# Opposition Brief — Housing Authority of Jefferson Parish v. Johnson (No. 05-1584)

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386016_1030%3A2

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2006

## Text

| (%) =o ee

No, 05-1584 AN6 14 2°75

OFFICE OF THE Guerm
SUFFER: E CO" CTS
ae

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

HOUSING AUTHORITY OF JEFFERSON PARISH, et al.,

Petitioners,

V.

CATRICE JOHNSON, et al.,

Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED States Court OF APPEALS
FOR THE FirTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
Mark A. MorEAu REAGAN W. Simpson
Laura A. TUGGLE Counsel of Record

New ORLEANS LEGAL ASSISTANCE CHRISTIAN A. GARZA
1010 Common, Suite 1400A KING & SPALDING LLP
New Orleans, Louisiana 70112 1100 Louisiana, Suite 4000
(504) 529-1000 Houston, Texas 77002
(713) 751-3200

Attorneys for Respondents

202832 ce

COUNSEL PRESS
(800) 274-3321 + (800) 359-6859

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. The Voucher Program
B. Respondents’ Allegations Below

C. Dispositions in the District Court and
Court of Appeals

Il. REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION

There Is No Circuit Split

The Court of Appeals Applied Settled

The Court of Appeals Correctly Applied
Settled Law

1. Congress conferred a concrete right
to identified individuals

The obligation to confer the right is
binding

Contents
Page
4. Enforcement of the right is not

foreclosed by a comprehensive
regulatory scheme. ............. 10

CONCLUSION

iil

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES

CASES:

Alexander y. Sandoval,

Pee Ws APP ROED vices he oe) oaxee este

Blessing v. Firestone,

WORT MIRO oc a

City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams,

544 U.S. 113 (2005) ........... SSeS

Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharms., Inc.,

URES SI erg he

Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe,

SAG US DIS CNA goo ek ee

Johnson v. Hous. Auth. of Jefferson Parish,

442 F.3d 356 (Sth Cir. 2006) .............

Johnson v. Hous. Auth. of Jefferson Parish,
2004 WL 2414095 (E.D. La. Oct. 28, 2004),

rev'd, 442 F.3d 356 (Sth Cir. 2006) ........

Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,

og eM pe.) eee ee ere eee

Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n,

SO aa SOE RNOED coda gesew ai vaveveds

Page

passim

passim

iv

Cited Authorities
Page

Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment

& Hous. Auth.,

Te OO EM CAPOED oN e00s Od sb wES OVERS passim
STATUTES & RULES:
2 UGE. B28 7 CR ook oo oe rs eS passim
Q2U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) os cee Cee neste e's 3
BA CBS POSIT CHONG MOU) vices cs bese’ 3
24 C.E.R. $ 962.555 (Weat 2006) és vices 3, 11
H.R. Rep. No. 100-122(I) (1987), as reprinted in

BET GE AE OORT See cc hvcss bee kee es 11
PR LY. Fe AOD ove o's chews eee awe eRe CRE 2

Been WN eee My BER ic 6 Grea Gri bo Boke oe Ree 6

TABLE OF APPENDIX

Page

Appendix — Housing Choice Voucher Program
Guidebook

l

This brief in opposition is being filed jointly by all of
the respondents, who were plaintiffs below.

I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Respondents receive federal rent subs*ies under 42
U.S.C. § 1437f(0) (2000), which established the Housing
Choice Voucher Program (the “Voucher Program”).
Respondents filed suit in federal district court alleging that
they had not received their full subsidies, as defined by
statute, because Petitioners had failed to calculate subsidies
with the required allowance for tenant-paid utilities.
Petitioners are the Jefferson Parish Housing Authority, its
executive director, and the Louisiana Housing Development
Corporation, which is under contract with the Housing
Authority to operate Jefferson Parish’s Voucher Program.

A. The Voucher Program.

The Voucher Program, enacted in 1988 as part of Section
8 of the Housing Act of 1937, is a tenant-based rent subsidy
program. It enables low-income families to rent suitable
housing in the private market, giving families flexibility in
choosing housing by providing a statutorily defined “monthly
assistance payment.” Jd. § 1437f(0)(2). The assistance
payment is, for purposes of this suit, equal to: the amount
by which the family’s “rent” exceeds 30% of adjusted
monthly family income, with rent expressly defined to
include the “amount allowed for tenant-paid utilities.” /d.
§ 1437f(0)(2)(A).'

