 A.2d 57; see General Statutes (Rev. to 1972) § 53a-54 (c); and, therefore, for statute of limitation purposes, we treated the case as one “punishable by death ....” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Golino, supra, at 447, 518 A.2d 57. We further concluded that, although the state was barred by Furman from seeking the death penalty against Golino, that fact did not affect the conclusion, based on our his- torical analysis, that we had reached in Ellis, namely, that the legislature never intended for capital crimes, because of their gravity, to be subject to any period of limitation. See id., at 444-45; 518 A.2d 57. The trial court in the present case relied heavily on the historical analysis that we em- ployed in Ellis and Golino in concluding that, despite the broad language of the pre-1976 amendment version of § 54-193, the legislature never intended to establish a limitation period for the offense of murder because of the gravity of that offense. 32a rectly concluded that Paradise does not bar the state’s prose- cution of the defendant for murder because our determination in Paradise that the murder prosecutions in that case were time barred rested on a faulty assumption, namely, that the five year limitation period of the pre-1976 amendment ver- sion of § 54-193 applied to murder as well as to all other felonies. See footnote 30 of this opinion. Upon reconsideration, we are persuaded that Paradise was wrongly decided. In particular, we conclude that we were misguided in establishing a presumption that, in the ab- sence of a contrary indication of legislative intent, an amendment to a criminal statute of limitations is not to be applied retroactively. As we explain more fully hereinafter, we are convinced that, with respect to those offenses for which the preamendment limitation period has not expired, it is far more likely that the legislature intended for the amended limitation period to apply to those offenses. In view of the fact that the five year limitation period of the pre- 1976 amendment version of § 54-193 had not expired with respect to the October, 1975 murder of the victim when the 1976 amendment to that statutory provision became effec- tive, we conclude that P.A. 76-35, § 1, is the operative statute of limitations for purposes of this case.3! Because, under 31 In light of our conclusion that P.A. 76-35, § 1, applies to the offense in the present case, we have no reason to address the state’s alternate con- tention that the legislature never intended to establish a limitation period for murder and, consequently, that the five year limitation period of the pre-1976 amendment version of § 54-193, despite its facial applicability to all felonies, including murder, does not bar the state’s prosecution of the defendant for the murder of the victim. Indeed, this court is bound to consider first the state’s claim that P.A. 76-35, § 1, applies retroactively to the offense in the present case because, if that claim has merit, P.A. 76- 35, § 1, necessarily trumps the possible applicability of the pre-1976 [Footnote continued on next page] ~ 33a % P.A. 76-35, § 1, there is no time period within which murder and other class A felonies must be prosecuted, the trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss the infor- mation. - We begin our analysis of this issue with a brief overview of the pertinent statutory provisions. The defendant was convicted of murder in violation of § 53a-54a, which, in 1975, specified that the offense “is punishable as a class A felony unless it is a capital felony and the death penalty is imposed as provided by section 53a-46a” General Statutes (Rev. to 1975) § 53a-54a(c). Because the defendant was not charged with capital murder,>2 his offense was punishable as a class A felony, which, pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1975) § 53a-35(b)(1), carries a maximum sentence of life imprisonment. At the time of the offense in October, 1975, General Statutes (Rev. to 1975) § 54-193 provided in rele- vant part: “No person shall be prosecuted ... for any crime or misdemeanor of which the punishment is or may be impris- onment ... except within five years next after the offense has been committed...” In 1976, however, the legislature amended § 54-193 to provide: “No person shall be prose- [Foomote continued from previous page] amendment version of § 54-193. Because we conclude that P.A. 76-35, § 1, does, indeed, have retrospective applicability to the offense in the present case, the issue of whether the legislature intended for the pre- 1976 limitation period of § 54-193 to apply to murder is a moot question for purposes of this case. For purposes of our analysis and resolution of the issue presented, however, we assume, without deciding, that the five year limitation period of the pre-1976 amendment version of § 54-193 applies to murder. 32 There is no dispute that the murder of the victim in the present case did not give rise to a charge of capital murder. 34a cuted for any offense, except a capital felony or a class A felony for which the punishment is or may be imprisonment in excess of one year, except within five years next after the offense has been committed.... There shall be no limitation of time within which a person may be prosecuted for a capital felony or a class A felony.” P.A. 76-35, § 1. We next turn to a review of our relevant prior precedent construing legislative amendments to criminal statutes of limitation, beginning with Paradise. In Paradise, the defen- dants, Brian Ellis and Wilmer Paradise, were charged, in 1981, with murder, felony murder and kidnapping, all class A felonies, in connection with a murder that had been com- - mitted in 1974. State v. Paradise, supra, 189 Conn. at 347, 456 A.2d 305. The trial court dismissed the charges against Ellis and Paradise; id., at 348, 456 A.2d 305; concluding that their prosecutions were barred by the five year limitation pe- nod of the pre-1976 amendment version of § 54-193, which was in effect at the time of the offenses. See id., at 350, 456 A.2d 305. On appeal, the state claimed that P.A. 76-35, § 1, which excluded class A felonies, including murder, from the purview of the five year limitation period of § 54-193, was procedural in nature and, therefore, had retroactive applica- bility absent a contrary legislative intent. /d. In support of its position, the state relied primarily on “an extensive body of civil case law”; id.; in which this court had held that “proce- dural statute[s] ... ordinarily will be applied retroactively without a legislative imperative to the contrary ....”35 /d., at 351, 456 A.2d 305. 