# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Muhammad v. Diamond Offshore Co.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 2003
- **Citation:** 538 U.S. 1056

## Text

«ane Geurt, U.S.
FILE ®

021245 FEB 21 2003

GRICE OF THE GLERK

In The
Supreme Court of the Anited States

¢

SADAT MUHAMMAD,

Petitioner,

V.

DIAMOND OFFSHORE COMPANY,

Respondent.

*

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari
To The Supreme Court Of The State Of Louisiana

2
v

PETITION FOR WRIT OF C.:RTIORARI

¢

LAWRENCE D. WIEDEMANN
Louisiana Bar #13457
WIEDEMANN & WIEDEMANN
821 Baronne Street

New Orleans, Louisiana 70113
Telephone: (504) 581-6180

Counsel of Record for Petitioner,
Sadat Muhammad

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO. (800) 225-6964
OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Whether, or not, decisions of the 16th Judicial District
Court, State of Louisiana, the Third Circuit Court of
Appeal, State of Louisiana, and the Louisiana Su-
preme Court, refusing to apply OSHA violations of 29
C.F.R. 1910.24(f) and (g) by respondent to the unin-
spected vessel, OCEAN LEXINGTON, are in direct
conflict with this Court’s controlling decision in Chao
v. Mallard Bay Drilling, Inc., 534 U.S. 235, 122 S. Ct.
738, 151 L.Ed. 2d 659.

Whether, or not, the above State Courts in assessing
100% fault to the seaman respondent ignored this
Court’s controlling decision in Kernan v. American
Dredging Company, 355 U.S. 394 (1958), and 45
U.S.C. §53, making the violation of an applicable
regulatory statute “negligence per se” and eliminating
appiicant’s alleged comparative fault.

ii
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

Applicant

SADAT MUHAMMAD, a person of the full age of
majority and a resident of Marion County, Mississippi.

Respondent

Diamond Offshore Company, a Delaware corporation
domiciled in Wilmington, Delaware, with its principal
office in Houston, Texas, and its principal business
establishment in New Iberia, Louisiana.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
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SR On ili
NE PID ssasavescassscccnsensnecsansescvssseanessevereses v
EE AR SR rt 1
EINE ERE SERIE! “AI ES OA Oa Te 1
Statutory and Regulatory Provisions...................006.. 2
oss scennncwnesecsnaccssundesvessébesevees 2
Reasons for Granting the Writ..................c..csecceeeeeeee 4

Meastiaens rik ican evevedsbesbinekiceninns 4

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ELE ERE STOR ey a ea 15
Appendix

Appendix A

Decision dated November 27, 2002, of the Su-

preme Court, State of Louisiana......................0000. App. 1

Appendix B

Decision dated July 10, 2002, from the Court of

Appeal, Third Circuit, State of Louisiana............ App. 2

Appendix C

Written Reasons dated March 28, 2001, of the
Honorable William D. Hunter of the 16th Judi-

iv”

TABLE OF CONTENTS -— Continued
Page
Appendix D

Judgment dated May 16, 2001, rendered by the
Honorable William D. Hunter of the 16th Judi-
cial District Court, Parish of Iberia, State of Lou-
I ses cttrcitsscencrennsineiavnntnnciansidaaaaineiedite App. 33

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES:
Chao v. Mallard Bay Drilling, Inc., 532 U.S. 1017,

121 S.Ct. 1954, 149 L.Ed. 2d 751 (2002) .........0.0...0.. 3,5
Chao v. Mallard Bay Driliing, Inc., 5384 U.S. 235, ;

122 S.Ct. 738; 151 L.Ed. 2d 659 (2002) ............. ce eeeeeeeee 3
Colmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525, 58 S.Ct.

651, 82 L.Ed. 993 (1938) ................sererecceeceses sesveeeesesenenee 12
In Re: Complaint of Roy Cook & Sons, Inc. v. Allen,

F Gee ae BE Ce CA Bi in ensiccoscscevievecinserssabeasiontcnion 14
Dedon v. Dedon, 404 So.2d 904 (La. 1981) ....... eee 5
Jacobs v. City of Bunkie, 737 So.2d 14 (La. 1999).............. 6
Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1, 82 L.Ed. 3, 58 S.Ct.

FG Ne Paiva thaanncncaddphicuaanuntabanteeiaaniiniaiaaltishaesdadda ae;
Kernan v. American Dredging Company, 355 U.S.

Pe Ge enivastusarvniensiensntinincnaiianamaael 5, 11, 13, 14
Mallard Bay Drilling, Inc. v. Herman, 212 F.3d 898

CE Re BOD vhintiticsniscsntbiccintamsdineniemmeenene 3, 4, 11
Marceaux v. Conoco, Inc., 124 F.3d 730 (5th Cir.

NE dicsvshiastintcidinplinnchbaviinaisnaieiiadaiaimedipiaiidipialainiedaditas 10
The Pennsylvania, 88 U.S. 125 (1874)..........ccceeeeeeeeeeeeeees 11
Vendetto v. Soniat Offshore Drilling Co., 725 So.2d

TE Ces repos denicacincsn\iiticenphensiapettndonouaamiaiaonas 5,14
Vryant v. Rucker, 11 F.Supp. 309 (D.C. Ala. 1953)............. 6

Watterson v. Mallard Bay Drilling, 649 So.2d 431
CE. BD: SA Ti, FeO ves vinsnescnnsncipecnscinebnstbtamecnionian 4,5

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page
STATUTES:
SF Nts Naess siiuiscci tv wcbelcblacaadeak dade ta i 1
BO FAD, COMED, CBD. csecssesisancsonisroinitcbeonincsnccec cue 8
29 C.FR. §1910.24(f) and (g).....cccccccssesssescesesceceocess.... 2, 8, 12
OF Gi. GE vanssiciasiiomonnieinnansicuae cna eee 2
PE FO IE sacsssisnecocnccndnaneoudicies as 13
GD DB FB svessssnsssistisicsedeumates sevetibicaapiialanainaiiamalal 2,13
OF DAE, Ta onsistonnsepseisisasaneanbunpeiees ceeecana ae 2

MOOG. TE a ininniicaicmmntG. eee 2, 6

1

OPINIONS BELOW

On March 28, 2001, Honorable William D. Hunter of
the 16th Judicial District Court, Parish of Iberia, State of
Louisiana, rendered written reasons in which he found
seaman/applicant 100% at fault for his on-the-job accident.
(Appendix C).

On May 16, 2001, Honorable William D. Hunter in the
same Court entered Judgment dismissing applicant’s
claim for damages. (Appendix D).

On July 10, 2002, the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit,
State of Louisiana, affirmed the Judgment of the Trial
Court dismissing applicant’s claim for damages. (Appendix
B).

On November 27, 2002, the Supreme Court of the
State of Louisiana denied applicant’s writ of certiorari
and/or review with two dissents from the seven Court
composition. (Appendix A).

,
v

JURISDICTION

The Supreme Court, State of Louisiana, denied
applicant’s application for a writ of certiorari and/or
review on November 27, 2002. This petition for a writ of
certiorari is filed within the prescribed period of ninety
(90) days after the November 27, 2002, final judgment.

The jurisdiction of this Honorable Court is invoked
under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §2106.

4
.

2

STATUTORY AND REGULATORY PROVISIONS

The Federal Employees Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §53,
and 46 U.S.C. §688, incorporating the rights under 45
U.S.C. §53; 46 U.S.C. §3301, statutorily defining “in-
spected vessels;” 43 U.S.C. §2102(43), defining “unin-
spected vessels;” 29 U.S.C. §654(a)(1), (2), outlining OSHA
responsibility.

,%
vy

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Plaintifffapplicant, Sadat Muhammad, applicant
hereinafter, is a 3l-year-old African American resident of
Columbia, Mississippi. He is a high school graduate,
married, and the father of two minor children, ages 5 and
4 at the time of the trial.

Applicant began working offshore with Pool Offshore
in 1995 at age 24, and went to work with defen-
dant/respondent, Diamond Offshore Company, respondent
hereinafter, as a roustabout in October, 1996.

On March 8, 1997, applicant was a seaman/roustabout
on the OCEAN LEXINGTON, an unlicenced mobile
offshore drilling vessel owned by respondent, acting in the
course and scope of his employment with respondent.

Applicant was injured when descending an industrial
metal stair from one deck to another. The stair was in
violation of 29 C.F.R. §1910.24(f), requiring uniform tread
width and riser height and 29 C.F.R. §1910.24(g), requir-
ing platforms at the top and bottom of the stair extending
30” back in the direction of travel. The stair in question
had a 4'/" plate across the entrance, thereby eliminating
the platform and increasing the first riser from 9" to 13'/”".

SP

3

Applicant fell down the steps as a result of these breaches
of the OSHA standards and sustained disabling injuries.

