# Appendix — McNab v. United States

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386015_2330%3A2

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 2004
- **Citation:** 540 U.S. 1177

## Text

_ > waprane Court, U8.
FILE®

03 622 ocr 24 2008

No.

IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States

DAVID HENSON MCNAB,
Petitioner,
V.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
_ Respondent.

On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari
To The United States Court Of Appeals
For The Eleventh Circuit

APPENDIX TO PETITION
FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

WILLIAM W. WATTS, III MIGUEL A. ESTRADA
HUDSON & Watts, LLP Counsel of Record

P.O. Box 989 MARK A. PERRY
Mobile, AL 36601 WILLIAM M. JAY
(251) 432-7200 GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP

1050 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 955-8500

Counsel for Petitioner

ia

APPENDIX A: Opinion of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit,
filed March 21, 2003, amended, May 29,
an SEER OF ON TN AACE Neen BAT AEE la

APPENDIX B: Order on Motion for Pretrial De-
termination of Foreign and State Law,
United States District Court for the Southem
District of Alabama, filed October 12, 2000........ 44a

APPENDIX C: Order on Motions Based on
Honduran Law Developments, United States
District Court for the Southern District of
Alabama, filed August 28, 2001 .......ccccccccceccceceeee 66a

APPENDIX D: Order of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Amend-
ing Panel Opinion and Denying Rehearing,
SOOO FEB 2, DE ses esssavs vce ssessivsvivesvnrvenvsnciaece: 77a

APPENDIX E: Judgment in a Criminal Case,
United States District Court for the Southern
District of Alabama, filed August 27, 2001 ......... 79a

APPENDIX F: Footnote 24 of Original Panel
Decision, Deleted on Rehearing, filed March

21, 2003, amended, May 29, 2003 ......ceccecccceceeceee 89a
APPENDIX G: Fifth Amendment to the United

SU CII aise ssescvsvisssvescvevevuvserssanavevesees 92a
APPENDIX H: 16 U.S.C. §§ 3372-3373 ...... ened 93a
APE BLE UBC. © 371 ccscescessccesssseovesveseeseees 10la
APPENDIX J: 18 U.S.C. § 545 (1994) .oocccecceceeees 102a

APPENDIX K: 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-1957 (1994) ......104a

lla
APPENDIX L: Second Superseding Indictment,

United States District Court for the Southern
District of Alabama, filed Sept. 26, 2000...........

APPENDIX M: Excerpts of Transcript of For-
eign Law Hearing, United States District
Court for the Southern District of Alabama,
on September 27-29, 2000 .........:sscssesesresseseeees

APPENDIX N: Excerpts of Transcript of Tnal,
United States District Court for the Southern
District of Alabama, on October 23-27, 2000....

APPENDIX O: Government’s Trial Exhibit 26,
Anonymous Fax, dated February 3, 1999..........

APPENDIX P: Legal Opinion of Hector Ramon
Trochez, Attorney General of Honduras,
dated July 24, 2000 ........secsa:sssseeevenanstessvennesveces

APPENDIX Q: Declaration of Sergio Zavala
Leiva, Attorney General of Honduras, dated
May 13, 2002 .....0ss+. In his opinion, Assistant Attorney General Espinoza

(“Espinoza”) indicates that there is no retroactive application of the
invalidation of Resolution 030-95 because “the sanction to which
[the defendants’] conduct applies is based on a measure that origi-
nates in the Fishing Law and not in the activity of the Executive
Branch.” Appellee’s Addendum of Foreign Law Materials at tab

[Footnote continued on next page]

40a

fore this court is squarely on the side of the retroactive appli-
cation of the invalidation of Resolution 030-95. I can come
to no other conclusion.

As to the appropriate interpretation of the Honduran
Court’s use of the terms “annulment” and “future inapplica-
bility,” Attorney General Leiva provides the most reasoned
and reasonable explanation. Attorney General Leiva ex-
plains:

The reason that the laws of Honduras and, in
particular, the Court of Administrative Ap-
peals, with its specific language in its judg-
ment, only set forth its future inapplicability is
to guarantee the legal security of the State,
protecting it from damages and losses that
could have been caused by the enforcement of
an act that is null and void as a matter of law.

(Leiva Decl. § 8). J

[Footnote continued from previous page]

1. Upon closer examination, it becomes clear that Espinoza’s
opinion is premised on the assumption that the Fishing Law, not
Resolution 030-95, defines the minimum lobster harvest size.
Therefore, invalidation of Resolution 030-95, a resolution imple-
mented pursuant to the authority of the Fishing Law, is without
import and the question of retroactivity is rendered irrelevant.
This opinion is mistaken for two critical reasons. Firstly,
Espinoza’s opinion ignores the fact that, for purposes of U.S. law,
the predicate act the defendants were charged with violating is
Resolution 030-95, not the Fishing Law. Secondly, Espinoza’s
opinion ignores the fact that, with regard to minimum lobster har-
vest size, the Fishing Law is silent and directs such restrictions to
be fashioned pursuant to regulation. See Decreto No. 154, May
19, 1959, La Gaceta, June 9, 1959, art. 70.

4la

Apparently, in Honduras the government may be subject
to civil liability for the enforcement of a subsequently de-
clared invalid law Therefore, in the context of Honduran
law, the Honduran Court’s language makes sense and simply
seeks to limit the government’s liability and protect its treas-
ury. The precise language of the Honduran Court supports
this interpretation. Following the use of “annulment” and
“future inapplicability” is a colon followed by the following
illuminating language, “[t]his Resolution does not confer any
right to claims.” Thus, Attorney General Leiva’s explana-
tion, as compared to the other evidence before the court, is
most compelling. Furthermore, this court should not inter-
pret Honduran law in a vacuum. As stated above, in Hondu-
ras, Article 96 of the Honduran Constitution retroactively
applies the invalidation of Resolution 030-95 to any criminal
defendant. The Honduran Court certainly would have been
aware of the existence and effect of Article 96 when crafting
the language and scope of its opinion and this court should
seek to interpret the Honduran Court’s opinion in its proper
context.

The majority advances the important principle of finality
in support of its decision. As a general proposition, I agree
that finality is an important aspect of American jurispru-
dence. However, in the context of an invalidated substantive
criminal law which forms the basis of a criminal prosecution
or conviction, reliance on the concept of finality is mis-
placed. As stated above, under both U.S. and Honduran law,
retroactive application is warranted for a criminal defendant
charged or convicted of a subsequently declared invalid
criminal statute. Cf, Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333,
346, 94 S. Ct. 2298, 2305, 41 L. Ed. 2d 109, 119 (1974) (in
the context of a petition for relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255, concluding that if conviction and punishment are for
an act not made criminal by the law, “[t]here can be no room
for doubt that such a circumstance inherently results in a

42a

”

complete miscarriage of justice ....” (Internal quotations

omitted)).

For emphasis, I repeat again that the majority opinion
discusses extensively and is strongly critical of the changed
position or shift by the Honduran government. While that
terminology may give comfort to the majority, it is simp]
not accurate. While various government officials gave con-
flicting opinions regarding the validity of Resolution 030-95,
this was before the Honduran courts ruled. The Honduran
courts have now ruled and both agree, Resolution 030-95 was
null and void. The majority casts this in an unfavorable light
akin to something sinister. In my opinion, this is no different
than what occurs routinely in our country. Attorneys, and
even the Attorney General of a state or the United States, of-
ten express opinions about statutes only to find that after a
court challenge, they were wrong. That is all that happened
here. Some of the experts were right; some were wrong.
But, the Honduran courts have now spoken and there is sim-
ply no doubt that Resolution 030-95 is null and void as if it
never existed.

To suggest that the newly issued statements and opinions
of Honduran officials do not carry the weight of the earlier
statements is a strange position for members of the judiciary.
The so-called “shift in position” is the result of lawful litiga-
tion within the courts of a foreign nation. I think we would
be shocked should the tables be reversed and a foreign nation
simply ignored one of our court rulings because it caused
some frustration or inconvenience.

The evidence in this case supports the conclusion that the
defendants were guilty of knowingly violating the law at the
time they harvested, shipped and sold these “shorts.” The
prosecutors did their very best to establish the law of Hondu-
ras which is essential under the Lacey Act. It is easy to un-
derstand the frustration inherent in this present situation.
But, the Lacey Act, by its very terms, is dependent upon the

43a

laws of a foreign sovereign. In this situation, we do not con-
trol the outcome of challenges made to those underlying
laws. No one has suggested that McNab was not exercising
his lawful rights as a citizen of Honduras or that the courts of
Honduras were without authority to issue the decisions they
did.

Most reluctantly, I therefore dissent.

APPENDIX B

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA

v. CRIMINAL ACTION
NO. 1:00-00079-(1, 2, 3 & 4)-RV

DAVID HENSON [Filed October 12, 2000]

MCNAB, ROBERT D.
BLANDFORD, |
ABNER SCHOEN-
WETTER, DIANA H.
HUANG

ORDER

This matter is before the court on the following docu-
ments:

1. “Motion for Pretrial Determination of Foreign and State
Law Pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b) and 26.1 and
Memorandum in Support Thereof,” (doc. 46), together
with evidentiary materials, (in redwell), filed by the gov-
ernment;

2. “Motion to Dismiss Counts One through Twelve and
Counts Twenty-Eight Through Forty-Three of the In-

45a

dictment,” (doc. 53), filed by defendant David Henson
McNab:'

3. “Opposition To Defendant McNab’s Motion to Dismiss
Counts One Through Twelve and Counts Twenty-Eight
Through Forty-Three of the Indictment,” (doc. 87), filed

. by the government;

4. “Supplement/Amendment to ... Motion for Pretrial De-
termination of Foreign and State Law and Memorandum
in Support Thereof,” (doc. 100), filed by the government;

5. “Notice of Intent to Offer in Evidence Foreign Records,”
(doc. 105), filed by the government;

6. “Response to the Government’s Motion for Pretrial De-
termination of Foreign and State Law,” (doc. 110), filed
by defendant McNab;

7. “Renewed Motion for Evidentiary Hearing on Govern-
ment’s Motion for Determination of Foreign Law” (doc.
113), filed by defendant McNab;

8. “Opposition to Pretrial Determination of Foreign and
State Law,” (doc. 115), together with a supporting brief,
(doc. 116), filed by defendant Robert D. Blandford;

9. “Notice of Intent to Offer in Evidence Foreign Records,”
(doc. 117), filed by defendant McNab;

10. “Reply to Defendant [McNab’s] Response to Motion for
Pretrial Determination for Foreign and State Law,” (doc.
122), filed by the government;

' The motion to dismiss is premised on multiple grounds,

including the contention that “the transactions are not violative of
any valid law, treaty, or regulation in Honduras.” Mot. To Dism.,

q2.

46a

11. “Notice of Intent to Offer in Evidence Foreign Records,”
(doc. 125), filed by the government;

12. “Motion to Dismiss the Superseding Indictment,” (doc.
151), filed by defendant McNab;

13. “Brief in Support of ... Response to the Government’s
Motion for Pretrial Determination of Foreign and State
Law and In Support of .. . Motion to Dismiss the Super-
seding Indictment,” (doc. 178), filed by defendant
McNab;

14.“Summary Brief on Pretrial Determination of Foreign
and State Law,” (doc. 182), filed by the government;

15. “Summary of Significant Evidence Supporting its Posi-
tion Regarding the Determination of Foreign Law,” (doc.
185), filed by the government;

16. “Supplemental Opposition to Government’s Motion for
Determination of Foreign Law and In Support of Defen-
dant McNab’s Motion to Dismiss,” (doc. 186), filed by
defendant McNab:

17. “Notice of Filing of Expert Supplementary Affidavit,”
: (doc. 194), filed by defendant McNab;

18. “Supplemental Brief Regarding Foreign Law Issue,”
(doc. 199), filed by defendant McNab; and

19. All exhibits admitted during the September 27-29, 2000
hearing. |

INTRODUCTION

In this criminal proceeding, defendants are charged with,
inter alia, conspiring to violate and/or violating the Lacey
Act, 16 U.S.C. § 3371 et seg. Inter alia, the Lacey Act
makes it unlawful “to import, export, transport, sell, receive,
acquire, or purchase in interstate or foreign commerce any
fish .. . taken, posSessed, transported, or sold in violation of
any law or regulation of any State or in violation of any for-

47a

eign law.” 16 U.S.C. § 3372(2)(A). In this case, the gov-
ernment contends that defendants violated Honduran law in
various ways when they imported or conspired to import
spiny lobster tails and shrimp on multiple occasions over a
five-year period.” So that the court can adequately charge the
jury, the government requests the court to “determine” that
Honduran law:

(1) prohibits one to harvest, process, or
sell (including the sale/exportation of such

° The second superseding indictment also charges that some

of the defendants violated the Lacey Act by importing shrimp and
spiny lobsters in violation of Florida law, and the government has
requested the court to “determine” the relevant Florida law. As
stated on the record during the September 27-29 hearing, none of
the parties contest the validity or scope of the applicable Florida
law as set forth in the government's motion. There being no dis-
pute between the parties regarding the relevant Florida law, the
court concludes that Florida law prohibits:

l. the harvesting or possessing of any spiny lobster
(Panulirus argus) with a tail measurement less than 5 1/2
inches.

y the harvesting or possessing of egg-bearing spiny
lobster and/or the possessing of spiny lobster or spiny lob-
ster tails from which eggs, swimmerettes, or pleopods
have been removed or stripped. The practice of strip-
ping or otherwise molesting egg-bearing spiny lobster
in order to remove the eggs is also prohibited.

