# Appendix — Whorton v. Collier (No. 05-589)

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386016_0435%3A2

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 2005

## Text

by a state court if the decision of that court rests on a state
law ground that is independent of the federal question
and adequate to support the judgment.” Id. The Court
explained, "The doctrine applies to bar federal habeas
when a state court declined to address a prisoner's
federal claims because the prisoner had failed to meet a
state procedural requirement." Id. at 729-30.

[1] In order for a state procedural rule to preclude
federal review, the rule must be “firmly established and
regularly followed." Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 423-24,
111 S.Ct. 850, 112 L.Ed.2d 935 (1991). The Ninth Circuit
has elaborated that ‘a state rule must be clear,
consistently applied, and well-established at the time of
the petitioner's purported default." Calderon v. United
States District Court (Bean), 9 F3d 1126, 1129
(9th Cir.1996) (quoting Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d 1005, 1010
(9th Cir.1994)). [FN5] If a state procedural rule is not
well-established before a petitioner supposedly breaks
the rule, then the rule cannot prevent federal review of
the petitioner's federal claims. Although the state is not
required “to articulate every permutation of every rule,
Bargas v. Burns, 179 F.3d 1207, 1213 (9th Cir.1999), a rule
held generally adequate can be deemed inadequate as
applied to particular unique circumstances, Lee v. Kemna,
534 US. 362, 376, 122 S.Ct. 877, 151 L.Ed.2d 820 (2002)
Once a petitioner has demonstrated the inadequacy of a
rule, the state bears the ultimate burden of proving the
rule bars federal review. Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573,
585-86 (9th Cir.2003). [FN6]

ENS. The dissent argues that the petitioner must cite
cases in which a procedural bar is applied inconsistently.
Dissent at 6245. Inconsistency is only one aspect of the
principle that a state's procedural bar must be adequate.
This court has repeatedly said the state's rule must be

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clear, consistently applied, and well-established. Sev ¢.yv
Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1052 (9th Cir.2004);
Melendez v. Warden, 288 F.3d 1120, 1122 (9th Cir.2002)
lackson v. Calderon, 211 F.3d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir.2000). The
emphasis in the case before us is whether the rule was
well-established. We, obviously, do not require a habeas
petitioner to show inconsistency in application when the
problem with the rule is that the rule is not clear or well-
established and has never been applied to the unique
circumstances of his case

FN6. The Ninth Circuit explained the state's burden for
proving the adequacy of a state rule, saying

Once the state has adequately pled
the existence of an independent and
adequate state procedural ground as an
affirmative defense, the burden to place
that defense in issue shifts to the
petitioner. The petitioner may satisfy this
burden by asserting specific factual
allegations that demonstrate the
inadequacy of the state procedure,
including citation to authority
demonstrating inconsistent application ot
the rule. Once having done so, however,
the ultimate burden is the state's

Powell v. Lambert, 357 F.3d 871, 875 (9th Cir.2004) (quoting
Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 586 (9th Cir.2003))

This standard for determining the adequacy of

state procedural bars is w ell-established in federal habeas

law. The dissent accuses the majority of creating ‘a

radical new rule of law which shifts the burden of proof
from the prisoner to the State." Dissent at 1289. The
dissent confuses a disagreement over the interpretation of
Nevada state law with a conflict over the federal habeas
standard. In this opinion we hold that Collier met his
burden by establishing that no state rule was adequately
established to bar his state habeas petition. Only then do
we shift the burden to the state, as the standard demands.
This is merely an application of the federal habeas
standard as it stands today. This holding makes no new
habeas law. State procedural rules must also be
independent to preclude federal review. As Collier
challenges only the adequacy of Nevada's procedural
rule, not its independence, we do not address the
independence prong.

The Nevada procedural rule at issue is a one-year time
limit for tiling a habeas corpus petition. The relevant law states:

Unless there is good cause shown
for delay, a petition that challenges the
validity of a judgment of sentence must be
filed within 1 vear after entry of the
judgment of conviction or, if an appeal
has been taken from the judgment, within
| year after the supreme court issues its
remittitur. For the purposes of his
subsection, good cause for delay exists if
the petitioner demonstrates to the
satisfaction of the court:

(a) That the delay is not the
fault of the petitioner; and

(b) That dismissal of the
petition as untimely will
unduly prejudice the
petitioner

Nev.Rev.Stat. 34.726(1). This court previously
found that the Nevada Supreme Court generally applies
this time limit consistently to habeas petitions. See, e.g
Loveland v. Hatcher, 231 F.3d 640, 643 (9th Cir.2000); Moran
v. McDaniel, 80 F.3d 1261, 1268-70 (9th Cir.1996). The
adequacy of this general time bar, however, is not at issue
here. The issues for review are specific to the application
of this rule in Collier's case. First, was it clear and well-
established in Nevada law that the original judgment, not
the amended judgment of conviction starts the one-year
time limit? Second, was it clear and well-established in
Nevada law that a motion to correct an illegal sentence
does not toll the one-year time limit?

B. Amended judgments

[2] The plain language of Nev.Rev Stat. 34.726(1)
does not distinguish between original judgments of
conviction and amended judgments of conviction. Until
recently, there was little in Nevada statutory or case law
to offer guidance on this issue. [FN7]| Then, on September
3, 2004, the Nevada Supreme Court published an opinion
holding that amended judgments of conviction do not
automatically re-start the time clock under Nev.Rev Stat
34.726(1). Sullivan v. Nevada, 96 P3d 761, 764 (Nev.2004)
Instead, an amended judgment of conviction may, if

proved, qualify as “good cause" under Nev.Rev.Stat
§ 34.726(1)(a), thus allowing for additional appeals. Id
The Nevada Supreme Court said

FN7. In 1888, the Nevada Supreme Court denied a
motion for a new trial in a civil case where the trial
court's clerk had entered the wrong name on the
judgment. Burbank v. Rivers, 20 Nev. 159, 18 P. 753 (1888).
The Nevada Supreme Court found the clerical error did
not extend the time for filing an appeal. Id. at 755. The
court said that to prevail on such a basis, the petitioner
must “affirmatively show, to the satisfaction of this court,
that he was deceived or misled by the entry as made.” /d.
Burbank is not instructive in the case before us. First, the
amendment to Collier's judgment was not a clerical error.
The trial court failed to include the basis for the
judgment: the statute under which Collier was sentenced.
Second, the Burbank case is not cited by the state courts as
grounds for the state courts’ opinions in this case. The
Burbank_rule (if such a rule exists) is not at issue here.
Finally, the Burbank case has not been cited by a Nevada
state court since 1921. See Bottini v. Mongolo, 45 Nev. 245,
197 P. 702, 704 (1921). Nowhere is it cited in the State's
briefing materials. The dissent's shaking the dust off a
century old rule, not used by the state courts in eighty
years, does not establish the rule as adequate under
federal habeas law. We do not reject the rule because it is
old, we reject it because it is not well-established.

We emphasize, however, that the entry of
an amended judgment may in and of
*1286 itself provide the good cause
required by that statute to present
appropriate post-conviction claims
relating to the amendment at issue. In
other words, if the claims presented in a
petition filed within one vear of the entry
of the amended judgment challenge the
proceedings leading to a_ substantive

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amendment of the judgment and could
not have been raised in prior proceedings,
there may be no delay attributable to the
“fault of the petitioner."

ld. As Sullivan was decided only recently, such a
rule cannot be held clearly and well-established at the
time Collier filed his motion to correct an illegal sentence
in 1997. Notably, the Nevada Supreme Court does not
cite a single statute, rule, or case standing for the
proposition that amended judgments of conviction do not
automatically re-start the one-year tme clock under
Nev.Rev Stat. 34.726(1). The two cases noted in the
discussion, Dickerson v. State, 114 Nev. 1084, 967 P.2d 1132
(1998) and Pellegrini v. State, 117 Nev. 860, 34 P.3d 519
(2001), are cited only to illustrate the legislature's general
intent in enacting Nev.Rev.Stat. 34.726(1). Sullivan, 96
P.3d at 764 nn. 7 & 10-11. There is scant evidence that
amended judgments of conviction did not re-start the
one-year clock at the time of Collier's default.

[3] The dissent would give substantial weight to
Morrell v. Edwards, 98 Nev. 91, 640 P.2d 1322 (1982). In
that case, the Nevada Supreme Court created a rule
governing when the time for an appeal in the civi/ context
may start anew after an amended judgment. The court
stated that whether ‘an appeal is properly taken from an
amended judgment rather than the judgment originally
entered depends upon whether the amendment
disturbed or revised legal rights and obligations which
the prior judgment had plainly and properly settled with
finality.” Id. at 1324. The Nevada Supreme Court has
never applied this standard in a criminal case. The
standard for criminal cases, as established in 2004, is

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whether the issues presented in the appeal relate to a
substantive change in the amended judgment. Sullivan, 96
P.3d at 764. Rules for civil appeals do not dictate
procedure for criminal habeas appeals. The Nevada
Supreme Court has specifically said, "this court has
consistently and repeatedly held that rules of civil
appellate procedure are not applicable to appeals from
statutory post-conviction habeas corpus proceedings."
Klein v. Warden, 118 Nev. 305, 43 P.3d 1029, 1033 (2002).
The rule establishing when amended judgments allow a
new period to file habeas appeals was decided by the
Nevada Supreme Court's holding in Sullivan in 2004.
L[FN8] Because this rule was not adequately established, if
at all, prior to 2004, it cannot bar federal habeas review in
Collier's case. [FN9]

FN8. The first footnote of the Nevada Supreme Court's
Opinion states that the court had previously disposed of
the case in an unpublished disposition on March 5, 2004.
The government then filed a motion seeking publication
of the decision. "Cause appearing, [the Court granted] the
State's motion to publish." Sullivan, 96 P.3d_ at 762 n. 1.
The cause for publication is not mentioned. Given the
lack of guidance on this issue in prior opinions, the need
for publication is consistent with the need to establish the
rule.

ENY. The dissent suggests that because Collier cannot
show cases illustrating an inconsistent application of such
> rule Collier's claim fails. Dissent at 1292. The dissent
completely ignores the well-established prong of the
standard for determining, adequacy. See supra at 1294-95.
Collier has shown this state procedural rule did not exist
prior to 2004 and the government has fatied its burden to
show it was adequately established

A-18

C. Motions to correct an illegal sentence

[4] The second procedural rule at issue is whether
a motion to correct an illegal sentence tolls the one-year
clock under Nev.Rev.Stat. 34.726(1). The question is
whether a motion to correct an illegal sentence is an
appeal ... from the judgment" as stated in Nev.Rev Stat
34.726(1). Collier's motions to correct an illegal sentence
were properly filed under Nevada state law. The state
district court considered Collier's first motion and
amended his judgment of conviction. Both the Nevada
district court and the Nevada Supreme Court considered
his second motion and denied it on the merits. Collier
filed his federal habeas petition after the Nevada
Supreme Court's remittitur on his state habeas petition
When Collier filed his motion to correct an illegal
sentence, there was little in Nevada's state law to guide
the courts’ understanding of whether these motions are
an appeal from judgment, thus tolling the period for
filing a habeas petition under Nev.Rev.Stat. 34.726(1)
Then, after Collier filed his motion to correct an illegal
sentence, the Nevada Supreme Court gave form to these
words in Dickerson v. State, 967 P.2d at 1133-34. There-the
court held only timely direct appeals qualified as appeals
tolling the one-vear time limit. [FN10] Jd. The Court held

FNIO. Because the Dickerson case was decided after
Collier filed his motion to correct an illegal sentence, it is
not determinative in this case. Thus we need not explore
whether under Nevada state law motions to correct an
illegal sentence are direct appeals

We now construe [Nev Rev Stat.]

