# Opposition Brief — Sodexho Marriott Services, Inc. v. McReynolds

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2003
- **Citation:** 540 U.S. 818

## Text

aa

my 99 909

No. 02-1781 ~ | JUL ce Y eens

Jn The
Supreme Court of the Anited States
¢

SODEXHO MARRIOTT SERVICES, INC.,

Petitioner,
v.

CYNTHIA CARTER MCREYNOLDS, et al.,

Respondents.

¢

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari
To The United States Court Of Appeals
For The District Of Columbia Circuit

¢

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION
TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

¢

KERRY ALAN SCANLON*

DAVID O. BICKART

STEVEN S. ROSENTHAL

T. MELINDAH BUSH

NICOLE J. BECTON

KAYE SCHOLER LLP

901 15th Street, N.W., Suite 1100
Washington, DC 20005

(202) 682-3500

Attorneys for Respondents

* Counsel of Record

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO. (800) 225-6964
OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831

QUESTION PRESENTED

Should this Court review a decision by the court of
appeals denying an interlocutory appeal under Rule 23(f)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, where the decision
is one committed to the sole and unfettered discretion of

the courts of appeals?

ii

‘TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
QUESTION PRESENTE D)........0cssceverssvssesssnvavsesevesss i
COUNTER-STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................ 1
REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT.................... 10

A.

The Court of Appeals’ Decision Not to Accept
Sodexho’s Petition for Interlocutory Review
Was Committed to that Court’s Discretion
and Does Not Warrant This Court’s Review...

. The Language, History and Advisory

Committee Notes of Rule 23(f) Support the
Conclusion that the Decision Whether to
Grant Interlocutory Review is Committed to
the Sole, Unfettered Discretion of the Courts
OC DRDOUAB: oss0cssninessniiincimaiinmaatin

There is No Circuit Conflict on Rule 23(f)
UTR oncnsvsinnnsvnsiiintacsiqnadiminiananecmmacatons,

The Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure Has Identified No Problems with
Rule 23(f) that Require Fixing at This Time;
Any Efforts to Circumscribe the Courts of
Appeals’ Discretion As to Whether to Review
Class Certification Orders Should be Left to
the Committee or to Congress...............:0ecce00s

Even if the District Court’ Partial
Certification Order Presented Unsettled
Issues of Class Action Law for D.C. Circuit
Review, That Fact Provides No Reason for
This Court to Review This Case................0006

CONCLUEEIN coscnrrevsssneciannsanbionnieanaiimmemnntanineiiinia

10

12

14

18

LUST

ill
TABLE OF CONTENTS -- Continued

i cospccssnvissensnisienasbvovoaunsnbone App. 1

Letter from Judge Anthony J. Scirica to Honorable
F. James Sensenbrenruer, Jr.

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES
Blair v. Equifax Check Servs., Inc., 181 F.3d 832
CE SE. SEE chiianicnniimiatiiananmnneian 15, 16
Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978) ...10, 13
Cook v. Boorstin, 763 F.2d 1462 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ............... 4
General Telephone Company of the Southwest v.
Fetes, GBF UB. BAT CI vice cvcsccescoscssnsiissessassovessoveenss 3
Hartman v. Duffey, 19 F.3d 1459 (D.C. Cir. 1994).............. 3
In re Delta Air Lines, 310 F.3d 953 (6th Cir. 2002),
cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2252 (2003) ........... sihlinialcaiilatal 15,17
In re Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litig., 289
Ae BO CES... CR, cis csencacevasesessosesvicssess 11, 15, 16, 17
Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., 338 U.S.
He ticks ciiiciniennncaistaseiaessnenbintiaseiienelaisiesanaiainmcodaen 13, 14

Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Norris, 529 U.S.
1107 (2000), denying cert., 191 F.3d 283 (2d Cir.

Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Robinson, 535
U.S. 951 (2002), denying cert., 267 F.3d 147 (2d

Se: Bn eiish sins cinnierinlaiichtnndasneennaiaascpd tutabucneidinianssiebiasades 21
ivewton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 259 F.3d 154 (3d Cir. 2001)................ eee ee 16, 17, 19

Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Chase, No. 02-1447
(June 6, 2003), denying cert., 310 F.3d 953 (6th
NG SI cicnesssnecunsincicsgsannliniadtte ecccaietiianeitiniadgaieapeeneddlaacasininesies 20

Prado-Steinman ex rel. Prado v. Bush, 221 F.3d
SA GEE Se CN va niiececnsskevintinpinvarsennontnnerniantantesebucns 16

~

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page

Segar v. Civiletti, 508 F. Supp. 690 (D.D.C. 1981),

aff’d, 738 F.2d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1984)...........ccsscceseeeeeeees 4
Swint v. Chambers County Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35

(FID ciosinisscistssincecntensinpiiviisin academician 15
Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 584 U.S. 951

(2001), denying cert., 249 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2001)........ 20
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989)...........::cecsesrereeeeeeeees 14
United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55 (2002)... eens 13
Visa U.S.A., Inc. v. Walmart Stores, Inc., 536 U.S.
~ 917 (2002), denying cert., 280 F.2d 124 (2d Cir.