3. any person, firm, or corporation to deal in any
saltwater products, including lobster tails, without first
paying for and procuring a saltwater products dealer li-
cense. It is unlawful to sell, deliver, ship, or transport any
saltwater products without all invoices of such products
having thereon the wholesale dealer license number.

48a

lobster to a buyer outside Honduras for which
payment is, made directly or indirectly to a
Honduran citizen or company) any lobster the
tail of which measures less than five and one-
half (5 2) inches in length;

(2) prohibits one to harvest lobster com-
mercially between March 16 and July 31 of
years 1995, 1996 and 1998. In all other years,
the closed season runs from December 1
through April 30.

(3) prohibits one to harvest shrimp com-
mercially between February 1 and June 30 of
each year;

(4) prohibits one to harvest or destroy the
eggs of any aquatic species, including spiny
lobster, for profit; This includes a prohibition
against the tearing out or, in any other way
separating, the eggs from the female lobster,
for profit;

(5) prohibits one, commencing on the
sixth day after the beginning of the respective
lobster or shrimp closed season, to transport,
sell, store, or refrigerate lobster and/or shrimp
unless the lobster and shrimp were harvested
prior to the first day of the closed season;

(6) requires lobster and shrimp fishermen
to dock their vessels and unload their catch in
a Honduran port prior to exportation. This
duty may be fulfilled by the fishermen by ei-
ther docking the vessel that caught the lobster
or shrimp or transferring the catch to a li-
censed ship that in turn docks and unloads the
catch;

49a

(7) requires that businessmen and those
who use any kind of boat for fishing activities
or transportation of any fish species protected
by law, including lobsters, report in writing to
the governmental authorities the outcome of
their fishing trip. The captain of any fishing
boat has to report the departure and arrival of
the boat to governmental authorities, pointing
out places where the fishing was done, and the
species and amount caught.

(8) prohibits one to export lobster without
first processing/packing that lobster in Hondu-
ras which includes the packing of lobster into
boxes that have been paraffined and labeled
with (a) the business name of the firm that
makes the product, (b) the weight, (c) that it
was “inspected and approved of by the Hon-
duran Ministry of Natural Resources” and (d)
the number assigned to the processing com-
pany.

The government contends that these points of law are
mandated by certain Honduran statutes, regulations, and
resolutions. Except as noted below, defendants do not con-
test the government’s interpretation of the relevant Honduran
Statutes, regulations, and resolutions; rather, defendants’ pri-
mary contention is that the resolutions upon which the gov-
ernment relies do not satisfy the Honduran constitutional re-
quirements for resolutions and, therefore, are null and void.
The parties’ contentions and supporting evidence are dis-
cussed infra.’, *

* Defendants had asserted that they could not be indicted
under the Lacey Act when the underlying foreign law provides

[Footnote continued on next page]

50a

Over a 2 2-day period, the court conducted an eviden-
tiary hearing on the Honduran law issues. Additionally, the
court has reviewed the voluminous evidentiary material sub-
mitted by the parties before, during, and after the hearing.
After due consideration, the court makes the following de-
terminations of foreign law pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3505(b)’
and Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)° and 26.1.’

[Footnote continued from previous page]

only civil penalties or when the foreign government has not prose-
cuted them under the criminal penalties. Based on the reasons and
authorities cited by the government in its briefs, the court previ-
ously denied defendants’ motion to dismiss to the extent that it was
predicated on either of these two grounds.

* The government and defendant McNab have submitted a

tremendous amount of evidentiary material regarding Honduran
law. Given the time constraints on the court, the court cannot pos-
sibly address each item of evidence in this written order. Never-
theless, so the record is clear, the court notes that it has carefully
reviewed all of the materials submitted in English.

° ‘Title 18 U.S.C. § 3505 provides:

At the arraignment or as soon after the arraignment as
practicable, a party intending to offer in evidence under
this section a foreign record or regularly conducted activ-
ity shall provide written notice of that intention to each
other party. A motion opposing admission in evidence of
such record shall be made by the opposing party and de-
termined by the court before trial. Failure by a party to
file such a motion before trial shall constitute waiver of
objection to such record or duplicate, but the court for
cause shown may grant relief from the waiver.

° Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b) provides, inter alia:

[Footnote continued on next page]

Sla

DISCUSSION

Point of Law 1—Prohibition of harvesting lobster less than
5 1/2 inches in length

The government relies on Resolution No. 030-95 (De-
cember 5, 1995) to establish that Honduras law prohibits the
harvest and sale of lobster less than 5 1/2 inches in length.
That resolution provides in relevant part:

For the capture of lobster:

d) The minimum size for the capture of lobster
is 5.5 inches or 14.5 centimeters of abdominal

length.
Resolution No. 030-95, Third Provision
Point of Law 2—Closed season for harvesting of lobster
Point of Law 3—Closed season for harvesting of shnimp

The government relies on Decree No. 154, The Fishing
Law (May 19, 1959), Chapter V, Article 41, and Resolutions

[Footnote continued from previous page]

Any defense, objection, or request which is capable of de-
termination without the trial of the general issue may be
raised before trial by motion.

’ Fed. R. Crim. P. 26.1 provides:

A party who intends to raise an issue concerning the law of
a foreign country shall give reasonable written notice. The
court, in determining foreign law, may consider any
relevant material or source, including testimony,
whether or not submitted by a party or admissible un-
der the Federal Rules of Evidence. The court’s deter-
mination shall be treated as a ruling on a question of
law.

52a

No. 001-95 (January 14, 1995), No. 030-95 (December 5,
1995), and No. 031-97 (December 17, 1997), to establish that
Honduras law prohibits the harvest of lobster and shrimp dur-
ing closed seasons. The Fishing Law provides in relevant
part:

The closed season for fishing for shrimp and
lobster is fixed as the period between 1 De-
cember and 30 April of each year.

The Fishing Law, Chapter V, Article 41.
The three resolutions provide in relevant part:

FIRST: To establish closing season annually for the
capture of Shrimp [and] Lobster . . . in the At-
lantic Ocean, during the following periods:
a) Shrimp, from the lst of February to the
30th of June.

b) Lobster, from the 16th of March to the 31st
of July.

Resolution No. 001-95 (establishing the closed season for the
year 1995).

FIRST: To establish closing season annually for the
capture of all species of shrimp [and] lobster
...1n the Atlantic Ocean and in the coastal la-
goon system, during the following periods:
a) Shrimp, from the Ist of February to the

30th of June.

b) Lobster, from the 16th of March to the 31st
of July.

Resolution No. 030-95 (establishing the closed season for the
year 1996).

FIRST: To establish closing season for the capture of
shrimp [and] lobster .. . in the Caribbean Sea
and in the coastal lagoon system, during the
following time periods:

53a

a) Shrimp, from the lst of February to the
30th of June 1998.

b) Lobster, from the 16th of March to the 31st
of July 1988.

Resolution No. 031-97 (establishing the closed season for the
year 1998).

The government established that the resolutions were is-
sued by the Honduran Minister of the Department of Agricul-
ture and Livestock and were duly published in La Gaceta, the
official publication of the Republic of Honduras.

Defendants do not dispute the contents of the three reso-
lutions upon which the government relies to establish Points
of Law 1, 2, & 3; rather, they contend that the resolutions are
null and void. To support their contention, defendants rely
upon a number of legal opinions which the court has care-
fully reviewed.

Dr. Saul Litvinoff, a professor of law at Louisiana State
University, and Efrain Moncada Silva, a professor at the Na-
tional Autonomous University of Honduras and licensed
member of the Honduran bar, testified that the resolutions do
not meet the requirements of the Honduran Constitution in
order to have “a general binding, effect.” Aff. of Litvinoff,
p. 6. Specifically, Prof. Litvinoff testified that, under Arti-
cles 245 and 248 of the Honduran Constitution, to be valid
and binding, the documents must be 1) “issued in the form of
a regulation, 2) [] signed by the President and countersigned
by the departmental secretary, and 3) published in the official
form.” Jd. Prof. Salvia testified similarly.

The court has reviewed the cited portions of the Hondu-
ran Constitution and disagrees with the professors’ interpre-
tation thereof. Article 245 provides:

The President of the Republic has the
me general administration of the States. His
powers are: to issue accords and decrees and

54a

to issue regulations and resolutions in accor-
dance with law.

Article 248 provides:

The decrees, regulations, accords, orders,
and judgments of the President of the Repub-
lic must be authorized by the department sec-
retaries or their undersecretaries in proper
cases. If they fail to meet these require-
ments[,] they shall have no legal force.

As the court understands these two constitutional provi-
sions, the President of the Republic of Honduras is constitu-
tionally authorized to issue regulations and resolutions in ac-
cordance with law, and if he issues regulations, they must be

~authorized by the appropriate departmental secretary. How-
ever, these two provisions (which appear to be plain and
straightforward) do not state (or even suggest) that the presi-
dent is the only Honduran official legally authorized to issue
a resolution. Buttressing the court’s reading of these consti-
tutional provisions are two important facts. First, the gov-
ernment presented unrebutted testimony that other Honduran
departments (e.g., communications and banking) had issued
resolutions as a means of carrying out the laws governing
those industries. Second, the testimony of virtually every
witness asked was that everyone in the Honduran fishing in-
dustry, including defendant McNab and the government offi-
cials in the fishing industry, viewed the resolutions as legally
binding. Indeed, defendant McNab issued memoranda to his
boat captains reminding them of the lobster size limits.

Additionally, Liliana Paz, the General Secretary in the
Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (the Honduran de-
partment responsible for the fishery management program),
testified that that Honduran Ministry most certainly views the
resolutions as legally binding. Secretary Paz is a graduate of
the National Autonomous University of Honduras and an at-
torney licensed in Honduras. She is the highest level attor-

SS

55a

ney within the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock, and her
job duties include providing legal advice to “the Minister in
matters having to do with legal affairs, institutional commu-
nication, [and] international cooperation.” Secretary Paz also
has experience clerking for one of the Honduran courts. The
court finds her to be well-qualified to speak to the issues re-
garding the validity and contents of the Fishing Law and the
related regulations and resolutions. Upon observing her de-
meanor, the court finds Secretary Paz to be a very credible
witness.

In contrast, the court found the testimony of Prof. Silva to
be less than credible, as he testified that he had not, as of the
date of his in-court testimony, decided whether he was going
to charge defendant McNab for his legal services (including
his time spent researching, drafting, and testifying).* Thus, it
appears that this expert witness for the defense intends to
charge a fee akin to a contingency fee. As for Professor Lit-
vinoff, the value of his testimony as to what is required under
Honduran law is diminished by the fact that he is not a li-
censed attorney in Honduras. Additionally, unlike Secretary
Paz, neither of these gentlemen regularly interpret the fisher-
ies laws, regulations, and resolutions.

The court~also notes that the Fishing Law itself specifi-
cally contemplates the implementation of resolutions such as
those at issue here in furtherance of the Law. The Fishing
Law of 1959, Chapter 11, Article 7, provides in relevant part:

[The Department of Hunting and Fishing]
shall be the only authority to resolve, clarify,
and decide all questions raised about the con-
ditions that must be satisfied by fisheries

8

Professor Silva was not asked who had paid his travel ex-
penses to America for the purpose of testifying in this matter.

56a

products, to permit them to be captured, trans- ‘
ported or sold for consumption in the markets
and for other industrial uses, and everything
related to importation, exportation and licens-
ing, to which end it shall announce such reso-
lutions an other measures as it believes neces-
sary for fisheries activities to be as effective as
possible.

The Fishing Law of 1959, Chapter II, Article 7.

Defendants correctly point out that elsewhere in the Fish-
ing Law, “[t]he Executive Branch, through the secretariat of
Natural Resources, is the superior authority on fisheries and
fisheries-related matters, and therefore, may establish and
announce ... [certain] measures [including those related to
closed seasons] through regulations.” The Fishing Law,
Chapter I, Article 5. After review, the court is unable to rec-
oncile Articles 5 & 7. Faced with this statutory dilemma, the
court finds the testimony of Secretary Paz to be cnitical—
namely, that the resolutions are valid, that the Honduran gov-
ernment views the resolutions to be valid, and that the Hon-
duran government has acted in accordance with the resolu-

tions.

One other item of evidence submitted by defendants mer-
its a remark. Defendants have submitted a one-sentence rul-
ing issued by the Honduras Supreme Court of Justice which
defendants characterize as a judicial statement by the high
court that resolutions are not law. One of defendant
McNab’s witnesses (Honduran attorney Maria Letizia De
Guillen) recently petitioned the Supreme Court challenging
the constitutionality of two of the resolutions at issue before
this court. In denying the petition, the high court stated in
toto:

Denied the admission of the petition of uncon-
stitutionality interposed by the way of action
_ by attorney MARIA LETIZIA DE GUILLEN,

ee

57a

because they recur against two administrative
resolutions that do not have the character of
law and according to article 184 of the Consti-
tution of the Republic: the recourse of uncon-
stitutionality only proceed against the Law by
reason of form or content.