44.726(1) to mean that the one-vear period

for filing a post-conviction habeas corpus
petition begins to run from the issuance of
the remittitur from a timely direct appeal
to this court from the judgment of
conviction or from the entry of the
judgment of conviction if no direct appeal
is taken. A timely direct appeal is one in
which the notice of appeal is filed with the
district court within the time period
prescribed by statute.

ld. Dickerson was decided in 1998 and Collier filed
his motion to correct an illegal sentence in 1997. [FN11]
Collier cannot be held accountable for rules established
after his purported breach. See Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S.
411, 424, 111 S.Ct. 850, 112 L.Ed.2d 935 (1991); Petrocelli v.
Angelone, 248 F.3d 877, 885 (9th Cir.2001).

FN11. The dissent relies heavily on Dickerson, 114 Nev.
1084, 967 P.2d 1132, and the NRAP 4(b). Dissent at 1298-
99. Neither is controlling here. Dickerson was decided
after Collier's purported breach. NRAP 4(b) established
tolling mechanisms for direct appeals, not habeas appeals.
It is inapplicable to the question of whether a motion to
correct an illegal sentence tolls the time period for filing a
habeas appeal. Furthermore, NRAP 4(b) does not govern
motions to correct an illegal sentence. Such motions, as
the Respondent and the dissent concede, need not be
tiled within thirty days of judgment as NRAP 4(b)
requires. Collier's motions to correct an illegal sentence
were timely and were addressed on the merits by the
Nevada courts

The government concedes it was in Dickerson
where the tolling provisions in Nev.Rev.Stat. 34.726(1)

A-20

were narrowed to apply only to a “timely direct appeal."
Dickerson, 967 P.2d at 1133. Nonetheless, the government
argues such a rule “necessarily follows" from a prior
Nevada Supreme Court decision in Edwards v. State,
112 Nev. 704, 918 P.2d 321 (1996). In Edwards, the Nevada
Supreme Court explained that motions to correct an
illegal sentence are special because they attack a sentence
that is “either facially illegal or is the result of a mistaken
assumption regarding a criminal defendant's record, time
constraints and procedural defaults necessarily do not
apply." Id. at 324. The Nevada Supreme Court's
discussion of motions to correct an illegal sentence (and
like appeals) in Edwards emphasizes that these motions
are free from the various constraints and time limits
restricting access to other appeals. In particular these
motions are exempted from the limitations *1288 on
habeas’ petitions. Id; Nev.Rev.Stat. 34.724(2)(a).
Suggesting it "necessarily follows" from the discussion in
Edwards that motions to correct an illegal sentence (and
similar motions) limit an individual's ability to pursue
habeas relief completely mischaracterizes the Edwards
opinion. The Nevada Supreme Court's emphasis in
Edwards is on narrowly defining this type of appeal while
emphasizing broad access to it. Petitioners suffering
under the errors challenged by motions to correct an
illegal sentence are free of the procedural hurdles placed
on other types of appeals. It is disingenuous to suggest
Lidwards interpreted the phrase "an appeal has been taken
from the judgment" in Nev.Rev.Stat. 34.726(1) to exclude
motions to correct an illegal sentence. The Nevada
Supreme Court considered no such question. Twisting
the court's words to create such a meaning does not
establish a clear, consistently applied, and well-
established rule

A-21

Today, because of the Dickerson decision, the
confusion present during Collier's appeal does not exist.
[FN12] Defendant-Appellants know they may pursue
habeas relief only within one year “from the issuance of
the remittitur from a timely direct appeal to this court
from the judgment of conviction or from the entry of the
judgment of conviction if no direct appeal is taken.’

Dickerson, 967 P.2d at 1133-34

FN12. The dissent suggests that every prisoner in Nevada
convicted prior to September 3, 2004 will be able to file a
meritless motion to correct an illegal sentence en route to
filing a state habeas petition. Dissent at 1289-90. This
assertion is unwarranted. In this case, the petitioner's
motion to correct an illegal sentence was granted and he
filed his second motion to correct an illegal sentence
within the one-year period for filing an appeal. His
motions were properly filed and considered on the merits
by the Nevada state courts. If a person were able to
replicate this unlikely pattern and they were convicted
prior to the Nevada Supreme Court's opinion in Dickerson
v. Nevada, 114 Nev. 1084, 967 P.2d 1132 (1998) (holding
motions to correct an illegal sentence are not an appeal
from a judgment) then they could and should be able to
file their habeas appeal. No state rule was established to
the contrary prior to the Dickerson opinion

Conclusion

The Nevada procedural rules applied by the
Nevada state courts to bar Colliers habeas petition are
not adequate to preclude federal review of his habeas
petition. The rules applving Nev Rev Stat. 4.726(1) were
not clear, consistently applied, and well-established at the

\-22

time of Collier's purported defauit. When Collier filed his
motion to correct an illegal sentence in 1997 and
subsequent habeas petitions, it appeared under state law
a habeas petition could follow a remittitur from such an
appeal and amended judgment. The district court's
opinion is reversed and the appeal is remanded for
consideration on the merits.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

BEA, Circuit Judge, dissenting

| respectfully dissent because the majority's
opinion allows a petitioner for writ of habeas corpus to
mock the Nevada statutory deadline for filing a habeas
petition from a judgment of conviction, simply by filing
one or any number of motions to correct an illegal
sentence, no matter how moeretricious the motions
Henceforth, any prisoner convicted before the effective
date of Sullivan v. Nevada, 96 P3d 761 (Nev.2004)—
September 3, 2004 — will be able to file a baseless motion
to correct an illegal sentence as a prelude to filing a
Nevada state habeas petition on the ground that the
denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence creates
a one-year opportunity to file a habeas petition. | disagree
with the majority's analysis on three major points

First, it was well-established in Nevada law that a
motion to correct an illegal sentence did not either re-start
or toll [FN1] the one-year time limit in which to file a
habeas petition under Nevada Revised Statutes ("NRS") §
4.726(1). The majority opinion confuses appeals and
habeas petitions, both of which are used to attack the

merits of a judgment of conviction, with a motion to

correct an illegal sentence, which is used only when the
judgment contains a sentence that is invalid under the
statutory sentencing scheme, or when the district court
sentenced the defendant based on a misunderstanding of
the defendant's prior criminal record. Just as important,
there is no basis in the language of Nev. Rev. Stat.
§ 34.726(1) to conclude that a motion to correct an illegal
sentence either re-starts or tolls the time in which to file a
state habeas petition.

EN1. This is not to suggest that Collier's motions to
correct an illegal sentence were filed during the one-year
period when there was time to "toll," ic. stop the running
of the time to file a habeas petition. Indeed, the one year
had run both from the judgment (July 5, 1995) and the
amended judgment (March 26, 1997), when Collier filed
his habeas petition

on May 28, 1999.

Second, the majority opinion arrives at its
conclusion by placing the burden on the State to cite this
court to a prior case in’ which Collier's precise argument
was rejected by the Nevada Supreme Court to prove that
Nevada's one-year time limit to file a habeas petition
under NRS § 34.726(1) was well-established law. This is a
radical new rule of law which shifts the burden of proof
from the prisoner to the State, without the benefit of an
en bane or Supreme Court ruling that mandates such a
burden shift. Heretofore, where the State has pleaded a
procedural bar and the defendant challenges the
adequacy of a State's procedural bar, it is first the
petitioners burden to prove the procedural bar is
inadequate. Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 586
(9th Cir.2003). Only if the petitioner proves the
procedural bar is inadequate does the burden then shift

A-24

to the State to prove the procedural bar is adequate. Here,
Collier failed in his initial burden of proof. The majority
opinion now relieves petitioners of that burden.

Further, the majority presumes that a statute is not
well-established law unless a court has ruled that the
statute means what it says. This ruling will lead to all
sorts of mischief. Habeas petitioners have a duty to
follow the plain language of a State's procedural rules,
even where no State court has yet rejected the precise
attempt made by the petitioner to circumvent those rules.
Bargas v. Burns, 179 F.3d 1207, 1211 (9th Cir.1999).
Third, even if the amended judgment of conviction did
start anew the time period in which Collier could file an
appeal, which I contend it could not, Collier's habeas
petition was filed more than one year after the date of
entry of the amended judgment of conviction. Hence,
Collier's habeas petition was still barred under
NRS § 34.726(1). The only way Collier's appeal from the
amended judgment of conviction could be timely is if his
second motion to correct an illegal sentence re-started the
time for him to appeal from the amended judgment. Of
course, a motion to correct an illegal sentence cannot
revive the time in which to appeal after that time has run
out; is also not one of the few motions which toll the time
in which to appeal a judgment of conviction in a criminal
case under Nevada Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b).

I. Procedural History

The precise chronology of events is important in
this case. On May 17, 1995, Collier pleaded guilty to

A-25

Count | of the Amended Information, which charged him
with violating NRS §§ 453.3385 and 453.3405 for
possession of a trafficking quantity of a controlled
substance. Collier and the State entered into a plea
bargain in which Collier agreed to a 45-year sentence. In
exchange, the district attorney dismissed the other ten
charges filed against Collier. [FN2]

FN2. Collier had been charged with eleven drug
trafficking offenses. After Collier's arrest, a substantial
amount of methamphetamine, ephedrine, and marijuana
was found in Collier's storage shed, along with
\%) weapons and narcotics paraphernalia. | add these
details lest a reader of the majority opinion come away
with the impression that Collier was an unfortunate
bystander who infelicitously fell captive to the wares of a
government plant.

At the time Collier entered his plea, the maximum
sentence under NRS § 453.3385 for a drug trafficking
offense was life in prison and a $100,000 fine. Nev. Rev.
Stat. § 453.3385(2) (1993). Five days before Collier was
sentenced, the Nevada legislature changed the law, and
the maximum sentence became fifteen years. Nev. Rev
Stat. § 453.3385(2)(1995). The new version of
NRS § 453.3385(2) specifically stated, however, that it did
not apply to any offense committed before its effective date
of July 1, 1995. Id. The Amended Information, to which
Collier pleaded guilty, stated that Collier committed a
violation of NRS § 453.3385 on March 12, 1994, over a year
before the effective date of the new statute. Therefore, the
amended statute did not apply to Collier's case

Collier was sentenced in accordance with the plea
agreement, and a final judgment of conviction was
entered against him on July 5, 1995. The judgment stated
that Collier was guilty of Count | of the Amended
Information and the court sentenced him to 45 years
imprisonment and assessed a $100,000 fine

Collier then had 30 days to file an appeal attacking
his judgment of conviction or to extend the 30-day period
by filing one or more specific motions which, under
NRAP 4(b), serve to toll the running of that 30-day

period:

In a criminal case, the notice of
appeal by a defendant shall be filed in the
district court within thirty (30) davs after
the entry of the judgment or order
appealed from.... If a timely motion in
arrest of judgment [FN3}] or for a new trial
on any ground other than newly
discovered evidence |[FN4] has been
made, an appeal from a iudgment of
conviction may be taken within thirty (303
days after entry of an order denying the
motion. A motion for a new trial based on
the ground of newly discovered evidence
will similarly extend the time for appeal
from a judgment of conviction if the
motion is made before or within thirty
(30) days after entry of the judgment

FN3. A motion in arrest of judgment must be filed within

7 davs after a determination of guilt or within such

further time as the court may fix during the 7-day period
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 176.525 (1995)

EN4. A motion for a new trial that is not based on newly
discovered evidence must be filed within 7 days after the
verdict or finding of guilt. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 176.515
(1995).

