# Amicus Curiae Brief — Poyck v. Florida (No. 05-751)

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386016_0584%3A4

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2005

## Text

8

Pearce was involved in the murder of a teenage boy and the
attempted murder of a second after the teenagers failed to
purchase drugs that Pearce ordered them to buy for him. After
holding the boys hostage, and forcing one of them to perform
oral sex on him, Pearce and three friends drove the two boys
to a remote location, where Pearce ordered one of the boys
out of the truck and ordered one of his friends to “break
[the boy’s] jaw’” or “‘pop him in the jaw... .’” Id. at 566.
Pearce’s accomplice instead shot the bey and announced
(though mistakenly) to Pearce that he had killed him. Pearce
then drove the truck another 200 yards and ordered the second
boy out of the car, at which point one of Pearce’s accomplices
shot and killed the second boy. Although he did not expressly
order his accomplice to kill the second boy, Pearce was the
instigator of a crime in which killing was an essential
component. In light of the murderous shooting of the first
boy just moments carlier, Pearce’s ordering the second boy
out of the truck could have been viewed by the jury as nothing
less than an order to kill.

No comparable evidence was presented to the jury in
Mr. Van Poyck’s case. Although Mr. Van Poyck and Valdes
were both heavily armed when they attempted to carry out
the escape, killing was in no way an essential component or
purpose of the plan, nor did the State present any evidence
cither that Mr. Van Poyck planned, or knew in advance that
Valdes intended, to kill anyone during the course of the
felony. Instead, the State relied entirely on inconclusive eye-
witness testimony that, as the Florida Supreme Court held
in Van Poyck I, was insufficient as a matter of law to prove
that Mr. Van Poyck was the triggerman. In short — with Mr.
Van Poyck’s conviction for premeditated murder having been
overturned, and no legitimate evidentiary proof in the record
that he actually killed anyone — Mr. Van Poyck’s death

9

sentence now stands alone as a disturbing exception among
Florida’s current death-row population.

In affirming the trial court’s denial of Mr. Van Poyck’s
request for DNA testing, the Florida Supreme Court ruled
out the possibility that the jury in Petitioner’s case would
have recommended a life sentence even if the jury had known
to a scientific certainty that — contrary to the State’s
contention at trial - Mr. Van Poyck was not the triggerman.
Van Poyck v. State, 908 So. 2d 326 (Fla. 2005) (“Van Poyck
IT’). The State has not dispt ed Petitioner’s contention that
the results of the requested DNA testing could conclusively
prove (by demonstrating the absence of the victim’s blood
from Mr. Van Poyck’s clothing) that Mr. Van Poyck did not
kill anyone; nor did the Florida Supreme Court question the
evidentiary significance of the requested DNA testing in this
regard. Instead, the Court simply declared, based on its own
sense of the record, that there was no “reasonable probability
that Van Poyck would have received a lesser sentence”
regardless of whether he actually fired the fatal shots.
Id. at 329.

In dismissing the importance of the DNA evidence
sought by Mr. Van Poyck, the court failed to cite any empirical
basis whatsoever for its factual conclusion. As discussed
above, however, the court’s supposition that Mr. Van Poyck’s
non-triggerman status would have made no difference clashes
directly with the evidence supplied by Florida’s actual death-
row population: namely, that Florida juries generally do not
recommend, and Florida trial courts do not impose, death
sentences on defendants who did not themselves either kill
or murderously direct or plan a killing. If triggenaan status
in felony murder cases were in fact inconsequential to
prosecutors who sought the death penalty and jurors who

10

recommended it, there surely would be more non-triggermen
on Florida’s death row.