1. If a family chooses a unit renting for more than the “payment
standard” (established by the housing authority in accord with

(Cont’d)

2

By adopting that formula for assistance payments,
Congress enabled families to secure both housing and
necessary utilities that would not cost them more than
30% of their adjusted monthly family income. /d.
§ 1437f(0)((2)(A).? Under that statutory formula (i.e., “rent”
minus 30% of income), monthly assistance payments increase
concomitantly with an increase in the “amount allowed for
tenant-paid utilities” (included in the term “rent’’). Jd.

The “amount allowed for tenant-paid utilities” refers to
the amount established by the housing authority in
compliance with HUD’s implementing regulations. /d.
Congress thus incorporated into its statutory formula HUD’s
regulatory requirements governing utility allowances, a long-
standing feature of all federal housing programs. At all times

relevant to this case, the Voucher Program required an

(Cont'd)

statutory formula based on fair rental values), the family’s assistance
payment is limited to the amount by which the payment standard
(rather than “rent’’) exceeds 30% of income, in which case the housing
authority’s failure to employ the correct utility allowance would not
affect assistance payments. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(0)(1)(A)-(B) &
(2)(B) (2000). That alternative formula is not relevant here because
Rule 12(b)(6) requires the Court to accept as true Respondents’
allegation that they were adversely affected by the Petitioners’ failure
to increase the utility allowance. See, e.g., Sutton v. United Air Lines,
Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 475 (1999). Petitioners’ argument to the contrary
(Pet. at 16) improperly raises an issue not adjudicated below.

2. Section 1437f(0)(2)(A) provides two alternatives to 30% of
adjusted income — namely, 10% of unadjusted monthly income and
certain welfare payments allocated to housing, but both are
insignificant to this case and thus are omitted for the sake of
simplicity.

3

increase in the amount of utilitics if utility rates changed
10% or more. 24 C.F.R. § 982.517(b) & (c) (West 2006)
(eff. July 1994). It further mandated that the amount allowed
for tenant-paid utilities reflect the “typical cost of utilities
and services paid by energy-conservative households that
occupy [similar] housing.” /d. § 982.517(b)(1).

B. Respondents’ Allegations Below.

Respondents filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section
1983”), alleging that Petitioners failed to calculate and
provide legally required allowances for tenant-paid utilities.
As a result, Respondents were required to make rent
contributions that were higher than Congress intended, and
they received monthly assistance payments that were lower
than intended.’ Respondents further alleged that the utility

schedule for Jefferson Parish did not increase from 1995
through at least 2004, even though utility costs increased
more than 10% several times during those years. See R. 195
at 4 18. Petitioners’ own evidence demonstrated that their
2004 utility schedule decreased amounts allowed for a
number of categories of utility costs. Compare R. 136 with
R. 137 (1995 & 2004 utility schedules attached to affidavit
of Programs Director of Petitioner Louisiana Housing
Development Corporation).

3. Respondents alleged in their second amended complaint that
Petitioners failed to base their utility allowance on “typical cost of
utilities ... [of] energy-conservative households [in similar]
housing.” 24 C.F.R. § 982.517(b)(1) (West 2006). Although the
district court refused to permit Respondents to file the amended
complaint, the court did address that specific allegation. Johnson,
2004 WL 2414095, at *1 (App. B to Pet. at 26a).

4

C. Dispositions in the District Court and Court of
Appeals.

Necessarily taking Respondents’ allegations as true under
Rule 12(b)(6),* the district court held that Petitioners’
violations of the Voucher Program could not constitute a
denial of federal rights under Section 1983. Without a
hearing, the district court dismissed Respondents’ claims.
Johnson v. Hous. Auth. of Jefferson Parish, 2004 WL
2414095 (E.D. La. Oct. 28, 2004), rev'd, 442 F.3d 356 (Sth
Cir. 2006) (cited as Johnson) (reprinted in App. B to Pet.).

Respondents then appealed to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. That court reversed in a
unanimous opinion. Johnson v. Hous. Auth. of Jefferson
Parish, 442 F.3d 356 (Sth Cir. 2006) (also cited as Johnson)
(reprinted in App. A to Pet.).