ED sicssisickinsncosvercsnkitenienteteniunssakasesancbiabalimdentsliaeman ial 20
STATUTES
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) cenisiiisaneceadidieh nbiiaead astlidealamniiaiaadeiaenaacamal 11
43 UB.C. GF BOG 00 OF BOG, sevsivesievnvesiesscsncssamassationeaninervmintin 2
GRU BL. 6 Th kidman: 2
Rules Enabling Act, Pub. L. No. 102-572, § 101, 106

Stat. 4506 (codified as 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e)).................65 10
RULES
Pek, Kh. Aanth. Fi GG) scevvesivcisssvevnsninvivecnicsmetiecensiagmmeniananl 15
Pad. B: Bee. Pe NG covnioccinniceeenneee 15
Pod, Fy Cae Fe Be vistcssssertnianiviccniominmnncnieneaeena 4
Ped. Th, Ce Fe a icecccncccesiansitosusieninccnnsinmintinncaanisin passim

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued
Page

MISCELLANEOUS

Administrative Office of U.S. Courts, “Judicial
Business of the United States Courts 2002,”
Table X-4, available at http:/;www.uscourts.gov/
JUDAS UIA TREIIUE DEINE wens nessienrevinininiionnsncemmmnnnontnenaes 18

Letter from Judge Anthony J. Scirica to Honorable
F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., reprinted in H.R.
Rep. No. 106-144 at 127 (2O0SB)........::.ss0sveseorssesssrsssssverses 19

1

COUNTER-STATEMENT OF THE CASE’

This employment discrimination case challenges a
promotion process that used to be common 40 and 50 years
ago. Supervisors and senior officials, who are overwheln -
ingly white, have been given free reign to handpick their
selections from lower management ranks without a
competitive posting process, without using any predeter-
mined selection criteria and without recording why they
selected their favored promotion candidates and rejected
or declined to consider disfavored candidates. A leading
industrial psychologist described this system as “lax and
corruptible,” and prone to discrimination against racial
minorities. Prien Rep. J 4, Exhibit 11 to Motion for Class
Certification, Docket No. 34.’ No one should be surprised
that the company’s “good old boy network,” as some of its
white managers described it, did in fact discriminate
against black managers. Hendrickson Dep. at 164, 166,
184, Exhibit 7 to Motion for Class Certification, Docket
No. 34. Racism flourished in this system and the com-
pany’ own human resources personnel, including a
corporate vice president, agreed that the supervisors
involved in most of the promotion decisions “won't hire
[black people].” Petitioner’s Appendix (hereinafter “Pet.
App.”) B at lla.

The Respondents charge that the Petitioner, Sodexho
Marriott Services, Inc. (“Sodexho”), has denied its
African-American managers promotions and promotion

* This Counter-Statement of the Case, accompanied by record
citations, is submitted in response to Petitioner’s Statement of the
Case, which is devoid of record citations.

? The record citations in this brief are to the district court record
and docket numbers because no record on appeal was created

2

opportunities, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seg. and the Civil Rights
Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, in the following ways,
among others: “(1) positions are filled without being posted
at all; (2) when jobs are posted, favored employees are
preselected for the positions; and (3) when ‘more than one
person is actually considered for an opening, hiring man-
agers have virtually total discretion in their promotion
decisions because they are not given job-related or objec-
tive criteria and are not required to document the reasons
for their decisions, making them unreviewable.’” Pet. App.
B at 9a-10a. The Complaint further alleges that Sodexho’s
African-American managers face a “glass wall” as well as a
“glass ceiling,” because they have been shunted into dead-
end “black” accounts that serve and are supervised mostly
by African-Americans. See Class Complaint at { 24k, 27,
Docket No. 1. The Complaint seeks extensive and highly
detailed injunctive relief, including requiring Sodexho to
adopt and implement a validated promotion selection
procedure, including job posting and interview policies and
to keep records of its selection criteria and its promotion
decisions. Id. at 52-54. The Complaint also seeks back pay
and compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at 54.°

* The Complaint seeks no particular amount of damages, let alone
the $1 billion cited in the Petition, Pet. at 4, which assumes without a
shred of record support that every class member would recover
$300,000 — the statutory maximum under Title VII. The Petition
provides no record support for this assumption, and the only class
member testimony relied on by Petitioner in the District Court merely
observed that the amount of damages was for a jury to decide. See, e.g.,
Richardson Dep. at 214-21, Exhibit 98 to Motion for Class Certification,
Docket No. 34.

After six months of discovery, the respondents moved
to certify the case as a class action on behalf of all ad-
versely impacted African-American salaried employees at
Sodexho or its predecessors during the class period who
held or sought to hold upper-level managerial or supervi-
sory positions or jobs leading to those positions. See Pet.
App. B at 10a. Petitioner estimated that 2,600 Sodexho
employees are included in the certified class and Respon-
dents do not dispute that the number of class members is
roughly in the range of a few thousand.

Under D.C. Circuit law applying this Court’s holding
in General Telephone Company of the Southwest v. Falcon,
457 U.S. 147 (1982), the class representatives are required
to make a “significant showing” that Sodexho’s promotion
practices operated under a “common policy” of discrimina-
tion. Hartman v. Duffey, 19 F.3d 1459, 1472 (D.C. Cir.
1994) (citing Wagner v. Taylor, 836 F.2d 578, 589 (D.C. Cir.
1987)). Pet. App. B at 27a-28a, 32a. In evaluating whether
Respondents made a “significant showing,” the district
court considered nine volumes of Sodexho documents,
depositions, transcripts and expert reports. Jd. at 3a. The
portrait that emerged from this “comprehensive record,”
id., was of a promotion process that was typical of the
early 1960s, which is rife with the risk that managers,
exercising unlimited and unreviewable discretion, will
continue promoting white employees to higher positions
previously occupied by whites and keeping black employ-
ees in lower-level positions traditionally held by blacks.

Sodexho’s selection procedures do not represent, as
Petitioner suggests, merely “decentralized” decisionmak-
ing. Instead, as the district court found, “the testimony of
Sodexho’s own witness, as well as that of other company
employees confirms that Sodexho’s policy and practice is to

4

allow each manager to make promotion decisions based on
whatever crite:ia he or she chooses, with no guidance or
rules.” Id. at 3la-32a. Sodexho’s hiring managers have
“complete discretion” to decide whom to interview for each
position. Jd. at 9a. They are subject to no rules and are
given no guidelines on how to evaluate or rank those
promotion candidates that they do interview. Jd. And they
typically keep no notes or other documentation to explain
their selection. Jd. Upon reviewing this system, whose
elements Sodexho’s own witnesses repeatedly confirmed,
one of this countrys foremost industrial psychologists
testified that in 40 years he had never encountered a
company of Sodexho’s size with such “lax and corruptible
selection criteria and procedures.” Motion for Class Certi-
fication at 1, Docket No. 34.