On March 28, 2001, Judge William D. Hunter, His
Honor below, rendered reasons for judgment in which he
found applicant 100% at fault and denied applicant’s Jones
Act negligence and general maritime unseaworthiness
claims for damages, rejecting the testimony of Dr. Gary
Nelson, applicant’s safety engineering expert, concerning
the OSHA violations causing the accident, relying on the
United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal decision in
Mallard Bay Drilling, Inc. v. Herman, 212 F.3d 898 (5th
Cir. 2000), reversed by this Honorable Court’s decision in
Chao v. Mallard Bay Drilling, Inc., 532 U.S. 1017, 121
S.Ct. 1954, 149 L.Ed. 2d 751 (2002). Appendix C.

Applicant filed a timely devolutive appeal to the Third
Circuit Court of Appeal from the Lower Court’s denial of
damages, and also cast applicant 100% at fault.

Applicant filed a motion to remand the case for
further proceeding in the District Court predicated on the
decision by the United States Supreme Court in Chao v.
- Mallard Bay Drilling, 534 U.S. 235, 121 S.Ct. 738, 151
L.Ed. 2d 659 (2002), reversing the Fifth Circuit decision in
the same case subsequent to the Lower Court Judgment
herein and prior to submission of the case for judgment in
the Court of Appeal.

The Third Circuit Court of Appeal on July 10, 2002,
rendered judgment affirming the Lower Court’s denial of
damages in favor of applicant and, in the same decision,
denied applicant’s motion to remand. Appendix A.

Applicant filed a timely application for a writ of
certiorari, and/or review, to the Louisiana Supreme Court

4

and on November 27, 2002, the Court, with two dissents,
denied applicant’s writ application. Appendix A.

¢

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
ARGUMENT

I. WHETHER, OR NOT, DECISIONS OF THE
16TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE
OF LOUISIANA, THE THIRD CIRCUIT
COURT OF APPEAL, STATE OF LOUISIANA,
AND THE LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT,
REFUSING TO APPLY OSHA VIOLATIONS OF
29 C.F.R. 1910.24(F) AND (G) BY RESPON-
DENT TO THE UNINSPECTED VESSEL,
OCEAN LEXINGTON, ARE IN DIRECT CON-
FLICT WITH THIS COURT’S DECISION IN
CHAO V. MALLARD BAY DRILLING, INC., 534
U.S. 235, 122 S.CT. 738; 151 L.ED. 2D 659.

Honorable William D. Hunter, his Honor Below,
understandingly applied the then-controlling United
States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal decision in Mallard
Bay Drilling, Inc. v. Herman, 212 F.3d 898 (5th Cir. 2000),
excluded the testimony of Dr. Gary Nelson, applicant’s
expert, stating in his written opinion, Appendix C:

“Although Dr. Gary Nelson, a safety engineer,
testified by deposition as to the safety of the
stairwell and spoke of OSHA regulations, the
OCEAN LEXINGTON is not under any OSHA
guidelines. Watterson v. Mallard Bay Drilling,
649 So.2d 431 (La. App. Cir. 3, 10-12-94).”

We believe that His Honor was referring to Mallard v.
Herman, a federal appeals decision, and not.to Watterson
uv. Mallard, a state appeals decision, since Mallard uv.

pee MOM IUEEE NS pare oe =

Herman eliminated the applicability of OSHA regulations
to the drilling rig therein. Watterson v. Mallard held
OSHA regulations to apply to the drilling rig therein and
the violation thereof to be “negligence per se” under Ker-
nan v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426, 78 S.Ct. 394,
2 L.Ed. 2d 382 (1958). It also eliminated contributory
negligence of the seaman as a consideration under 45
U.S.C. §53.

We would accept the applicability of Watterson uv.
Mallard because it would mean that applicant should have
recovered at trial. However, Herman v. Mallard, coming
after Watterson v. Mallard, eliminated the applicability of
OSHA regulations to a drilling rig because it is a vessel
and, according to that decision, only subject to Coast
Guard regulations.

However, the United States Supreme Court in Chao v.
Mallard Bay Drilling (the same case as Herman, involving
a change in United States Secretaries of Labor from
Herman to Chao), 532 U.S. 1017, 121 S.Ct. 1954, 149
L.Ed. 2d 751 (2002), specifically reversed Herman uv.
Mallard, supra, and held OSHA regulations applicable to
drilling rigs, subsequent to the District Court decision
herein but before the Appellate Court decision herein. .
Chao v. Mallard, supra, is on all fours with Watterson v.
Mallard, supra. The Chao decision, of course, is binding on
the Louisiana Courts (District, Appeal, and Supreme),
under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Consti-
tution, Article 6, Clause 2, and Louisiana Supreme Court
decisions in Dedon v. Dedon, 404 So.2d 904 (La. 1981); and
Vendetto v. Soniat Offshore Drilling Co., 725 So.2d 474 (La.
1999) (applying the maritime law of the United States
Fifth Circuit).

6

An Appellate Court is bound to adjudge a case before
it in accordance with the law existing at the time of its
decision. When the law changes during the pendency of a
suit, the new law applies on appeal even though it re-
quires reversal of a Trial Court judgment which was
correct under the law at the time it was rendered. Jacobs
v. City of Bunkie, 737 So.2d 14 (La. 1999).

The Third Circuit Court of Appeal, unable to distin-
guish the United States Supreme Court holding in Chao v.
Mallard Bay, supra, and sidestepping applicant’s motion
to remand predicated thereon, makes the astounding, and
unsupported, conclusion that the OCEAN LEXINGTON is
an “inspected” vessel. Appendix B.

“Inspected vessel” is not a term subject to interpreta-
tion. “Inspected vessels”, subject to exclusive Coast Guard
regulation, are 14 types statutorily defined by the United
States Congress with specificity in 46 U.S.C. §3301, and a
mobile offshore drilling rig, like the OCEAN LEXING-
TON, is not one of the 14 described vessels designated as
“inspected”.

The term “inspected vessel” as used in 46 U.S.C.
§3301, because of its exclusivity, has been given a strict
interpretation. Steam vessels, one of the 14 listed in-
spected vessels, for instance, does not include motorboats.
Vryant v. Rucker, 11 F.Supp. 309 (D.C. Ala. 1953). Also
tugboats that are motor-driven, as opposed to steam
powered, are not “inspected vessels”. Kelly v. Washington,
302 U.S. 1, 82 L.Ed. 3, 58 S.Ct. 87 (1937).

It is undisputed that OSHA regulations have no
applicability to the 14 specific vessels described as “in-
spected vessels” under 46 U.S.C. §3301.

7

The mobile offshore drilling rig, OCEAN LEXING-
TON, is clearly not an “inspected” vessel as a matter of
law and the Court of Appeals characterization of it, as
such, in its opinion, is clearly erroneous as a matter of law.
Only the United States Congress, and not the State
Appellate Court, can determine what is, and what is not,
an “inspected vessel” as a matter of law.

The question then posed is whether this legally
“uninspected” vessel is subject to OSHA regulation and
that is resoundingly answered by this Honorable Court in
Chao v. Mallard, supra, as follows:

“In Coast Guard terminology, Rig 52 was an ‘un-
inspected vessel’ under 43 U.S.C. §2101(43) as
opposed to one of the 14 varieties of inspected
vessels subject to comprehensive Coast Guard
regulation. See 46 U.S.C. §3301 (1994 ed. and
Supp. V).”

The Court in Chao, supra, went on to state:

“ ... mere possession by another federal agency
of unexercised authority to regulate certain
working conditions is insufficient to displace
OSHA’s jurisdiction. Furthermore, another fed-
eral agency’s minimal exercise of some authority
over certain conditions on vessels such as Rig 52
does not result in complete pre-emption of OSHA
jurisdiction, because the statute also makes clear
that OSHA is only pre-empted if the working
conditions at issue are the particular ones ‘with
respect to which’ another federal agency has
regulated, and if such regulations ‘affect occupa-
tional safety or health.’ §653(b)(1). n7 To deter-
mine whether Coast Guard regulations
have pre-empted OSHA’s jurisdiction over
the working conditions on Rig 52, it is thus

8

necessary to examine the contours of the
Guard’s exercise of its statutory authority,
not merely the existence of such authority.”
(Bold emphasis added).

No factual determination was made by the Louisiana
Trial Court, the Appellate Court, or the Supreme Court of
“the contours of the Guard’s exercise of its authority”, or
OSHA's obligation to require the employer to provide
working conditions that “are free from recognized hazards
which are likely to cause death or serious bodily harm” to
their employees, and to require employer compliance with
safety standards promulgated by the Secretary of Labor.
29 U.S.C. §654(a)(1), (2).