After review, this court understands the ruling to be that
the Supreme Court of Justice only reviews the constitutional-
ity of a law (i.e., a statute or other form of legislation enacted
by the Honduran legislative branch—National Congress) and
that it does not determine the constitutionality of any “lesser”
documents (i.e., regulations and resolutions issued by the ex-
ecutive branch) notwithstanding that those “lesser” docu-
ments, have the binding force of law. According to defen-
dants, the fact that the Supreme Court declined to address the
constitutionality of the resolutions because they are no “law”
does not equate to a holding by the high court that he resolu-
tions have no binding legal effect. Defendants’ argument
goes too far and is simply unsupported. Honduran law
clearly encompasses many mechanisms which carry the force
of law notwithstanding that the mechanism is not denomi-
nated as “law” (and thereby subject to review by the Supreme
Court of Justice). y

Accordingly, the court concludes that the government has
met its burden of establishing that Points of Law 1, 2, & 3 (as
set forth on page five of this order) are valid and binding un-
der Honduran law.

Point of Law 4—Prohibition of harvesting egg-bearing lob-
ster or the removal of eggs from lobster

The government relies on Decree No. 154, The Fishing
Law (May 19, 1959), Chapter VII, Article 70(3), to establish
that Honduras law prohibits the harvest and sale of egg-
hearing lobster and the tearing out or separating in any other
way the eggs from the female lobster. That law provides in
relevant part:

- 58a

The following offense shall be punished
with [a fine of] THREE HUNDRED LEMPI-
RAS or THREE HUNDRED DAYS impris-

onment:

* ke &

3) Those who destroy or harvest the eggs,
or the offspring of fish, chelonians, or other
aquatic species for profit.

The Fishing Law, Chapter VII, Article 70(3).

Defendants do not contest the validity of the Fishing
Law; rather, they argue that Article 70(3) was written to pro-
tect the eggs and young of fish, turtles, and other aquatic spe-
cies which have been placed in situ. To this end, defendants
rely on Prof. Litvinoff’s supplemental affidavit in which he
opines that this statutory provision does not bar the severance
of the egg-bearing part of a female lobster or the harvesting
of egg-bearing lobsters. Moreover, the professor suggests
that the provision does not reach the harvesting of any lob-
sters, for “the Honduran system has always been specific in
its attempts to regulate lobster harvesting activities” and
“there is no mention of lobster in this provision.”

The court finds that defendants’ interpretation of Article
70(3) is strained and unnecessarily limiting. The statutory
provision is broadly written and clearly encompasses lob-
ster—which is undisputedly an “aquatic species.” Also, there
is nothing in the plain language of the provision which indi-
cates that it is limited to eggs in situ. Moreover, to read an in
situ requirement into the statutory provision would render
part of the provision an absurdity, for it is difficult to con-
ceive of a situation in which one would destroy eggs in situ
for profit.

Accordingly, the court concludes that the government has
met its burden of establishing that Point of Law 4 (as set

59a

forth on page five of this order) is valid and binding under
Honduran law.

Point of Law 5—Only lobster and shrimp harvested during
open season may be transported, sold, stored, or refrigerated
after 6th day of closed season

The government relies on Decree No. 154, The Fishing
Law (May 19, 1959), Chapter VII, Articles 28 and 54, to es-
tablish that Honduras law prohibits the transport, sale, stor-
age, or refrigeration of lobster and shrimp on or after the
sixth day of the closed season unless the lobster and shrimp
were harvested prior to the first day of the closed season.

The Fishing Law provides in relevant part:

The sale and transport of species which
are canned, salted, smoked, or prepared by in-
dustrial means and were caught prior to the
start of their respective closed seasons are also
authorized at all times.

The Fishing Law, Chapter IV, Article 28.

The transport and sale of species in closed
seasons ... is permitted until the fifth day af-
ter the respective closed season has begun for
the purpose of selling off existing quantities
which were captured prior to the start of said
closed season.

The Fishing Law, Chapter V, Article 54.

Defendants have not challenged this Point of Law or the
underlying law from which it is derived. Accordingly, the
court concludes that the government has met its burden of
establishing that Point of Law 5 (as set forth on page five of
this order) is valid and binding under Honduran law.

Point of Law 6—Fishermen must dock, in a Honduran port,
the vessel which caught lobster or shrimp and unload catch or

60a

transfer the catch to a licensed vessel that in turns docks and
unloads the catch in a Honduran port.

The government relies on Decree No. 154, The Fishing
Law (May 19, 1959), Chapter VII, Article 30, to establish
that Honduras law requires lobster and shrimp fishermen to
dock their vessels and unload their catch in a Honduran port
prior to exportation. Secretary Paz testified that, although
not specifically authorized by the Fishing Law, the Honduran
government deemed this requirement to be satisfied by either
the docking of the vessel that caught the lobster or shrimp or
the transferring of such catch to a licensed ship that in tum
docks and unloads the catch in a Honduran port.

The F ishing Law provides in relevant part:

Fishermen shall be required to dock their
vessels and unload their catch in Honduran
ports.

The Fishing Law, Chapter IV, Article 30.

Defendants have not challenged this Point of Law or the
underlying law from which it is derived. Accordingly, the
court concludes that the government has met its burden of
establishing that Point of Law 6 (as set forth on page five of
this order) is valid and binding under Honduran law.

Point of Law 7—Reporting requirements

The government relies on Decree No. 154, The Fishing
Law (May 19, 1959), Chapter VII, Articles 35 & 37, to estab-
lish that Honduras law requires businessmen and those who
use any kind of boat for fishing activities or transportation of
any fish species protected by law, including lobsters, must
report in writing to government authorities the outcome of
their fishing trip. The captain of any fishing boat must report
the departure and arrival of the boat to government authori-
ties, pointing out places where fishing was done and listing
the species and amount caught.

6la

The Fishing Law provides in relevant part:

Businessmen, shipowners, employers,
fishermen and sailors, as applicable to each
business, boat, ship, or transport of each class
dedicated to the fishing or transport of any of
the species protected by this Law, are required
to give to the respective officials an account or
report, in writing, of the results of the fishing
or fishing expedition, and to have the mer-
chandise examined to verify whether regula-
tory requirements have been met, and to ob-
tain the statistical data, and to allow their
books to be reviewed.

The Fishing Law, Chapter IV, Article 35.

All fishing boat captains shall report to
the appropriate office when they depart for
work and when they return, indicating fishing
places, species and quantities caught.

The Fishing Law, Chapter IV, Article 37.

Defendants have not challenged this Point of Law or the
underlying law from which it is derived. Accordingly, the
court concludes that the government has met its burden of
establishing that Point of Law 7 (as set forth on page six of
this order) is valid and binding under Honduran law.

Point of Law 8—Inspection, processing, and packing re-
quirements

The government relies on Agreement No. 0008-93 (Janu-
ary 13, 1993), Articles 3, 4, & 49, to establish that Honduras
law prohivits the exportation of lobster without first having it
officially inspected for health and sanitation and proc-
essed/packed at an approved establishment in Honduras,
which includes the packing of lobster into boxes that have
been paraffined and labeled with the business name of the

62a

firm that makes the product, the weight, that it was “In-
spected and Approved of by the Honduran Ministry of Natu-
ral Resources” and the number assigned to the processing
company. This “Agreement” is a regulation under Honduran
law, it was duly published in La Gaceta, and defendants do
not dispute its validity. As Secretary Paz testified, the
Agreement contains the inspection, industrial, health, and
hygiene regulations for the protection of fishery products.

Agreement No. 0008-93 provides in relevant part:

The ones subject to the Official Inspec-
tion are the fishing vessels, storing centers and
plants that capture, gather, industrialize and

- pack fishing products.

In agreement with the present Regulation
only the products previously inspected can be
offered for sale. ,

Products for export can only be the ones
processed in plants approved for that purpose.

Agreement No. 0008-93, Article 3.

Fish, crustaceans, molluscs, anurous rep-
tiles and mammals of comestible type, from
fresh or salt water, assigned for internal con-
sumption or export and by extension are also
included the subproducts obtained from the
same mentioned products.

Agreement No. 0008-93, Article 4.

For the icing and packing of the products it will be ob-
served:

h) The packing must be made in boxes with
the appropriate label, treated with paraffin
and the size must have been approved

63a

during the registration process. They
must have the following legend:

lst) The name or trade name of the busi-
ness that manufactured the product.

2nd) The weight.

3rd) The legend “Product of Honduras”
that can be also placed in another lan-
guage.

4th) A 3 (three) centimeter circle, “In-
spected and Approved by the Department
of Natural Resources of Honduras” and
the number assigned to the establishment
doing the processing.

5th) In addition, it can have printed the
different denominations of the size of the
product.

Agreement No. 0008-93, Article 49(h).

efendants do not object to the first part of this statement
, .e., that it is prohibited under Honduran law to export
without first having it officially inspected for health
itation and processed at an approved establishment in

tailed requirements of a processing plant under the Fishing
Law. Rather, the dispute between the parties turns on the
definition of “processing,” a term that is not specifically de-
fined in the Agreement.

Based on the evidence presented, the court concludes that
“processing” fish products for exportation includes inspec-
tion, grading, the preparation of the products for packaging,
and the packaging itself. Secretary Paz testified that process-
ing includes packaging. Mike Powers of Garden Restaurants
testified that partial processing can occur onboard the fishing
vessel, including the measuring and cutting off the lobster
tails, washing, deveining, and dipping the product into an

64a

approved preservative. However, the “process” is not com-
plete until the product is graded, the official inspector (or his
selected technician) inspects and approves the product, and it
is properly packaged for exportation.

Finally, defendants make much of the fact that Agree-
ment 0008-93, Article 5(t), permits the use of plastic as part
of the packing materials.’ However, Article 49 of Agreement
0008-93 plainly requires that the product ultimately be placed
in a paraffined box prior to exportation, with the box appro-
priately labeled with the requisite information. Additionally,
Secretary Paz testified that packing lobster in plastic bags—
without more—for exportation is not adequate under Hondu-
ran law.

Accordingly, the court concludes that the government has
met its burden of establishing that Point of Law 8 (as set
forth on page six of this order) is valid and binding under
Honduran law.

CONCLUSION

It is ORDERED that defendant McNab’s “Motion to
Dismiss Counts One through Twelve and Counts Twenty-
Eight Through Forty-Three of the Indictment,” (doc. 53),
and “Motion to Dismiss the Superseding Indictment,”
(doc. 151), are DENIED.

° — Agreement 0008-93, Article 5(t) provides:

Packing Materials: All the materials such as sheets of
aluminum, plastic, wax paper, cardboard boxes and others,
used to cover and protect the fishing products, and that
have been approved by the Department.

The fact that the Agreement permits the use of plastic as a packing
material is not surprising given the extensive regulations regarding
the use of ice.

65a

Nothing in this order should be construed as expressing,
an opinion or making a finding as to the innocence or guilt of
any of the defendants. It will be for the jury to decide
whether the government proves any of the defendants guilty
of any of the charges beyond a reasonable doubt. The fact
that the court has “determined” the applicable Honduran law
does not mean that the government has proven that any of the
defendants have violated Honduran law or that the lobster or
shrimp at issue in this case were taken, possessed, etc., in
violation of Honduran law.

The Clerk is DIRECTED to send a copy of this order
to counsel for all parties by facsimile.

DONE this 12th day of October, 2000.
/s/

RICHARD W. VOLLMER, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

66a

APPENDIX C

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF [Filed August 28, 2001]
AMERICA

v. CRIMINAL ACTION
NO. 1:00-00079-(1, 2, 3 & 4)-RV

DAVID HENSON MCNAB
ROBERT D. BLANDFORD
ABNER SCHOENWETTER-
DIANE H. HUANG

ORDER

This matter is before the court on the following docu-
ments:

1. “Alternative Motions Based on Honduran Law Develop-
ments,” (doc. 336), filed by defendant David Henson
McNab; '/”

' The “Alternative Motions”—which are premised on essen-

tially the same grounds—are a “Motion to Dismiss,” a “Motion for
New Trial Based on Newly Discovered Evidence,” and a Motion
for Redetermination of Foreign Law.”

2 Defendants Robert D. Blandford and Abner J. Schoen-
wetter adopted defendant McNab’s “Alternative Motions,” (docs.
346 & 342, respectively). Defendant Diane H. Huang filed her
own motion, also titled “Alternative Motions Based on Honduran

[Footnote continued on next page]

67a

2. “Notice of Filing Regarding Hygiene Regulation Re-
peal,” (doc. 325), filed by defendant McNab;

3. “Notice of Filing Regarding Annulment Action,” doc.
324), filed by defendant McNab;

4. “Notice of Filing Regarding Fishing Law Changes,” (doc.
326), filed by defendant McNab;

5. Supplemental Filing in Support of Alternative Motions,”
(doc. 341), filed by defendant McNab;

6. Second Supplemental Filing in Support of Alternative
Motions, (doc. 371), filed by defendant McNab;

7. “Second Response to Defendants’ Alternative Motions
Based on Issues of Honduran Law,” (doc. 387), filed by
the government;

and

8. Reply Declaration, (doc. 388), filed by defendant
McNab.*

[Footnote continued from previous page]

Law Developments,” (doc. 344), which is predicated on essentially
the same grounds and evidence as McNab’s alternative motions.
For simplicity’s sake, the court will refer only to the alternative
motions filed by defendant McNab, although the court’s ruling
applies to all four defendants.

