# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Newdunn Associates, LLP v. United States Army Corps of Engineers

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 2004
- **Citation:** 541 U.S. 972

## Text

FILED
03 637 ocr 272093
No.
=_
35n the

Supreme Court of the United States

_

NEWDUNN ASSOCIATES, LLP; ORION ASSOCIATES;
NORTHWEST CONTRACTORS CORPORATION,

Petitioners,
V.

UNITED STATES ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS,

Respondent.

”
4

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

,™
4

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

>.
a

TIMOTHY S. BISHOP

DOUGLAS E. KAHLE
RUSSELL R. EGGERT Counsel of Record
Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw MARK R. BAUMGARTNER
190 South LaSalie Street Pender & Coward, P.C.
Chicago, IL 60603 222 Central Park Ave.
(312) 782-0600 Virginia Beach, VA 23462

(757) 490-3000

Counsel for Petitioners

QUESTION PRESENTED

The court of appeals, in Square conflict with the Fifth
Circuit’s decision in Rice v. Harken Exploration Co., 250
F.3d 264 (Sth Cir. 2001), and at odds with the principles laid
down by this Court in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook
County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159
(2001), held that federal authority under Clean Water Act
Section 404 encompasses wetlands on petitioners’ property
that have only an ephemeral, intermittent, occasional, and
indirect manmade hydrological connection to navigable
waters located miles distant. The question presented, which is
of critical nationwide importance to determining the scope
of burdensome federal permitting schemes and the balance of
power between state and federal regulators, is:

Whether federal Clean Water Act jurisdiction over
“navigable waters” extends to wetlands that are not adjacent
or contiguous to open waters but from which rainwater
runoff may occasionally reach navigable waters located miles
away through a series of manmade, indirect, ephemeral, and
intermittent surface water connections.

ii

RULE 29.6 STATEMENT

None of the petitioners has a parent corporation or a non-
wholly owned subsidiary, and no publicly held corporation
owns 10% or more of any petitioners’ stock.

Additional plaintiffs in the district court and appellants in\
the court of appeals were the Virginia State Water Control
Board and Dennis H. Treacy, Director of the Virginia
Department of Environmental Quality.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

QUESTION PRESENTED.........ccccccsscsssssssssssseseeeeeeeecccccn. i
RULE 29.6 STATEMENT .......cccccccssssssssssssscssseseeeeeeeecccc. ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..........cccccccssssssssesecseseoooecccecc Vv
PI MEI cn ssasenssinsvsonseoseevnsonocosoeseccs, 1
oe ps ig 1
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED... eecccccseeees. 1
Meese ss sastsanonbissnacbcsonrnsovensnennsesseses,.... 1
A. The Statutory and Regulatory Scheme. .........0.000000.......... 4
B. The Corps’ Enforcement Action And The District

Court’s Findings Of Fact And Decision.................. 5
C. The Fourth Circuit’s Decision ......ccsssssscseeeeeeeeccccc. 7
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION........2.....00.0.. 7
A. The Fourth and Fifth Circuits Are In Direct

Conflict Concerning Whether Nonnavigable,

Intermittent, Ephemeral Waters Are “Navigable

Waters” Within The Meaning Of The Clean

I hana ete sceescsenrtoratniarecssscegceovtntarsonsoseseees...,... 7
B. The Fourth Circuit’s Decision Is At Odds With

The Principles This Court Set Forth In SWANCC......... 10
C. The Fourth Circuit’s Decision That Roadside

Ditches Are Tributaries Is Inconsistent With The

CWA, Because The CWA Defines A Ditch As A

“Point Source” And Not A ) , eee 13
D. The Fourth Circuit’s Erroneous Decision Flies In

The Face Of Corps Regulations and Policy................... 14

1. The Corps’ Regulations Limit Jurisdiction To
The Ordinary High Water Mark ........-ccccccc00--.-.. 15

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS - continued

2. The Corps’ Regulatory Guidance
Distinguishes Manmade Ditches From Natural
Ticats ca 15

3. Prior To SWANCC The Corps Treated The
Type Of Wetlands At Issue The Same As
IE IE vistnisnidiesesiasinsseveanioascstiaerrneiiacsneeisesn, 17

E. This Court’s Guidance Is Necessary Because
There Is No Consistent National Policy On CWA
GRR asrsiinirtciteinilcabal tial aal ia 19

F. The CWA Does Not Authorize The Corps To
Exercise General Land Use Regulation, Which
Congress Expressly Reserved For State And
Local Govermment..............0.s.cosssssesreseesscassesesesesesososoees 23

SAA ITT sitaihiisen.diciualcs medusa niuagniecnae 25

Vv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)

CASES
Aiello v. Town of Brookhaven,

136 F. Supp. 2d 81 (E.D.N.Y. | a Ee 13
Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital,

GEE D. TOG EGG) scevevensnesnvessvsssorareasesesssorsciessseese.... 14
Grayned v. City of Rockford,

WW I cisiihicenihrneccetatithad ce 7
Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation Dist.,

243 F.3d 526 (9th Cir. 2001) oo... .cecccccecsscscessescsccceeeoeeces... 13
Hoffman Homes v. United States,

902 F.2d 567 (7th Cir. 1990) oo... .ceccccceccsssssecesceccoseeesecsn. 22
Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide Inc., -

FID IB. BE CIDE) scsscsensevscnssessicessvvrsnesesasoursmusonececic,.. 14
Rice v. Harken Exploration Co., '

250 F.3d 264 (Sth Cir. 2001) .o...eccccccccccceecoeeosecees... passim
Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v.

United States, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) ...eecccccccceccoeeseeses. passim
Southern Pines Assoc. v. United States,

912 F.2d 713 (4th Cir. 1990) oo... ccceccsccsscoseccessoeceseecessn. 22
United States v. Buday,

138 F. Supp. 2d 1282 (D. Mont. Pe cinkvbititoiiiuiee 10
United States v. Deaton,

332 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 2003)... ..cccssecssccssscscssescoeceeeecesecsn. 9
United States v. Rapanos,

339 F.3d 447 (6th Cir. 2003) oo. ..cccccscecsscsssssescecsoecessece... 10

United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.,
GPR TTB. TEE (RIGID sr csnnsessnsnerscnseinersinmesesadberiosssosoesccec.c, 11

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES -— continued

Page(s)
FEDERAL STATUTES
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Be ae Se cisaneatesninenacssnatsitiinanennisiinnisinidieeiiaaaiinin |
ee Hii cia inkcensisieisiniiiipininceiinmiiainaaainn 1, 23, 24
Is Te WI binttisnceesinnnnatinmsencnennnimiiiaaaiieds 1
a ee FE ciierivisatineementsiescsnaniaminaion 1, 4, 13
Fee RG Ie MEP innsishhnicndainanibadiniineadiaiieieaaaiassianele 14
ee es eB itisicisenstnsiieartnsigsnsnisescenileinlanciciieanainia passim
es SF Re iacinensnicteiigiccesaksasiisicsaiicinensicidagliciiakinana |
Fe a, hs er ciiiseviiicvicehteeenecssarienscenuenlldiaehaaicbiaesatani 1
Fe Rt iticsaiecienatiiiincinnaittinneeapiaiaiabiiiiaens 1,13
Pees 0 TINIE Pt cicssisea si niacchlescticinatensteinabbiebiilbnaignaiit 1, 3, 13
Fe es Sy HUET Pissvssisnstinidsaiahuntatinenniernibietiishndilbabaatiilda 1,3,4
ee are OF I deisveninsnwitsoancebcesieslacasiastamsiadeshinaiaeaenaanoraaaiaainde 7
REGULATIONS
a ats Oe IE isis so snicceoeeoesdcasaneniceiadiapiicatacbetidiasan iii 19
Fe ee ile I CREE icsniccahnivninsinisicsinitasalliiaiagiaa 17
Fe a OF EE Biexcshseeretesnniedaiemaanande 4
ee ee its sncsieensintiontsickiontescaecinncnabeiiciais sii 17
i Se EE Piet ssieinsaneinsensispninclnnintaiioasinenebsiehicleiietnacadaisliok 4
ae ly 6 TD eicisnrsssisessinliiaiidiasioveaaiiamniaminanaabiiaad 4

33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a), (b), (c), and (€) .ccccsssesssccssssscessessesssseess 1

a Pe ee a

> Gi Die tet e ttt th Bie,

vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - continued

Page(s)
I Bidets 1, 4, 15
ee ii cicciintoensondaeamennenanaaenens 17
33 C.F.R. § 330.5(a)(26) (1986) ......ccscsessssssessssssssssesssesessee 17
TB aise scichstls otncrienititncenaanen 19
at | RS 5 eae enn anaes et 19
ee iitoesnnicntvenalnniianiines 19
cn cncsdalatucniconaensaincnnaini 19
AO C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(8) ...cesccscccccccssscsessscssssusssecssscuscusensenes 14
ee aiibitiie sinciiissinescriictcrnnctnsniclacnaiiaaiat 23
8 Sh. , | a na 16, 17
Fi: at ea 16
51 Fed. Reg. 41206 (1986) .....c.ccccscssesssesssesseesseseee 3, 4, 15, 16
55 Fed. Reg. 47990 (1990) .....c.cccsscscssssesssessssssecsssssecnsenseenee 14
Oe Bik TI iinet 4, 15, 16
Ee ie I arin tiie setdensdiceieietesiaccsteiceationetetioi 8
OTHER AUTHORITIES .
fs FL, / | een 24

EPA & Corps, Guidance for Asserting Federal
Jurisdiction Over Isolated Wetlands in
Response to U.S. Supreme Court Decision in
SOPMEVO, Coane CFO. 1D, BOGS) nncccecsescscrcesssevesovesesccescnes 5,8

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Appeal Decision,
Evangelista, Detroit District,
File No. 00-010-030-0 (August 25, 2000)..................00. 21

viii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - continued

Page(s)

U.S. Corps of Engineers, Appeal Decision,
Daniel, New Orleans District,
File No. 20-010-0562 (June 20, 2001) ............cccccccseeeeees 20

U.S. Corps of Engineers, Appeal Decision,
E. Tetz & Sons, Inc. and Concrete Properties,
New York District, -
File No. 2000-00117 (June 24, 2003).............cccccee0 21, 22

U.S. Corps of Engineers, Appeal Decision,
Meehan, New York District,
File No. 2002-00023 (November 19, 2002)...............0006. 21

U.S. Corps of Engineers, Appeal Decision,

Memphis Stone and Gravel Company,

Vicksburg District,

File No. 200113910 (July 19, 2002)..............ccceccsseseeeeee 20
U.S. Corps of Engineers, Appeal Decision,

Molycorp, Inc., Los Angeles District,
File No. 2000-01678 (August 16, 2001)..............ccccceee 20

U.S. Corps of Engineers, Appeal Decision, NEC
Transit/Williams, L.L.C., Buffalo District,

File No. 2000-00325(2) (August 30, 2001)...............0000. 21
U.S. Corps of Engineers, Appeal Decision,

Soundview Properties, Inc.,

Jacksonville District,

File No. 199905468 (November 19, 2001)..............00000 20

U.S. Corps of Engineers, Appeal Decision,
Sunrise Office Park, Los Angeles District,

File No. 2001-00379 (September 7, 2001)................00000 20
V. Albrecht & B. Goode, Wetland Regulation in
the Real World (Feb. 1994)...............cccccscccssccscssesceees 22, 24

a ae EAL OF aS ET ETS SR Se eer

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|

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioners Newdunn Associates LLP, Orion Associates,
and Northwest Contractors Corporation respectfully petition
for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (App., infra, 1a-19a)
is reported at 344 F.3d 407. The opinion of the district court
(App., infra, 20a-56aa) is reported at 195 F. Supp. 2d 751.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on
September 10, 2003. This Court’s jurisdiction is invoked
under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The relevant provisions of the Clean Water Act, 33
U.S.C. §§ 1251(a), (b), (g), 1311(a), 1344(a), (0), (g),
1362(7), (12), (14) are set forth at App., infra, 57a-60a. The
relevant regulations, 33 C.F.R. §§ 328.3(a), (b), (c), (e), and
33 C.F.R. § 328.4(c) are set forth at App., infra, 60a-62a.

STATEMENT

The issue in this case is whether Congress, in enacting
Section 404(a) of the Clean Water Act (“CWA” or “Act”),
authorized the United States Army Corps of Engineers
(“Corps”) to assert jurisdiction over activities on property
containing wetlands adjacent to manmade ditches that are
only intermittently wet and that are located miles from
navigable waters. The Corps has asserted jurisdiction in this
and other cases based upon its interpretation that the
navigable waters of the United States encompass any wetland
from which rainwater may ultimately flow into navigable
waters, no matter how remote, indirect, or occasional that
runoff may be. In upholding such broad federal jurisdiction

2

(and reversing the district court), the Fourth Circuit seriously
misunderstood this Court’s teachings and created a Square
conflict with the Fifth Circuit as to the scope of a major
federal statute affecting the use of land across the Nation.

This Court recently set forth the principles governing the
Corps’ exercise of jurisdiction under Section 404 of the
Clean Water Act. Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook
County v. United States, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) (“SWANCC’”)
(Corps jurisdiction does not reach ponds, not adjacent to
navigable waters, that are used by migratory birds). This
Court found that “the plain text and import of § 404(a)” is
that it reaches only waters and wetlands that have a
“significant nexus” and are “inseparably bound up with”
waters of the United States, and that applying that standard
the Act does not reach “nonnavigable, isolated, intrastate
waters.” Jd. at 167, 169-170. This Court also found “no
persuasive evidence” that the Corps erred in 1974 when it
promulgated regulations interpreting the Statutory term
“navigable waters” as waters that are navigable in fact, have .
been navigable in the past, or could be made so in the future.
Id. at 167. And it could discern no purpose in 1977
amendments to the CWA “[bJeyond Congress’ desire to
regulate wetlands adjacent to ‘navigable waters.’” Jd. at 170-
171.