Certainly, there can be no serious dispute that conclusive
scientific proof that Mr. Van Poyck did not himself kill
anyone would have constituted powerful mitigating evidence
in the jury’s sentencing deliberations. Cf. Zerquera v. State,
549 So. 2d. 189, 193 (Fla. 1989). Moreover, in addition to
the evidence cited above, other available empirical evidence
strongly supports the conclusion that jurors’ support for the
death penalty materially diminishes when the defendant is
proved to have been an indirect accomplice in the killing
that gave rise to a capital offense. See, e.g., Stephen P. Garvey,
Aggravation and Mitigation in Capital Cases: What Do
Jurors Think?, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 1538, 1566 (1998)
(“(S]upport for the death penalty in public opinion polls drops
from 70-76% when respondents are asked whether or not
they support the death penalty in the abstract to 25-29% when
they are asked whether they support the death penalty for a
defendant who was ‘[o]nly an accomplice to the killing.’”’).
The jury verdict form in Mr. Van Poyck’s case demonstrates
that as many as eleven jurors believed that Mr. Van Poyck
was the triggerman, and therefore may have relied on that
belief in deciding to recommend a death sentence.
See Petitioner’s Appendix at F-1. The Florida Supreme
Court’s failure to acknowledge the potentially decisive
importance of this belief in the jury’s ultimate sentencing
recommendation was arbitrary and capricious and cries out
for correction by this Court.

This failure was particularly egregious because definitive
DNA evidence exonerating Mr. Van Poyck of the triggerman
role would have essentially knocked out a key pillar of the
State’s penalty-phase argument to the jury. During the penalty

1]

phase hearing in Petitioner’s case, only Mr. Van Poyck’s own
self-interested testimony was offered to counter the State’s
contention that Mr. Van Poyck was in fact the triggerman.
The identity of the triggerman was the centerpiece of the
prosecutor’s argument for the death penalty: ‘So again, it is
important who the trigger man is. There is no doubt about it.
It’s important to your deliberations, okay.’” See Van Poyck
II, 908 So.2d at 331. As the dissenting opinion below
observed, “[T]here can be no doubt that the prosecution, in
seeking the death penalty asserted to the jury first, that it
- was important in their deliberations on the penalty to
determine who the triggerman was, and, second, in this case,
the evidence supported a determination that the defendant
was the triggerman.” /d. at 331 (Anstead, J., dissenting).

Further compounding this error was the court’s refusal
to consider the cumulative impact of such DNA evidence in
conjunction with the other extensive mitigating evidence that
Mr. Van Poyck’s trial counsel failed to discover and present
at his original penalty-phase hearing. The “reasonable
probability” test under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure
3.853(c)(5)(C) is the same as that required to demonstrate
prejudice under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694
(1984), and should be construed as incorporating that
constitutional standard. Mr. Van Poyck’s initial collateral
attack on his sentence alleging constitutionally ineffective
assistance of penalty-phase counsel sharply divided the
Florida Supreme Court and came within a single vote of
prevailing. See Van Poyck v. State, 694 So. 2d 686 (Fla.
1997). This close decision was not based on counsel’s failure

5. Although a majority of the court held that Mr. Van Poyck’s
counsel was not ineffective for failing to obtain and present DNA

evidence at the guilt phase, see id. at 697, it made no such ruling
(Cont'd)

12

to obtain DNA evidence for the penalty phase, but rather
was the result of trial counsel’s “blatant lack of investigation
and preparation” in failing to discover and present an
abundance of mitigating evidence concerning Mr. Van
Poyck’s mental health and other personal history. The impact
of scientifically conclusive DNA evidence proving Mr. Van
Poyck’s innocence of actual killing must be weighed together
with the other severe deficiencies in the mitigation case that
were presented to the jury. In that context, there clearly exists
a “reasonable probability” that the addition of exculpatory
DNA evidence at the penalty phase would have led to a
sentence of life, not death. The Florida Supreme Court’s
analysis totally ignored that consideration.

In short, the Florida Supreme Court’s rejection of
Petitioner’s request for DNA testing was based on mere
arbitrary speculation at odds with what we know about capital
juries and sentences. In reality, there is a compelling basis to
believe that DNA evidence absolving Mr. Van Poyck of the
triggerman role could, and likely would, have dramatically
transformed the dynamics of the penalty phase hearing and
the jury’s sentencing deliberations in this case. Reversal of
the Florida Supreme Court’s arbitrary result is essential to
vindicate Mr. Van Poyck’s well-established constitutional
right to present fo a jury the substantial mitigating scientific
proof that he was not the triggerman, see, e.g., Lockett v.
Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978); Hitchcock v. Dugart, 481 U.S.

