# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Koz v. United States, 124 S. Ct. 77 (2003) (No. 02-1699)

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 2003

## Text

(y! Supreme Court, U.S.
LED

021699 may 12 2003

No.
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
The Supreme Court of the United States

JOSEPH P. KOZ,
Petitioner
v.
UNITED STATES,

Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Guy J. FERRANTE, ESQ.

KING & EVERHARD, P.C.
8019 Daffodil Court
Springfield, VA 22152
(703) 644-2009

Counsel of Record for
Petitioner

Questions Presented

When a statute states that a military officer “shall ...
be retired in the highest grade in which he served on
active duty satisfactorily ... for not less than six
months,” is en officer entitled to retire in a grade in
which he served more-than-satisfactorily for 12
years?

If a statute enacted for the benefit of military
personnel is susceptible to two different readings, are
veterans entitled to the benefit of the most favorable
reading?

Are statutes afforded their plain meaning unless
doing so would be truly and genuinely absurd?

Table of Conten

Questions Presented.....................sscessresseerssssesedones i
Table of Authorities.....................::ccserceseeees aerate” iv
Citations sissies leg cK ep nO Reena NIALL siete l
I sckctcrccneamnen B icisaspbaceammeieonel 2
Statutory Provision .................csrccersessserssensesessees 2
Statemnent Of Ghe Came «........:...cccesiscsicccieceebesesescenet 2
= gf. CNC e tte. 3
2. The Proceedings Below ..................::ccseeseeeeee 6 :
ATQUMENS...............000.0-ccssscnsceneersecensesecsnesssonssenseeres 8

1. The Plain Meaning of the Statutory Language......8

2. Any Ambiguity Should be Resolved in
Men DOOR Wi. BR Res 9

3. The iain Meaning of Section 1370(aX1)

Bb UE IIE on oi cassirenicsicrrnrtrvoneteuinaionnes 10
CII asco cicvisiccicsinsitoremenarneeennnenene 12
Appendix
Judgment, Koz v. United States,

Fed. Cir. 02-5081 (Feb. 12, 2003).......... ae Al

Judgment, Koz v. United States,
Fed. Cl. 00-727C (Dec. 20, 2001).............0++- A3

il

Koz v. United States,
Fed. Cl. 727C (Dec. 19, 2001).......0.ccccccceeeee A4

Record of Proceedings, Air Force Board
for Correction of Military Records,
Docket No. 98-01802..................ccccccccssecsees A 10

Memorandum for the Executive Director,
Air Force Board for Correction of
Military Records, Feb. 22, 2000................... A 19

oc ssihicmroecdnve A 23

111

Cases

See WON icicdalic. dace 9

happell v lace,
462 U.§.: 296 (1983). 5 resssseserssesecrivereenensevees O

Clinton v. Goldsmith,
$26 U.S. S2D C1999). «....0..00.00c0s0000 PAE ee 6

Conroy v. Aniskoff,
507 U.S. 511 (1993)............-ccccccsssscrreescoensees 10

Crooks v. Harrelson,
Be I i oisscvcencscried oornivntonen 10

v. Uni
620 F.2d 247 (Ct. Cl. 1980)............eeeeeeeee: 5

Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock Repair Corp.,
ST Ear 9

eS nee 10

H rv. Uni
326 F.2d 982 (Ct. Cl.), ;
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 977 (1964)............-+ 11

King v. St. Vincent’
GEE UES, BET CI ian cn inn ncn cecb ces nensesennes 9

v
Fed. Cl. 00-CV-727 (December 20, 2001).... 1

Koz v. United States,
Fed. Cir. 02-5081 (February 12, 2003)......... 1
MCI Telecommunications Corp. v.
BC ives 12

Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney,
Pee ES Pe, , Seneeeeanee ov Sree 11

itizen v ice, é
BBA CG SAB ooasssnsccssenigenretoones 10

F v. Taxation With R —_
Washington,
ee SI oo iectcnonmineendiuinn ll

Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.,
SID-U.S. FFF CGS ) avisicsesssicsciccssssccessscnesssess 8

24 M.J. 309 (CMA),

cert. denied, 484 U.S. 976 (1987)................ 11
BES U.S. FEISS Pe vcsvsscvscessceressresvesscennqensoess 12
Statutes
10 U.S.C: Chapter 47...............::ccsscsssecseesssessessesensens 11
BIR Coke | | Anne erernennennner tm prvsnioedaneieende 4
10 U.S.C. § 815()).................cescscssecserrsnserssecssenneees 5
10 U.S.C. § 1370 0.0... eececeesecseeecseeeeeneneenennennenceenens passim

10U

U.S.C. & LEED ...cssscsssvenssoessssescsconssvevecceseneveosenneses 1]

ite 6 IS: cliccacdnnaacee 12
St |. Caen ainanontnNes 6
iret CO ss een 2
PUCE SIT ikon ose ae 2
BULC. (OL... Le 2

Miscellaneous Authorities

SE IR SOBA icictiicrsinor lens. 8
ask CUE ie ccssced ode nee l
S. Rep: No. 1911, 87" Cong., 2d Sess. ...........-:000 5

S. Rep. 2420, 84™ Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted
in 1956 U.S. Code and Administrative News............ 12

In the Supreme Court of the United States

JOSEPH P. KOZ,
Petitioner,
¥.
UNITED STATES,

‘Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

This case is about military officers who dedicate their
lives to defending and protecting this nation’s rule of law.

Citati

The Court of Federal Claims dismissed Petitioners’
complaint in an unpublished decision. Koz v. United States,
Fed. Cl. 00-CV-727 (December 20, 2001). A4 - A9. That
decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit pursuant to Fed. Cir. R. 36. Koz v. United
States, Fed. Cir. 02-5081 (February 12, 2003). A1.

Jurisdicti

The Federal Circuit judgment was entered on

February 12, 2003. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1254(1).

Statutory Proviel

This case involves the interpretation of 10 U.S.C. §
1370(a), which states in pertinent part:

(1) Unless entitled to a higher retired grade
under some other provision of law, a
commissioned officer (other than a
commissioned warrant officer) of the Army,
Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps who retires
under any provision of law other than chapter
61 or chapter 1223 of this title shall, except as
provided in paragraph (2), be retired in the
highest grade in which he served on active
duty satisfactorily, as determined by the
Secretary of the military department
concerned, for not less than six months.

(2)(A) In order to be eligible for voluntary
retirement under any provision of this title in
a grade above major or lieutenant
commander, a commissioned officer of the
Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps
must have served on active duty in that grade
for not less than three years....

m f th

Tucker Act jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. § 1491) is
predicated upon 10 U.S.C. §§ 1370 and 8991. Retired
military officers are entitled to retired pay commensurate

with the grade at which they retire and the number of years
of active service they performed.

