# Appendices — King v. City of Bainbridge

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386015_1823%3A2

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendices
- **Published:** January 1, 2003
- **Citation:** 540 U.S. 876

## Text

la
APPENDIX A

SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA

No. S02A1685.

KING,
V.

CITY OF BAINBRIDGE.

March 10, 2003.
Reconsideration Denied April 11, 2003.

FLETCHER, Chief Justice.

The City of Bainbridge filed suit against Ethel King to
enforce its zoning ordinance that precluded her placement of
a mobile home in an R-2 residential district. King contended
that the City’s zoning ordinance was unconstitutional and that
it was preempted by federal law. The trial court rejected these
arguments and King appeals. Because the City’s ordinance
restricting mobile homes to mobile home parks and
subdivisions is not preempted by federal law and is not
unconstitutional, we affirm. Ethel King owns a tract of land,
the majority of which lies within the city limits of Bainbridge,
Georgia and is zoned R-2. The City’s zoning ordinance
specifically excludes mobile homes from R-2 districts. In
1995, three days after placing her mobile home on her
property, the City informed King that she was in violation of
the City’s zoning ordinance. She was also informed that the
mobile home could be legally placed on a portion of her
property falling outside the city limits. Instead of complying
with the City’s demand to move the mobile home, King

Ee ae oo
eS Rae

" " aes “ Be sare .
ee 7 SSL ae OPE LO HEN VER Coe ON ie eS» Rae Nes tg

a tee lS i tte

i a Ti aa Ee OBER ESS

2a

installed electricity, a septic tank, and a porch, all without
first obtaining the required permits or seeking an amendment
to the zoning ordinance. When the City filed suit in January
1996, King defended on the basis that the zoning ordinance
violated her substantive ‘ue process rights. After a reversal
by this Court on a prvcedural ground,’ the trial court
ultimately heid that the zoning ordinance was constitutional
and was not preempted by the National Manufactured
Housing and Safety Standards Act of 1974 (“the Act”).

Federal Preemption

The Act sets minimum standards for the construction of
manufactured homes and was passed to reduce injuries,
deaths, insurance costs, and property damage related to
manufactured homes and to improve the quality of
manufactured homes.’ “Manufactured homes” are built on a
permanent chassis,’ and are also referred to as mobile homes
in the regulations and in common parlance.” The regulations
promulgated under the Act by the United States Department
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) require that each
mobile home bear a special label certifying that it is built in
compliance with HUD safety standards and has been
inspected in accordance with HUD regulations.° The Act also
recognizes “modular homes.” In contrast to mobile homes,
modular homes are built on a temporary chassis that is
removed upon installation on a permanent foundation.’ The

' King v. City of Bainbridge, 272 Ga. 427, 531 S.E.2d 350 (2000).
? 42 U.S.C. §§ 5401-5426.

342 U.S.C. § 5401.

* 42 U.S.C. § 5402(6), 24 C.F.R. § 3280.2.

°24 C.F.R. § 3282.8.

© 24 C.F.R. § 3280.11.

742 U.S.C. § 5403(f), 24 C.F.R. § 3282.12.

3a

Act specifically provides for the exclusion of modular homes
from its coverage.®

The preemptive scope of the Act over safety and
construction standards for mobile homes is expressly defined
in the Act: Whenever a Federal manufactured home con-
struction and safety standard established under this [chapter]
is in effect, no State or political subdivision of a State shall
have any authority either to establish, or to continue in effect,
with respect to any manufactured home covered, any standard
regarding construction or safety applicable to the same aspect
of performance of such manufactured home which is not
identical to the Federal manufactured home construction and
safety standard.”

Thus, any attempt to place higher construction standards on
mobile homes than those established under the Act is invalid.
However, nothing in the Act prevents localities from
excluding mobile homes from certain zoning districts. The
City’s zoning ordinance creates such an exclusion. Under the
City’s ordinance, mobile homes must bear the HUD
certification label and these homes are specifically excluded
from the R-2 zoning district: “Permitted uses. (a) Any use
permitted in the R-1 residential district, except mobile
homes.” By excluding HUD-certified mobile homes from the
R-2 district, the City has not imposed any safety or
construction requirement on the homes, but has simply
determined that this type of housing is inappropriate in an R-2
district. The Eleventh Circuit has expressly held that
“{u}ndoubtedly [a city] could limit Zone R-AA to convention-
ally-built residences and exclude mobile homes.” '® Because
the City has not infringed on the federal government’s control

8 id.
” 42 U.S.C. § 5403(d).

Scurlock v. City of Lynn Haven, 858 F.2d 1521, 1525 (llth
Cir.1988).

4a

over safety and construction standards for mobile homes, its
zoning ordinance is not preempted by the Act.

King argues that the City imposes safety and construction
standards on mobile homes by permitting “a mobile home
with a DCA sticker” in R-2 districts. This argument fails to
recognize the factual and legal distinction between a modular
home and a mobile home. Modular homes are separately
defined in the City’s ordinance and are built in accordance
with OCGA §§ 8-2-110—8-2-121 and the rules of the
Department of Community Affairs. The requirements of
OCGA § 8-2-110, et seg. are virtually identical to the
requirements for a modular home exempt under the federal
act.'' Thus, a modular home is not simply a mobile home
with a DCA sticker; instead modular homes and mobile
homes are distinct uses, which both the state and federal
statutes recognize, and the City’s different treatment of them
in its zoning ordinance is not an infringement on federal
safety standards for mobile homes.

Courts considering similar zoning ordinances have
concluded that they are not preempted by the Act. For
example, in Bibco Corporation v. City of Sumter,'? the
Supreme Court of South Carolina held that the Act did not
preempt an ordinance excluding HUD-certified mobile homes
from a specific zoning district, but permitting modular homes
built under South Carolina’s Modular Building Construction
Act.

''42 U.S.C § 5403(f); 24 C.F.R. § 3282.12; OCGA § 8-2-110—8-2-
121; Ga. Ruk» and Regs. 110-2-7 et seg. See also Hill v. Duncan, 249
Ga.App. 342, 548 S.E.2d 83 (2001) (using “modular” to describe home
built under OCGA § 8-2-110, ef seg. and Atty. Gen. Op. 84- 4 (referring
to OCGA § 8-2-110 et seq. as a “modular home statute”)).

'2 332 S.C. 45, 504 S.E.2d 112 (1998).

'? See also Texas Manufactured Housing Ass’n v. City of Nederland,
101 F.3d 1095, 1100-1101 (Sth Cir.1996) (ordinance restricting mobile

Sa

King’s reliance on Scurlock v. City of Lynn Haven “4 is
inapposite because of the significant difference between Lynn
Haven’s and Bainbridge’s zoning ordinances. Lynn Haven’s
ordinance provided no specific uses or exclusions in the
relevant zoning district. Instead, the ordinance relied solely
on its safety code to distinguish appropriate uses. The
Eleventh Circuit concluded that the ordinance would require
greater safety and construction standards on mobile homes in
that district, and therefore, federal law preempted the local
ordinance.'” The court contrasted the impermissible Lynn
Haven statute with a permissible one that specifically
excluded mobile homes from a particular zoning district.'®
The City does not rely on its safety codes, as Lynn Haven did,
but instead excludes HUD-certified mobile homes -from R-2
districts regardless of safety and construction standards.

King also relies heavily upon the testimony of one City
official that a mobile home that could meet the City’s

building codes could be placed in an R-2 district: The
official’s testimony is in conflict with the plain language of
the ordinance and is unsupported by any evidence that the
City has ever applied the ordinance except as it is written.
Therefore, this testimony fails to support the argument that
the ordinance conflicts with federal law.'”

homes to mobile home parks not preempted); Brookside Village v.
Comeau, 633 S.W.2d 790 (Tex.1982) (same); Burton v. City of Alexander
City, No. Civ. A.99-D-1233-E, 2001 WL 527415 (M.D.Ala. March 20,
2001) (same).

* 858 F.2d 1521 (11th Cir.1988).

'’ See also Colorado Manufactured Housing Ass'n v. County of
Pueblo, 946 F.Supp. 1539, 1552-1553 (D.Colo.1996) (ordinances that
permit mobile homes in residential districts if they also meet Uniform
Building Code standards are preempted).