29 C.F.R. 1910.24(f) and (g), the OSHA regulation
specifically applicable to fixed industrial stairs, like those
involved herein, provides:

“(f) Stair treads. All treads shall be reasonably
slip-resistant and the nosings shall be of non-
slip finish. Welded bar grating treads without -
nosings are acceptable providing the leading
edge can be readily identified by personnel de-
scending the stairway and provided the tread is
serrated or is of definite nonslip design. Rise
height and tread width shall be uniform
throughout any flight of stairs including
any foundation.” (Bold emphasis added).

“(g) Stairway platforms. Stairway platforms shall
be no less than the width of a stairway and
a minimum of 30 inches in length measured
in the direction of travel.” (Bold emphasis
added).

ceaeiiaiiiaiisiiiili tt

9

The 4'% inch plate across the top of the stair elimi-
nated the required platform and also created a grossly
disproportionate top riser.

Dr. Gary Nelson, one of applicant’s experts, testified
that the stairs involved in applicant’s accident were in
direct violation of the OSHA regulation in that there was
an absence of uniformity in the treads and risers and in
the requirement of a platform at the top and bottom no
less than the width of the stairwell and a minimum of 30
inches in length.

In his deposition, introduced into evidence at pp. 637-
639, he opined:

“Q. Now, in looking at the staircase in question,
that is, the four photographs 9 through 12,
would you tell us what, if any, deficiencies
that you find as a safety engineer in the de-
sign and construction of the stairwell?

A. Yes, there are two primary deficiencies.
First, is the introduction of a very specific
and serious hazard in the form of a tripping
hazard at the very top of the stairs, which
produces stair dimensions that are not uni-
form. It violates all design standards in
terms of uniform tread-riser dimensions,
and it also violates the sections of the stan-
dards dealing with landings, which indicate
that the landing must extend forward from
the top of the stairs at least the width of the
stairs and a minimum, I think of 36 inches,
if ’m correct.

So there is not a flat landing at the top
of the stairs. You have this plate barrier at

EE EEE OO ee

10

the very top of the stairs that you have to
step over.

Also violative of good design would be
that the handrails are essentially unaccessi-
ble until you get on the first step descend-
ing. Of course, that’s the very time you need
the handrails because you are stepping over
this physical hazard.”

Dr. Nelson also testified that the statutory defects in
the steps were the proximate cause of applicant’s accident.

Dr. Nelson was uniquely qualified to render an expert
opinion in this case. He obtained a Ph.D. in industrial
safety engineering from Texas A&M University in 1975.
His Master’s Thesis was entitled “Engineering—Human
Factors Interface in Stairway Tread-Riser Design,”
one of the specific issues in this case. Dr. Nelson taught
industrial safety engineering at Texas A&M for 12 years
and worked in the field of safety engineering for 36 years.
In short, it is respectfully submitted that Dr. Nelson’s
expertise in safety engineering, predicated on his educa-
tion, work experience, and teaching experience is self-
evident and requires no further substantiation. Applicant,
however, refers this Honorable Court to the case of Mar-
ceaux v. Conoco, Inc., 124 F3d 730 (5th Cir. 1997), in
which Dr. Nelson was accepted as an expert in the field of
safety engineering by the United States Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeal.

Retired Commander David Cole, another applicant
expert, with years of active service as a marine inspector,
accident investigator, and reconstructionist, testified that
the 4'/ inch plate across the top of the stairs eliminating

11

the OSHA required platform, was a cause in fact of appli-
cant’s accident.

Judge William D. Hunter in the State District Court
ignored this testimony under the then controlling decision
of the Fifth Circuit in Mallard Bay Drilling v. Herman,
supra,

The violation of OSHA Regulation 29 C.F.R. 1910.24(f)
and (g) by respondent in failing to have uniform treads
and risers and a platform as wide as the stairs and a
minimum of 30" back from the stairs, constitute negli-
gence per se under Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355

U.S. 426, 78 S.Ct. 394, 2 L.Ed. 2d 382 (1958).

Applicant, in view of the foregoing law and expert
testimony, certainly cannot be held to have overcome
negligence per se under Kernan v. American Dredging Co.,
supra, and the burden under The Pennsylvania, 88 U.S.
125 (1874).

It is obvious that the trial of this matter was fatally
flawed by the state of the law at the time and the dra-
matic change in the law thereafter. It is only fair, and just,
that this matter be remanded to the Louisiana Supreme
Court with a mandate that they order a new trial so that
the critical evidence now admissible can be considered by
Honorable William D. Hunter.

As a matter of fact Mr. Cass, the defense “expert”
relied on by the Court of Appeal to incorrectly classify the
OCEAN LEXINGTON to be an “inspected vessel”, testified
that the United States Coast Guard did not have any
specifications for exterior stairs. Therefore, the Coast
Guard and no other federal agency, pre-empted OSHA’s

12

obligation to impose safety regulations and a duty on the
employer herein.

Seamen are historically “wards” of the Courts. See
Colmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525, 58 S.Ct. 651, 82
L.Ed. 993 (1938). They deserve, and are afforded, special
treatment because of the hazardous nature of their em-
ployment and also because they have no compensation
scheme to fall back on. Therefore, these special laws and
statutes were enacted in recognition of their “ward” status.
To ignore the statutory benefits reduces them from “ward”
status to.a status below that of land-based employees.

II. WHETHER, OR NOT, THE ABOVE STATE
COURTS IN ASSESSING 100% FAULT TO THE
SEAMAN RESPONDENT IGNORED THIS
COURT’S CONTROLLING DECISION IN
KERNAN V. AMERICAN DREDGING COM-
PANY, 355 U.S. 394 (1958), AND 45 U.S.C. §53,
MAKING THE VIOLATION OF AN APPLICA-
BLE REGULATORY STATUTE “NEGLIGENCE
PER SE” AND ELIMINATING APPLICANT’S |
ALLEGED COMPARATIVE FAULT.

The Louisiana Lower Court, the Appellate Court, and
the Supreme Court found applicant 100% responsible for
applicant’s fall down a flight of statutorily defective stairs.

A Jones Act seaman, like applicant herein, cannot be
guilty of contributory negligence when the owner of the
vessel, respondent herein, violates a statute, or regulation,
enacted for the safety of his seaman employees.

We have shown in argument I that respondent vio-
lated the OSHA regulation, 29 C.F.R. 1910.24(f) and (g), in
failing to provide uniform risers and treads and in failing

OO

13

to provide a platform at the top of the steps at least as
wide as the steps and 30 inches back. Obviously, the OSHA
regulation was enacted to prevent the very type of acci-
dent that occurred to applicant herein.

45 U.S.C. §53 of the Federal Employees’ Liability Act
is incorporated into the Jones Act, and applies with equal
force to seamen such as applicant. See Kernan v. American
Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426, 2 L.Ed. 2d 382, 78 S.Ct. 394
(1958).

45 U.S.C. §53 of the FELA provides:

“In all actions hereafter brought against any
such common carrier by railroad under or by vir-
tue of any of the provisions of this act [45 USCS
§§ 51 et seq.] to recover damages for personal in-
juries to an employee, or where such injuries
have resulted in his death, the fact that the em-
ployee may have been guilty of contributory neg-
ligence shall not bar a recovery, but the damages
shall be diminished by the jury in praportion to
the amount of negligence attributable to such
employee: Provided, That no such employee
who may be injured or killed shall be held
to have been guilty of contributory negli-
gence in any case where the violation by
such common carrier of any statute enacted
for the safety of employees contributed to
the injury or death of such employee.” (Bold
emphasis added).

Obviously, the OSHA regulations afore cited were
enacted specifically for the safety of users of stairways.
However under Kernan v. American Dredging Company,
supra, it is irrelevant whether, or not, the particular
provision was enacted for the safety of the crew members
just so long as the instrument in statutory violation was a

14

cause of the crew member’s injury. For instance, in Kernan
v. American Dredging Company, supra, a navigational
light in violation of a navigational regulation, having
nothing to do with crew member’s safety, was found to be a
cause of the crew member’s injury creating liability and
abrogating any contributory negligence factor.

Under the FELA, incorporated into the Jones Act, the
breach of a safety statute which is even a “slight contribut-
ing cause” makes the employer responsible for 100% of the
seaman’s injury, without consideration of, or reduction for,
the seaman’s contributory negligence, if any. See Jn Re:
Complaint of Roy Cook & Sons, Inc. v. Allen, 778 F.2d 1037
(5th Cir. 1986).

His Honor in the District Court understandably
ignored the OSHA regulation because of the state of the
law at trial but, in so doing, he also utilized the wrong
burden of proof. He _ utilized a reasonable em-
ployer/reasonable seaman standard citing Gautreaux v.
Scurlock, 107 F.3d 331 (5th Cir. 1997) and Vendetto v.
Soniat Offshore Drilling Co., 725 So.2d 474 (La. 1999),
instead of the statutory violation standard making the
employer 100% responsible when the violation is a “slight
contributing cause” and exonerating the employee from
any contributing negligence under Complaint of Roy Cook
& Sons, Inc. v. Allen, supra.

