# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Gaines v. White River Environmental Partnership

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 2003
- **Citation:** 540 U.S. 881

## Text

dupmme Gout, US.
(r) FILE®
03 205 Jul 29 2003
———OFFIGE—OF THE-CLERK

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

LOUIS F. GAINES,
Plaintiff - Petitioner

V.

WHITE RIVER ENVIRONMENTAL
PARTNERSHIP, Et Al.,
Defendants - Respondents

Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari
To The United States Court Of Appeals
For The Seventh Circuit

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Louis F. Gaines, Pro Se
5337 North College Avenue
Indianapolis, IN 46220 - 3141
317 -- 283 - 4821

annenne eae P

PRT RIS Fee
— ae ee
Ne ow

QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW

1. For EEOC Charge #240-A1-0803: Since Pro
Se Plaintiff: (1) timely opposed the Defendants’
unlawful Age & Race discrimination in employ-
ment; and, (2) immediately received a "Hostile
Reply" from the Defendants, who "Silenced" him
- was the Plaintiff required to subject himself to
additional discrimination, humiliation, retaliation,
and/or threats - in order to qualify for judicial
relief? See PP. 5 - 6.

2. For EEOC Charge #240-A1-0879: (1) charge
was filed against the Defendants on January 29,
2K01; (2) for the "Date Discrimination Took
Place," Pro Se Plaintiff listed "12/26/2000" and
"1/11/2001; (3) the District Court overlooked this
charge in its review; and, (4) the Seventh Court
determined that the above charge was untimely
filed. If Pro Se Plaintiff has been denied due
process, and/or equal protection of the law, then
what relief is due? See PP. 7-8.

3. For EEOC Charge #240-A1-1110: (1) on
January 22, 2K01, EEOC Charge #240-A1-0803
was filed; (2) on January 25, 2K01, the
Defendants suddenly required the Operations
Specialists to perform large scale, and long term
"Union duty: cleaning primarily;" (3) the Plain-
tiff, however, was required to do more than his
fair share of cleaning, and to document such
cleaning, unlike others; and, (4) the Lower Courts
determined that the Plaintiff has not suffered any
adverse treatment. If the Plaintiff has been
denied due process and/or equal protection of the
law, then what relief is due? See P. 8.

4. For EEOC Charge #240-99-1616: (1) in 1999,
the Defendants were the first to file a summary
judgment motion against Pro Se Plaintiff; (2) he
was not allowed to amend his Complaint on any
authority, or under any circumstance; (3) in 2K01,
Pro Se Plaintiff was the first to file a summary
judgment motion; (4) afterwards, the Defendants
filed two motions to amend, and they were
granted; and (5), the Defendants were then grant-
ed a favorable summary judgment, which was
partially influenced by one or both amended
motions. If the Plaintiff has been denied due
process, and/or equal protection of the law, then
what relief is due? See P. 9.

5. Reference the "Doctrine of Continuing Vio-
lation:" (1) between the period of December 1,
1999 and June 1, 2K03; Pro Se Plaintiff has filed
five unlawful discrimination in employment suits
against the Defendants; (2) such suits were
provoked by the Defendants, and Pro Se Plaintiff's
attempt to defend or protect his civil and con-
stitutional rights; (3) the Lower Courts have de-
termined that some complaints were untimely
filed; and, (4) the Lower Courts have consistently
denied all relief. If the Lower Courts have er-
roneously withheld the protection of the "Doc-
trine of Continuing Violation" from Pro Se Plain-
tiff - then what relief is due? See P. 16,

6. Reference the Plaintiff's on-the-job, "Irre-
parable Injury" that the Defendants caused him to
willfully suffer during "Discovery," in 1999.
What relief, if any, is the Plaintiff due? See
PP. 3-5.