Nev. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(1995).

Collier did not file a direct appeal within 30 days after the
entry of the judgment of conviction, nor did he file either
a motion in arrest of judgment or a motion for new trial.
Therefore, the right to appeal his judgment of conviction
expired on August 4, 1995.

Because Collier did not file a timely appeal, he
then had one year after the entry of his judgment of
conviction to file a habeas petition under Nevada law:

Unless there is good cause shown for
delay, a petition that chailenges the
validity of a judgment or sentence must
be filed within 1 year after entry of the
judgment of conviction or, if an appeal
has been taken from the judgment, within
1 year arter the Supreme Court issues its
remittitur. For the purposes of this
subsection, good cause for delay exists if
the petitioner demonstrates to the
satisfaction of the court:

(a) That the delay is not the fault of
the petitioner; and

A-28

(b) That dismissal of the petition as
untimely will unduly prejudice the
petitioner

Nev. Rev. Stat. § 34.726(1) (1995). Collier failed to
file a habeas petition by July 5, 1996. His right to file a
habeas petition expired on that date, absent good cause
for the delay.

On March 21, 1997, over 8 months after his appeal
and habeas opportunities had expired because of the
passage of time, Collier filed a pro se motion to correct an
illegal sentence under NRS § 176.555. In his motion,
Collier set forth the language of Count I to which he had
pleaded guilty. He moved the court to amend the
judgment to include the statute numbers to which he
pleaded guilty, NRS §§ 453.3385 and 453.3405. [FN5] As a
second ground for his motion, Collier quoted the revised
version of NRS § 453.3385 and moved the court to limit
his sentence to 2 years, down from the 45 vears he agreed
to earlier. Coilier did not claim that he was ever confused
as to the statute under which he was convicted. The
statutes were spelled out in the Amended Information
and plea agreement, and Collier himself set them forth in
his motion to correct an illegal sentence

FN5. Why this punctiliousness? Perhaps Collier thought

that if he got the court to put in the statute number he
could argue the now revised statute would apply and he
was being held illegally. He was conveniently forgetting
that the revised statute, by its own terms, did not apply to
crimes committed betore its effective date of July 1, 1995

A-29

Since Collier committed the offense on March 12, 1994,
regardless whether the statute number was listed in his
judgment, the revised statute does not apply to Collier's
case. But one must remember, Collier was acting pro se

On March 26, 1997, the Nevada state district court
issued an amended judgment of conviction, in effect
granting his motion that the judgment recite the statute
numbers under which he was convicted. The amended
judgment now specified that Collier had been found
guilty of NRS §§ 453.3385 and 453.3405. The court did
not, March 26, 1997. Collier did not file a habeas petition
before March 26, 1998.

FN6. This is precisely in keeping with the Nevada
Supreme Court's ruling in Burbank v. Rivers, 20 Nev. 159,
I8 P. 753, 755 (1888), discussed imfra. The date of the
judgment does not change when it is amended to correct
a clerical mistake, as was the case here.

On May 20, 1997, Collier tiled a second pro se
motion to correct an illegal sentence based on the same
grounds as his first motion to correct an illegal sentence.
[EN7Z]however, grant the second part of his motion; it
retused to reduce Collier's sentence by 43 vears. As the
majority correctly noted, "the amended judgment did not
change the sentence.” Maj. Op. at 6221. In fact, the
amended judgment of conviction even kept the original
date: "Dated this 5th day of July, 1995." [FN6] Collier
neither moved for reconsideration of his motion nor did
he appeal the district court's failure to rule on his motion
to limit his sentence to 2 vears, or any other aspect of the
amended judgment entered on

A

FN7. The majority claims Collier filed this second motion
“reviving” his claims asserted in his March 21, 1997
motion. Maj. Op. at 1282. To repeat is not to revive. His
earlier claim had been denied; it was final. The repetition
of his claim did not “relate back" or otherwise seek a
reconsideration of his earlier motion. It was just a second
attempt.

On May 28, 1997, the Nevada state district court
denied Collier's second motion to correct an illegal
sentence. The district court specifically denied Collier's
motion on the merits because, by its terms, the revised
version of NRS § 453.3385 did not apply to his case. This
time, Collier timely appealed the district court's order
denying his second motion to correct an illegal sentence
on June 10, 1997

On November 16, 1998, Collier filed a notice of
appeal from his original judgment of conviction, claiming
his appeal was untimely because his trial counsel did not
inform Collier he had a right to appeal. The Nevada
Supreme Court dismissed Collier's appeal as untimely
under NRAP 4(b) on February 3, 1999. [FN8]

FN8. The Nevada Supreme Court had no power to enlarge
the time for Collier to file his direct appeal. Nev. R. App. P.
26(b) (1995); Walker v. Scully, 99 Nev. 45, 657 P.2d 94 (1983).
Neither could the court have extended the time for Collier
to file either a motion in arrest of judgment or a motion for
new trial to toll the time to file an appeal. Nev. Rev. Stat. §
178.476 (1995); Culinary & Hotel Serv. Workers Union v.
Haugen, 76 Nev. 424, 357 P.2d 113 (1960) (court did not
have power to extend time to file motion for new trial,
even pursuant *o a stipulation between the parties, and
thus the notice of appeal was untimely).

A-31

On May 13, 1999, the Nevada Supreme Court
affirmed the district court's order denying Collier's
second motion to correct an illegal sentence. The
remittitur was issued on June 11, 1999.

On May 28, 1999, Collier filed a pro se petition for
writ of habeas corpus in the Nevada state district court,
seeking to have all charges against him dismissed. Collier
again claimed his trial counsel failed to inform him that
he had a right to file a _ direct appeal.
On August 20, 1999, the Nevada state district court
dismissed Collier's habeas petition as untimely under
NRS § 34.726(1). It also held that Collier failed to show
good cause for the untimeliness of the petition. On
September 1, 1999, Collier appealed from the state district
court's denial of his habeas petition to the Nevada
Supreme Court.

While Collier's appeal from the denial of his state
habeas petition was pending, he filed a habeas petition in
federal district court through counsel on June 30, 2000.
On August 28, 2001, the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed
the district court's denial of Collier's state habeas petition,
holding that his petition was untimely under
NRS § 24.726(1).

On March 28, 2003, the federal district court denied
Collier's federal habeas petition, holding that the
dismissal of Collier's state habeas petition under
NRS § 34.726(1) precluded federal habeas review because
NRS § 34.726(1) was an independent and adequate state
procedural bar [FN9] and Collier failed to show good
cause for the untimeliness of his state habeas petition.
This timely appeal followed.

A-32

ENY. For a state procedural bar to be an independent and
adequate ground sufficient to support a finding of
procedural default, the rule must be “clear, consistently
applied, and well-established at the time of petitioner's
purported default.” Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d 1005, 1008
(9th Cir.1994). A state procedural rule is adequate if the
state courts follow it “in the vast majority of cases." Moran
v. McDaniel, 80 F.3d 1261, 1270 (9th Cir.1996) (citation
omitted)

Il. Standard of Review

We review de nove the district court's decision to
deny a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition. Nunes v. Mueller,
350 F.3d 1045, 1051 (9th Cir.2003). We review findings of
fact made by the district court for clear error, and “may
atfirm the district court's decision on any ground
supported by the record, even if it differs from the district
court's rationale.” Id

Ill. Analysis

A. Under the Plain Language of NRS § 34.726(1) a
Motion to Correct an [legal Sentence Does Not Re-Start

or Toll the Time in Which to File a Habeas Petition

Regardless whether the original or amended
judgment of conviction is the relevant judgment, Collier's
state habeas petition, filed on May 28, 1999, was untimely
under NRS § 34.726(1) because it was filed more than one
vear after the original judgment was entered on July 5,
1995, and more than one year after the amended
judgment was entered on March 26, 1997, neither of

which did Collier timely appeal

The Nevada Supreme Court has stated that a
motion to correct an illegal sentence is to be used only
when the judgment contains a sentence that is invalid
under the statutory sentencing scheme, or is based on the
district court's misunderstanding of the defendant's
criminal record. Edwards v. State, 112 Nev. 704, 918 P.2d
321, 324-25 (1996).

Here, Collier properly filed a motion to correct an
illegal sentence given that his argument was that his
judgment of conviction failed to recite the statute
numbers under which he was convicted and his sentence
exceeded the statutory maximum. | agree that he was
able to file such motion at any time. Nev. Rev. Stat.
§ 176.555 (1995). But this is a very different proposition
from saying that a motion to correct an illegal sentence
also re-starts or tolls the time in which to file a habeas
petition, which must be filed within one year.

First, a motion to correct an illegal sentence and a
habeas petition are entirely different remedies with
different purposes. Collier's motion to correct an illegal
sentence did not raise the question whether he was justly
convicted. Collier had pleaded guilty. The motion raised
only the question whether Collier was correctly
sentenced for his crime.

On the other hand, a habeas petition is used to
¢*‘tack the validity of a judgment of conviction or sentence
based on alleged errors occurring at trial or sentencing.
Edwards, 918 P.2d at 324-25. A judgment of conviction
encompasses not only a sentence, but also a finding of
guilt. [here are important reasons why the Nevada
legislature has limited the time in which a judgment of
conviction can be attacked collaterally. Witnesses dic,

move away, or forget; evidence is lost. Witnesses and

evidence are irrelevant to a motion to correct a sentence,
particularly where the sentence is negotiated, and
imposed following a guilty plea. That is why timing is
important to a habeas petition, but irrelevant to a motion
to correct a sentence.

Second, under Nevada law a motion to correct an
illegal sentence does not re-start or toll the time in which
to file a habeas petition. Indeed, in Edwards, the Nevada
Supreme Court specifically disapproved of the very tactic
Collier is attempting to use here:

We have observed that defendants are
increasingly filing in_ district court
documents entitled "motion to correct
illegal sentence" or “motion to modify
sentence” to challenge the validity of their
convictions and sentences in violation of
the exclusive remedy provision detailed in
NRS 34.724(2)(b), in an attempt to
circumvent the procedural bars governing
post-conviction petitions for habeas relief
under NRS chapter 34. We have also
observed that the district courts are often
addressing the merits of issues regarding
the validity of convictions or sentences
when such issues are presented in motions
to modify or correct allegedly illegal
sentences without regard for the
procedural bars the legislature has
established. If a motion to correct an illegal
sentence or to modify a sentence raises

issues Outside of the verv narrow scope of

the inherent authority recognized in this

4-35

Opinion, the motion should be summarily
denied.