It is respectfully submitted that the Louisiana Courts
erred in finding applicant guilty of contributory negligence
under the cited law and that they all precipitated a gross
injustice in finding the applicant seaman 100% at fault
when the law requires the employer to be judicially cast

15

for 100% of the fault when a statutory violation is found to
have been committed.

+

CONCLUSION

It is respectfully submitted that this Honorable Court
should grant a writ of certiorar: to the Louisiana Supreme
Court, State of Louisiana, and after due proceedings,
.-remand this matter to the Supreme Court of Louisiana
with a mandate to order the 16th Judicial District Court,
Parish of Iberia, State of Louisiana, to retry this case in
view of this Honorable Court’s decision in Chao v. Mallard
Bay Drilling, Inc., supra, materially changing the law
applicable to the case.

Respectfully Submitted,
WIEDEMANN & WIEDEMANN

LAWRENCE D. WIEDEMANN,
Bar #13457

821 Baronne Street

New Orleans, Louisiana 70113

Telephone: (504) 581-6180

Attorneys for Applicant,
Sadat Muhammad

APPENDIX

Page
APPENDIX A
Decision dated November 27, 2002, of the Supreme
I, ee Oe BS acne vnccccnseneccerecercrcsceeesesecsees App. 1
APPENDIX B
Decision dated July 10, 2002, from the Court of
Appeal, Third Circuit, State of Louisiana)............... App. 2

APPENDIX C —s

Written Reasons signed March 28, 2001, by the
Honorable William D. Hunter of the 16th Judicial
District Court, Parish of Iberia, State of Louisiana;..App. 20

APPENDIX D

Judgment dated May 16, 2001, rendered by the
Honorable William D. Hunter of the 16th Judicial
District Court, Parish of Iberia, State of Louisiana; ..App. 33

App. 1

APPENDIX A
The Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana
SADAT MUHAMMAD
Ve. NO. 2002-C-2409

DIAMOND OFFSHORE
COMPANY

IN RE: Muhammad, Sadat; — Plaintiff; Applying for
Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Iberia, 16th
Judicial District Court Div. D, Nos. 86-273; to the Court

of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 02-0172

November 27, 2002

Denied.

CDT
CDK
JPV
JTK
JLW

CALOGERO, C.J., would grant the writ.
JOHNSON, J., would grant the writ.

Supreme Court of Louisiana
November 27, 2002

/s/ Rai L. Dayli
Deputy Clerk of Court
For the Court

App. 2

APPENDIX B
STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT
02-0172

SADAT MUHAMMAD Judgment rendered July |
VERSUS 10, 2002. Applications for

rehearing may be filed
DIAMOND OFFSHORE _ within the delays allowed

COMPANY by La. Code Civ. P. art.
2166 or La. Code Crim. P.
art. 922.
* * cd
APPEAL FROM THE

SIXTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
PARISH OF IBERIA, NUMBER 86,273
HONORABLE WILLIAM D.-HUNTER

* * *

GLENN B. GREMILLION
JUDGE

* * *

Court composed of Sylvia R. Cooks, Jimmie C. Peters, and
Glenn B. Gremillion, Judges.

AFFIRMED IN PART AND |
REVERSED IN PART |

Lawrence D. Wiedemann

WIEDEMANN & WIEDEMANN

821 Barone St.

New Orleans, LA 70113

(504) 581-6180

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT
Sadat Muhammad

App. 3

Cameron B. Simmons

P.O. Drawer 232

Jeanerette, LA 70544

(318) 276-6034

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE
Diamond Offshore Company

Christopher Bremer Siegrist

407 Roussell St.

Houma, LA 70360

(985) 879-2427

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE
Diamond Offshore Company

Linda Jane Nelsoi

LAMBERT & NELSON

701 Magazine St.

New Orleans, LA 70130

(504) 581-1750

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE
Lambert & Nelson

GREMILEION, Judge.

The plaintiff, Sadat Muhammad, appeals the trial
court’s judgment finding that he failed to prove negligence
on the part of the defendant, Diamond Offshore Company,
and the denial of his claim of unseaworthiness. Diamond
answered the appeal seeking reversal of portions of the
trial court’s judgment. We affirm in part and reverse in
part.

FACTS

On March 8, 1997, Muhe mmad sustained injuries as a
result of a fall while traversing the stairs leading from the
port pipe rack deck to the air conditioner deck on the Rig
OCEAN LEXINGTON. Muhammad, a roustabout for

App. 4

Diamond, was carrying a five-gallon bucket of industrial
soap in one hand and a long-handled brush in the other as
he approached the stairs. He fell down the stairs as he was
attempting to step over a four and one-half inch coaming
located at the top of the stairs. Shortly thereafter, Mu-
hammad filed suit against Diamond seeking damages
pursuant to the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.App. § 688, and the
general maritime law claim of unseaworthiness. A petition
of intervention was filed by Muhammad’s former attor-
neys, Lambert & Nelson, P.L.C., seeking attorney’s fees as
a result of a contingency fee contract entered into between
them and Muhammad. This matter was severed from the
trial of the main demand.

Following « bench trial on the merits, the trial court
held that Muhammad was solely at fault in causing the
accident and that Diamond did not breach any duty owed
to him. It further held that he failed to prove that an
unseaworthy condition of the OCEAN LEXINGTON was a
proximate cause of his accident and subsequent injuries.
The trial court also held that Diamond improperly with-
held maintenance and cure payments from Muhammad
and that he had not yet reached maximum medical recov-
ery due to the fact that further surgery was scheduled on
his lumbar spine. It awarded Muhammad maintenance of
$15 per day from November 8, 1997 until he reached
maximum medical recovery, past medical expenses of
$59,599.53, and future medical expenses of $46,309. Based
on a joint motion of the parties, Muhammad’s daily rate of
maintenance was amended from $15 to $20 per day.

A judgment was rendered on May 14, 2001, which
awarded Muhammad the above stated damages, and also
awarded him pre-judgment judicial interest on his past
and future medical expense awards from March 8, 1997,

ee ee

App. 5

and judicial interest on his maintenance award from
November 8, 1997, until he reached maximum medical
recovery. This appeal by Muhammad followed. Subsequent
to his motion for appeal, an order was issued staying
execution of the May 14, 2001 judgment pending this
appeal. A hearing on the award of attorney’s fees was held,
after which the trial court awarded Muhammad attorney’s
fees in the amount of $15,000

ISSUES

Muhammad raises six assignments of error on appeal.
He argues that the trial court erred in excluding evidence
of Diamond’s violation of applicable Occupational Safety
and Health Act (OSHA) regulations and in relying on
Vendetto v. Sonat Offshore Drilling Co., 97-3103 (La.
1/20/99), 725 So.2d 474, and Gautreaux v. Scurlock Ma-
rine, Inc., 107 F.3d 331 (5th Cir. 1997), in finding Diamond
free from fault. He further argues that the trial court
erred in failing to find the OCEAN LEXINGTON unsea-
worthy, in failing to apply the doctrine of momentary
forgetfulness, and in failing to award him general and
economic damages as a result of his cervical discectomy
and his lumbar fusion..

Diamond answered Muhammad’s appeal, arguing that
it was aggrieved by the trial court’s award of future
medical expenses and pre-judgment interest on those
expenses, and by the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees
to him based on a finding that it wrongfully terminated
his maintenance and cure benefits.

App. 6

MOTION TO REMAND

Initially, we note that Muhammad has filed a Motion
to Remand asking that we remand this matter to the trial
court for further proceedings in light of Chao v. Mallard
Bay Drilling, Inc., 534 U.S. 235, 122 S.Ct. 738 (2002).
Chao dealt with the applicability of OSHA regulations to a
vessel which had not been inspected by the Coast Guard
and in which it had not issued affirmative regulations
covering the working conditions at issue. However, we
need not remand this matter, since the trial court never
reached the issue of whether the coaming at issue was
defective. Rather, the trial court held that Muhammad
failed to carry his burden of proving that the coaming was
the proximate cause of his accident. Since the issue of
whether the coaming was defective was never reached, a
remand of this matter is not called for. Additionally, the
report of Diamond’s expert in naval architecture and
marine surveying, Sheldon Cass, states that the OCEAN
LEXINGTON requires yearly inspections in order to
maintain a current U.S. Coast Guard certificate. Thus,
this is a vessel which has been inspected by the Coast
Guard. Accordingly, the motion to remand is denied.