(Cont'd)

with regard to the prejudicial impact of failing to introduce this
evidence at the penalty-phase. The tactical justification cited by the
court for counsel’s decision not to introduce DNA testing evidence
at the guilt phase had no application at the penalty phase, at which
DNA evidence demonstrating that Mr. Van Poyck was not the
triggerman could only have helped him in the eyes of the jury.

13

393 (1987), and to preserve the fundamental constitutional
requirement that the jury be allowed to “consider and give
effect to [Petitioner’s mitigating] evidence in imposing
sentence,” Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989). The
Florida Supreme Court’s fundamental failure to properly
assess the potentially decisive impact of DNA-based proof
on Mr. Van Poyck’s sentence represents a constitutional error
that plainly warrants this Court’s review.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

P. BENJAMIN DUKE

CovincTon & BURLING

1330 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10019

(212) 841-1000

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

APPENDIX

APPENDIX A:

FLORIDA DEATH ROW INMATES WITH FELONY MURDER CONVICTIONS
WHO PHYSICALLY CAUSED A VICTIM'S DEATH

| Toney

course of molesting her).

Florida Description Did the inmate
Death Row physically cause a
_Inmate victim's death?
Barwick, |Barwick v. State, 660 So.2d 685, 689 (Fla. 1995) (defendant fatally stabbed victim after raping her in the Yes
Darryl course of a robbery).

Bradley, |Bradley v. State, 787 So.2d 732, 735-36 (Fla. 2001) (defendant beat victim to death with a “war stick” in Yes
Donald the course of a burglary).
Branch, Branch v. State, 685 So.2d 1250, 1252 (Fla. 1997) (defendant beat, stomped, sexually assaulted and Yes
Eric strangled victim in the course of stealing her car).
Caballero, |Caballero v. State, 851 So.2d 655, 659 (Fla. 2003) (defendant “covered [the victim’s] mouth to muffle her Yes
Luis screams [and] pulled her head [while his accomplice] pulled [a] cord” around her neck to strangle her in

the course of robbing her).
Carroll, Carroll v. State, 815 So.2d 601, 607 (Fla. 2002) (defendant raped and fatally strangled a ten-year-old Yes
Elmer girl).
Clark, Clark v. State, 613 So.2d 412, 413 (Fla. 1993) (defendant shot victim “seven or eight times” in the course Yes
Ronald of an armed robbery).
Cummings- |Cummings-El v. State, 863 So.2d 246, 248 (Fla. 2003) (defendant fatally stabbed his ex-girlfriend in the Yes
El, F.W. —jcourse of an armed burglary).
Davis, Davis v. State, 703 So.2d 1055, 1056-57 (Fla. 1998) (defendant fatally injured a two-year-old girl in the Yes

I-V

Florida Description Did the inmate
Death Row physically cause a
Inmate victim’s death?
Doorbal, |Doorbal v. State, 837 So.2d 940, 949 & n.21 (Fla. 2003) (defendant killed one victim in the course of an Yes
Noel elaborate criminal enterprise through one of the following means, “an overdose of horse tranquilizer;
asphyxia for strangulation . . . ; or blunt force trauma to [the victim’s] skull”; defendant killed a second
victim by repeatedly injecting her with horse tranquilizer).
Farr, Farr v. State, 62\ So.2d 1368, 1369 (during an attempted kidnapping, defendant crashed the victim’s car Yes
Victor into a tree, thereby killing her ).
Fennie, Fennie v. State, 855 So.2d 597, 600 (Fla. 2003) (defendant fatally shot victim in the back of her head in Yes
Alfred the course of an armed robbery and kidnapping).
RRNA it it
Floyd, Floyd v. State, 850 So. 2d 383, 387-89, 401-02 (Fla. 2003) (defendant was convicted of fatally shooting Yes
Maurice his mother-in-law during the course of a robbery; the Florida Supreme Court reversed his convictions for
felony murder and robbery, finding that the jury charge was insufficient to support the robbery conviction,
but affirmed defendant’s death sentence based on his first-degree premeditated | murder conviction).
Garcia, Garcia v. State, 644 So.2d 59, 60-62 (Fla. 1994) (defendant stabbed two elderly sisters while burglarizing Yes
Henry their home).
Gaskin, Gaskin v. State, 591 So. 2d 917, 918 (Fla. 199}) (defendant fatally shot a husband and wife in the course Yes
Louis of burglarizing their home).
Geralds, Geralds v. State, 601 So.2d 1157, 1158 (Fla. 1992) (defendant beat and stabbed victim to death in the Yes
Mark \course of burglarizing her home).
Gorby, Gorby v. State, 819 So.2d 664, 671 (Fla. 2002) (defendant Te beat in victim’s head in the course of a Yes
Olen burglary).