Id. at 325 n. 2. The majority incorrectly characterizes the
holding of Edwards. It is true that motions to correct an
illegal sentence can be filed at any time. But the filing of a
motion to correct an illegal sentence does not revive, nor
toll, the time in which to file a habeas petition

Further, in Sullivan v. Nevada, 96 P3d 761
(Nev.2004), the Nevada Supreme Court considered a case
that involved an amended judgment and held:

No specific language in NRS 34.726
expressly provides that the one-year time
period restarts if the judgment of
conviction is amended.

Moreover, construing NRS 34.726 to provide
such an extended time period would result
in an absurdity that the Legislature could
not have intended. [FN10] A judgment of
conviction may be amended at any tune to
correct a clericai error [under NRS § 176.565]
or to correct an illegal sentence [under NRS §
176,555]. Because the district court may
amend the judgment many vears, even
decades, after the entry of the original
judgment of conviction, restarting the one-
year period for all purposes every time an
amendment occurs would frustrate the
purpose and = spirit of NRS 44.726.
Specifically, it would undermine — the
doctrine of finality of jadgments by allowing

A-%6

petitioners to file post-conviction habeas
petitions in perpetuity

FN10. The court in Sullivan was referring to precisely the
‘absurdity" the majority embraces today and enacts tor
all Nevada convictions earlier than Sullivan, supra

ld. at 764 (footnotes eliminated)

(he majority holds that because no Nevada court
before Sullivan had ruled that the plain language of
NRS § 34.726(1) means what it says, a petitioner could
well believe that a motion to correct an illegal sentence
would re-start the time in which to file a habeas petition;
hence, according to the majority, the one-year time period
of NRS § 34.726(1) was not "well-established" until
Sullivan. While this argument might have some merit if
the language of NRS § 34.726(1) were ambiguous and
might allow one to interpret it in the manner Collier does,
the language of the statute is not ambiguous. See supra p
6221. In ruling that the very argument proposed by
Collier "would result in an absurdity that the Legislature
could not have intended,” the court in Sullivan was
interpreting what the legislature intended wien NRS §
4.726(1) was cnacted. | he meaning derived is not new; it
has always been there. Sev. ¢.g.. Bousley v. United States
523 US. 614, 633, 118 S.Ct. 1604, 140 L.Fd.2d 828 (1998)
("It is well established that 'when this Court construes a
statute, it is explaining its understanding of what the
statute has meant continuously since the date when it

became law.’ ") (quoting Rivers v. Roadway Lxpress, lnc. 511
LS, 298, 313, n. 12, 114S.Ct. 1510, 128 L.Ed.2d 274 (1994));
Schaeenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1204 (9th Cir.2000) Ct is

well-established that acts of Congress enjoy a strong

presumption of constitutionality and that newly-passed
statutes do not require judicial ratification in order to take
effect.)

B. Collier Has the Burden to Prove NRS § 34.726(1) Is
Not Adequate

[he majority holds that: “Once a petitioner has
demonstrated the inadequacy of a rule, the state bears the

ultimate burden of proving the rule bars federal review.’
Majority Op. at 6224-25. Although the majority properly

cites the standard, it mis applies the burden of proof
because Collier never has established the inadequacy of
NRS § 34.726(1). See Majority Op. at 6225, n. 6

For ease of reference, | reiterate the Ninth Circuit's
standard regarding the burden of proving the adequacy
ot a state rule

Once the state has adequately pled the
existence of an independent and adequate
state procedural ground as an affirmative
defense, the burden to place that defense
in issue shifts to the petitioner. The
petitioner may satisfy this burden by
asserting specific factual allegations that
demonstrate the inadequacy of the state
procedure, including citation to authority
demonstrating inconsistent application of
the rule. Once having done so, however,
the ultimate burden is the state's

Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 586 (9th Cir.2003)
(emphasis added).

Thus, Step One is the state pleads a procedural bar.
The burden is then shifted to the petitioner. Step Two is
where the petitioner must demonstrate the inadequacy of
the state procedural bar, including "citation to authority
demonstrating inconsistent application of the rule."

The majority completely skips over Step Two, the
step requiring a petitioner who claims a state procedural
bar (here clearly stated in NRS § 34.726(1)) is not
adequate, to prove the inadequacy of the bar. Collier has
not alleged any specific factual allegations or cited us to
any cases, nor can we find any, where the Nevada
Supreme Court failed to apply NRS § 34.726(1), so that
one could conclude NRS § 34.726(1) was not "well-
established." Nor has he cited any cases where the
Nevada Supreme Court allowed a motion to correct an
illegal sentence to re-start either the time to file an appeal
or the time to file a habeas petition. Thus, the state carried
its burden under Step One by _ pleading
NRS § 34.726(1) as a procedural bar. Collier has failed to
carry his burden under Step Two.

Indeed, we have previously held _ that
NRS § 34.726(1) is an independent and adequate state
procedural rule barring federal habeas review. See
Loveland v. Hatcher, 231 F.3d 640, 643 (9th Cir.2000); Meran
v. McDaniel, 80 F.3d 1261, 1269 (9th Cir.1996). The
majority's conclusion is directly at odds with Loveland
and Moran. The majority concludes that because a case
presenting Collier's precise factual situation had not been
previously decided by the Nevada Supreme Court, the
law must not be well-established. But this cannot be the

A-W

rule. The precise factual situations involved in Loveland
and Moran had not been decided prior to those cases
either. Nevertheless, we held that NRS § 34.726(1) barred
federal review of those cases.

The only difference between Moran, Loveland and
this case is that Collier filed feo motions to correct an
iliegal sentence rather than the one motion filed in those
cases. This difference makes no more distinction than the
fact that Collier is not named Loveland or Moran

This court has already soundly rejected the
argument that for a procedural bar to be ‘“well-
established" a state court must have ruled that a
particular attempt to circumvent that procedural bar is
invalid. In Bargas vo. Burns, 179 F.3d 1207, 1211
(9th Cir.1999), the petitioner made a similar attempt to
circumvent Nevada's procedural bars. Bargas pleaded
guilty to sexual assault in Nevada state court. He then
filed a state habeas petition, claiming that he had
ineffective assistance of counsel and that his plea was not
knowing and voluntary. /d. at 1209-10. This petition was
denied, but the trial court failed to rule specifically on his
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Bargas appealed
to the Nevada Supreme Court, but only on the ground
that his plea was not knowing and voluntary. He failed to
raise his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The
Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the denial of his habeas
petition. fd, at 1210

Bargas then filed a habeas petition in federal court
Alleging inetiective assistance of counsel. The district
court dismissed his petition, holding that his claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel was unexhausted
because he failed to assert this claim before Nevada's
highest court. fd. at 1210

\-40)

Bargas then filed a second habeas petition in state
court, attempting to “revive,” as Collier did in his second
motion to correct an illegal sentence, his claim that he had
ineffective assistance of counsel and that his plea was not
knowing and voluntary. /d. The trial court held that
Bargas had procedurally defaulted on his ineffective
assistance of counsel claim by not appealing the failure to
rule on that issue in his first habeas petition. Id

Bargas then filed a second habeas petition in
federal court, again claiming he had ineffective assistance
of counsel and that his plea was not knowing and
voluntary. The district court denied the petition on the
claim that Bargas' plea was not knowing and voluntary,
but refused to reach the issue of ineffective assistance of
counsel because that claim was barred by an independent
and adequate state procedural bar—NRS § 34.726(1). /d.
On appeal, we affirmed the district court's ruling that it
had no jurisdiction to hear petitioner's federal habeas
petition on the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel
because Nevada's law that a habeas petitioner had to
raise all his claims in his first petition was “well
established," even though no Nevada case had yet held
that a second habeas petition did not "revive" such
claims

[Bargas] argues that there are not any
reported cases in Nevada specifically
holding that a petitioner procedurally
detaults a claim when he fails to appeal
from the denial of post-conviction relief,
and instead files a second petition for
habeas corpus. Although we agree with
that conclusion, Nevada law nevertheless
clearly requires a petitioner to raise all

A-41

claims in his first petition, unless he can
demonstrate cause and prejudice ...

ld, at 1211. The same is true here. Simply because no
Nevada court had previously stated that a second motion
to correct an illegal sentence does not re-start or toll the
time in which to file a habeas petition, anv more than a
first such motion, does not mean the law was not well-
established. NRS § 34.726(1) and NRAP 4(b) are both
quite clear about what alone will toll the time to file an
appeal and a habeas petition. All Collier had to do was
read the relevant statutes. Although Sullivan was not
decided at the time Collier was convicted, NRS § 34.726(1)
was well-established. NRS § 34.726(1) was passed in 1991,
well before Collier was convicted in 1995,

lhe plain language of NRS § 34.726(1) shows that
motions to correct an illegal sentence do not re-start or
toll the time in which to file a habeas petition. See supra
p. 6221. NRS § 34.726(1) states that on/y an appeal tolls the
time in which to file a habeas petition. The majority
opinion is reading possibilities into NRS § 34.726(1) that
the plain language of that statute precludes. There are no
cases where the Nevada Supreme Court allowed such a
second, identical and denied motion to correct an illegal
sentence to re-start or toll the time in which to file either
an appeal under NRAP 4(b)(1) or a habeas petition under
NRS § 34.726(1). Further, although the majority states that
Collier filed a second motion to correct an illegal
sentence reviving the challenge to his sentence
(Majority Op. at 1282), this second motion was not a
timely-filed motion to reconsider the denial of his first
raotion. Thus, it could not "revive" his first motion.
Accordingly, we are bound by Loveland and Moran

A-42

C. A Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence Does Not
Re-Start or Toll the Time in Which to File an Appea!

Because the plain language of NRS § 34.726(1)
states that an appeal will toll the time in which to file a
habeas petition, we must examine whether Collier's
direct appeal from his judgment of conviction was a valid
appeal under Nevada law. It was not

Under either the original judgment of conviction,
entered on July 5, 1995, or the amended judgment of
conviction, entered on March 26, 1997, Collier's appeal
from his judgment of conviction, filed on November 16,
1998, was untimely and was therefore of no effect. Nev
R. App. P. 4(b). This rule was well-established at the time
of Collier's conviction even under the majority's holding
that there must be a case saving so. See Lozada v. State,
110 Nev. 349, 871 P.2d 944, 946 (1994)

Moreover, the amended judgment of conviction
did not re-start the time period for Collier to file a direct
appeal attacking his judgment of conviction under
NRAP 4. The Nevada Supreme Court addressed a similar
situation in Morrell v. Ldwards, 98 Nev. 91, 640 P.2d 1322
(1982). There, the Nevada Supreme Court dismissed a
civil appeal as untimely where the notice of appeal was
not filed within thirty days of the original judgment, but
was filed within thirty days of the amended judgment
The judgment had been amended to strike an award of
costs. The court held that: "The test for determining
whether an appeal is properly taken from an amended
judgment rather than the judgment originally entered
depends on whether the amendment disturbed or revised
legal rights and obligations which the prior judgment had
plainly and properly settled with finality.” 640 P.2d at

A-43

1324. Here, the amended judgment of conviction did not
revise the legal rights of the parties. The majority opinion
dismisses Edwards because it was a civil case, but there is
no reason the same principles would not apply to a
criminal case.