The Petitioner, Joseph P. Koz, served for 13 years as
a colonel in the United States Air Force. He was retired as a_
lieutenant colonel on July 1, 1995, however, after the
Secretary of the Air Force determis2d that his service as a
colonel during portions of 1994 was not satisfactory. Mr.
Koz maintains that he was entitled by law to retire as a
colonel by virtue of his 12 illustrious years of service in that

grade.
1. Statement of Facts

Mr. Koz served his country as an active duty Air
Force officer and fighter pilot for more than 30 years. His
career began with a 1965 graduation from the United States
Military Academy at West Point, and included 2 tours of
duty in Vietnam and 350 combat missions during which he
received 27 Air Medals, 5 Distinguished Flying Crosses, and
a Bronze Star.

Having steadily progressed through the ranks, often
at an accelerated pace, Mr. Koz was promoted to the grade of
colonel in 1981. For the mext 12 years, Mr. Koz’
performance was nothing short of magnificent and
impeccable. The direct national security implications of his
efforts were nowhere more evident than from his service as
the Defense and Air Attache at the U.S. Embassy in Israel
during the sensitive time leading up to Operation Desert
Storm, which earned him personal commendations from two
United States ambassadors. He then moved on to the
Defense Intelligence Agency, where his spectacular
management of the U.S. Attache System worldwide earned
him a second Defense Superior Service Medal.

1993 saw Mr. Koz serving as the Commandant of the
highly respected Air Force Institute of Technology [AFIT].
But 1993 also saw Mr. Koz’ personal life take a dramatic
turn when a leukemia diagnosis was confirmed. This

revelation was so devastating to Mr. Koz that he did not even
tell his wife until many years later. As a Command Pilot with
more than 2,500 hours in the cockpit, this trauma was
compounded by his resulting removal from flying status for
the first time in 28 years. And finally came the realization
that the only way of life that he had known since high school
would come to an end when he would have to retire from
military service upon accumulating 30 years of service in
1995. 10 U.S.C. § 634.

Spurred by these cumulative developments, Mr. Koz
became preoccupied with two overwhelming goals: to enjoy
life while he was still physically able, and to find a civilian
job. Unfortunately, these preoccupations caused lapses of
judgment that, in turn, led to uncharacteristically
inappropriate behavior on Mr. Koz’ part. As his second-in-
command would later describe it:

I believe it was possible that Joe Koz was not

entirely responsible emotionally for what I

characterize as the bizarre behavior that led to

his being relieved of command and

subsequently disciplined. ... Colonel Koz

started to become noticeably very tense

during the summer of 1994.... It was apparent

to me that he was becoming especially

apprehensive about obtaining suitable

employment upon his retirement from the Air

Force. Our conversations and his behavior

convinced me that his level of employment

seeking activity and the related apprehension

were more~ than what I would consider

“norma!” for a retiring Air Force member. To

me, Joe was beginning to exhibit what I

would characterize as a level of “panic.” ...

This was a man in distress. ... These actions,

in my view, are not those of a calculating,

rational individual. I now see them as

possibly the actions of an intellectually

4

disoriented, emotionally panicked human

being who was frightened over the prospect of

being unemployed and unemployable after

being mandatorily retired from a 30-year Air

Force career. Additionally, there were vague

indications of serious Koz family health

problems, though, except for Mrs. Koz’ hip
surgery, I have no direct knowledge of other
This second-in-command was unaware of the impact that the
leukemia diagnosis had also had on the “panic” that Mr. Koz
was experiencing.

Nonetheless, frequent absences from work inspired
an anonymous complaint that triggered an Inspector General
investigation that revealed various questionable and
uncharacteristic activities associated with Mr. Koz’ quest to
find and secure a civilian job. On May 11, 1995, Mr. Koz
was offered non-judicial punishment ' for misconduct
flowing from the IG investigation. During this process, Mr.
Koz called attention for the first time to the “profound
effect” that the leukemia diagnosis had had on his conduct.
He accepted the imposition of non-judicial punishment “to
get the matter resolved as quickly and painlessly as possible
for himself and the Air Force.” A10.

In light of this non-judicial punishment, however,
Mr. Koz’ immediate commander initiated proceedings to
determine the grade at which he would be permitted to retire.

Article 15 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice
(10 U.S.C. § 815(b)) permits commanders to impose
“disciplinary punishments for minor offenses without the
intervention of a court-martial.” See Dumas v. United States,
620 F.2d 247, 251 (Ct. Cl. 1980), quoting, S. Rep. No. 1911,
87" Cong., 2d Sess. at 2-4 (“The legislative history states
definitely that nonjudicial punishment is noncriminal in
character and ‘in this sense has no connection with the

military court-martial system.””).

Mr. Koz made no excuses, but relied solely upon his
illustrious and unblemished record during the previous 12
years. That commander recommended that Mr. Koz be
retired as a colonel because anything less “would be
disproportionate to the offenses he committed and would not
properly account for the many valuable years of service he
gave to the United States Air Force.” The next-higher
commander disagreed and recommended retirement as a
lieutenant colonel because, “Although superb performance
record through a career marked by significant responsibilities
stands clear, this illegal action and poor attitude concerning
obligations to the USAF during 1994 warrant strong
disciplinary measures.” The Secretary’s designee adopted the
latter recommendation, found that Mr. Koz had not served
satisfactorily in the grade of colonel, and directed his
retirement as a lieutenant colonel on July 1, 1995.

2. The Proceedings Below

Following his retirement as a lieutenant colonel, Mr.
Koz applied to the Air Force Board for Correction of
Military Records [AFBCMR] ” asking that his retired grade
be changed to colonel. He maintained, inter alia, that he met
the standard contemplated by Section 1370 through
“demonstrated excellence in all that he accomplished on
behalf of the Air Force for 12 years [notwithstanding that] in
the 13" year he took some missteps.” ° A majority of the

2 10 U.S.C. § 1552. See Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296,
303 (1983); Clinton v. Goldsmith, 526 U.S. 529, 539 (1999).
> Mr. Koz also maintained that his lapses of judgment were
mitigated by the emotional trauma that he underwent at the
time, which a clinic psychologist described as follows:

The response to a terminal illness can best be

understood by recognizing that typically the

initial diagnosis is in and of itself a shock and

often met with disbelief, anxiety and denial.