33 In Paradise, the state :naintained that the retroactive application of the 1976 amendment to § 54-193 did not affect Paradise’s or Ellis’ sub- stantive rights because, at the time that they allegedly had committed the murder with which they were charged, the five year limitation period of the pre-1976 amendment version of § 54-193 had not yet expired. See [Footnote continued on next page] 35a We declined, however, to decide whether the 1976 amendment was substantive or procedural. /d., at 353, 456 A.2d 305. Although we reaffirmed “the continued vitality and utility of the principle that procedural statutes will be ap- plied retrospectively absent a contrary legislative intent in the civil field”; id., at 351, 456 A.2d 305; we concluded that this tenet was inapplicable to criminal statutes in light of the prin- ciple that such statutes “must be strictly construed.” /d., at 352, 456 A.2d 305. In accordance with this principle, we concluded that “criminal statutes are not to be accorded ret- rospective effect absent language clearly necessitating such a construction....”34 Jd., at 353, 456 A.2d 305. After observ- ing that § 54-193 must be strictly construed because it is “pe- nal in nature”; id., at 352, 456 A.2d 305; we explained that, because the language of P.A. 76-35, § 1, did not indicate “a clear legislative intent that the statute have a retrospective effect”; id., at 353, 456 A.2d 305; it could not be applied ret- {Footnote continued from previous page} State v. Paradise, Conn. Supreme Court Record & Briefs, December Term, 1982, Pt. 2, State’s Brief p. 5. 34 Our conclusion in Paradise that criminal statutes are not subject to retroactivity analysis on the basis of whether they are substantive or pro- cedural was predicated on State v. Jones, 132 Conn. 682, 47 A.2d 185 (1946), a case in which this court had concluded that a statute requiring the examination of certain criminal defendants for venereal disease was not retroactive in light of the general principle that, “in a criminal case a retrospective construction of a statute should not be adopted unless its language clearly makes such a construction necessary.” (Internal quota- tion marks omitted.) /d., at 685, 47 A.2d 185. We nevertheless acknowl- edged in Paradise--albeit without elaboration or specification--that “(t}he civil-criminal distinction enunciated in Jones and affirmed [in Paradise}, is not necessarily applicable to other areas of the criminal process.” State v. Paradise, supra, 189 Conn. at 353 n.5, 456 A.2d 305. 36a roactively to conduct that had preceded its effective date. See id. In view of the fact that all of the parties in Paradise had proceeded on the assumption that the five year limitation pe- riod of the pre-1976 amendment version of § 54-193 applied to all felonies, including murder, we affirmed the judgment of the trial court dismissing the information as time barred. In State v. Crowell, 228 Conn. 393, 398-99, 636 A.2d 804 (1994), we expressly reaffirmed our conclusion in Para- dise that criminal statutes of limitation are accorded prospec- tive effect only. The sole issue presented in Crowell was whether the seven year limitation period of General Statutes (Rev. to 1993) § 54-193a was applicable to the state’s prose- cution of the defendant, Martin Crowell, for offenses relating to his alleged sexual molestation of a child when the amend- ment establishing that seven year limitation period became effective after the commission of the charged offenses but prior to the expiration of the preamendment five year limita- tion period. /d., at 394-95, 636 A.2d 804. In urging this court to overrule Paradise, the state maintained that our holding in that case was “based on the faulty premise that a statute of limitations that extends a previous limitation period before that previous period has expired is ‘retroactive.’” /d., at 398, 636 A.2d 804. Specifically, the state claimed that, “to be ‘retroactive,’ a statute must affect a ‘vested right’ that existed on the date it took effect. Because a defendant has no night to a statute of limitations defense while the original limitation period remains unexpired, a new statute of limitations that takes effect before the original limitations period has expired does not affect a vested right and therefore cannot be retroac- tive.” Jd. We rejected the state’s claim, noting that “(t]he holding in Paradise was based firmly on the principle that criminal statutes must be strictly construed ... [and] not, as the state claims, on a technical misunderstanding of the na- ture of retroactivity.” (Citation omitted.) /d., at 399, 636 A.2d 804. Because there was nothing in the language of the amendment to indicate that the extended limitation period 37a had retrospective effect, we concluded that the trial court properly had followed the dictates of Paradise in dismissing as time barred the charges against Crowell. The next case relevant to our inquiry is /n re Daniel H., 237 Conn. 364, 678 A.2d 462 (1996), in which this court ad- dressed the issue of whether a 1994 amendment to General Statutes § 46b-127, the mandatory juvenile transfer statute, had retroactive applicability. See id., at 366-67, 678 A.2d 462. We concluded that the 1994 amendment, which elimi- nated the right to an immediate appeal from a court order transferring a juvenile matter to the regular criminal docket, had prospective effect only. See id., at 378, 678 A.2d 462. In so concluding, we explained, first, that our resolution of the issue was guided by the canon of strict construction ap- plicable to criminal statutes.35 /d., at 373, 678 A.2d 462. In contrast to Paradise, however, that conclusion did not end our analysis. After noting that, under General Statutes § 55- 3,36 substantive changes to the law presumptively have pro- spective application only; id., at 372, 678 A.2d 462; we stated that “[t)he first step in ascertaining whether the 1994 amendment was intended to apply retroactively ... is to de- cide whether the removal of a juvenile’s ability to appeal immediately from a court’s transfer order is a substantive change in the law.” Jd., at 373, 678 A.2d 462. We answered 35 We observed that, although statutes concerning juvenile matters gen- erally are considered to be civil in nature, statutes relating to alleged criminal misconduct of juveniles, such as § 46b-127, are subject to the canon of strict construction applicable to criminal) statutes. Jn re Daniel H., supra, 237 Conn. at 373, 678 A.2d 462. 36 General Statutes § 55-3 provides: “No provision of the general stat- utes, not previeusly contained in the statutes of the state, which imposes any new @bixgatson on any person or corporation, shall be construed to have a retrospective effect.” 