The Fifth Circuit, in Rice v. Harken Exploration Co., 250
F.3d 264 (Sth Cir. 2001), applied the principles set forth in
SWANCC. Reading SWANCC to authorize CWA jurisdiction
over waters that are “actually navigable” or “adjacent to an
open body of navigable water,” the Fifth Circuit held that “a
small seasonal creek” and “intermittent streams which only
infrequently contain running water” are not “sufficiently
linked” to navigable waters to themselves “qualify as
“navigable waters.’” Jd. at 270-272.

In stark contrast to SWANCC and Rice, the Fourth
Circuit’s ruling here allows the Corps to control

3

development, agriculture, and other land use activity in every
wetland from which any rainwater runoff may ultimately, on
occasion, reach navigable waters. The Fourth Circuit treats
ephemeral, intermittent waters distant from navigable waters
as within CWA jurisdiction; the Fifth Circuit does not.

The Fourth Circuit also held that manmade roadside
ditches and culverts were waters of the United States. App.,
infra, 17a. Yet, the Corps has long recognized a distinction
between manmade ditches and natural streams, and, prior to
this Court’s decision in SWANCC, did not generally consider
manmade drainage ditches to be waters of the United States.
See 51 Fed. Reg. 41206, 41217 (1986). Nonetheless, the
Fourth Circuit considered the distinction “irrelevant,” App.,
infra, 17a, deferring to the Corps’ new position.

The Fourth Circuit’s decision in this regard directly
conflicts with the plain language of the CWA, which defines
ditches, culverts and other manmade conveyances as “point
sources,” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14), App., infra, 60a, not as
“waters of the United States.” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7), App.,
infra, 59a. And the Corps only sometimes, on a case-by-case
basis, considers ditches and culverts to be jurisdictional
“tributaries” of navigable waters. Neither the Fourth Circuit
nor the Corps provide any guidance to landowners as to when
federal jurisdiction will be asserted over such ditches.

Under the Fourth Circuit’s decision, the CWA reaches to
the top of every mountain and the end of every street in the
country. The Corps is permitted to exercise this broad
jurisdiction without any showing of actual effect on
navigable waters or interstate commerce. Given the split
among circuits, the contrast between the Virtually limitless
jurisdiction accorded the Corps by the Fourth Circuit and the
direction given by this Court in SWANCC, and the practical
importance of the question presented to landowners and
regulators throughout the country, this Court should grant
certiorari. |

4

A. The Statutory and Regulatory Scheme.

When Congress enacted the CWA, it delegated authority
to the Corps to issue permits for the discharge of dredged and
fill material into “the navigable waters at specified disposal
sites.” 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a); 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a); App., infra,
58a. The CWA defines “navigable waters” as “the waters of
the United States, including the territorial seas.” 33 U.S.C.
§ 1362(7), App., infra, 59a. The statute does not define
“waters of the United States.”

The Corps asserted jurisdiction in this case pursuant to
regulations that define “waters of the United States” to
include “[aJll waters which are currently used, or were used
in the past, or may be susceptible to use in interstate or
foreign commerce, including all waters which are subject to
the ebb and flow of the tide” (33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(1), App.,
infra, 60a), tributaries of such waters (33 C.F.R.
§ 328.3(aX(5), App., infra, 61a), and wetlands adjacent to
such waters or their tributaries. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(7),
App., infra, 61a.

The Corps’ regulations do not define the term “tributary,”
and do not define manmade drainage or irrigation ditches as
navigable waters of the United States. In some regulatory
interpretations, the Corps explains that a manmade ditch is
subject to the Corps’ jurisdiction only if it extends the
ordinary high-water mark of an existing water of the United
States. 65 Fed. Reg. 12818, 12824-25, App., infra, 38a n.13.'

' The Corps’ regulations specify that CWA jurisdiction in nontidal
waters extends only to the ordinary high-water mark, or if adjacent
wetlands are present, to the extent of those wetlands. 33 C.F.R.
§ 328.4(c\(1), (2), App., infra, 62a. In the preamble to its 1986
Regulations, the Corps states “[t]herefore, it should be concluded
that in the absence of wetlands the upstream limit of Corps
jurisdiction also stops when the ordinary high water mark is no
longer perceptible.” 51 Fed. Reg. at 41217 (1986), App., infra,
38a.

5

However, the Corps reserves, on a case-by-case basis, the
right to assert jurisdiction over ditches that can flow, even
intermittently, into other covered waters, but articulates no
meaningful guidance on the appropriate basis for such a
decision. App., infra, 47a; see EPA & Corps, Guidance for
Asserting Federal Jurisdiction Over Isolated Wetlands in
Response to U.S. Supreme Court Decision in SWANCC Case
(Jan. 10, 2003) (“Corps 2003 Guidance”).

B. The Corps’ Enforcement Action And The
District Court’s Findings Of Fact And Decision

During the summer of 2001, Newdunn Associates L.L.P.
(“Newdunn”), and its agents, Orion Associates (“Orion”) and
Northwest Contractors Corporation (“Northwest”), began
logging, filling and excavating on Newdunn’s property in
Newport News, Virginia. The Corps and the Virginia State
Water Control Board (“Board”), acting through the director
of the Virginia Department of Environmental Quality
(“DEQ”), Dennis H. Treacy, filed enforcement actions in.
federal and state court, respectively. Both agencies accused
Newdunn of conducting unauthorized activities in wetlands.”

? Virginia state law, at the time of Newdunn’s activities,
specifically permitted placement of fill into wetlands. App., infra,
23a. Therefore, Newdunn’s filling activities did not violate state
law. Once a wetland is filled, it is no longer saturated to the surface
with water and therefore no longer a wetland. The State alleged
that because the placement of fill eliminating the wetlands was
unauthorized by the Corps, Newdunn’s activities in the converted
uplands violated other state laws. Because the State’s allegations
hinged upon whether the fill was authorized, Newdunn removed
the State’s suit to the federal court, which consolidated the
enforcement actions for trial. The Fourth Circuit held that the
district court did not have jurisdiction to decide the asserted
violation of state law. App., infra, at 13a. Petitioners do not seek
review of that part of the Fourth Circuit’s decision.

6

The district court conducted a five-day bench trial, after
which it ruled that neither the Corps nor the Board had
jurisdiction over Newdunn’s property. The court found that
the wetlands on Newdunn’s Property “are not adjacent to
navigable waters or waters of the United States by any
reasonable definition of adjacency.” Jd. at 54a.

At trial, the “Corps’ claim of jurisdiction [was] based
solely upon the alleged surface water or hydrologic
connection of the Property to the navigable portion of Stony
Run.” App., infra, at 29a-30a. The district court carefully
traced how tenuous a hydrologic connection that was. “Rain
generated runoff’ only “occasionally exits the property
through a spur ditch”—“[t]here is no evidence,” the court
found, “of_the frequency or volume of th[at] surface water
runoff.” The spur ditch leads to a manmade drainage ditch
that runs east of and parallel to Interstate 64 (the “eastern I-
64 ditch”). That eastern ditch, the court found, “is ephemeral,
or dry most of the year,” and any water in it is
“intermitten[t].” Any water that continues through the
eastern I-64 ditch eventually reaches a culvert under I-64,
through which it travels to another manmade ditch parallel to
and on the western side of I-64. That western ditch, 1% miles
in length, “was constructed partially through dry land.”
Water “intermittently travels” through the western ditch into
the “not-navigable-in-fact” Western Arm of Stony Run, at a
point a mile away from where the Central Arm of Stony Run
becomes navigable. Jd. at 30a-32a & n.10 (all emphases
added).

The district court held that in these circumstances the
Corps had “not carried its burden of factually proving a
sufficient connection between the wetlands on the Property
and navigable waters or waters of the United States.” App.,
infra, 45a. And any claim that wetlands on Newdunn’s
property were within the Corps’ jurisdiction “far exceeded
the grant of authority by congress in the CWA.” Jd. at 46a.

7

The court rejected the Corps’ assertion that “a culvert or
storm drainage pipe” is a “tributary.” Jd. at 45a.

The district court observed that although the Corps’ 1986
regulations generally exclude non-tidal drainage ditches from
its definition of tributaries, the Corps reserves the power to
assert jurisdiction over such ditches on a case-by-case basis.
Id. at 47a. Because the Corps failed to articulate any limits to
its discretionary jurisdiction, the district court held, the
regulations are insufficient to meet the constitutional
guidelines set forth by this Court in Grayned v. City of
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972). Ibid.

C. The Fourth Circuit’s Decision

The Fourth Circuit, although finding no error in the
district court’s findings of fact, reversed. It held that the
attenuated connection between wetlands on Newdunn’s
property and navigable portions of Stony Run was a
“sufficient nexus” for Corps jurisdiction. App., infra, at 19a.
The Corps may permissibly assert jurisdiction over wetlands
adjacent to nonnavigable tributaries of navigable waters, and
may permissibly label as tributaries intermittent and
ephemeral waters in manmade ditches and culverts and
drains located miles from navigable waters. Jd. at 17a.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

A. The Fourth and Fifth Circuits Are In Direct
Conflict Concerning Whether Nonnavigable,
Intermittent, Ephemeral Waters Are “Navigable
Waters” Within The Meaning Of The Clean
Water Act.

The Fifth Circuit in Rice v. Harken Exploration Co., 250
F.3d 264 (5th Cir. 2001), interpreting the Oil Pollution Act,
33 U.S.C. § 2701 (“OPA”), was the first court of appeals to
reconsider the jurisdictional scope of the term “navigable
waters” after the SWANCC decision. Jd. at 266. The court
noted that the OPA and CWA contained the same definition

8

of navigable waters, which should be interpreted the same
way. Id. at 267. The court reviewed its previously broad
interpretation of the language of the CWA and contrasted it
with this Court’s holding in SWANCC. Id. at 268-269.

Noting this Court’s warning in SWANCC that the word
“navigable” cannot be read out of the statute, the Fifth
Circuit held that “a body of water is subjected to regulation
under the CWA if the body of water is actually navigable or
is adjacent to an open body of navigable water.” Id. at 269.
Based on that standard, the Fifth Circuit held that federal
authority does not extend to waters or wetlands “that have
only an indirect, remote and attenuated connection with an
identifiable body of ‘navigable waters.” Jd. at 272. See id. at
270-272 (holding that “a small seasonal creek” and
“intermittent streams that only infrequently contain running
water” are not “sufficiently linked” to navigable waters to
“qualify as ‘navigable waters’ subject to federal
jurisdiction); see also Corps 2003 Guidance (observing that
“[s]ome courts have interpreted the reasoning in SWANCC to
potentially circumscribe CWA jurisdiction over tributaries”
and that Rice “is the leading case taking the narrowest view
of CWA jurisdiction after SWANCC’).

The district court found that the ditch nearest Newdunn’s
property was ephemeral. App., infra, 30a. The Fourth Circuit
did not overturn that conclusion. The Corps’ only definition
of “open water” specifically “does not include ephemeral
waters.” 67 Fed. Reg. 2020, 2094 (2002) (emphasis added).
Therefore, Newdunn’s wetlands are not adjacent to open
water.

This case thus presents the opportunity to decide the
important issue specifically reserved by this Court in
Riverside Bayview as to which the circuits are now squarely
in conflict: “the authority of the Corps to regulate discharges
of fill material into wetlands that are not adjacent to bodies of
open water.” 474 U.S. at 131 n.8. Wetlands that are not

9

adjacent to actually navigable waters do not have the
“significant nexus” that informed this Court’s “reading of the
CWA in Riverside Bayview Homes.” SWANCC, 531 U.S. at
167.

As the district court found and the Fourth Circuit did not
contradict, the wetlands on Newdunn’s property have only an
occasional, manmade, indirect, remote and attenuated
connection with a body of navigable water—the Central Arm
of Stony Run. If Newdunn’s property were located in the
Fifth Circuit the district court’s opinion would have been
affirmed. Instead, the Fourth Circuit adopted a starkly
contrasting view of federal authority.

Rather than restricting the Corps’ jurisdiction to waters
with a “significant nexus” to navigable waters or those that
are “inseparably bound up with the ‘waters’ of the United
States” (SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 167), the Fourth Circuit holds
an indirect, manmade, and occasional “nexus” sufficient.
App., infra, at 19a.

The Fourth Circuit extends the Corps’ jurisdiction to
“any branch of a tributary system that eventually flows into a
navigable body of water.” App., infra, at 16a. The Fourth
Circuit requires no minimum volume or frequency of water
flow to support jurisdiction, and remoteness of a wetland
from navigable water is no bar to the exercise of jurisdiction.
Anything that “eventually provides ‘additional matter’” to a
navigable water is a “tributary” and therefore subject to
CWA jurisdiction. United States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698,
710 (4th Cir. 2003).

Further expanding CWA jurisdiction, the Fourth Circuit
refused to find any distinction between natural tributaries and
manmade ditches and culverts. App., infra, at 17a. The court
of appeals held that the Corps’ jurisdiction includes “the
entire tributary system” including roadside ditches and
culverts. Jd. at 17a. In the Fourth Circuit, any drop of water
flowing from any property to traditional navigable water

10

through any gutter, pipe, culvert, or ditch regardless of
distance or amount of flow is ‘navigable water’ within the
meaning of the CWA. Any wetlands ‘adjacent’ to the gutter,
pipe, culvert or ditch would be subject to federal regulation.