In overturning the district court, the Fifth Circuit applied
the traditional test adopted in Blessing v. Firestone, 520 U.S.
329, 340-41 (1997) (cited as Blessing), to determine whether
Congress intended to create an enforceable right to properly
calculated monthly assistance payments in the Voucher
Program. Johnson, 442 F.3d at 360 (App. to Pet. at 7a). The
Fifth Circuit applied the test narrowly, as instructed in
Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 287-90 (2002)
(cited as Gonzaga). Johnson, 442 F.3d at 360 (App. to Pet.
at 7a-8a). Further, the Fifth Circuit validated its application
of the Blessing test by following this Court’s decision in
Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment Authority, 479 U.S.
418 (1987) (cited as Wright). Johnson, 442 F.3d at 360-63

4. See, e.g., Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 475
(1999).

5

(App. to Pet. at 9a-13a). Wright held, wholly consistent with
this Court’s more recent decisions, that virtually identical
language in the public housing program created an
enforceable federal right. See id. at 360 (App. to Pet. at 8a).

Applying the Blessing test in conformity with this Court’s
precedents, the Fifth Circuit determined that: (1) the text of
the statute at issue requires that assistance payments include
an allowance for tenant-paid utilities; (2) courts can
competently determine whether a housing authority has
improperly calculated utility allowances; and (3) Petitioners’
obligation to provide legally required assistance payments
is not diminished by HUD’s potential ability to waive
application of utility-allowance regulations. Jd. at 363-65
(App. to Pet. at 13a-19a). Finally, the Fifth Circuit held that
a judicial remedy is not foreclosed by any comprehensive
administrative enforcement scheme because, as Wright also
held in the context of public housing, Congress has never
given HUD comprehensive or exclusive powers to remedy a
housing authority’s violations of the Voucher Program’s
requirements. Jd. at 365-66 (App. to Pet. at 19a-21a).

For those reasons, the Fifth Circuit reversed and
remanded for further proceeding on the merits in the district
court. Petitioners now seek this Court’s review of that
decision.

Il, REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION

Petitioners request review of the Fifth Circuit’s ruling
that Respondents may invoke Section 1983 to seck to enforce
their statutory right under a federal housing program to an
accurate calculation of monthly assistance payments. That
ruling, which did not address the merits of Respondents’

6

claim, does not justify a grant of certiorari because it does
not create or deepen any conflict among the circuits. Further,
the ruling is simply a case-specific and proper application of
the settled legal standard that this Court articulated in such
cases as Blessing and Gonzaga.

A. There Is No Circuit Split.

This Court does not ordinarily exercise review absent a
circuit split. See U.S. Sur. Ct. R. 10. Petitioners cite no split
among the circuits because there is none. No other circuit
has addressed whether the failure to set proper utility
allowances for Voucher Program participants denies an
enforceable federal right.

Nor is there any circuit conflict on the analytical
approach that the Fifth Circuit employed. The Fifth Circuit
applied the three-part Blessing test: (1) whether the statute
creates an individual and enforceable benefit to the plaintiff;
(2) whether the right is definite enough for courts to enforce;
and (3) whether observance of the right is a binding obligation
on States. Johnson, 442 F.3d at 360 (citing Blessing, 520
U.S. at 340-41) (App. to Pet. at 7a). The application of the
Blessing test conflicts with no other circuit.

B. The Court of Appeals Applied Settled Law.

There is no circuit conflict over the B/essing test because
it is settled law. Repeatedly, this Court has applied the test
to determine whether a federal statute grants rights that an
individual may enforce by a Section 1983 suit. See, e.g., City
of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113, 119-20
(2005); Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 281, 287-90.

7

Further, the Fifth Circuit did not expand the application
of Blessing beyond its boundaries. To the contrary, it
distinctly recognized the “narrowness of the [Blessing]
doctrine as typified in Gonzaga” and described its holding
as a “rarity.” Johnson, 442 F.3d at 360 (App. to Pet. at 7a-
8a). Thus, the Fifth Circuit dispelled Petitioners’ prediction
that a flood of litigation will ensue. Pet. at 12. Further, the
Fifth Circuit acknowledged, contrary to Petitioners’ argument
(Pet. at 12-14), that a right enforccable under Section 1983
must be found in the statute itself and not merely in a
regulation. /d. at 363-64 (App. to Pet. at 1 5a-16a).