7. What other relief is the Plaintiff due?

li.

ae

| LIST OF PARTIES

1. LOUIS F. GAINES, Petitioner
5337 North College Avenue
Indianapolis, IN 46220-3141

2. WHITE RIVER ENVIRONMENTAL PART-
NERSHIP, Et. Al., Respondent
; 2700 South Belmont Avenue
Indianapolis, IN 46221

3. IWC RESOURCES CORPORATION,
Managing Partner, and Respondent
1220 Waterway Boulevard
Indianapolis, IN 46206

4. SUEZ, Partner, and Respondent
16 Rue De La Ville Leveque
75383 Paris Cedex 08
France

5. UNITED WATER SERVICES, Inc.,
Partner, and Respondent

200 Old Hook Road

Harrington Park, NJ 07640

lii.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SUBJECT PAGE

QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW
LIST OF PARTIES
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CITATION OF OPINIONS & REPORTS
CONSTITUTION & OTHER AUTHORITY
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Jurisdiction of Lower Courts

Material Facts To Consider
ARGUMENT

Summary

Conclusion

APPENDIX

iv.

iii.

p—

2.

a ee ee ee ee

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
SUBJECT PAGE
ANDERSON v. LIBERTY LOBBY

INC. 106 S.Ct. 2505; 1986 11.

CURTIS 1000, INC. v. SUESS,
24 F.3d 941 (7th Cir. 1994) 20.

FILIPOVIC v. K & R EXPRESS
SYSTEMS, INC., 176 F.3d 390, 391
(7th Cir. 1999) 16.

GILBERT v. HOMAR, 138 L.Ed 2d
120, 121; 1997 11.

HARRIS v. FORKLIFT SYSTEMS, INC.,
126 L.Ed 2d 295; 1993 12.

KOLSTAD v. AMERICAN DENTAL
ASS'N, 119 S. Ct. 2118, 2119; 1999 20.

LUJAN v. DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE,
112, S. Ct. 2130, 2131; 1992 19.

McCORMICK v. CITY OF CHICAGO,
390 F.3d 319 (7th Cir. 2000) 15.

McDONNELL DOUGLAS CORP. v.
GREEN, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1818; 1973 14.

O'CONNOR v. CONSOLIDATED COIN
CATERERS CORP., 134 L. Ed 2d
433; 1998 le

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION:

Fifth Amendment: PP. 10, 12 15,17 & 19.
Eighth Amendment: PP. 2,12 & 19.
Thirteenth Amendment: PP. 2, 12 & 19.

TITLE 28 U.S.C.
§ 1254, P. 1.
§ 1291, P. 3.
§ 1331, P. 2.
§ 1332, P. 2.
§ 1343(a), P. 2.

TITLE 29 U.S.C.
§ 623(a), P. 2.
§ 623(d), P. 2 & 14.
§ 659, P. 2.
$ 660, P. 2.
§ 666, P. 2.

vi.

:
4
.

TITLE U.S. C.

§ 1391(b), P. 2.

§ 1981, PP. 2, 11, 12, 15, 17 & 19.
| § 1981(c), PP. 11 & 12.

§ 1983, P. 2.

§ 2000e-2(a), PP. 2 & 12.

$ 2000e-2(k)(c)(2), PP. 2 & 12.

§ 2000e-2(m), P. 2.

SP LOI MIE” ne Pa Rts gt -

§ 2000e-3(a), PP. 2, 12 & 19.
§$ 2000e-5, P. 2.

FEDERAL RULES OF:

Appellate Procedure, Rule 35, PP. 2 & 17.

Civil Procedure, Rule 56, PP. 2, 11, 12,
| 15,17 & 19.

Evidence, Rule 406, PP. 2 & 21.

vii.

aera aaa

CITATION OF OPINIONS OR REPORTS
LOUIS F. GAINES v. WHITE RIVER ENVIRON-
MENTAL PARTNERSHIP, Et Al.:

530 U.S. 1230; 120 S. Ct. 2661; 147 L. Ed. 2d
275; June 12, 2000.

534 U.S. 952; 122 S. Ct. 349; 151 L. Ed. 2d
263; October 9, 2001.

| 202 F.3d 272; January 3, 2000.
248 F.3d 1157; March 23, 2001

No. 02-3849, April 4, 2003; see Appendix A.
| IP-01-1158-H/K, September 30, 2002; Ibid., B.
No. 023849, May 12, 2003; Ibid., C.