The Sixth Circuit has similarly expanded CWA
jurisdiction in United States v. Rapanos, 339 F.3d 447 (6th
Cir. 2003). There, the court upheld CWA jurisdiction
wherever a “hydrologic connection” is proven between
wetlands and navigable waters. It held such a connection to
be present when a wetland connected through manmade
drains and creeks to navigable waters 11 to 20 miles distant.
See also United States v. Buday, 138 F. Supp. 2d 1282 (D.
Mont. 2001) (upholding federal jurisdiction over wetlands
adjacent to non-navigable “tributaries” 235 miles from the
navigable water to which they connected).

B. The Fourth Circuit’s Decision Is At Odds With
The Principles This Court Set Forth In SWANCC

Recently, this Court in SWANCC considered whether
Clean Water Act jurisdiction extends to isolated intrastate
ponds that may provide habitat for migratory birds. This
Court concluded that the text of the Act does not allow the
Corps to exercise such broad jurisdiction. In denying the
Corps’ jurisdiction over isolated ponds this Court set forth
principles to guide lower courts in determining the proper
scope of Section 404 jurisdiction.

Prior to SWANCC, some courts had interpreted the Clean
Water Act as granting jurisdiction to the full extent of the
Commerce Clause. This Court rejected that approach.
Instead, this Court held that the Corps’ jurisdiction under the
Act was based on Congress’ power to regulate navigation.
531 U.S. at 168 n3 (finding nothing to “signif[y] that
Congress intended to exert anything more than its commerce
power over navigation”).

11

This Court rejected the Corps’ position that the word
“navigable” in the statute has no “independent significance.”
531 U.S. at 172. This Court instead endorsed the Corps’ view
of the scope of the 1972 Act set forth in the Corps’ 1974
regulations—as reaching waters navigable in facts, navigable
in the past, or capable of being made navigable in the future.
Id. at 168. Thus, ““‘it is the water body’s capability of use by
the public for purposes of transportation or commerce which
is the determinative factor.’” Jbid. quoting 33 C.F.R.
§ 209.260(e)(1)(1974). Statutory amendments in 1977
supported extending the meaning of navigable waters to
include waters and “wetlands adjacent to ‘navigable waters’”
(id. at 170-171), leading this Court in United States v.
Riverside Rayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985), to hold
that Section 404(a) jurisdiction extended to “wetlands that
actually abutted on a navigable waterway.” SWANCC, 531
USS. at 167.

This Court held in SWANCC that “the plain text and
import of [CWA] § 404(a)” is that the Act reaches only
waters and wetlands that have a “significant nexus” to and
are “inseparably bound up with” navigable waters. 531 U.S.
at 167. Wetlands that “actually abutted on a navigable
waterway” and primary tributaries of navigable rivers satisfy
that standard (ibid.); but “nonnavigable, isolated, intrastate
waters” do not. Jd. at 170.

In refusing to interpret the CWA to give the Corps
jurisdiction over every pond in the country that might
provide habitat for migratory birds, this Court relied on the
principle that it takes a “clear statement” from Congress to
“alte[r] the federal-state framework by permitting federal
encroachment upon a traditional state power,” such as “the
States’ traditional and primary power over land and water
use.” SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 173-174. Avoiding such
encroachment through administrative overreaching is
especially important in the case of the Clean Water Act, this
Court observed, where Congress chose expressly to

12

‘recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities
and rights of States’” in those areas. Id. at 174.

The issue as to which, we have demonstrated, the courts
of appeals are divided is where, within the jurisdictional
scheme described in SWANCC, to fit wetlands that are not
adjacent to traditional navigable waters but are adjacent to
intermittent, ephemeral waters that occasionally run in
manmade ditches and culverts through which they may
eventually reach remote navigable waters. Like the Fifth
Circuit in Rice v. Harken, we believe that a fair reading of
SWANCC is that the CWA requires a more direct and
substantial connection between jurisdictional and traditional
navigable waters than the attenuated connection provided by
the possibility of intermittent flow of some quantity of water
through manmade ditches to remote navigable water.
Remote, intermittent water in manmade roadside ditches is
not in any meaningful sense, adjacent to, or a tributary of
navigable water. As Justice Stevens understood in dissent in
SWANCC, the effect of this Court’s ruling is that “such

‘isolated’ waters as ‘intermittent rivers, streams, tributaries,
and perched wetlands that are not contiguous or adjacent to
navigable waters’” are “completely excise[d] * * * from the
scope of the Act.” 531 U.S. at 189 & 190 n.14; see also id. at
187 n.13 (recognizing that wetlands, being only marginally
“waters” are “the most marginal category of ‘waters of the
United States’ potentially covered by the [CWA]”).

Were the Corps correct in its assertion of power over
water with any hydrological connection to navigable waters,
no matter how remote and attenuated, the vast accretion of
federal authority at the expense of traditional state powers
that the Court fended off in SWANCC will have occurred
anyway, and in a likely more potent form that leaves virtually
no water anywhere in the nation beyond the Corps’ reach.
The same “clear statement” rule of statutory interpretation
applied in SWANCC applies here. There is no more a clear
congressional statement in the CWA that federal power

13

reaches wetlands adjacent to normally dry ditches that could
on occasion indirectly carry runoff to remote navigable
waters than there was a clear congressional statement found
in SWANCC that federal power reaches isolated ponds used
by migratory birds.

The Fourth Circuit thus failed to apply the teaching of
SWANCC—in fact going through contortions to avoid the
lessons of that case. Other courts of appeals have similarly
sought to restrict the SWANCC decision to its facts, refusing
to follow the plain statutory meaning described by this Court.
E.g., United States v. Rapanos, supra; Headwaters, Inc. v.
Talent Irrigation Dist., 243 F.3d 526, 534 (9th Cir. 2001).
Further guidance from this Court is now essential.

C. The Fourth Circuit’s Decision That Roadside
Ditches Are Tributaries Is Inconsistent With The
CWA, Because The CWA Defines A Ditch As A
“Point Source” And Not A Tributary

Section 301(a) of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1311(a), prohibits the discharge of pollutants into navigable
waters. The term “discharge of a pollutant” means “any
addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point
source.” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12)(A). The Clean Water Act
further defines the term “point source” as “any discernable,
confined and discrete conveyance, including but not limited
to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well * * * from
which pollutants are or may be discharged.” 33 U.S.C.
§ 1362(14).

By definition, pipes, ditches and conduits are not
tributaries, but rather are point sources, which can, in some
circumstances, discharge pollutants into navigable waters. In
Aiello v. Town of Brookhaven, 136 F. Supp. 2d 81 (E.D.N.Y.
2001), for example, the court held that “culverts * * * qualify
as point sources.” Jd. at 118. Because the culverts at issue
there discharged pollutants into a pond and stream that were
navigable-in-fact, CWA jurisdiction existed. Jbid.

14

The Fourth Circuit’s definition of “tributary” includes
anything that “provides ‘additional matter’” that ultimately
reaches a navigable water. Deaton, 332 F.3d at 710. If all
pipes, ditches, channels, tunnels, conduits, wells, and discrete
fissures are “tributaries,” then a § 402 NPDES permit would
be required for all discharges into these “waters of the United
States.” Absurdly, every homeowner would need a § 402
permit for any discharges from his property into a curbside
gutter or house drain. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342.

The Environmental Protection Agency, which shares
CWA regulatory authority, however, defines the system of
“toads with drainage systems, * * * curbs, gutters, ditches
and man-made channels, or storm drains” as Municipal
Separate Storm Sewer Systems. 40 CFR. § 122.26(b)(8).
Separate storm sewers and other conveyances of urban runoff
“are point sources under the CWA.” 55 Fed. Reg. 47990,
47991 (1990).

The Corps’ litigation position that ditches and pipes are
tributaries, which is inconsistent with the plain language of
the CWA, and EPA regulations, leads to absurd results not
intended by Congress, and should be rejected. See Bowen v.
Georgetown University Hospital, 488 U.S. 204, 212 (1988);
Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 86
(2002).

D. The Fourth Circuit’s Erroneous Decision Flies In
The Face Of Corps Regulations and Policy

Despite the Corps’ litigating position in this and other
cases since SWANCC, the agency’s regulations have long
recognized narrower limits on its jurisdiction. Concepts such
as headwaters, ordinary high water marks, and manmade
drainage or irrigation ditches have all served to mark the
outer limits of CWA jurisdiction. The Fourth Circuit’s
decision has vastly expanded federal jurisdiction by making
all of these concepts irrelevant to the reach of the statute.

15

I. The Corps’ Regulations Limit Jurisdiction To
The Ordinary High Water Mark

The Fourth Circuit concluded that the Corps’ jurisdiction
reaches “‘any branch of a tributary system that eventually
flows into a navigable body of water.”” App., infra, 16a,
quoting Deaton, 332 F.3d at 711 (emphasis added). Corps
regulations, however, limit Corps jurisdiction in non-tidal
waters to the ordinary high-water mark (“OHWM™”) and
make clear that CWA jurisdiction ends when the OHWM is
no longer discernable. 33 C.F.R. § 328.4; App. infra, 62a; see
also, e.g., 51 Fed. Reg. at 41217 (1986); App., infra, 38a; 65
Fed. Reg. 12818, 12823 (2000) (drainage ditch constructed in
a stream is a water of the United States “provided an OHWM
is still present”); Tr. of Oral Argument to Fourth Circuit at 5
(Corps’ counsel acknowledged this limitation on Corps’
authority).

Thus, in order for wetlands to be jurisdictional they must
be adjacent to the ordinary high water mark of a non-tidal
water of the United States. 33 C.F.R. § 328.4(c); App. infra,
62a. Here, the district court found that the eastern I-64 ditch
was ephemeral, meaning that at most times during the year it
was dry. App. infra, 30a. A ditch that does not ordinarily
have water will likely not have an ordinary high water mark,
and the district court made no finding that any OHWM
existed in any of the ditches and culverts in issue.
Nonetheless, the Fourth Circuit—without finding the
presence of an OHWM—upheld the Corps’ jurisdiction. In
doing so, it effectively removed, as a matter of law, the
jurisdictional limitation contained in 33 C.F.R. § 328.4(c).

2. The Corps’ Regulatory Guidance Distinguishes
Manmade Ditches From Natural Tributaries

Corps regulations have consistently treated manmade
ditches differently from natural tributaries. In 1975, man-
made canals which are navigable-in-fact were considered
waters of the United States, but “drainage and irrigation

16

ditches have been excluded.” 40 Fed. Reg. 31320, 31321
(1975). The 1977 regulations specifically stated that
“manmade nontidal drainage and irrigation ditches excavated
on dry land are not considered waters of the United States.”
42 Fed. Reg. 37122, 37144 (codified at 33 CFR.
323.2(a)(3)) (1977). The Corps explained that drainage and
irrigation ditches are only regulated by the CWA at the point
where they feed into navigable waters. 42 Fed. Reg. at
37127.

Even in 1986, when the Corps began regulating drainage
and irrigation ditches on a case-by-case basis, the Corps did
not define ditches as tributaries. 51 Fed. Reg. 41206, 41217.
Instead, the Corps recognized that non-tidal drainage ditches
were even further removed from navigable waters than ponds
used by migratory birds. Jbid.

In March 2000, the Corps stated that ditches constructed
in streams could'be waters of the United States if they
contained an OHWM, but still did not define ditches as
tributaries. 65 Fed. Reg. 12818, 12823 (2000). According to
current Corps guidance, ditches constructed in uplands are
still generally not waters of the United States. Jd. at 12824.

Nontidal drainage and irrigation ditches that are not
navigable-in-fact have s been excluded from the
general definition of the tnavigable” “waters of the United
States.” Given this regulatory history, it is remarkable that
the Fourth Circuit ignores the district court’s finding of fact
that the I-64 ditches were not waters of the United States.
The district court found that the Corps had failed to meet its
burden to prove that these ditches were tributaries. App.,
infra, at 47a. Overturning the district court’s judgment,
without challenging its factual conclusions, amounts to
holding that a// manmade ditches are waters of the United
States as a matter of law. There is no support for this
conclusion in either the statute or the regulations.

17

3. Prior To SWANCC The Corps Treated The Type
Of Wetlands At Issue The Same As “Isolated
Waters”

The Corps has long recognized that there is a point in
natural streams above which the flow is de minimis. This
point is called the “headwaters,” which the Corps defines as
“the point on a stream beyond which the flow of the water
body is normally less than five cubic feet per second.” 40
Fed. Reg. 31320, 31321 (1975); 33 C.F.R. § 330.2(d) (2003).
It is undisputed that the property in this case is above the
headwaters.

In the 1975 regulations, when the Corps expanded its
definition of waters of the United States, the Corps only
asserted jurisdiction in tributaries “up to their headwaters.”
40 Fed. Reg. at 31324 (1975). In 1977, the Corps’ position
was that permits would “ordinarily not be required” for
activities above the headwaters. 42 Fed. Reg. at 37129.
However, the Corps asserted that these headwaters were now
“waters of the United States” within its jurisdiction. Jbid. The
1977 regulations equated waters above the headwaters with
isolated waters such as the ponds in SWANCC. 33 CFR.
§ 323.2(ay(5) (1977); 42 Fed. Reg. 37144 n.2. As the
footnote makes clear, the Corps claimed authority over
isolated waters and waters above the headwaters under the
broad assertion of jurisdiction in 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) over
waters “which could affect” interstate commerce—a provision
upon which this Court cast substantial doubt in SWANCC.

The Corps issued new regulations in 1986, purportedly to
“clarify the scope of the 404 program.” 51 Fed. Reg. at
41217. However, those regulations now required landowners
to get permits for activities above the headwaters. Still, the
permit regulations treated “isolated waters” and headwaters
the same. 51 Fed. Reg. at 41218: 33 C.F.R. § 330.5(a)(26)
(1986).