The D.C. Circuit has long recognized that promotion
systems, like Sodexho’s, that are “unchecked,” “unvali-
dated” and “subjective” present a great risk of racial bias
when the decisionmakers are predominantly white. See,
e.g., Cook v. Boorstin, 763 F.2d 1462, 1472 (D.C. Cir. 1989);
Segar v. Civiletti, 508 F. Supp. 690, 706 (D.D.C. 1981),
aff’d, 738 F.2d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1984).* However, Respon-
dents did not rely solely on facts that showed a risk of

* Sodexho’s class certification opposition ignored these controlling
precedents. Its petition for certiorari compounds its earlier error by
misstating that the district court found a “lack of controlling precedent”
on whether subjective selection criteria may-represent a common issue
of fact or law supporting certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). Pet. at
23. The “controlling precedent” which the district court found lacking
consisted of district court opinions in other circuits upon which Sodexho
had relied. These opinions were not “controlling” because they involved
very different facts. Pet. App. B at 35a.

5

bias. They presented, and the district court considered,
admissions by high-ranking Sodexho managers that their
companys promotion system was indeed “corrupt.” For
example, human resource managers from across the
country, who work closely with the promotion system,
admitted that “our district managers won’t hire black
people.” Pet. App. B at 1la-12a. Sodexho’s top official and
corporate representative for equal employment opportu-
nity issues testified that the sparse number of “African-
American promotions ‘indicated a problem’ and ‘would be
considered low.’” Jd. at 11a. A senior-level white manager
also provided several examples of preselection of white
managers for promotions and racist statements by other
white upper-level managers, such as “African Americans
were genetically inferior to whites, and genetically most of
the criminals in the world were African Americans, and
that they didn’t deserve to have promotions.” Jd. at 12a.

Contrary to Sodexho’s unsupported assertions in its
petition about its “aggressive pursuit of affirmative ac-
tion,” Pet. at 5, the record also shows, and the district
court found, that Sodexho’s top managers admitted that
they had a problem promoting blacks to upper-level jobs
but did nothing to remedy the problem. They tried instead
to cover it up. For example, in 1995, company executives
“were made aware of the lack of African-Americans” in
upper-level jobs by members of the company’s own diver-
sity roundtable group, yet they did nothing to address or
remedy the problem. Pet. App. B at 12a-13a. In fact, a
Sodexho executive refused to permit a class member to

6

review its workforce diversity data because “the numbers
really don’t look very good.” Id. at 13a.°

The Respondents buttressed their showing of class-
wide discrimination with a statistical analysis of Sodexho’s
company-wide promotion data by Dr. Bernard Siskin,
whose opinions Petitioner concedes satisfy Fed. R. Evid.
702, i.e., are “based upon sufficient facts or data,” are the
“product of reliable principles and methods” and have been
applied “reliably to the facts of the case.” Pet. at 8 (conced-
ing that Dr. Siskin’s report satisfied threshold for admissi-
bility). Dr. Siskin concluded that Sodexho’s company-wide
promotion process had resulted in statistically significant
racial disparities in promotions adverse to African-
Americans. See Pet. App. B at 15a-16a. After examining
over 10,000 promotions from 1995-2001, Dr. Siskin esti-
mated, with a high degree of confidence (statistically
significant at more than eight standard deviations, far

* Sodexho also argues, with no record citation whatsoever, that its
“employment practices have been reviewed numerous times by the U.S.
Department of Labor’s Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs
(“OFCCP”) and have repeatedly received a clean bill of health.” Pet. at
5. However, Sodexho’s own corporate witness for equal employment
opportunity and affirmative action issues admitted that although the
Department of Labor requires annual affirmative action plans for each
individual unit with more than 50 employees, of which Sodexho has
hundreds, Petitioner has produced only about 20 affirmative action
plans (“AAPs”), none of which covered more than a single year. See
Watkis Dep. v.2 at 181-83, Exhibit 4 to Motion for Class Certification,
Docket No. 34. Those AAPs appear to have been created only in
response to the handful of audits by the OFCCP for a few individual
units. Such threadbare affirmative action compliance is hardly “aggres-
sive,” but instead falls short of even the basic affirmative action
requirements. Moreover, an OFCCP audit of only a handful of units
cannot be construed as a “clean bill of health.”

NTR AAAS AT NI A

above the 1.96 standard deviations which the D.C. Circuit
has accepted) that African-Americans had received far
fewer promotions than one would expect in a race-neutral
promotion process. See Pet. App. B at 15a-l6a & n.12;
Siskin Rep. at {9 24, 33, Exhibit 9 to Motion for Class
Certification, Docket No. 34; Siskin Supp. Rep. at 76,
Exhibit 50 to Motion for Class Certification, Docket No.
34. The district court recognized that under controlling
D.C. Circuit precedent, such a statistically significant
disparity, standing alone, is sufficient to establish the
presence of a class-wide discriminatory practice. Pet. App.
B at 16a n.12 (citing Anderson v. Zubieta, 180 F.3d 329,
339-40 (D.C. Cir. 1999)). Dr. Siskin’s analysis also sup-
ported the plaintiffs’ “glass wall” allegation. He found that
African-American managers are segregated by race into
predominantly “black accounts,” with nearly two-thirds of
all African-American managers in large accounts concen-
trated in less than ten percent of those accounts, while
two-thirds of those accounts (596 out of 878) have no
African-American managers at all. See id. at 16a.