JONES ACT

Jones Act negligence was discussed by the supreme
court in Foster v. Destin Trading Corp., 96-0803, pp. 3-4
(La. 5/30/97), 700 So.2d 199, 208 (on rehearing):

The Jones Act allows an injured seaman to
bring a negligence suit against his employer. 46
U.S.C.App. § 688 (1994). The employer’s poten-
tial liability extends to all personal injuries aris-
ing during the course of the seaman’s
employment, but proof of negligence is essential

App. 7

to recovery. See id. Such negligence may arise in
many ways including the failure to use reason-
able care to provide a seaman with a safe place to
work, the existence of a dangerous condition on
or about the vessel, or any other breach of the
duty of care. See Davis v. Hill Engineering, Inc.,
549 F.2d 314, 329 (5th Cir.1977); 1 Thomas J.
Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law § 6-
21, at 312 (2d ed.1994). The duty of care owed by
an employer under the Jones Act is that of ordi-
nary prudence, namely the duty to take reason-
able care under the circumstances. Gautreaux v.
Scurlock Marine, Inc., 107 F.3d 335-36 (5th
Cir.1997). The seaman bears the evidentiary
burden of proving that a breach of the duty owed
by the employer was a cause of his injuries.
However, a seaman need only present “slight
evidence” that his employer’s negligence caused
his injuries in order to reach the jury or to be
sustained upon appellate review. Jd. at 334-35.
The employer can introduce evidence of the sea-
man’s own negligence to reduce damages through
application of pure comparative fault principles.
Like his employer, the seaman must meet the
standard of ordinary prudence by acting as a
reasonable seaman would act under the same
circumstances. Id. at 339.

The manifest error — clearly wrong standard of review
applies in Jones Act and general maritime cases. Afes v.
Mallard Bay Drilling Inc., 01-836 (La. App. 3 Cir. 12/12/01),
801 So.2d 653, writ denied, 02-0100 (La. 3/15/02), 811
So.2d 915.

After reviewing the record in its entirety, we find that
the trial court was presented with differing views of the
evidence pertaining to the cause of Muhammad’s fall.
Thus, it was reasonable for the trial court to find that

App. 8

Muhammad failed to act as a reasonable seaman would
under like circumstances and that he was the sole cause of
the accident.

Muhammad testified that he was carrying a five
gallon-plastic bucket of industrial soap in one hand and a
four-foot-long brush in the other hand when he attempted
to descend the stairway. He was unsure which hand held
which item. He stated that he intended to step over the
coaming and then grasp the stair railing with the hand
holding the brush. Before he could do so, Muhammad
testified that he fell as he brought his trailing foot over the
coaming. However, in his deposition, he was unsure of the
specific cause of his fall, stating that the brush he was
carrying became caught in the coaming. After his fall, the
bristle part of the brush was found caught in the coaming
at the top of the stairs, while the handle was found at the
bottom of the stairs with him. Muhammad testified that
he had been up and down these stairs before and that he
was aware of Diamond’s policy requiring him to always
hold onto a railing with one hand while ascending or
descending stairways. However, he denied being told that
he could not traverse the stairs while carrying something
in both hands.

Diamond presented evidence pertaining to its policy
requiring employees to hold onto railings with one hand
any time they were using stairways on the OCEAN LEX-
INGTON. Its safety manual specifically states, “Traveling
up and down ladders or stairways require the employee to
use the handrails.” Diamond employees, Oliver Gandy and
Timothy Taylor, both testified that its policy requires an
employee to maintain one hand on the handrail at all
times while traversing stairways on the rig. They further
stated that Diamond’s policy required an employee

App. 9

carrying a brush and bucket to place the brush in the
bucket before using a stairway. Jerry McHenry, Diamond’s
safety representative on the rig at the time of the accident,
verified its policy required employees to keep one hand on
a handrail at all times.

Gandy testified that Muhammad admitted not having
a hand on the handrail at the time of his fall and that he
had attended a safety meeting minutes earlier, at which
this policy was discussed. Gandy further stated that he
has never had a problem with the stairs and that he first
grasps hold of the handrail before stepping over the
coaming and proceeding down the stairs. Taylor, who was
on the air conditioner deck, testified that he saw Muham-
mad approaching the stairs with the bucket and brush in
his hands and then saw him falling, but that he did not
see what caused him to fall. Both stated that the bucket
and brush handle were found on the air conditioner deck
with Muhammad, but the brush itself was found at the top
of the stairs behind the coaming. McHenry recalled that
Muhammad stated that he was not using the handrail at
the time of the accident.

Considering the foregoing evidence, we cannot say
that the trial court was manifestly erroneous in finding
that Muhammad was the sole cause of his accident.
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court denying his
claim for damages pursuant to the Jones Act is affirmed. -
This assignment of error is dismissed as being without
merit.

UNSEAWORTHINESS

Pursuant to the general maritime law, a seaman is
entitled to work on a seaworthy vessel. Thus, a vessel

App. 10

owner has an absolute duty to furnish a seaworthy vessel,
and a breach of that duty will give rise to a claim for
general damages. Vendetto v. Sonat Offshore Drilling Co.,
97-3103 (La. 1/20/00), 725 So.2d 474. An action for unsea-
worthiness arises if a seaman alleges that he was injured
as a result of a defective condition of the vessel, its equip-
ment, or its appurtenances. Jd. The unseaworthiness of a
vessel is a question of fact, which will be determined on a
case-by-case basis. Id.

There is a more stringent causation re-
quirement for claims of unseaworthiness than
Jones Act claims. In an unseaworthiness claim,
the plaintiff must show that the unseaworthy
condition played a substantial part in bringing
about or actually causing the injury and that the
injury was either a direct result or a reasonably
probable consequence of the unseaworthiness. |
Phillips [v. Western Company of North America],
953 F.2d (923,] at 928 [(5th Cir. 1992)].

Derouen v. Mallard Bay Drilling, LLC, 00-1268, p. 7
(La.App. 3 Cir. 6/22/01), 808 So.2d 694, 705.

The trial court denied Muhammad’s claim of unsea-
worthiness, finding that he failed to meet the threshold
evidentiary standard for proving such a claim. It held that
the cause of Muhammad’s accident was likely something
other than the placement of the coaming.

After reviewing the evidence, we find that the trial
court was presented with contradictory evidence on this
issue. Therefore, we cannot say that it erred in denying
Muhammad damages based on his general maritime law
claim of unseaworthiness.

Rianne

App. 11

David Cole, an expert in admiralty and maritime
matters, testified that the coaming represented a tripping
hazard because it did not allow a person descending the
steps to progress down them as they would any other
stairs. He opined that the coaming presented a vertical
barrier requiring Muhammad to lift his foot up and over
the four inch barrier and then step down a distance
greater than the expected twelve inches in order to reach
the first tread of the stairway. Although he admitted that
coamings are used as pollution control devices on board
vessels, Cole recommended that it be moved closer to the
source of the possible oil spill, so that a person traversing
it would not have to do so while also attempting to descend
@ stairway. Based on his understanding of what had
occurred, Cole testified that the coaming was the cause of
Muhammad’s fall.

Cole further testified that the stairways handrails
presented a deficiency in their design since there was a
gap between them and the pipe rack deck’s guardrail. He
stated that the handrails should have been constructed so
that they joined the top railing of the guardrail, which
would allow a continuous railing for a person at the
transition point between the deck and the stairway. As
constructed, he stated that the stairway presented nothing
for the person descending the stairway to grab a hold of
while he was taking the exaggerated step up and over the
coaming in order to access the stairway. However, Cole
testified that there were no regulations specifying the
construction of handrails or pertaining to the placement of
coamings. He further testified that Muhammad had an
obligation to recognize and safely negotiate the hazard and
that a seaman has an obligation to hold onto a railing
whenever possible. Cole stated that he would not condone

App. 12

Muhammad traversing the coaming and the stairway
while holding a bucket in one hand and a brush in the
other.

Cass testified that neither the coaming nor the stair-
way itself presented an unreasonable risk of harm to the
men working on the rig. After physically inspecting the
stairway in question, he stated that this stairway met the
Coast Guard requirements for interior stairways, since its -
slope did not exceed fifty degrees. Cass testified that there
are no specific regulations pertaining to exterior stair-
ways. He further stated that the coaming did not present
an unreasonable risk since it was well painted and striped
and was easily observable as a hazard.

After reviewing the evidence, we find no error in the
trial court’s denial of this claim. The cause of Muhammad’s
fall was his failure to hold onto one of the stairway hand-
rails during an attempt to traverse the stairs while carry-
ing a bucket of industrial soap in one hand and a long-
handled brush in the other hand. Accordingly, we find that
he failed to carry his burden of proving that the unseawor-
thy condition of the OCEAN LEXINGTON, namely the
position of the coaming or the location of the handrails,
played a substantial part in bringing about his fall. The
judgment of the trial court denying Muhammad’s claim of
unseaworthiness is affirmed. This assignment of error is
dismissed.