C. The Court of Appeals Correctly Applied Settled Law.

The Court of Appeals correctly applied each prong of
the Blessing test. Congress intended to confer a right to
Voucher Program participants; enforcement of that right lies
within judicial competence; and the obligation to confer the
right is binding. Further, no comprehensive enforcement
scheme negates a Section 1983 suit to enforce the right. See
Blessing, 520 U.S. 340-41.

1. Congress conferred a concrete right to identified
individuals.

Congress expressly included in the statutory formula for
monthly assistance payments “the amount allowed for tenant-
paid utilities.” 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(0)(2)(A). Thus, Congress
not only anticipated HUD’s implementing regulations on
tenant-paid utilities, but it also adopted those regulations as
part of the statutory formula. As a-result, the statute expressly
conferred the benefit that Petitioners denied when they failed
to increase the utility schedule as HUD directed.

8

In addition to creating a concrete monetary right, the
Voucher Program is expressly for the benefit of identified
individuals. Section 1437f(0)(2) refers to “the monthly
assistance payment for a family receiving assistance.” /d.
(emphasis added). The next subsection provides: “For a
family receiving tenant-based assistance, ... the monthly
assistance payment for the family shall be” the expressed
statutory formula. Jd. § 1437f(0)(2)(A) (emphasis added).

In holding that the above language creates enforceable
federal rights, the Fifth Circuit properly followed this Court’s
analysis in Wright. Johnson, 442 F.3d at 360 (App. to Pet. at
8a). Wright was expressly approved by this Court in Gonzaga
because the statutory language in Wright conferred an
“iadividualized, concrete monetary entitlement.” Gonzaga,
536 U.S. at 280, 288 n.6. The same entitlement is at issue
here. As the Fifth Circuit noted, while the Voucher Program
confers more flexibility in housing choices than the program
at issue in Wright, the effect of denying properly calculated
assistance payments is identical — namely, to force families
to pay more than 30% of their income in housing costs.
Johnson, 442 F.3d at 362 (App. to Pet. at 1 la-12a). Indeed,
Wright recognized a federal right under less compelling
statutory language. The term “rent” in the statute construed
in Wright was not, as here, statutorily defined to include
tenant-paid utilities; instead, the definition was supplied only
by regulation. Wright, 479 U.S. at 420 & n.2, 431. Therefore,.
Wright is not distinguishable in any meaningful way as
Petitioners assert (Pet. at 13).°

5. Wright is not distinguishable, but Petitioners rely on cases
that are. See Pet. at 19. In Blessing and Gonzaga, federal funding
was conditioned, respectively, on the States’ adoption of effective

(Cont'd)

9

2. The right can be enforced by courts.

Petitioners’ argument that federal courts are not competent
to determine utility allowances (Pet. at 17) is simply incorrect.
No special competence is needed to decide whether utility
rates have increased more than 10% over the last decade.
Nor is any special expertise needed to determine typical
utility costs. The HUD Guidebook for the Housing Choice
Voucher Program points out that “[i]nformation regarding
typical utility usage and the cost of utilities and services is
generally available” from a number of public sources, such
as electric utility suppliers, public utility commissions, and
state or local agencies.°

Evaluating such data is well within the competence of
federal courts. This Court so held in Wright, which expressly

rejected the argument that the concept of ““‘reasonable’ allowance
for utilities is too vague” to be enforceable (479 U.S. at 431),

(Cont’d)

child support programs and privacy policies. See Blessing, 520 U.S.
at 333-35; Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 276. In each case, Congress used
federal funding to encourage policies, but stopped short of compelling
them, so that States could choose not to confer the benefits by
declining federal funds. For a different reason, no federal right existed
in Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 27§ (2001), also cited by
Petitioners. Pet at 19. The statute in A/exander prohibited intentional
discrimination. Alexander, 532 U.S. at 280. The plaintiff, however,
was seeking relief from a State policy's disparate impact, which did
not fall within the statute’s prohibition. /d. at 278, 293.

6. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & UrsaAn Dev., HousinGc CHOoIce VOUCHER
PrRoGRAM GuibEBOOK § 18.3 (2001). The Guidebook is available at
www.hud.gov/offices/pih/programs/hev/forms/guidebook.cfm.
Chapter 18 concerns allowances for utilities. Section 18.3 is quoted
above and is reprinted in the appendix to this opposition.