The district court declined Petitioner’s request to
weigh Dr. Siskin’s analysis against the competing analysis
of the same data offered by its expert. Although the
district court ruled that the case law did not support
weighing conflicting expert opinions at the class certifica-
tion stage, id. at 13a-14a and n.10, it nevertheless consid-
ered Sodexho’s criticisms of Dr. Siskin’s statistical analysis
that have now been recycled in the certiorari petition.
First, contrary to Sodexho’s contention that Dr. Siskin
“failed to assess whether the shortfall [of African-
American promotions] was national in scope or was
limited to particular divisions, regions, or local operating
units,” see Pet. at 4, the district court recognized that he

8

had indeed found that these statistically significant racial
disparities existed company-wide. See Pet. App. B at 17a.
Next, the district court rejected Petitioner’s criticism,
which it raises again in this Court, that Dr. Siskin failed to
consider whether disparities in education or work experi-
ence explained the racial disparity in promotions. See Pet.
at 8-9. Because Sodexho had no computerized data on
education or work experience that an expert could use, the
district court refused to “penalize” respondents for So-
dexho’s own “lack of centralized controls and record
keeping.” Pet. App. B at 38a n.25.°

The district court also rejected Petitioner’s contention
that the class representatives were inadequate, because
the class potentially included managers who had super-
vised other class members. Jd. at 48a-49a. Consistent with
other district court decisions in the circuit, the district
court read the leading D.C. Circuit decision on intra-class
conflicts to require a case-by-case evaluation of the impact
of a potential conflict among supervisors on the class
member’s adequacy, and on the particular facts of this

* The testimony of its statistical expert; Dr. Haworth, was neither
(as described by Sodexho) more “objective” nor “more accurate” (Pet. at
5, 6) than Dr. Siskin’s. To take but one example, Dr. Haworth unac-
countably assumed the only qualified candidates for “open” positions
came from those few, other units from which successful candidates had
previously been selected. For example, Dr. Haworth’s “pool” of two
white managers who were, by her assumption, the only ones “available”
for a position at American University in Washington, D.C., included a
white man from North Carolina, who was selected for the job, and
excluded 31 blacks in the same job category in the Washington, D.C.
area, five of whom already worked at American University. See Siskin
Decl. at J 4, Exhibit 92 to Respondent’s Reply Memorandum In Support
of Its Motion for Class Certification, Docket No. 47.

9

case, found the potential for conflict to be minimal. Jd. at
47a (citing Wagner v. Taylor).

Therefore, the district court found that Respondents
had “made a ‘significant showing’ [as required by D.C.
Circuit precedent] that Sodexho’s lack of any uniform
promotion policy or guidelines has had a disparate impact
on the promotion of African-American employees, and has
enabled or even fostered an environment at the company
in which officials intentionally discriminate against blacks
by denying them promotions to upper-level managerial
positions.” Id. at 32a. On June 25, 2002, the Court certi-
fied, for liability purposes only, a class of African-American
managers employed by Sodexho since March 27, 1998. Id.
at 3a-4a, 53a-54a. Pending a determination on liability,
the Court deferred decision on certifying any remedial
issues, such as those involving back pay or any other
monetary relief. Id. at 5la-52a.

On July 10, 2002, Petitioner filed a Rule 23(f) petition
for interlocutory appeal, which the court of appeals denied
because it did not present “any ‘unsettled and fundamen-
tal issue[s] of law relating to class actions, important both
to the specific litigation and generally, that [are] likely to
evade end-of-the-case review.’” Pet. App. A at la-2a.
Sodexho now seeks review of the court of appeals’ discre-
tionary order denying its Rule 23(f) petition.

¢

10

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

A. The Court of Appeals’ Decision Not to Accept
Sodexho’s Petition for Interlocutory Review
Was Committed to that Court’s Discretion and
Does Not Warrant This Court’s Review

With very limited exceptions, the U.S. courts of
appeals have jurisdiction to review only “final” district
court orders, and district court orders granting or denying
class certification are “interlocutory,” not “final.” In Coo-
pers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978), this Court
held that class certification orders are not reviewable
unless both the district court certifies the order under 28
U.S.C. § 1292(b) and the would-be appellant persuades the
court of appeals that “exceptional circumstances justify a
departure from the basic policy of postponing appellate
review until after the entry of a final judgment.” 437 U.S.
at 475 (quoting Fisons, Ltd. v. United States, 458 F.2d
1241, 1248 (7th Cir. 1972)). Coopers & Lybrand recognizes
that section 1292(b)’s screening procedure requires sepa-
rate, independent discretionary decisions by the district
court and the court of appeals. Id. at 474-75. Thus, even if
the district court exercises its discretionary power to
recommend an interlocutory appeal, “[t]he appellate court
may deny the appeal for any reason, including docket
congestion.” Jd. at 475.

Congress subsequently amended the Rules Enabling
Act to authorize this Court to “prescribe rules ... to
provide for an appeal of an interlocutory decision to the
Courts of Appeals.” Pub. L. No. 102-572, § 101, 106 Stat.
4506 (codified as 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e)). The Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference
of the United States then proposed, and this Court
adopted, a new Civil Procedure Rule 23(f), which allows a

11

court of appeals “in its discretion [to] permit an appeal
from an order of a district court granting or denying class
action certification.... ” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f). Rule 23(f)
was “designed on the model of § 1292(b),” and it built upon
§ 1292(b) jurisprudence. Proposed Amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 167 F.R.D. 523, 565
(1996). The new rule modified the § 1292(b) standard in
two respects, both of which increased the court of appeals’
discretion whether to accept an interlocutory appeal from
a class certification order: The court of appeals was given
discretion to accept an appeal without a district court
certification ruling, and the court of appeals’ jurisdiction
was not limited to orders that involved “a controlling
question of law as to which there is a substantial ground
for difference of opinion. ... ” Advisory Committee Notes
to Rule 23(f). The net effect of these modifications was that
Rule 23(f) vested the courts of appeals with broad and
standardless discretion as to whether to grant review of
class certification orders.

