# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Jagodka v. Lafler

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 2006
- **Citation:** 546 U.S. 1172

## Text

Petitioner Jagodka filed an Application for Leave to
Appeal with the Michigan Court of Appeals, which was
deni¢d on June 25, 2002. The Michigan Supreme Court
denied Leave to Appeal on February 28, 2003, and
Reconsideration was denied on May 30, 2003.

Proceedings in the Federal Courts
Petitioner Jagodka filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus on June 12, 2003, arguing that he was denied his
constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. He also
argued that the Judge misconstrued the law when he made
certain rulings, and that his sentence amounted to a
disproportionate sentence, which violated the Eighth
Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment. U.S.
Const. Amend. VIII.

On March 2, 2004, District Judge Arthur J. Tarnow
issued a Judgment and Opinion and Order dismissing the
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Judge Tarnow found that
Petitioner did not timely pursue his habeas corpus relief, and
that he is not entitled to equitable tolling.

Petitioner was granted a certificate of appealability on
the sole issue of whether his petition was time-barred.
Although Petitioner recognizes that his petition was filed
outside the applicable statute of limitations, he nevertheless
asserted that he is entitled to equitable tolling due to the
petitioner's lack of constructive knowledge of the filing
requirement, and given the fact that he was only 16 years old

-8-

at the time of the crime, he has demonstrated that his
ignorance of §§ 2244 between 1996 and 2003 was reasonable.
Once his grandparents obtained appellate counsel on his
behalf in 2001, he was diligent in pursuing his rights by
exhausting his state court remedies and filing the Writ in less
than one month after the Michigan Supreme Court denied
reconsideration of his application for leave to appeal. In
addition, there was a complete absence of prejudice to the
Respondent by the late filing of the Writ.

The one-year statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. §§
2244(d), became effective on April 24, 1996. His petition
was filed outside the applicable statute of limitations.

However, the one-year limitation period prescribed by
AEDPA for habeas actions is not a jurisdictional limitation,
and is subject to equitable tolling. Dunlap v. United States,
250 F.3d 1001, 1007 (6th Cir. 2001). In this regard,
Petitioner contends that he is entitled to equitable tolling.

The following five factors are to be considered in
determining the appropriateness in tolling a statute of
limitations: "(1) the petitioner's lack of notice of the filing
requirement; (2) the petitioner's lack of constructive
knowledge of the filing requirement; (3) diligence in pursuing
one's rights; (4) absence of prejudice to the respondent; and
(5) the petitioner's reasonableness in remaining ignorant of
the legal requirement for filing his claim." Dunlap v. United
States, supra at 1008; Andrews v. Orr, 851 F.2d 146, 151 (6th
Cir. 1988).

—*

Equitable tolling is only warranted in "rare and
exceptional circumstances." York v. Galetka, 314 F.3d 522,
527 (10th Cir.2003). However, courts have noted that

"{e]quitable tolling would be appropriate ... when a prisoner

is actually innocent" or "when an adversary's conduct--or
other uncontrollable circumstances--prevents a prisoner from
timely filing." Gibson v. Klinger, 232 F.3d 799, 808 (10th
Cir.2000). The Fifth Circuit concluded that "(t]he State's
failure to make available to a prisoner the AEDPA, which sets
forth the basic procedural rules the prisoner must follow in
order to avoid having his habeas petition summarily thrown
out of court [constituted] an impediment" under §§
2244(d)(1)(B). Egerton v. Cockrell, 334 F.3d 433, 438 (Sth
Cir.2003) Accordingly, the court held that the one-year
limitations period did not begin to run until the petitioner in
that case was transferred to a facility where a copy of AEDPA
was available. Egerton v. Cockrell, supra at 438.

Petitioner Jagodka maintains that his ignorance of §§
2244 between 1996 and 2001 was reasonable. He was only
16 years old at the time of the state court proceedings. Given
his age and lack of maturity at the time, he could not be
expected to have even reasonable constructive knowledge of
the one-year statute of limitations, particularly since it was
only enacted into law less than 6 months prior to his plea and
sentence.

Furthermore, once his grandparents obtained counsel

for him to pursue appellate remedies, his lack of appeals to

-10-

the Court of Appeals and the Michigan Supreme Court
prevented him from filing his habeas corpus petition within
the applicable statute of limitations. Nevertheless, he was
diligent in pursuing his rights by exhausting his, state court
remedies with counsel and filing the Federal Writ less than
one month after the Michigan Supreme Court denied
reconsideration of his application for leave to appeal. These
actions clearly demonstrate that Petitioner Jagodka timely
pursued his request for habeas relief. As Petitioner Jagodka
timely pursued his habeas corpus relief once he exhausted his
state court remedies, he is entitled to equitable tolling.