| IP 98-1741-C-M/S, August 19, 1999, and Octo-
) ber 25, 1999; 00-3802, March 23, 2001, and May
| 17, 2001; Ibid,. D

JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT

One, the "Order" of the Seventh Court was
entered on April 4, 2K03. See Appendix A., P. 1.
Two, Rule 11 does not apply. Three, the Petition
for a Rehearing was denied on May 12, 2K03.
Ibid., B., P. 29. Finally, this matter comes to the
Supreme Court on the authority of Title 28,
U.S.C., § 1254.

ee a a ee

CONSTITUTION & OTHER AUTHORITY

United States Constitution: the Fifth, Eighth,
and Thirteenth Amendments. See Appendix E,
Page 43.

Title 29, U.S.C., 8§ 623(a) & 623(d). Ibid.

Title 42, U.S.C., §§ 1981, 2000e-2(a), 2000e-
2(k)(c)(2), 2000e-2(m), and 2000e-3(a). Ibid.,
PP. 44-5.

Federal Rules of: (1) Appellate Procedure, Rule
35; (2) Civil Procedure, Rule 56; and, (3)
Evidence, Rule 406 - Ibid., PP. 45-7.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Jurisdiction Of The Lower Courts:

1. This case of unlawful discrimination in
employment was timely brought to the United
States District Court, Southern District of Indiana,
at Indianapolis; on August 9, 2K01. Jurisdiction,
however, was based on the following authority:
(1) Title 28, U.S.C., §§ 1331, 1332 & 1343(a); (2)
Title 29, U.S.C., §§ 626(c), 626(d), 659, 660, and
666; (3) Title 42, U.S.C., §§ 1391(b), 1981, 1983,
and 2000e-5; and, (4) the United States Consti-
tution, First, Fifth, Eighth, and Thirteenth Amend-
ments.

2. On September 30, 2K02, the District Court
2.

PIES BE DON SERIE BAA RAL TOOT ge Set EB

entered a summary judgment for the Defendants.
On October 25, 2K02, the case was timely
appealed to the Seventh Court, and on the
authority of Title 28, U.S.C., § 1291.

Material Facts To Consider:
Motions to amend, and summary judgments:

1. On October 2, 2K02, Pro Se Plaintiff
filed a summary judgment motion, with all the
supporting documents. See Appellant's Brief,
Appendix: "Docket Sheet,” P. 37, Items #14-18.

2. On February 13, 2K02, the Defendants
filed a motion to amend their "Answer." Ibid.,
#35. On September 30, 2K02, the District Court
granted the Defendants' motion to amend. Ibid.,
P. 40, #83. Also see current Appendix B, P.
13., 978.

3. On March 8, 2K02, the Defendants'
motion for summary judgment was filed. Ap-
pellant's Brief, Appendix, P. 38, Items #52-56.

4. On April 1, 2K02, the Defendants filed a
motion to correct their defective affidavits. Ibid.,
P. 39, #66. On September 30, 2K03, the District
Court granted the above motion. Ibid., P. 40, #83.
Also see current Appendix B, P. 11, 1 4.

5. After granting the Defendants’ motions
to amend, the Defendants’ summary judgment mo-
tion was then granted, and the Plaintiff's was
denied. See Appellant's Brief, Appendix, P. 41;
and, current Appendix B, P. 26 & 27. :

3.

.

6. In Gaines v. White River Environmental
Partnership, et al., IP-98-1741-C-M/S; the De-
fendants caused the Plaintiff to suffer an on-the-
job, "Irreparable Injury" on June 2, 1999. On
June 10, 1999, the Plaintiff: (1) filed a motion to
amend; (2) he was not allowed to amend his i
Complaint before July 9, 1999, the day in which /
the Defendants’ summary judgment motion was :
filed; and, (3) he was not allowed to amend after
July 9, 1999, either. See Appellant's Brief, P. 6.,
to include reference to medical documentation.
Also see current Appendix D, P. 34., and other
relevant evidence on PP. 32-38.