AFBCMR members recommended that Mr. Koz’ record be
corrected to show that “he served satisfactorily in the grade
of colonel within the meaning of Section 1370(a), Title 10,
United States Code.” A17. They did so in recognition of Mr.
Koz’ “outstanding career for 28 years,” including 12 years of
excellence as a colonel. A16-A17. A lone dissenting
AFBCMR member urged that Mr. Koz’ application be
denied because his “one year of significant misconduct
offsets his prior years of distinguished service.”

... The patient’s behavioral and psychological
responses in such circumstances are most
likely not representative of a rational, logical
individual. ... It would not be unusual for a
patient’s behavior when diagnosed with any
form of terminal cancer to be characterized by
fear and anxiety regarding all aspects of the
future. ... It is very important to note the fact
that [Mr.] Koz did not discuss or reveal his
diagnosis to even his wife. ... Thus, it is
likely to assume that he had very little support
or empathy in his interpersonal environment
at the time of this diagnosis. Thus, his
behavior is described to have been out of the
norm for him as he faced both the diagnosis
of terminal illness and simultaneously a
mandatory retirement after 30 years as an Air
Force officer. It is within reasonable
psychological probability to conclude that he
was experiencing extreme apprehension and
anxiety about his future in terms of survival.
... It was my opinion as I understood [Mr.]
Koz that he wanted to live as fully as possible
in the present with the knowledge that his
time without symptoms was not predictable.

Although “majority vote constitutes the action of the
Board,” favorable actions have no finality unless unanimous.
32 CFR §§ 865.4 (1) and (p). Thus, Mr. Koz’ case was
forwarded for final action to the Secretary’s designee who
agreed. with the AFBCMR minority and denied the
application. A 21-22.

Mr. Koz filed suit in the U.S. Court of Federal
Claims maintaining that Section 1370(a)(1) mandated his
retirement as a colonel because he had “served on active
duty satisfactorily ... for not less than six months” in that
grade. The Court acknowledged that “the statute may support
such an interpretation grammatically.” A5. It granted
summary judgment for the Air Force, however, because “a
Court cannot attribute absurd results to acts of Congress [and
we] cannot imagine that Congress intended to guarantee
retirement to an officer based on his or her first six months
of duty.” A5, A7.

Mr. Koz reiterated his position before the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which affirmed without
comment or opinion. Al.

Arguments
1. The Plain Meaning of the e.

The “first step in interpreting a statute is to determine
whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous
meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case.”
Robinson v. Shell Oil Co. 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997).
Analysis of the statutory provision at issue is facilitated by
simply obscuring the discretion-conferring clause (“as
determined by the Secretary of the military department
concerned”) from the middle of the sentence. The operative
language would then state that an officer “shall ... be retired
in the highest grade in which he served on active duty
satisfactorily for not less than six months.” It is hard to
imagine any more plain and unambiguous language. Because

8

the phrase “for not less than six months” qualifies the
_ immediately preceding word “satisfactorily,” Mr. Koz was
legally entitled to retire as a colonel by virtue of his 12 years
of more-than-satisfactory service in that grade.

If Congress had meant to provide that officers are
retired at the highest grade in which they have served at least
six months provided the Secretary determines that all of that
service was satisfactory, there were many ways for it to say
so. One way was to use those words in the statute. Another
was to provide that officers must have “served satisfactorily
on active duty for not less than six months,” thereby having
the six-month clause modify the active duty requirement
rather than the subordinate satisfactory determination. As
enacted, however, Section 1370(a)(1)’s six-month clause
applies directly to the satisfactory determination, and means
that Mr. Koz was unlawfully denied retirement as a colonel.

2. Any Ambiguity Should be Resolved in Veterans’
Favor.

Even if the statutory language is susceptible to two
different interpretations, veterans should receive the benefit
of the most favorable reading.

This Court has repeatedly invoked that interpretive
canon that statutes enacted to benefit servicemembers must
be liberally construed in their favor. King v. St. Vincent’s
Hospital, 502 U.S. 215, 220-21 n. 9 (1991), citing, Fishgold
v. Sullivan Drydock Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275, 285 (1946);
Boone v. Lightner, 319 U.S. 561, 575 (1943). Retirement is
one of the paramount tangible benefits that Congress has
conferred upon servicemembers. Section 1370 is central to
that benefit because it affects the grade in which they will
enjoy it. Z

Mr. Koz maintains that six months is the minimum
period of satisfactory service that will authorize retirement in
a grade. To the extent that the text of Section 1370(a)(1)
might also be read to mean that all of an officer’s service in a

grade must be satisfactory, that reading should be rejected in
favor of Mr. Koz’ more beneficial (and faithful)

interpretation.

3. The Plain Meaning of ion 137 1) is not
Absurd.

The rule that absurd interpretations of statutes should
be rejected
remains a legitimate tool of the Judiciary,
however, only as long as the Court acts with
self-discipline by limiting the exception to
situations where the result of applying the
plain language would be, in a genuine sense,
absurd, i.e., where it is quite impossible that
Congress could have intended the result, and
where the alleged absurdity is so clear as to be

obvious to most anyone.
Public Citizen v. Department of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 470

(1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring). See Conroy v. Aniskoff,
507 U.S. 511, 517-18 (1993) (“we cannot say that Congress
would have found our straight-forward interpretation and
application of its words either absurd or illogical”). * A
literal interpretation of Section 1370(a)(1) is not absurd in
the least.

* See also Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55, 60 (1930)
(‘Laws enacted with good intention, when put to the test,
frequently, and to the surprise of the law maker himself, turn
out to be mischievous, absurd or otherwise objectionable.
But in such case the remedy lies with the law making
authority, and not with the courts.”); Griffin _v. Oceanic
Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 576 (1982) (“The remedy
for any dissatisfaction with the results in particular cases lies
with Congress [which] may amend the statute; we may
not.”).

First, no military member is ever “guaranteed”
retirement. ° All are subject to dismissal for criminal conduct
that is deemed serious enough to warrant court-martial under
the Uniform Code of Military Justice. 10 U.S.C. Chapter 47.
Indeed, even already-retired personnel may be dismissed
from the military, and thereby stripped of the retirement
benefits that they previously enjoyed. United States _v.
Overton, 24 M.J. 309 (CMA), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 976
(1987); Hooper v. United States, 326 F.2d 982 (Ct. Cl.), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 977 (1964). In_ less egregious
circumstances, service members are subject to administrative
separation for wrongdoing ranging from substandard
performance to outright misconduct. 10 U.S.C. § 1181. In
short, it is not absurd for Section 1370 to be excluded from
the arsenal of disciplinary mechanisms that are available to
military authorities, but that it chose not to employ in his
case.