'© 858 F.2d at 1525.

"” See Clark v. Winnebago County, 817 F.2d 407, 409 n. 4 (7th Cir.
1987) (County’s position that mobile homes not excluded if they meet

6a

Additionally, we acknowledge the Catch-22 in which the
City finds itself. Under Cannon v. Coweta County,'® which
did not address the preemption issue, this Court held that a
zoning ordinance that restricted mobile homes to mobile
home parks, based on aesthetic and protection of property
values concerns, was unconstitutional.’ Instead, the Court
held that a municipality can only regulate the placement of
mobile homes based on construction standards.”°

Constitutionality of Ordinance

King also contends that the zoning ordinance is
unconstitutional because it exceeds the police powers of the
City under Cannon.?'_ We now conclude that Cannon was
wrongly decided and hereby overrule it. A zoning ordinance
does not exceed a city’s police powers unless it is “clearly
arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to
the public health, safety, morals or general welfare.””” Courts
routinely uphold zoning ordinances broadly restricting mobile
home placement.”° A wide variety of rationales have been

building code untenable in light of ordinance providing that mobile homes
may not be placed outside mobile home district).

'8 960 Ga. 56, 389 S.E.2d 329 (1990).
'° Td. at 60, 389 S.E.2d 329.

© Id. (municipality can regulate placement of mobile homes only if
they meet standards “designed to assure that the home will compare
favorably with other housing that would be allowed on that site,” quoting
case that held that acceptable standards included insulation, adequacy of
plumbing, and windstorm damage). See Robinson Township v. Knoll, 410
Mich. 293, 302 N.W.2d 146, 152 (1981).

2 rg

2 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395, 47 S.Ct.
114, 71 L.Ed. 303 (1926).

3 See, e.g., Town of Scranton v. Willoughby, 306 S.C. 421, 412 S.E.2d
424 (S.C.1991); McCollum v. City of Berea, 53 S.W.3d 106 (Ky.App.
2000) and cases cited in n. 17-29. See also Rathkoph, The Law of
Planning and Zoning § 19.04; Annot., 17 A.L.R.4th 106, 111 § 3 (1982).

Ta

found sufficient to justify these ordinances: preserving land

for low density, single-family dwellings,” protection of prop-

erty values,” guarding against increased crime,”° guarding
8

against traffic congestion,”’ maintaining aesthetics,“ regu-
lating popuiation density,”’ preventing waste and sewage
problems,” regulating quality of housing stock,’' and
concerns about wind vulnerability.”

The evidence in this case showed that the City’s purpose it
restricting mobile home placement was to regulate the quality
of housing stock and promote general safety concerns.
These reasons are not arbitrary or unreasonable and bear a
substantial relation to the public health, safety, and gen-
eral welfare. Therefore, the City’s ordinance is not
unconstitutional.

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur, except BENHAM and THOMP-
SON, JJ., who dissent.

4 Bibco, 504 S.E.2d at 116-117

> Texas Manufactured Housing Ass’x at 1106; Colorado
Manufactured Housing Ass'n v. City of Salida, 977 F.Supp. 1080, 1085
(D.Colo.1997).

6 Bibco, 504 S.E.2d at 116-117.
27 Bibco, 504 S.E.2d at 116-117.
8 Clark, 817 F.2d at 409.

- Duggins v. Town of Walnut Cove, 63 N.C.App. 684, 306 S.E.2d 186
(N.C.App. 1983).

*° Brookside Village, 633 S.W.2d 790; Barre Mobile Home Park vy.
Town of Petersham, 592 F.Supp. 633, 636 (D.Mass. 1984).

*' Burton, 2001 WL 527415, * 10.
*° Grant v. Seminole County, 817 F.2d 731, 736 (11th Cir.1987).

8a

THOMPSON, Justice, dissenting.

I believe the City’s zoning ordinance is an unconstitutional
encroachment upon federal law. Accordingly, I dissent.

1. Federal preemption occurs when a federal law conflicts
with a state law, including zoning ordinances and other laws
created by municipalities. See Scurlock v. City of Lynn
Haven, 858 F.2d 1521, 1524 (11th Cir.1988). In such cases, if
the two conflicting laws cannot be reconciled to serve the full
purposes and objectives of Congress in passing the federal
law, the supremacy clause dictates that the State law must
give way to the federal law. States do not have the
constitutional power to legislate in federally preempted areas
of law. /d. at 1523-1524. At issue before us is a conflict
between a City of Bainbridge zoning ordinance and 42 U.S.C.
§ 5403(d), which provides:

Whenever a Federal [mobile] home construction and
safety standard established under this chapter is-in effect,
no State or political subdivision of a State shall have
authority either to establish, or to continue in effect, with
respect to any [mobile] home covered, any standard
regarding construction or safety applicable to the same
aspect of performance of such [mobile] home which is
not identical to the Federal [mobile] home construction
and safety standard.

This statute clearly evidences congressional intent to “pre-
clude[ ] states and municipalities from imposing construction
and safety standards upon mobile homes that differ in any
respect from those developed by HUD.” (Emphasis omitted.)
Scurlock, supra.

The evidence presented in this case demonstrated that
modular homes, which are prefabricated, but are not built on
a chassis, could be placed in an R-2 zoning district if they
bore a Department of Community Affairs (“DCA”) certifi-
cation sticker; that a DCA sticker certifies that a modular

| |

9a

home is built in accordance with the Georgia Industrialized
Building Act; and that, aesthetically, as long as a “skirt” is
placed around a mobile home, there is very little, if any,
difference between a modular home and a mobile home.
There was also evidence that modular homes bearing a DCA
sticker are safer than mobile homes bearing a HUD sticker;
and that the City adopted its ordinance restricting mobile
homes to mobile home parks and subdivisions for safety
purposes. In this regard, the city manager testified that the
City would not permit a mobile home with only a HUD
sticker in an R-2 zoning district; but it would permit a mobile
home with a DCA sticker in such a district because it would
have been “built stronger and safer.”

In Scurlock, a City of Lynn Haven zoning ordinance
permitted mobile homes that met the City’s building codes to
be placed anywhere within city limits; mobile homes with
only a HUD sticker, however, were restricted to licensed
trailer parks. The City argued that the ordinance passed
constitutional muster because mobile homes were built to a
lesser standard and were less safe. The court determined that
the City’s rationale for limiting the siting of mobile homes
was impermissible because safety standards for such homes
were preempted by federal law. The court reasoned that if
HUD has set the standard for safe construction, a munici-
pality cannot create barriers to the full implementation of that
standard. /d. at 1524-1525.

Like the zoning ordinance in Scurlock, supra, the purpose
and effect of the zoning ordinance in this case are to limit the
siting of mobile homes based solely on their manner of
construction. Because this zoning rationale impedes the full
implementation of federal building standards, the City’s
zoning ordinance is unconstitutional.

True, on its face, the zoning ordinance appears to restrict
the location of mobile homes appropriately. However, as
noted above, the City enacted, and intends to enforce, its

10a

ordinance on the basis of construction and safety concerns.
Thus, the ordinance was enacted as a thinly veiled attempt to
circumvent the HUD safety and construction standards, ' and
to frustrate the federal objective,” to wit: the regulation of
mobile home safety standards.

When all is said and done, it is clear that in enacting its
ordinance the City was motivated by a desire to legislate in
the mobile home safety arena; and the City’s interpretation of
the ordinance gives it that effect. The ordinance should not be
saved simply because it appears to be regular on its face. See
Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 105 S.Ct. 1916, 85
L.Ed.2d 222 (1985) (although law disenfranchising persons
convicted of crimes appears neutral on its face, it will be held
to violate equal protection if its original enactment was
motivated by a desire to discriminate and it continues to have
that effect).

Compare Texas Manufactured Housing Assn. v. City of Nederland,
101 F.3d 1095, 1100 (Sth Cir. 1996).