38a that question in the affirmative and, therefore, concluded that the change presumptively had prospective applicability only. Id., at 375-76, 678 A.2d 462. We further determined that, be- cause the presumption of prospective applicability was not rebutted by a clear expression of legislative intent to the con- trary, the amendment did not apply retroactively. /d., at 376, 678 A.2d 462. Thereafter, in State v. Parra, 251 Conn. 617, 619-20, 741 A.2d 902 (1999), we considered whether a statutory amendment limiting the time within which a defendant may move to vacate a judgment and withdraw a previously en- tered plea properly was applied to crimes committed prior to the effective date of the amendment. The defendant, Juan Parra, relied on Paradise in support of his claim that the amendment could not operate retroactively because it lacked explicit statutory language requiring such an application. /d., at 622, 741 A.2d 902. Although we acknowledged that “Paradise created a bright line rule on matters involving the statutory construction of criminal statutes ... namely, that the language of the statute itself must clearly necessitate a retro- spective construction for one to be given”; (citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted) id., at 624, 741 A.2d 902; we nevertheless reasoned that “the breadth of [our] holding in Paradise”; id.; is limited to “certain types of criminal stat- utes, such as a statute of limitations for the prosecution of a crime ....” J/d., at 625, 741 A.2d 902. In reaching this con- clusion, we noted that, in /n re Daniel H., we previously had “made clear that there are instances in which ... Paradise ... [does not prevent] this court from considering the legislative history of a criminal statute in determining whether such a statute should be applied retroactively.” State v. Parra, su- pra, at 625, 741 A.2d 902. As we explained in Parra, “[i}n In re Daniel H., we determined whether a statutory amend- ment eliminating the nght to an immediate appeal from an order transferring a juvenile matter to the regular criminal docket applied retroactively... While we specifically held 39a that the statutory amendment at issue was a criminal statute that affected substantive rights ... we, nonetheless, looked to its legislative history to determine whether the amendment should be applied retroactively.... Thus, we did not limit our analysis to a determination of whether the language of the amendment clearly necessitated a retrospective application, but, rather, used the normal tools of statutory construction to determine the legislature’s intent on the issue of retroactive application of the amendment.” (Citations omitted.) Jd. We further explained that the amendment at issue in Parra fell within “those other areas of the criminal process ... to which the holding of Paradise does not extend”; (citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted) id., at 626, 741 A.2d 902; because the provision “affect[ed] an area of the criminal process far removed from the actual criminal con- duct for which the defendant originally was charged. For example, [the amendment did] not change the elements of the crime with which the defendant was charged, alter the ele- ments of his defense to that crime or make more burdensome the punisixment for that crime, after its commission.” Jd. Ac- cordingly, we concluded that we were not restricted to the language of the amendment in determining whether the legis- lature had intended that it be applied retroactively; rather, the “proper test ... [was] whether the language of [the amend- ment] or its legislative history ... indicates that the legislature clearly and unequivocally intended for the statute to apply retroactively.” Jd., at 627, 741 A.2d 902. We noted, finally, that, because the pertinent legislative history evinced a clear legislative intent to apply the amendment retroactively; id., at 628, 741 A.2d 902; it was not necessary to determine whether the amendment was substantive or procedural. /d., at 628 n.8, 741 A.2d 902. With this background in mind, we now reexamine our conclusion in Paradise that P.A. 76-35, § 1, has prospective effect only. As we explain hereinafter, that conclusion is 40a fundamentally flawed because it is founded solely on the mistaken premise that the rule of strict construction bars the presumption of retroactivity otherwise applicable to amend- ments to statutes of limitation. In view of our determination that our conclusion in Paradise rested on a faulty premise, we are obliged to take a fresh look at the issue of whether a criminal statute of limitations should be applied retroactively or prospectively in circumstances such as those of the present case, in which the legislature has not clearly evinced an in- tent one way or the other. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that, with respect to those criminal offenses for which -the applicable preamendment statute of limitations pe- riod has not yet expired, an amendment to that statute of limi- tations is presumptively retroactive. Because the limitation period of the pre-1976 amendment version of § 54-193 had not expired with respect to the offense in the present case prior to the effective date of the 1976 amendment, and be- cause the legislature did not evince an intent to have the amendment applyprospectively only, we conclude that P.A. 76-35, § 1, provides the operative statute of limitations in the defendant’s case. Of course, our ultimate objective in construing statutes is to discern and effectuate the apparent intent of the legislature. E.g., Cogan v. Chase Manhattan Auto Financial Corp., 276 Conn. 1, 7, 882 A.2d 597 (2005); State v. Ledbetter, 263 Conn. 1, 12, 818 A.2d 1 (2003). Although that objective is the same for gps and-criminal statutes, we have recog- nized that certain principles of statutory construction bear special relevance to our interpretation of criminal statutes, one of which is the rule of strict construction. Thus, it has long been held that, “unless a contrary interpretation would frustrate an evident legislative intent, criminal statutes are governed by the fundamental principle that such statutes are strictly construed against the state.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Reynolds, 264 Conn. 1, 69, 836 A.2d 224 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 908, 124 S.Ct. 1614, 4la 158 L.Ed.2d 254 (2004). Indeed, the rule, which “is perhaps not much less old than construction itself’; United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95, 5 L.Ed. 37 (1820); finds its roots in Sir Edward Coke’s opinion in Heydon’s Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 637 (Ex. 1584); see M. Radin, “A Short Way with Statutes,” 56 Harv. L-.Rev. 388, 389 (1942); and, in this state, it can be traced back to at least 1821. See Daggett v. State, 4 Conn. 60, 63 (1821). Succinctly stated, “(t]he purpose of the rule of strict construction is ... to enable the people of the State to know clearly and precisely what acts the legislature has forbidden under a penalty, that they may govern their conduct accordingly, and to make sure that no act which the legislature did not intend to include will be held by the courts within the penalty of the law.” State v. Faro, 118 Conn. 267, 274, 171 A. 660 (1934); accord State v. Zazzaro, 128 Conn. 160, 167, 20 A.2d 737 (1941). “Strict construction is a means of assuring fairness to persons sub- ject to the law by requiring penal statutes to give clear and unequivocal warning in language that people generally would understand, concerning actions that would expose them to liability for penalties and what the penalties would be.” 3 J. Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Construction (6th Ed. Singer 2001) § 59:3, p. 142. “Another reason for strict con- struction is to protect the individual against arbitrary discre- tion by officials and judges.... A related argument is to the effect that since the power to declare what conduct is subject to penal sanctions is legislative rather than judicial, it would risk judicial usurpation of the legislative function for a court to enforce a penalty whe[n] the legislature had not clearly and unequivocally prescribed it.” /d., pp. 144-45. The requirement that criminal statutes shall be strictly construed is therefore predicated on two fundamental princi- ples. First, the public is entitled to fair notice of what the law forbids. Second, legistatures and not courts are responsible for defining criminal activity. Neither of these two principles is advanced, however, by applying the rule of strict construc- 42a tion to criminal statutes of limitation. Because the statutory limitation period has nothing to do with the scope or reach of the substantive offense, neither the public’s nght to fair warming of the legislatively proscribed conduct nor the risk that the offense will be enlarged judicially beyond the con- templation of the legislature is implicated by the statutory limitation period. Consequently, applying the rule of strict construction to criminal statutes of limitation would be “[t]o enforce the rule beyond its purpose [and, thereby] to exalt technicalities above substance.” State v. Faro, supra, 118 Conn. at 274, 171 A. 660. Indeed, because criminal statutes of limitation do not de- fine criminal conduct, establish the punishment to be im- posed or otherwise burden defendants, such statutes are not truly penal at all. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. George, 430 Mass. 276, 279, 717 N.E.2d 1285 (1999) (“[s]tatutes of limi- tation do not define criminal conduct, are not penal statutes, and may not be subject to ... strict construction against the [state]”). In fact, such statutes represent an expression of “legislative grace”; State v. Hodgson, 108 Wash.2d 662, 667, 740 P.2d 848 (1987), cert. denied sub nom. Fied v. Washing- ton, 485 U.S. 938, 108 S.Ct. 1117, 99 L.Ed.2d 277 (1988); for “they are a surrendering by the sovereign of its ngbt to prosecute”; id.; after a specified period of time has elapsed from the acts constituting the offense. Put differently, be- cause such statutes inure to the benefit of criminal defen- dants, it is illogical to characterize those statutes as penal for purposes of determining the proper approach to their con- struction. In Paradise, we did not explain our conclusion that § 54- 1%3 1s pena! in nature, and, therefore, that that provision must ve strictly construed. Indeed, we cited only one case, namely, State v. Anonymous (1976-6), 33 Conn.Supp. 34, 358 A.2d 691 (1976) (Anonymous), to support that conclusion. See State v. Paradise, supra, 189 Conn. at 352, 456 A.2d 305. In 43a State v. Anonymous (1976-6), supra, at 39, 358 A.2d 691, a judge of the Court of Common Pleas?’ coricluded, also with- out analysis or explanation, that § 54-193 is a penal statute and, therefore, subject to the canon of strict construction. In support of its assertion that § 54-193 is a penal statute, the court in Anonymous relied solely on State v. Bello, 133 Conn. 600, 53 A.2d 381 (1947), a case in which this court affirmed the conviction of the defendant, Riggs Bello, for gambling. See id., at 601, 604, 53 A.2d 381. In Bello, however, we ap- plied the canon of strict construction in connection with our interpretation of the antigambling statute itself, not any ap- plicable statutory limitation period. See id., at 604, 53 A.2d 381. Thus, the cases that provide the basis for our conclusion in Paradise that § 54-193 is a penal statute to which the canon of strict construction applies simply do not support that conclusion. Contrary to our determination in Paradise, § 54-193, like other criminal statutes of limitation, is remedial in na- ture. “The purpose of a siatute of linutations is to limit expo- sure to criminal prosecution to a certain fixed period of time following the occurrence of those acts the legislature has de- cided to punish by criminal sanctions. Such a limitation is designed to pro’ect individuals from having to defend them- selves against charges when the basic facts may have become obscured by the passage of time and to minimize the danger of official punishment because of acts in the far-distant past. Such a time limit may also have the salutary effect of en- couraging law enforcement officials promptly to investigate suspected criminal activity.” Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 414-15, 90 S.Ct. 858, 25 L.Ed.2d 156 (1970). In- deed, it is because of the remedial nature of criminal statutes 37 The Court of Common Pleas was merged into the Superior Court in 1978. See General Statutes § 51-164s. 44a of limitation that they “are to be liberally interpreted in favor of repose.”38 (internal quotation marks omitted.) /d., at 115, 90 S.Ct. 858. In Paradise, the rule of strict construction provided the sole basis for our determination that P.A. 76-35, § 1, has pro- spective effect only. See State v. Paradise, supra, 189 Conn. at 352, 456 A.2d 305. Because we are not persuaded that that rule applies to criminal statutes of limitation, the validity of our holding in Paradise necessarily is suspect.39 Even if we 38 Thus, like all remedial statutes, a criminal statute of limitation must be construed liberally to effectuate the legislature’s intent. See, e.g., Knight v. F.L. Roberts & Co., 241 Conn. 466, 474, 696 A.2d 1249 (1997); Dysart Corp. v. Seaboard Surety Co., 240 Conn. 10, 18, 688 A.2d 306 (1997). Because the remedial purpose of a criminal statute of limita- tion is to provide for repose after the expiration of a specified period of time, the statute must be construed liberally to effectuate that purpose. This maxim of liberal construction, however, is not determinative of whether the pre-1976 amendment version or the post-1976 amendment version of § 54-193 applies to the criminal conduct that is the subject of the present case because both provisions represent a legislative mandate; the question is which such mandate applies. Of course, once it has been determined which provision is applicable, then that provision must be liberally construed in favor of repose. But until such time as the applica- ble statute is identified, the doctrine of liberal construction has no appli- cability. Thus, although in Paradise, we referred to this tenet of statutory construction; State v. Paradise, supra, 189 Conn. at 352, 456 A.2d 305; it provides no guidance on the issue of whether the pre-1976 amendment or the post-1976 amendment version of § 54-193 applies to the defendant’s conduct. ; 39 We also note that our holding in Paradise leads to a result that is inconsistent with the rationale underlying that holding when it is applied to a statutory amendment that reduces the limitation period. In such cir- cumstances, the prospective application of the amendment would inure to [Footnote continued on next page] 45a were to assume that the rule is applicable to such statutes, however, we see no reason why its application would lead inexorably to the presumption against retroactivity that we announced in Paradise. Indeed, as we had recognized long before Paradise, “[t]he rule of strict construction does not require that the narrowest technical meaning be given to the words employed in a criminal statute in disregard of their context and in frustration of the obvious legislative intent.