7. On March 23, 2001, the Seventh Court
affirmed the summary judgment for the De-
fendants in ..., 98-1741-C-M/S. See Appendix D.,
PP. 38-9. ;

8. On May 17, 2001, the Seventh fined Pro
Se Plaintiff $1,000.00 for filing a "frivolous
appeal," as determined by the Seventh Court.

Ibid., P. 41.

9. On April 4, 2K03, the Seventh Court
affirmed the summary judgment for the De-
fendants in ..., IP-01-1158-C-H/K. Ibid.,
Appendix A., P. 3.

10. In its "Order" of April 4, 2K03, the
Seventh Court issued another warning to Pro Se
Plaintiff, about bringing "frivolous arguments" to
the Seventh Court. Ibid., P. 8.

11. On May 12, 2K03, Pro Se Plaintiff's
Petition for a Rehearing was denied. Ibid.,
Appendix C., P. 30.

EEOC Charge #240-A1-0803:

1. Charge alleged unlawful Age and Race
discrimination.

2. As early as June, 1997, the Plaintiff
attempted to get the Defendants to allow him to
serve as a replacement for a Shift Supervisor. See
Appellant Reply Brief,, Appendix, P. 28.

3. In April or May 2K, the Defendants
secretly, or very selectively, notified Mr. G.
Sawyer, 33, and "White," that they were looking
for someone to serve as a temporary Shift
Supervisor. The Defendants also withheld the
same information from the Plaintiff, 55, and
"Black." See Appellant's Brief, PP. 9-10.

4. On May 11, 2K, the Defendants used E-
mail to widely announce Mr. G. Sawyer's selec-
tion. See Appellant's Reply Brief, Appendix, P.
30: Ex. #307.

5. On May 11, 2K, Pro Se Plaintiff
opposed Mr. Sawyer's selection to serve as a
temporary Shift Supervisor. Ibid.. Appendix, P.
31: Ex. #308.

6. On May 12, 2K, the Defendant issued a
hostile reply to Pro Se Plaintiff. Ibid.. Appendix,
P. 32: Ex. #309. |

7. Also on May 12, 2K, the Defendants
"Silenced" Pro Se Plaintiff by writing, "Louis, ..., I
expect to hear no more from you on this subject."
Ibid., Appendix, P. 33: Ex. #310.

8. After being "Silenced" on May 12, 2K,
the Plaintiff was discouraged from competing with
Mr. Sawyer for this employment opportunity.
See Appellant's Brief, P. 10, f Three, Item Seven.
Also see Appellant's Reply Brief, P. 9, 1 21.

9. Between the period of May 12, 2K, and
October 1, 2K, Mr. Sawyer released information,
in the presence of the Plaintiff, that he, Mr.
Sawyer; has already been promoted, but not
officially. Appellant's Reply Brief; P. 9 {| 22.

10. On October 1, 2K, the Defendants
promoted Mr. G. Sawyer to the position of Shift
Supervisor, or Supervising O & M Specialist, by
another name. _Ibid.. Appendix, P. 36: Ex.
#315, Second Page.

11. After promoting Mr. Sawyer on October
1, 2K, this same position was then posted on
October 24, 2K, for others to apply or bid. See
10, above.

12. In its "Order " of April 4, 2K03, the
Seventh Court did the following: (1) determined
that EEOC Charge #240-A1-0803 was timely; (2)
that Pro Se Plaintiff is not entitled to any relief,
because he failed to apply for the position that
Mr. Sawyer was promoted to; (3) that the Plaintiff
has not suffered any adverse treatment; and, (4),
affirmed the ruling of the District Court to this
extent. See Appendix A., PP. 5-7.

13. On May 12, 2K03, and to the extent of
the above, Pro Se Plaintiff's Petition for a Re-
hearing was denied. Ibid.. Appendix C, P. 30.

ONS BRD AY MOAN MES gE BL. ts

EEOC Charge #240-A1-0879

1. Charge was filed on January 29, 2K01,
alleging unlawful Race discrimination, and
Retaliation. See Complaint, P. 17. Also see
Appellant's Brief, PP. 11-13, starting with 1 9.

2. For the "Date Discrimination Took
Place," the Plaintiff listed "12/26/2000 ," and
"1/11/2001;" and "Continuing. Complaint, P. 17.