* In determining preemption vel non, it is the practical impact of the
ordinance that counts. See Gade v. National Solid Wastes Mgmt. Assn.,
505 U.S. 88, 105-106, 112 S.Ct. 2374, 120 L.Ed.2d 73 (1992). See also
Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 651-652, 91 S.Ct. 1704, 29 L.Ed.2d 233
(1971), in which the Supreme Court observed: We can no longer adhere to
the aberrational doctrine . . . that state law may frustrate the operation of
federal law as long as the state legislature in passing its law had some
purpose in mind other than one of frustration. Apart from the fact that it is
at odds with the approach taken in nearly all our Supremacy Clause cases,
such a doctrine would enable state legislatures to nullify nearly all un-
wanted federal legislation by simply publishing a legislative committee
report articulating some state interest or policy—other than frustration of
the federal objective—that would be tangentially furthered by the
proposed state law .... [A]ny state legislation which frustrates the full
effectiveness of federal law is rendered invalid by the Supremacy Clause.
In this case, the articulated purpose of the ordinance was one which
frustrates the federal objective. When pressed at oral arguments, counsel
for the City was unable to provide any rationale other than safety for
limiting the placement of mobile homes.

lla

2. In Cannon v. Coweta County, 260 Ga. 56, 389 S.E.2d
329 (1990), this Court held that an ordinance restricting the
placement of mobile homes exceeds the police power if it is
enacted to protect property values. Unlike the ordinance in
Cannon, the ordinance in this case was enacted for safety
reasons. Thus, this case does not present a Cannon issue, and
I see no need to debate its merits at this time.

I am authorized to state that Justice BENHAM joins in
this dissent.

Se Ee Oe fe ee ne

12a
APPENDIX B

SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA

Case No. S02A1685
Atlanta, April 11, 2003

The Honorable Supreme Court met pursuant to adjourn-
ment. The following order was passed:

ETHEL KNIGHT KING a/k/a ANNIE ETHEL KING,
Vv.

CITY OF BAINBRID.

Upon consideration of the Motion for Reconsideration filed
in this case, it is ordered that it be hereby denied.

All the Justices concur, except Benham and Thompson, JJ.,
who dissent.

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA
Clerk’s Office, Atlanta

I herby certify that the above is a true extract from the
minutes of the Supreme Court of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the_seal of said court hereto
affixed the day and year last above written.

Sherie M. Welch, Clerk |

13a
APPENDIX C

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF DECATUR COUNTY
STATE OF GEORGIA

[Filed Sep. 27, 2001]
Civil Action File No. 96-V-040

THE CITY OF BAINBRIDGE, GEORGIA,
Plaintiff,
VS.

ETHEL KNIGHT KING, a/k/a ANNIE ETHEL KING,
Defendant.

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT FOR
INTERLOCUTORY AND PERMANENT INJUNCTION

The Georgia Supreme Court having reversed this Court’s
Order of August 24, and remanded the case to this Court for
consideration of the constitutional issues raised by Defendant,
and upon remand, the Parties having waived the opportunity
to present additional evidence or argument, and each of the
Parties having agreed to submit the matter to the Court for
decision based on the existing record, the Court makes the
following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:

FINDINGS OF FACT
eM

Technically, there is no such thing as a “mobile home.”
The proper names for residences commonly called “mobile
homes” that have been manufactured since 1976 and are
located in Georgia are either industrialized buildings that bear

l4a

a DCA sticker or manufactured housing that bear a HUD
sticker (T., pg. 68, lines 15-25; T., pg. 74, lines 2-9; T.,
pg. 133, lines 10-25; T., pg. 154, lines 18-20).

2.

A layman in the field or an ordinary citizen could not
distinguish between a “mobile home” with a DCA sticker and
a “mobile home” with a HUD sticker while it is being
transported nor could they distinguish between them after it
has been set up if it had a “skirting” around it (T., pg. 70,
lines 6-16; T. pg. 72, lines 6-9).

mm

Defendant owns, and has owned since May 27, 1986, a
tract of land in Decatur County, Georgia, that is shown on
Decatur County Tax Map B-80 as Parcel 14 F. A part of said
land is within the City Limits of the City of Bainbridge.
(Plaintiffs Exhibit 1—reduced Tax Map B-80; Plaintiffs
Exhibit 2—part_of Tax Map B-80 including Defendant’s
property; Plaintiffs Exhibit 7--Deed from Thurman L.
Knight, Jr., as Executor under the Last Will and Testament of
Thurman L. Knight, Sr., to Defendant dated May 27, 1986,
and recorded in Deed Book G-14, Page 411, Land Records of
Decatur County, Georgia; Plaintiffs Exhibit 6--plat of survey
by Grogan; Plaintiffs Exhibit 3-plat of Defendant’s property
on which witness Seymour plotted the City Limit’s line).

-4-

The City Limit’s sign is near Defendant’s property and the
Grogan survey shows that a substantial part of Defendant’s
property, and all of the road frontage of Defendant’s property,
is within the City Limits of Bainbridge (Plaintiff's Exhibit 6;
T. pg. 26, lines 12-22).

a

Pursuant to Article 1X of the Zoning Ordinance of the City
of Bainbridge, the part of Defendant’s property that lies

lSa

within the City of Bainbridge is zoned as a “R-2 Two Family
and Multiple Family Residential District” (Plaintiff's Exhibit
8; Plaintiffs Exhibit 10).

-6-

Pursuant to Article [IX of the Zoning Ordinance of the City
of Bainbridge, mobile homes bearing a DCA sticker are
permitted in “R-2 Two Family and Multiple Family Resi-
dential Districts,” but mobile homes bearing a HUD sticker
are not permitted in “R-2 Two Family and Multiple Family
Residential Districts” (Plaintiff's Exhibit 8, pg. 27, Sect.
9.02a; Plaintiff's Exhibit 8, pg. 4 definition of Mobile Home
and definition of Modular Home).

i.

A permit from the City of Bainbridge is required in order
to put any house, stick-built, mobile home, modular home,
industrialized building, manufactured housing, or anv other
kind of building in the City of Bainbridge. Defendant never
made an application to the City for a permit to put the house
in question or any other house on her property that is located
within the City of Bainbridge, and no such permit was ever
issued (T., pg. 104, lines 20 thru pg. 105, line 3; T., pg. 40,
lines 9-18; pg. 210, line 23 thru pg. 211, line 8; Plaintiffs
Exhibit 8, pg. 51, Sect. 21.02 and 21.03).

-

On September 2, 1995 (Saturday before Labor Day),
Defendant, without obtaining a permit from the City of Bain-
bridge to do so, caused a “mobile home” bearing a HUD
sticker to be delivered to a part of her land that was within the
City Limits of Bainbridge (T., pg. 213, lines 19-22: Plaintiffs
Exhibit 3; T., pg. 101, line 20 thru pg. 102, line 1).

-9.

On Tuesday, September 5, 1995, Charles Seymour, a build-
ing officer of the City of Bainbridge, went to the property of

l6a

Defendant and found a mobile home with a HUD sticker
sitting on the Defendant’s property (T., pg. 30, line 2 thru pg.
31, line 17).

-10-

On September 5, 1/995, Charles Seymour notified the
Defendant that the mobile home with the HUD sticker was on
the part of her land that was within the City Limits and that it
had to be moved (T., pg. 31, lines 11-17).

(See Findings of Fact 5 and 6 that the zoning on the
part of Defendant’s land that is within the City Limits
permitted mobile homes with a DCA sticker, but did not
permit mobile homes with a HUD sticker.)

it.

On September 5, 1995, there had been no improvements on
the property other than the delivery of the mobile home with
the HUD sticker to the property, except that the power
company had started to set up a pole, (T., pg. 31, line 18 thru
pg. 32, line 1) and except that Defendant contends that “the
septic tank was already in” (T., pg. 207, lines 19-25).

As.

On September 6, 1995, at the request of Mr. Knight
(Defendant’s brother), Charles Seymour, John. Busby, who
was employed as a buildings inspector part-time for the City
of Bainbridge under the supervision of Charles Seymour, and
Mr. Knight (Defendant’s brother), with the benefit of plats of
the property supplied by Mr. Knight (Defendant’s brother)
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 4), measured the property and agreed as to
the location of the City Limits line, which when plotted
on the plat provided by Mr. Knight, showed that approxi-
mately 90 percent of the mobile home was within the City
Limits of Bainbridge (Plaintiff's Exhibit 3; T., pg. 32, line 24
thru pg. 36, line 9).

ee ee ee POT he nt eae ee ee ee en ees ee

17a
oh %.