,
——
—_—_—_—

Description

Florida Did the inmate
Death Row physically cause a
| Inmate | ; victim’s death?
Gore, Gore v. State, 784 So.2d 418, 423, 427 (Fla. 2001) (defendant fatally stabbed and strangled victim in the Yes
Marshall _jcourse of an armed robbery).
Green, Green v. State, 64\ So.2d 391, 393 (Fla. 1994) (defendant fatally shot victim in the course of armed Yes
Crosley robbery and kidnapping).
Griffin, Griffin v. State, 639 So.2d 966, 967 (Fla. 1994) (defendant fatally shot a pursuing police officer after Yes
Michael _| burglarizing a hotel room). “Gite
Hartley, Hartley v. State, 686 So.2d 1316, 1318-19 (Fla. 1996) (defendant “left [his] trade mark” by shooting the Yes
Kenneth victim in the head in the course of an armed robbery).
Hendrix, |Hendrix v. State, 908 So.2d 413, 416 (Fla. 2005) (defendant fatally “shot, bludgeoned, and stabbed” his Yes
Robert former accomplice and his former accomplice’s wife after an armed burglary to prevent them from

testifying against him).

Hunter, Hunter v. State, 817 So.2d 786, 789 (Fla. 2002) (defendant fatally shot three men “in turn” in the course Yes
James of an armed robbery).
Hurst, Hurst v. State, 819 So.2d 689, 692-93 (r'la. 2002) (defendant stabbed victim to death in the course of Yes
Timothy __|robbing a restaurant).

£-V

Florida Description Did the inmate
Death Row physically cause a

Inmate victim’s death?
James, James v. State, 695 So.2d 1229, 1230-31 (Fla. 1997) (defendant raped and strangled an eight-year-old girl Yes
Edward and immediately thereafter raped and stabbed her grandmother).
Jones, Appeliant’s Initial Br., Jones v. State, 2005 WL 3451308 at *4-6 (Fla. Nov. 2005) (an eyewitness testified Yes'
Christopher |that defendant hit the victim in the head with a gun and then shot the victim in the chest in the course of a

robbery).

Jones, Jones v. State, 748 So.2d 1012, 1016 (Fila. 2000) (defendant strangled victim to death in the course of a Yes
David robbery and kidnapping).
Knight, Knight v. State, 770 So.2d 663, 664 (Fla. 2000) (defendant fatally shot victim in the course of a Yes
Ronald kidnapping).
Kopsho, _|Appellant’s Initial Br., Kopsho v. State, 2005 WL 3626062 at *8 (Fla. Nov. 14, 2005) (defendant fatally Yes”
William _|shot his wife while attempting to kidnap her).
Kormondy, |Kormondy v. State, 845 So.2d 41, 45 (Fla. 2003) (defendant fatally shot victim in the head in the course of Yes
Johnny an armed burglary). ze
Lukehart, |Lukehart v. State, 776 So.2d 906, 930-11, 922 (Fla. 2001) (defendant fatally hit infant in the head in the Yes
Andrew _|course of committing aggravated child abuse). oe

-—-

Case is still subject to direct review by the Florida Supreme Court.

Case is still subject to direct review by the Florida Supreme Court.