MOMENTARY FORGETFULNESS

In his fifth assignment of error, Muhammad argues
that the trial court erred in failing to apply the doctrine of
“momentary forgetfulness” to the facts of this case. We
disagree. We have held that this doctrine should apply

envi" CED scm

App. 13

only in those instances where there is “evidence of circum-
stances reasonably sufficient to have diverted plaintiff’s
mind from the danger in question. Mere forgetfulness or
lapse of memory is not excusable absent adequate divert-
ing circumstances.” Hailey v. LaSalle Parish Police Jury,
302 So.2d 668, 671 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1974). Although Mu-
hammad testified that the employees were instructed to
clean the rig because Diamond personnel were arriving for
a visit, we do not find that this was the type of diverting
circumstance meant by Hailey, such that it would absolve
him of his comparative negligence. Muhammad stated
that the cleanup they were involved in was routine
cleanup. He further stated that he normally carried items
in both hands while traversing stairs on the OCEAN
LEXINGTON. Accordingly, we find no merit in this as-
signment of error.

DAMAGES

Based on our finding affirming the trial court’s judg-
ment denying Muhammad’s claims for damages pursuant
to the Jones Act and general maritime law, this assign-
ment of error is rendered moot.

FUTURE CURE

In its answer to appeal, Diamond argues that the trial
court erred in awarding Muhammad future cure since he
presented “no evidence of an immediate need for future
medical treatment within a definite time frame.” Follow-
ing the rendition of judgment, Diamond filed a Motion and
Order to Show Cause Why Future Cure Should Not Be
Reimbursed with Incorporated Memorandum in Support.
Diamond argued that it had paid Muhammad the sum

ee

App. 14

awarded by the trial court for the lumbar surgery recom-
mended by Dr. Adatto; however, it claimed that surgery
was put off until such time as Muhammad loses weight.
Thus, it argued that it was entitled to reimbursement of
the $46,309 it paid for the future surgery and the termina-
tion of its maintenance obligation. Pursuant to a January
8, 2001 consent judgment, Diamond was relieved from
paying Muhammad maintenance and cure from December
20, 2001, until such time as he undergoes the recom-
mended surgery.

The law with regard to maintenance and cure was
discussed in Domonter v. C.F. Bean Corp., 99-1204, pp. 17-
19 (La.App. 5 Cir. 4/25/00), 761 So.2d 629, 640, writ
denied, 00-1872 (La. 9/29/00), 770 So.2d 354:

“Maintenance and cure” is an ancient duty
imposed upon the owner of a ship to provide food,
lodging and necessary medical services to sea-
men who become ill or injured during service to
the ship. Burgess v. C.F. Bean Corp, 98-3072
(La.App. 4th Cir.8/18/99), 743 So.2d 251; Comeaux
v. Basin Marine, Inc., 93-1624 (La.App. lst
Cir.6/24/94), 640 So.2d 833, 836, writ denied, 94-
2307 (La.11/18/94), 646 So.2d 386; Davis uv.
Odeco, Inc., 18 F.3d 1237, 1245 (5th Cir.1994),
cert. denied, 513 U.S. 819, 115 S.Ct. 78, 130
L.Ed.2d 32 (1994). Recovery is not dependent
upon negligence of the vessel or the owner and
the burden of proof in seeking maintenance and
cure is relatively light. Jd. In addition, generally,
a seaman need only prove that the injury arose
during his service of the vessel. The seaman does
not have to prove a causal connection to his du-
ties. Liner v. J.B. Talley and Company, Inc., 618
F.2d 327, 332 (5th Cir.1980); Burgess v. C.F. Bean
Corp, supra; Comeaux v. Basin Marine, Inc., 640

App. 15

So.2d at 836. The right to maintenance and cure
exists regardless of fault. The remedy is essen-
tially curative in nature and is not intended as
compensation for injury. Boudreau v. S/V
SHERE KHAN C, in rem, 27 F.Supp.2d 72, 83
(D.Maine 1998). The right to maintenance and
cure arises from the employee-employer relation-
ship. Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724,
731, 63 S.Ct. 930, 934, 87 L.Ed. 1107 (1943)f.]
Thus, the liability of shipowner for maintenance
and cure will be excused only by willful misbe-
havior or deliberate act of indiscretion on part of
seaman. Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. at
731, 63 S.Ct. at 934; DiBenedetto v. Williams, 880
F.Supp. 80, 86 (D. Rhode Island 1995).

Cure is payment of the seaman’s medical,
therapeutic and hospital expenses, until that
point in time when plaintiff reaches maximum
medical recovery. Fox uv. Texaco, Inc., 97 2126
(La.App. 1st Cir.11/6/98), 722 So.2d 1064, 1067.
Because it [sic] not fault based, but arises from
the contractual relationship between the parties,
defendant cannot avail itself of the apportion-
ment of fault to reduce its liability for plaintiff’s
medical expenses. The award of medical ex-
penses can be construed as compensation related
to personal injury only when the defendant’s ac-
tions in failing to pay maintenance and cure re-
sults in the worsening of a plaintiff’s condition.
Karim v. Finch Shipping Co., Ltd., 97-2518
(La.App. 4th Cir.8/26/98), 718 So.2d 572, 580.

Additionally, a seaman may only recover maintenance and
cure for those expenses actually incurred. Davis v. Odeco,
Inc., 18 F.3d 1237 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied sub nom,
513 U.S. 819, 115 S.Ct. 78 (1994). In Calmar S.S. Corp. v.
Taylor, 303 U.S. 525, 532-33, 58 S.Ct. 651, 55 (1938), the

App. 16

Supreme Court held with regard to the award of future
maintenance and cure:

The seaman’s recovery must therefore be
measured in each case by the reasonable cost of
that maintenance and cure to which he is enti-
tled at the time of trial, including, in the discre-
tion of the court, such amounts as may be
needful in the immediate future for the mainte-
nance and cure of a kind and for a period which
can be definitely ascertained.

In this instance, we agree with Diamond that the award of
future cure should be reversed since it cannot be definitely
ascertained when Muhammad will lose enough weight in
order to undergo lumbar surgery. Muhammad has been
attempting to lose weight since early 1997, when he began
treatment with Dr. Watermeier. Since he has not been able
to lose the required weight during this length of time,
there is no way of knowing when, or if ever, he will suc-
cessfully accomplish this task. However, our decision will
not preclude Muhammad from bringing suit in the future,
should he lose the weight and decide to have the surgery.
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court awarding
Muhammad $46,309 in future cure is reversed.

ATTORNEY’S FEES

Diamond further argues that the trial court erred in
awarding Muhammad $15,000 in attorney’s fees based on
its egregious conduct in wrongfully terminating his main-
tenance and cure benefits.

After reviewing the evidence, we find error in the trial
court’s award of attorney’s fees based on its finding that
Diamond improperly withheld maintenance and cure

App. 17

benefits from Muhammad subsequent to November 8,
1997. An award of attorney’s fees is proper only if the
employer has been found to have acted in a fashion which
is “callous and recalcitrant, arbitrary and capricious, or
willful, callous, and persistent.” Morales v. Garijak, Inc.,
829 F.2d 1355, 1358 (5th Cir. 1987) (footnote omitted).
That court went on to further state:

Thus, there is an escalating scale of liability: a
shipowner who is in fact liable for maintenance
and cure, but who has been reasonable in deny-
ing liability, may be held liable only for the
amount of maintenance and cure. If the shi-
powner has refused to pay without a reasonable
defense, he becomes liable in addition for com-
pensatory damages. If the owner not only lacks a
reasonable defense but has exhibited callousness
and indifference to the seaman’s plight, he be-
comes liable for punitive damages and attorney’s
fees as well.

Id.

A review of the record reveals no instance in which
Diamond acted in a willful, callous, or persistent manner.
Rather, we find this was an instance in which there were
differing opinions between the medical experts as to
Muhammad’s condition.

Diamond terminated Muhammad’s maintenance and
cure benefits on November 8, 1997, based on the opinion of
Dr. Christopher Cenac, an orthopedic surgeon, who exam-
ined Muhammad on four different occasions, the last
taking place on October 29, 1997. At his initial Visit, on
March 20, 1997, Muhammad did not tell either Dr. Cenac
or his nurse that he was suffering from any neck com-
plaints. He did not complain of neck pain until his October

App. 18

29th visit, at which time, he stated that his neck began
bothering him in August 1997. At that time, Dr. Cenac
released Muhammad to full unrestricted duty finding that
he was at maximum medical improvement and that he did
not require any further invasive testing or treatment.
After reviewing a pre-employment MRI performed on
Muhammad in October 1996, and a post injury MRI of
March 1997, Dr. Cenac opined that the findings on both
tests were identical. He further found some slight degen-
erative changes in the lumbar spine in the October 2, 2000
MRI, which he attributed to aging. Dr. Cenac opined that
there was no relationship between Muhammad’s present
problems, including his cervical findings, and the March 8,
1997 accident.