On September 6, 1995, Mr. Seymour, Mr. Bushy, and Mr.
Knight, after making the necessary measurements, deter-
mined that the mobile home could be placed on Defendant’s
property outside of the City Limits and still have the proper
setbacks (T., pg. 36, lines 9-19).

-14-

On September 6, 1995, Mr. Seymour again informed
Defendant that the mobile home with the HUD sticker was
within the City Limits and would have to be moved (T., pg.
37, iines 2-8).

(See Findings of Fact 5 and 6 that the zoning on the
part of Defendant’s land that is within the City Limits
permitted mobile homes with a DCA sticker, but did not
permit mobile homes with a HUD sticker.)

ane.

A permit is required from the City of Bainbridge before
electricity can be connected to any building within the City
Limits of Bainbridge; a permit from the City of Bainbridge is
required before the installation of air conditioning in any
building located in the City Limits of Bainbridge; a permit is
required from the City of Bainbridge before the installation of
a septic tank and the construction of a drain field within
the City Limits of Bainbridge (T., pg. 40, line 9 thru pg. 41,
line 15).

-16-

After having received numerous warnings from the City
that the mobile home with the HUD sticker was within the
City Limits and must be moved, Defendant, without obtaining
a permit from the City of Bainbridge to do so, caused
electricity to be installed, air conditioning to be installed, and
a porch to be added to the mobile home (T., pg 209, line 17
thru pg. 210, line 8).

18a
ah

Defendant neither applied for nor obtained any permits
from the City of Bainbridge either before or after causing the
mobile home to be placed on her land within the City of
Bainbridge, causing electricity to be supplied to the mobile
home, causing the air conditioning to be installed in the
mobile home, causing the septic tank to be installed on the
premises, and causing the drain field to be constructed on the
premises (T., pg. 104, line 20 thru pg. 106, line 2).

-18-

The City of Bainbridge has never declined any application
by Defendant to place the home in question or any kind of
home on Defendant’s property that is located within the City
Limits of Bainbridge (T., pg. 217, line 24 thru pg. 218, line
1;T., pg. 105, lines 4-7).

-19-

Section 21.05 thru Section 21.8 of the Zoning Ordinance of
the City of Bainbridge provides a procedure for the amend-
ment of the Zoning Ordinance upon application of a citizen or
a property owner (Plaintiffs Exhibit 8). Defendant has never
filed an application pursuant to the Zoning Ordinance of the
City of Bainbridge for the rezoning of her property that lies
within the City Limits of Bainbridge (T., pg. 217, line 24 thru
pg. 218, line 8).

-20-

At all times relevant to this case, the Southern Building
Code, the National Electric Code, the Standard Mechanical
Code, the Georgia State Plumbing Code, and the Standard
Plumbing Code were in effect in the City of Bainbridge as a
part of the Ordinances of the City of Bainbridge (T., pg. 15,
lines 9-18; T., pg. 18, lines 2-20).

19a
c'

The duties of an inspector in the Building Department of
the City of Bainbridge are to-inspect remodeling, repair, and
new construction within the City of Bainbridge to make sure
that all buildings and construction comply with the various
building codes (T., pg. 61, lines 1015).

ae

The purpose of requiring construction in accordance with
the various building codes and to inspect to confirm and
enforce compliance with the various building codes is to
protect the lives and the safety of the citizens of the City of
Bainbridge (T., pg. 108, lines 3-8; T., pg. 79, line 21 thru
pg. 80, line 2).

23.

Mobile Homes bearing the DCA sticker are subject to and
built in accordance with the identical building codes that are

enforcrd in the City of Bainbridge (T., pg. 85, line 20 thru
pg. 86, line 1).

he

Mobile Homes bearing the HUD sticker are built to a
minimum standard (T., pg. 134, line 24) and to less stringent
building codes as to both safety and strength than the Mobile
Homes codes that are enforced in the City of Bainbridge and
which apply to buildings bearing the DCA sticker (T., pg. 85,
line 20 thru pg. 86, line 12).

-25-

Due to construction under the more stringent codes, the
mobile home bearing the DCA sticker is safer for the citizens
of Bainbridge than is a building bearing the HUD sticker (T.,
pg. 85, lines 14-19), and Plaintiff adopted the zoning
ordinance to protect the lives of its citizens and for safety
purposes (T., pp. 108-109).

20a
-26-

HUD standards and requirements are “unconcerned with a
locality’s imposition of construction or safety standards that
do not directly diverge from a specific, identifiable HUD
standard[s]” and requirements. See Burton v. City of
Alexander City, Ala., 2001 WL 527415 at 7 (M.D. Ala.
2001).

a

HUD standards, regulations, and requirements do not
prevent a locality from regulating the siting of manufactured
homes within its jurisdiction without regard to the federally-
required construction and safety standards of the home itself.
See Burton at 7.

-28-

Defendant has failed to prove that the City of Bainbridge
acted on the basis that Defendant’s “mobile home” met HUD
standards but not the Southern Building Code, the National
Electric Code, the Standard Mechanical Code, the Georgia
State Plumbing Code, or the Standard Plumbing Code. See
Burton at 7.

-29-

On proper application to the City of Bainbridge, a permit
will be issued for any home, including a Mobile Home, that
complies with all of the City of Bainbridge building codes to
be placed in any residential zone in the City of. Bainbridge
(T., pg. 107, line 5 thru pg. 108, line 2).

-30-

Even with a proper application to the City of Bainbridge, a
permit will not be issued for any house that does not comply
with all of the City of Bainbridge building codes to be placed
in any residential zone in the City of Bainbridge, with the
single exception in favor of mobile homes with the HUD

2la

sticker and, upon proper application to the City of Bain-
bridge, mobile homes with the HUD sticker can be placed in
mobile home subdivisions or in mobile home parks (T., pg.
106, line 10 thru pg. 108, line 1), even though they do not
comply with the City of Bainbridge’s building codes.

91.

Even houses that comply with the code cannot be placed
anywhere in the City of Bainbridge without first obtaining a
permit (T., pg. 109, lines 13-18), and there are mobile home
parks/subdivisions in the City of Bainbridge in which the
Defendant is not precluded from placing a home bearing a
HUD sticker.

92.

The Zoning Ordinances of the City of Bainbridge do not
address the subject of quality of manufacture of mobile
homes independent of the DCA and HUD sticker provisions
(T., pg. 115, lines 6-9).

-33-

Defendant was advised by certified mail dated December
13, 1995, which she acknowledged that she received, among
other things, that:

“The Zoning Ordinance can only be changed or
modified by the Mayor and City Council.

If you would like to appear before the City Council to
further discuss your mobile home dilemma, please con-
tact City Manager Charles Tyson so that he can schedule
you for the next City Council meeting to be held on
December 19,1995.”

Defendant did not ask Mr. Tyson to arrange for Defendant’s
appearance before the City Councii, nor did Defendant go
before the City Council or the Mayor. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 5;
T., pg. 212, line 13 thru pg. 213, line 3).

22a
-34-

Plaintiff was notified that her “mobile home” was in
violation of the City of Bainbridge’s zoning ordinance
without ay regard to the standards of Plaintiffs mobile home.
See Burton at 9.

."s

The Defendant ignored the notice by Charles R. Seymour,
Building Official/Zoning Administrator of the City of Bain-
bridge on September 5, 1995, described in Finding of Fact 7
and the further notices in Finding of Facts 11 and 12 and
“never slowed down” in completing the installation of the
mobile home on her property within the City Limits of
Bainbridge (T., pg. 213, line 23 thru pg. 214, line 1).

-36-

Defendant did not raise a constitutional attack against the
Zoning Ordinance before or to the governing authority of
Plaintiff prior to filing her answer to the Plaintiffs Complaint
For Injunctive Relief in this case.

37

The Zoning Ordinance of the City of Bainbridge was
admitted in evidence as Plaintiffs Exhibit 8 without objection
(T., pg. 23, lines 18-20).