Moreover, a literal reading of Section 1370(a)(1) is
entirely compatible with related statutory provisions. Section
(a)(1) :prescribes the minimum time (6 months) that an
officer must serve satisfactorily in a grade in order to retire
in that grade. Section (a)(2) adds an additional requirement
before officers may retire in the higher grades. Reading
(a1) and (2) together, retirement in the higher grades
requires at least 3 years of service in that grade, at least 6
months of which was satisfactory. This is not absurd because
it does not apply “looser standards” to senior officers (A7); it
applies the same standard plus a longevity requirement.

Finally, “Our country has a long-standing policy of
compensating veterans for their past contributions by
providing them with numerous advantages. This policy has
‘always been deemed to be legitimate.”” Regan v. Taxation
With Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 551
(1983), quoting, Personnel Administrator of Mass. _v.
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279, n. 25 (1979) (footnote omitted).

. Contra A7.

11

A literal interpretation of Section 1370(a)(1) is consistent
both with that policy as well as overall legislative intent.

Congress has explained that officers’ commissions
entail a form of job security akin to tenure. S. Rep. 2420, gq”
Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1956 US. Code and
Administrative News at 3351. It is not genuinely absurd,
illogical, or even unexpected for that tenure to include the
attachment of retirement eligibility upon six months of
satisfactory service in a grade. ,

Just as courts should avoid rejecting administrative
interpretations just because they are deemed susceptible of
improvement, courts should avoid overriding the plain
meaning of statutes with which they might simply disagree.

Conclusion.

It has been said, “Law has reached its finest moments
when it has freed man from the unlimited discretion of some
ruler, some civil or military official, some bureaucrat.”

ited v. ich 342 U.S. 98, 101 (1951)
(Douglas, J., dissenting). If so, the law has reached its lowest
point here. Under the Air Force interpretation that the lower
courts have sanctioned, the Secretary of a military
department has unlimited discretion to determine not only
whether a prescribed period of service was “satisfactory,”
but also whether an entire period of service merited
retirement in a particular grade. This “goes beyond the
meaning that the statute can bear.” MCI

Telecommunications Corp. v. A.T. & T. Corp., 512 US.
218, 229 (1994). :

© See also 10 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (retirees receive benefit of
most favorable calculation of retired pay).

12

Respectfully submitted,

Guy J. Ferrante

King & Everhard, P.C.
8019 Daffodil Court
Springfield, VA 22152
(703) 644-2009

Counsel of Record
for Petitioner
May 12, 2003

13

Appendix

NOTE: Pursuant to Fed. Cir. R. 47.6, this disposition is not citable as
precedent. It is a public record. This disposition will appear in tables
published periodically.

United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit

02-5081
JOSEPH P. KOZ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES,
Defendant-Appellee.
JUDGMENT

ON APPEAL from the United States Court of Federal
Claims

In CASE NO(S). 00-C V-727
This CAUSE having been heard and considered, it is

ORDERED and ADJUDGED: AFFIRMED. See Fed. Cir. R.
36

Per Curiam (NEWMAN, MICHEL, and PROST, Circuit
Judges).

ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT

Jan Horbaly, Clerk

DATED: FEB 12 2003

A 2

In the United States Court of Federal Claims

No. 00-727 C
JOSEPH P. KOZ,
V. JUDGMENT
THE UNITED STATES

Pursuant to the court’s Opinion and Order, filed
December 19, 2001, granting defendant’s motion for
judgment on the Administrative Record and denying
plaintiff’ s cross-motion,

IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED this date,
pursuant to Rule 58, that judgment is for defendant and the
complaint is dismissed. No costs.

Margaret M. Earnest
Clerk of Court

December 20, 2001 By:
Deputy Clerk

NOTE: As to appeal, 60 days from this date, see RCFC
72, re number of copies and listing of all plaintiffs. Filing fee
is $105.00.

A 3

In the United States Court of Federal Claims

No. 00-727C
(Filed: December 19, 2001)
a am we * a *
JOSEPH P. KOZ, a
THIS OPINION
Plaintiff, . AND ORDER
WILL NOT BE
V. . PUBLISHED

fen ; .

* * * * * ~

Guy J. Ferrante, King & Everhard, P.C., Springfield, VA, for
plaintiff.

John C. Einstman, United State Department of Justice,
Washington, D.C., for defendant.

OPINION and ORDER

HODGES, Judge.

Plaintiff was a Colonel in the Air Force from 1981
until his voluntary retirement in 1994. He agreed to retire
after an investigation by the Inspector General determined
that he had violated various provisions of the Uniform Code
of Military Justice.

The Air Force allowed plaintiff to retire but not at the
rank of Colonel. A designee of the Secretary of the Air Force

A 4

determined that plaintiff's service as Colonel had not been
“satisfactory” within the meaning of 10 U.S.C. § 1370(a)
(2001). This case turns on the proper interpretation of that
statute.

Plaintiff argues that the statute requires only that an
officer serve satisfactorily for six months after which he
cannot be retired at a lower grade. While the statute may
support such an interpretation grammatically, a court cannot
attribute absurd results to acts of Congress. We grant
defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff became a Colonel in the Air Force in
December 1981. After several years of satisfactory service,
an Inspector General’s investigation established that plaintiff
had violated Uniform Code of Military Justice in several
respects. These included inappropriate off-duty employment,
misuse and abuse of temporary duty assignments, and being
AWOL. Plaintiff was offered non-judicial punishment
proceedings for charges of disobeying an order, dereliction
of duty, false monetary claims against the United States, and
conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman.

Plaintiff accepted non-judicial punishment rather than
trial by court martial. He was found guilty in May 1995, and
he agreed not to appeal. His sentence was forfeiture of a
portion of his pay for 2 months. Plaintiff then asked to be
allowed to be retired as a Colonel, but the Staff Judge
Advocate recommended to plaintiff's commander that he be
retired in the grade Lt. Colonel. The Judge Advocate found
that the plaintiff's conduct “jeopardized the core values of
the Air Force, and indicated a reckless disregard of
regulations and a lack of integrity.” His judgment of plaintiff —
in that regard is fully and carefully documented in the record.
“Colonel Koz repeatedly used his position for his own
gain... [He] lost sight of his duty as an officer and a member
of the Air Force. Leadership carries with it responsibilities

A 5

and certainly, accountability. Colonel Koz must be held
accountable for his actions.”