Further, the majority opinion dismisses a similar
holding in a criminal case Burbank v. Rivers, 20 Nev. 159,
18 P. 753, 755 (1888), as dusty old law. Majority Op. at
1285, n. 7. What the majority opinion refuses to
acknowledge is that Burbank is still good law. In Burbank,
the Nevada Supreme Court held that when a technical
change is made to a judgment of conviction, the time
within which an appeal may be taken from the judgment
of conviction is computed from the date of the entry of
the original judgment not the amended judgment, unless
the party filing the appeal can show that he was
“deceived” or “misled” vy the original judgment as
entered. Burbank v. Rivers, 20 Nev. 159, 18 P. 753, 755
(1888) (holding that a judgment that was amended to
state the defendant's correct name did not start the time
to file an appeal anew). Remember, the only change in
the amended judgment (March 26, 1997) was to add the
section number under which Collier was convicted. If
that is not merely “clerical” or “technical,” the words have
lost their meaning. Here, here is no argument Collier
was ever deceived or mised by the original judgment. By
dismissing Burbank as teo old, even though it has been
followed and cited, [FNVi] but never overruled, the
majority establishes the bizarre rule that a statute is only
well-established it a case has upheld the statute, but only
if that case is not tev old. Of course, the majority does not
tell us at what point a case becomes overruled by
operation of time

A+4

FNL. See Bottini v. Mongolo, 197 P. 702, 704, 45 Nev. 245,
245 (Nev.1921)

The only wav that Collier's appeal could be
considered timely is if his second motion to correct an
illegal sentence, which was filed on May 20, 1997, first
revived and then tolled the time in which to file an
appeal from his judgment of conviction. But that cannot
be the case--under NRAP 4(b), only timely motions in
arrest of judgment or for a new trial toll the time in which
to file an appeal. See supra p. 6236.

Further, the majority states that "there is no
established rule that motions to correct an illegal sentence
do not qualify as an appeal from judgment, thus tolling
the period for filing a habeas petition.” Majority Op. at
6223. This is incorrect for two reasons. First, as discussed
above, a motion to correct an_ illegal sentence
presupposes that guilt was proved or admitted. An
appeal from judgment posits innocence. Second, even if a
motion to correct an illegal sentence were to qualify as an
appeal, Collier failed to file his motion to correct an
illegal sentence within the 30-day time limit under
NRAP 4(b) and therefore, as an appeal, the motion was of
no effect. Lozada, 871 P.2d at 946. "In the case of an
untimely appeal, no ‘appeal had been taken from the
judgment’ within the meaning of NRS § 34.726(1) because
nothing has happened.” Dickerson v. State, 114 Nev. 1084,
967 P.2d 1132, 1134 (1998) (defendant who was convicted
of second degree murder filed an untimely appeal, and
then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus within one
year of the issuance of the remittitur on his appeal, but

not within one vear of his judgment of conviction; the
Nevada trial court dismissed the habeas petition as

untimely under NRS § 34.726(1); the Nevada Supreme
Court affirmed, holding that under the language of
NRS § 34.726(1) only a timely appeal tolls the one-year
period in which to file a habeas petition).

The court in Dickerson held:

We now construe NRS 34.726(1) to mean
that the one-vear period for filing a post-
conviction habeas corpus petition begins
to run from the issuance of the remittitur
from a timely direct appeal to this court
from the judgment of conviction if no
direct appeal is taken. A timely direct
appeal is one in which the notice of
appeal is filed with the district court
within the time period prescribed by
statute. See, e.g., NRAP 4.... In the case of
an untimely appeal, no “appeal had been
taken from the judgment” within the
meaning of NRS 34.726(1) because
nothing has happened.

Moreover, to construe the statute any
other way would lead to absurd results...
If the appeal referred to in NRS 34.726(1)
meant any appeal, whether this court
obtained jurisdiction or not, petitioners
would be able to file successive notices of
appeal year after vear and thus
perpetually re-start the one-year
limitation period. Clearly, this is not what
the legislature envisioned. Indeed, this
court has already noted that the statutory
time periods are intended to prevent such
results. “Without such limitations on the

A-46

availability of post-conviction remedies,
prisoners could petition for relief in
perpetuity and thus abuse post-conviction
remedies.” Lozada v. State, 110 Nev. 349,
871 P.2d 944, 950 (1994)]

Dickerson, 967 P.2d at 1133-34

Although it is true that Dickerson was the first
Nevada case to hold that only a timely direct appeal tolls
the time in which to file a habeas petition under
NRS § 34.726(1), Dickerson was simply relying on the
plain language of NRS § 34.726(1) and NRAP 4(b), and
interpreting the intent of the legislature when it enacted
NRAP 4(b). By concluding that Nevada law was not well-
established prior to Collier's appeal, the majority opinion
overlooks the plain language of NRS § 34.726(1) and
NRAP 4(b)(1). It would be a supremely arrogant view of
judicial importance to say that only judges can make law
Law does not have to be in the form of a judge's decision
to be binding. Statutes and rules are also binding

Here, under the majoritys analysis, a Nevada
prisoner can completely defeat both NRS § 34.726(1) and
NRAP 4(b), and repeatedly re-start the time in which to
file a state habeas petition, simply by filing a motion to
correct an illegal sentence and then appealing the denial
of that motion--even if th» grounds alleged in the motion
to correct an illega’ sentence could have been brought up
ina timely direct uppeal from the judgment of conviction
or an appeal trom an identical earlier motion, as is the

case here

[here is no need tor such a rule. Under Nevada
law, petitioners who can show good cause tor the delay

can avoid the one-vear limitation under \NRS §& 4726/1)

\4/

Dickerson, 114 Nev. 1084, 967 P.2d 1132, 1134.
lo establish good cause to excuse a procedural default
under Nevada law, ‘a defendant must demonstrate that
some impediment external to the defense prevented him
from complying with the procedural rule that has been
violated.” Lozada, 871 P.2d at 946. Here, Collier has not
shown good cause because, under Nevada law, the
failure of counsel to advise a criminal defendant that he
has the right to file a direct appeal is not good cause for
failing to file a habeas petition within one vear after
judgment of conviction. Dickerson, 967 P.2d at 1134

(FN12]

FN12. Like Collier, Dickerson argued that his direct
appeal was late because his counsel failed to tell him he
had a right to appeal. 967 P.2d at 1133

Preor to and at the time of Collier's conviction in

1995, it was well-established law that ov/y the motions
specified in NRAP 4 would toll the time in which to file a
notice of appeal. See, ¢e.g., Chapman indus. v. United Ins
Cu., 110 Nev. 454, 874 P.2d 739, 741 (1994) (per curiam) (a
motion for reconsideration is not a telling motion under
NRAP 4(a) and therefore does not re-start or toll the time
in which to file a notice of appeal); Holiday Inn Downtown
Barnett, 103 Nev. 60, 732 P.2d 1376, 1379 (1987)
(per curiam) (a motion to vacate an order ~ffirming an
ddimuinistrative decision is not a tolling motion under
NRAP 4(a) and therefore does not re-start or toll the time

in which to tile a notice of appeal) This was all well

established law at the time of Collier's convict

IV. Conclusion

The majority opinion allows a_ petitioner to
resurrect an expired right to file a habeas petition
attacking a judgment of conviction simply by filing a
motion to correct an illegal sentence. This is contrary to
Nevada law and to this court's holdings in Loveland and
Moran.

Although the majority acknowledges that we have
no power to second guess state court interpretations of
state law, Estelle v. McGuire, 02 U.S. 62, 67-68, 112 S.Ct.
475, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991), that is exactly what the
majority does. It second guesses NRS § 34.726(1) and
NRAP 4(b), not to mention our own burden of proof rule
stated in Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F3d 573, 586
(9th Cir.2003).

lf Collier's original July 5, 1995 judgment of
conviction is considered, Collier's November 16, 1998
notice of appeal was filed well after the thirty-day
deadline in NRAP 4(b), and his May 28, 1999 habeas
petition was filed well after the one-year deadline in
NRS § 34.726(1).

lf the March 26, 1997 amended judgment of
conviction is considered (which it should not be), Collier's
November 16, 1998 notice of appeal was filed after the
thirty-day deadline in NRAP 4(b), and his May 28, 1999
habeas petition was still filed after the one-year deadline
inn NRS § 34.726(1)

Phe one-year deadline in NRS § 34.726(1) was at all
times well-established law, and any way you look at this

AW

case, Collier missed that deadline. Accordingly, |
respectfully dissent.

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

STEVEN W. COLLIER,
Petitioner - Appellant,

No. 04-15017

D.C. No. CV-99-00641

vs ECR/ RAM
I as \ yas
BOB BAYER, ORDER

)
}
}
)
) District of Nevada,
)
)
)
Resp yndent Appellee )
)

Filed August 9, 2005

Before: B. FLETCHER, THOMAS, AND BEA, Circuit
judges

judges B. Fletcher and Thomas have voted to deny
the petition for panel rehearing. Judge Bea votes to grant the
petition for rehearing and petition for rehearing en ban
ludge Thomas votes to deny the petition for rehearing

en banc and Judge B. Fletcher so recommends
The full court has been advised of the petition for
rehearing en banc and no judge has requested a vote on

whether to rehear the matter cv haw. Fed. R App. P ta

The petition for panel rehearing and the petition for

rol rina « L ire dented

APPENDIX C

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEVADA

STEVEN WAYNE COLLIER, |)
) Case No. CV-N-99-641
Petitioner, ) ECR (RAM)
ORDER GRANTING

}

) CERTIFICATE OF
BOB BAYER, et al, ) APPEALABILITY

)

}

__Respondents. _

Filed December 30, 2003
Petitioner has filed a Notice of Appeal contesting
the dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus
pursuant to 28 US.C. § 2254, and an Application for
Certificate of appealability (#45) Respondents have
opposed the application (#48). Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P
22(b), this Court must issue a Certificate of Appealability

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253 or state why a certificate shall

not msue. 28 USC. § 2253 (2) provides that a certificate of

appealability is appropriate only if the petitioner has made

a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
right. The standard for the issuance of a certificate of
appealability calls for a “substantial showing of the denial
cf a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (c). The
Supreme Court has interpreted 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (c) as

follows:

Where a district court
has rejected the constitutional
claims on the merits, the
showing required to satisfy
§ 2253 (c) is straightforward:
The petitioner must
demonstrate that reasonable
jurists would find the district
court's assessment of the
constitutional claims
debatable or wrong. The
issue becomes somewhat
more complicated where, as
here, the district court
dismisses the petition based
on procedural grounds. We
hold as follows: When the
district court denies a habeas

petition on procedural
grounds without reaching the
prisoner's underlying

constitutional claim, a COA

should issue when the prison
shows, at least, that jurists of
reason would find it
debatable whether the
petition states a valid claim of
the denial of a constitutional
right and that jurists of reason
would find it debatable
whether the district court was
correct in its procedural
ruling

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see also James v.
Giles, 221 F.3d 1074, 1077-79 (9th Cir. 2000). The certificate
shall be granted.