> The government’s “Second Response” supercedes the gov-

ernment’s first response. (doc. 378).

* During the hearing held by the court on August 17, 2001,
the court granted defendant McNab’s “Motion for Leave to File
Reply Declaration,” (doc. 388), without objection by the govern-
ment.

68a

INTRODUCTION

Following a jury trial, defendants were convicted of, inter
alia, conspiring to violate the Lacey Act, 16 U.S.C. § 3371 et
seq. Stated generally, the Lacey Act makes it unlawful to
import into the United States fish or wildlife that has been
taken or acquired in violation of another country’s laws. In
this case, the government contended that defendants violated
Honduran law in various ways when they conspired to import
spiny lobster tails on multiple occasions over a five-year pe-
riod. Prior to trial, the court made a number of determina-
tions with respect to Honduran law pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §
3505(b)° and Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)° and 26.1.’

° Title 18 U.S.C. § 3505 provides:

At the arraignment or as soon after the arraignment
as practicable, a party intending to offer in evidence
under this section a foreign record or regularly conducted
activity shall provide written notice of that intention to
each other party. A motion opposing admission in evi-
dence of such record shall be made by the opposing party
and determined by the court before trial. Failure by a
party to file such a motion before trial shall constitute
waiver of objection to such record or duplicate, but the
court for cause shown may grant relief from the waiver.

° Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b) provides, inter alia:

Any defense, objection, or request which is capable
of determination without the trial of the general issue may
be raised before trial by motion.

’ Fed. R. Crim. P. 26.1 provides:

A party who intends to raise an issue concerning the
law of a foreign country shall give reasonable written no-
tice. The court, in determining foreign law, may consider
any relevant material or source, including testimony,

7a

#
=
a
i.

[Footnote continued on next page]

CapEOD EE ERIS HEE He i a ii a aca aa a ssiasane

os
Bo

69a

In his pending post-trial “alternative motions,” defendant
McNab has requested the court to revisit its Honduran law
determinations, at least as to three particular points. Because
the court’s jurisdiction was potentially impacted by the
newly-raised grounds, the court ordered the government to
file a response and, following that response, held a hearing
on August 17, 2001. After full consideration of the argu-
ments of counsel and the evidence submitted, the court con-
cludes that the alternative motions are due to be denied.

DISCUSSION

Point of Law 1—Lobster Size Limits—Annulment of
Resolution 030-95

In its original ruling on Honduran law, the court deter-
mined that Honduran Resolution 030-95, Third provision,
prohibits the harvesting of spiny lobsters which are less than
5 1/2 inches in length. Defendant McNab contends that
Resolution 030-95 has been annulled by a Honduran court
and that, pursuant to Article 96 of the Honduran Constitution,
the annulment operates retroactively in favor of a criminal
defendant such as himself. The annulment action was insti-
tuted by McNab following this court’s original ruling on
Honduran law.

The government does not contest defendant McNab’s as-
sertion that the Honduran “Court of the First Instant of Ad-
ministrative Law” declared Resolution 030-95 to be voided.
Rather, the government points out, correctly so, that the
Honduran administrative court declared the resolution to be

[Footnote continued from previous page]

whether or not submitted by a party or admissible under
the Federal rules of Evidence. The court’s determination
shall be treated as a ruling on a question of law.

70a

void “but ... only for purposes of [its] annulment and future
inapplicability. This Resolution does not confer any right to
claims.” Although the legal meaning of this limitation lan-
guage under Honduran law is not entirely clear to the under-
signed, the court concludes that the administrative court in-
tended to give its pronouncement prospective, rather than
retroactive, effect.®

Even if the administrative court’s voidance of Resolution
030-95 should be given retroactive effect, the express lan-
guage of the administrative court’s ruling provides that it will
not be a final judgment if an appeal is timely taken. It is un-
disputed that the Honduran government (which contested the

annulment action before the administrative court) timely ap-

pealed the ruling. Consequently, the administrative ruling is
not a final judgment, and it has no legal effect in Honduras.
Because the administrative decision is not Honduran law now
and because the evidence establishes that the Honduran gov-
ermment continues to enforce Resolution 030-95, the court
concludes that Resolution 030-95 continues to be valid under
Honduran law.

Point of Law 2—Processing/Packaging Rules—Repeal of
Agreement 0008-93

®* It would seem that a judge could not unilaterally declare

the effect of his/her ruling to be non-retroactive, for Article 96 of
the Honduran Constitution would appear to “trump” any such
declaration. This court need not decide that issue, however, be-
cause the government submitted evidence which the court under-
stands to mean that an Honduran administrative court lacks the
power to void a resolution with respect to criminal acts. See
affidavit of Jose Bernardo Torres Umanzor (“since the judgment
deals with an Administrative and not a Criminal matter, it has no
retroactive effect and only has effects for its future inapplicabil-

ity.”).

Tla

In its original ruling, the court concluded that Agreement
No. 0008-93 prohibits the exportation of lobster without first
having it officially inspected for health and sanitation and
processed/packed at an approved establishment in Honduras,
which includes the packing of lobster into boxes that have
been paraffined and labeled with (a) the business name of the
firm that makes the product, (b) the weight, (c) that it was
“Inspected and Approved of by the Honduran Ministry of
Natural Resources” and (d) the number assigned to the proc-
essing company.

It is undisputed that Agreement 0008-93 was issued pur-
suant to Decree No. 40 of May 16, 1973. It is also undis-
puted that Decree No. 40 was expressly repealed effective
January 13, 1995, by Decree No. 157-94. From this, defen-
dant McNab argues that the repeal of Decree No. 40 oper-
ated as a repeal of Agreement 0008-93. In support of this
position, defendant McNab offered the affidavit of Ramiro
Lozano, an Honduran attorney and law professor, who
opined that “regulations are automatically repealed when the
law under which they were issued is repealed.”

The Honduran Civil Code provides in relevant part: ~

Article 42—A law may be revoked totally or
partially by another law.

Article 43—The revocation « the law may be
express or tacit.

It is express when the new law expressly
revokes the law that antecedes it.

It is tacit when the new law contains rules
that may not be conciliated with the old law.

* Defendant McNab offered the affidavits of other Honduran
attorneys who offered similar, if not identical, opinions.

72a

Article 44—The express repeal may be total
or partial, as set forth by the repealing law.
The tacit repeal leaves in effect in the previous
law anything not in conflict with the provi-
sions of the new law, even though both ver-
sions may cover the same matter.

As the government points out, one of the objectives of the
new decree (No. 157-94) was “to strengthen the phyto-
zoosanitation, mainly in that which refers to the .. . control
of products that are of animal and plant origin.” Relying on
Article 44 of the Honduran Civil Code, the government con-
tends that “Agreement 0008-93 remained in effect following
the repeal of Decree No. 40, at the very least to the extent
that it did not impinge on the provisions of the new law.”
The court agrees. To conclude otherwise would mean that
the passage of a law intended to strengthen the existing law
would result in a weaker, if not impotent, new law during
that window of time until the appropriate ministry or agency
had sufficient time to draft, and the appropriate governmental
official(s) to sign and publish, new regulations. Such a result
is untenable. If the Honduran National Congress had simply
repealed Decree No. 40 without passing a new decree cover-
ing the same area of the law, then this court would readily
conclude that Agreement 0008-93 no longer carried the force
of law. That is not the case here, however. At all relevant
times a decree existed covering the area of phytozoosanita-
tion, and Agreement 0008-93 continued in effect when the
new decree became effective, at least to the extent that
Agreement 0008-93 was not inconsistent with the new de-
cree.

There are two additional facts which buttress the court’s
conclusion. First, the Honduran governmental officials re-
sponsible for the enforcement of Decree No. 40, Decree No.
157-94, and Agreement 0008-93 continued to enforce
Agreement 0008-93 after Decree No. 157-94 was enacted.

1 PREY LAO GORE Y He

73a

Second, when the Honduran government decided to create
new regulations for the enforcement of Decree No. 157-94, it
did so by the passage of Accord No. 1081-99 five years after
Decree No. 157-94 became effective. Decree No. 1081-99
specifically repealed Agreement 0008-93. If Agreement No.
0008-93 had been “automatically” repealed by the mere pas-
sage of Decree No. 157-94 in 1994 as defendant McNab
argues, then there would have been no reason for Honduras
to expressly repeal Agreement 0008-93 in 1999 as so pro-
vided in Accord No. 1081-99.

Accordingly, the court concludes that Agreement 0008-
93 remained in effect following the passage of Decree No.
157-94 and up to the passage of Accord No. 1081-99 and,
therefore, was in effect at all times relevant to the charged
conduct in the Second Superseding Indictment.

Point Three—Egg-Bearing Lobsters—Amendment of Ar-
ticle 70(3) of the Fishing Law

Defendant McNab correctly notes that Article 70 of the
Fishing Law was amended by the Honduras National Con-
gress in Decree No. 245-2000, which became effective on
February 5, 2001. Defendant McNab also correctly notes
that the amended Article 70 reenacted and restated some of
the prohibitions of the former Article 70. As this court de-
termined in its original ruling, the (now) former Article 70
prohibited the harvesting of egg-bearing lobsters. The
amended Article 70 does not contain a specific prohibition
against the harvesting of egg-bearing lobsters. The absence
of a specific prohibition regarding the harvesting of egg-
bearing lobster, combined with Article 96 of the Honduran
Constitution (which provides that a change in the law does
not have a retroactive effect except in criminal cases when
the change benefits the accused), constitute the basis for de-
fendant McNab’s assertion that all counts (and convictions)
predicated on a violation of the former Article 70 are due to
be dismissed.

74a

It is true that the Honduran National Congress reworked
Article 70. The amended legislation contains 10 specific
prohibitions and 1 catch-all provision. Namely, the follow-
ing conduct is sanctionable:

(a) Fishing with chemical or explosive elements;

(b) Fishing carried out by unlicenced persons or persons
with expired licenses;

(c) Fishing with prohibited gear;

(d) Catching for commercial purposes during the closed
season;

(e) Clearing mangrove swamps or destroying ecosystems
in general;

(f) Polluting with any substance the maritime or conti-
nental weters;

(g) Catching, destroying, or removing protected hydrobi-
ological species, especially manatees;

(h) Shipowners or captains of vessels that fail to report
their catch;

(i) Carrying out scientific research without a permit from
the National Fisheries Authority;

(j) Shipowners or captains of vessels that fail to comply
with the provisions related to the installation of the
Sea Turtle Excluding Devices (DETs) as set forth by
the National Fisheries Authority; and

(k) Any other activity not expressly mentioned in the
preceding items indicated with letters but which is
analogous.

In response, the government observes that the intent of
the Honduran National Congress in amending Article 70 was
to increase the monetary sanctions to reflect present currency
valuations, thereby putting some teeth into the law:

75a .

WHEREAS the current Fisheries Law .. . sets
forth sanctions of an administrative nature, the
amounts of which do not represent coercive
measures that reflect the gravity of the viola-
tions committed, so that it is necessary to re-
vise these sanctions according to the impor-
tance of the case and the -urrent value of the
national currency.

The government urges that those specific prohibitions con-
tained in the former Article 70 but not in the amended Article
70 (including the egg-bearing lobster prohibition at issue
here, as well as the prohibitions of catching lower weight
fish, crustaceans, and chelonians, and catching a quantity too
large to be transported in one’s own vessel) remain in effect
except to the extent that they are inconsistent with the new
prohibitions. Because there is nothing in the amended Arti-
cle 70 which is inconsistent with a prohibition against har-
vesting egg-bearing lobster, the government contends that the
harvesting of egg-bearing lobster prohibition remains in ef-
fect, if not on its own, then at least through the catch-all pro-
vision “(k)” of the amended Article 70.

Of the three changes in Honduran law which defendant
McNab advances in his alternative motions, it is this ground
which gives the court the most pause. It is troubling that the
Honduran National Congress would specifically “bring over”
certain prohibitions from the former Article 70 into the
amended Article 70, and choose not to specifically “bring
over” other prohibitions, only for this court to conclude that
the prohibitions not expressly brought over are still valid law
to the extent that they are not inconsistent with the amended
Article 70. Nevertheless, after full consideration, the court
concludes that that is exactly what this court must do in light
of Honduran Civil Code Articles 42, 43 & 44. This conclu-
sion is buttressed by the stated purpose of the amendment—
to increase the penalties—not to reduce the prohibited con-

76a

duct. This conclusion gains additional support from the affi-
davit of Liliana Paz, General Secretary in the Ministry of Ag-
riculture and Livestock, the department of the Honduran
government ultimately responsible for the enforcement of the
_ fisheries law, in which she states (albeit without much elabo-
ration) that “the destruction or harvest of eggs of aquatic spe-
cies remains prohibited under Honduran law, subject to
greater penalties.”

Accordingly, the court concludes that the harvesting and
destruction of egg-bearing lobsters continues to be prohibited
conduct under Honduran law.

CONCLUSION
After due consideration, it is

ORDERED that defendant McNab’s alternative mo-
tions are DENIED for the foregoing reasons.

The Clerk is DIRECTED to send a copy of this order
to counsel for all parties by facsimile.

DONE this 28th day of August, 2001.