In the four and one-half years since Rule 23(f) went
into effect, many courts of appeals have described the
criteria they will use to guide themselves in the exercise of
their discretion under Rule 23(f). Although relatively few
class actions are filed in the D.C. Circuit, last year in In re
Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litig., 289 F.3d 98
(D.C. Cir. 2002), the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit described the factors that would influ-
ence its discretion to accept an interlocutory appeal from a
class certification order. Like every other court before it
the D.C. Circuit announced that it would exercise its
discretion flexibly, mindful of the considerations that
underlie the rule, and the Advisory Committee Notes. “In
our view,” the court wrote, “interlocutory appellate review

12

under Rule 23(f) is properly directed by the guidance set
forth in the advisory committee’s note.” Id. at 104. None-
theless, agreeing with every other circuit court, the D.C.
Circuit retained ample discretion to accept review “in
special circumstances that neither the advisory commit-

tee’s note nor the courts foresaw.” Jd. at 105.

Exercising its discretion in light of Rule 23(f)’s back-
ground and language, the Advisory Committee Notes, and
its own recent writings, the D.C. Circuit chose not to
review the district court’s interlocutory order in this case.
Given the broad and standardless discretion granted the
courts of appeals by Rule 23(f), there is nothing in the D.C.
Circuit’s ruling that justifies this Court’s review.

B. The Language, History and Advisory Commit-
tee Notes of Rule 23(f) Support the Conclusion
that the Decision Whether to Grant Interlocu-
tory Review is Committed to the Sole, Unfet-
tered Discretion of the Courts of Appeals

Under congressionally-delegated authority, this Court
has provided that a court of appeals may “in its discretion”
permit an appeal from a district court’s interlocutory order
granting or denying class action certification. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 23(f). By committing class certification review to the
“discretion” of the courts of appeals, the rule provides no
standard uuder which this Court, through the exercise of
its own discretionary certiorari jurisdiction, can second-
guess how the courts of appeals exercise that discretion.
Furthermore, as discussed above, Rule 23(f) was created to
enhance the discretion that the courts of appeals had
exercised under § 1292(b), which (where the district court
has certified an interlocutory order for appeal) authorizes

13

the appellate court to “deny the appeal for any reason....”
Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 475.

The Advisory Committee Notes “provide a reliable
source of insight into the meaning of a rule, especially
when, as here, the rule was enacted precisely as the
Advisory Committee proposed.” United States v. Vonn, 535
U.S. 55, 64 n.6 (2002). The Advisory Committee Notes to
Rule 23(f) describe the appellate court’s decision to accept
an appeal as “unfettered” and subject to that court’s “sole
discretion” based on “any consideration that the court of
appeals finds persuasive.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f) Advisory
Committee Notes. The exercise of discretionary jurisdic-
tion would not be “unfettered” if this Court were to second-
guess how the appellate court exercised its discretion,
applying a legal standard of this Court’s making.

Moreover, in committing the decision whether to
entertain interlocutory review to the “sole discretion” of
the courts of appeals, Rule 23(f) was intended to allow a
court of appeals to grant or deny review based upon the
overall status of its docket, a factor which this Court is in
no position to reassess. It is, thus, entirely understandable
why the Advisory Committee Notes liken the discretion of
a court of appeals under Rule 23(f) to “the discretion of the
Supreme Court acting on a petition for certiorari.” At its
essence, the decision whether to grant a writ of certiorari
is a highly individualistic determination as to whether the
demands of this Court’s docket and the need for clarifying
the law make it desirable to review “a particular case at a
particular time.” Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc.,
338 U.S. 912, 918 (1950). Rule 23(f), likewise, expressly
granted the courts of appeals “unfettered” discretion to

14

grant review based upon the desirability of reviewing a
particular case at a particular point in time.

Because it would undermine the unfettered discretion
that Rule 23(f) has given to the federal appellate courts to
determine whether to accept an appeal thereunder, So-
dexho’s petition for a writ of certiorari to review the
appellate court’s Rule 23(f) denial should be denied.

C. There is No Circuit Conflict on Rule 23(f)
Standards

Rule 23(f) contemplates that the circuit courts will
evaluate each petition for interlocutory review on a case-
by-case basis, without being confined to any hard-and-fast
rules. In analogizing discretionary review under the new
rule to this Court’s certiorari jurisdiction, the Advisory
Committee knew that “different reasons not infrequently
move different members of the Court in concluding that a
particular case at a particular time makes review undesir-
able.” Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. at 918; see also
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 296 (1989) (noting variety of
considerations behind certiorari denial). It is therefore not
necessary or even desirable for each panel of each circuit
to employ an identical standard in choosing whether to
accept a petition for interlocutory review. Indeed, some
circuits have not announced the criteria they would
employ in acting on petitions for review, and there is

15

nothing in the rule that requires them to do so.’ The rule-
making process that culminated in Rule 23(f) concluded
that each appellate court should have free reign to pass on
interlocutory review petitions as that court sees fit, and
that decision is entitled to “full respect.” Swint v. Cham-
bers County Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 48 (1995). It is unneces-
sary and undesirable for this Court to grant certiorari to
impose any single review standard on the courts of ap-
peals.

In any event, there is no circuit conflict. Consistent
with the Advisory Committee Notes, and beginning with
Blair v. Equifax Check Servs., Inc., 181 F.3d 832 (7th Cir.
1999), every circuit that has spoken to the issue has
declined to adopt a “bright-line approach,” or to issue a
definitive “catalog of factors.” Jd. at 834. Last year, after
surveying the decisions of the seven circuits (including the
D.C. Circuit) that had already written on the issue, the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found that they all
sounded the same theme: they “eschew any hard-and-fast
test in favor of a broad discretion to evaluate relevant
factors that weigh in favor of or against an interlocutory
appeal.” In re Delta Air Lines, 310 F.3d 953, 959 (6th Cir.
2002), cert. denied, 123 S.Ct. 2252 (2003). The D.C.
Circuit’s Lorazepam opinion falls squarely within the
consensus view of every circuit: “Interlocutory appellate
review under Rule 23(f) is properly directed by the guid-
ance set forth in the advisory commiitee’s note,” and any

" Federal Appellate Rules 5(c) and 32(c) treat petitions for inter-
locutory review as “other papers,” just like petitions for rehearing,
which are commonly determined by order, without any explanation.