The Secretary of the Air Force determined in June
1995 that plaintiff had not served satisfactorily in the grade
of Colonel and directed that he be retired as Lt. Colonel.
Plaintiff appealed to the Board for Correction of Military
Records, arguing that an earlier diagnosis of leukemia and
anxiety over his retirement had caused the behavioral
problems that stained an otherwise sterling career. A
majority of the Board agreed that plaintiff's misconduct had
been offset by many years of distinguished service, but the
Secretary of the Air Force rejected the Board’s
recommendation that plaintiff be retired in the grade of
Colonel. Plaintiff filed suit here asking that his military
records be corrected to reflect that he retired as a full
Colonel.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff makes the following arguments to support his
case: (1) The plain language of §1370(a)(1) does not permit
retirement of an officer in a lower rank after 6 months
satisfactory service in that grade; and (2) the actions of the
Secretary of the Air Force in overruling the Board for
Corrections of Military Records were “manifestly arbitrary
and capricious.”

It is important to note what plaintiff does » argue. He
does not argue that he was promised retirement at the grade
of Colonel if he retired voluntarily. He does not argue that
any other promises were made to him that might have
rendered an otherwise voluntary retirement involuntary. He
does not argue that an officer cannot be retired in a lesser
grade absent a court martial conviction or other proceedings
that did not occur.

-
The primary issue in this case is the meaning of Title
10, § 1370. That section provides:

A 6

(a) Rule for Retirement in Highest Grade
Held Satisfactorily. (1) Unless entitled to a higher
retired grade ... a commissioned officer ... who
retires ... shall, except as provided in paragraph (2),
be retired in the highest grade in which he served on
active duty satisfactorily, as determined by the
Secretary of the military department concerned, for

not less than 6 months.
(2)(A) In order to be eligible for voluntary
retirement ... in a grade above Major or Lt.

Commander, a commissioned officer ... must have
served on active duty in that grade for not less than 3
years ....

10 U.S.C. § 1370(aX1)-(2){A).

Plaintiff interprets section (a)(I) to mean that once an
officer has served 6 months in a given rank satisfactorily,
that person can never be retired at a lesser rank. He also
argues, apparently in the alternative, that section (a)(I) does
not apply at all because section (a)(2) covers ranks above
Major or Lt. Commander. We cannot imagine that Congress
intended to guarantee retirement to an officer based on his or
her first six months of duty, or that even looser standards
should apply to higher ranking officers. ;

Statutes should be interpreted so that meaning is
given to each provision. Magnesium Corp. of America v.
United States, 166 F.3d 1364, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Both
paragraphs of this section have logical meaning if they are
_ read to require that an officer serve in his current rank for at
least 6 months and serve satisfactorily during his tenure in
that rank, before he may retire at that rank. If the officer is a
Lt. Colonel or Commander or higher, he must serve in rank
for at least 3 years before he can retire. In other words,
lower-ranking officers must serve at least 6 months in grade;
senior officers at least 3 years. Everyone must serve
satisfactorily as determined by the Secretary. Whether a

A 7

particular officer has served satisfactorily is a decision to be
made exclusively by the military, so we do not address that
issue. ~

2:

Plaintiff's second argument, that the Secretary acted
arbitrarily and capriciously, seems to depend mostly on his
interpretation of the statute. That is, the Secretary determined
that plaintiff's retirement in a lesser grade was lawful and
that determination was erroneous, therefore, her
determination was arbitrary and capricious. This is a circular
argument that in any event is disposed of by the statutory
interpretation described above.

Plaintiff claims that the Secretary’s decision to
disagree with the majority of the AFBCMR, which
recommended that Mr. Koz be retired as Colonel, is
“manifestly arbitrary and capricious.” The Secretary has the
authority to disagree with the Board’s recommendation,
however. Exercising the option to disagree is not arbitrary or
capricious. It was not contrary to law, regulation, or
procedure either. The Secretary of the Air Force made her
decision after having “carefully considered all of the
circumstances of this case” and having concluded that she
“(does) not agree with the recommendation of the majority
of the AFBCMR Panel.”

Plaintiff makes an assertion that the Secretary found
his service unsatisfactory “merely because of dissatisfaction
with the punishment he had previously received.” That
charge is not supported by the record. We have reviewed the
administrative record carefully in light of plaintiff allegations
and found no reason to question the Secretary’s diligence.

This case highlights the importance of a court's
deference to persons who are authorized by Congress to
make military personnel decisions. Plaintiff complains that
the Secretary “ignored and/or disregarded the mitigating
effect that Lt. Colonel Koz’s leukemia diagnosis had on his
judgment in 1994. There is no evidence that that factor was
considered at any stage of the grade determination action.”

ae

Yet the record contains the following statement of a medical
consultant to the Board for Correction of Military Records:

Therefore, to assert that concern over a “life
threatening” disease was proximate to a “panic” state
that affected [plaintiff's] judgment and ational
thinking is untenable and unsupportable. Indeed,
[plaintiff] met a Medical Evaluation Board in 1993
that found him fit and returned him to duty to finish
out his 30 year career.

The medical consultant seviewed plaintiff's “entire
case file” and the Air Force Secretary “carefully considered
all of the circumstances of this case” before issuing her
ruling. Assuming as we must that the Secretary carried out
her official duties correctly, fairly, in good faith, and in
accordance with the law and governing regulations, such
facts are dispositive of plaintiffs charges.

CONCLUSION

Congress requires that appropriate military authorities
determine whether an officer has served satisfactorily at the
rank in which the officer wishes to retire. In this case, the
Secretary of the Air Force determined that plaintiff's service
asa Colonel was not satisfactory. Her decision to retire
plaintiff in the grade of a Lt. Colonel was lawful. Her actions
in all respects were supported by the Administrative Record.
She did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in carrying out her
responsibilities.

Defendant’s motion for judgment on _ the
Administrative Record is GRANTED. Plaintiffs cross-
motion is DENIED. The Clerk will enter judgment for
defendant. No costs.

Robert H. Hodges, Jr.
Judge-

A9

RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
AIR FORCE BOARD FOR CORRECTION OF MILITARY
RECORDS

IN THE MATTER OF: DOCKET NUMBER: 98-01802
INDEX CODE: 133.00

JOSEPH P. KOZ COUNSEL: FRANK J. SPINNER
027—32—3544 HEARING DESIRED: NO

APPLICANT REQUESTS THAT:

His grade of colonel (0-6) be reinstated and his records be
corrected to reflect retirement in the grade of colonel,
effective 1 Jul 95.