/s/
RICHARD W. VOLLMER, JR
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

77a

APPENDIX D

[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
MAY 29, 2003
THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK

No. 01-15148

D. C. Docket No. 00-00079-CR-1-RV

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
DAVID HENSON MCNAB,
ROBERT D. BLANDFORD, et al., Defendants-
Appellants.
No. 02-10810

D. C. Docket No. 00-00079-CR-CB
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ABNER SCHOENWETTER,

78a

ROBERT D. BLANDFORD, Defendants-
Appellants.

No. 02-11264

D. C. Docket No. 00-00079-CR-1-RV
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee
versus

DAVID HENSON MCNAB,
ABNER SCHOENWETTER, et al., Defendants-Appellants

Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Alabama

(May 29, 2003)
Before HULL, WILSON and FAY, Circuit Judges.
ORDERED:

The petitions for rehearing are granted in part by deleting
entirely footnote 24 from the Court’s opinion which was is-
sued on March 21, 2003. The Court will issue a substituted
opinion making that deletion. The Court otherwise denies
the petitions for rehearing of defendants’ McNabb, Schoen-
wetter, Huang, Blandford and Embassy of Honduras.

No member of this Court having requested a poll, we
deny the suggestion for rehearing en banc. See Fed. R. App.
P. 35(a); Eleventh Circuit Rule 35-5.

FAY, Circuit Judge, dissents.

79a

APPENDIX E

[Filed August 28, 2001]

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

UNITED STATES OF JUDGMENT IN A
AMERICA CRIMINAL CASE
(For Offenses Committed On
or After November 1, 1987)
V.
DAVID HENSON MCNAB CASE NUMBER: 1:00-CR-
00079-001
THE DEFENDANT: Donald Briskman, J. Patrick
Courtney, III and _ Patrick
Sims
Defendant’s Attorney
() pleaded guilty to count(s) _.
() pleaded nolo contendere to count(s) _ which was
accepted by the court.
(X) was found guilty on count(s) 1-12, 28-43 after a
plea of not guilty.
Date Count
Title & Nature of Offense Offense No.(s)
Section Concluded
18 U.S.C. Conspiracy 05/10/2000 l
§ 371
18 U.S.C. Importation con- 02/04/1999 2-12

§§ 545 & 2 trary to law

80a

18 U.S.C. Fraudulent transac- 12/11/1998 28-42
§§ 1957 &2 _ tions of funds de-

rived from unlawful

activity

18 U.S.C. Conspiracy to en- 05/10/2000 43
§§ 1957 & gage or attempt to
1956(h) engage in monetary

transactions

The defendant is sentenced as provided in pages 2
through 5 of this judgment. Pre-sentence is imposed pursu-
ant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.

() The defendant has been found not guilty on
count(s) _.

() Count(s) ___ is/are dismissed on the motion of the
United States.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant shall no-
tify the United States Attorney for this district within 30 days
of any change of name, residence, or mailing address until all
fines, restitution, costs and special assessments imposed by
this judgment are fully paid. If ordered to pay restitution, the
defendant shall notify the court and United States attorney of
any material change in the defendant’s economic circum-
stances.

Defendant’s Social Security 08/07/2001

No.: NONE Date of Imposition of
Judgment

Defendant’s Date of Birth:

01/17/1952

Defendant’s U.S.M. No.:
39028-018

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Defendant’s Residence /s/

Address: RICHARD W. VOLLMER,
Roatan (Bay Island) JR.
Honduras, Central America SENIOR UNITED STATES

DISTRICT JUDGE
Defendant’s Mailing 8-27-01
Address: Date

JUDGMENT ENTERED ON DOCKET

82a

IMPRISONMENT

The defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the
United States Bureau of Prisons to be imprisoned for a total
term of 97 months, said term consisting of 60 months as to
each of counts 1 through 12 and 97 months as to each of
counts 28 through 42 and 43, all such terms to run CON-

CURRENTLY:
() Special Conditions:
() The court makes the following recommendations
to the Bureau of Prisons:
() The defendant is remanded to the custody of the
United States Marshal.
() The defendant shall surrender to the United States
Marshal for this district:
() ats aam/p.m.on__..
() as notified by the United States Marshal
(X) The defendant shall surrender for service of sen-
tence at the institution designated by the Bureau of
Prisons:
() before2p.m.on__.
(X) as notified by the United States Marshal.
NOTE TO U.S. MARSHAL: Defendant
allowed to remain on bond pending ap-
peal to the 11th Circuit Court of Ap-
peals and may self-surrender to the in-
stitution after a decision is rendered on
appeal;
() as notified by the Probation or Pretrial
Services Office.
RETURN

I have executed this judgment as follows:

83a

Defendant delivered on

- at
tified copy of this judgment.

to
with a cer-

UNITED STATES MARSHAL ™
By

Deputy U.S. Marshal

LH OER OG CRE

84a

SUPERVISED RELEASE

Upon release from imprisonment, the defendant shall be on
supervised release for a term of 3 YEARS as to each of
counts 1-12, 28-42 & 43, all such terms to ran CONCUR-
RENTLY:

(X) Special Conditions:

1. Immediately after incarceration, the defendant is to be
delivered to a duly authorized Immigration official for possi-
ble DEPORTATION; If deported, the defendant is to remain
outside the United States pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). If
not deported, within 72 hours of release from custody of the
Bureau of Prisons or Immigration authorities, the defendant
shall report in person to the probation office in the district to
which he is released and abide by their instructions;

For offenses committed on or after September 13, 1994: The
defendant shall refrain from any unlawful use of a controlled
substance. The defendant shall submit to one drug test
within 15 days of release from imprisonment and at least two
periodic drug tests thereafter, as directed by the probation
officer.

() The above drug testing condition is suspended
based on the court’s determination that the defen-
dant poses a low risk of future substance abuse.
(Check, if applicable)

(X) The defendant shall not possess a firearm, destruc-
tive device, or any other dangerous weapon

If this judgment imposes a fine or a restitution obligation, it
shall be a condition of supervised release that the defendant
pay any such fine or restitution that remains unpaid at the
commencement of the term of supervised release in accor-
dance with the Schedule of Payments set forth in the Crimi-
nal Monetary Penalties sheet of this judgment. The defen-
dant shall report to the probation office in the district to

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85a

which the defendant is released within 72 hours of release
from the custody of the Bureau of Prisons.

The defendant shall not commit another federal, state or local
crime.

The defendant shall not illegally possess a controlled sub-
stance.

The defendant shall comply with the standard conditions that
have been adopted by this court (Probation Form 7a).

The defendant shall also comply with the additional condi-
tions on the attached page (if applicable).

STANDARD CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION

1) the defendant shall not leave the judicial district without
the permission of the court or probation officer, -

2) the defendant shall report to the probation officer and shall
submit a truthful and complete written report within the first
five days of each month;

3) the defendant shall answer truthfully all inquiries by the
probation officer and follow the instructions of the prob. offi-
cer;

4) the defendant shall support his or her dependents and meet
other family responsibilities;

5) the defendant shall work regularly at a lawful occupation
unless excused by the probation officer for schooling, train-
ing, or other acceptable reasons;

6) the defendant shall notify the probation officer at least ten
days prior to any change in residence or employment;

7) the defendant shall refrain from excessive use of alcohol
and shall not purchase, possess, use, distribute, or administer
any controlled substance or any paraphernalia related to any
controlled substances, except as prescribed by a physician;

86a

8) the cefendant shall not frequent places where controlled
substances are illegally sold, used, distributed, or adminis-
tered;

9) the defendant shall not associate with any persons engaged
in criminal activity, and shall not associate with any person
convicted of a felony unless granted permission to do so by
the probation officer; |

10) the defendant shall permit a probation officer to visit him
or her at any time at home or elsewhere and shall permit con-
fiscation of any contraband observed in plain view of the pro-
bation officer;

11) the defendant shall notify the probation officer within
seventy-two hours of being arrested or questioned by a law
enforcement office,

12) the defendant shall not enter into any agreement to act as
an informer or a special agent of a law enforcement agency
without the permission of the court;

13) as directed by the prob. officer, the defendant shall notify
third parties of risks that may be occasioned by the defen-
dant’s criminal record or personal history or characteristics,
and shall permit the probation officer to make such notifica-
tions and to confirm the defendant’s compliance with such
notification requirement.

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te

‘

87a

CRIMINAL MONETARY PENALTIES

The defendant shall pay the following total criminal
monetary penalties in accordance with the schedule of pay-
ments set forth on Sheet 5, Part B.

Assessment’ Fine Restitution
Totals: $2,800.00 $100,000.00 .

* * * * *

88a

SCHEDULE OF PAYMENTS

se. fF 8 2 ©

The defendant will receive credit for all payments previously
made toward any criminal monetary penalties imposed.

() Joint and Several:

() The defendant shall pay the cost of prosecution.

() The defendant shall pay the following court
cost(s):

(X) the defendant shall forfeit the defendant’s interest

in the following property to the United States:

EIGHT HUNDRED THOUSAND AND NO/100
DOLLARS ($800,000.00)

Payments shall be applied in the following order:
(1) assessment; (2) restitution principal; (3) restitution inter-
est, (4) fine principal; (5) community restitution, (6) fine in-
terest (7) penalties, and (8) costs, including cost of prosecu-
tion and court costs.

Wess 9, - iid bi haan. hig ns} ee a PP RETITREY my a inp Lo Bier

89a

APPENDIX F

[Footnote 24 of original panel decision,
deleted on rehearing]

[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
MARCH 21, 2003
THOMAS K. KAHN
‘ CLERK

No. 01-15148

D. C. Docket No. 00-00079-CR-1-RV
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

DAVID HENSON MCNAB,

ROBERT D. BLANDFORD, et al., Defendants-

Appellants.

No. 02-10810

D. C. Docket No. 00-00079-CR-CB
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

90a
versus
ABNER SCHOENWETTER,
ROBERT D. BLANDFORD, Defendants-
Appellants.
No. 02-11264

D. C. Docket No. 00-00079-CR-1-RV

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
DAVID HENSON MCNAB,
ROBERT D. BLANDFORD, et al., Defendants-
Appellants.

Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Alabama

(March 21, 2003)
Before HULL, WILSON and FAY, Circuit Judges.
WILSON, Circuit Judge:

eS €&€ 8 @ @

Thus, we must decide whether we are bound by the Hon-
duran government’s current position regarding the validity of
these laws, or whether we are free to follow the Honduran
government’s original position.”

4 The Executive Branch of the United States government,
represented here by the Department of Justice, has taken the posi-

[Footnote continued on next page]

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[Footnote continued from previous page]

tion that the various Honduran laws in issue are valid and specifi-
cally that under Honduran law the Honduran court’s judgment re-
garding Resolution 030-95 applies only prospectively. The Execu-
tive Branch, in effect, has declined to accept the position of the
Honduran Embassy as determinative as to Honduran law.

There is no authority directing courts making foreign law de-
terminations to hold as determinative declarations made by foreign
embassies as to their laws. Instead, this Court considers the Hon-
duran Embassy’s position as evidence of what the Honduran law is
in conjunction with the other evidence in this case, which conflicts
with the Honduran Embassy’s position. Our Executive Branch’s
decision not to accept as determinative the position of a foreign
embassy on foreign law inevitably touches upon considerations of
foreign policy, which typically involve nonjusticiable “political
questions” committed to the other branches of government. See
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211-12 (1962) (recognizing that
many questions touching foreign relations are political questions);
Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918). Such is the
case here because a judicial decree that the Honduran Embassy’s
position is determinative would place this Court in conflict with
the Executive Branch with respect to the amount of deference due
a foreign government official’s position. See Baker, 369 U.S. at
217 (“Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a po-
litical question is found . . . the impossibility of a court’s undertak-
ing independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect
due coordinate branches of government .. . .”).

92a

APPENDIX G

The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause provides:

No person shall * * * be deprived of life, lib-
erty, or property, without due process of law
* * *

U.S. Const. amend. V.

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Sy ONAL OMEN POE RE RTI SP eT! HOY Ps a Tee TN bey eS

93a

APPENDIX H

TITLE 16—CONSERVATION

CHAPTER 53—CONTROL OF ILLEGALLY TAKEN
FISH AND WILDLIFE

Ss & €&€ &
§ 3372. Prohibited acts
(a) Offenses other than marking offenses
It is unlawful for any person—

(1) to import, export, transport, sell, receive, acquire, or
purchase any fish or wildlife or plant taken, possessed, trans-
ported, or sold in violation of any law, treaty, or regulation of
the United States or in violation of any Indian tnbal law;

(2) to import, export, transport, sell, receive, acquire, or
purchase in interstate or foreign commerce—

(A) any fish or wildlife taken, possessed, transported,
or sold in violation of any law or regulation of any State or in
violation of any foreign law, or

(B) any plant taken, possessed, transported, or sold in
violation of any law or regulation of any State;
(3) within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction
of the United States (as defined in section 7 of title 18)—

(A) to possess any fish or wildlife taken, possessed,
transported, or sold in violation of any law or regulation of
any State or in violation of any foreign law or Indian tribal
law, or

94a

(B) to possess any plant taken, possessed, transported,
or sold in violation of any law or regulation of any State;'

(4) to attempt to commit any act described in paragraphs
(1) through (4).

(b) Marking offenses

It is unlawful for any person to import, export, or trans-
port in interstate commerce any container or package con-
taining any fish or wildlife unless the container or package
has previously been plainly marked, labeled, or tagged in ac-
cordance with the regulations issued pursuant to paragraph
(2) of section 3376(a) of this title.