Diamond also had the opinion of Dr. Michael Moll-
eston, a neurosurgeon, who was chosen by both Diamond’s
and Muhammad’s original attorney’s. [sic] After his April
1, 1997 examination, Dr. Molleston found nothing wrong
neurologically with Muhammad. He admitted having
headaches, but denied any neck pain when he was directly
questioned about this by Dr. Molleston. Dr. Molleston
found him uncooperative in his examination, very sensi-
tive to trivial touching, and forcibly resistant to the
straight leg raise test. He felt that this indicted symptom
magnification. Although Muhammad complained of
headaches on the top of his head, Dr. Molleston stated that
headaches in this area were atypical for indicating the
presence of a neck injury. Although he recommended
Muhammad undergo further diagnostic testing, such as a
bone scan, these tests were never performed.

Diamond further introduced the report of Dr. Thomp-
son Dietz, a radiologist, who reviewed the MRIs performed
on Muhammad in October 1996, March 1997, and May

|

App. 19

2000. After reviewing these three tests, Dr. Dietz found
that the later MRI was comparable to the both [sic] earlier
MRIs, in that there was only a relatively subtle interval
increase in the size of the previously noted L5 S1 disc
herniation, which dated back to October 1996.

Finally, Diamond introduced evidence that Muham-
mad was involved in two automobile accidents in January
1998. In the second accident, which occurred on January
30, 1998, Muhammad stated that he struck his head into
the ceiling of the car, where it joins the windshield. Both
Drs. Adatto and Watermeier stated that this type of injury
could cause or aggravate a previous neck injury.

Considering the evidence, we find that Diamond did
have a reasonable defense for terminating Muhammad’s
maintenance and cure, and that it did not exhibit a cal-
lousness or indifference to his plight which would subject
it to attorney’s fees. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial
court awarding Muhammad $15,000 in attorney’s fees is
reversed.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial
court awarding Sadat Muhammad future cure is reversed,
as is the award of attorney’s fees. The remainder of the
trial court’s judgment is affirmed. The costs of this appeal
are assessed equally between the plaintiff-appellant,
Sadat Muhammad, and the defendant-appellee, Diamond
Offshore Company.

AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART.

App. 20

APPENDIX C
SADAT MUHAMMAD 16TH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT
VS. NO. 86273-D PARISH OF IBERIA

DIAMOND OFFSHORE CO. STATE OF LOUISIANA

For the Plaintiff: Lawrence D. Wiedemann,
New Orleans, LA

For the Defendant: Cameron B. Simmons,
Jeanerette, LA
Christopher B. Siegrist,
Houma, LA

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Filed March 29, 2001)

This suit was heard in Iberia Parish on November 14
and 15, 2000. The case was taken under advisement with
a deposition of Jerry McHenry still to be taken as well as
post-trial memorandums to be submitted by all parties. All
matters have been submitted to the Court, with the
exception of attorney’s fees, and the case is now in posture
for decision.

FACTS:

Sadat Muhammad (Sadat) worked as a roustabout for
Diamond Offshore (Diamond) from October 11, 1996 until
March 8, 1997. Prior to starting work for Diamond, Sadat
underwent a comprehensive pre-employment physical and
was cleared for employment in a heavy labor capacity. On
March 8, 1997, Sadat sustained injury when he fell on an
external stairway leading from the pipe deck to the air

App. 21

conditioning (A/C) deck while he was carrying a long
handled cleaning brush in one hand and a bucket of
cleaning fluid in the other. There are handrails situated at
the top of the stairway and along the stairway. There is
also a four-inch deck coaming marked with black and
yellow striping, used for pollution control, in the area by
the stairwell. Sadat was found by another worker, Timo-
thy Taylor, at the bottom of the stairwell on the A/C deck.
After a brief accident report was filled out with the safety
technician, Jerry McHenry, Sadat was taken off the vessel
by helicopter to Terrebonne General Hospital in a neck
brace and on a back board. He was treated and released
whereupon Sadat was picked up by his wife. Sadat com-
plained of various injuries over the 22 day period following
the accident, namely dizziness, left shoulder pain, low
back pain, and headaches.

Sadat had several follow-up visits for his injuries. He
was seen by Dr. John Watermeier on March 19, 1997,
complaining of moderate to severe low back and neck pain,
headaches, and numbness in both feet. In April 1997, less
than one month following the accident, Dr. Watermeier
made a diagnosis of post-traumatic disc disease in the
cervical and lumbar spine.

On March 17, 1999, Dr. Kenneth Adatto performed an
anterior cervical discectomy and fusion at C5-6. He was
also seen by Dr. Christopher Cenac, at the request of
Diamond, in March of 1997 and in October of 1997. Dr.
Cenac, based on his findings and those of Dr. Michael
Molleston released the plaintiff to full duty; however, the
plaintiff never returned to work. This suit followed.

This is a Jones Act case where general maritime law
will be used. The plaintiffs allege negligence on the part of

App. 22

Diamond as well as assert a claim of nnseaworthiness of
the vessel, Ocean Lexington.

The plaintiff, Sadat, testified that he did not know
exactly how he tripped and fell down the stairwell. He
stated that he was carrying a long-handled brush in one
hand and a bucket with cleaning fluid in the other hand.
He also stated that he was unable to use the handrail at
the top of the stairwell. He did testify that he knew he was
supposed to have one hand on the handrail. He stated that
he stepped over the four-inch deck coaming with his front
foot then somehow tripped when he proceeded with his
next foot as he approached the first step. It was apparent
from his testimony that he was uncertain as to what
exactly caused his fall. He stated it may have been his
second foot that got caught in the coaming, or the brush
which was dangling at his side that may have got caught
in the coaming. In his deposition, which was admitted into
evidence, he stated that the brush got caught in the
coaming. He further testified that he fell down the stairs
and the bucket and handle of the brush ended up with him
at the bottom, while the actual brush remained at the top
of the stairwell. Sadat also gave extensive testimony about
his injuries and his capacity to perform certain daily tasks.
He also testified that he had a previous back injury for —
which he was treated at Charity Hospital. He also testified
that he had a car accident in January of 1998, and that he
had leg pain after that incident.

The plaintiffs wife, Mrs. Muhammad, testified about
what she has observed regarding her husband’s injuries.
Since his accident, she stated that Sadat has had much
difficulty with his neck and back. She said that he is
unable to play sports and unable to have a physical rela-
tionship with her. She also said that Sadat was unable to

App. 23

do any heavy lifting including picking his children up off
the ground.

Mr. Timothy Taylor, who was also a roustabout on the
Ocean Lexington, testified as to his perceptions of the
accident since he came upon the scene as Sadat was falling
down the stairs. He also testified about the procedure he
and Sadat were supposed to follow as roustabouts in
carrying the bucket and brush as well as walking down a
stairwell. Mr. Taylor stated that they were told several
times at safety meetings that they were supposed to put
the brush inside the bucket and put it in one hand, while
the other is to be kept free to utilize the handrail as they
go down a stairwell. There was a safety meeting the
morning of the accident where proper procedure was
discussed. Mr. Taylor also testified that Diamond’s safety
procedures call for one hand to be on the handrail at all
times when using a stairwell. Mr. Taylor did not see what
caused the accident, however, he testified that he saw
Sadat, the bucket, and the handle of the brush at the
bottom of the stairwell on the A/C deck. Mr. Taylor testi-
fied that he has used the stairwell several times and has
performed the task of cleaning the A/C deck. He stated
that the proper procedure was to carry the bucket and
brush in one hand while leaving the other hand free to use
the handrail while descending the stairwell. He also
testified that the handrail is accessible when you approach
the steps.

Dr. John Watermeier testified by deposition. He
stated that he saw Sadat eleven days after the accident
and diagnosed him with a cervical and lumbar disk syn-
drome after performing several tests including an MRI. He
testified that surgery was the only way to cure the prob-
lem. He also stated that the fall on the Ocean Lexington

App. 24

was the cause of the injuries to Sadat. (Watermeier dep.
Pgs 16, 17.)

Dr. Kenneth Adatto also testified by deposition. Dr.
Adatto testified to similar findings as Dr. Watermeier. He
performed an anterior cervical discectomy and fusion at
C5-6 on Sadat on March 17, 1999, and has scheduled an
anterior lumbar discectomy and fusion at L5-S1. He also
testified that the injuries were more likely than not a
result of the fall.

Dr. Michael Molleston testified, by deposition, that he
saw Sadat only once. He testified that he thought some of
Sadat’s injuries were “emotional” and he did not relate the
plaintiffs headaches to his neck pain. He did not treat
Sadat, but scheduled a follow-up appointment for further
tests. Sadat did not attend this appointment.