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Faro, supra, 118 Conn. at 274, 171 A. 660. In other words, the principle of strict construction should not be applied in a manner that is “hostile” to an evident legislative purpose; State v. Levy, 103 Conn. 138, 141, 130 A. 96 (1925); or in a way that is con- trary to common sense. See State v. Reynolds, supra, 264 Conn. at 70, 836 A.2d 224. Thus, as a leading commentator on statutory construction has explained, “[t]he rule of strict construction is not the only factor which influences the inter- pretation of [criminal] laws. Instead, the rule is merely one among various aids which may be useful in determining the meaning of penal laws. This has been recognized time and again by the decisions, which frequently enunciate the prin- ciple that the intent of the legislature, or the meaning of the statute, must govern and that a strict construction should not be permitted to defeat the policy and purposes of the statute.” 3 J. Sutherland, supra, § 59:6, pp. 159-61. At a minimum, [Footnote continued from previous page] the detriment of the defendant because the original, longer limitation pe- riod presumptively would be applicable. This result is incompatible with the rationale of our holding in Paradise, namely, the rule of strict con- struction, a rule that, when applicable, requires us to construe statutes against the state and in favor of criminal defendants. The bizarre nature of this result substantiates our rejection of the rote application of the rule of strict construction to criminal statutes of limitation in Paradise. 46a therefore, our reliance in Paradise on the canon of strict con- struction, to the exclusion of all other considerations, casts serious doubt on the validity of our conclusion.49 For the foregoing reasons, we reject as logically un- _ founded our holding in Paradise that the canon of strict con- struction requires the conclusion that P.A. 76-35, § 1, has prospective effect only. We therefore must determine whether our conclusion in Paradise nevertheless was correct. We conclude that it was not. It is axiomatic that, “[w]hether to apply a statute retroac- tively or prospectively depends upon the intent of the legisla- ture in enacting the statute.” (Internal quotation marks omit- ted.) In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 695, 741 A.2d 873 (1999). In seeking to discern that intent, “[oJur point of de- parture is ... § 55-3,41 which ... we have uniformly inter- preted ... as a rule of presumed legislative intent that statutes affecting substantive nghts shall apply prospectively only... The Legislature only rebuts this presumption when it clearly and unequivocally expresses its intent that the legislation 40 Aswe previously have noted, in State v. Crowell, supra, 228 Conn. 393, 636 A.2d 804, this court reaffirmed our holding in Paradise, stating: “After a thorough consideration of the parties’ arguments in ... Paradise ... and the reasoning behind that decision, we conclude that it should not be overruled.” /d., at 399, 636 A.2d 864. We then expressed our ap- proval of the rationale on which our holding in Paradise was based, namely, “the principle that criminal statutes must be strictly construed ....” Id. These conclusory assertions in Crowell notwithstanding, we en- gaged in no analysis or explanation as to why the rule of strict of con- struction constituted a sound basis for our determination that criminal statutes of limitation presumptively have prospective effect only. Conse- quently, Crowell is no more persuasive a precedent than is Paradise. 4 | See footnote 36 of this opinion. 47a shall apply retrospectively.”42 (Internal quotation marks ~ omitted.) Rice v. Vermilyn Brown, Inc., 232 Conn. 780, 786, 657 A.2d 616 (1995); see also Coley v. Camden Associates, Inc., 243 Conn. 311, 316, 702 A.2d 1180 (1997). As a corol- lary to this principle, we also “have presumed that procedural or remedial statutes are intended to apply retroactively absent a clear expression of legislative intent to the contrary ....”43 Miano v. Thorne, 218 Conn. 170, 175, 588 A.2d 189 (1991); accord Jn re Daniel H., supra, 237 Conn. at 372-73, 678 A.2d 462. “While there is no precise definition of either {substantive or procedural law], it is generally agreed that a substantive law creates, defines and regulates rights while a 42 “[This] presumption against retroactive legislation is deeply rooted in our jurisprudence, and embodies a legal doctrine centuries older than our Republic. Elementary considerations of fairness dictate that individuals — should have an opportunity to know what the law is and to conform their conduct accordingly; settled expectations should not be lightly disrupted. For that reason, the principle that the legal effect of conduct should ordi- narily be assessed under the law that existed when the conduct took place has timeless and universal human appeal.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Faraday, 268 Conn. 174, 196, 842 A.2d 567 (2004), quoting Jmmigration & Naturalization Service v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 316, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 150 L.Ed.2d 347 (2001). 43 Since our decision in Paradise, we repeatedly have recognized the utility of this approach to statutory construction as a guide to determining whether the legislature intended for a particular criminal statute to have ~ retrospective effect. See, e.g., State v. Faraday, 268 Conn. 174, 197, 842 A.2d 567 (2004); Jn re Michael S., 258 Conn. 621, 630, 784 A.2d 317 (2001); State v. Parra, supra, 251 Conn. at 628 n.8, 741 A.2d 902; In re Daniel H., supra, 237 Conn. at 372, 678 A.2d 462. Indeed, as we have explained, in Paradise, we acknowledged the applicability of this ap- proach in regard to certain unspecified “areas of the criminal process.” State v. Paradise, supra, 189 Conn. at 353 n.5, 456 A.2d 305. 48a procedural law prescribes the methods of enforcing such ~ rights or obtaining redress.” (Internal quotation marks omit- ted.) Carr v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 273 Conn. 573, 593, 872 A.2d 385 (2005). Moreover, the “retroactive application of a law occurs only if the new or revised law was not yet in effect on the date that the relevant events un- derlying its application occurred.” State v. Faraday, 268 Conn. 174, 197, 842 A.2d 567 (2004); see also State v. Breton, 264 Conn. 327, 421-22, 824 A.2d 778, cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1055, 124 S.Ct. 819, 157 L.Ed.2d 708 (2003); Jn re Daniel H., supra, at 377, 678 A.2d 462. Finally, in determin- ing the retrospective applicability of any criminal statute, we must be mindful that the ex post facto clause of the United States constitution*4 bars any state from enacting “any law [that] imposes a punishment for an act [that] was not punish- able at the time [that] it was committed; or imposes addi- tional punishment to that then prescribed.” (Internal quota- tion marks omitted.) Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28, 101 S.Ct. 960, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981). Although “a law en- acted after expiration of a previously applicable limitations period violates the Ex Post Facto Clause when it is applied to revive a previously time-barred prosecution”; (emphasis in original) Stogner v. California, 539 U:S. 607, 632-33, 123 S.Ct. 2446, 156 L.Ed.2d 544 (2003); because it deprives the - defendant of a fully vested defense to prosecution, the consti- tution “does not prevent the State from extending time limits ... for prosecutions not yet time barred.”45 (Emphasis added.) /d., at 632, 123 S.Ct. 2446. 44 The constitution of the United States, article one, § 10, provides in relevant part: “No State shall ... pass any ... ex post facto Law ....” 45 In Stogner, the United States Supreme Court considered the constitu- tionality of a statute of limitations that, as applied to the defendant, Marion Stogner, revived a prosecution that had been time barred under {Footnote continued on next page] 49a Application of these considerations leads unmistakably to the conclusion that, subject to the limitations of the ex post facto clause, criminal statutes of limitation, including P.A. 76-35, § 1, should be accorded a presumption of retroactivity. Indeed, we long have held that civil statutes of limitation are presumed to apply retroactively because they do not affect or alter substantive rights. Roberts v. Caton, 224 Conn. 483, 488, 619 A.2d 844 (1993); see, e.g., Jones Destruction, Inc. v. Upjohn, 161 Conn. 191, 195-96, 286 A.2d 308 (1971). As we have explained, “[a] statute of limitations is generally considered to be procedural, {and therefore presumptively retroactive] especially whe[n] the statute contains only a limitation as to time with respect to a right of action and does not itself create the right of action.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Moore v. McNamara, 201 Conn. 16, 22, 513 A.2d 660 (1986); accord Roberts v. Caton, supra, at 488, 619 A.2d 844. “This is so because ... the limitation merely acts as a bar to a remedy otherwise available.” Moore v. McNa- mara, supra, at 22, 513 A.2d 660. The fundamental purpose and effect of criminal statutes of limitation are the same as [Footnote continued from previous page] the original limitation period that was in effect when Stogner allegedly had committed the crimes with which he was charged. Stogner v. Cali- fornia, supra, 539 U.S. at 609, 123 S.Ct. 2446. The court concluded that the statute as applied violated the ex post facto clause because it “retroac- tively withdr[ew] a complete defense to prosecution after it ha[{d] already attached”; id., at 632, 123 S.Ct. 2446; thereby rendering Stogner subject to punishment under the new law for past criminal conduct for which he was not subject to punishment when the new law was enacted. See id., at 613, 123 S.Ct. 2446. The court also made clear, however, that the exten- sion of a statute of limitations to offenses not barred by a previous limita- tion period does not implicate the ex post facto clause. /d., at 632, 123 S.Ct. 2446. 50a civil statutes of limitation; as the United-States Supreme Court has stated in noting the similarities between such stat- utes, they both “represent a legislative judgment about the balance of equities in a situation involving the tardy assertion of otherwise valid rights: [t]he theory is that even if one has a just claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice to defend within the period of limitation and that the right to be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 322-23 n.14, 92 S.Ct. 455, 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971). Because both criminal and civil statutes of limitation are predicated on the same general policy con- siderations and perform the same basic functions, it makes sense to treat them the same for the purpose of determining whether they give rise to a presumption of retroactive or pro- spective applicability, at least in the absence of good reason not to do so. We know of no such reason. Unless the statute of limi3 A second such report reflects the fact that Morganti was interviewed by the police again the following day. That re- port states that Morganti had agreed to “appear at the [djetective [b]ureau for the purpose of putting [together] a composite picture of the subject that he had observed on Field Point [Road] near Walsh [Lane] on Thursday, [October 30, 1975].” Another police report indicates that, on November 5, 1975, the police interviewed Carl Wold, a resident of Walsh Lane in the Belle Haven neighborhood. Wold informed the police that, at about 7:20 p.m. on October 30, 1975, he went out for his nightly walk. According to Wold, he walked east on Walsh Lane, turned right onto Field Point Road and then turned south toward Field Point Circle.54 He recalled having 53 Morganti provided the following description of the individual he had observed walking that evening: ‘White, male, [six feet] tall, 200 [pounds], late [twenties] to early [thirties], dark rimmed glasses, fatigue jacket, tan [slacks], blonde hair.” 54 Wold gave the interviewing officers the following description of his attire on the evening in question: “Brown (olive) field jacket, yellow corduroy shirt, tan slacks top-sider shoes ....” The report also includes the following physical description of Wold: “[Six feet, one inch], 210 [pounds], dark brown, straight hair, medium length and wears silver rimmed glasses.” The report further describes Wold as a twenty-three year old white male. 65a a short conversation with an officer at the Field Point police booth and, later, on his way home, being stopped by a special police officer on Field Point Road, just south of the Walsh Lane intersection. This officer had inquired of Wold where he was headed, and Wold responded that he was returning to his home on Walsh Lane. Wold further stated that he re- turned home at about 8 p.m. and remained there for rest of the evening.°5 Wold denied walking on Otter Rock Drive that evening.°® Approximately nineteen years later, on October 8, 1994, Inspector Frank Garr of the office of the state’s attorney in- terviewed Morganti again.5”? The written report of that inter- view reflects that Morganti informed Garr that James F. Murphy, a private investigator who had been retained by the Skakel family, had contacted him and questioned him about the “incident involving the individual [that Morganti had] stopped on Field Point Road, in Belle Haven” on the evening of October 30, 1975. Morganti also told Garr that he saw 55 Wold’s father, with whom Wold resided, corroborated Wold’s ac- count of his activities that evening. In addition, a second special duty officer, John Duffy, was on duty at the Field Point police booth sometime between 6 p.m. and 6:30 p.m. on the evening of October 30, 1975, when he observed Wold, who was known to Duffy as a resident of Walsh Lane, taking his daily walk on Field Point Road. Duffy also recalled having a brief conversation with Wold, who told Duffy that he was heading home. 56 The police contacted Morganti again on November 5, 1975. At that time, Morganti stated that he was certain that the man to whom he had spoken on Field Point Road on the evening of October 30, 1975, was the same individual he later observed walking on Otter Rock Drive. 57 The copy of the report provided to this court does not indicate the identity of the investigator who authored the report. Both the state and the defendant have indicated, however, that Garr wrote the report. 