18

As the history of the Corps’ regulations make Clear, the
Corps has historically treated even natural streams above the
headwaters as “isolated.” Areas above the headwaters are
only occasionally connected to navigable waters through
surface water runoff. Ecologically, high elevation wetlands
are less functional than wetlands adjacent to navigable, open
water. App., infra, 31a. The Fourth Circuit’s decision
endorses the Corps’ exercise of jurisdiction over waters that
even the Corps recognizes as being as far removed from
navigable waters as the “isolated ponds” at issue in
SWANCC.

Although this Court has held there is “no persuasive
evidence” that the Corps erred in its 1974 regulations
interpreting “navigable waters” as waters that are navigable
in fact, have been navigable in the past, or could be made so
in the future (SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 167), and although 1977
amendments to the CWA did no more than indicate
“Congress” desire to [in addition] regulate wetlands adjacent
to [such] ‘navigable waters”” (id. at 170-171), the Corps has
time and again expanded its CWA jurisdiction to waters ever
more distantly and contingently connected to traditional
navigable waters. It is questionable whether many of those
regulatory expansions of jurisdiction, which find no
reasonable basis in the language of the CWA, survive
SWANCC. But what is clear is that even were the current
regulations permissible, they would not on any plausible
interpretation reach Newdunn’s wetlands, connected to
distant navigable waters only by remote, ephemeral,
intermittent flows of rainwater runoff through a series of
manmade ditches and culverts. This 30-year history of
progressive regulatory overreaching, compounded by the
Corps’ straining of its own regulations since SWANCC,
warrants corrective action by this Court now.

19

E. This Court’s Guidance Is Necessary Because
There Is No Consistent National Policy On CWA
Jurisdiction

Due to inconsistent administrative interpretations, and
resulting confusion over the extent of the Corps’ CWA
jurisdiction, Section 404 enforcement actions make up
approximately 75% of the Corps’ reported 5,500 annual
alleged violations of federal law under its regulatory
authority. U.S. Corps of Engineers, Regulatory Program
Overview, available at . Conversely, only
10% of the Corps’ enforcement actions involve Rivers and
Harbors Act violations, a statutory scheme where jurisdiction
is more apparent.

Absent this Court’s review of this case, landowners’
property rights will continue to be determined on an
arbitrary, ad hoc basis, with inconsistent results from
different Corps divisions and courts throughout the country.
Whether the Corps asserts jurisdiction over a particular piece
of property depends upon where in the country the property
is located. “Most of the authority for administering the
regulatory program has been delegated to the thirty-six
district engineers and eleven division engineers.” 33 C.F.R.
§ 320.1(b). The Corps may determine its jurisdiction
administratively as part of the Section 404 permit application
process, or in a separate Jurisdictional Determination. 33
C.F.R. § 331.2. The Corps has established an administrative
appeal process for jurisdictional determinations and permit
decisions, (33 C.F.R. § 331.1 et seg.), in which each Corps
division hears and decides the appeals from its subject
district, (33 C.F.R. § 331.7(a)), without regard to previous
decisions. 33 C.F.R. § 331.7(g). Administrative decisions
have no precedential value even within the same Corps’
district. Ibid. As a result, the scope of CWA jurisdiction
varies widely.

20

Some Corps divisions require that a ditch, or natural
watercourse, exhibit an ordinary high-water mark
(“OHWM7”)) in order to be considered “waters of the United
States.” For example, in the Mississippi Valley Division, a
ditch was not considered a water of the United States because
an “OHW mark was not evident.” U.S. Corps of Engineers,
Appeal Decision, Memphis Stone and Gravel Company,
Vicksburg District, File No. 200113910 (July 19, 2002). In
another case, the same division held that CWA jurisdiction
did not extend to a property because the Corps failed to
“clearly establish that the point of connection in the unnamed
natural drain to the Calcasieu River was below the plain of
the Calcasieu River OHWM.” U.S. Corps of Engineers,
Appeal Decision, Daniel, New Orleans District, File No. 20-
010-0562 (June 20, 2001).

' Similarly, the South Atlantic Division found CWA
jurisdiction did not exist where “the district did not document
the presence of an ordinary high-water mark.” U.S. Corps of
Engineers, Appeal Decision, Soundview Properties, Inc.,
Jacksonville District, File No. 199905468 (November 19,
2001).

On the other side of the country, the South Pacific
Division finds CWA jurisdiction even though drainage from
a property to navigable water did not exhibit an OHWM.
U.S. Corps of Engineers, Appeal Decision, Sunrise Office
Park, Los Angeles District, File No. 2001-00379 (September
7, 2001). And in another case, involving desert washes, (U.S.
Corps of Engineers, Appeal Decision, Molycorp, Inc., Los
Angeles District, File No. 2000-01678 (August 16, 2001))
the appeals officer concluded that the “policy position that a
tributary connection can exist in the absence of a continuous
ordinary high-water mark is reasonable.” Ibid. Accordingly,
the appeals officer upheld jurisdiction despite the fact that
there was no OHWM in the desert washes. Jbid.

21

In other Corps Divisions abrupt changes make predicting
CWA jurisdiction impossible. In 2000, the Great Lakes and
Ohio River Division held that a drainage ditch was not a
tributary, and therefore not a ‘water of the United States’, if it
merely conveyed “runoff from climatic factors” to navigable
waters. See U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Appeal Decision,
Evangelista, Detroit District, File No. 00-010-030-0 (August
25, 2000).

A year later, the same Corps Division adopted a
conflicting position on CWA jurisdiction. See U.S. Corps of
Engineers, Appeal Decision, NEC Transit/Williams, L.L.C.,
Buffalo District, File No. 2000-00325(2) (August 30, 2001).
In that case, the appeals officer determined that the subject
wetland had “no discernable outlet for water flow and no
evidence that water ever flows from the wetland.” Jbid. The
appeals officer found only that the wetland was in “close
proximity” to other wetlands, and contained “similar
vegetation and soils.” Jbid. These wetlands displayed “no
discernable channel or wetland soils in the area where water
overflowed.” Jbid. In fact, water overflows occurred so
“rarely or with such low velocity that it leaves no evidence of
flow through erosive forces.” Ibid. Nonetheless, CWA
jurisdiction was found to exist.

A North Atlantic Division appeals officer recently upheld
CWA jurisdiction where rainwater flowed down a grass
upland slope and a portion of a wetland into a culvert that ran
underneath a road and into an intermittent stream which was
a tributary of the Hudson River. See USS. Corps of
Engineers, Appeal Decision, E. Tetz & Sons, Inc. and
Concrete Properties, New York District, File No. 2000-
00117 (June 24, 2003).

The landowner argued that less than a year earlier, the
same appeals officer, in U.S. Corps of Engineers, Appeal
Decision, Meehan, New York District, File No. 2002-00023
(November 19, 2002), had rejected the Corps’ assertion of

22

CWA jurisdiction because the Corps had failed to prove the
existence of an OHWM in a manmade drainage ditch. The
appeals officer refused to explain or justify his sudden
change of position and merely pointed out that the Corps’
regulations “expressly prohibit citation of a prior appealed
decision in any other administrative appeal.” Tetz & Sons,
supra.

The Corps’ inconsistent, case-by-case approach to CWA
jurisdiction is particularly troublesome because judicial
review of the Corps’ jurisdiction is only available after the
landowner completes the application process or the Corps
brings an enforcement action. Southern Pines Assoc. v.
United States, 912 F.2d 713 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that
CWA provides clear and convincing evidence that Congress
intended to bar pre-enforcement review); Hoffman Homes v.
United States, 902 F.2d 567 (7th Cir. 1990) (same).

The application process for a Section 404 permit is costly
and time consuming. The petitioner in SWANCC, for
example, amassed an administrative record of 46,000 pages
and battled with the Corps for over 13 years before this Court
held that the Corps had no jurisdiction over the property. See
Oral Argument Transcript at 16-17, SWANCC, supra. The
average process time for those that complete the application
process is 373 days. See V. Albrecht & B. Goode, Wetland
Regulation in the Real World (Feb. 1994). Unfortunately,
most landowners do not complete the application process.
Ibid (reporting that the majority of individual permit
applications are withdrawn). Each day countless landowners
must decide whether to embark upon a lengthy and costly
application process, give up their property rights, or risk an
enforcement action. Under current Corps practices, it is
impossible for a landowner to make a rational, informed
decision.

The vastly differing and contradictory positions reflected
in the administrative process demonstrate that the Corps has

23

no consistent national policy on CWA jurisdiction. Without
clear guidance from this Court, landowners’ property rights
will continue to be controlled by arbitrary administrative
decisions that vary from location to location and time to time.

F. The CWA Does Not Authorize The Corps To
Exercise General Land Use Regulation, Which
Congress Expressly Reserved For State And
Local Governments

Section 404(a) grants the Corps authority to issue permits
for the discharge of dredged or fill material at “specified
disposal sites.” 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a); App., infra at 58a.
Nothing in the plain text of Section 404 manifests Congress’
intent to delegate to the Corps the authority to regulate
general land use activities. To the contrary, Congress
expressly set forth its policy to “recognize, preserve and
protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States to * *
* plan development and use [ ] of land.” 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b),
App., infra, 57a.

Pursuant to the current regulations, the Corps claims the
authority to issue permits for the construction of homes,
shopping centers, airports, and roads. These are not “disposal
sites.” They are general development activities fully and
properly regulated by state and local governments.

Newdunn does not want to operate a disposal site; it
wants to develop its property. However, the Corps’ Section
404 permit process requires Newdunn to demonstrate to the
Satisfaction of the Corps that there are no practicable
alternative sites that Newdunn could develop. 40 C.F.R.
§ 230.10. How, when, and where a landowner should be
permitted to develop property is a land-use issue that
Congress left to state governments. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b),
App., infra, 57a.

If any artificial drain or ditch would extend the Corps’
jurisdiction, localities, as they seek to control rain-water

24

runoff, would constantly be expanding federal jurisdiction
over new lands. There is no evidence that Congress intended
to wrench this authority from local government and give it to
the Corps. To the contrary, “[t]he conferees were uniquely
aware of the process by which the dredge and fill permits are
presently handled and did not wish to create a burdensome
bureaucracy in light of the fact that a system to issue permits
already existed.” 118 Cong. Rec. 33699 (1972). The
legislative history shows that Congress intended for the
Corps to deal with the discharge of dredged materials into
navigable waters, much as it did under the Rivers and
Harbors Act.

In reality, the regulatory scheme that has arisen due to the
Corps’ claim of Section 404 jurisdiction is unparalleled in its
inconvenience and burden to the landowners. See V.
Albrecht & B. Goode, Wetland Regulation in the Real World
(Feb. 1994). If the Corps is allowed to extend CWA
jurisdiction to every roadside ditch in the country then every
local land use decision would be subject to federal review
and control. This would be directly contrary to Congress’
express goal to “recognize, preserve and protect the primary
responsibilities and rights of States to * * * plan development
and use [ ] of land.” 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b), App., infra, 57a.

25

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted.
TIMOTHY S. BISHOP DOUGLAS E. KAHLE
RUSSELL R. EGGERT Counsel of Record
Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw MARKR. BAUMGARTNER
190 South LaSalle Street Pender & Coward, P.C.
Chicago, IL 60603 222 Central Park Ave.
(312) 782-0600 Virginia Beach, VA 23462

(757) 490-3000

OCTOBER 2003

, Faster RED Te See a

la

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

Nos. 02-1480 & 02-1594

DENNIS H. TREACY, Director,
Department of Environmental Quality;
STATE WATER CONTROL BOARD,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,
and

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.

NEWDUNN ASSOCIATES, LLP; ORION ASSOCIATES;
NORTHWEST CONTRACTORS,
Defendants-Appellees.

MARY MARGARET WHIPPLE, Virginia State Senator;
L. PRESTON BRYANT, Virginia State Delegate;
CHESAPEAKE BAY FOUNDATION, INCORPORATED,
Amici Supporting Appellants.

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS; THE
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF HOME BUILDERS;
NFIB LEGAL FOUNDATION; NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF INDUSTRIAL AND OFFICE
PROPERTIES; NATIONAL MULTI HOUSING
COUNCIL; NATIONAL APARTMENT ASSOCIATION;
REAL ESTATE ROUNDTABLE; BUILDING INDUSTRY
LEGAL DEFENSE FOUNDATION; FOUNDATION FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS;
INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL OF SHOPPING CENTERS,
Amici Supporting Appellees.

2a

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
and

DENNIS H. TREACY, Director,
Department of Environmental Quality;
STATE WATER CONTROL BOARD,

Plaintiff,
v.

NEWDUNN ASSOCIATES, LLP; ORION ASSOCIATES;
NORTHWEST CONTRACTORS,
Defendants-Appellees.

MARY MARGARET WHIPPLE, Virginia State Senator;
L. PRESTON BRYANT, Virginia State Delegate;
CHESAPEAKE BAY F OUNDATION, INCORPORATED,
Amici Supporting Appellants.

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS; THE
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF HOME BUILDERS;
NFIB LEGAL FOUNDATION; NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF INDUSTRIAL AND OFFICE
PROPERTIES; NATIONAL MULTI HOUSING
COUNCIL; NATIONAL APARTMENT ASSOCIATION;
REAL ESTATE ROUNDTABLE; BUILDING INDUSTRY
LEGAL DEFENSE F OUNDATION; FOUNDATION FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS;
INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL OF SHOPPING CENTERS,
Amici Supporting Appellees.

Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk.
Henry C. Morgan, Jr., District Judge.
(CA-01-508-2, CA-01-86-4, CA-01 -508)

3a

February 25, 2003, Argued
September 10, 2003, Decided

JUDGES: Before GREGORY and SHEDD, Circuit Judges,
and C. Arlen BEAM, Senior Circuit Judge of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting by
designation. Judge Gregory wrote the opinion, in which
Judge Shedd and Senior Judge Beam joined.