3. In granting the Defendants’ motion for a
summary judgment, on September 30, 2K02, the
District Court completely overlooked this charge,
or failed to address it. See Appendix B., PP. 15-
28. Also see Appellant's Brief, P. 13.

4. The Seventh Court, in its "Order" of
April 4, 2K03; denied all relief on the claim that
EEOC Charge #240-A1-0879 was untimely filed.
Ibid.. Appendix A., P. 5. Also see 111 & 2
above.

5. In a step-by-step approach, with sup-
porting exhibits, Pro Se Plaintiff attempted to
reveal to the Seventh Court that EEOC Charge
#240-A1-0879 was timely filed in every respect.
See Appellant's Petition for a Rehearing En Banc,
PP. 4-6.

6. On May 12, 2K03, all relief was denied
by the following standard. Ibid., P. 30:
ORDER
On consideration of the petition

7.

a

for rehearing en banc filed by plain-
tiff, no judge in active service has
requested a vote on the petition for
rehearing en banc, and all the judges
on the original panel have voted to
deny rehearing. The petition is
theref. -e DENIED.

EEOC Charge #240-A1-1110:

1. Charge alleged unlawful Age and Race
discrimination, and Retaliation. See Complaint,
P.20. Also see Appellant Brief, PP. 13-14.

2. On January 25, 2K01, the Defendants
told the Plaintiff that a "Verbal" agreement had
been reach with the local union to allow the
Operation Specialist to perform "Union Duty."

3. When the Plaintiff requested a written
Statement to document the above Claim, the
Defendants denied the request. Ibid,

4. Forcing the Plaintiff to perform "Union
Duty," placed him at a greater risk of being ]
injured on-the-job; the assignment discouraged
continued employment, and it lowered the status
of the "Operation Specialist.” Ibid,

5. The Seventh Court determined the
following: (1) the Plaintiff has not suffered
adverse treatment, and (2) the Plaintiff has failed
to establish prima facie discrimination. See
Appendix A., PP. 3 & 6.

8.

6. The Petition for a Rehearing was also
denied to this extent. See Appendix C., P. 30.

Plaintiff's "Irreparable Injury:"
1. See P. 4.,16.

2. Since June 10, 1999, Pro Se Plaintiff has
been trying to hold the Defendants accountable for
the above injury; however, such attempts have

failed. Ibid., P. 4.

3. Under no circumstance, and under no
authority has Pro Se Plaintiff been able to hold the
Defendants responsible for his on-the-job, "Ir-
reparable Injury,” which needlessly took place on
June 2, 1999,

4. EEOC Charge #240-99-1616, May 7,
1999; for example, does not contain any language
relating to an "Irreparable Injury,” because the
foregoing injury occurred on June 2, 1999. See
Complaint, P. 12. Also see Appellant's Brief,, PP.
7-9; see Appellant's Reply Brief, PP. 3-8: see
Appellant's Petition For A Rehearing En Banc, PP.
2-4; and, see Appendix D., PP. 32-37.

Time limitations:
In its "Order" of April 4, 2K03, the Seventh

Court wrote the following. See Appendix A., PP.
4-5:

... Title VII and the ADEA, however,

require plaintiff to meet strict dead-
lines: in Indiana, EEOC charges must
be filed within 300 days of the alleged
incident of race or sex discrimination,
and within 180 days of the alleged in-
cident of age discrimination.

ARGUMENT

Summary: The evidence fairly and sufficiently
show that the lower courts have consistently used
a standard of review that is inconsistent with the
relevant standards of the United States Supreme
Court, and the intent of the United States
Congress. In other words, Pro Se Plaintiff has
been categorically denied due process and equal
protection of the law; therefore, the review of the
Supreme Court is necessary for: (1) the benefit of
all, (2) providing a standard in which the Plaintiff
can be granted all due relief; and (3) preventing
the Defendants from being allowed to willfully
violate the Plaintiff's civil and constiéstion rights
and then escape all accountability or punishment
for such unlawful conduct.