APPLICANT CONTENDS THAT:

In mid-1994, he faced the prospect of mandatory retirement
and was also living with a diagnosis of leukemia. In
retrospect, and after talking to a psychologist, he realized
that both matters affected his judgment and behavior to a
degree that he did not appreciate at the time. In his last year
of service as the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT)
commandant, he was confronted with the realization that his
military career had to end and he had to look for new
employment. His response to this realization led him to
engage in conduct that was questioned by his commander
and some of his subordinates. An IG investigation was
initiated and Article 15 punishment was subsequently
imposed. The primary claims against him involved
questionable TDY practices and off-duty employment.

He accepted nonjudicial punishment proceedings because he
wanted to get the matter resolved as quickly and painlessly
as possible for himself and the Air Force. In his letter to

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SAF/IGQ and in his response to the Article 15, he explained
his state of mind at the time he began off-duty employment
and the circumstances related to the TDY trips in question.
Additionally, in making the decision to accept Article 15
proceedings, it never occurred to him that by receiving
punishment, his record would actually be reviewed to
determine his retirement grade. His Air Force defense
counsel never informed him that such a possibility was
likely. Had he been properly informed before the fact, he
may well have made a number of different decisions to
develop and present evidence. The potential emotional and
financial impact of retiring at a lesser grade is considerably
higher than the impact flowing from nonjudicial punishment.
He feels as though he was blindsided by the Air Force.

He was granted a 30% disability for his leukemia by the
Department of Veteran’s Affairs. In support of his request,
applicant sulnits an affidavit, counsel’s Brief, letters from
former AFIT vice commandants, a letter from a clinical
psychologist, copies of the Secretarial grade determination,
the Article 15 and additional documents associated with the
issues cited in his contentions. These documents are
appended at Exhibit A.

STATEMENT OF FACTS:

On 9 Jun 65, the applicant was commissioned a second
lieutenant in the Regular Air Force. He was progressively
promoted to the grade of colonel, with a date of rank (DOR)
of 28 Dec 81 and an effective date of 1 Aug 82.

The applicant’s 8 Dec 94 request for voluntary retirement,
effective 31 Jan 95, was approved by the commander.

A SAF/IG inquiry was conducted concerning the applicant’s
alleged inappropriate off-duty employment, misuse and
abuse of temporary duty (TDY) assignment and permissive

A ll

TDY, absent from Air Force duties while not on leave, and
not wearing a uniform to work. The 19 Jan 95, IG Summary
Report of Investigation indicated that allegations of holding
full-time employment, holding basketball practices during
normal duty hours, coming to work for only short periods of
time, not wearing a uniform to work, and using permissive
TDY for inappropriate purposes were substantiated. The
allegations of not being on leave while performing off-duty
employment and making dubious TDY trips were partially
substantiated (see Exhibit B).

On 11 May 95, applicant was notified of his commander's
intent to impose nonjudicial punishment (Article 15) for
alleged misconduct, on divers occasions between the periods
of 2 Feb 94 and 8 Dec 94, in violation of Articles 90, 92, 132
and 133, UCMJ. The applicant consulted a lawyer, waived
his right to demand trial by court-martial, accepted
nonjudicial punishment and attached a written presentation.
After considering all matters presented to him, the
commander found that the applicant did commit one or more
of the offenses alleged. The commander imposed
punishment of forfeiture of $2,979 pay per month for two
months. Applicant did not appeal the nonjudicial
punishment.

On 15 May 95, the applicant was notified of his
commander’s intent to request the Secretary of the Air Force
determine whether the applicant served satisfactorily in the
grade of colonel under the provisions of 10 USC 1370. The
applicant - acknowledged receipt of the notification and
subsequently submitted a personal statement requesting that
he be retired in the grade of colonel. On 25 May 95,
applicant’s commander recommended the applicant be
retired in the grade of colonel. On May 95, the Air Education
and Training Command (AETC) vice commander
recommended the applicant be retired in the grade of
lieutenant colonel and requested the case file be forwarded to

A 12

the Secretary of the Air Force. On 20 Jun 95, the Secretary
of the Air Force found that the applicant did not serve
satisfactorily in the grade of colonel and directed that he be
retired as a lieutenant colonel on 1 Jul 95.

On 30 Jun 95, the applicant was relieved from active duty
and retired effective 1 Jul 95 in the grade of lieutenant
colonel under the provisions of AFI 36-3203 (maximum
service or time in grade). He had completed a total of 30
years and 22 days of active service for retirement. .

The relevant facts pertaining to the applicant’s medical
condition are contained in the letter prepared by the
AFBCMR Medical Consultant. Accordingly, there is no need
to recite these facts in this Record of Proceedings.

F EE A

The AFBCMR Medical Consultant, stated that the applicant
was diagnosed in Nov 92 with chronic lymphocytic leukemia
(CLL), an overproduction of lymphatic cells in the bone
marrow. Erratic and uncharacteristic behavior between Feb
and Dec 94 led to an Article 15, which was the basis for the
grade determination. Applicant/counsel argue that excessive
concern over the applicant’s approaching mandatory
retirement date plus the diagnosis of leukemia caused the
applicant to perform irrationally in the last year of his
service; that he was not responsible for his actions; and,
therefore, should not have been subject to his grade
reduction.

The AFBCMR Medical Consultant indicated that at the time
the diagnosis of CLL was made, the applicant’s treating
physician stated the applicant “has an excellent prognosis
with no change in life expectancy.” The appticant has never
required any treatment for this disease, and most likely never
will other than periodic checks of his blood count. CLL,

A 13

while diagnostically a cancer, is not a disease that normally
affects a person’s longevity or general health. Therefore, to

<~—___ assert that concern over a “life-threatening” disease was
proximate to a “panic” state that affected the applicant’s
judgment and rational thinking iis untenable and
unsupportable. The applicant met a Medical Evaluation
Board (MEB) in 1993 that found him fit and tured him to
duty to finish out his 30-year career.

The AFBCMR Medical Consultant stated that nothing in the
records available for review supports the contention that the
applicant had a medical condition that could conceivably
have contributed to his 1994 behavior that resulted in his
nonjudicial punishment and lowered retirement grade. The
AFBCMR Medical Consultant is of the opinion that no
change in the records is warranted and the application should
be denied (Exhibit D). :

The General Law Division, HQ USAF/JAG, stated that the
applicant agues his distinguished service as a colonel (0-6)
from 1981 through 1994 greatly outweighs the relatively
minor misconduct alleged in 1994, making his service as an
0-6 more than satisfactory. He denies that he committed the
alleged offenses in 1994. The applicant indicated that his
earlier diagnosis of leukemia, when coupled with his anxiety
over his impending mandatory retirement, caused adverse
psychological effects and maladaptive behavior.