16

further written guidance on the subject should be under-
stood as “guidance, not a rigid test.” 289 F.3d at 104, 105.

The D.C. Circuit’s “further written guidance” as ta
when interlocutory review is appropriate is also consistent
with that of other circuits. Sodexho inaccurately portrays
the D.C. Circuit as having adopted a “death knell” rule for
class certification orders, because the court has empha-
sized that end-of-the case review remains available for
run-of-the mill challenges. Pet. at 12-13. But almost every
circuit has said much the same thing. For example the
Third Circuit, whose standards are said to present an
“irreconcilable” conflict with the D.C. Circuit, has observed
that “interlocutory review will generally prove unneces-
sary” if “allowing the litigation to follow its natural course
would provide the moving party with an adequate rem-
edy.” Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 164-65 (3d Cir. 2001). The Eleventh
Circuit has similarly cautioned against interlocutory
review of class certification orders absent “a compelling
need for resolution of the legal issue sooner, rather than
later.” Prado-Steinman ex rel. Prado v. Bush, 221 F.3d
1266, 1274 (1lth Cir. 2000). The Seventh Circuit has
agreed. In accepting review in blair v. Equifax, the court
of appeals emphasized that the certification order was
likely to “evade review at the end of the case,” because the
pending action was one of multiple suits pending in
various jurisdictions. 181 F.3d at 838.

Nor have the courts of appeals perceived any conflict
among themselves. In Newton v. Merrill Lynch, the Third
Circuit drew on the “thoughtful opinions of four other
circuits, including the First Circuit.” 259 F.3d at 163 n.3,
164 n.5. If there is anything in the First Circuit’s guidance
that is “highly restrictive” (Pet. at 14 n.9), it has escaped

17

the notice of many federal appellate judges.” Likewise,
although the Petition seeks to portray the D.C. Circuit as
unusually hostile to interlocutory review, the Sixth Circuit
has read the D.C. Circuit’s warning that interlocutory
review is the exception, rather than the rule, as consistent
with “the other courts before it.” In re Delta Air Lines, 310
F.3d at 959. In fact far from having adopted a standard
that is more restrictive than other circuits, the D.C.
Circuit regards its criteria as being more flexible and less
hostile to interlocutory review thah that of the Seventh
Circuit, the Petitioner’s paragon of liberality. In Loraze-
pam, the D.C. Circuit observed that, where the district’s
order did not sound the “death knell” for the litigation, the
Seventh Circuit would ignore entirely the likelihood that
the district court’s order was simply wrong. 289 F.3d at
105. In contrast the D.C. Circuit will not ignore district
court error, at least where such error is “manifest.” Jd.°

* Sodexho deals with this incongruity only by accusing the First
Circuit of dissimulation: “Thus the First Circuit has adopted a highly
restrictive standard closer to that of the D.C. Circuit, even though it
professes affinity with the Seventh Circuit.” Pet. at 18 n.9. And in
Sodexho’s warped world, the Second Circuit’s guidance is “significantly
more liberal” than the D.C. Circuit’s, id. at 15 n.7 (citing In re Visa-
Check /Master Money Antitrust Litig, 280 F.3d at 124, 132 n.2 (2d Cir.
2001), in which review was granted), but, nevertheless, is calculated to
“shut the door on Rule 23(f) appeals.” Pet. at 15 (citing In re Sumitomo
Copper Litig., 262 F.3d 134, 140 (2d Cir. 2001)).

* Contrary to Sodexho’s claim (Pet. at 12), it is not at all certain
that mandamus is available to correct erroneous certification orders.
Indeed, Rule 23(f) was adopted in part because courts and scholars
were “uneas[y]” that the use of mandamus to reverse class certification
orders may have unduly “stretched the writ’s traditionally restrictive
parameters.” Newton v. Merrill Lynch, 259 F.3d at 163.

18

In its attempt to manufacture a circuit conflict,
Sodexho misuses statistics, as well as words. It is neither
surprising nor significant that the Seventh Circuit has
heard quite a few Rule 23(f) appeals, while the D.C.
Circuit has not heard any. Only a handful of Rule 23(f)
petitions have reached the D.C. Circuit, in contrast to the
multitude of petitions in the Seventh Circuit and many
other circuits. The disparity in petitions reflects the
twenty-fold difference between the very few class actions
of any sort that are pending in the D.C. Circuit (23) and
the large number that are pending in the Seventh Circuit
(453). Administrative Office of U.S. Courts, “Judicial Busi-
ness of the United States Courts 2002,” Table X-4, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbususcjudbus.html.” It should
not take a statistician to recognize that meaningful com-
parisons between the circuits cannot be drawn from raw
numbers of petition grants.

D. The Committee on Rules of Practice and Pro-
cedure Has Identified No Problems with
Rule 23(f) that Require Fixing at This Time;
Any Efforts to Circumscribe the Courts of Ap-
peals’ Discretion As to Whether to Review
Class Certification Orders Should be Left to
the Committee or to Congress

Sodexho’s reliance on pending legislation to support
its view that “de minimis review” under Rule 23(f) is

” According to the latest Administrative Office Report, as of
September 30, 2002, only 0.5 percent of the 4,835 class actions pending
in the federal courts were filed in the District of Columbia, and only
three of these were civil rights employment cases. Jd.