10

contrary to Petitioners’ assertion that the “utility allowance
schedule per se was not at issue in Wright?” (Pet. at 17).

Finally, federal courts competently address more
complex issues. See, e.g., Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S.
498, 519-20 (1990) (stating that courts are competent to
decide reasonable and adequate rates for hospital services);
cf. Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-
93 (1993) (assigning trial judges the often complex task of
making “a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning
or methodology underlying the [expert] testimony is
scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or
methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue,”
but remaining “confident that federal judges possess the
capacity to undertake this review’’).

3. The obligation to confer the right is binding.

Petitioners appear to argue that the obligation to increase
the utility schedule with rising utility costs is not binding
because HUD can waive that obligation. Pet. at 19. Yet HUD
did not waive that obligation at any time in the past, and
there is no evidence in the record that Petitioners have
received a waiver or even applied for one. Even if such a
waiver occurred in the future, it would neither remedy nor
erase Petitioners’ past failure to calculate monthly assistance
payments in accord with existing utility allowance
requirements.

4. Enforcement of the right is not foreclosed by a
comprehensive regulatory scheme.

Although HUD precludes Voucher Program participants
from challenging policies like the utility allowance in an

1]

informal administrative hearing (24 C.F.R. § 982.555(b)(3)),
Petitioners incorrectly seek to extend this bar to judicial
challenges. Pet. at 9. Administrative preclusion is hardly a
basis for prohibiting judicial enforcement of statutory rights;
instead, it is a reason for allowing a suit like this one under
this Court’s settled jurisprudence. ,

Further, in Wright, this Court held that Congress did not
create a comprehensive enforcement scheme to displace
Section 1983 suits asserting the denial of federal housing
assistance. See Wright, 479 U.S. at 423-29. That decision
mirrors relevant legislative history, which confirms
congressional intent to permit familics recciving housing
assistance to be able to bring suit under Section 1983 for
violations of housing assistance programs. See H.R. Rep.
No. 100-122(1), at 14 (1987), as reprinted in 1987
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3317, 3330 (noting congressional intent to
allow adversely affected tenants to bring suit under Section
1983 to enforce their statutory rights). Because Congress has
similarly established no comprehensive program to displace
judicial enforcement of rights conferred by the Voucher
Program, the Fifth Circuit’s unanimous ruling recognizing
Respondents’ Section 1983 claims should remain
undisturbed.

CONCLUSION

The Fifth Circuit properly decided this case in accord
with congressional intent expressed in clear statutory
language and based on the precedents of this Court. Any
hypothetical policy argument that Petitioners may posit for
violating federal law (see Pet. at 20-21) falls far short of
invoking this Court’s review powers. Therefore, the Court
should deny the petition.

12

Respectfully submitted,

REAGAN W. SIMPSON
Counsel of Record
CHRISTIAN A, GARZA

KinGc & SpaLpinc LLP

1100 Louisiana, Suite 4000
Houston, Texas 77002
(713) 751-3200

Mark A. Moreau

LaurA A. TUGGLE

NEw ORLEANS LEGAL ASSISTANCE
1010 Common, Suite 1400A
New Orleans, Louisiana 70112
(504) 529-1000

Attorneys for Respondents

APPENDIX

la

APPENDIX — HOUSING CHOICE VOUCHER
PROGRAM GUIDEBOOK

* * 6

18.3 Establishing a Utility Allowance Schedule

When establishing a utility allowance schedule, a PHA should
make every effort to base the allowances on actual rates and
average consumption estimates that will be adequate to cover
expected average utility costs over a twelve month period.
(Like the “budget plans” available through many local utility
companies, the allowances are based on an estimated full
year of usage divided equally over 12 months, although the
family’s actual usage may fluctuate from month to month.)
Information regarding typical utility usage and the cost of
utilities and sewices is generally available through the
following local sources:

Electric utility suppliers

Natural gas utility suppliers

Water and sewer suppliers

Fuel oil and bottled gas suppliers

Public utility commissions

Real estate and property management firms
State and local agencies

Appliance sales and leasing firms
Neighboring PHAs

Average Consumption Data

If a PHA 1s unable to find adequate sources for local
information regarding utility consumption, HUD will
approve usc of national average consumption data. These