(c) Sale and purchase of guiding and outfitting services and
invalid licenses and permits

(1) Sale

It is deemed to be a sale of fish or wildlife in viola-
tion of this chapter for a person for money or other consid-
eration to offer or provide—

(A) guiding, outfitting, or other services; or
(B) a hunting or fishing license or permit;

for the illegal taking, acquiring, receiving, transporting, or
possessing of fish or wildlife.

(2) Purchase

It is deemed to be a purchase of fish or wildlife in
violation of this chapter for a person to obtain for money or
other consideration—

1

So in original. Probably should be followed by “or”.

2

(3).

So in original. Probably should refer to pars. (1) through

95a

(A) guiding, outfitting, or other services; or
(B) a hunting or fishing license or permit;

for the illegal taking, acquiring, receiving, transporting, or
possessing of fish or wildlife.

(d) False labeling offenses

It is unlawful for any person to make or submit any false
record, account, or label for, or any false identification of,
any fish, wildlife, or plant which has been, or is intended to
be—

(1) imported, exported, transported, sold, purchased, or
received from any foreign country; or

(2) transported in interstate or foreign commerce.

96a

TITLE 16—CONSERVATION

CHAPTER 53—CONTROL OF ILLEGALLY TAKEN
FISH AND WILDLIFE

* *& &k KF

§ 3373. Penalties and sanctions
(a) Civil penalties

(1) Any person who engages in conduct prohibited by
any provision of this chapter (other than subsections (b) and
(d) of section 3372 of this title) and in the exercise of due
care should know that the fish or wildlife or plants were
taken, possessed, transported, or sold in violation of, or in a
manner unlawful under, any underlying law, treaty, or regu-
lation, and any person who knowingly violates section
3372(d) of this title, may be assessed a civil penalty by the
Secretary of not more than $10,000 for each such violation:
Provided, That when the violation involves fish or wildlife or
plants with a market value of less than $350, and involves
only the transportation, acquisition, or receipt of fish or wild-
life or plants taken or possessed in violation of any law,
treaty, or regulation of the United States, any Indian tribal
law, any foreign law, or any law or regulation of any State,
the penalty assessed shall not exceed the maximum provided
for violation of said law, treaty, or regulation, or $10,000,
whichever is less.

(2) Any person who violates section 3372(b) of this title
may be assessed a civil penalty by the Secretary of not more
than $250. 2

(3) For purposes of paragraphs (1) and (2), any reference
to a provision of this chapter or to a section of this chapter

97a

shall be treated as including any regulation issued to carry
out any such provision or section.

(4) No civil penalty may be assessed under this subsec-
tion unless the person accused of the violation is given notice
and opportunity for a hearing with respect to the violation.
Each violation shall be a separate offense and the offense
shall be deemed to have been committed not only in the dis-
trict where the violation first occurred, but also in any district
in which a person may have taken or been in possession of
the said fish or wildlife or plants.

(5) Any civil penalty assessed under this subsection may
be remitted or mitigated by the Secretary.

(6) In determining the amount of any penalty assessed
pursuant to paragraphs (1) and (2), the Secretary shall take
into account the nature, circumstances, extent, and gravity of
the prohibited act committed, and with respect to the violator,
the degree of culpability, ability to pay, and such other mat-
ters as justice may require.

(b) Hearings

Hearings held during proceedings for the assessment of
civil penalties shall be conducted in accordance with section
554 of title 5. The administrative law judge may issue sub-
penas for the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the
production of relevant papers, books, or documents, and may
administer oaths. Witnesses summoned shall be paid the
same fees and mileage that are paid to witnesses in the courts
of the United States. In case of contumacy or refusal to obey
a subpena issued pursuant to this paragraph and served upon
any person, the district court of the United States for any dis-
trict in which such person is found, resides, or transacts busi-
ness, upon application by the United States and after notice
to such person, shall have jurisdiction to issue an order re-
quiring such person to appear and give testimony before the
administrative law judge or to appear and produce documents

98a

before the administrative law judge, or both, and any failure
to obey such order of the court may be punished by such
court as a contempt thereof.

(c) Review of civil penalty

Any person against whom a civil penalty is assessed un-
der this section may obtain review thereof in the appropriate
District Court of the United States by filing a complaint in
such court within 30 days after the date of such order and by
simultaneously serving a copy of the complaint by certified
mail on the Secretary, the Attorney General, and the appro-
priate United States attorney. The Secretary shall promptly
file in such court a certified copy of the record upon which
such violation was found or such penalty imposed, as pro-
vided in section 2112 of title 28. If any person fails to pay an
assessment of a civil penalty after it has become a final and
unappealable order or after the appropriate court has entered
final judgment in favor of the Secretary, the Secretary may
request the Attorney General of the United States to institute
a civil action in an appropriate district court of the United
States to collect the penalty, and such court shall have juris-
diction to hear and decide any such action. In hearing such
action, the court shall have authority to review the violation
and the assessment of the civil penalty de novo.

(d) Criminal penalties
(1) Any person who—

(A) knowingly imports or exports any fish or wildlife
or plants in violation of any provision of this chapter (other
than subsections (b) and (d) of section 3372 of this title), or

(B) violates any provision of this chapter (other than
subsections (b) and (d) of section 3372 of this title) by know-
ingly engaging in cenduct that involves the sale or purchase
of, the offer of sale or purchase of, or the intent to sell or pur-
chase, fish or wildlife or plants with a market value in excess

of $350,

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2

DPOF DP

Ms. Paz, I’ve handed you what’s been marked as Gov-
ernment’s Exhibit C. Do you recognize those docu-
ments?

Yes.
What are they?

This is a publication of The Gazette. It’s a photocopy of a
publication of The Gazette.

Publication of what?

Here it shows Resolution 001-95.
And what about on the second page?
Resolution 030-95.

And on the last page?

Resolution 031-97.

Once a resolution is published in La Gaceta, what does
that [65] mean as a legal matter in Honduras?

The publication in The Gazette would have the same
meaning as a personal notification or service to the effect
that if someone considers or feels that his or her rights
have been injured, the person can file a petition before
the appropriate authorities, and also for the—for it to be
enforced.

So, does it become effective after publication?
Yes.

Are those three resolutions then, following their publica-
tion in La Gaceta, do they have legally binding force in
Honduras? ;

163a

. Well, yes.

. In addition to the resolutions, the documents you brought,
you said, contained a copy of The Fishing Law. Is that
Decree Number 154 from 1959?

. Yes.

. And the copy that you brought, was that a published La
Gaceta version?

A. Yes.

And that 1959 statute, is that still valid and binding in
Honduras today? :

2

A. Yes, entirely.
THE COURT: What was the date of that, please?
MS. COLBOURN: 1959.
(Brief pause.)

[66]

Q. Ms. Paz, I’ve just handed you what’s been marked as
Government’s Exhibit D. Do you recognize that docu-
ment?

Yes.
What is it?

A. It’s a photocopy of The Gazette in which the decision,
0008-93, is published. It publishes the industrial and
health and hygiene regulations for the protection of fish-
ermen—excuse me, for fishery products.

DP

* * * * *

MS. COLBOURN:
Q. Is this document a regulation under Honduran laws?
[67]

164a

A. Yes. These are Honduran regulations. These are valid
regulations.

* * * * *

[74]
MS. COLBOURN:

Q. Ms. Paz, if I could turn your attention to Article 70, Sub-
section 3, of The Fishing Law.

A. Yes.

Q. Could you explain to the Court what that provision pro-
hibits.
MR. COURTNEY: Judge, we would object to any inter-
pretation. The statute speaks for itself.

MS. COLBOURN: Your Honor, we would agree, but
[75] apparently Mr. Courtney did not when we were speaking
this morning and argued that there is an interpretation issue
as to the term “for profit.” And that’s the issue we would
like to address.

MR. COURTNEY: Well, I don’t think there’s been any
showing, Judge, that this lady from the administrative de-
partment—

THE COURT: Counsel, you’re going to have to raise
your voice. The interpreter is speaking up here, and I’m—I
don’t hear you.

MR. COURTNEY: I’m sorry. Judge, my point is, I
don’t think there’s been a showing that this witness is com-
petent to interpret fishing laws. She obviously has no experi-
ence in the fishing department and in matters of that sort, and
she’s not competent to interpret The Fishing Law.

MS. COLBOURN: Your Honor, she is the highest level
attorney within the Ministry of Livestock and Agriculture,
which is responsible for the fishery management program.

ape PS s 5 eh eek ee aks fll ep TET IS Ot Rea Tere ey eee Relais ee ee ve ~ OR TS ee :
2 phe RR A TO Er eee REFER ee eR abil sea : :

165a

And she has testified that it is part of her job to provide ad-
vice on legal affairs to the Minister of that department. There
is no more qualified official.

THE COURT: All right. She’s also an attorney?
MS. COLBOURN: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. I'll overrule.

MS. COLBOURN:

[76]

Q. Ms. Paz, if you could answer the question, which was:
Could you please explain to the Court what Article 70,
Subsection 3, prohibits?

A. Article 70 speaks of sanctions that are assessed or im-
posed when someone violates these provisions contained
in the Article. And Subsection 3 refers to the whoever
destroys or collects for purposes of profit the eggs, larva
of the fish—okay. There’s a word quelonios, I'll get
back to her. Okay. —turtles or other aquatic species.
The purpose of establishing closed seasons is to protect
the reproduction and maintain the resources—

MR. COURTNEY: Judge, the question was about Num-
ber 3, which is about destroying fish eggs.

MS. COLBOURN: Your Honor, if I could be allowed to
ask the questions and let the witness explain her answers.

THE COURT: All right. I'll consider an objection,
Counsel. I believe the answer that is being provided is not in
answer to the question. I’ll sustain it on that ground. You
may ask the question again, Counsel.

MS. COLBOURN:

Q. Section 70—Article 70, Subsection 3, does that specifi-
cally address closed seasons, or does it address the har-
vest or collection of eggs?

166a

It talks about harvesting or collecting eggs.

Q. You had mentioned that one of the—that Article 3 goes
to [77] the harvest of eggs of fish or other aquatic species.
Would lobster be considered one of the other aquatic spe-
cies covered under that section?

>

>

Yes, of course, yes.

Q. Would this provision prohibit an individual in Hondu-
ras—

INTERPRETER: An individual?

Q. —in Honduras from capturing a lobster that was carrying
eggs and removing the eggs from the lobster?

MR. COURTNEY: Judge, we renew our objection.
She’s not competent.

THE COURT: Is that the—wait one second. Is that the
end of your question?

MS. COLBOURN: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. All mght. Mr. Courtney.

MR. COURTNEY: And Judge, we object to her answer-
ing that. She’s not competent—

THE COURT: All nght. Overruled.

MR. COURTNEY: —to provide that testimony.
MS. COLBOURN:
Q. Ms. Paz, you can go ahead and answer.

A. I wasn’t able to hear it because too many people were
talking at the same time.

Q. I'll repeat the question. Does Subsection 3 of Article 70,
would that prohibit an individual in Honduras from cap-
turing a lobster that had eggs on it and removing the eggs
from the [78] lobster?

Ris Mal daisies Ce lakk es haath hhc asad, bap ee MAI aed iawn cat calcd eae concede etnec cee eee

° ea dnl enna
vseshia HSS ENS REALE PECAN PONTE AEE LIE LE er ee eR

167a

MR. COURTNEY: Same objection.

A. It does prohibit it, because if they picked up a lobster, a

lobster with eggs, they would have to detach them by
handling them.

MS. COLBOURN:

Q. And the collection of lobster in Honduras, is that nor-

A.
Q.

QO >

mally an activity done for profit?
As far as I know, yes.
So, if someone were engaged in activity for profit under

Subsection 3, would that be prohibited under Honduran
law, the activity of capturing the lobster with eggs?

. Yes, of course.

. Ms. Paz, are you familiar with the agreement we spoke

about earlier, 0008-93, promulgated by SENASA?

. SENASA, yes.

What is SENASA?

Okay. It’s a directorate, an independent directorate of the
Secretariat of Agriculture and Livestock. What it means
is national service, national—national service of agricul-
tural health, including—the word “agricultural” in this
case includes plants and animals.

If I could turn your attention back to the Government’s
Exhibit marked A chart. If you could look at point num-
ber seven. I believe it’s on the third page.

[79]

A.
Q.

(Witness complies.)

Is it a correct Honduran—is it a correct statement of
Honduran law to say that it is prohibited under Honduran
law under the agreement we have been discussing to ex-
port lobster without first having it officially inspected for

168a

health and sanitation and processed at an approved estab-
lishment in Honduras?

A. That’s right.

* * * i*

[92]
MS. COLBOURN:

Q. Ms. Paz, I’ve just handed you what’s been marked as
Government’s Exhibit F. Have you seen that document
before?

THE COURT: Mr. Courtney, I’m going to assume that
you have a copy of this document unless you otherwise ad-
vise the Court.

MR. COURTNEY: Yes, sir. We don’t know what it
says, but I’ve got it. °

MS. COLBOURN:
Q. Ms. Paz, have you seen that document before?
A. Yes.