19

“unfair” (Pet. at 27), merely confirms that adjustment of
the standards for interlocutory review is best left to
Congress. After Sodexho filed the Petition, the House of
Representatives approved H.R. 1115, sections 6 and 8 of
which make any class certification order that is entered
after this proposed law’s enactment appealable as of right.
If courts acting under the five-year-old legal regime of
Rule 23(f) do not exercise their discretion sufficiently
frequently, Congress can easily strip appellate courts of
their discretion entirely, as H.R. 1115 would do, although
even the House bill would not affect pending cases, like
this one. Other than to change the result in this case,
there is no reason for this Court to exercise its certiorari
authority to craft a new standard to govern interlocutory
review of class action orders.

Furthermore, this Court should consider that the
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the
Judicial Conference has opposed H.R. 1115. In a letter to
the Chair of the House Committee on the Judiciary, Judge
Scirica," writing for the Rules Committee, reminded the
House Committee that interlocutory appeals have gener-
ally been “disfavored because they cause unwarranted,
expensive, and wasteful interruption;” that the Rules
Committee was “unaware of any dissatisfaction expressed
by the bench and bar with ... Rule [23(f)];” and that “any
consideration of amending it should be deferred until the
bench and bar have had more experience with it.” Letter
from Judge Anthony J. Scirica to Honorable F. James

" Judge Scirica wrote Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154 (3d Cir. 2001).

20

Sensenbrenner, Jr., reprinted in H.R. Rep. No. 108-144 at
127, 128 (2003) (Appendix A).

E. Even if the District Court’s Partial Certifica-
tion Order Presented Unsettled Issues of Class
Action Law for D.C. Circuit Review, That Fact
Provides No Reason for This Court to Review
This Case

Sodexho dedicates a significant portion of its petition
to an attempt to convince this Court that the district
court’s decision presents “fundamental, unsettled issues of
class action law” worthy of D.C. Circuit review. Even if
Sodexho’s premise were correct, that premise would not
| justify certiorari review in this case. Each of the questions
that Sodexho maintains is “unsettled” has been recently
presented in petitions for certiorari to this Court, and this
Court has not found any of them worthy of review. So-
dexho posits a “conflict” between the Second. Circuit and
the Seventh Circuit (among others) on how closely courts
should scrutinize conflicting expert opinions at the class
certification stage. Pet. at 20-22. But this Court has
recently denied certiorari to review these supposedly
conflicting authorities. Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc.,
534 U.S. 951 (2001), denying cert., 249 F.3d 672 (7th Cir.
2001); Visa U.S.A., Inc. v. Walmart Stores, Inc., 536 U.S.
917 (2002), denying cert., 280 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 2001);
Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Norris, 529 U.S. 1107
(2000), denying cert., 191 F.3d 283 (2d Cir. 1999). See also
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Chase, No. 02-1447 (June 6,
2003), denying cert., 310 F.3d 953 (6th Cir. 2002). Like-
wise, although Sodexho claims a circuit split on when a
class may be certified for liability purposes only (Pet. at
26), this Court did not find it necessary to resolve that

ee ee a

21

supposed “conflict” last year. Metro-North Commuter R.R.
Co. v. Robinson, 535 U.S. 951 (2002), denying cert., 267
F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2001).” If these issues are “unsettled” —
and we do not believe that they are unsettled — this Court
has had and will continue to have ample opportunity to
resolve them in cases which present these issues. This
Court clearly has no need to follow the “roundabout”
practice of compelling the D.C. Circuit to exercise its
discretionary jurisdiction merely to set the stage for
possible consideration by this Court of issues that may
possibly be decided by the D.C. Circuit. The possible
existence of unsettled issues of class action law that might
justify D.C. Circuit review in no way supports this Court’s
grant of a Writ of Certiorari.

* Even Sodexho does not claim a circuit conflict on its third
“unsettled” issue - whether the existence of “decentralized” and
“subjective” decisionmaking can constitute a discriminatory “policy.”
(Pet. at 23-26). It cites numerous district court decisions that it claims
favor its view, but no appellate decision. And as noted in the text, this
Court has recently denied certiorari in the Caridad case, which
Sodexho describes as similar to its case. In our view, the district court’s
evaluation of all the case law as turning on the application of widely
different factual patterns, rather than any fundamental doctrinal
disagreement, is a fairer reading, and one that argues strongly against
any discretionary review, either by an appellate court under Rule 23(f),
or by this Court.

22

CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons, the Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

KERRY ALAN SCANLON*

DAVID O. BICKART

STEVEN S. ROSENTHAL

T. MELINDAH BUSH

NICOLE J. BECTON

KAYE SCHOLER LLP

901 15th Street, N.W., Suite 1100
Washington, DC 20005

(202) 682-3500

Attorneys for Respondents
* Counsel of Record

App. 1

APPENDIX A

COMMITTEE ON RULES OR
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
OF THE
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20544

[Names Omitted In Printing]
May 12, 2003

Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. _
Chair

Committee on the Judiciary

United States House of Representatives
2138 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515-6216

Dear Chairman Sensenbrenner:

On March 26, 2003, the Director of the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts, Leonidas Ralph
Mecham, advised you of the March 18, 2003, Judicial
Conference resolution recognizing “that the use of minimal
diversity of citizenship may be appropriate to the mainte-
nance of significant multi-state class action litigation in
__ the federal courts, while continuing to oppose class action
legislation that contains jurisdictional provisions that are
similar to those in the bills-introduced in the 106th and
107th Congresses.” I am writing you about two specific
provisions of the “Class Action Fairness Act of 2003” (H.R.
1115), which are not affected by the Judicial Conference
resolution but which directly affect Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and are inconsistent with the
Rules Enabling Act rulemaking process. (28 U.S.C.
§§ 2072-2077.)

App. 2

The first provision requires courts of appeals to rule
on all interlocutory appeals of class-action certification
decisions. It directly conflicts with Rule 23(f). The second
provision imposes extensive plain-English requirements
on settlement notice. It overlaps with amendments to Rule
23(c(2\B) approved by the Supreme Court that are
presently before the Congress and will take effect on
December 1, 2003, unless Congress acts otherwise. We
respectfully request your committee to withdraw both
provisions from H.R. 1115.