rv

Florida Ree Description Did the inmate
Death Row : physically cause a

Inmate e _ victim’s death?
Mahn, Mahn v. State, 714 So.2d 391. 393-94 (Fla. 1998) (defendant stabbed his father’s live-in girlfriend and her Yes
Jason son to death in the course of an armed robbery).
Marshall, {Marshall v. State, 604 So. 2d 799, 802 (Fla. 1992) (defendant beat a fellow inmate to death while Yes
Matthew _jattempting to collect gambling winnings).
Melton, Melton v. State, 638 So.2d 927, 929 (Fla. 1994) (defendant “fired the fatal shot” in the course of robbing a Yes
Antonio pawn shop).
Mendoza, (Mendoza v. State, 700 So.2d 670, 672 (Fla. 1997) (defendant fatally shot victim in the course of an Yes
Marbel attempted robbery).
Miller, Miller v. State, 770 So.2d 1144, 1146-47 (Fla. 2000) (defendant beat a homeless man to death with a pipe Yes
David in the course of an attempted robbery).
Morrison, |Morrison v. State, 8\8 So.2d 432, 437-39 (Fla. 2002) (defendant fatally stabbed victim in the course of an Yes
Raymond jarmed robbery).
Nelson, Nelson v. State, 850 So.2d 514, 518 (Fla. 2003) (defendant, in the course of kidnapping, robbing, and Yes
Micah sexually assaulting the victirn, killed the victim by “attempt[ing] to strangle her with his bare hands,

empt{ ying] the contents of a fire extinguisher into her mouth, and forc[ing] a tire iron into her mouth and
through the back of her head”).

Orme, Orme v. State, 896 So.2d 725, 729 (Fla. 2005) (defendant strangled victim to death in the course of raping Yes
Roderick {and robbing her).
Pardo, Pardo v. State, 563 So.2d 77, 78 & n.i (Fla. 1990) (defendant “intentionally killed” nine victims in five Yes
Manuel separate episodes “for pecuniary gain’).

$-V

Frank

7 burglarizing their home).

Florida Description Did the inmate
Death Row physically cause a
Inmate victim’s death?
Reese, Reese v. State, 694 So.2d 678, 680 (Fla. 1997) (defendant strangled victim to death in course of a sexual Yes
John battery and burglary).
Rodriguez, |Rodriguez v. State, --- So.2d ----, 2006 WL 1243475 at *1 (Fla. Jan 19, 2006) (defendant fatally shot Yes
Juan victim four times in the course of a robbery).
Rodriguez, |Rodriguez v. State, 753 So.2d 29, 34 (Fla. 2000) (defendant fatally shot two victims in the course of an Yes
Manolo armed robbery).
Rogers, Rogers v. State, 783 So.2d 980, 985-86 (Fla. 2001) (defendant stabbed victim to death in the course of an Yes
Glen armed robbery).
Sims, Sims v. State, 681 So.2d 1112, 1113 (Fla. 1996) (defendant fatally shot a police officer in the course of an Yes
Merit armed robbery).
Suggs, Suggs v. State, 644 So.2d 64, 65-66 (Fla. 1994) (defendant stabbed victim to death in the course of a Yes
Emest kidnapping).
Taylor, Taylor v. State, 583 So.2d 323, 325 & n.2 (Fla. 1994) (defendant beat and choked victim to death “in the Yes
Perry commission of a sexual battery”).
Trease, Trease v. State, 768 So.2d 1050, 1052 (Fla. 2000) (defendant fatally slit victim’s throat in the course of an Yes
Robert armed robbery).
Walls, Walls v. State, 64) So.2d 381, 385 (Fla. 1994) (defendant fatally shot two victims in the course of Yes

Florida Description Did the inmate
Death Row physically cause a
Inmate | victim's death?
Watson, Watson v. State, 651 So.2d 1159, 1160 (Fla. 1995) (defendant fatally stabbed victim in the course of an Yes
Kenneth __|armed burglary).
Whitton, | Whitton v. State, 649 So.2d 861, 863-64 (Fla. 1995) (defendant fatally stabbed victim in the course of a Yes
Gary robbery).
Willacy, | Willacy v. State, 696 So.2d 693, 694-95 (Fla. 1997) (defendant “doused [his} victim with gasoline and set Yes
Chadwick her on fire” “in the course of a robbery, arson, and burglary”).
Zack, Zack v. State, 911 So.2d 1190, 1195-96 (Fla. 2005) (defendant stabbed victim to death in the course of a Yes
Michael “nine-day crime spree” that included robbery and sexual battery).
Zakrzewski,|Zakrzewski v. State, 866 So.2d 688, 690 (Fla. 2004) (defendant pled guilty to strangling his wife and Yes
Edwards __jkilling their two children with a machete).