MS. COLBOURN: Again, Your Honor, this document
was obtained yesterday. The difficulty we’ve had is that the
documents we were provided by the Defense Counsel were
given to us on September 7th, the majority of them not trans-
lated into English. We immediately sought expedited trans-
lations, which we started receiving approximately 14 days
later. We were still receiving the last of them the end of last
week. Once we were able to digest them, because I don’t
speak Spanish or read it, we got in contact with the Honduran
officials to ask them questions about the issues that were
raised in these documents. The Honduran officials have re-
acted very quickly, but in order to prepare the documents and
fax them up to explain what was going on, it took a few days.
We got these yesterday, and we are translating them as fast as
we can. We may have this [93] translation by this afternoon,

pee Pern “ a
Se et ols ce aa

Reka Mab peat tent 8:

169a

and we will provide it. We provided copies of the Spanish
language documents as soon as we got them yesterday.

Q.

DP f PY

>

Ms. Paz could you explain to the Court basically, without
reading the whole thing, what that document says? To
start with, who is it from?

. It’s signed by Juan Arnaldo Hernandez Espinoza, the As-

sistant General Prosecutor, or in that capacity. He’s—he
is an attorney.

What is his relationship, if you know, professionally to
the Fiscalia Especial para la Defensa de la Constitucion?
I’m sorry, and this would be specifically Department of
Islas de la Bahia, Department of the Islas de la Bahia.

Le me—I’m sorry, you’re looking confused. Let me re-
phrase this.

(Brief pause.)

Ms. Paz, the black binder I’ve just handed you is a copy
of documents submitted by the Defense Counsel in this
case on September 7th. Could you turn your attention to
the document that’s at tab number four of that folder?

(Witness complies.)
Who is that document signed by?
From the public prosecutor’s office.

What is the relationship of the individual who signed that
document with the gentleman who signed Government
Exhibit F [94] that I put before you?

This is a higher organization than this organization here.
The Special Prosecutor’s Office for the Defense of the
Constitution is subordinate to this other agency.

And that other agency or the individual who signed Ex-
hibit F, could you explain, just paraphrasing, what he
says in Exhibit F for the Court?

A.

Q.

170a

He refers to about the legality or the effectiveness or
the—whether these—in other words, whether these reso-
lutions are legal, valid, or void.

And what does he conclude regarding the ongoing valid-
ity of those resolutions in Honduras?

He says that these resolutions were issued under Article 5
of The Fishing Law. He said that these resolutions be-
came mandatory by virtue of their publication in The Ga-
zette. A substantial part of them talks about the way in
which these resolutions were issued or what they came to
regulate, saying that in the Law of Administrative Proce-
dures, it says that any defect in form would only deter-
mine whether or not the—the act or action was voidable
or not when it lacks the formal required—the formal re-
quirements—the indispensable formal requirements to
achieve their end or does not allow the parties to defend
themselves.

Does he provide a final conclusion as to the current valid-
ity of those resolutions in Honduras?

[95]

A.

>

>

Yes, that they are valid, because to invalidate them, a
procedure or proceeding would have to be conducted.

. And I’m guessing that it has not been conducted; is that

what you’re—
No.

In addition to the document that you just looked at at tab
number four in the Defendant’s documents, have you had
a chance to review the other documents filed by Defen-
dant McNab?

Yes.

Could you tell the Court your opinion of the conclusions
generally of those documents.

17la

A. These are opinions, legal opinions from some authorities
of the country as to whether these resolutions are laws or
constitute laws or regulations, whether or not they’re null
and void. And all of them give the opinion that this is not
a law nor regulations and that they are null and void.

My opinion is that they are not laws or regulations be-
cause they do not have the form that would be required
for them to be such. But in the absence of regulations,
the Secretariat has implemented this form for a long time
as an instrument to enforce The Fishing Law without go-
ing beyond the parameters set down by the law. And if
they say that they’re void, for them to be declared null
and void, a procedure would_have to be followed, and the
person who deemed himself affected by one of these
resolutions would have filed the appropriate appeal with
[96] the—or the entity having jurisdiction. And to date,
this has not happened.

* * * * *
[98]
MS. COLBOURN:

Q. Ms. Paz, one final question just to conclude. Resolution
001-95, 030-95, and 031-97, are they currently valid and
binding legal requirements in the country of Honduras?

A. Yes.
* * * * *
[101]
CROSS EXAMINATION
BY MR. COURTNEY:

* * * * *

[112]

Q.

172a

Well, when Ms. Colbourn was asking you questions, you
read from Mr. Hernandez’ letter and suggested to the
Court that Mr. Hernandez was suggesting that there could
be a suit filed in Honduras to declare the resolutions void.
Does that help you?

I know that there is an ex officio review of administrative
actions. And there’s also a procedure to void or render
null and void for any statement or any declaration,
whether it’s properly issued or indirectly issued.

Could that take two years?

[113]

MS. COLBOURN: Your Honor, if she could be permit-

ted to finish her answer?

THE COURT: Let her finish the question first.
MR. COURTNEY: I’m sorry.

But we start out on the basis of the legitimacy of the ac-
tions by the Public Administration. And they are valid as
long as someone does not initiate or bring a suit or initi-
ate a proceeding to have them declared invalid or null and
void.

How long would such a proceeding take, possibly two
years?

No. One advantage of the administrative procedure is
that it’s a very fast procedure. There are deadlines im-
posed by law to file a complaint. The deadlines, starting
from the publication data, the time period begins to run.
To date, no one has filed a complaint, neither the gov-
ernment attorney nor a private party.

Well, let me ask you then, if the government attorney was
to file a complaint or if a citizen was to file a complaint,
would the Defender of the Republic be the—be the gov-
ernment attorney in that case?

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173a

INTERPRETER: Okay. Excuse me, the first—if a pri-
vate party or a?

MR. COURTNEY: If a private party filed such a case,
would the Defender of the Republic be the attorney on the
other side?

A. The government attorney is the lugal representative of the
[114] state—of the government. However, the govern-
ment attorney would replace the attorney from any one of
the secretariats. In this case, it would be the Secretariat
of Agriculture and Livestock. Before a legal trial is insti-
tuted or initiated, the administrative recourse—
administrative recourse has to be exhausted.

* * * * *
[126]

THE COURT: All night. I think the witness can come
down. All right. Mr. Briskman, call your expert out of turn.

MR. BRISKMAN: Saul Litvinoff.
THE COURT: Thank you, ma’am. Thank you.
THE WITNESS: (In English:) You’re welcome.
(Brief pause.)
| SAUL LITVINOFF,
having first been sworn, testified as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. BRISKMAN:
Q. Would you state your name to the Court, please.
A. My name is Saul Litvinoff.
Q. And where do you live, Mr.—Professor Litvinoff?
A. My domicile is in the City of Baton Rouge, Louisiana.

Q. And what is your occupation, please, sir?

174a

[127]

A. I’m a Professor of Law at the Law Center of the Louisi-

DP OPA PA

ana Law University.

And how long have you held that position?
For 39 years.

You were born where, please, sir?

In Buenos Aires, Argentina.

And do you speak Spanish fluently?

I do.

Do you speak—are you fluent in any other languages be-
sides Spanish and, obviously, English?

French, German, Italian, Latin, classical Greek, and some
English.

Professor Litvinoff, beginning with your college degrees,
would you tell the Court where you obtained degrees in
various universities—

THE COURT: Counsel, how about just saying where

he’s going. I’m not going to take much more time with this.
If you don’t get to the meat of it, we’re going to continue it
over until tomorrow.

MR. BRISKMAN: Well, I will be very direct, Your

Honor.

THE COURT: All right. You set out, and he can say yes

or no.
MR. BRISKMAN:

Q. Did you receive an LL.B. from the University of Buenos

[128] Aires in 1949?

A. Correct.

Gaunt enleie ae uaeaAaebacusinumaeee ee de orn

>

175a

Did you receive a Master of Law from Yale University in
1964?

Correct.

Q. Have you received various honors relative to your legal

QO >

>

practice, including the Order of the Coif, the Rivers
Award for outstanding contributions to Louisiana studies,
were you awarded The Center for Louisiana Studies at
the University of Southwestern Louisiana (sic)?

Correct.

Have you received various declarations from France, Ar-
gentina, as well as Honduras?

Correct.

Q. Are you a member of the Louisiana Bar, the—or the State

Law Institute, the Argentine Bar, the Costa Rican Bar,
and the Honduran Bar, both honorary members for Costa
Rico and Honduras?

A. Correct.

Q. Have you practiced law from 1959 to 1962 in Buenos
Aires, and then additionally from 1954 and 1959 in Bue-
nos Aires?

A. That is correct.

Q. Have you held academic positions at LSU from 1965 to
the present?

A. That is correct.

[129]

Q. Have you also held academic positions at the University
of Puerto Rico and as a visiting law professor at the
Catholic University in Belgium?

A. At the City of Louvain in Belgium, that is correct.

176a

Q. And you were a visiting professor at the University of
Puerto Rico; is that nght?

A. Correct.

THE COURT: Counsel, we’re going to give you 30
minutes to examine the witness, and you can use it as you
choose.

MR. BRISKMAN: Your Honor, I would offer as exhibit
to the Court the resume of Professor Litvinoff.

MR. MURTHA: No objection, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All nght.
(Brief pause.)

MR. BRISKMAN:

Q. Professor Litvinoff, at my request, did you have an op-
portunity to review various documents which included
resolutions of the country of Honduras?

Yes.

Q. Did you review those resolutions, Resolution Number
003, 1980, and Resolution Number 30 of 1995, of Hon-
duras?

>

>

I have.

Q. Were you asked to review those as to whether or not they
constituted—did you also have an opportunity to review
the [130] indictment, the supplemental indictment that
was—superseding indictment that was filed in this Court
against Mr. McNab and others?

I have.

QD P

Did you review in conjunction therewith the various
regulations and articles of Honduran law that Mr. McNab
and others were allegedly charged with violating or
charged with allegedly violating?

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177a

I have.

All right. Did you reach conclusions relative to the Hon-
duran law cited in that indictment, including various reso-
lutions?

I have reached conclusions concerning the resolutions.

All night. And what is your opinion concerning those
resolutions?

That those so-called resolutions attempt to be regulations.
Actually, a resolution is an order similar to a judicial de-
cision that puts an end to a dispute, a particular dispute.
What those resolutions attempt actually to be are regula-
tions implementing the application of a particular statute.

Were the resolutions that you reviewed, did it have any
kind of regulatory force, in your opinion?

In my opinion, they lack regulatory force because they
are not regulations issued in the proper manner according
to the Honduran constitutional procedure and according
to the Honduran [131] law of organization of the admini-
stration and according to the Honduran law of administra-
tive procedure.

And what did you base your conclusions on, Professor?

That a regulation that implements the application of a
particular statute must be issued by the president of the
republic, whose firm—well, let me term a different
phrase—must be co-signed by the pertinent minister with
notice to the attorney general of the republic, and finally,
published in La Gaceta.

Did the resolutions that you reviewed meet those re-
quirements?

The resolutions I reviewed do not meet those require-
ments.

And as such, do they constitute Honduran law or not?

2

178a

In my opinion, as such, those acts are stricken with abso-
lute nullity.

Are you familiar with the Honduran Constitution?
I am.

Were you familiar with the Honduran Constitution before
I engaged your services?

I have.

And did you review these purported resolutions or regula-
tions in conjunction with the Honduran Constitution?

I saw that.

And what—does the Constitution provide a procedure for
the enactment of Honduran law?

[132]

A.

‘OO >}

According to the Constitution, Articles 3 and 21, if I re-
member properly, the enactment of statutes is the su-
preme contribution of the legislative power. Now, later
articles, and if I recall properly, 245 and 248, entitle the
president to implement the application of those statutes or
laws through regulations issued by him.

Were these documents that you reviewed that purported
to be Honduran law, did they meet the requirement to
even be a resolution?

. They don’t.
. And why is that?

. Excuse me, have you asked whether they meet the re-

quirements to be a resolution?

. Do they meet the requirements to be regarded as a regula-

tion?

To my mind, they don’t.

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179a

Q. And why is that, please, sir?
A. In the first place, the way in which they have been la-

beled. In the second, the lack of a signature of the proper
authorities to issue a valid regulation.

* * * *

[135]
Q.

Professor, the resolutions that you reviewed contained in
the superseding indictment, are they void or voidable?

. To my—they are void, that it’s absolutely void.
. And do they or do they not constitute Honduran law, be-

ing void?

Void acts do not constitute valid law.

. Did you review the various opinions that were submitted

by the Defense, including the advisory opinion of the At-
torney General of Honduras?

. Lhave.

The opinion of the special ad hoc commission appointed
by the Honduran Bar Association?

I have.

Did you also review the opinion of the Defender of the
Constitution?

I have reviewed that opinion.

And various opinions by Attorneys Dionisio Matute and
Dr. Silva?

That is correct.

And do you concur—did you also review the Supreme
Court [136] opinion, Supreme Court of Honduras?

I have.

180a

Q. And do you concur in what you have reviewed of those
writings?

A. To my mind, the conclusions contained in those state-
ments are perfectly correct.

* * * *
[137]
CROSS EXAMINATION
BY MR. MURTHA:
* * * *
[143]

Q. Very well, sir. And you are aware that the size, the mini-
mum size limitation on Honduran lobster was set forth in
a resolution that was published in La Gaceta?

>

That resolution was published, yes.