. 3%

The evidence of Defendant was factually insufficient to
show by clear and convincing evidence that she will suffer a
significant detriment under the existing zoning of her
property or that the existing zoning bears an insubstantial
relationship to the public interest. See Gradous v. Bd. of
Commissioners of Richmond County, 256 Ga. 469, 471
(1986), citing, 250 Ga. 658 (1983). Brown v. Dougherty
County

23a
-39-

The evidence of Plaintiff was factually sufficient to
establish that the existing zoning of Defendant’s property
bears a substantial relationship to the public interest. See
Gradous at 471.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
its

The Zoning Ordinances of the City of Bainbridge, having
been admitted into evidence without objection, is presumed to
be valid.

¥

The evidence of Defendant was legally insufficient to show
by clear and convincing evidence that she will suffer a
significant detriment under the existing zoning of her
property or that the existing zoning bears an insubstantial
relationship to the public interest. See Gradous at 471.

=3-

The evidence of the Plaintiff was legally sufficient to
establish that the existing zoning of Defendant’s property
bears a substantial relationship to the public interest. See
Gradous at 471.

-4-

The Court is aware of the Scurlock v. City of Lynn Haven,
Fla., 858 F.2d 1521(1 1th Cir. 1988) decision, but it appears
that Scurlock does not apply in this case. The City of
Bainbridge has not imposed greater safety requirements for a
mobile home than the HUD standards and requirements;
therefore, Scurlock does not apply in this case.

-5-

The preemption doctrine does not apply since the City of
Bainbridge’s ordinance does not conflict with any HUD

24a

requirements nor deal with construction and safety and does
not impose any additional requirements on a home with a
HUD sticker. See Scurlock at 1524.

-6-

The City of Bainbridge’s zoning ordinance is rationally and
reasonably calculated to protect the safety and general
welfare of the community by regulating the quality of
housing stock. See Burton at 10.

a %

The City of Bainbridge’s zoning ordinance establishes
rational and reasonable guidelines by which prospective
home buyers can determine which parts of the city will
accommodate housing stock commensurate to their prefer-
ences and desires. See Burton at 10.

In order for Defendant to raise a question as to the con-
stitutionality of the City of Bainbridge’s zoning ordinance,
Defendant must show: (1) the ordinance or the particular
parts of the ordinance which the Defendant challenges, stated
with fair precision; (2) the provision of the Constitution,
which the ordinance is claimed to violate, must be clearly
designated; and (3) wherein the ordinance, or some desig-
nated part of it, violates such constitutional provision.
Richmond Concrete Products Co., Inc. v. Ward, 212 Ga. 773,
774-75 (1956), reversed on other grounds by State v. Crane,
224 Ga. 643 (1968).

-9-

It appearing that Defendant has failed to clearly designate
the violated provision of the Constitution and how the
ordinance violates the Constitution, Defendant has failed io
meet her burden. See Richmond Concrete at 774-75.

A Spar Soares i>

a ae ad

AON eg

Tye are

LYN RE

OGTR tA DY

Sp heds REL tet LP

25a

-10-
Based on this Court’s Conclusions of Law, the City of
Bainbridge’s zoning ordinance is found to be constitutional,

and Defendant has failed to provide clear and convincing
evidence otherwise.

-l1-

That the Defendant is in violation of the Zoning Ordinance
of the City of Bainbridge in each of the ways alleged by the

- Plaintiff in its Complaint.

IT IS THEREFORE, CONSIDERED, ORDERED AND
DECREED by the Court that the zoning ordinance in ques-
tion is constitutional, Plaintiff's prayer for an interlocutory
and a permanent injunction is hereby granted, Defendant is

- hereby enjoined from continuing to violate the Zoning

Ordinance of the City of Bainbridge in the ways specified in
the Complaint and in any other way, and Defendant is hereby
ordered to remove the mobile home described in the
Complaint from that portion of her land that lies within the
City Limits of Bainbridge within ninety (90) days of the date
of this Order.

This 26th day of September, 2001.

/s/ J. Richard Porter, III
J. RICHARD PorTER, III
Judge, Superior Court of
Decatur County, Georgia

Prepared by the Court

26a
APPENDIX D

ZONING ORDINANCE
CITY OF BAINBRIDGE, GEORGIA

(Plaintiff's Exhibit 8)
[Logo]

Adopted October 20, 1987
Amended January 5, 1988
Amended July 6, 1993

Prepared by:
Southwest Georgia Regional Development Center

ZONING ORDINANCE
CITY OF BAINBRIDGE, GEORGIA
ARTICLE I
INTRODUCTION
Section 1.01. Short Title 1
Section 1.02. Authority for Enactment |
ARTICLE II
I, sesccisewssncsinscecnsicisntiiicitsteiishsciiaihitieiiia lesesteiteciasnsaee eee ee
ARTICLE III
LIST OF DISTRICTS
Section 3.01. Districts 6
Section 3:02. Limited Use Provision 6

Section 3.03. Official Zoning Map 6

27a

ARTICLE IV
GENERAL PROVISIONS

Section 4.01. Conflicting Regulations 7

Section 4.02. Scope 7

Section 4.03. Street, Alleys, And Railroad Rights-
Of-way 7

Section 4.04. Permitted Uses 7

Section 4.05. Permitted Area 7

Section 4.06. Permitted Height 7

Section 4.07. Continuance of A Non-Conforming Use 7

Section 4.08. Only One Main Structure On A Lot 8

Section 4.09. Substandard Lots 8

Section 4.10. Frontage 8

Section 4.11. Site Distance At Intersections 8

Section 4.12. Reduction Of Lot Area Prohibited 8

Section 4.13. Accessory Residential Building 8

Section 4.14. Prohibited Uses In All Residential
Districts 9

Section 4.15. Automobile Service Stations And Public
Garages 10

Section 4.16. Protective Screening 10

Section 4.17. Signs 10

Section 4.18. Radio, Television Stations 14

Section 4.19. Satellite Receiving Dish Antenna 15

Section 4.20. Special Approval 15

Section 4.21. Zoning Of Annexed Areas 16

ARTICLE V
NON-CONFORMING BUILDINGS AND USES

Section 5.41. Non-Conforming Use Of Land,
Continuation Of Use 17

Section 5.02. Restoration 17

Section 5.03. Discontinuance Or Abandonment t7—-

Section 5.04. Change Of Tenancy Or Ownership 17

28a

ARTICLE VI
OFF-STREET PARKING AND LOADING
REQUIREMENTS
Section 6.01. Parking Requirements 18
Section 6.02. Off-Street Parking Design Regulations 21
Section 6.03. Planted Areas 22
Section 6.04. Off-Street Loading Requirements 22
Section 6.05. Off-Street Waiting Area For Drive
Through Facilities 23
ARTICLE VII
R4A, SINGLE FAMILY RESIDENTIAL DISTRICT
Section 7.01. Statement Of Purpose 24
Section 7.02. Permitted Uses 24
Section 7.03. Uses Permitted After Special Review By

The Planning Commission And
Approved By The City Council 24
Area, Height, And Placement

Section 7.04. Requirements 25
ARTICLE VIII
R-1, SINGLE FAMILY RESIDENTIAL DISTRICT
Section 8.01. Statement of Purpose 26
Section 8.02. Permitted Uses 26
Section 8.03. Uses Permitted After Special Review By

The Planning Commission And
Approved By The City Council 26
Section 8.04. Area, Height, And Placement
Requirements 26

29a

ARTICLE IX
R-2, TWO FAMILY AND MULTIPLE-FAMILY
RESIDENTIAL DISTRICTS

Section 9.01. Statement of Purpose 27

Section 9.02. Permitted Uses 27

Section 9.03. Uses Permitted After Special Review By
The Planning Commission And
Approved By The City Council 27

Section 9.04. Area, Height, And Placement
Requirements 27

ARTICLE X
R-PUD, RESIDENTIAL PLANNED UNIT
DEVELOPMENT DISTRICT

Section 10.01. | Statement Of Purpose 28
Section 10.02. Procedures For PUD (,R-PUD, C-PUD)
Approval 28

Section 10.03. Permitted Uses 28

Section 10.04. | Uses Permitted After Special Review By
The Planning Commission And
Approval By The City Council 28

Section 10.05. — Preliminary Review 28

Section 10.06. Procedure For Preliminary Approval 28

Section 10.07. Procedure For Final Plan Approval 29

Section 10.08. Area, Height, And Placement

Requirements 30

Section 11.04.