I. Pro Se Plaintiff Has Been Denied Due
Process & Equal Protection Of The Law, As
It Applies To Motions To Amend, And
“ummary Judgment Procedure

A. Legal standards
1. United States Constitution, Fifth Amendment;

10.

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 1981(c); Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, Rule 56(c) & 56(e). See Appen-
dix E, PP. 43-8.

2. Court cases:

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 106 S.Ct.
2505; 1986:

2. Federal Civil Procedure

Substantive law will identify which
facts are material for purpose of sum-
mary judgment, as only disputes over
facts that might affect the outcome of
suit under the governing law will prop-
erly preclude the entry of summary
judgment; factual disputes that are ir-
relevant or unnecessary will not be
counted. Federal Rules Civ. Proc.
Rule 56(c), 28 U.S.C.A.

Gilbert vy. Homar, 138 L Ed 2d 120, 121:
1997:

Constitutional Law

4. Due process is not a technical con-
ception with a fixed content unrelated
to time, place, and circumstances;
rather, it is flexible and calls for such
procedure protections as the particular
Situation demands.

B: Argument: One, the evidence shows that

11.

when the Defendants were the first to file a mo-
tion for summary judgment, Pro Se Plaintiff was
not allowed to amend on any authority, or under
any circumstances. See P. 4. Two, when the
Plaintiff was the first to file a summary judgment
motion, the Defendants were allowed to freely
amend, or such motions were freely granted. See
P. 3. Three, the Defendants’ motions to amend
were designed to affect the outcome of the case,
and they did. See P. 3., 1 5. Four, based on
the foregoing, the Defendants’ summary judgment
motion was inappropriately granted, and the Plain-
tiffs was inappropriately denied. Five, the
Plaintiff is entitle to all due relief. See PP. 3-4.

II. Once An Unlawful Employment Practice Is
Reasonably Opposed - The Adversely Treated
Employee Is Not Required To Suffer Additional
Discrimination, Humiliation, Retaliation, Or
Threats; In Order To Obtain Judicial Relief

A. Legal standards:

1. United States Constitution, the Fifth, Eighth,
and Thirteenth Amendments; Title 29, U.S.C., 8
623(a), and 623(d); Title 42, U.S.C., 88 1981,
1981(c), 2000e-2(a), 2000e-2(k)(c)(2), 2000e-
3(a); and, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules
56(c) & 56(e). See Appendix E., PP. 43-8

2. Court cases: See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., and Gilbert v. Homar; P. 11. Also see the
following cases:

Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 126 L Ed -
12.

2d 295; 1993:

Civil Rights § 7.6, 7.7

...» Title VII comes into play, however,
before the harassing conduct leads to a
nervous breakdown, and (2) ..., the
very fact that the discriminatory con-
duct was so severe or pervasive that it
created a work environment abusive to
employees because of their race, gen-
der, religion or national origin offends
Title VII's broad rule of workplace
equality.

O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers
Corp., 134 L. Ed 2d 433; and, 116 S.Ct. 1307,
1308; 1998:

Decision: In suit under Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act, (1) replace-
ment by person under 40 held not oro-
element of prima facie case. and (2)
fact that replacement is substantially
younger held to be morse reliable in-
dicator.

3. Civil Rights

The ADEA prohibits discrimination
on the basis of age and not class mem-
bership Age Discrimination Act of
1967, § 2 et seq., as amended, 29 U.S.-
C.A., § 621 et seq. :

13.

TL ee
J
:

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 93 ;
S.Ct. 1817, 1818; 1973.

a

4. Civil Rights

In implementation of employment and
personnel decisions, Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 tolerates no
racial discrimination, subtle or other-
wise. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701
et seq., 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000 et seq.