Reversed and Remanded.
OPINION BY: Gregory

OPINION: GREGORY, Circuit Judge:

During the summer of 2001, without obtaining a permit
from the Army Corps of Engineers (the “Corps’”) or the
Virginia State Water Control Board (the “Board”), Newdunn
Associates, Orion Associates, and Northwest Contractors
(collectively “Newdunn”) began ditching and draining
wetlands on a forty-three-acre property near Newport News,
Virginia (the “Newdunn Property”). Pursuant to its authority
under the Clean Water Act (“CWA” or the “Act”), the Corps
brought a civil enforcement action in federal district court.
The Board initiated its own enforcement action in state court,
premised on the Virginia Nontidal Wetlands Resources Act
of 2000 (the “Virginia Act”). Newdunn removed the state
action to federal court, and the two cases were consolidated.
After a five-day bench trial, the district court ruled for
Newdunn in both cases, finding that the Corps lacked
jurisdiction over wetlands on the Newdunn Property under
the Clean Water Act, and that the jurisdictional reach of
Virginia law was merely coextensive with federal law. For
the reasons stated below, we reverse.

4a

I.

In 1978, Newdunn Associates purchased forty-three acres
of land located in Newport News, Virginia. It is undisputed
that approximately thirty-eight acres of the Newdunn
Property (the “Newdunn Wetlands”) were “wetlands,” as that
term is defined by the Corps in its CWA regulations. 33
C.F.R. § 328.3(b) (2002) (defining “wetlands” as “those
areas that are inundated or saturated by surface or ground
water at a frequency and duration sufficient to support, and
that under normal circumstances do support, a prevalence of
vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil
conditions”). Historically, before the construction of
Interstate 64 (“I-64”), the wetlands on the Newdunn Property
had a natural hydrologic connection to Stony Run, which is a
navigable waterway-in-fact. Presently, the Newdunn
Wetlands remain connected to the navigable waters of Stony
Run by the intermittent flow of surface water through
approximately 2.4 miles of natural streams and manmade
ditches (paralleling and crossing under I-64). Silt-laden
waters from the Newdunn Wetlands merge with clear water
flowing south of the manmade ditch on the west side of I-64.

In May of 2001, following the Supreme Court’s ruling in
Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County (‘SWANCC”) y.
United States, 531 U.S. 159, 167, 121 S. Ct. 675 (2001),
which struck down the Corps’ attempted exercise of
jurisdiction under its Migratory Bird Rule, Newdunn
informed the Corps that it believed the Corps lacked
jurisdiction over the Newdunn Property, and began filling the
Newdunn Wetlands without a permit. Newdunn argued that
there were no “jurisdictional” wetlands on the property, even
though the property contained “scientific” wetlands. The
Corps disagreed with Newdunn’s interpretation of SWANCC,
and on July 6, 2001, attempted to assert jurisdiction over
wetlands on the Newdunn Property by commencing an

Sa

enforcement action in federal district court, alleging
violations of sections 301 and 404 of the Clean Water Act.

Based on the same activities, and pursuant to Virginia
state law, the Board issued an Emergency Special Order
(“ESO”), mandating that Newdunn cease stumping and
grading on its property. Va. Code. Ann. § 62.1-44.15(8b).
Newdunn ignored the ESO, and as a result, on August 7,
2001, the Board filed a civil enforcement action in state
court, alleging violations of Va. Code Ann. § § 62.1-44.5,
62.1-44.14, 62.1-44.15, 62.1-44.15:5, 62.1-44.23, and 62.1-
44.32 (2001). Newdunn removed the Board’s action to
federal court. The Board, claiming that the district court was
without jurisdiction to consider its case, filed a motion to
remand. The court denied the Board’s motion, and the Corps’
and the Commonwealth’s cases were consolidated for a five-
day bench trial in March of 2002.

As to the federal suit, the district court held that the
Corps’ wetlands regulations were invalid because they
exceeded Congress’ grant of authority to the Corps under the
Clean Water Act. On the state suit, the court ruled that the
Commonwealth “has been unable to show that the Virginia
Legislature has, at this time, granted regulatory authority
independently of the Corps’ jurisdiction.” Accordingly, the
district court determined that the Commonwealth lacked
jurisdiction over the Newdunn Wetlands, since its authority
was presumably coextensive with the Corps’. This
consolidated appeal followed.

II.

We review de novo both the district court’s statutory
interpretation of the Clean Water Act, Hughes River
Watershed Conservancy v. Glickman, 81 F.3d 437, 448 (4th
Cir. 1996), and the district court’s conclusion that it had
subject matter jurisdiction over the Commonwealth’s
enforcement action, Jn re Celotex Corp., 124 F.3d 619, 625
(4th Cir. 1997). We review any factual findings of the district

6a

court for clear error. Virginia Vermiculite, Ltd. v. Historic
Green Springs, Inc., 307 F.3d 277, 284 (4th Cir. 2002).

II.
A.

Before reaching the merits of either case, we must first
determine whether we have jurisdiction over the Board’s
enforcement action premised on Virginia law. In cases where
state law creates the cause of action, federal question
jurisdiction is “unavailable unless it appears that some
substantial, disputed question of federal law is a necessary
element of one of the well-pleaded state claims.” Franchise
Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 13,
103 S. Ct. 2841 (1983) (emphasis added). For a federal issue
to be both a necessary and disputed element, “the vindication
of a right under state law [must] necessarily turn[ ] on some
construction of federal law.” Jd. at 9 (emphasis added).

In the present case, the district court noted that both the
Virginia state statute and the Corps’ federal regulations
define “wetlands” as “those areas that are inundated or
saturated by surface or groundwater at a frequency and
duration sufficient to support, and tiat under normal
circumstances do support, a prevalence of vegetation
typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions.” 33
C.F.R. § 328.3(b); Va. Code Ann. § 62.1-44.3. Based on this
shared scientific definition,' the district court concluded “that

' It is, of course, unexceptional that Virginia would elect to take
advantage of the Corps’ vast technical resources in elucidating the
scientific meaning of “wetlands,” while at the same time making its own,
unrelated decision on when and where to exercise jurisdiction over those
wetlands. As Henry R. Butler and Jonathan R. Macey have observed:

One real source of economies of scale associate’ with

centralization of environmental regulation could be in

centralized research on technical, scientific issues that recur

throughout a number of different states . . . . These economies
(Continued on following page)

Ta

the state statute is coextensive with the CWA.” In making
this finding, however, the district court confused the
definition of “scientific wetlands” and “jurisdictional
wetlands.”

Newdunn concedes, and the district court recognized, that
at least thirty-eight acres of the Newdunn Property contained
“wetlands” as that term is used in both 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b)
and Va. Code Ann. § 62.1-44.3. Thus, from a scientific
perspective, there is no disputed federal question as to
whether the Newdunn Property contains wetlands.? Because
the resolution of this case in no way turns upon any
interpretation of 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b), there can be no federal
question jurisdiction based on Virginia’s decision to adopt
the Corps’ technical definition of wetlands. See Franchise
Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 9. Stated differently, the issue is not

can be realized by the federal government even when most
policy-making and implementation functions are handled by
the states.

Henry R. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Using Federalism to
Improve Environmental Policy 26 (1996).

? In fact, even if this case did involve a dispute over the scientific
definition of wetlands, it is doubtful that the conflict would raise a
question of federal law. Importantly, the General Assembly did not
reference or cite to federal law in its definition of wetlands. Rather, it
merely parroted the language from the federal regulation in Va. Code
Ann. § 62.1-44.3. The fact that a state law might mimic the wording of a
federal law, of course, does not transform interpretation of the state
statute into a federal question.

Many states, for example, have “little NEPAs” on their books,
which are based on language found in federal law. See Bradley C.
Karkkainen, “Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing
Government’s Environmental Performance,” 102 Colum. L. Rev. 903,
905 (2002) (noting that the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 4321, et seq., “has inspired dozens of ‘little NEPAs’ at the state and
local levels”). Notwithstanding the presence of mirrored language, courts
applying those statutes are interpreting state, not federal, law.

8a

whether the Newdunn Property contains wetlands, but
whether those wetlands are within the jurisdiction of the
State Water Control Board. The answer to this question is
resolved solely by looking to the Virginia Wetlands
Resources Act of 2000, codified at Va. Code Ann. §§ 62.1-
44.3, 44.5, 44.15, 44.15:5, 44.29 (2001).

The Virginia Act was crafted after this circuit announced
its decision in United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251 (4th Cir.
1997), and after the D.C. Circuit invalidated the Corps’
Tulloch rule, which had allowed the Corps to regulate
incidental fallback as a pollutant added to a wetland, see
Nat'l Mining Assoc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 145 F.3d
1399, 1404 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Following Wilson and National
Mining, and the subsequent loss of federal control over
Virginia’s wetlands, nearly 10,000 acres of nontidal wetlands
were drained or were set to be drained in a period of less than
six months. See Tyler Whitley, “Nontidal Wetlands Rules
Bill , Expected, ” Richmond Times-Dispatch, Dec. 1, 1999, at
B42 Although Virginia was losing wetlands at a dramatic
pace, the State Water Control Board was largely without
authority to act. Interpreting then-existing state law, former
Attorney General Mark Earley opined, “(T]he Board [did]
not have authority to regulate wetlands beyond that
contemplated by the § 401 certification process” found in the
CWA. 1999 Op. Va. Att’y Gen. 179.

Subsequent to this 1999 opinion, environmentalists
petitioned the Virginia General Assembly to fill the
regulatory vacuum. Delegate L. Preston Bryant, Jr.,
responded to this call, and co-patroned a bill to provide the
State with a comprehensive, nontidal wetlands permitting

3 As Wilson and National Mining make clear, the district court
erred when it wrongly assumed that, prior to the Supreme Court’s ruling
in SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 148 L. Ed. 2d 576, 121 S. Ct. 675 (2001), the
Corps enjoyed “seemingly unlimited jurisdiction.”

9a

program. In a letter to then-Governor James S. Gilmore, III,
Delegate Bryant explained the need for his proposal as
follows:

For many years, the federal wetlands permitting
program has fluctuated in its ability to protect
Virginia’s nontidal wetlands. This fluctuation
has_ resulted not only from _ changing
administrations and policies within the federal
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, but more
recently from changing federal case law... .A
comprehensive state program would remove the
uncertainty created by changing federal policies
and case law decisions.

Letter from L. Preston Bryant, Jr., Delegate, to James S.
Gilmore, III, Governor (Dec. 3, 1999) (quoted in Br. of
Amici Curiae Sen. Whipple, et al. at 19). Delegate Bryant’s
bill was ultimately passed into law, becoming the Virginia
Act at issue in this case. See S. 648, 2000 Gen. Assem., Reg.
Sess. (Va. 2000); H.D. 1170, 2000 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess.
(Va. 2000) (amending Va. Code Ann. §§ 62.1-44.3, 44.5,
44.15, 44.15:5, 44.29). Newdunn posits that the Virginia Act
was crafted narrowly to close only the Tulloch loophole, and
not to broaden the Board’s jurisdiction within the
Commonwealth. The plain text of the Virginia Act, however,
belies this contention. Virginia law defines “state waters”
broadly to include “all water, on the surface and under the
ground, wholly or partially within or bordering the
Commonwealth or within its jurisdiction, including
wetlands.” Va. Code Ann. § 62.1-44.3 (emphasis added). The
words “including wetlands” were added to the statute by the
Virginia Act, without any jurisdictional limitation. S. 648,
2000 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2000); H.D. 1170, 2000
Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2000). In “state waters,”
Virginia law prohibits excavating, draining, filling, dumping,

10a

or any other activity that may significantly alter or degrade a
wetland without a permit issued by the Board. See Va. Code
Ann. § 62.1-44.5. Nothing in the Virginia Act refers to the
CWA’s definition of “navigable waters” or the “waters of the
United States.” A plain reading of the Virginia Act, therefore,
makes it inconceivable that the term “wetlands” as it is used
in the state legislation could necessarily turn on the
resolution of a question of federal law.*

Alternatively, Newdunn maintains that the Board’s
jurisdiction depends on a resolution of federal law because

‘In fact, if there were any doubt as to the meaning of the text, the
legislative history of the Virginia Act makes it abundantly clear that the
legislation was crafted, not to incorporate the CWA’s jurisdictional
limits, but rather to remedy perceived shortcomings with the
jurisdictional reach of federal law.

During the 2000 General Assembly session, legislators rejected a
proposal that would have limited the Board’s jurisdiction to those
wetlands “that are subject to federal jurisdiction under the federal Clean
Water Act.” See Legislative History of S. 695, Gen Assem. Reg. Sess.
(Va. 2000), available at http://leg 1 .state.va.us/001/bil.htm; Legislative
History of H.D. 1246, 2000 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2000),
available at http://leg1.state.va.us/001/bil.htm.

Instead, lawmakers adopted an initiative that defined “wetlands”
without any federal jurisdictional limitation and that was crafted not only
to close the Tulloch loophole, but also “to protect and enhance the
Commonwealth’s wetland resources” by charging the Board with
designing regulatory programs “to achieve no net loss of existing wetland
acreage and functions.” See Legislative History of S. 648, Gen Assem.
Reg. Sess. (Va. 2000), available at http://leg1 .state.va.us/001/bil.htm;
Legislative History of H.D. 1170, 2000 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Va.
2000), available at http://leg1.state.va.us/001/bil.htm.

As one commenter has observed, “Under Virginia’s new wetlands
regulations, impacts that may have been permissible to isolated wetlands
under federal regulations will be limited in Virginia. This is because
Virginia includes wetlands as part of its definition of ‘state waters,” Lisa
Spickler Goodwin, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Environmental Law,
37 U. Rich. L. Rev. 117, 143 (2002).

lla

Va. Code Ann. § 62.1-44.15:5 provides: “Issuance of a
Virginia Water Protection Permit shall constitute the
certification required under § 401 of the Clean Water Act.”
Based on this statute, Newdunn posits that the Board’s
jurisdiction must be coextensive with the Corps’. Newdunn’s
theory, however, is premised on a _ fundamental
misunderstanding of the relationship between the federal and
state permitting procedures.