66a that person walking north on Field Point Road at approxi- mately 8 p.m. that evening. Morganti further stated that he was replacing a fallen road stanchion just north of the resi- dence of Cynthia Bjork on Otter Rock Drive sometime be- tween 9:30 and 10 p.m. that evening when, from a distance of approximately one hundred yards, he observed the same in- dividual “walking in a northerly direction through the front yard of a residence on Otter Rock Drive, across from the Skakel residence.”>8 The report also states that, at the time of the original police investigation of the victim’s murder, “Morganti reported the entire episode to the [police] investi- gators and assisted in the making of a composite sketch of the individual. A complete investigation into the matter was instigated, and it was determined that the individual was ... Carl Wold.” The report further states that Garr, who was ac- companied by Murphy and, apparently, Morganti, then pro- ceeded to the location on Otter Rock Drive where Morganti recalled having observed the individual for a second time on the evening of October 30, 1975.59 Following the jury verdict and shortly before sentencing, the defendant, on August 26, 2002, filed an amended motion for a new trial and request for an evidentiary hearing,®° 58 Another police report documents an interview with Bjork, who lived on Otter Rock Drive in the Belle Haven neighborhood at the time of the murder, Bjork told police that her husband had seen Morganti outside her house replacing a fallen road stanchion at about 9:40 p.m. on October 30, 1975. 59 According to the report, Garr confirmed that this individual was ap- proximately 100 yards from Morganti when Morganti saw the individual for the second time that evening. 60 Practice Book § 42-53 authorizes the filing of a motion for a new trial. Practice Book § 42-54 provides that, “[uJnless otherwise permitted [Footnote continued on next page] 67a claiming, inter alia, that the state had violated his rights under Brady by failing to make a timely disclosure of a composite drawing of the individual who Morganti had observed on the evening of October 30, 1975.6! In support of his claim, the defendant asserted that the state had not provided him with a copy of that drawing until August ~1, 2002, and that the drawing was significant because it tended to buttress his third party culpability defense. In particular, the defendant as- serted that the composite drawing bore a strong resemblance to Littleton, a former suspect in the victim’s murder whom the defendant, in support of his third party culpability de- fense, had identified as a likely perpetrator. The defendant further maintained that, although the state had concluded that Wold was the person who Morganti had observed near the crime scene at or near the time of the victim’s murder, dis- crepancies in Wold’s and Morganti’s statements as to when Morganti saw Wold cast doubt on the state’s conclusion. {Footnote continued from previous page] by the judicial authority in the interests of justice, a motion for a new trial shall be made within five days after a verdict or finding of guilty or within any further time the judicial authority allows during the five-day period.” 6! The defendant’s original motion for a new trial was filed on June 12, 2002. 62 In his brief to this court, the defendant represents that “[a]fter [he] was convicted, but prior to sentencing, [his] new counsel inquired about the existence of the sketch ....” The record otherwise is silent as to when the defendant’s new counsel, who filed an appearance on behalf of the defendant after the jury verdict, requested the drawing. The record also is devoid of any indication as to what specifically had prompted the defen- dant’s new counsel to make such a request. 68a The trial court heard argument on the defendant’s mo- tion on August 28, 2002, the same day that the sentencing hearing commenced. At the hearing on the defendant’s mo- tion, defense counsel represented that, despite the state’s open file policy in the case, the composite drawing was not among the materials that the state had made available to the defendant’s trial counsel prior to trial. Defense counsel further represented that the state had provided the defen- dant’s trial counsel with 1806 pages of discovery in connec- tion with the case. During the argument, the trial court asked the defen- dant’s trial counsel whether he had received, prior to trial, the 1975 investigative report that refers to Morganti’s willing- ness to participate in the creation of a composite drawing, and the 1994 investigative report that refers to a completed composite drawing. The defendant’s trial counsel] answered in the affirmative with respect to both reports. At the conclu- sion of the argument, the court denied the defendant’s motion for a new trial and for an evidentiary hearing on that mo- tion.65 On appeal, the defendant renews his claim that he 63 The portion of the hearing during which the parties addressed the issue of the composite drawing was argued on behalf of the defendant by attorney Hubert Santos, whom the defendant had retained after the jury had returned its verdict. The defendant also was represented at the hear- ing by his trial counsel, Michael Sherman. 64 The state has not challenged the defendant’s representation that his trial counsel had received 1806 pages of materials from the state during the course of pretrial discovery. 65 The trial court rejected the defendant’s claim regarding the compos- ite drawing both on the ground that the claim was untimely and because it lacked merit. In view of our conclusion that the trial court properly re- jected the defendant’s claim on its merits, we need not address the issue {Footnote continued on next page} 69a was deprived of a fair trial by virtue of the state’s failure to _ produce the composite drawing prior to trial. Our analysis of the defendant’s claim begins with the pertinent standard, set forth in Brady and its progeny, by which we determine whether the state’s failure to disclose evidence has violated a defendant’s right to a fair trial. In Brady, the United States Supreme Court held that “the sup- pression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an ac- cused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Brady v. Mary- land, supra, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194. In Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999), the United States Supreme Court identified the three essential components of a Brady claim, all of which must be established to warrant a new trial: “The evidence at issue [Footnote continued from previous page] of the timeliness of the defendant’s Brady claim insofar as it relates to the composite drawing. 