JAG stated that the clinical psychologist’s opinion is based
or the applicant’s representation that he was diagnosed with
terminal cancer. However, as the AFBCMR Medical
Consultant explained, the applicant was diagnosed with a
type of leukemia that is not only non-terminal, but normally
requires no treatment and has no adverse effect on the
person’s longevity or general health. JA indicated that the
applicant had ample opportunity to convince the commander
imposing nonjudicial punishment that he was not guilty of

A 14

any offense, but he was unale to do so. The applicant has
failed to provide any new evidence that would compel a
different conclusion, save the psychologist’s report discussed
(dismissed) above and the suggestion of a former colleague
that the applicant’s “bizarre” behavior was indicative of a
lack of mental responsibility at the time. The MAJCOM
legal review of the grade determination action contains a
sufficient recitation of the facts to persuade JAG that the
misconduct allegations were well founded.

JAG stated that there is no dispute the applicant served the
Air Force admirably in all assignments as a colonel except
the last; and, a grade determination should consider the
member’s entire service at the higher grade to determine
whether, on the whole, it was “satisfactory.” However, there
is no simple mathematical formula for balancing 12 years of
excellent service against one year of significant misconduct.
The Secretary’s designee determined the repeated and
serious nature of the misconduct warranted retirement in the
lower grade. JAG indicated that the AFBCMR should
overturn the designee’s decision only if it finds it so lacking
in reason or factual support as to constitute an injustice. JAG
sees no compelling reason to do so. Accordingly JAG
recommended the applicant’s request be denied (Exhibit E).

APP ; Ww FOR V. ATI

Counsel reviewed the advisory opinions and indicated that
the applicant is not claiming any sort of complete mental
responsibility “defense.” Psychological factors, however, are
relevant to issues of mitigation and extenuation. Therefore,
the evidence and statements provided with the application
warrant consideration in balancing the applicant’s record as a
colonel over 13 years against the stresses he faced in his final
year of active duty. The applicant has also provided an
additional statement addressing the points raised by the JAG
advisory writer with respect to what he [applicant]

A 15

experienced when he learned of his leukemia diagnosis.
Ultimately, they believe that an injustice occurred (refer to
Exhibit G).

THE BOARD CONCLUDES THAT:

1. The applicant has exhausted all remedies provided by
existing law or regulations.

2. The application was timely filed.

3. Sufficient relevant evidence has been presented to
demonstrate the existence of probable error or injustice. The
evidence of record reflects that, subsequent to his receipt of
nonjudicial punishment under Article 15, a Secretarial
determination was made that the applicant had not served
satisfactorily in the grade of colonel, and that he should be
retired in the grade of lieutenant colonel. While we have
founds no evidence which has shown to our satisfaction that
the Article 15 punishment was improper or an abuse of
discretionary authority, it is the opinion of the Board
majority that approval of the requested relief would be
appropriate based on the following considerations. After a
thorough review of the evidence, the Board majority noted
that the applicant had an outstanding Air Force career for 28
years and prior to the grade determination, with the
exception of the infractions which led to the imposition of
the Article 15, he had performed his duties faithfully and
well in the grade of colonel for more than 12 years. The
Board majority believes it is significant that the applicant
could have been tried by court-martial for the offenses for
which the Article 15 was imposed. A conviction by a court-
‘martial would have carried a more severe punishment than
that imposed by the nonjudicial punishment, ¢.g., reduction
in grade and/or dismissal from the service. At the time the
officer grade determination package was initiated, the
applicant’s superior (the Air University commander and a

A 16

lieutenant general) recommended the applicant be retired in
the grade of colonel, noting that the vast majority of his
service career and particularly that as a colonel, the applicant
was an “excellent” performer and expressing the opinion that
a “reduction in his rank would be disproportionate to the
offenses he committed and would not properly account for
the many valuable years of service he gave to the Air Force.”
Based on the above, the Board majority believes that, being
closer to events, the opinion of the applicant’s superior
deserves considerable deference in this matter. In view of the
above, the Board majority believes that_the applicant’s
retirement in the grade of lieutenant colonel was excessively
harsh and, therefore, unjust and that the Article 15 was
sufficient punishment for his misconduct. Accordingly, the
Board majority recommends that the applicant’s records be
corrected to reflect that he retired in the grade of colonel.

THE BOARD RECOMMENDS THAT:

The pertinent military records of the Department of the Air
Force relating to APPLICANT be corrected to show that:

a. The Secretary of the Air Force found that he serve
satisfactorily in the grade of colonel within the meaning of
Section 1370(a), Title 10, United States Code, and directed
that be retired in that grade.

b. On 30 June 1995, he was relieved from active duty
and effective 1 July 1995, he retired for length of service in
the grade of colonel.

The following members of the Board considered this
application in Executive Session on 27 September 1999,
under the provisions of AFI 36-2603:

Mrs. Barbara A. Westgate, Panel Chair
Mr. Vaughn E. Schlunz, Member

A 17

Mr. Steven A. Shaw, Member

Messrs. Schlunz and Shaw voted to grant the relief sought in
this application. Mrs. Westgate voted to deny the applicant’s
request and submitted a minority report which is attached at
Exhibit H. The following documentary evidence was
considered:

Exhibit A. DD Form 149, dated 25 Jun 98, w/atchs.

Exhibit B. Applicant’s Master Personnel Records.

Exhibit C. SAF/IG Report of Inquiry, dated 19 Jan 95
(withdrawn).

Exhibit D. Letter, AFBCMR Medical Consultant, dated
22 Sep 98.

Exhibit E. Letter, HQ USAF/JAG, dated 18 Dec 98.

Exhibit F. Letter, AFBCMR, dated 18 Jan 99.

Exhibit G. Letter from counsel, dated 19 Mar 99, and
letter from applicant, dated 19 Mar 99.

Exhibit H. | Minority Report.

BARBARA A. WESTGATE, Panel Chair

A 18

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, DC

Office of the Assistant Secretary _ 22 Feb 2000

MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
AIR FORCE BOARD FOR CORRECTION OF
MILITARY RECORDS (AFBCMR)

FROM: SAF/MI

SUBJECT: BCMR Case on Lieutenant Colonel Joseph P.
Koz, 027-32-3 544, USAF, Retired

I have carefully considered all of the circumstances
of this case and do not agree with the recommendation of the
majority of the AFBCMR panel that the Secretarial decision
that the applicant did not serve satisfactorily in the grade of
colonel pursuant to Section 1370(a), Title 10, United States
Code, was too harsh, and, therefore, unjust.