The Sixth Circuit incorrectly determined that
Petitioner Jagodka was not entitled to equitable tolling of the
statute of limitations. The Court took note of the unusual
procedural history of Petitioner Jagodka's state court litigation
but concluded that Petitioner Jagodka did not pursue his
rights diligently. The Court focused primarily on the fact that
courts are reluctant to find that a lack of notice of the
AEDPA, or ignorance of the law in general, excuses a late
filing.

However, the record does not support the Court’s
conclusion that Petitioner Jagodka was not diligent in
pursuing his rights. See, Dunlap, 250 F.3d at 1008. While it
is true that more than five years elapsed between the
imposition of Petitioner Jagodka's sentence in November
1996 and the filing of his state post-conviction action in 2001,
he clearly offered a reasonable explanation of this long delay.

a

Moreover, when he filed his state post-conviction action, he
was still unaware of AEDPA, and the fact that he was only

able to file any appellate pleadings after his grandparents
obtained legal counsel for him supports the proposition that
his lack of access to AEDPA contributed to the delay in filing
his §§ 2254 petition. See, Egerton v. Cockrell, supra.
Finally, it is worth noting that there was a complete
absence of prejudice to the Respondent by the late filing of
the writ in this case. Any consideration of Petitioner’s claims
raised in his previously filed writ of habeas corpus would
have merely amounted to more work for the Respondent.
The denial of equitable tolling would effectively
preclude appellate review in this case. The one-year statute
of limitations is designed to bar frivolous appeals, not to
preclude appellate review of cases involving substantial
issues. Since the federal district court has not indicated that
the issues involved in Petitioner Jagodka's petition are
frivolous, it is clear that the matters raised in the previously
filed writ of habeas corpus should be considered on their

merits.

12.

SUMMARY AND RELIEF REQUESTED

For these reasons Petitioner Jagodka ask this

Honorable Court to grant certiorari in this case and remand
this matter to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit for review of the issues raised tn his petition for writ

of habeas corpus.

Respectfully submitted,

PHILLIP D. COMORSKI (P46413)
Attorney for Petitioner

2632 Buhl Building

Detroit, Michigan 48226

(313) 963-5101

«13.

APPENDIX

6TH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FILINGS:

Opinion,
os SA are pearene es reyes Al-A6

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN FILINGS:

Opinion and Order Granting

Request for Certificate of

Appealability,

I oo che hue eas yak ae B1-B4

Opinion and Order Granting
Respondent’s Motion for
Summary Judgment and
Dismissing Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus, 7

EES ie 5 hss kane udaxe wees C1-C6
Judgment, |

filed 02/26/04 ..... error rr ore tree D1-D2

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

OPINION,
FILED JULY 27, 2005

A-1 through A-6

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

No. 04-1345
FILED

July 27, 2095
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT "ed< qd Green,

|

JASON JAGODKA, )
Petitioner-Appellant, ) ON APPEAL FROM
V. ) THE UNITED STATES
BLAINE LAFLER, ) DISTRICT COURT FOR
Respondent-Appellee.) THE EASTERN DISTRICT
OF MICHIGAN

Before: SILER and DAUGHTREY, Circuit Judges; and
MARBLEY, District Judge.”

PER CURIAM. Petitioner Jason Jagodka appeals the
district court’s denial of his petition for a writ of habeas
corpus. The issue certified for appeal by the district cov — is
whether Jagodka’s petition was timely in light of the one-
year statute of limitations in the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). 28 U.S.C. §
2244(d)(1). We affirm.

* The Honorable Algenon L. Marbley, United States District
Judge for the Southern District of Ohio, sitting by
designation.

A-!

BACKGROUND

Jagodka is a Michigan prisoner serving sentences of
25 to 50 years for second degree murder, and two years for
possession of a firearm while in the commission of a felony.
He pleaded no contest to the charges in 1996 and, although he
was 16, was sentenced as an adult. The convictions were
finalized on November 14, 1997, one year after sentencing,
when the time limit for filing a direct appeal in state court
expired. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A); M.C.R. 7.205(F)(3).
Jagodka did not seek either direct review of his conviction or
collateral attack at the state level before his conviction was

finalized.