Section 401(a)(1) of the CWA requires an applicant for a
federal permit to “provide the licensing or permitting agency
a certification from the State in which the discharge
originates or will originate . . . .” The Commonwealth, by
enacting § 62.1-44.15:5, has taken advantage of this federal
provision, so that when federal and state laws overlap,
applicants may use their state permits to satisfy the
certification requirements under section 401 of the CWA. Of
course, simply because a state permit carries the added ©
benefit of satisfying a potentially applicable federal
requirement does not mean that the state’s jurisdictional
reach turns on an interpretation of the CWA. Undoubtedly,
situations will arise where a permittee needs a state permit,
but no federal permit. In those situations, the state permitting
process would apply without reference to the CWA.

As the Supreme Court of Virginia recognized, “The
CWA and federal regulations allow a state program to
operate a discharge elimination system program in place of
the federal program, provided that the state program is
authorized under state law and has standards that are at least
as stringent as the federal ones.” State Water Control Bd. v.
Smithfield Foods, $42 $.E.2d 766, 768 (Va. 2001) (emphasis
added). That is, for a state’s permitting procedure to satisfy
the federal requirements of 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a), the state
law must be “at least” as exacting as the Clean Water Act,
but of course, it may be more demanding.

12a

Even when state and federal requirements do overlap, as
was the case in Smithfield Foods, the issue of whether the
Board has authority to regulate the subject wetlands remains
a question of Virginia law. Accordingly, the Board’s
jurisdiction cannot “necessarily depend” on any
interpretation of federal law, even if it happens that federal
and state laws are coextensive on the particular facts of a
certain case. See Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 13.

The Virginia Supreme Court’s finding in Smithfield
Foods that “the interests and rights of both the [federal and
State] entities were vested in a single permit” does not alter
this analysis. See Smithfield Foods, 542 S.E.2d at 770. In
Smithfield Foods, because this court had already “affirmed
the finding of the district court that Smithfield was liable,”
and because the United States Supreme Court denied
certiorari, the federal determination was a final judgment for
the purposes of res judicata. Id. at 768. In the present case,
while the Corps and the Board may ultimately require
Newdunn to obtain the same discharge permit, no final
judgment in either case has been rendered.

Depending upon how the Corps and Newdunn resolve the
federal case on remand, the Board’s interest may or may not
be satisfied. Accordingly, the Board should be permitted to
pursue its rights in a Virginia court. Of course, if either the
state or federal actions were to result in a final judgment
requiring the issuance of a permit satisfying both federal and
state laws, then Newdunn might elect to file a motion to have
the unresolved action dismissed on the grounds of res
judicata. See Smithfield Foods, 542 S.E.2d at 771.

In sum, in light of the Virginia Act’s clear statutory
language, it is apparent that “Virginia now regulates
activities in wetlands beyond its federal mandate.” Goodwin,
Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 37 U. Rich. L. Rev. at 141. It
would be perverse, therefore, for this court to conclude that
the jurisdictional limits of the Virginia Act depend upon the

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13a

CWA. Any determination as to the extent of the Board’s
jurisdictional reach is purely a question of state law that does
not require the resolution of any federal question. Because
we lack jurisdiction over the Board’s action, we reverse the
district court’s ruling on the Board’s motion to remand, and
we remand the state enforcement action to the Virginia court
from which it was improperly removed.

B.

We now turn to the only case for which federal subject
matter jurisdiction exists -- the Corps’ civil enforcement
action premised on the CWA.

The Federal Water Pollution Control Amendments of
1972, known collectively as the Clean Water Act, were
crafted “to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and
biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.” 33 U.S.C. §
1251(a) (2002). To achieve this ambitious goal, Congress
mandated that “the discharge of any pollutant by any person
shall be unlawful” except as in compliance with the Act’s
permitting procedures. Jd. § 1311. The permitting scheme at
issue in this case is articulated in section 404(a), which gives
the Corps the authority “to issue permits . . . for the discharge
of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters at
specified disposal sites.” Id. § 1344(a). The CWA defines
“navigable waters” to include “the waters of the United
States, including the territorial seas,” id. § 1362(7), and the
Corps’ regulatory jurisdiction is limited by this definition.

In 1985, the Supreme Court ruled that the Corps
possessed the authority to exercise jurisdiction over wetlands
that were adjacent to other waters, even though the wetlands
themselves were not navigable waters-in-fact. United States
v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 139, 106 S.
Ct. 455 (1985). The Court deferred to the Corps’ technical
expertise on the matter, noting the considerable difficulty,
both for the Corps and for federal courts, in defining the

14a

| jurisdictional limits of the Act. Jd at 132. The Court
explained:

In determining the limits of power to regulate
discharges under the Act, the Corps must
necessarily choose some point at which water
ends and land begins. Our common experience -
tells us that this is often no easy task: the
transition from water to solid ground is not
necessarily or even typically an abrupt one.
Rather, between open waters and dry land may
lie shallows, marshes, mudflats, swamps, bogs --
in short, a huge array of areas that are not wholly
aquatic but nevertheless fall far short of being
dry land. Where on this continuum to find the
limit of “waters” is far from obvious.

Id. The Corps had determined that wetlands adjacent to other
waters should be included in the definition of “waters of the
United States,” because “wetlands adjacent to lakes, rivers,
streams, and other bodies of water may function as integral
parts of the aquatic environment even when the moisture
creating the wetlands does not find its source in the adjacent
bodies of water.” Jd. at 134-35. The Supreme Court upheld
the Corps’ exercise of jurisdiction, concluding, “We cannot
say that the Corps’ conclusion that adjacent wetlands are
inseparably bound up with the ‘waters’ of the United States --
based as it is on the Corps’ and the EPA’s technical expertise
-- is unreasonable.” Jd. at 134.

The Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed Riverside
Bayview Homes, commenting: “It was the significant nexus
between the wetlands and ‘navigable waters’ that informed
our reading of the CWA in Riverside Bayview Homes.”
SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 167; see also United States v. Krilich,
303 F.3d 784, 791 (7th Cir. 2002) (observing that the
SWANCC Court “reaffirm[ed] its prior holding [in Riverside

.

15a

Bayview Homes] that Section 404 encompassed non-
navigable wetlands adjacent to navigable waters,” but
“explicitly declined to further determine the exact meaning of
‘navigable waters’”). In SWANCC, the Court struck down the
Corps’ so-called “Migratory Bird Rule,” which defined
“waters of the United States” to include intrastate waters,
“[w]hich are or would be used as habitat by birds protected
by Migratory Bird Treaties; or . . . [w]hich are or would be
used as habitat by other migratory birds which cross state
lines... .” SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 164 (quoting 51 Fed. Reg.
41217). Quoting Riverside Bayview Homes, the Court held
that “Congress’ concern for the protection of water quality
and aquatic ecosystems indicated its intent to regulate
wetlands ‘inseparably bound up with the “waters” of the
United States.” Jd. at 167 (emphasis added). Thus, the
Corps’ attempted exercise of jurisdiction over isolated ponds
that had no hydrologic connection whatsoever to navigable
waters could not stand.°

Along similar lines, this court has previously held that the
phrase “waters of the United States” cannot be used by the
Corps to assert jurisdiction over intrastate, nonnavigable
waters, solely on the ground that those waters could possibly
affect interstate commerce. United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d

* As is evident from the above discussion, Newdunn’s insistence
that SWANCC limited the Corps’ jurisdiction solely to those wetlands
adjacent to navigable waters-in-fact is plainly incorrect. Unlike the
administrative regulation at issue in Riverside Bayview Homes, the
“Migratory Bird Rule” before the Court in SWANCC was not developed
to clarify the scientifically nebulous point “at which water ends and land
begins.” Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 134. Instead, the Corps’
supposed justification for the rule was purely legal — that Congress
drafted the CWA with the intention of defining “waters of the United
States” as broadly as possible under the Commerce Clause. The Court
rejected the Corps’ interpretation of the CWA, recognizing that the
Corps’ Commerce Clause argument would read the phrase “navigable
waters” completely out of the statute. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 172.

l6a

251, 253-54 (4th Cir. 1997). We explained, “To include
intrastate waters that have nothing to do with navigable or
interstate waters, expands the statutory phrase ‘waters of the
United States’ beyond its definitional limit.” Jd. at 257-58
(emphasis added). Accordingly, we struck down 33 C.F.R. §
328.3(a)(3), because it attempted to give the Corps
jurisdiction over any waters, “the use, degradation or
destruction of which could affect interstate or foreign
commerce ... .” Jd. at 257 (quoting 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)
(1993)). As we held in Wilson, and as the Supreme Court
affirmed in SWANCC, the Corps’ jurisdiction does not extend
to the limits of the Commerce Clause. Rather, the critical,
limiting term is ‘navigable waters,’ as that term is defined in
33 U.S.C. § 1362(7).

In the present case, the Corps asserts jurisdiction over
navigable waters (33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(1)), tributaries of
navigable waters (§ 328.3(a)(5)), and “[w]etlands adjacent to
waters (other than waters that are themselves wetlands). . .”
(§ 328.3(a)(7)). The Corps defines “adjacent” to mean,
“bordering, contiguous, or neighboring. Wetlands separated
from other waters of the United States by man-made dikes or
barriers, natural river berms, beach dunes and the like are
‘adjacent wetlands.’” 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(c). This circuit has
recently concluded that, pursuant to these regulations, the
Corps intends to assert jurisdiction over “any branch of a
tributary system that eventually flows into a navigable body
of water.” United States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698, 711 (4th
Cir. 2003). In Deaton, the Corps claimed authority to
regulate wetlands bordering a “roadside ditch” that took “a
winding, thirty-two mile path to the Chesapeake Bay.” Jd. at
702. Along the way to the Bay, water flowed from the
Deaton’s wetlands to the roadside ditch, and then into a
_ “culvert” on the other side of the road. Jd. Water from the

culvert drained into a second ditch, which flowed into
Beaverdam Creek. Beaverdam Creek was “a direct tributary
of the Wicomico River, which [was] navigable.” Jd. The

17a

distance from the Deaton’s wetlands to a navigable-in-fact
river was approximately eight miles. The Deaton court
upheld the Corps’ exercise of jurisdiction over all of these
waters, finding that “the Corps’s regulatory interpretation of
the term ‘waters of the United States’ as encompassing
nonnavigable tributaries of navigable waters does not invoke
the outer limits of Congress’s power or alter the federal-state
framework.” Jd. at 708. In dismissing a Commerce Clause
challenge to the Corps’ regulations, the Deaton court
summarized Congress’ well-articulated purpose for crafting
the CWA and concluded, “The Corps has pursued this goal
by regulating nonnavigable tributaries and their adjacent
wetlands. This use of delegated authority is well within
Congress’s traditional power over navigable waters.” Jd. at
707. In sum, the Corps’ unremarkable interpretation of the
term “waters of the United States” as including wetlands
adjacent to tributaries of navigable waters is permissible
under the CWA because pollutants added to any of these
tributaries will inevitably find their way to the very waters
that Congress has sought to protect.

To the extent that Newdunn challenges the Corps’
decision to label the manmade, I-64 ditch a “tributary,” that
argument has also been foreclosed by Deaton. The Deaton
court recognized that the Corps has defined the word
“tributary” to include “the entire tributary system,” including
roadside ditches. Jd. at 710. As explained above, Deaton
deferred to the Corps’ definition of “tributary” because
“discharges into nonnavigable tributaries and adjacent
wetlands have a substantial effect on water quality in
navigable waters.” Jd. at 712. That the I-64 ditch at issue in
the present case is a manmade rather than a natural
watercourse is an irrelevant distinction. As the Corps has
explained:

The discharge of a pollutant into a waterway
generally has the same effect downstream

18a

whether the waterway is natural or manmade.
Indeed, given the extensive human modification
of watercourses and hydrologic systems
throughout the country, it would be difficult to
identify a principled basis in this case for
distinguishing between natural watercourses and
watercourses that are wholly or partly manmade
or modified.

(Br. for the United States at 48-49.) This observation is
particularly meaningful in the present case, where the United
States has extensively documented the connection between
the Newdunn Property’s wetlands and the navigable waters,
both before and after the construction of I-64. Because of this
long-standing connection, it would be illogical to conclude
that, prior to the existence of I-64, the Newdunn Wetlands
would have been within the ambit of the Corps’ regulations,
but that now, with the construction of the highway, the
wetlands are no longer jurisdictional.

As stated before, the CWA’s primary objective is “to
restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological
integrity of the Nation’s waters.” 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2002).
If this court were to conclude that the I-64 ditch is not a
“tributary” solely because it is manmade, the CWA’s chief
goal would be subverted. Whether manmade or natural, the
tributary flows into traditional, navigable waters.
Accordingly, the Corps may permissibly define that tributary
as part of the “waters of the United States.” See 33 U.S.C. §
1362(7).

Turning our attention to the specific wetlands at issue in
this case, it is undisputed that water flows intermittently from
wetlands on the Newdunn Property through a series of
natural and manmade waterways, crossing under I-64,
draining into the west arm of Stony Run, and eventually
finding its way 2.4 miles later to traditional navigable waters.

19a

As the district court found, Stony Run is “navigable-in-fact”
because the “lower reaches of Stony Run are subject to the
ebb and flow of the tide.” The court further found that “Stony
Run flows into the Warwick River, which intersects with the
James River, which intersects with the Hampton Roads
Harbor, which intersects with the Chesapeake Bay.” These
factual findings are supported in part by photographic
evidence of silt-laden water flowing from the subject
property into Stony Run. Because there exists a sufficient
nexus between the Newdunn Wetlands and navigable waters-
in-fact, the Corps’ jurisdiction in this case is amply supported
by the Act and the Corps’ regulations under the Act.