B. Argument: One, see PP. 5-6. Two, any
form of unlawful discrimination in employment -
is an act of "Adverse Treatment; and, the victim is
entitled to reasonable relief at that point. Three,
once an unlawful employment practice is rea-
sonably opposed, the complaining employee, or
the victim, is not required to suffered additional
discrimination, humiliation, or threats - in order
to obtain judicial relief. Four, Pro Se Plaintiff
reasonably and timely opposed the Defendants’
unlawful Age and Race discrimination against
him. Five, afterwards, the Defendants became
"Hostile" toward the Plaintiff, and he was
"Silenced." Six, the Defendants used an unlawful
selection procedure that discriminated against the
Plaintiff on the basis of Age and Race. Seven,
since the Defendants' summary judgment motion
was inappropriately granted, and since the Plain-
tiff's was inappropriately denied - it follows that
the Plaintiff is entitled to all due relief.

II. EEOC Charge #240-A1-0879 Was Very
Timely Filed

14.

A. Legal standards:

1. See P.9., "Time limitations."

2. See United States Constitution, Fifth Amend-
ment; Title 42, U.S.C., § 1981; and the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56; Appendix E.,
PP. 43-8.

B. Argument: One, see PP. 7-8. Two, the
Lower Courts could not reasonably ask for a more
timely filing. Three, to the extent of the fore-
going, Pro Se Plaintiff has been denied due
process and equal protection of the law; and, the
summary judgment for the Defendants was in-
appropriately entered, and the Plaintiff's was in-
appropriately denied.

IV. Pro Se Plaintiff Is Entitled To Protection
Of "Continuing Violation Doctrine," Too
A: Legal standards:
1. See United States Constitution, Fifth Amend-
ment; Title 42 U.S.C., § 1981; and, the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56; Appendix E.,
PP. 43-8.

2. See the case of Gilbert v. Homar, P.11. Also
see the following cases:

McCormick v. City of Chicago, 30 F.3d 319
(7th Cir. 2000):

5. Federal Civil Procedure

15.

Pro se complaints are to be liberally
construed and not held to the stringent
standards expected of pleadings
drafted by lawyers.

povic v. K & R Express Systems, Inc.,

176 F.3d 390, 391 (7th Cir. 1999):

2. Civil Rights

Continuing violation doctrine allows a
Title VII complainant to obtain relief
for time-barred act of discrimination
by linking it with acts that fall within
the statutory limitations periods;
courts will then treat the series of acts
as one continuous act ending within
limitations period. Civil Rights Act of
1964, § 706(d), as amended, 42 U.S.-
C.A. § 2000e-5(e).

3. Civil Rights —

Courts will consider three factors in
determining whether employee has
established continuing violation un-
der Title VII: (1) whether the acts
involve the same subject matter; (2)
the frequency at which they occur;
and (3) the degree of permanence of
alleged acts of discrimination, which
should trigger an employee's aware-
ness of and duty to assert his or her
rights. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §
706(d), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §
2000e-5(e).

16.

B. Argument: One, see PP. 1-17. Two, the
Defendants continually and willfully violate the
Plaintiff's civil and constitutional rights, but
absolutely nothing is ever done by the Lower
Courts to hold them accountable. Three, the
Defendants are not above the law. Four, the
Defendants must be made to comply with the
requirements of "Equal Employment Opportunity.”
Five, Pro Se Plaintiff is entitled to the protection
of the "Continuing Violation Doctrine,” like all
other members of a protected class. Six, in at
least one instance, the Seventh Court found one
EEOC charge timely filed. See P. 6., 9 12.
Seven, to the extent of the above, the Defendants'
summary judgment was inappropriately entered,
and the Plaintiff's was inappropriately denied.
Eight, Pro Se Plaintiff is entitled to all due relief.

V. Pro Se Plaintiff's Petition For A Rehearing
En Banc Was Denied In Error
A. Legal standards
1. See the United States Constitution, Fifth
Amendment; Title 42, U.S.C., § 1981; and, the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56;
Appendix E., PP. 43-8.

Zz. See the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure,
Rule 35. Ibid., P. 42:

Rule 35. En Banc Determination
(b)(1)(A) the panel decision conflicts
with a decision of the United States
Supreme Court or of the court to which

17.

)

the petition is addressed (with citation
to the conflicting case or cases) and
consideration by the full court is there-
fore necessary to secure and maintain
uniformity of the court's decisions; or

(b)(1)(B) the proceeding involves one
or more questions of exceptional im-
portance, each of which must be con-
cisely stated; for example, a petition
may assert that a proceeding presents a
question of exceptional importance if
it involves an issue on which the panel
decision conflicts with the authorita-
tive decisions of the United States
Court of Appeals that addressed the
issue.