Section 11.05.
Section 11.06.
Section 11.07.
Section 11.08.

30a

ARTICLE XI
R-TH, TOWN HOUSE DEVELOPMENT DISTRICT

Section 11.01.
Section 11.02.
Section 11.03.

Statement Of Purpose 31

Permitted Uses 31 :

Uses Permitted After Special Review of
The Planning Commission And
Approval Of The City Council 31

Area, Height, And Placement and
Development Requirements 31

Preliminary Review 32

Procedure For Preliminary Approval 32

Procedure For Final Plan Approval 33

The Rezoning Of Any Property For
Town House Development Will Follow -
Established Rezoning Policies
And Procedures 34

ARTICLE XII

R-M, MOBILE HOME PARK AND MOBILE HOME

Section 12.01.
Section 12.02.

Section 12.03.
Section 12.04.

Section 12.05.
Section 12.06.
Section 12.07.
Section 12.08.

Section 12.09.

SUBDIVISION DISTRICT

Statement Of Purpose 35

R-M Mobile Home Park And Subdivision
District 35

Permitted Uses 35

Uses Permitted After Special Review By
The Planning Commission and
Approval By The City Council 35

Travel Trailers 35

Mobile Home Parks 36

Mobile Home Parks: Improvements 38

Mobile Home Parks: Accessory Uses
Permitted 39

Mobile Home Subdivision: General
Requirements 40

3la

ARTICLE XIII
R-0, RESTRICTED OFFICE-INSTITUTIONAL DISTRICT

Section 13.01. Statement of Purpose 41

Section 13.02. Permitted Uses 41

Section 13.03. Uses Permitted After Special Review By
The Planning Commission and
Approval By The City Council 41

Section 13.04. Area, Height, and Placement
Requirements 41

ARTICLE XIV
B, NEIGHBORHOOD BUSINESS DISTRICT

Section 14.01. Statement of Purpose 42

Section 14.02. Permitted Uses 42

Section 14.03. Uses Permitted After Special Review Of
The Planning Commission and
Approval By The City Council 42

Section 14.04. Protective Screening 43

Section 14.05. Area, Height, and Placement
Requirements 43

ARTICLE XV
CBD, CENTRAL BUSINESS DISTRICT

Section 15.01. Statement Of Purpose 44

Section 15.02. Permitted Uses 44

Section 15.03. Uses Permitted After Special Review Of
The Planning Commission and ©

: Approval By The City Council 44

Section 15.04. Protective Screening 44

Section 15.05. Area, Height, and Placement
Requirements 44

Section 16.01.
Section 16.02.
Section 16.03.

Section 16.04.
Section 16.05.

32a

ARTICLE XVI
C, HIGHWAY COMMERCIAL DISTRICT

Statement Of Purpose 45

Permitted Uses 45

Uses Permitted After Special Review Of
The Planning Commission And
Approval By The City Council 45

Protective Screening 45

Area, Height, And Placement
Requirements 45

ARTICLE XVII

C-PUD, COMMERCIAL PLANNED UNIT

Section 17.01.
Section 17.02.
Section 17.03.

Section 17.04.
Section 17.05.

Section 17.06.

DEVELOPMENT DISTRICT

Statement Of Purpose 46

Permitted Uses 46

Uses Permitted After Special Review By
The Planning Commission And
Approval Of The City Council 46

Procedure For Project Approval 46

Procedure For Preliminary And Final
Approval 46

Area, Height, And Placement
Requirements 46

ARTICLE XVIII

I-1, LIGHT INDUSTRIAL DISTRICT

Section 18.01.
Section 18.02.
Section 18.03.

Section 18.04.

I-1, Light Industrial District 47

Permitted Uses 47

Uses Permitted After Special Review of
The Planning Commission And
Approval Of The City Council 48

Area, Height, And Placement
Requirements 48

Section 19.01.
Section 19.02.
Section 19.03.

Section 19.04.

33a

ARTICLE XIX
I-2, HEAVY INDUSTRIAL DISTRICT

I-2, Heavy Industrial District 49

Permitted Uses 49

Uses Permitted After Special Review of
The Planning Commission And
Approval By The City Council 49

Area, Height, And Placement
Requirements 49

ARTICLE XX

ICRC COT ROMERO ociessccescecicesssicciccerssoscessescessiopnsesesens 50

ARTICLE XXI

ADMINISTRATION AND ENFORCEMENT

Section 21.01.
Section 21.02.
Section 21.03.
Section 21.04.
Section 21.05.
Section 21.06.
Section 21.07.

Section 21.08.

Enforcement 51

Permits 51

Certificates Of Occupancy 51

Fees 52

Amendments 52

Zoning Policies And Procedures 53

Policies And Procedures For City Initiated
Zoning Activities 53

Procedures For Rezoning Request By
Citizen/Property Owner 55

34a
ARTICLE XXII
BOARD OF ZONING APPEALS

Section 22.01. Creation Of Board Of Zoning Appeals 56
Section 22.02. Membership And Appointments 56
Section 22.03. Term of Office 56
Section 22.04. Compensation 56
Section 22.05. Rules And Procedures 56
Section 22.06. Administrative Assistance 56
Section 22.07. Meetings 56
Section 22.08. Appeals And Review 57
Section 22.09. Fee For Appeals 57

Section 22.10.

Section 22.11.
Section 22.12.

Powers Of Board Of Zoning Appeals
Concerning Variances 57

Notice of Hearing 59

Approval Period 60

ARTICLE XXIll

INTERPRETATION, APPLICATION, VIOLATIONS,
VALIDITY CONFLICT AND EFFECTIVE DATE

Section 23.01. Interpretation, Purpose And Conflict 61
Section 23.02. Violations And Penalties 61

Section 23.03. Validity |

Section 23.04. Conflicting Provisions Repealed 61
Section 23.05. Effective Date 61

ZONING ORDINANCE

CITY OF BAINBRIDGE GEORGIA

PREAMBLE

An Ordinance of the City of Bainbridge. Georgia, to
regulate and restrict the use of land and buildings by dividing
the City of Bainbridge into districts; defining certain terms
used therein; imposing regulations, prohibitions and restric-
tions governing the erection, construction and reconstruction

35a

of structures and buildings and the use of lands for business,
industry, residence. social and other specified purposes; regu-
lating and limiting the height of buildings and open spaces;
regulating and limiting the density of population; limiting
congestion on the public streets by providing for off-street
parking and loading of vehicles; providing for the gradual
elimination of non conforming uses of land, buildings and
structures; establishing the boundaries of districts; providing
the means of enforcing said Ordinance and providing a
penalty for violation of said Ordinance, and repealing
conflicting ordinances.

ARTICLE I
INTRODUCTION

Section 1.01. Short Title. This Ordinance shall be known as
the Zoning Ordinance of the City of Bainbridge.

Section 1.02. Authority for Enactment The Mayor and Coun-
cil of the City of Bainbridge enact this Ordinance under the
exercise of powers conferred upon it by the Georgia State
Constitution, Article IX, Section II, Paragraph IV.

ARTICLE II
DEFINITIONS

ACCESSORY BUILDING: A subordinate building or struc-
ture on the same lot, or part of the main building, occupied by
or devoted exclusively to an accessory use.

ACCESSORY USE: A use naturally and normally incidental
to, subordinate to, and auxiliary to the permitted use of the
premises. —

ADAPTIVE RE-USE: The development of a new use for an
older building or for a building originally designed for a
special or specific purpose.Adaptive reuse is particularly
useful as a technique for preserving older buildings or historic
or architectural significance in the Central Business District
of the City.

36a

APARTMENT HOUSE: A residential structure containing
three (3) or more apartments.

BILLBOARD: Any construction or portion thereof upon
which a sign or advertisement is placed, painted, or otherwise
designated for the purpose of making anything known to the
general public, but not including bulletin boards used to
display official court or public office notices.

BOARD OF ZONING APPEALS: The words “Board of
Zoning Appeals” or, “Board” shall mean the Board of Zoning
Appeals of the City of Bainbridge.