The petition was dismissed because the claim
raised was procedurally barred and the court believed that
the petitioner failed to make an adequate showing of cause
and prejudice to overcome that bar. We are precluded
from considering the merits of procedurally barred claims

absent a showing of cause and prejudice. Coleman ov

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991). Petitioner seeks a

certificate of appealability on three bases

That the procedural bar applied
by the Nevada Supreme Court
and relied upon by this court is
inadequate to foreclose federal
review.

NM

That Petitioner made an
adequate showing of cause
and prejudice to overcome the
procedural bar
3 That the propriety of applying
y
procedural bars to his
particular type of constitutional
claim is questionable among
jurists of reason
The single ground for relief before the court was
whether petitioners rights to effective assistance of
counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment were
denied when his counsel failed to consult with him
regarding his right to an appeal and failed to file a notice
of appeal on his behalf
Petitioner has raised a valid showing of the denial

of a constitutional right. [he facts underlying his claim

paint a picture of potential prejudice to petitioner due to a

contlict of interest on the part of his defense counsel

Ihe second prong to our inquiry is whether jurists
of reason would find it debatable whether the district
court was correct in its procedural ruling. Slack, 529 US.
at 484. ‘The Nevada Supreme Court denied Petitioner's
appeal of the state district court's denial of his post-
conviction petition on the basis that it was filed more than
one year after his conviction became final. Petitioner
argues that Nevada law is unclear in its application of the
tolling provision to motions to correct illegal sentences.
He contends that the one-year period of time to file his
habeas petition was tolled pending the issuance of
remittitur of his appeal of denial of that motion.

We believe the circumstances are such that the
issue could be “debatable among jurists of reason,”
whether another court could resolve the issues differently,
or to cause us to decide that the showing was “adequate to

deserve encouragement to proceed further.”

Slack, 329 US. at 484, ciling, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880,

893 (1983). The watershed Nevada case determining the
tolling of the one-year period for filing a state post-
conviction petition, Dickerson v. State, was not decided
until November 25, 1998. 114 Nev. 1084, 967 P.2d 1132
(1998). Petitioner's Motion to Correct [legal Sentence was
filed March 1997, Thus, until 1998, it was debatable in
Nevada exactly which remittitur must issue before the
one-year period of time to file a post-conviction petition
would begin to run. Thus, issue one and two of the
application should be allowed to proceed on appeal

The third issue proposed for this appeal raises an
obscure question of the appropriate avenue for addressing
the type of constitutional claim arising under the holding
of Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 120 S. Ct. 1029 (2000). Petitioner
brought his claim under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and then, late in
the proceeding, sought leave to re-characterize his petition

one seeking a writ of auditea quercla, contending this was

defense or legal defect arising subsequent to the entry of

final judgment. Petitioner cites Doe v. INS, 120 F.3d 200,
203 (9 Cir. 1997) to support this contention. However,
Petitioner chose his avenue for relief and should be bound
by that choice. This issue does not meet the standard
imposed by 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (2) or Slack

A certificate of appealability will be granted as to basis
one and two of the application, but denied as to basis three

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Petitioner's
Application for Certification of Appealability (#45) is
granted in part and denied in part. Bases and one and
two of the application should be permitted to proceed on

appeal. Basis three should not.

December ECR
Dated this 30 day of january,-2004.
2003

Ls/__

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

APPENDIX D

AO 450 (REV__5/85) Judgment in a Civil Case ©

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

eee DISTRICT OF NEVADA

———

BOB BAYER, et al.,

STEVEN COLLIER, )
) JUDGMENT IN
Plaintiff, ) ACIVIL CASE
)
) CASE NUMBER
vs. ) CV-N-99-0641-
) ECR(RAM)
)
)
)

sj Detendants.
Filed March 28, 2003

Jury Verdict. This action came before the Court for a
trial by jury.
The issues have been tried and the jury has rendered its
verdict.

Decision by Court. This action came to trial or
hearing before the Court. The issues have been tried or
heard and a decision has been rendered.

X_Decision by Court. This action came to be considered
before the Court. The issues have been considered and a
decision has been rendered.

IT 1S ORDERED AND ADJUDGED

that petitioner's amended petition for writ of
habeas corpus (Docket #17) is denied. Claim one is
procedurally barred from federal review. The Clerk shall
enter judgment accordingly.

March 28, 2003.
Lance Wilson ___

Clerk

Ls/

___ Lisa Mann

Deputy Clerk

D-2

APPENDIX I
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEVADA
STEVEN COLLIER
) Case No. CV-N-99-641
Petitioner ECR (RAM)
Vs MEMORANDUM
} DECISION ORDER
BOB BAYER, et al
Respondents _)
Filed March 28, 2003
Petitioner, Steven Collier, filed an amended
petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 US.
§ 226 challenging his sentence and conviction (Docket
#14). Respondents, through their counsel the Attorney
C,eneral tor the State of Nevada, tiled a motion to dismiss

based upon exhaustion grounds. (Docket #21). The court

issued an order finding Ground One exhausted and

Ccround Two unexhausted. (Docket #28). Petitioner was

given the option of abandoning the unexhausted ground
and proceeding on the remaining fully exhausted ground,
or dismissing the petition. Petitioner chose to abandon the
unexhausted ground for relief. (Docket #29)

Respondents filed an answer to the remaining
ground for relief. (Docket #35). Petitioner sought leave of
court to file a traverse (Docket #36), which was granted
(Docket #37). Petitioner subsequently filed a notification

to the court that he would not be filing a traverse. (Docket

#38). Pending before the court at this time is Ground One

of the amended petition

[he court has reviewed the entire record in this
case, including all exhibits of the state proceedings, as well
as all of the pleadings, motions and other documents filed
in the record of this case. Following that review, the court

concludes that petitioner's claim is procedurally barred

from review

1. Procedural Background

On May 17, 1995, petitioner pled guilty to one
count of possession of a trafficking quantity of a controlled
substance. (Ex. 48/49). In the plea agreement, the parties
stipulated to a forty-five (45) year term of imprisonment.
(Ex. 50). The petitioner was sentenced to a forty-five (45)
vear term of imprisonment. (Ex. 50).

On May 20, 1997, Collier filed a motion to correct
illegal sentence. (Ex. 68). The State district court denied
the motion. (Ex. 70). Collier appealed the denial to the
Nevada Supreme Court (Ex. 71), and they issued an order
dismissing the appeal. (Ex. 78)

On November 16, 1998, petitioner filed a notice of
appeal concerning his conviction. (Ex. 74). The Nevada
Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, finding the notice of

appeal untimely, thereby divesting the court of

jurisdiction. (kx. 75)

On May 28, 1999, petitioner filed a post-conviction
petition for writ of habeas corpus. (Ex. 80). The State

district court denied the petition finding it was

proceaurally barred, and the petitioner unable to show
cause and prejudice to overcome the bar
(Ex. 8&7). Petitioner appealed the denial of his post

conviction petition to the Nevada Supreme Court
(Ex. 89). Prior to the Nevada Supreme Court deciding the
appeal, petitioner filed the instant petition for federal
habeas corpus. On January 11, 2001, the Nevada Supreme
Court issued an order affirming the State district court's
denial of the post-conviction petition. (Ex. 97)

2. Legal Discussion

The court has thoroughly reviewed the tacts ot thir
case and has considered carefully all of the legal points
and authorities presented by petitioner and respondents

Following that review, the court ts tully appraised of the

facts and circumstances regarding this matter, and tinds

that further briefing by the parties is neither warranted
nor required. Further, the court finds that the factual
record has been adequately developed in the state courts
relating to the issues presented in this petition. The court
finds that no further factual development via an
evidentiary hearing is required.

3. Procedural Default

The Federal courts will not review a question of
state law decided by a state court if the decision of the
State court rests on a state law ground that is independent
ot tederal question and adequate to support the
judgement. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991).
This rule applies whether the state law ground is
substantive or procedural and whether the default was
caused by a failure to raise a claim at trial, a failure to raise

a particular claim on appeal, or a failure to appeal at all

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750.

it is well established that “[i}n order to constitute
adequate and independent grounds sufficient to support a
finding of procedural default, a state rule must be clear,
consistently applied, and well established at the time of
the petitioner's purported default.” Wells v. Maass, 28 F.
3d 1005, 1010 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing ord v. Georgia, 498 US.
411, 424-25 (1991); and County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140,
150-51 & nn. 8-10 (1979)).

Nevada law provides in pertinent part: “Unless
there is good cause shown for delay, a petition that
challenges the validity of a judgment must be filed within
1 year after entry of judgment of conviction or, if an
appeal has been taken from the judgment, within 1 year
after the supreme court issues its remitittur.” Nev. Rev.
Stat. § 34.726

In order to impose a procedural bar, the State court

must clearly state that it relied on the procedural violation

as its reason for rejecting the claims. See Siripongs v.

Calderon, 35 F.3d 1308 (9 Cir. 1994). Here, the Nevada
Supreme Court clearly stated in its order that the petition
was procedurally barred. (Ex. 97).

The Nevada Supreme Court has consistently
applied the state rule which prohibits review of the merits
of a claim presented in an untimely petition, unless the
petitioner demonstrates cause. Moran v. McDaniel, 80 F.3d
1261, 1269 (9 Cir. 1996). Thus, the state procedural
default rule at issue is adequate and independent.

Clearly, the petitioner's post-conviction petition for
writ of habeas corpus was filed more than one year after the
judgment and is untimely. Petitioner has violated the
state's procedural default rule. Therefore, Claim One of the
amended petition is barred from federal habeas review,
unless the petitioner can establish cause for the procedural
bar and prejudice by not hav® « he claim addressed on the

merits, or demonstrate a ‘undamental miscarriage of

justice. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 749-50 (1991).

E-7

Cause for a procedural default must ordinarily turn

on whether the prisoner can show that some objective
factor external to the defense impede counsel's efforts to
comply with the state’s procedural rule. Thus, cause may
be established by showing that “the factual or legal basis
for a claim was not reasonably available to counsel” or
that there was “some interference by officials that made
compliance impracticable.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478,
488 (quoting Prown v. Allen, 344 U. S. 443, 486 (1953)).
Examples of such external factors include the discovery of
new evidence, a change in the law, and interference by
state officials. Id.; see also Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158,
1163 (9 Cir. 1988).

Assn, ing petitioner was able to show cause for his
procedural default, he also must show prejudice arising
trom the alleged constitutional errors. Petitioner must
show more than the mere possibility of prejudice crated by

the trial court's constitutional errors. Petitioner must

show actual and substantial disadvantage, which infected
the entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.
United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982).