On May 15, 1995, the Commander, Air University
(AU) notified the applicant of his intention to request a
Secretarial Determination of Satisfactory Service pursuant to
AFI 36-3203 and 10 USC 1370(a). He based his request on
applicant’s application to retire from active duty and his
receipt of an Article 15 under the Uniform Code of Military
Justice (UCMJ) on the same date. On this date, applicant was
punished for three specifications of dereliction of duty, three
specifications of filing false claims and one specification of
conduct unbecoming an officer. He received a forfeiture of
$2,979.00 per month for two months. Upon being given the
Opportunity to present matters for the Secretary to consider
in determining whether his service was satisfactory, the
applicant asked to be allowed to retire in the grade of
colonel. On May 25, 1995, after considering the matters

presented by the applicant, the AU Commander

A 19

recommended that he be retired in the grade of colonel.

On May 31, 1995, the Vice Commander, Air
Education and Training Command (AETC/CV) disagreed
and recommended the applicant be retired in the grade of
lieutenant colonel because of his documented misconduct.
He stated that although a superb performance record through
a career marked by significant responsibilities stands clear,

this illegal action and poor attitude concerning obligations to —

the USAF during 1994 warrant strong disciplinary measures.
If his only error had been one of judgment in pursuing post
retirement employment opportunities prematurely, he could
concur with the recommendation for retirement as a colonel.
In his view, however, it was clear that, with premeditation,
the applicant concocted several TDYs simply to facilitate
interviews. Moreover, despite strong feedback from his
subordinates that his actions were affecting both the morale
and performance of his people, and despite a direct order
from his commander to cease and desist, he continued with
inappropriate, unauthorized, and illegal activities. The
AETC/CV concluded by stating that this reflects a total
disregard for his unit, his people, the organizational Air
Force or established standards of conduct for an officer
particularly of his grade.

On June 20, 1995, the then Deputy for Air Force
Review Boards announced that the Secretary of the Air
Force found that the applicant did not serve satisfactorily in
the grade of colonel within the meaning of Section 1370(a),
Title 10, United States Code. However, the Secretary found
that he served satisfactorily in the grade of 0-5 and directed
that he be retired as lieutenant colonel on July 1, 1995.

In his application to the AFBCMR, applicant asserts,
essentially, that his distinguished service as a colonel from
1981 through 1994 greatly outweighs the relatively minor
misconduct alleged in 1994, making his service as a colonel

A 20

more than satisfactory; that his behavior caused
“perceptions” of impropriety, but he accepted the Article 15
process not because he was guilty but solely to resolve the
matter quickly; and that his earlier diagnosis of leukemia,
when coupled with his anxiety over his impending
mandatory retirement, caused adverse psychological effects
and maladaptive behavior.

HQ USAF/JAG and the Chief Medical Consultant,
AFBCMR, found no merit in the applicant’s assertions and
recommend that his application be denied. HQ USAF/JAG,
advises, among other things, that whether a string of
incidents in the final year is sufficient to render the entire
service as a colonel unsatisfactory is a matter of judgment to
be exercised by the Secretary or his designee. Here, the
designee determined that the repeated and serious nature of
the misconduct warranted retirement in the lower grade. The
AFBCMR’s task is not to decide whether it would have
reached the same conclusion had it been the decision-maker.
Rather; the AFBCMR should overturn the designee’s
decision only if it finds it so lacking in reason or factual
support as to constitute an injustice.

The AFBCMR panel finds no error in the Secretarial
decision that the applicant did not serve satisfactorily in the
grade of colonel. Nonetheless, in consideration of all of the
circumstances of this case (i.e., the applicant’s lengthy
record of outstanding service, the fact that the misconduct
was disposed of by nonjudicial punishment as opposed to
courts-martial and the recommendation from the AU
Commander), the majority of the AFBCMR panel concludes -
that the Secretarial determination that the applicant did net
serve satisfactorily in the grade of colonel was too harsh and,
therefore, unjust. Noting the flagrant misconduct committed
by the applicant, the minority member of the AFBCMR
panel does not believe that the Secretarial decision was
overly harsh and believes the applicant’s request should be

A 21

denied. I agree.

The AFBCMR has_ considerable discretion in
determining what set of circumstances constitute either an
error or an injustice and, as 4 consequence, its
recommendation is entitled to considerable deference. I note,
however, that the courts have defined injustice as treatment
by military authorities which shocks the sense of justice.
Given the gravity of the offenses committed, I do not find his
treatment by the military shocking in the least. Quite the
contrary, he appears to have been fortunate that courts-
martial charges were not preferred whereby, if convicted, the
penalty could have far exceeded retirement in a lower grade.
In view of the foregoing and in the absence of clear-cut
evidence that he was falsely accused, it is my decision that
his application be denied.

RUBY B. DEMESME
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
(Manpower, Reserve Affairs,

Installations and Environment)

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10 U.S.C. § 137

(1) Unless entitled to a higher retired grade under some other
provision of law, a commissioned officer (other than a
commissioned warrant officer) of the Army, Navy, Air
Force, or Marine Corps who retires under any provision of
law other than chapter 61 or chapter 1223 of this title shall,
except as provided in paragraph (2), be retired in the highest
grade in which he served on active duty satisfactorily, as
determined by the Secretary of the military department
concemed, for not less than six months.

(2)(A) In order to be eligible for voluntary retirement under
any provision of this title in a grade above major or
_ lieutenant commander, a commissioned officer of the Army,
Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps must have served on
active duty in that grade for not less than three years, except
that the Secretary of Defense may authorize the Secretary of
a military department to reduce such period to a period not
less than two years in the case of retirements effective during
the period beginning on October 1, 1990, and ending on
December 31, 2001.

(B) The President may waive subparagraph (A) in
individual cases involving extreme hardship or exceptional
or unusual circumstances. The authority of the President
under the preceding sentence may not be delegated.

(C) In the case of a grade below the grade of lieutenant
general or vice admiral, the number of members of one of
the armed forces in that grade for whom a reduction is made
during any fiscal year in the period of service-in-grade
otherwise required under this paragraph may not exceed the
‘number equal to two percent of the authorized active-duty
strength for that fiscal year for officers of that armed force in
that grade. :
(3) A reserve or temporary officer who is notified that he
will be released from active duty without his consent and

A 23

thereafter requests retirement under section 3911, 6323, or
8911 of this title and is retired pursuant to that request is
considered for purposes of this section, to have been retired
involuntarily. An officer retired pursuant to section
1186(b)(1) of this title is considered for purposes of this
section to have been retired voluntarily.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386015_1606%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