BOARDING HOUSE: A dwelling where meals or lodging
and meals, are provided for compensation to three or more
persons by pre-arrangement for definite periods. A boarding
house is to be distinguished from a hotel, motel or a nursing
home.

BUILDING, PRINCIPAL: A building in which is conducted
the principal use of the lot on which it is located.

BUILDING HEIGHT: The vertical distance measured from
the curb level to the highest point of the roof surface, if a flat
roof: to the deck line of mansard roofs; and to the mean
height level between eaves and ridge of gable, hip, and
gambrel roofs.

CLINIC: A professional office where the services of more
than one practitioner can be obtained and where patients are
studied or treated on an out-patient basis and where no over-
night accommodations are provided.

COMMISSION: The word “Commission” shall mean the
Planning Commission of Bainbridge.

CONVALESCENT HOME: A convalescent home is a home
for the care of children or the aged or infirm, or a place of rest
for those suffering bodily disorders, wherein two or more
persons are cared for. Said home shall conform and qualify
for license under State laws.

37a

CONDOMINIUM HOME: A form of ownership of less than
the whole of a building or system of buildings under a statute
which provides the mechanics and facilities for formal filing
and recording of divided interest in real property, whether the
division is vertical or horizontal.

DAY CARE FACILITY: A day care facility is any indi-
vidual or jointly owned facility designated to offer care
and/or training to children unrelated to the owner or director
for any part of a day on some kind of a regular basis. Such
facility may or may not be operated for profit. Day care is not
a baby-sitting service to be used for the convenience of the
parents at irregular intervals (Drop-ins).

DENSITY: The number of families residing on, or dwelling
units developed on an acre or land. As used in this ordinance,
all densities are stated in families per gross acre.

DRIVE-IN ESTABLISHMENT: A business establishment,
other than a drive-in restaurant. so developed that its retail or
service character is dependent on providing a driveway
approach or parking spaces for motor vehicles so as to serge
patrons while in the motor vehicle.

DRIVE-IN RESTAURANT: A drive-in restaurant or. other
drive-in establishment serving food and/or drink so developed
that its retail or service character is dependent on providing a
driveway approach or parking spaces for motor vehicles so as
to serve patrons while in the motor vehicle.

DWELLING, SINGLE FAMILY: A building or portion
thereof used or designed for use as a residence for a single
family.

DWELLING, MULTIPLE: A building or portion thereof
used or designed as a residence for three or more families
living independently or each other and doing their own
cooking in said building. This definition includes three-family

38a

houses, four-family houses, and apartment houses, but
does not include hotels, motels, trailer camps or mobile
home parks.

FAMILY: One or more persons living together and related
by blood, marriage, or legal adoption, and occupying a
dwelling unit as a single non-profit housekeeping unit as
distinguished from a group occupying a hotel, club. boarding
house, fraternity or sorority house. A family shall be deemed
to include domestic servants. gratuity guests, and not more
than three foster or boarded children whose room and board is
paid by a recognized child care agency or organization.

FLEA MARKET: A market at which second hand articles
are displayed and sold.

GARAGE, PRIVATE: An accessory building designed or
used for the storage of not more than three motor driven
vehicles owned and used by the occupants of the building to
which it is accessory.

GARAGE, PUBLIC: Any premises used for the storage or
care of motor driven vehicles, or place where any such
vehicles are equipped for operation, repaired or kept for
remuneration. hire or sale.

GROUP HOME: A group home is a residential use (home)
of a property in residential areas of the City of Bainbridge for
the care of individuals in the home environment which have
mental and/or developmental disabilities or individuals who
will benefit socially from living in a group environment. All
group homes must be licensed by the appropriate state
agency.

GUEST HOUSE: A building or portion thereof used or
esigned for uses as a residence, specifically as an accessory
use to be the principal building. Z

39a

HALF-WAY-HOME: A group home facility which is
licensed or supervised by any Federal, State, or County
health/welfare agency relating to drug abuse problems,
offender rehabilitation or similar purposes.

HOME OCCUPATION: Any use conducted entirely within
the dwelling and carried on by the inhabitants thereof, which
use is incidental and secondary to the use of the dwelling for
dwelling purposes and does not change the character thereof.
Provided further, that no article or service is sold or offered
for sale on the premises, except such as is produced by such
occupation; that such occupation shall not require internal or
external alterations or construction features, equipment,
machinery, outdoor storage, or signs not customary in resi-
dential areas. One (1) non-illuminated name plate, which is
not more than two (?) square feet in area. may be attached to
the building which shall contain only the name and
occupation of the resident of the premises. Clinics. hospitals,
barber shops, beauty parlors, and child care center day
nurseries, among others. shall not be deemed to be home
occupations.

KENNEL: Any lot or premises on which three (3) or more
dogs, four (4) months or more old. are kept either perm-
anently or temporarily, for purpose of sale, care, breeding or
training for which any fee is charged.

MINI-WAREHOUSE: A buildings s that contains varying
sizes or individual. compartmentalized and control-access
stalls or lockers for storing the excess personal property of an
individual or tamily. No business agtivities other than the
rental of storage units shall be conducted on the premises.

MOBILE HOME: “Mobile Home” is a detached single
family dwelling unit, designed for longterm occupancy,
which has been prefabricated and then transported to its site
or to a sales lot usually on its own wheels, except the units
commonly referred to as the “Double-wiles”, and requires

40a

only minor work before occupancy such as connection to
utilities or to a foundation. Such units are usually fully
equipped and furnished. Mobile Homes must bear the
insignia issued by the U. S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development (H. U. D.) All mobile homes within the
City of Bainbridge will either be located within a mobile
home park or mobile home ‘subdivision.

MOBILE HOME PARK: “Mobile Home Park” shall mean a
licensed business operation which leases spaces for
permanent or for temporary occupancy for periods exceeding
thirty (30) days for mobile homes and, under some con-
ditions, travel trailers.

MOBILE HOME SUBDIVISION: A “Mobile Home Sub-
division” is defined as at least a three (3) acre site which has
been designed for the subdivision of individual lots for
exclusive mobile home development.

MODULAR HOMES: “Modular Homes” means a factory-
fabricated single family dwelling which is constructed in one
or more sections. “These units are manufactured in accord-
ance with the Georgia Industrialized Building Act and the
rules of the Department of Community Affairs issued
pursuant thereto.” Each unit must bear a seal of approval
issued by the Commissioner of DCA.

OPEN AIR BUSINESS USES: Open air business uses shall
include the following:

a. Retail sale of trees, shrubbery, plants, flowers, seed,
topsoil, humus, fertilizer, trellises, lawn furniture,
playground equipment and other home garden sup-
plies and equipment.

b. Retail sale of fruit and vegetables.

c. Miniature golf, golf driving range, children’s amuse-
ment park or similar recreation uses.

4la

d. Bicycle, trailer. motor vehicles. boats or home equip-
ment sales, service or rental services.

e. Outdoor display and sale of garages, swimming pools,
and similar use.

PLANNED UNIT DEVELOPMENT: A Planned Unit De-
velopment is a single parcel of land within which a number of
buildings are located or intended to be located in accordance
with an overall plan of design and not in relation to a
prearranged pattern of land subdivision. Examples of a
Planned Unit Development (P.U.D.) include a complex of
apartment buildings or a shopping center with a number of
stores.

SERVICE STATION: A building or structure designed or
used for the retail sale or supple of fuels, lubricants, air, water
and other operating commodities for motor vehicles, aircraft
or boats. and including the customary space and facilities for
the installation of such commodities on or in such vehicles,
and including space for facilities for the temporary storage of
vehicles not over forty-eight (48) hours, minor repair, or
servicing, but not including buffing, painting, refinishing,
steam cleaning, rust-proofing, or high speed washing thereof.

SIGN, OUTDOOR ADVERTISING: Any card, cloth, paper,
metal, glass, plastic, wood. plaster, stone or sign of other
material of any kind, placed for outdoor advertising purposes
on the ground or on any tree. wall, bush, rock, post, fence,
building, structure, or thing whatsoever. The term “placed: as
used in the definition of “Outdoor Advertising Sign”, and
“Outdoor Advertising Structure’’ shall include erecting, con-
structing, posting, painting, printing, tacking, nailing, gluing,
sticking, carving or other fastening, affixing or making visible
in any manner whatsoever. See also ‘‘BILLBOARD”.