Petitioner argues that he can establish cause and
prejudice to excuse the procedural default. See Petitioner's
Legal Brief on Procedural Default, pp. 6-13. Petition
argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance
when he operated under a conflict of interest, and failed to
consult with him concerning his right to pursue a direct
appeai. Ineffective assistance of counsel may constitute
cause, if the representation amounts to an independent
Sixth Amendment violation. Bonin v. Vasquez, 999 F. 2:
425, 428 (9t Cir 1993).

[he United States Supreme Court has held that
“|clounsel has a constitutionally imposed duty to consult
with the defendant about an appeal when there is reason
to think either (1) that a rational defendant would want to

appeal (because there were non-frivolous grounds for

appeal), or (2) that his particular defendant reasonably

demonstrated to counsel that he was interested in
appealing.” Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 480 (2000).
“In making this determination, courts must take into
account all of the information counsel knew or should
have known.” Id. “Only by considering all relevant
factors in a given case can a court properly determine
whether a rational defendant would have desired an
appeal or that the particular defendant sufficiently
demonstrated to counsel an interest in an appeal.” Id.

If the court determines that counsel's performance
in failing td consult with the defendant about an appeal
“fell below an objective standard of reasonableness”, the
court must then apply the second prong of the Strickland!
test which requires the defendant to show prejudice from
counsel's deficient performance. Roe v. Flores-Ortexga,

528 U.S. at 480-82. In order to show prejudice, a defendant

| Strickland @. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)

E-10

“must demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel's deficient failure to consult with him
about an appeal, he would have timely appealed.” Roe v.
Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 484.

In considering whether petitioner's trial counsel
had a constitutionally imposed duty to consult with
petitioner concerning an appeal, the court must examine
all of the relevant faciors.

Petitioner alleges that he had seven appellate issues

he would have raised on direct appeal, had such as appeal

been taken. See Amended Petition, pp. 17-21. Despite
allegations to the contrary, non of petitioner's alleged
issues are potentially meritorious claims.

First, petitioner alleges that his right to conflict free
representation, due process, equal protection and a
reliable sentence were violated when he was represented
by the public defender’s office. The Sixth Amendment

guarantee of effective assistance of counsel includes the

right to counsel’s undivided loyalty. Wood v. Georgia,

450 U.S. 261, 271-72 (1981); United States v. Baker, 256 F.3d
855, 859-860 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing United States v. Mett, 65
F.3d 1531, 1534 (9th Cir. 1995)). To prevail on an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim based upon conflict
of interest, petitioner must show that “an actual conflict of
interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance.”
Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350 (1980).

Petitioner has failed to demonstrate an actual
conflict of interest on the part of the public detender’s
office. Petitioner contends that the public defender’s office
represented the petitioner at the same time that thev
represented another person who was used as an informant
in petitioner's case. A review of the record reveals that the
informant was represented by the public defender’s office
in early 1994. (See Ex. 95). The informant entered into a
guilty plea, and judgment was entered in March 1994. (See

Ex. 95). On March 23, 1194, the informant was sentenced

to an indeterminate term-of probation not to exceed three

vears. (Seve Judgment, Ex. 95). The criminal information
was not filed against the petitioner until June 24, 1994.
Petitioner plead guilty on May 17, 1995. Thus, petitioner's
contention that the two were represented by the same
office at the same time is belied by the record.

Second, petitioner claims that his trial counsel was
ineffective for working under an actual conflict of interest.
Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel may not be
raised on direct appeal in Nevada. Pellegrini v. Nevada,
117 Nev. 860 (2001). Thus, even if counsel had filed a
direct appeal, petitioner would not have been able to raise
this issue on direct appeal.

Third, petitioner states that he would have argued
that the trial court's failure to grant him substitute counsel
and inquire into the alleged conflict between the petitioner
and the public defender’s office violated petitioner's

constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel.

In his amended petition, petitioner stated that he

had a conflict with the public defender’s office, because
they did not show up to represent him in another pending
case, and the public defender advised petitioner to waive
his preliminary hearing despite the fact that petitioner
provided the public defender with a letter from private
counsel requesting a motion to dismiss be made a the
preliminary hearing. Despite petitioner's contentions to
the contrary, his allegations do not amount to a conflict of
interest.

Fourth, petitioner argues tnat his arrest and
conviction violated his due process rights, because the
State violated the terms of its substantiai assistance
agreement. A_ review of the record indicates the
substantial assistance agreement did not provide the
petit:oner with permission to possess narcotics.
Possession of a narcotic was allowed only in a “controlled

transaction”. (See Ex. 11). Petitioner has failed to

E-14

demonstrate that this is a potentially meritorious claim.
Fifth, petitioner claims that the trial court erred in
accepting petitioner's guilty plea without an affirmative

showing that it was entered knowingly, intelligently and

voluntarily. Challenges to the validity of a guilty plea

may not be raised on direct appeal in Nevada, they must
first be raised in the context of a post-conviction petition
for writ of habeas corpus. See Mitchell v. State, 109 Nev.
137, 138 (1993).

Sixth, petitioner asserts that the State pursued two
separate actions arising out of the same arrest, thereby
violating the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

Petitioner claims that the Nevada Department of
Taxation’s April 25, 1994, letters which imposed a tax debt
and fine in the amount ot just under two million dollars on
the petitioner is a punishment, and that the State's

subsequent criminal prosecution is a second punishment

for the same crime. The Nevada Department of Taxation
has assessed the petitioner with a drug tax which,
although it is a civil penaltv, could arguably constitute
punishment if the petitioner had paid the tax. Petitioner
makes no allegation that he paid the tax. A review of the
record -demonstrates no payment of the tax, nor a
judgment or other enforcement procedure by the
government. Since petitioner did not pay the drug tax,
and the government did not seek to enforce the drug tax,
petitioner has not been punished within the meaning of
the Double Jeopardy Clause. U.S. v. Sanchez-Escareno,
950 F.2d 193 (5" Cir. 1991). Therefore, this claim lacks merit.

Finally, petitioner claims that the statute under
which he was sentenced was subsequently amended to
provide a lesser penalty for those later convicted under the
same statute. Petitioner claims that the statute's provision
limiting its application to offenses occurring before its date

of implementation is unconstitutional. Petitioner fails to

F-16

articulate any legal basis for his assertions.

An examina, of other relevant factors reveals
that petitioner, through his trial counsel, negotiated a plea
bargain for the disposition of the criminal charges.
(Ex. 49). Pursuant to the plea bargain, petitioner plead
guilty to one count of possession of a trafficking quantity
of a controlled substance. (Ex. 48). Petitioner benefited
from the plea bargain in that he plead guilty to second
level trafficking, as opposed to the third level trafficking
with which he was originally charged. (Ex. 49, p.3).
Additionally, the State dismissed another pending third
level trafficking case and a simple possession charge
against the petitioner. (Ex. 49, p.3). Petitioner stipulated
to a forty-five (45) year sentence. (Ex. 49, p.3).

At sentencing, the trial judge gave petitioner the
opportunity to make a statement as to why sentence
should not be imposed. Petitioner declined to make a

statement. (Ex. 50, p.5). The trial judge noted that the

E-17

parties has stipulated to a forty-five (45) year sentence,
which was also the sentence recommended in the pre-
sentence report. (Ex. 50, p.5). The judge recounted the
physical evidence against the petitioner and stated that
“{t|his demonstrates beyond doubt the defendant is a drug
dealer and has been involved in narcotics transactions for
a substantial period of time.” (Ex. 50, pp. 5-6).

Following sentencing the State dismissed the
5 5

pending third level trafficking charge and simple

possession charge as agreed to in the plea agreement.
(Ex. 55). Petitioner received the benefits he negotiated for
in the plea bargain process.

A review of the record reveals that petitioner did
not file a notice of appeal, or any other document
indicating that he wished to appeal his conviction.
Petitioner makes no allegation that he ever made any
indication to his counsel that he wished to appeal.

A review of the totality of the circumstances shows

that petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel

should have known that petitioner would have wanted to

appeal. Therefore, petitioner has been unable to establish
an independent Sixth Amendment violation.

Petitioner also argues that he was unable to timely
file his post-conviction petition because of interference by
State government officials. Specifically, petitioner claims
that he tried, ultimately unsuccessfully, to obtain
documents for over one year. Whether or not petitioner
had difficulties in obtaining these documents is immaterial
to petitioner's ability to timely file his petition. The
documents petitioner was attempting to obtain are not
necessary to file the petition.

Petitioner's claims are insufficient to establish cause
to overcome the procedural bar.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that petitioner's
amended petition for writ of habeas corpus (Docket #17) is

DENIED. Claim one is procedurally barred from federal

review. The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that petitioner's
metion to accept a late pleading (Docket #39) is
GRANTED. Petitioner's motion to refashion the pending
28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition into a motion to issue writ of
Audita Querela (Docket #40) is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that respondents’
motion to strike petitioner's legal brief on procedural
default and request to refashion pending 2254 petition as a
request to issue writ of Audita Querela (Docket #41) is
DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that petitioner's
request for an evidentiary hearing (Docket #40) is

DENIED.

Dated this 28 day of March, 2003.

/s/
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

APPENDIX F
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEVADA
STEVEN COLLIER, )
Petitioner, CV-N-99-641-ECR
vs. 7 ORDER
BOB BAYER, et al., |
Respondent. .

Filed August 28, 2001

Respondents filed a motion to dismiss (421) the
petition for writ of habeas corpus. [Petitioner filed an
opposition to the respondents’ motion to dismiss (#24). to
which respondents replied (#25). After the Nevada Supreme
Court dismissed petitioner's appeal of the denial of his state
habeas corpus petition on February 6, 2001, petitioner filed
and addendum to his opposition (#26), to which
respondents replied (#27). For the following reasons, the

court shall GRANT the motion to dismiss (#21).

I-1

In their motion to dismiss (#21) and other related

4

motions (#25, 27), respondents assert that both grounds in

the instant petition are unexhausted. Although petitioner,

in his opposition (#24) and addendum (#26), repeatedly

asserted that petitioner exhausted all grounds in state
court, this court finds that petitioner exhausted Ground |
in state court, yet failed to exhaust Ground II of the instant
petition

Both the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 and federal case law have specified the
requirements for exhausting state remedies before a
petitioner may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in
the federal courts. Until a state prisoner has exhausted his
available state remedies for all claims raised, a federal
court will not grant the prisoner's petition for habeas
relict. Rose i mudy, 455 U.S. 509, 510 (1982) To exhaust a
claim, petitioner must have “fairly presented” that specific

claim to the Supreme Court of Nevada Picard

Conner, 404 US. 270,275-76 (1971); Sclrwartzmiller vo

Gardner, 752 F.2d 1341, 1344 (9th Cir. 1984). Furthermore,
a petitioner cannot merely allege exhaustion; the record
must show that the petitioner sought review in the highest
state court. Cartwriglit v. Cupp, 650 F.2d 1103, 1104 (9 Cir.
1981) (per curiam), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1023 (1982). The
petitioner also “must have either referenced specific
provisions of the federal constitution or statutes or cited to
federal case law” in order to exhaust federal claims in state
court. Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 670 (9% Cir. 2000).
A federal court cannot hear a mixed petition (one that
contains both exhausted and unexhausted claims for
habeas corpus relief). Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 521-22
(1982); Greenawalt v. Stewart, 105 F.3d 1268, 1273 (9° Cir
1997), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1102, (1997)

The instant petition contains two grounds tor
habeas relief. Ground | claims that petitioner's Sixth and

Fourteenth Amendments rights were violated when

petitioner's trial counsel failed to inform him that he had a
right to appeal his guilty plea, and when trial counsel
failed to file a notice of appeal. Ground II claims that
petitioner's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were
violated when the trial court judge failed to inform
petitioner, after accepting his guilty plea, that he had a
right to appeal. In its review of the state court record, the

court finds that Ground I of the instant petition was

exhausted. Petitioner never specified which of his state

court pleadings contained the arguments in Ground II of
his federal petition. Nor did the court discover any thing
in the state court record te indicate that petitioner fairly
presented the claims in Ground II to the Nevada Supreme
Court. Thus, the court finds that Ground II of the instant
petition is unexhausted.