IV.

For the reasons stated above, the ruling of the district
court is reversed. We remand the Board’s state enforcement
action directly to the Virginia state court from which it was
improperly removed. We remand the Corps’ enforcement
action to the district court for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED

20a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
NORFOLK DIVISION

Civil Action No. 2:01cv508

United States of America,
Plaintiff,

V.
Newdunn Associates LLP, Orion Associates,
and Northwest Contractors Corporation
Defendants.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
NEWPORT NEWS DIVISION

Civil Action No. 4:01cv86

Dennis H. Treacy, Director
Commonwealth of Virginia
Department of Environmental Quality
And State Water Control Board,
Plaintiffs,

V.
Newdunn Associates LLP, Orion Associates,
and Northwest Contractors Corporation
Defendants.

April 3, 2002, Decided
April 3, 2002, Opinion Filed

OPINION BY: HENRY COKE MORGAN, JR., UNITED
STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

2la

OPINION:
OPINION AND ORDER

The parties come before the Court in these consolidated
cases for a non-jury trial, seeking to resolve issues
surrounding the Defendant’s activities on the forty three (43)
acre parcel of land located at the intersection of Industrial
Park Drive and Jefferson Avenue in Newport News, Virginia
(the “Property’ or the ‘“Newdunn Property”). At the
conclusion of the trial on March 8, 2002, the Court ruled
from the bench that the United States Army Corps of
Engineers (the “Corps’’) did not have jurisdiction to regulate
the Property. The Court also ruled that Plaintiff Dennis
Treacy (“Treacy”), Director of the Virginia Department of
Environmental Quality (“VDEQ”), acting on behalf of the
State Water Control Board (the “Board’’), possessed no
jurisdiction over the Property independent of the Corps’
claim of jurisdiction. This order further explains the
reasoning of the Court’s decision.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Newdunn Associates, LLP (‘“Newdunn” or the
“Defendants”) is the owner of the Property at issue in this
case. On May 21, 2001, the Corps issued a second
jurisdictional determination that the Newdunn Property
contained wetlands which are waters of the United States and
any filling would require a “404 permit,” pursuant to Section
404 of the Clean Water Act (“CWA”), 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a).
From approximately June 12, 2001 through July 12, 2001,
Newdunn and/or persons acting on their behalf, conducted,
contracted for, supervised and/or otherwise controlled the
discharge of dredged or fill material onto the Newdunn
Property without a permit under CWA section 404. On June
14, 2001 and June 16, 2001, the Corps issued a cease and
desist order to the Defendants. On June 25, 2001, the Board
issued Newdunn an Emergency Special Order (“ESO”)

22a

directing Newdunn Associates to cease all excavation on the
Property. Believing that the Corps lacked jurisdiction over
the Property and that their activities did not violate state law,
the Defendants elected not to comply with these orders.

On July 6, 2001, the United States filed a Complaint in
United States v. Newdunn Associates, et. al., Civil Action
No. 2:01cv508, seeking inter alia an injunction barring the
Defendants from discharging dredged or fill material into the
Property without a permit. On July 13, 2001, the Court
granted the motion by the United States for a Temporary
Restraining Order (“TRO”) enjoining the Defendants from
conducting any filling or related activity on the Property for a
period of ten (10) days. On July 23, 2001, after conducting an
evidentiary hearing and viewing the Property, the Court
granted a Preliminary Injunction (“PI”) with significant
modifications to the July 13, 2001 TRO. With certain
conditions regarding, amongst other things, the maintenance
of a buffer strip of wetlands on the perimeter of the Property
and the construction of a ditching system to minimize surface
water runoff, the Court lifted the prohibition on the
Defendant’s activities. The Court indicated at that time that
the paramount issue in this case was whether the Corps had
jurisdiction to regulate the Property.

From late July, 2001 through approximately September
30, 2001, Defendants and/or persons acting on their behalf
conducted, contracted for, supervised and/or otherwise
controlled the use of mechanized land-clearing and earth
moving equipment to discharge dredged or fill material into a
portion of the wetlands on the Newdunn Property.

On July 30, 2001, the Court filed a written Order
explaining the July 23, 2001 Preliminary Injunction. The
Corps, unsuccessful in its attempt in this Court to enjoin
Newdunn’s filling activities, then conferred with the state
regulatory body, the VDEQ. The day after the Court entered
the Preliminary Injunction, Treacy notified Newdunn that it

23a

could not excavate ditches on the Property® and followed this
notice with a civil action in the Circuit Court of the City of
Newport News, Virginia, seeking to enjoin the excavation
ordered by this Court.’ Prior to VDEQ’s filing this state court
claim, Newdunn filed Newdunn Associates, L.L.P. v. Dennis
H. Treacy and Bert W. Parolari, Jr., Civil Action No.
_2:01cv575, in which Newdunn sought to enjoin Treacy and
Parolari, as state officials, from proceeding with plans to seek
injunctive relief in state court regarding Newdunn’s ditching
activities on the Property. On August 8, 2001, Newdunn also
filed a petition to remove the state action to this Court, which
had been designated Dennis H. Treacy and State Water
Control Board v. Newdunn Associates, L.L.P., Civil Action
No. 4:01cv86.

In an Order entered in Civil Action No: 2:01cv575 on
August 9, 2001, this Court issued a TRO enjoining Treacy
and Parolari from instituting any proceeding in state court
against Newdunn relating to activities authorized by the PI

° In July, 2001, the statute upon which the VDEQ relied, Va. Code
§ 62.1-44.5 and 62.1-44.15:5, did not prohibit the filling of wetlands. As
conceded by the VDEQ, as of July, 2001, this statute only barred the
excavation of wetlands. The portion of the statute prohibiting excavation
became effective July 1, 2000 in accord with normal scheduling of
effective dates by the Virginia legislature. However, the statute
specifically contains a delayed effective date for the prohibition of filling
wetlands until October 1, 2001, thereby intentionally creating a window
of opportunity for owners, such as Newdunn, to fill property alleged to be
wetlands.

7 The City of Newport News had also previously and conditionally
approved excavation on the Property as part of a drainage plan. When it
was brought to the Court’s attention that a more extensive ditching plan
had been ordered by the City of Newport News, by modification of its
Preliminary Injunction in Civil Action No. 2:01cv508, on August 22,
2001, the Court permitted the more extensively and presumably more
scientifically sound system of ditching approved by the City of Newport
News to be substituted for the Court’s ditching plan.

24a

and ordered them to appear and show cause why such state
court proceeding would not be controlled by Civil Action
No. 2:01cv508, which was pending in this Court. In a tele-
conference hearing held on August 10, 2001, this Court
rejected the state’s request to dissolve or modify this TRO.

On August 8, 2001, Treacy and Parolari moved to
dismiss Newdunn vy. Treacy, et. al., Civil Action No.
2:01cv575. On August 17, 2001, the United States filed a
Motion to Enforce the Preliminary Injunction in United
States v. Newdunn, et. al., Civil Action No. 2:01cv508. On
August 20, 2001, Newdunn moved in Civil Action No.
2:01cv575 to convert the August 9, 2001 TRO into a PI. The
Court heard evidence and arguments on these interrelated
motions on August 20, 2001.* In an Order filed August 22,
2001, the Court extended the TRO for an additional 10 days,
ordered Newdunn to obtain a bond with sufficient surety or
obtain an appropriate letter of undertaking from a bank in the
principal sum of one-hundred and fifty thousand dollars to
cover the potential cost of reversing its excavation activities
and ordered a hearing upon Newdunn’s request for a
Preliminary Injunction be held on August 30, 2001. Further,
the Court dismissed Parolari as a party to the suit.

On August 23, 2001, Treacy moved to remand Civil
Action No. 4:01cv86 to the Newport News Circuit Court.
The Court heard arguments on this motion as well as
Newdunn’s motion to convert the August 9, 2001 TRO to a
Preliminary Injunction on August 30, 2001. In an Order filed

8 At the August 20, 2001 hearing, counsel for VDEQ issued a
thinly veiled threat that, should the Court lift the TRO, it would proceed
with other legal actions against Newdunn, including possible criminal
actions. When pressed further by the Court, VDEQ counsel, an Assistant
Attorney General, refused to either confirm or deny that criminal action
was contemplated. Given the complexities of these civil actions, the
Court found that the threat of criminal proceedings placed Newdunn in an
untenable position.

25a

August 31, 2001 in Civil Action No:201cv575, the Court
found preliminarily that (1) Treacy relied on the Corps’
assertion of jurisdiction over the Property via the CWA in his
attempt to assert jurisdiction to enjoin the excavation of
ditches and, (2) Treacy’s proffered evidence was insufficient
to establish that Newdunn’s filling and subsequent
excavation activities authorized in the Court’s July 30, 2001
Preliminary Injunction was in violation of state statute, Va.
Code §§ 62.1-44.5 and 62.1-44.15:5, and (3) as of October
1, 2001, Treacy had independent jurisdiction over further
filling activity provided that Treacy also had independent
jurisdiction over the Property. Further, the Court converted
the TRO into a Preliminary Injunction with modifications,
and thereby enjoined Treacy from instituting any proceeding
in state court against Newdunn related to activities authorized
by the Corps’ Preliminary Injunction issued by the Court on
July 30, 2001 and modified on August 22, 2001 in Civil
Action 2:01cv508. The Court set an expiration date for the
Treacy Preliminary Injunction of October 1, 2001.

In an Order filed September 5, 2001 in Civil Action No.
4:01cv86, the Court again found that Treacy relied on the
Corps’ assertion of jurisdiction over the Property via the
CWA in his attempt to assert jurisdiction to enjoin the
excavation of ditches. In that Order the Court denied
Treacy’s Motion to Remand.

On October 4, 2001, the Board affirmed the Emergency
Special Order (“ESO”) and held that Newdunn was in
violation of Va. Code § 62.1-44 et seq. The Board issued a
Final Special Order (“FSO”) on October 11, 2001 ordering
Newdunn to cease its activities on the Property. Both the
ESO and FSO listed as the first Finding of Fact that the
Corps had jurisdiction over the Property under the CWA.

On October 26, 2001, Treacy moved for Voluntary
Dismissal Without Prejudice of Civil Action No. 4:01cv86.
On October 29, 2001, Newdunn moved to Consolidate Civil

26a

Action No. 2:01cv 508 and Civil Action No. 4:01cv86. On
November 7, 2001, Newdunn moved for a Preliminary
Injunction to prevent VDEQ from taking any further state
administrative actions involving Newdunn’s activities on the
Property before October 1, 2001. On November 7, 2001,
Treacy moved for partial summary judgment against
Newdunn on the issue of liability based upon the outcome of
the state administrative hearings. The Court held a hearing on
these matters on December 11, 2001. In an Order filed
December 21, 2001, the Court adhered to its finding that
Treacy’s exercise of jurisdiction was dependent upon the
Corps’ alleged jurisdiction under the CWA. Further, the
Court (1) denied Treacy’s Motion to Voluntarily Dismiss
without Prejudice Civil Action No. 4:01cv86, (2)granted
Newdunn’s Motion to Consolidate Civil Action No. 2:0lcv
508 and Civil Action No. 4:01cv86, (3) declined to consider
Treacy’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment because
Treacy failed to file a statement of undisputed facts as
required by Local Rule 56(B), and (4) denied Newdunn’s
Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Further, the Court ordered
all parties to arrange a Settlement Conference with a
Magistrate Judge of this Court. The Court ordered that each
party be represented at said settlement conference by
someone with authority to settle the case or that such a
person be readily available via telephone during the
conference.’

On February 1, 2002, the Corps filed a Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment. On February 8, 2001, the Board issued
a Supplemental Final Special Order (“SFSO”) finding that
Newdunn’s activities on the Property prior to October 1,
2001 were in violation of state law. On February 13, 2002,
Treacy filed a Motion for Summary Judgment based on this

® The Settlement Conference was held on January 24, 2002. The
parties were unable to settle the matters before the Court.

—— ne REE RE eer eon

27a

SFSO. The Corps’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
and Treacy’s Motion for Summary Judgment were not
considered by the Court, as they did not mature within a
reasonable time before the date of trial.

The bench trial in this case began on March 4, 2002. The
Corps argued that a “surface water’ or “hydrological”
connection exists between the wetlands on the Property and
other Waters of the United States, as defined in Corps’
regulations, and therefore the Corps had jurisdiction over the
Property. Treacy argued that Newdunn violated Va. Code §§
62.1-44.15:5 and 62.1-44.5 and that Treacy possessed
jurisdiction over the Property independent of the Corps.
Newdunn contended that the Corps’ regulations exceeded the
authority granted under the CWA and, in the alternative, that
the Corps did not properly exercise jurisdiction under their
own regulations. Newdunn also argued that Treacy possessed
no jurisdiction independently of the Corps and, in the
alternative, Newdunn did not violate the state statute. The
Court ruled from the bench on March 8, 2002. The court
indicated it was ruling for the Defendants, but that it would
not enter judgment until a written opinion and order was
filed.

II. Findings of Fact

1. In September and October of 1997, the Williamsburg
Environmental Group, Inc. (“WEG”), an environmental
consulting firm, performed a wetland delineation on the
Newdunn Property at the request of Newdunn Associates.
WEG determined that most of the Property constituted
wetlands.

2. In September of 1999, another environmental
consultant, Doug Davis of Davis Environmental Consultants,
acting on behalf of Newdunn Associates, requested a
jurisdictional determination and confirmation of wetlands
delineation from the Corps. On December 16, 1999, the
Corps provided Newdunn with a formal jurisdictional

28a

determination that the Property contained wetlands which it
believed were subject to CWA jurisdiction. The Corps also
confirmed the wetland delineation submitted by Davis at this
time. A determination that a property contains wetlands is
defined as a delineation in Corps regulations. A
determination by the Corps that it has jurisdiction over
wetlands previously delineated is a separate decision.