Party Entitled to Interlocutory Appeal .-
of Class-Action Certification Decision
Section 6 of H.R. 1115 amends 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)

and would provide a party the right to an interlocutory
appeal of a court’s decision granting or denying class-
action certification, if an appeal notice is filed within 10
days. The provision also stays all c‘scovery and other
proceedings during the pendency of the appeal.

Rule 23(f) was added by the Supreme Court in 1998. It
provides courts of appeals with discretion to permit an
appeal from an order granting or denying class-action
certification. This provision also gives the district court
and court of appeals discretion to stay proceedings in the
district court pending outcome of the appeal.

Rule 23(f) was promulgated as a result of an exhaus-
tive study of class-action practices by the Advisory Com-
mittee on Civil Rules. In its study of Rule 23, the
committee considered hundreds of public comments,
empirical studies, discussions at several major conferences
of practitioners and judges well experienced in class
actions, and statements given at public hearings at which

App. 3

witnesses from major corporations, law firms, and law
schools testified. The final Rule 23(f) was reviewed and
approved by the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules,
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Judicial
Conference of the United States, and Supreme Court of
the United States before it was transmitted to the United
States Congress in accordance with the Rules Enabling
Act.

Rule 23(f) made the necessary changes to reduce
unwarranted procedural obstacles in obtaining appellate
review of a district court’s class-action certification deci-
sion. At the same time, however, it addressed concerns
expressed by many judges and lawyers that interlocutory
appeals are often unnecessary and would be abused as a
procedural tactic to delay proceedings and unfairly in-
crease litigation expense in many class actions. These
concerns would be heightened by an automatic-stay
provision, which could disrupt the district court’s ability to
manage the case. Providing an appeal as of right might
tempt a party to file an interlocutory appeal solely for
tactical reasons. Staying discovery and other proceedings
in the district court would only increase the tactical
advantages of filing an interlocutory appeal, particularly
because resolution of the appeal may not occur for 12 to 18
months.

Interlocutory appeals in general have been tradition-
ally disfavored because they can cause unwarranted,
expensive, and wasteful interruptions. Rule 23(f) vests
discretion in the appellate judges to permit interlocutory
appeal of class-action certifications in appropriate cases
and gives both the district court and the appellate court
discretion to decide whether to stay proceedings pending

App. 4

appeal. It has been working well, as evidenced by a signifi-
cant and growing body of appellate law. The courts of
appeals have announced detailed criteria to guide practi-
tioners in deciding whether to seek leave to appeal. And
the decisions that have granted leave to appeal are devel-
oping much-needed guidance on class action certification.
The rules committees are unaware of any dissatisfaction
expressed by the bench and bar with the rule. Moreover,
the rule was only recently promulgated. Any consideration
of amending it should be deferred until the bench and bar
have had more experience with it.

Plain-English Settlement Notice Requirement

Section 3 of H.R. 1115 adds a new § 1715 to title 28,
United States Code, prescribing detailed requirements
governing the contents of proposed class-action settlement
notices. On March 27, 2003, the Supreme Court transmit-
ted to Congress amendments to Rule 23, which take effect
on December 1, 2003, unless Congress acts otherwise. The
amendments prescribe the contents of class-certification
notices and also require that the court direct notice of a
proposed settlement in a reasonable manner to all class
members. The matters addressed by these amendments
overlap to a certain extent with § 1715. We also believe
that in its present form § 1715 may undermine the bill’s
stated objectives by requiring notices so elaborate that
most class members will not even attempt to read them.
Moreover, if H.R. 1115 is enacted without revision before
December 1, 2003, reconciling any differences between the
bill’s notice provisions and the notice provisions in Rule 23
that are due to take effect in December 2003 may generate
unnecessary confusion and litigation.

App. 5

In the course of our Rule 23 study, we examined
proposals that would have required extensive notices, but
found that requiring detailed information in a class notice
would be counterproductive, resulting in more complicated
and unclear notices. It would defeat the goal of providing
clearer and simpler information to putative class mem-
bers. H.R. 1115’s settlement-notice requirements are
detailed and would likely encounter the same types of
problems. Moreover, H.R. 1115’s provisions are directed
primarily at settlement notices, while the Rule 23 amend-
ments address not only settlement notices but also the
class-certification notice in which putative class members
are first notified of the action and, when appropriate,
given an opportunity to exercise their right to opt out of
the ¢lass. The interface between Rule 23 and § 1715 is
complicated by the growing number of “prepackaged” class
actions that combine the first notice of class certification,
including the opportunity to opt out, with notice of pro-
posed settlement provisions. -

At our request, the Federal Judicial Center worked
with expert communications and linguistics consultants to
develop sample plain-English class-action certification and
settlement notices in products liability and securities
cases. These notices are available on the Center’s web site
_ at . The illustrative forms were sub-

jected to consumer testing by representative focus groups.
The forms were well publicized and appeared in Law Week
and BNA’s Class Action Reporter. The Center’s sample
notices together with the Rule 23 amendments represent
the culmination of many years of intensive study and work
addressing the problems raised by unclear class-action
notices. It is our belief that these models will significantly
improve class-action notices.

App. 6

_ At the same time, the rules committees do not con-
sider that their class-action work has ended with the Rule
23 amendments. They will continue to monitor the status
of class-action practice, including the use of class-action
notices.

We recommend that section 6 and new §1715 as
added by H.R. 1115 be withdrawn. Thank you for consider-

ing our request.

Sincerely,

/s/ A. Scirica
Anthony J. Scirica
United States Court of
Appeals

cc: Honorable John Conyers, Jr., Ranking Democrat
Members of the House Judiciary Committee
Honorable David F. Levi, Chair, Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386015_1633%3A3. Public record. Not legal advice.