L-V

APPENDIX B:

FLORIDA DEATH ROW INMATES WITH FELONY MURDER CONVICTIONS
WHO MAY NOT HAVE PHYSICALLY CAUSED A VICTIM'S DEATH

Florida Description Did the inmate If no, was the
Death Kow ; physically cause a | inmate’s intention to
Inmate sisi victim’s death? | kill premeditated?
Alston, Alston v. State, 723 So.2d 148, 152-53 (Fla. 1998) (after defendant and his Possibly Yes
Pressley half-brother took their victim, James Lee Coon, to the woods at gunpoint, the
defendant “‘shot [Coon] twice in the head””; defendant’s half-brother also shot
Coon after defendant told him “that ‘the boy wil! have to be dealt with,
meaning killf[ed],’ because [Coon] could identify them”).
Chamberlain, | Chamberlin v. State, 881 So.2d 1087, 1093 (Fla. 2004) (in the course of a No Yes
John robbery and three homicides, defendant “said ‘no more witnesses and
encouraged [his accomplice] to kill [Bryan] Harrison”; unsure whether their
victims were dead, defendant subsequently “retrieved morc bullets, and
reloaded the gun,” so that his accomplice could “again ‘empt[y] the gun’ into
Harrison and [Harrison’s girlfriend]’’).
Henyard, Henyard v. State, 689 So.2d 239, 242-43 (Fla. 1996) (defendant and an Possibly Yes
Richard accomplice fatally shot two young girls after defendant raped and repeatedly

shot their mother in the course of stealing their car; prior to his crime,
defendant stated that he intended to “steal a car, kill the owner, and put the
victim in the trunk”).

i-d

Florida Description Did the inmate If no, was the
Death Row physically cause a | inmate’s intention to
Inmate victim’s death? kill premeditated?
Krawczuk, Krawczuk v. State, 634 So.2d 1070, 1071 (Fla. 1994) (although it is not clear Possibly Yes
Anton whether it was defendant or his accomplice who more directly caused the death
of David Staker, the record reflects that a “week before the murder, the pair
decided to rob and kill Staker” and that defendant choked Staker and “twice
poured drain cleaner and water into Staker’s mouth”).
J awrence, Lawrence v. State, 831 So.2d 121, 124-25 (Fla. 2002) (in the course of a No Yes
Gary robbery, defendant beat the victim, Michael Finken, with a pipe “until it bent”
and then a baseball bat; although it appears that defendant's wife may have
delivered the fatal blow with a knife, defendant told his stepdaughter prior to
beating Finken that he and his wife intended to “knock off Mike”).
Lugo, Lugo v. State, 845 So.2d 74, 88, 114 (Fla. 2003) (in the course of an elaborate No Yes
Daniel criminal enterprise, defendant injected one of his victims, Krisztina Furton,
with horse tranquilizer and ordered his accomplice to continue to inject Furton
with tranquilizer, thereby causing her death; the trial court found that the
defendant “had a cold, calculated, and premeditated plan to kill [his} victims
and dispose of their bodies”).
io z — a
Pearce, Pearce v. State, 880 So.2d 561, 565-67 (Fla. 2004) (defendant and his No No
Faunce accomplices kidnapped two boys and drove them to a remote location;

defendant ordered one boy out of the car, and one of defendant's accomplices
shot the boy in the head; defendant drove the car another 200 yards and

ordered the second boy out of the car, and the same accomplice shot the second |

boy in the head; the trial court found that defendant's crime was “cold,
calculated, and premeditated”).

ong

cl

Florida Description Did the inmate If no, was the )
Death Row physicatly cause a | inmate’s intention to
Inmate victim’s death? kill premeditated?
Stein, Stein y. State, 632 So.2d 1361, 1363 (Fla. 1994) (prior to shooting two Pizza Possibly Yes

Steven Hut employees to death in the course of robbing the restaurant, defendant and

his accomplice agreed “that there could be no witnesses to the robbery”).
Williams, Williams-v. State, 622 So.2d 456, 459 (Fla. 1993) (defendant, who ran a drug No Yes
Ronald trafficking ring in Miami, ordered his accomplices “to ‘drop’ whoever was

involved with the theft of his money and drugs”).

t-d

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386016_0584%3A4. Public record. Not legal advice.