In 2001, Jagodka filed a motion for relief from
judgment in Monroe County Circuit Court. In denying this
motion, the court found that Jagodka had not met his burden
of establishing entitlement to the relief requested, as set forth
in M.C.R 6.508(D)(3), which precludes the court from
granting relief to the defendant if “the motion . . . alleges
grounds for relief... which could have been raised on appeal
from the conviction and sentence.” /d. An exception exists if

the defendant can demonstrate “good cause for failure to raise

A-2

such grounds on appeal,” but the court concluded that
Jagodka had not met this burden. Jagodka then filed a motion
for leave to appeal in the Michigan Court of Appeals, which
was denied in 2002. Similarly, the Michigan Supreme Court
denied Jagodka’s delayed application for leave to appeal in
February 2003, stating only that he had “failed to meet the
burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR
6.508(D).” His motion for reconsideration was denied in May
2003.

Jagodka filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus
on June 12, 2003, alleging that he was denied effective
assistance of counsel at trial and that his sentence was
disproportionately harsh. He concedes that his petition was
untimely; however, he maintains that he did not file the
necessary state appeals because he lacked appellate counsel
until 2001, when his grandparents obtained legal
representation for him. The district court granted the
respondent Lafler’s motion for summary judgment,
dismissing the petition with prejudice as untimely. The
district court then granted Jagodka a Certificate of
Appealability only on the issue of whether his habeas petition

was timely filed.

A-3

DISCUSSION

Federal courts grant equitable tolling sparingly, and the
burden is on the petitioner to show that it is warranted. Griffin
v. Rogers, 399 F.3d 626, 635 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing /rwin v.
Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990)). We
review a district court’s decision to refuse equitable tolling de
novo. Dunlap v. United States, 250 F.3d 1001, 1008 (6th Cir.
2001).

The one-year limitation period prescribed by AEDPA
for habeas actions is a statute of limitation, not a jurisdictional
limitation, and therefore is subject to equitable tolling. /d. at
1007. To decide whether equitable tolling applies, this court
weighs the following five factors: “(1) the petitioner’s lack of
notice of the filing requirement; (2) the petitioner’s lack of
constructive knowledge of the filing requirement; (3)
diligence in pursuing one’s rights; (4) absence of prejudice to
the respondent; and (5) the petitioner’s reasonableness in
remaining ignorant of the legal requirement for filing his
claim.” /d. at1008 (citing Andrews v. Orr, 851 F.2d 146, 151
(6" Cir.1988)). These factors are not necessarily
comprehensive and are not relevant in all cases. Cook v.

Stegall, 295 F.3d 517, 521 (6th Cir. 2002).

A-4

For brevity, the Andrews factors are combined for
analysis. Merging the first, second and fifth factors, Jagodka
argues that he lacked actual and constructive knowledge of
the § 2244(d) filing requirement because he was only 16 years
old at the time he pleaded no contest, a probation officer
found him to be relatively immature for his age, and he was
sentenced only six months after AEDPA became effective.
However, Jagodka failed to allege any material impediment
to his filing a timely application.

Jagodka argues that he was too young and immature
to understand his rights, disregarding the findings of fact
made at sentencing regarding his maturity and age. We have,
in an unpublished opinion, implicitly rejected this argument.
See Starnes v. United States, No. 99-5144, 18 Fed. Appx.
288, 293 (6th Cir. Aug. 22, 2001) (noting that “courts are
reluctant to find that a lack of actual notice of the AEDPA, or
ignorance of the law in general, may excuse a late filing.”’).
Additionally, although Jagodka asserts that his untimeliness
should be excused because only six months passed between
his sentencing and AEDPA’s effective date, this argument is

misleading. He had two years from his sentencing—not six

months-to file a timely habeas petition. He was sentenced on

November 14, 1996, and the habeas statute of limitations
expired on November 14, 1998. AEDPA had long been in
effect by the time his habeas petition was due.

The third factor to consider is the degree of diligence
exhibited by the petitioner in pursuing his rights. Jagodka
delayed from 1996 until 2001 to begin the necessary state
appeals. He attempts to excuse this inactivity by arguing that
his grandparents could not afford legal counsel for him during
that time. However unfortunate, this is no excuse, as no
constitutional nght to an attorney in state post-conviction
proceedings exists. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S, 722,757
(1991). Additionally, Jagodka has offered no evidence that he
pursued his rights in any way between sentencing and the
filing of this petition — even using appellate counsel the state
court offered to appoint for the purposes of direct review.
Because Jagodka was not wrongfully deprived of appellate
counsel, no adequate justification exists for his delay.

The fourth and final prong, prejudice to respondent,
need not be reached “unless the other factors of the test are
met.” See Dunlap, 250 F.3d at 1009. In light of the Andrews
factors, Jagodka has not met his burden to demonstrate
entitlement to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations.

AFFIRMED.