(f) Call fora Vote. A vote need not
be taken to determine whether the case
will be heard or reheard en banc un-
less a judge calls for a vote.

3. Also see the case of Gilbert v. Homar, P. 11.

dd ee ee ee ee ee eee ae ee ee eS Tee ee

B. Argument: One, see PP. 7-8. Two, to
allow all the existing errors to stand against the
Plaintiff, a panel of the Seventh Court denied the
Petition for a Rehearing En Banc, by presenting or
writing a "Standard" which is contrary to the
published standard of the Seventh Court, and the
United States Congress. See P. 7., 7 6, and
compare it with Rule 35(f), as quoted above!
Three, one "Standard" is clearly different than
the other!

18.

VI. Pro Se Plaintiff Is Entitled To Fair
Monetary Relief For The On-The-Job,
"Irreparable Injury" That The Defendants
Have Willfully Caused Him To Suffer

A. Legal standards:

1. See the United States Constitution, the Fifth,
Eighth, and Thirteenth Amendments; Title 29,
US.C., §$ 623(d); Title 42, U.S.C., §§ 1981, and
2000e-3(a); and, the Federal Rules of~ Civi?
Procedure, Rule 56 - Appendix E., PP. 42-8.

2. See the court cases of Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., & Gilbert v. Homar, P. 11.; Harris
v. Forklift Systems, Inc., PP. 12-3; McDonnell
' Douglas Corp. v. Green, P. 14.; and, Filipovic v.
K & R Express Systems, Inc., P. 16.

3. Also see the following cases:

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S.Ct
2130, 2131; 1992:

7. Federal Civil Procedure

At the pleading stage, general factual
allegations of injury resulting from de-
fendant's conduct may suffice to estab-
lish standing; in response to s
judgment motion, plaintiff can no
longer rest on mere allegations but
must set forth by affidavit or other evi-
dence the specific facts which will be
taken as true for purpose of summary
judgment; at the final stage, those

19.

facts if controverted, must be support-
ed adequately by evidence adduced at
trial. Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. Rule
56(e), 28 U.S.C.A.

Curtis 1000, Inc. v. Suess, 24 F.3d 941 (7th
Cir. 1994):

3. Torts

Tort of intentional interference with
advantageous business relations no
longer requires that relation inter-
fered with be one embodied in formal
contract.

Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 119
S.Ct. 2118, 2119; 1999:

6. Damages

Egregious or outrageous acts may
serve as evidence supporting inference
of evil motive required to impose
punitive damages.

B. Argument: One, see PP. 3-4, and P. 6.
Two, a double-standard has surely been main-
tained against Pro Se Plaintiff, which has pro-
duced a "Substantial Injustice” against him.
Three, the Defendants are guilty of a willful on-
the-job, "Irreparable Injury" against the Plaintiff.
Four, every summary judgment for the Defendants
should be reversed, because such judgments were

20.

inappropriately entered. Five, the Defendants are
not above the "Law." Six, the Plaintiff is entitled
to all due relief.

Conclusion

The evidence fairly and sufficiently show that
the Lower Courts have entered judgments that are
in conflict with relevant rulings of the United
States Supreme Court, and the intent of Congress.
Beneath the foregoing rulings lies the constant and
real threat that Pro Se Plaintiff will be sanctioned
by the Seventh Court for trying to defend, and
protect his civil and constitutional rights against
the Defendants, who are willful violators of the
laws of "Equal Employment Opportunity." See
PP. 1-21; Appendix A., P. 8; and, Appendix E., P.
47, " Rule 406." Clearly, the review of the
Supreme Court is needed - in light of all the
above. Pro Se Plaintiff is entitled to all due
relief. See PP. 10-21, and Appendix E., PP. 43-
48; for the authority to grant such relief.

Sincerely,

¢

\ pte
LOUIS F. /GA
Pro Se Plaintiff,

, July 31, 2K03

21.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386015_1944%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.