3. On May 21, 2001, before Newdunn began the filling
activities, the Corps issued a second jurisdictional
determination that the Property contained wetlands which are
waters of the United States. Although the Supreme Court’s
decision in Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United
States Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159, 121 S. Ct.
675 (2001) (SWANCC) was decided between the Corps’
December 16, 1999 determination of jurisdiction and its May
21, 2001 determination, it looked at the same factors in both
determinations.

4. Before Newdunn and its contractors commenced work
on the Property in early June 2001, the Property contained
approximately thirty-eight (38) acres of non-tidal forested
wetlands.

5. From approximately June 12, 2001 through July 12,
2001, the Defendants and/or persons acting on their behalf,
conducted, contracted for, supervised and/or otherwise
controlled the discharge of dredged or fill material onto the
Property. From about July 23, 2001 through approximately
September 20, 2001, the Defendants and/or persons acting on
their behalf, conducted, contracted for, supervised and/or
otherwise controlled the discharge of dredged or fill material
onto the Property. From early June, 2001 through September,
2001, the Defendants or persons acting on their behalf
conducted, contracted for, supervised, directed and/or
otherwise controlled the mechanized stumping, grading
and/or grubbing of the Property. From late July, 2001
through September, 2001, the Defendants or persons acting

29a

on their behalf conducted, contracted for, supervised,
directed and/or otherwise controlled the mechanized
excavation of ditches on the Property as indicated in the
proposal dated May 11, 2001 which was executed by and
between Orion and Newdunn and _ the “Drainage
Improvements for Newdunn Associates, L.L.P.” and
submitted by Newdunn to the City of Newport News,
Virginia. Newdunn conducted al! of these activities without a
permit under CWA § 404 or an individual or General
Virginia Water Protection Permit under Va. Code §§ 62.1-
44.15:5(D) and 62.1-44.5(A)(2).

6. Rain generated surface water runoff occasionally exits
the Property through a spur ditch by the Property. There is no
evidence of the frequency or volume of the surface water
runoff. At prior hearings, the Corps had claimed a
hydrological connection between the Property and Jones
Run, as well as a hydrological connection between the
Property and a branch of Stony Run located to the east of
highway I-64. However, these alternate hydrological
connections were not proven at any pretrial hearings and no
evidence of either alternate connection was presented at trial.
Further, at prior hearings, the Corps had claimed that surface
water runoff contributed to flooding in a low lying residential
area to the east of the Property. Obviously, maintaining the
Status quo, as urged by the Corps, would not alleviate this
problem and it was not mentioned at the trial. Although
reference was also made in pretrial hearings to damage to
plant and animal iife which occupied the wetlands on the
Property, no evidence on this issue was presented at trial by
the Corps. There was a mention in the State Board’s
February 8, 2002 Supplemental Special Final Order
(“SFSO”) of potential damage to plant and animal life, but
neither the Corps nor Treacy asserted this as a basis for
jurisdiction. Thus, the Corps’ claim of jurisdiction is based
solely upon the alleged surface water or hydrological
connection of the Property to the navigable portion of Stony

30a

Run and Treacy must base his claim of jurisdiction upon the
enabling statute passed by the Virginia Legislature.

7. In order for the surface water which exits the Property
to reach the navigable portion of Stony Run, it must traverse
the following path:

A. Enter the spur ditch leading from the
Property through the adjacent VDOT wetlands
approximately forty (40) feet to a manmade,
drainage ditch lying adjacent and parallel to the
east side of 1-64 (“eastern I-64 ditch”). The
eastern I-64 ditch is ephemeral, or dry most of
the year.

B. The surface water that continues through the
eastern 1-64 ditch intermittently travels
approximately four hundred (400) feet in this
ditch to a culvert, which runs under I-64.

C. The surface water that continues through the
culvert under I-64 intermittently travels
approximately one hundred (100) feet through
this culvert to another manmade, drainage ditch,
which lies on the western side of I-64 (“western
1-64 ditch”).

D. The surface water that continues through the
western [1-64 ditch intermittently travels
approximately one and one third miles down the
western I-64 ditch before intersecting the
Western Arm of Stony Run.

E. The Western Arm of Stony Run, including the
point where surface water from the western I-64
ditch intermittently enters the Western Arm of
Stony Run, is not navigable-in-fact.

3la

F. The Western Arm of Stony Run intersects
with the Central Arm of Stony Run
approximately one thousand (1,000) feet from
the point where surface water from the western
I-64 ditch may intermittently enter the Western
Arm of Stony Run.

G. Old Courthouse Road passes over Stony Run
approximately one mile downstream from the
point where surface water from the western I-64
ditch may intermittently enter the Western Arm
of Stony Run.

H. Stony Run is only _navigable-in-fact
downstream of the Old Courthouse Road
overpass. The lower reaches of Stony Run are
subject to the ebb and flow of the tide. The upper
limits of tidal influence reach the Old
Courthouse Road overpass.

I. Stony Run flows into the Warwick River,
which intersects with the James River, which
intersects with the Hampton Roads Harbor,
which intersects with the Chesapeake Bay.

8. The evidence shows that the wetlands contained on the
Property were non-tidal high elevation hydric soil flats,
which are qualitatively different and less functional than
wetlands that lay closer to navigable, open water.

9. The Property averaged approximately forty six (46)
feet above sea level in its natural state before any filling,
ditching, grading or stumping activities began. It rested on
one of the highest elevations in this generally low lying area.
Thus, the wetlands on the Property did not serve to filter
pollutants from I-64 or the surrounding area from entering

32a

the Chesapeake Bay. Rather, when surface water did exit the
Property, it actually traveled to the drainage ditches of I-64.

10. The Corps and Treacy have presented no evidence of
any pollution, other than silt from “clean fill,” exiting from
the Property. There is no evidence that the silt exiting the
Property as a result of Newdunn’s activities on the Property
actually reaches any natural watercourse or causes harm to
the Chesapeake Bay or any of its “natural” tributaries. '°

11. The Corps first promulgated regulations for the CWA
on April 3, 1974 (“1974” or “old” regulations).
Subsequently, it put forth revisions in 1975, 1977, and 1986
(“1986” regulations).

'° In fact, the Corps’ position may assist pollutants from I-64
entering the Chesapeake Bay. The Corps claims that it has jurisdiction
over the Property because of a “surface water connection” from a ditch on
the Property, to a drainage ditch on the eastern side of 1-64, through a
culvert under I-64, to a drainage ditch on the western side of I-64, to
Stony Run, and, eventually, into the Chesapeake Bay. Under this
scenario, the Corps only claims jurisdiction because of the existence of an
alleged hydrological connection from I-64 to the Chesapeake Bay. Thus,
in its quest to regulate the surface water and accompanying silt from the
Property, the Corps has promoted and failed to alter the path of pollutants
from I-64 to the Chesapeake Bay. Pollutants emanating from I-64 should
potentially cause more damage to the Chesapeake Bay than the silt from
the Property. Yet, in order to protect the Chesapeake Bay from these
pollutants emanating from 1-64, the Corps would have to alter the
hydrological connection from I-64 away from a path that leads to the
Chesapeake Bay. However, if it were to make such an alteration, the
Corps would no longer have a “surface water” or “hydrological”
connection from I-64 to the Chesapeake Bay. Without such a connection
from I-64 to the Chesapeake Bay, the Corps would have to concede that it
did not have jurisdiction over the Property and similar property which are
allegedly connected to the Chesapeake Bay via the ditches or culverts of
1-64. Thus by attempting to maintain the status quo with regard to the
Property both the Corps and Treacy are risking damage to the Bay. It was
for this reason that the Court vigorously and repeatedly urged the parties
to negotiate a settlement.

33a

12. The authority granted to the Corps by Congress has
not been expanded since the Corps promulgated the 1974
regulations.

13. Both the 1974 and 1986 regulations share the
definition for navigable waters: “The term ‘navigable waters
of the United States’ and ‘navigable waters,’ as used herein
mean those waters of the United States which are subject to
the ebb and flow of the tide and/or are presently, or have
been in the past, or may be in the future susceptible for use
for purposes of interstate or foreign commerce.” 33 C.F.R.
209.120(d)(1) (1974), 33 C.F.R. 321.2(a) (1986). Both sets of
regulations include the same conditions that must be met to
be considered a “navigable water.”"!

14. The 1986 regulations distinguish the applicability of
the term “navigable waters” from the term “waters of the
United States.” The 1986 regulations state,

“The terms ‘navigable waters of the United
States’ and ‘waters of the United States’ are used
frequently throughout these regulations, and it is
important from the outset that the reader
understand the difference between the two.
‘Navigable waters of the United States’ are
defined in 33 C.F.R. Part 329. These are waters
that are navigable in the traditional sense where
permits are required for certain work or

_ Specifically, the following conditions must be met:

“(1) Past, present, or potential presence of interstate or foreign
commerce;

(2) Physical capabilities for use by commerce as in paragraph (a) of
this section; and

(3) Defined geographic limits of the waterbody.”
33 C.F.R. 209.260(b) (1974), 33 C.F.R. 329.5 (1986).

34a

structures pursuant to Section 9 and 10 of the
Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899. ‘Waters of the
United States’ are defined in 33 C.F.R. Part 328.
These waters include more than navigable waters
of the United States and are the waters where
permits are required for the discharge of dredged
or fill material pursuant to Section 404 of the
Clean Water Act.” 33 C.F.R. § 320.1(d) (1986).

The 1974 regulations make no such distinction.

15. The 1986 regulations state that the definition for
“waters of the United States” applies to the authority of the
Corps under the CWA. 33 C.F.R. § 328.1 (1986). It also
clearly states that the definition for “navigable waters” “does
not apply to authorities under the Clean Water Act. . .” 33
C.F.R. § 329.1 (1986). Again, there is no such distinction in
the 1974 regulations.

16. The 1986 regulations define the term “waters of the
United States,”'* which it states applies to the CWA

'? The 1986 regulations use the following definition for “waters of
the United States”:

(1) All waters which are currently used, or were used in the past, or
may be susceptible to use in interstate or foreign commerce, including all
waters which are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide;

(2) All interstate waters including interstate wetlands;

(3) All other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams
(including intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, sloughs,
prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, or natural ponds, the use,
degradation or destruction of which could affect interstate or foreign
commerce including any such waters;

(i.) Which are or could be used by interstate or foreign
travelers for recreational or other purposes; or

(ii.) From which fish or shellfish are or could be taken and
sold in interstate or foreign commerce; or

(Continued on following page)

35a

jurisdictional limits, 33 C.F.R. § 328.1 (1986), in much
broader terms than the definition for “navigable waters.”

17. The 1974 regulations state under “General Policies”
that, “[t]he term ‘navigable waters of the United States’ is
used to define the scope and extent of the regulatory powers
of the Federal government.” 33 C.F.R. § 209.260(b)(1974).
The 1986 regulations do not contain this statement.

18. In several places throughout the regulations, the 1986
regulations have substituted the term “waters of the United
States,” where the old regulations had used “navigable
waters.” These changes took place in otherwise identical
sections of the new and old regulations. See e.g. 33 C.F.R.
209.120(b)(7) (1974) and 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(b)(7) (1986);
33 C.F.R. § 209.120(c) (1974) and 33 CFR. § 209.120(c)
(1986); 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(d)(3) (1974) and 33 C.F.R. §
323.2(c) (1986); 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(e)(2) (1974) and 33
C.F.R. § 323.3(a) (1986).

19. The 1975 regulations, in its definition of “Navigable
waters,” includes “All tributaries of navigable waters of the
United States up to their headwaters and landward to their
ordinary high water mark.” 33 C.F.R. 209.120(d)(2)(i)(e)

(iii.) Which are used or could be used for industrial purpose by
industries in interstate commerce;
(4) All impoundments of waters otherwise defined as waters of the
United States under the definition;

(5) Tributaries of waters identified in paragraphs (a)(1)-(4) of this
section;
(6) The territorial seas;

(7) Wetlands adjacent to waters (other than waters that are
themselves wetlands) identified in paragraphs (1)-(6) of this section.” 33
C.F.R. 328.3 (1986).

36a

(1975).° The 1975 regulations further define “Primary

'’ The Corps has argued in this case that the spur ditch, the I-64
drainage ditches, and the culvert all qualify as “tributaries” to “waters of
the United States,” making these alleged tributaries also waters of the
United States. However, the Corps has also expanded the definition of the
term “tributary” since the 1974 regulations:

The 1974 regulations stated, “The term ‘navigable waters of the
United States’ and ‘navigable waters,’ as used herein mean those waters
of the United States which are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide,
and/or are presently or have been in the past, or may be in the future
susceptible for use for purposes of interstate or foreign commerce.” 33
C.F.R. § 209.120(d)(1) (1974).

The 1975 regulations stated, “(2) ‘ ‘Navigable waters.’(i) the term
‘navigable waters,’ as used herein for purposes of Section 404 of the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, is administratively defined to mean
waters of the United States . . . and shall include the following waters:

(c) All tributaries of navigable waters of the United States up to
their headwaters and landward to their ordinary high water mark.

(i) Those other waters which the District Engineer determines
necessitate regulation for the protection of water quality as expressed in
the guidelines (40 CFR 230). For example, in the case of intermittent
rivers, streams, tributaries, and perched wetlands that are not continuous
or adjacent to navigable waters identified in paragraphs (a)-(h), a decision
on jurisdiction shall be made by the District Engineer.”

. (ii) The following additional terms are defined as follows:

(e) ‘Primary tributaries’ means the main stems of tributaries
directly connecti

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386015_2342%3A01. Public record. Not legal advice.