2a
Appendix

national average consumption figures represent average
amounts for an “average” 22 bedroom unit in a locality that
has approximately 4,000 heating degree days and an average
local water temperature of 50 degrees. The consumption
figures must be adjusted for the size of the dwelling unit.
The allowances for units in the PHA’s locality may need to
be adjusted to reflect the higher or lower cost of utilities
resulting from variations in typical outdoor temperatures and/
or the temperature of the local water supply. Data on the
average number of heating or cooling degree days for the
locality (the sum of the number of days that the indoor
temperature must be raised or lowered from the outdoor
temperature level to maintain a comfortable temperature on
each day for which heating or cooling is required) is generally
available from the National Weather Service or other local
sources. Data on the average local “degree days” will provide
a basis for making local adjustments to these average
consumption figures.

NATIONAL AVERAGE MONTHLY UTILITY CONSUMPTION For A
2'4 BEDROOM DWELLING UNIT

Utility Service = FaevUtility
Category E __ Units of Measurement | — Comsumption

Electricity
a. Lighting and Refrigeration KWH
b. Cooking KWH
c. Domestic Hot Water ! KWH
d. Space Heating KWH
e. Air Conditioning
Natural Gas and Bottled Gas
a. Cooking
b. Domestic Hot Water
c. Space Heating

. Feel Oi
a. Domestic Hot Water
b. Space Heating

. Water

Domestic Use

b. Lawr

3a
Appendix

Allowances by Unit Size

Whenever possible, consumption data should be obtained
for each unit size and type. If consumption data is available
only for an average unit size (2'4 bedrooms), the utility costs
should be multiplied by the following factors to determine
the costs for a specific unit size:

ADJUSTMENT Facrors By UNit SIZE

Adjustment Factor

Unit Size (Times 24% BR Monthly
: Consumption Figure)
0-BR 0.5

1-BR 0.7

2-BR 0.9

3-BR 1.)

4-BR 14

5-BR 1.6

Calculating a Utility Allowance

In the absence of reliable third-party average utility expense
data, monthly utility allowances can be calculated by multiplying
estimated monthly consumption times the local utility rate.

——s

ESTIMATING UTILITY EXPENSE FROM AVERAGE CONSUMPTION DATA

The average consumption of electricity used for domestic hot water is
340 KWH.

Ata scheduled rate of $.0552362 per KWH, the average monthly allowance for
domestic hot water for a 2'4 bedroom unit would be:

340 KWH x $.0552362 (rate per K WH)
= $19 (rounded to nearest do!!ar)

The al.owance for a 0-bedroom unit will be.

$19 (average 24 BR cost) x 0.5 (0-bedroom adjustment factor)
= $10

The a 'owance for a S-bedroom unit wi!) be
$19 (average 2% BR cost) x 1.6

(S-bedroom adjustment factor)
= $30 (rounded to nearest dollar)

4a

Appendix
Utility Rate Schedules

The cost of gas and electricity generally varies according to
the amounts consumed, as shown on the utility suppliers’
rate schedules. For this reason, it may not be possible to
accurately calculate the cost for a utility in any one-service
category until the usage of that utility for all service categories
is known. For example, a unit with electric heating, may
qualify for a lower “All-Electric” rate if electricity is also
used for cooking, lighting, refrigeration, and domestic hot
water. Rates for gas usage may decline with the volume of
gas used, resulting in a lower cost for gas used for heating,
cooking, and domestic hot water than for each use considered
separately. For convenience in calculating the utility allowances
for any combination of utilities, it is recommended that the
PHA use the higher rates. Allowances for electric cooking,
water heating, and space heating should be calculated using
the lower rates at the middle or bottom of the company’s
rate schedule.

Ranges and Refrigerators

If rental units in the PHA’ s jurisdiction are typically leased
without owner-provided ranges and/or refrigerators, an
allowance must be made for the cost to the family of
providing its own. Allowances for tenant-provided ranges
and refrigerators should be based on the lower of the cost of
leasing the cquipment or the cost of purchasing it on an
installment plan.

Sa
Appendix

Other Utilities and Services

The utility allowance schedule should also provide
allowances for all other utilities and services for which, in
the PHA’s locality, the tenant is typically responsible, and
which are required for compliance with HQS. Examples
would be firewood used as a primary heating fuel, or the
required annual flushing of a septic tank in an area without
public sewers.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386016_1030%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.