Therefore, the court shall grant respondents’
motion to dismiss petition as mixed. Since the court did

not examine the merits of the respondents’ procedural

default arguments in their motion to dismiss, the court

shall deny the procedural default arguments without
prejudice, subject to renewal by incorporation at a later time
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that respondents’
motion to dismiss (#21) is GRANTED. Petitioner shall
have thirty (30) days from the entry of this order on the
record within which to inform the court whether
petitioner wishes to formally and forever abandon the
claims for relief set out in Ground II and wishes to pursue
his petition with Ground I only. Alternatively, petitioner
shall have thirty (30) days from the entry of this order on
the record within which to inform the court that he wishes
to return to state court to completely exhaust his petition
The failure to timely inform the court of his decision will
result in the dismissal of the petition without prejudice as

a mixed petition.

Dated this 27 day of August, 2001

Ls/
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGI

APPENDIX G

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

STEVEN COLLIER, )
)
Appellant, ) No. 34762
)
vs )
)
WARDEN, NEVADA STATE )
PRISON, JOHN IGNACIO )
)
RSE SEs

Filed January 11, 2001
ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

This is a proper person appeal from an order of the
district court dismissing appellant's post-conviction
petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

On July 5, 1995, the district court convicted
appellant, pursuant to a guilty plea, of one count of
possession of a trafficking quantity of a controlled
substance. The district court sentenced appellant to serve

a term of forty-five vears in the Nevada State Prison. On

March 26, 1997, the district court entered an amended

judgment of conviction to include the relevant statutory
provisions under which appellant was convicted. This
court dismissed appellant's untimely appeal from his
judgment of conviction and sentence for lack of
jurisdiction. Collier v. State, Docket No. 33382 (Order
Dismissing Appeal, February 3, 1999).

On March 21, 1997, appellant filed a proper person
motion to correct an illegal sentence in the district court.
On May 28, 1997, the district court denied appellant's
motion. This court dismissed appellant's appeal. Collier
v. State, Docket No. 30578 (Order Dismissing Appeal,
May 13, 1999).

On May 28, 1999, appellant filed a proper person
post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the
district court. The State opposed the petition. Appellant
tiled a reply. Pursuant to NRS 34.750 and 34.770, the

district court declined to appoint counsel to represent

G-

hN

appellant or to conduct an evidentiary hearing. On
August 10, 1999, the district court dismissed appellant's
petition. This appeal followed.

Appellant filed his petition approximately four
years after entry of the judgment of conviction and one
and one-half years after entry of the amended judgment of
conviction. Thus, appellant's petition was untimely filed
See NRS 34.726 (1). Appellant's petition was procedurally
barred absent a demonstration of cause for the delay and
prejudice. See id

In an attempt to demonstrate cause for the delay,
appellant argued that he was deprived of a direct appeal
because his trial counsel failed to inform him of his right
to appeal. Based upon our review of the record on appeal,
we conclude that the district court did not err in
determining that appellant failed to demonstrate sufficient

cause to overcome his delay See Harris v. Warden,

114 Nev. 956, 964 P.2d 785 (1998); Lozada v. State,
110 Nev. 349, 871 P.2d 944 (1994).

Having reviewed the record on appeal, and for the
reasons set forth above, we conclude that appellant is not
entitled to relief and that briefing and oral argument are
unwarranted. See Luckett v. Warden, 91 Nev. 681, 682,
541 P.2d 910, 911 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1077 (1976).
Accordingly, we affirm the order of the district court.

It is so ORDERED.-

_Ls/ =
Shearing
Ls/ AB PEaTCO BO
Agosti
cee sess a: vee
Leavitt
ce Hon. Brent T. Adams, District Judge

Attorney General

Washoe County District Attorney
Steven Collier

Washoe County Cler«

We have considered all proper person documents filed or
received in this matter, and we conclude that the relief requested iS

mnt warranted

APPENDIX H

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

STEVEN W. COLLIER, )
)
Appellant, ) No. 30578
)
VS. )
)
THE STATE OF NEVADA )
)
Respondent, dete ey

Filed May 13, 1999

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL

This is a proper person appeal from an order of the
district court denying appellant's motion to correct an illegal
sentence. On July 5, 1995, appellant was convicted pursuant to
a guilty plea of one count of possession of a trafficking quantity
of a controlled substance of between 14 and 28 grams.’ See
NRS 453.3385(2). The district court sentenced appellant to

serve a term of forty -five vears in the Nevada State Prison.

On May 26, 1997, the district court entered an amended judgment
on conviction, which included the relevant statutory provisions

under which appellant was convicted

On March 21, 1997, appellant filed a motion to
correct an illegal sentence in the district court. On
May 28, 1997, the district court denied the motion, and this
appeal followed. In the motion, appellant contended that
his forty-five year sentence was illegal because the statute
under which he was convicted, NRS 453.3385(2), provides
for a minimum term of not less than two years and a
maximum term of not more than fifteen years

We conclude that appellant's contention lacks
merit. At the time of appellant's offense in March 1994,
NRS 453.3385(2) provided for a sentence of life or a
definite term of no less than ten years. Appellant's forty-
five year sentence was within the statutory limit. We
recognize that NRS 453.3385(2) was amended in 1995 to
reduce the penalty to a minimum term of two vears and a
maximum term of fifteen vears. 1995 Nev. Stat., ch. 443,
§ 296, at 1288. Hlowever, that amendment became

effective on July 1, 1995, and does not apply to offenses

H-2

committed before that date. 1995 Nev. Stat., ch. 443,
§§ 393-394, at 1340. Thus, the amendment does not apply
to appellant's sentence, as he committed the offense in
1994 Therefore, we conclude that the district court
properly denied appellant's motion

Having reviewed the record on appeal and for the
reasons set forth above, we conclude that appellant in not
entitled to relief and that briefing and oral argument are
unwarranted. See Luckett v. Warden, 91 Nev. 681, 682, 541
P.2d 910, 911 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1077 (1976)
Accordingly, we

ORDER this appeal dismissed. *

PME MER sia
Young
Shearing
Leavitt
We have considered all proper person documents filed of
received in this matter, and we conclude that the relief requested is

not warranted. We deny appellant s motion for voluntary dismissal

as mow

Hon. Brent T. Adams, District Judge
Attorney General

Washoe County District Attorney
Steven W. Collier

Washoe County Clerk

APPENDIX I

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
STEVEN WAYNE COLLIER,
Appellant, No. 33382
VS.

STATE OF NEVADA

Nm ee ee eee eet eee”

Respondent.
Filed February 3, 1999

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL

This is a proper person appeal from a judgment of
conviction. Our review of this appeal indicates that the district

nm

court entered the judgment of conviction on July 5, 1995,
Appellant did not file the notice of appeal, however, until
November 16, 1998, well after the expiration of the thirty-day
appeal period prescribed by NRAP 4 (b). An untimely notice of

appeal fails to vest jurisdiction in this court. See Lozada v.

State, 110 Nev. 349, 871 P.2d 944 (1994). Accordingly, we

conclude that we lack jurisdiction to consider this appeal,

and we
ORDER this appeal dismissed
Ls/ ie
Young
Shearing
= SF SEE ES oe ar
Leavitt

cc Hon. Brent T. Adams, District Judge

Hon. Frankie Sue Del Papa, Attorney General
Hon. Richard A. Gammick, District Attorney
Steven Collier

Amy Harvey, Clerk

In the notice of appeal, appellant contends that his trial counsel
tailed to intorm him regarding his right to directly appeal his
conviction. We note that such a claim should be raised in the first
instance na post conviction petition tor a writ of habeas oOrpus
filed mm the district court. See Lozada v. State, 110 Nev. 349, 87]
2d 844 (1994) We express no opinion concerning whether
yppellant could satisty the procedural requirements detailed in
NRS chapter 44 or whether appellant would be entitled to reliet
pursuant to Lozada. See also Dickerson v. State, 114 Ne 967
P2d 1132 ICR (Adv. Op. No. 119, November 25, 1998): Harris \
Warden, 1f4 Nev YH4 P Od 7S9 (1998

APPENDIX J

No. CR94-1483

Dept. No. 6

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF WASHOE

STATE OF NEVADA,

Plaintiff, ) Reporter: R. Molezzo
VS. )
) AMENDED
STEVEN WAYNE COLLIER, ) JUDGMENT
Defendant )
)

Filed March 26, 1997
No sufficient cause being shown by Defendant as

to why judgment should not be pronounced against him,
the Court rendered judgment as follows:

Phat Steven Wayne Collier is guilty of the crime of
Possession of a Tratficking Quantity of a Controlled

Substance, a violation of NRS 453.3385 and NRS 453.3405,

a felony as charged in Count | of the Amended
Information, and that he be punished by imprisonment in
the Nevada State Prison for the term of forty-five (45)
years and payment of a fine in the amount of One
Hundred Thousand Doilars ($100, 000.00). The Defendant
is given credit for four hundred ten (410) days time served
commencing at the beginning of his term. The Defendant
is further ordered to reimburse the County of Washoe the
sum of Twenty-five Dollars ($25.00) for the statutory
administrative assessment fee and the Sixty Dollar ($60.00)
chemical analysis fee.

Dated this 5th day of July, 1995.

District Judge

APPENDIX K

No. CR94-1483

Dept. No. 6

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF WASHOE

STATE OF NEVADA,
Plaintiff,

Reporter: R. Molezzo
vs.

STEVEN WAYNE COLLIER,
Defendant.

JUDGMENT

)
)
)
)
)
ee

Filed July 5, 1995
No sufficient cause being shown by Defendant as

to why judgment should not be pronounced against him,
the Court rendered judgment as follows:

That Steven Wayne Collier is guilty of the crime of
Possession Of A Trafficking Quantity Of A Controlled
Substance as charged in Count I of the Amended
Information and that he be punished by imprisonment in

the Nevada State Prison for the term of forty-five (45)

years and payment of a fine in the amount of $100,000.00.

Ihe defendant is further ordered to pay the $60.00

chemical analysis fee and the $25.00 administrative

assessment fee. The defendant is given credit for 410 days

time served commencing at the beginning of his term.
Dated this 7#h day of July, 1995.

~3
B.A.

[s/ TERM ENY See
DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386016_0435%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