Q. And you are aware that there is a legal mechanism for
challenging that resolution if somebody so desired?
A. Iam.

* * * * *

[149]

THE COURT: All right, sir. Let me ask you a few ques-
tions, please. You are aware, I take it, that Honduras has
resolutions that you have reviewed that affect or attempt to
affect the fishing industry; is that correct?

THE WITNESS: I have, yes.
THE COURT: All right. And who are those resolutions
prepared by?

THE WITNESS: I have seen some prepared by secretar-
ies general of a particular ministry or department or the head
of a particular agency. :

18la

THE COURT: All right, sir. Is that part of the executive
department?

THE WITNESS: Those agencies or ministries, yes, they
are, they are part of the executive power, Judge, yeah.

THE COURT: All night, sir. And you are saying that it
is your opinion that notwithstanding the fact that the [150]
executive department had passed these resolutions, that they
have not complied with Honduran law, which would make
those resolutions applicable to individuals who are covered
by Honduran law; is that correct?

THE WITNESS: That is correct, Judge. According to
Articles 245 and 248 of the Honduran Constitution, it says
regulations to be valid should be issued by the President of
the Republic, his signature—well, it should be co-signed by
the pertinent minister, that the regulations should be advice to
the Attorney General—

THE COURT: And that’s what I have. And it’s your po-
sition that these all resolutions, to be effective, must be is-
sued by the President of the Republic?

THE WITNESS: Correct.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you, sir. That’s all I
have.

* * * *

182a

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF CRIMINAL NO.
AMERICA, 00-0079
VS. SEPTEMBER 28, 2000
COURTROOM 2B
DAVID HENSON McNAB, U.S. FEDERAL

ROBERT BLANDFORD, AB- COURTHOUSE
NER SCHOENWETTER, and MOBILE, ALABAMA
DIANE HUANG,

Defendants.
VOLUME II

CONTINUATION OF THE MOTION HEARING

BEFORE THE HON. RICHARD W. VOLLMER, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
* * * xX *

[196] :
MS. COLBOURN: We would call as the last witness i
Special Agent Paul Raymond. :
SPECIAL AGENT PAUL WILLIAM RAYMOND, :

having first been sworn, testified as follows:

* * * * *

[216]
CROSS EXAMINATION
BY MR. COURTNEY:

* * * *

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sexes diy Sheahan ish eames adeeb es, :

fe ga pees kT LSA aah IS ia oe OD

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SEERA NEES SESE AE

ODS EAR EA a NG =

183a

[221]

Q.

2)

>

A.

Now, you mentioned to the Court that what started all of

this was an anonymous fax that your office received, cor-
rect?

. Yes, that’s correct.

. And that’s what kicked off your checking the Caribbean

Dream Company’s cargo on the Caribbean Clipper in
Bayou La Batre in February of ’99?

. Correct.

. And that anonymous fax said that there were 30 percent

undersized lobsters on the boat, didn’t it?

. I think it did say that.

. And then the case was resolved, and y’all did some pack-

ing down in Florida, and you found about three percent
undersized lobster on the shipment, didn’t you?

Are you referring to by weight?
Yes, sir.

I don’t recall. It’s a couple thousand pounds. I don’t re-
call the percentage—

We calculated it. It’s approximately three-and-a-half
percent, is it not, or do you disagree with that?

MS. COLBOURN: Your Honor, he’s testifying.
I’ve never calculated the percent.
THE COURT: All nght. Counsel, you can offer your

[222] evidence later. Don’t testify.
MR. COURTNEY:

Q.

A.

How many pounds of undersized lobster did you find in
the 70,000-pound shipment?

Several thousand pounds.

184a

Q. A couple?
A. We seized the 70,000 pounds of egg-bearing and under-
sized.

Q. Agent, I was asking you about undersize. We’re trying to
get percent here. How many pounds of undersized lob-
ster did you find?

THE COURT: Counsel, let him answer the question.
We’ll understand what he’s saying.

_A. I’d have to look at my notes to see exactly how many un-
dersized pounds there were. Several thousand.

Q. Was it approximately three or four percent?

MS. COLBOURN: Objection, Your Honor, asked and
answered.

THE COURT: Well, if he can estimate the three, the
several thousand, he may. If he can’t, it’s not necessary.

A. I recollect that there were about a total of 7,000 total
pounds that was seized, combination of egg-bearing fe-
males and undersized tails.

Do you recall what the percentage of undersized tails
alone [223] was?

The percentage?

2

Or the number of pounds.
By weight?
By weight.

It would be somewhere around two or 3,000 pounds di-
vided by 70,000 pounds.

So, if it’s 2,000 pounds, it would be about three percent?
I’ll — I agree with you on the math.

* * * KX *

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185a

[242]
EFRAIN MONCADA SILVA,

having first been sworn through the interpreter, testified as
follows:

* * * * X
[244]
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. COURTNEY:
Q. Would you state your name for the Court.
A. (Witness answers in Spanish.)
Q. And where do you reside?

THE REPORTER: Excuse me, excuse me. I need to
get—

THE COURT: Wait. I didn’t hear the name.

INTERPRETER: Would you—(speaking in Spanish)}—
cite the name for the Court. And he just mentioned his name.

THE COURT: What is his name?

INTERPRETER: Efrain Moncada Silva.

THE COURT: Could you spell that, please?
INTERPRETER: Yes. E-f-r-a-i-n, Moncada, M-o-n-c-a-

da, Silva, S-i-l-v-a.

MR. COURTNEY:

[245]

Q. And your date of birth, please, sir?
A. February 14th, 1933.

Q. And how long have you been a licensed attorney, Profes-
sor Silva?

186a

A. 40 years.
Q. And have you practiced law in Honduras?
A. Yes.

MR. COURTNEY: Judge, if I could, his curriculum vi-
tae is part of Exhibit Seven. With the Court’s indulgence, I'll
just hit the high points and perhaps save us some time.

THE COURT: All nght. If you will, just state them all.
If you would, you said he’s a licensed attorney, but you did
not say where.

MR. COURTNEY:

Q. Are you a licensed attorney in Honduras, Professor?
A. Yes.

Q. And other countries?

A. No.

MR. COURTNEY: Judge, the curriculum vitae reflects
that Professor Silva received a Doctorate of Law in Buenos
Aires in 1973, and that he has been a full-time professor at
the Faculty of Law and Social Sciences at the University of
Honduras, and that he teaches administrative law, constitu-
tional law, administrative procedures, administrative legisla-
tion, advanced administrative law. [246]

He has held a number of important positions within the
Government of Honduras. He’s been the Advisor of the
Board of Directors of the Institute of Social Security, the Ad-
visor to the Ministry of Communications, Public Works and
Transport. He’s been a judicial consultant. He’s been a legal
advisor to the National Enterprise of Electric Energy. He’s
an advisor of the National Congress. He’s an advisor of—
he’s been an advisor of the Secretary of Treasury. He has
been a Minister of Governing and Justice in the Republic of
Honduras.

187a

He has published—he is a member of a number of pro-
fessional organizations, including the Bar Association of
Honduras, Inter-American Lawyers Federation, et cetera, as
referenced at paragraph 11.

He’s received a page full of distinguishments itemized at
article 12. He has published a page-and-a-half of articles
concerning various aspects of Honduran law.

THE COURT: Including constitutional law?
MR. COURTNEY: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Very good. Thank you.

* * * * *

[248]
MR. COURTNEY:

Q. Professor Silva, were you requested to provide a legal
opinion regarding certain of the laws and/or resolutions
referenced in the indictment?

Yes.

Q. And at the time, did you understand from reviewing the
indictment that those were Resolutions 003-80 and 030-
95 which addressed size limits of eggbearing lobster
and/or closed season?

ae ag si ge Matto a taba hota tear H ON? agit eis
Se fee CNEL NE as Pe ec foal a ad aca sa intial
SELLE OPEN ee Te on s :

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INTERPRETER: Could you repeat that? Let me go
slowly.

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Q. I’m sorry. From your review of the indictment, did you
understand that the laws that Mr. McNab was charged
with violating—

INTERPRETER: Go back one more.

Q. That the laws that Mr. McNab was charged with violating
were—included Resolution 003-1980 and 030-1995?

A. Yes.

188a

Q. While sitting in this proceeding, have you also heard
from the Government that they are contending that Reso-
lutions 001-95 and 031-97 have been violated?

INTERPRETER: Okay. Go back again. :

While attending this proceeding, have you also learned
that the Govérnment is contending that Mr. McNab vio-
lated [249] Resolutions 001-1995 and 031-1997?

Yes, he has.

Have you reviewed those resolutions as well?

©

(No audible response.)

Do the—

THE COURT: Counsel, I’m not getting the answer.
A. Yes.

THE COURT: You’re going to have to tell—when he
says yes, even if he shakes his head, I’m not watching him,
I’m listening to you. So, you have to speak up. Thank you.

INTERPRETER: Okay. Yes, I will.
MR. COURTNEY:

Q. And do the opinions expressed in your letter opinion ap-
ply equally to Resolutions 001-95 and 031-97?

INTERPRETER: Please repeat.
Q. Do the opinions set forth—
THE COURT: Did he say yes?

INTERPRETER: No, no. I have to ask him to repeat
twice because he’s asking and going too long with sentences.

MR. COURTNEY:

Q. Do the opinions contained in your legal opinion apply
equally to Resolutions 001-95 and 031-97?

Dr >

189a

A. Yes. They have the same accusation—the same weak-
nesses. Yes, because they have the same weakness.
Thank you.

Q. Okay. Let’s refer to question one in your legal opinion.
[250]
INTERPRETER: Let’s—

Q. Refer to paragraph one of the legal opinion. It states that
the—the first question is whether the referenced resolu-
tions have the character of law.

INTERPRETER: Repeat that again, please.
Q. The question is whether the referenced resolutions—
INTERPRETER: Stop there.
Q. —have the character of Honduran law.
A. No, it doesn’t have the character of law.
*x* * * * x
[251]
MR. COURTNEY:

Q. ‘nd then question number two, Professor Silva, was
whether the resolutions constitute regulations or regula-
mento under Honduran law?

INTERPRETER: Repeat that, please.
Q. Question number two is whether the resolutions—
[252]

INTERPRETER: Go ahead.

Q. —constitute regulations or regulamento. And is your
conclusion or opinion in that segue stated at Subpara-
graphs A and B?

INTERPRETER: Could you repeat that last resolution?

190a

MR. COURTNEY:

Q. Subparagraphs A and B. Please read your opinion at
Paragraphs A and B about whether they constitute resolu-
tions or not.

A. Letter A: “Since they have not been issued by the Presi-
dent of the Republic, we went against this established in
the Article 245, Attribution Number 11, of the Constitu-
tion of the country.”

And then read Paragraph B.

A. “Upon not accepting the form of the agreement, the legal
dispositions were broken that we have quoted in the Code
of Administrative Procedures of 1930.”

* * * * *

2

[254]

Q. Professor Silva, question three says if they do not have
the character of either law or regulation, do Resolutions
003 of 31 March 1980 and 030-95 have legal effect.

* * * * *

[255]

MR. COURTNEY:

Q. Question three. Okay. Read him question three.
(Interpreter complies.) |

A. The resolutions do not have the legal effect.

* * * * *

[257]

Q. Professor Silva, please explain to Judge Vollmer why you
are of the opinion that the resolutions involved in this
case have no legal effect in Honduras?

MMAMGRE AA wee oaks ptt tei ie ey na ten Ghee c.

Se ae a ie tt ga ee eee ATR EEEY tet oe eae vee

ERP WOES

19la

A. Gladly. First of all, because they have—the defect of in-
competency because the power of regulation in Honduras
only belongs to the President of the Republic and not the
Secretary of State or the Ministers, if you want—State
Ministers. Then the Minister has appropriated powers
that belong to the President of the Republic that are in the
Constitution.

‘ ey tsa we Te “
sera SHEN REN

And we in Honduras in Article 315 of the Constitution,
we have a mechanism of automatic supremacy of the
Constitution. What it says, when there is incompatibility
between the Constitution and the law or any subordinated
norm, the Constitution prevails. What it means, that any
law or regulation that is against the Constitution, no pub-
lic authority can apply those rules. And it would incur—
oh, it [258] would incur in responsibility for them.

Besides, Article 321 in the Constitution established that
the bureaucrats of the State do not, do not have any
power attribution than the one established by the law, and
any action executed at the—outside the law is null and
implies responsibility.

4
%

OE ORR OE se ne i Pai

Re ORT NC Ps PN cae or
ANGI Trace Uy

os Ba SE ORI AAET SIE eS

When the Minister appropriate the power of regulation
attributed by the Constitution in the Article 245, Section
11, ring forth in Article 248, they have appropriated a
power that they do not have and the Constitution has
been violated. The Secretary of States or the Minister—
State Ministers, according to the General Law of the Ad-
ministration, Article 36, Section 6, can only be enacted—
can only enact actions related—instruments related to
the—with the internal administration of the office, and no
regulations or—that has to do with individuals, with third
parties in general.

* * * * *

192a

[261]
[By Mr. Courtney:]

Q. Okay. Have you reviewed the opinion of the Defender of
the Republic?

INTERPRETER: Could you repeat that, please?

Q. Defender of the Republic. Has he reviewed the opinion
of the Defender of the Republic?

Yes.
Who is the Defender of the Republic?

A. The Attorney General of the Republic is the re

[Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.]

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386015_2330%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