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING

REQUEST FOR CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY,
FILED APRIL 30, 2004

B-1 through B-4

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION
JASON JAGODKA,
Petitioner, Case Number: 03-72267
V. HONORABLE ARTHUR J. TARNOW

BLAINE C. LAFLER,
Respondent.

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING REQUEST
FOR CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Petitioner Jason Jagodka, through his attorney, filed a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 D.S.C. §
2254. On February 26, 2004, the Court issued an Opinion
and Order Granting Respondent's Motion for Summary
Judgment and Dismissing Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.
Petitioner has filed a Notice of Appeal. Thus, the Court must
determine whether Petitioner is entitled to a certificate of
appealability (COA). See Castro v. United States, 310 F.3d
900,901 -02 (6" Cir. 2002) (holding that "a district judge must

issue or deny a COA if an applicant files a notice of appeal"

without awaiting the filing of an application for a COA).

B-1

"When a habeas applicant seeks permission to initiate
appellate review of the dismissal of his petition,” a federal
court should "limit its examination to a threshold inquiry into
the underlying merit of his claims.” Miler-El v. Cockrell, 123
S. Ct. 1029, 1039 (2003). A certificate of appealability may
be issued "only if the applicant has made a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. §
2253(c)(2). The substantial showing threshold is satisfied

when a petitioner demonstrates "‘that reasonable jurists could
debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition
should have been resolved in a different manner or that the
issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to
proceed further."" Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484

(2000) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 at 893, n.4

(1983)). When a prisoner's habeas corpus petition was denied
on procedural grounds, a certificate of appealability "should
issue. . .if the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason
would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid
claim of the denial of a constitutional right, and that jurists of
reason would find it debatable whether the district court was

correct in its procedural ruling." Id.

B-2

The Court denied Petitioner's habeas corpus petition
because it was not timely filed. Petitioner's conviction became
final on November 19, 1997, when the time for filing a direct
appeal in state court expired. See M.C.R. 7.204(A)(2) &
7.205(F). Therefore, absent state collateral review, Petitioner
was required to file his petition for a writ of habeas corpus by
November 19, 1998, to comply with the one-year limitations
period. Petitioner sought state collateral review of his
conviction. However, on November 19, 1997, the date the
limitations period commenced, Petitioner had no application
for collateral review pending. He did not file his motion for
relief from judgment until January 12, 2001. Thus, the
limitations period commenced on November 19, 1997, and
continued to run, uninterrupted, until it expired on November
19, 1998. Petitioner's motion for relief from judgment was
not filed until over two years after the limitations period
expired and, consequently, this Court held it did not serve to
toll the limitations period. :

Petitioner also failed to allege that there existed any
impediment to his filing a timely application, that his claim

involves a newly-recognized constitutional right or newly-

B-3

discovered facts, or that he is actually innocent. The Court,
therefore, held that the petition was untimely.

My ego tells me that all reasonable jurists would agree
with my decision that the petition was not timely filed. My
experience is opposite. Thus, my belief that this was the
correct decision should not insulate that decision from further

review. See Taylor v. Howes, 26 Fed. Appx. 397, 399 (6" Cir.

2001). Because the Court is not infallible and does not believe
that its decision should be insulated from further review, the
Court finds that reasonable jurists could find it debatable
whether this Court was correct in its procedural ruling and
whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a
constitutional right. See Slack, 529 U.S. at 484. Therefore, the
Court shall grant a certificate of appealability for
consideration of the timeliness of the petition.

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS
ORDERED that Petitioner's Request for Certificate of
Appealability is GRANTED.

/s/ Arthur J. Tarnow
ARTHUR J. TARNOW
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

DATE: _ April 30, 2004

APPENDIX C

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
RESPONDENT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND DISMISSING
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS,
FILED FEBRUARY 26, 2004

C-1 through C-6

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION
JASON JAGODKA,
Petitioner, Case Number: 03-72267
V. HONORABLE ARTHUR J, TARNOW

BLAINE C. LAFLER,
Respondent.

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT AND DISMISSING PETITION FOR
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

I. Introduction
Petitioner Jason Paul Jagodka, through his attorney,
has filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner is currently incarcerated at the
Saginaw Correctional Facility in Freeland, Michigan. Before
the Court is Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment and

Dismissal of Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

II. Procedural History
On August 21, 1996, Petitioner pleaded no contest in

Monroe County Circuit Court to second-degree murder and
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. On
November 14, 1996, he was sentenced to twenty-five to fifty
years imprisonment for the second-degree murder conviction,
to be served consecutively to two years imprisonment for the
felony-firearm conviction. Petitioner did not file a direct
appeal of his conviction or sentence.