TOWN HOUSE: One of a group of two or more attached
single family residences. Each town house unit is separated
from the adjoining unit or units by an approved fire wall or

42a

walls. Fire walls shall be located on the lot line. Each town
house has a front and rear ground level entrance. The town
house is located on its own approved. recorded “lot”.

VARIANCE: A variance is a relaxation of the terms of the
Zoning Ordinance where such variance will not be contrary to
the public interest and where, owing to conditions peculiar to
the particular property and not the result of any action of the
applicant, a literal enforcement of this Ordinance’s require-
~ ments would result in unnecessary and undue hardship (see
Section 22.10).

ARTICLE VII
R4A, SINGLE FAMILY RESIDENTIAL DISTRICT

Section 7.01. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE. The Single
Family Residential District is established as a district in
which the principal use of land is for single family dwellings.
For the single family residential district, the specific intent of
this Section is:

a. To encourage the construction of and the continued
use of the land for single family dwellings.

b. To discourage any land use which would generate
traffic on minor or local streets, other than normal
traffic to serve the residences on those streets.

Section 7.02. PERMITTED USES.

a. Single family detached dwellings, except mobile
homes.

b. Accessory buildings or uses customarily incidental to
any of the permitted uses, when located on the same
lot and not involving any business, profession, trade
or occupation. One (1) private garage for each
residential lot in which there are housed not more than
four (4) automobiles, not more than one (1) of which
may be a commercial vehicle not larger than a reg-
ularly manufactured pick-up or panel truck of 7500

43a

lbs. gross vehicle weight capacity, which shall be
housed within a garage and provided said commercial
vehicle is owned and operated by a member of the
family that resides in said living unit.

Section 7.03. USES PERMITTED AFTER SPECIAL
REVIEW BY THE PLANNING COMMISSION AND
APPROVED BY THE CITY COUNCIL.

a. Churches, provided that the proposed site is not less
than two (2) acres and a complete site development
sketch is submitted with the application and provision
is made for off-street parking.

b. Public and private schools.
. c. Recreational developments.

d. Cemeteries, provided that a complete site develop-
ment sketch is submitted with the application.

e. Clubs and fraternal organizations not operating for
profit provided that:

1. The buildings are not placed closer than fifty (50)
feet to any property lines; and

2. There is a planted buffer-strip at least ten (10) feet
wide along the side and rear lot lines.

f. Public buildings, structures or land uses.

g. Hospitals and clinics.

h. Home Occupations—Home occupations as limited
and defined in Article II.

44a

ARTICLE VIII
R-I, SINGLE-FAMILY RESIDENTIAL DISTRICT

Section 8.01. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE. The Single-
Family Residential Districts are established as districts in
which the principal use of land is for single-family dwell-
ings. For the R-1 single-family residential districts, in
promoting the general purpose of these regulations. the
specific intent of this Section is:

a. To encourage the construction of, and the continued
use of the land for single-family dwellings.

Section 8.02. PERMITTED USES

Any permitted use in the R-1 A district, except mobile
homes.

Section 8.03. USES PERMITTED AFTER SPECIAL
REVIEW BY THE PLANNING COMMISSION AND
APPROVED BY THE CITY COUNCIL.

a. Any use listed under Section 7.03 of R-1 A district.

Section 8.04. AREA, HEIGHT, AND PLACEMENT
REQUIREMENTS. (In accordance with the Schedule of
Regulations. Article XX).

ARTICLE IX
R-2. TWO-FAMILY AND MULTIPLE-FAMILY
RESIDENTIAL DISTRICT

Section 9.01. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE, The intent of the
R-2 Residential District is to provide for medium to higher
density residential development; to provide for variety in the
City’s housing stock, to encourage neighborhood mainten-
ance and preservation by allowing the conversion of large
single-family homes to two family and multi-family use; and
to provide suitable areas for new multi-family development.

45a
Section 9.02. PERMITTED USES.

a. Any use permitted in the R-1 residential district,
except mobile homes.

b. Two family (Duplex) residential.
Multi-family (apartments and condominiums) *

d. Townhouses (subject to the provisions of Article XI,
Sections 11.04 through 11.07.)

Section 9.03. USES PERMITTED AFTER SPECIAL
REVIEW BY THE PLANNING COMMISSION AND
APPROVAL BY THE CITY COUNCIL.

a. Mortuaries.

b. Cemeteries.

c. Professional offices.

d. Public and private schools.

e. Public Buildings.

f. Art, music, photographic and dance studies.

g. Recreation development.

h. Boarding homes.

i. Home occupations.

j. Clinics.

k. Hospital and rest homes.

1. Nursery school, kindergarten, day care facilities.

m. Half-way houses.

* For development of apartment units of only one building on a given
site. The R-PUD development standards Article X, Sections 10.05
through 10.08, will apply to multiple dwellings of more than one building
on a given site.

46a

n. Other uses similar to the above and compatible with
the local neighborhood and environment as interpreted
by the Planning Commission and approved by the
City Council.

Section 9.04. AREA HEIGHT -AND PLACEMENT
REQUIREMENTS. (In accordance with the Schedule of
Regulations, Article XX). -

ARTICLE X
R-PUD, RESIDENTIAL PLANNED UNIT
DEVELOPMENT DISTRICT

Section 10.01. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE. It is the
intention of this section to provide areas of sufficient size and
allowing reasonable flexibility in design and orientation for
the establishment of a structure, or group of structures, which
includes multiple dwellings designed in a planned unit
development of more than one building on a given site.

Therefore, the Zoning Ordinance regulations relative to
area, height, bulk and placement may, in the Planned Unit
Development District, be modified by the Planning Com-
mission and City Council, in the case of a plan for a large
scale development which, in the judgment of the Planning
Commission and City Council, provides adequate open space
and improvements for circulation. recreation, light, air and
service needs of the tract when fully developed, provided that
in no case may the density of the proposed planned unit
development exceed 13 dwelling units per acre and provided
further that the minimum site size for the residential planned
unit development is three (3) acres.

Section 10.02. PROCEDURES FOR PUD (R-PUD, C-PUD)
APPROVAL. Any proposed property for PUD development
must first be rezoned to the appropriate (R-PUD or CPUD)
zoning classification. The PUD rezoning procedure will
generally follow the same procedures as other rezoning

47a

requests. However, the applicant for PUD zoning shall submit
a preliminary site development plan of the proposed
development at the same time a petition for PUD zoning
is made.

No rezoning for PUD will be granted to a petitioner until
the preliminary site plan is reviewed by the Planning
Commission and approved by the City Council, respecting
other property rezoning criteria established by the City.

Section 10.03. PERMITTED USES. In all R-PUD Districts,
no building or land, except as otherwise provided in this
Ordinance, shall be erected or used except for one or more of
the following specified uses:

a. One, two, and multi-family dwelling units including
town house dwellings.

b. Mobile home parks, provided that the density of the
proposed mobile home park shall not exceed ten ( 10)
dwelling units per acre and provided further that the
minimum size of the proposed mobile home park shall
be not less than four (4) acres, and meet appropriate
design standards.

Section 10.04. USES PERMITTED AFTER SPECIAL
REVIEW BY THE PLANNING COMMISSION AND
APPROVAL BY THE CITY COUNCIL.

Any use listed under Sections 9.03 of R-2 District.

Section 10.05. PRELIMINARY REVIEW. Preliminary re-
view is recommended as an aid to both the developer and to
the City. Under this procedure, a developer provides the
information which is described below and the Planning
Commission then acts on the information provided. This
review is intended to then serve as a guide for the immediate
inspection of the Planning Commission, subject to a thorough
study and analysis. Changes and additions which may have to

48a

be made before a mutual agreement is reached can be made
at such time without excessive engineering costs to the
developer.

Section 10.06. PROCEDURE FOR PRELIMINARY AP-
PROVAL. An application shall be submitted to the Planning
Commission by the owner or his authorized representative for

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386015_1823%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