66 We note, preliminarily, the standard of review applicable to both of the defendant’s claims. “Appellate review of a trial court’s decision granting or denying a motion for a new trial must take into account the trial judge’s superior opportunity to assess the proceedings over which he or she has personally presided.... Thus, [a] motion for a new trial is ad- dressed to the sound discretion of the trial court and is not to be granted except on substantial grounds.... In our review of the denial of a motion for [a new trial}, we have recognized the broad discretion that is vested in the trial court to decide whether an occurrence at trial has so prejudiced a party that he or she can no longer receive a fair trial. The decision of the trial court is therefore reversible on appeal only if there has been an abuse of discretion.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. McIntyre, 250 Conn. 526, 533, 737 A.2d 392 (1999). 70a must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpa- tory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadver- tently; and prejudice must have ensued.” J/d., at 281-82, 119 S.Ct. 1936; see also State v. Wilcox, 254 Conn. 441, 452, 758 A.2d 824 (2000) (“[t]o establish a Brady violation, the de- fendant must show that [1] the government suppressed evi- dence, [2] the suppressed evidence was favorable to the de- fendant, and [3] it was material [either to guilt or to punish- ment]” [internal quotation marks omitted]). Under the last Brady prong, the prejudice that the defendant suffered as a result of the impropriety must have been material to the case, such that “the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.” Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995). The trial court concluded that the defendant had failed to demonstrate either that the composite drawing was suppressed or that it was ma- terial. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the de- fendant cannot show that the state suppressed the composite drawing for purposes of Brady. Consequently, we need not, and, therefore, do not, reach his claim concerning the materi- ality prong of the Brady test.67 67 We note that the trial court rejected the defendant’s materiality claim on the ground that the composite drawing would not have been admissi- ble at trial because Morganti did not testify even though he was an avail- able witness and could have described the individual he saw on the eve- ning of October 30, 1975. We agree with the defendant that, contrary to the conclusion of the trial court, the fact that Morganti did not testify at trial has no bearing either on the admissibility or materiality of the draw- ing; the defendant presumably would have placed the drawing into evi- dence, through Morganti or otherwise, if the defendant had been provided with a copy of the drawing in advance of trial. In any event, the trial [Footnote continued on next page} Tha For purposes of this appeal, we presume that the state did not provide the defendant with a copy of the drawing prior to August 21, 2002.68 To the extent that the state failed to do so, that failure constituted a violation of the open file policy to which the state had announced it would adhere in the case. That fact alone, however, is not dispositive of the [Footnote continued from previous page] court never made any findings on the materiality issue, which necessar‘ly involves a fact specific inquiry into the relative import of any exculpatory evidence that has been suppressed in view of the trial evidence as a whole. See, e.g., United States v. Gil, 297 F.3d 93, 103 (2d Cir.2002) (“We assess materiality or prejudice in light of the trial evidence. Where the evidence against the defendant is ample or overwhelming, the with- held Brady material is less likely to be material than if the evidence of guilt is thin.”); see also State v. Hammond, 221 Conn. 264, 294, 604 A.2d 793 (1992) (noting that reviewing court will give deference to finding of trial court on claim of possible Brady violation because of “difficulty inherent in measuring the effect of nondisclosure in the course of a lengthy trial with many witnesses and exhibits” [internal quotation marks omitted]). For that reascn, and because our rejection of the defendant’s challenge to the trial court’s resolution of the suppression issue is disposi- tive of the defendant’s claim concerning the composite drawing, we do not address the defsndant’s contention that the trial court improperly de- termined that the drawing was not material. 68 We make this presumption in light of the defendant’s representation that he had not been provided with a copy of the composite drawing and because the trial court, having rejected the defendarit’s request for a hear- ing on the issue, made no factual finding on th = 69 As we previously have stated, “although w* encourage the use of open file policies and recognize that this practice may increase the effi- ciency and the fairness of the criminal process ... [w]e ... [nevertheless] urge parties not to consider implementation of an open file policy as satis- {Footnote continued on next page] 72a defendant’s claim regarding the suppression component of Brady because it is well established that “evidence is not considered to have been suppressed within the meaning of the Brady doctrine if the defendant or his attorney either knew, or should have known, of the essential facts permitting him to take advantage of [that ] evidence.” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) United States v. Payne, 63 F.3d 1200, 1208 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1165, 116 S.Ct. 1056, 134 L.Ed.2d 201 (1996); accord United States v. Zichettello, 208 F.3d 72, 103 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied sub nom. Lysaght v. United States, 531 US. 1143, 121 S.Ct. 1077, 148 L.Ed.2d 954 (2001); see also United States v. LeRoy, 687 F.2d 610, 618 (2d Cir. 1982), — cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1174, 103 S.Ct. 823, 74 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1983). The rationale underlying this exception to the state’s disclosure obligation under Brady is obvious: Brady is de- signed to assure that the defendant is not denied access to exculpatory evidence known or available to the state but un- known or unavailable to him. See, e.g., United States v. LeRoy, supra, at 619; United States v. Ruggiero, 472 F.2d 599, 604 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939, 93 S.Ct. 2772, 37 L.Ed.2d 398 (1973). It is not intended either to relieve the defense of its obligation diligently to seek evidence favorable to it or to permit the defense to close its eyes to information likely to lead to the discovery of such evidence. Thus, the composite drawing will not be deemed to have been sup- pressed by the state, notwithstanding the open file policy in effect in this case, if the defendant or the defendant’s tnal [Footnote continued from previous page] faction of the defendant’s discovery requests or the state’s constitutional obligation to disclose exculpatory materials.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Wilcox, supra, 254 Conn. at 453 n. 19, 758 A.2d 824. 73a counsel reasonably was on notice of the drawing’s existence but nevertheless failed to take appropriate steps to obtain it. See, e.g., United States v. LeRoy, supra, at 618-19 (defendant cannot prevail under Brady if he w [Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.] --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386016_1162%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.