On January 12,2001, Petitioner filed a motion for
relief from judgment in the trial court. The trial court denied
the motion on April 23, 2001. People v. Jagodka, No. 96-
27613 (Monroe County Circuit Court Apr. 23, 2001).
Petitioner filed a delayed application for leave to appeal the
trial court's decision in the Michigan Court of Appeals. The
Michigan Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal. People v.
Jagodka, No. 240512 (Mich. Ct. App. June 25, 2002).
Petitioner then filed a delayed application for leave to appeal

in the Michigan Supreme Court. The Michigan Supreme

Court denied leave to appeal. People v. Jagodka, 468 Mich.
853 (Mich. Feb. 28, 2003). Petitioner filed a motion for

reconsideration, which was denied. People v. Jagodka, No.
122180 (Mich. May 30, 2003).
On June 12, 2003, Petitioner, through his attorney,

filed the pending petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
III. Analysis

Respondent has filed a Motion for Summary Judgment
on the ground that the petition for habeas corpus relief was
not timely filed. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214
("AEDPA" or "the Act") applies to all habeas petitions filed
after the effective date of the Act, April 24, 1996. Petitioner's
application for habeas corpus relief was filed after April 24,
1996. Therefore, the provisions of the AEDPA, including the

limitations period for filing an application for habeas corpus

relief, apply to Petitioner's application. Lindh v. Murphy, 521
U.S. 320, 337 (1997).

The AEDPA amended 28 U.S.C. § 2244 to include a
one-year limitations period within which habeas petitions
challenging state court judgments must be filed. A prisoner is

required to file a federal habeas corpus petition within one

year of:

the date on which the judgment of conviction became
final by the conclusion of direct review or the
expiration of the time for seeking such review.
28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d)(1)(A).
However, the time during which a prisoner seeks
collateral review of a conviction does not count toward the
limitations period. Section 2244( d)(2) provides:

The time during which a properly filed application for
post-conviction or other collateral review with respect
to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not
be counted toward any period of limitation under this
subsection.

28 U.S.C. § 2244( d)(2).

In the pending case, Petitioner's conviction became
final on November 19, 1997, when the time for filing a direct
appeal in state court expired. See M.C.R. 7.204(A)(2) &
7.205(F). Therefore, absent state collateral review, Petitioner
was required to file his petition for a writ of habeas corpus by
November 19, 1998, to comply with the one-year limitations
period. Petitioner sought state collateral review of his
conviction. However, on November 19, 1997, the date the
limitations period commenced, Petitioner had no application

for collateral review pending. He did not file his motion for

C-4

relief from judgment until January 12,2001. Thus, the
limitations period commenced on November 19, 1997, and
continued to run, uninterrupted, until it expired on November
19, 1998.

Petitioner's motion for relief from judgment was not
filed until over two years after the limitations period expired
and, consequently, did not serve to toll the limitations period.
Petitioner fails to allege that there existed any impediment to
his filing a timely application, that his claim involves a
newly-recognized constitutional night or newly-discovered
facts, or that he is actually innocent. Therefore, Petitioner has
failed to present any circumstances which would warrant
equitable tolling of the limitations period.

Accordingly, Petitioner's application f6r a writ of
habeas corpus ts barred by the one-year statute of] imitations.
IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that the
habeas corpus petition was filed outside the one-year
limitations period prescribed in 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d)(1)(A).
Further, the Court concludes that Petitioner has failed to

establish that he 1s entitled to equitable tolling of the

limitations period.

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that the Respondent's
Motion for Summary Disposition and Dismissal of Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the petition fora
writ of habeas corpus is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).

/s/ Arthur J. Tarnow
ARTHUR J. TARNOW
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

DATE: _ February 26, 2004

APPENDIX D

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

JUDGMENT,
FILED FEBRUARY 26, 2004

D-1 through D-2

‘UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION
JASON JAGODKA,
Petitioner, Case Number: 03-72267
V. HONORABLE ARTHUR J. TARNOW

BLAINE C. LAFLER,
Respondent.

JUDGMENT

The above entitled matter having come before the
Court on a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Honorable
Arthur J. Tarnow, a United States District Judge, presiding,
and in accordance with the Memorandum Opinion and Order
entered on February 26, 2004.

IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the
Petition for Habeas Corpus is DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.

Dated at Detroit, Michigan, this 26" Day of February,
2004.

D-]

DAVID J. WEAVER

CLERK OF THE COURT
BY: _/s/ Cathe A. Pickles

Deputy Clerk

Approved:

ARTHUR J. TARNOW
ARTHUR J. TARNOW
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

D-2

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386016_0561%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.