Dr. Christopher Cenac testified at trial that he saw
Sadat at the request of Diamond on March 20, 1997 and
October 29, 1997. Dr. Cenac testified that there was
nothing wrong with his neck, but noted complaints of
numbness with his neck, right foot pain, pain in his back,
and headaches. He thought that the headaches were non-
cervical in nature and not related to the fall on the Ocean
Lexington. Dr. Cenac saw him again in October, and after
reviewing the reports of Dr. Molleston and evaluating the
patient himself, found that Sadat was ready to return to
work at full capacity. Dr. Cenac also testified that there
was no difference in the appearance of the lumbar in the
plaintiffs pre-employment MRI and post-injury MRI. He
also did not find any signs of nerve root impingement or
entrapment.

Dr. Thompson Dietz, a board certified radiologist,
testified that he could find no nerve root impingement and

a

App. 25

also stated, as Dr. Cenac did, that there was no difference
in the lumbar in the pre and post MRI’s.

LAW AND ANALYSIS:

Jones Act Negligence: Relying on Vendetto v. Sonat
Offshore Drilling Co., 725 So.2d 474 (La. 1999) and Gaut-
reaux v. Scurlock, 107 F.3d 331 (5th Cir. 1997), the court
must apply the standard of proof outlined in both cases. In
overruling Spinks v. Chevron, 507 F.2d 216 (5th Cir.
1975), the court in Gautreaux held that a Jones Act
seaman is required to act as a reasonable seaman under
like circumstances, and a Jones Act employer is required
to act as a reasonable employer under like circumstances.
Although not bound by the 5th Circuit decision, the
Supreme Court and the 3rd Circuit have applied this
standard, therefore, we must do the same. The so-called
slight negligence standard is not appropriate in Jones Act
cases as a result.

A seaman, then, is obligated under the Jones Act to
act with ordinary prudence under the circumstances,
Gautreaux, supra. The circumstances of a seaman’s
employment include not only his reliance on his employer
to provide a safe workplace but also his own experience,
training, or education. The reasonable person standard,
therefore, under a Jones Act negligence action becomes
one of the reasonable seaman in like circumstances.

In Vendetto, supra, the plaintiff was undertaking a
common, ordinary task which he had done many times
beford, and he chose the method by which to lower the
tools, which weighed no more than forty pounds. There
was no testimony that the method he chose to use was
unsafe, merely that there were other methods which he

App. 26

could have used. The Supreme Court held that the em-
ployer could not be held liable by applying the standard
set out in Gautreaux. The employer was held to a standard
as that of an employer in like circumstances, and since the
plaintiff could not prove that the employer breached any
duty to the employee, the negligence claim failed.

It is clear that there was a policy and an instruction to
the roustabouts that they should follow certain safety
procedures when attempting to descend the stairwell from
the pipe deck to the A/C deck in order to perform the
cleaning duties. It is clear from the testimony of Sadat,
Timothy Taylor, and Jerry McHenry that a seaman in like
circumstances would not have attempted to descend a
staircase with a five gallon bucket filled with soap in one
hand and a long-handled brush in the other. (McHenry
dep. Pgs. 25-31.) The policy was for the brush to be put
inside the bucket so that the other hand could be free to
use the handrail. Diamond cannot be held liable to a
seaman who did not act with ordinary care while perform-
ing his cleaning duties.

In Vendetto, the Court found that the employer was
not liable merely for the failure to instruct; however, in
this case, we do have a specific policy and instruction.
Sadat testified that he knew he was supposed to have one
hand on the railing. Timothy Taylor testifies that the crew
was instructed at the safety meetings about the proper
way to perform this task. There was to be one hand free to
utilize the handrail while stepping over the coaming and
descending the stairwell.

Absent a showing that the method taught was unsafe,
namely using one hand on the handrail to step over the
coaming and proceed down the stairwell, there can be no

App. 27

finding against the Jones Act employer on a negligence
claim, Vendetto, supra. Clearly from all the testimony at
trial, there was no proof that the method taught was
unsafe. The plaintiff failed to exercise the care a reason-
able seaman would in like circumstances. He did not
follow the policy nor did he use the method that was
taught to him.

Accordingly, the Court finds that the plaintiff was
100% at fault as he did not act as a reasonable seaman in
like circumstances, and that the employer did not breach
any duty owed to the plaintiff. Additionally, the Court
finds that Diamond acted as a reasonable employer in like
circumstances. The Jones Act negligence claim fails.

UNSEAWORTHINESS

The Court in Foster v. Destin Trading Corp, No. 96-
0803 (La. 5-30-97); 700 So.2d 199, stated that an owner of
a vessel is responsible to the captain or any seaman
thereof for injuries received because of the unseaworthi-
ness of the vessel and that there is an implied obligation
that all reasonable means shall be employed to insure the
seaworthiness of the vessel. To prevail on an unseawor-
thiness claim a seaman must prove that the unseaworthy
condition was the proximate cause of his injury, Youn v.
Maritime Overseas Corp, 605 So.2d 187, (La.App. 5th Cir
1992.) Although the duty of seaworthiness is absolute and
does not require negligence, the mere fact an accident
occurred does not establish unseaworthiness, Vendetto,
supra. The plaintiff must prove that the unseaworthy
condition played a substantial part in bringing about or
actually causing plaintiffs injury and that injury was

App. 28

either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence
of the unseaworthiness.

The plaintiff did not carry his burden in proving by a
preponderance of the evidence the coaming was the
proximate cause of his accident. Using the standard in
Vendetto, the plaintiff, by his own testimony could not
establish how he tripped. He testified that it may have
been the coaming or it may have been the brush. This
testimony, along with all other evidence, does not meet the
threshold evidentiary standard to prove unseaworthiness
under Vendetto. It is more likely than not that something
other than the placement of the coaming caused the
accident.

Although Dr. Gary Nelson, a safety engineer, testified
by deposition as to the safety of the stairwell and spoke of
OSHA regulations, the Ocean Lexington is not under
OSHA guidelines. Watterson v. Mallard Bay Drilling, 649
So.2d 431 (La.App Cir 3 10-12-94.)

Accordingly, this Court finds that the plaintiff did not
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the unsea-
worthy condition of the vessel was the proximate cause of
his injuries. The unseaworthiness claim fails.

MAINTENANCE AND CURE:

The duty to provide maintenance and cure arises from
the seaman’s employment contract and comprises most
illnesses or injuries which occur during the existence of
the employment arrangement. The shipowner’s obligation
to provide maintenance and cure ends when the seaman
reaches maximum medical cure. Maximum medical cure is
reached when the seaman’s injuries are determined by the

a

a

App. 29

seaman’s treating physician to be of a permanent nature.
An injured plaintiff is not required to choose the best
method of treatment, or select the most skilled and compe-
tent physician, and cannot be faulted for accepting a
course of treatment offered by his orthopedic surgeon as a
means of reducing his pain. Use v. Use, 654 So.2d 1355
(La.App Ist Cir. 1995.)

This Court finds that maintenance and cure was
improperly withheld. Dr. Cenac’s testimony does not
persuade the court on the extent of the plaintiffs injuries.
It is the trial court’s discretion to determine the weight
and credibility it gives to the testimony offered at trial.
There is ample medical evidence that establishes that the
plaintiff had not reached maximum medical recovery at
the time the defendant stopped maintenance and cure
payments on November 8, 1997. The depositions of Dr.
Watermeier and Dr. Adatto provide the evidence of the
plaintiffs injuries and the treatment that was rendered to
cure these injuries. Both doctors attribute the fall on the
Ocean Lexington to the back injuries suffered by the
plaintiff. Both thought surgery was necessary to resolve
the problems resulting from the injuries. There is a differ-
ence of opinion among the doctors regarding the lumbar
surgery proposed by Dr. Adatto. Dr. Cenac feels that any
nerve root impingement was not caused by the accident,
and in fact his pre-employment MRI was the same as his
post-injury MRI.

The test for determining causal relationship between
accident and subsequent injury is whether the plaintiff
provided through medical testimony that it is more prob-
able than not that subsequent injuries were caused by the
accident. Mart v. Hill, 505 So.2d 1120 (La. 1987.) The
claimant’s disability is presumed to have resulted from an

App. 30

accident, if before the accident the injured person was in
good health, but commencing with the accident if the
symptoms of the disabling condition appear and continu-
ously manifest themselves afterwards, providing the
medical evidence shows there to be a reasonable connec-
tion between the accident and the disabling condition.
Johnson v. Manuel, 670 So.2d 273 (La.App 3rd Cir. 1996.)
In order to defeat this presumption, the defendant must
show some other particular incident that could have
caused the injury in question.

The plaintiff underwent a full medical examination as
part of his pre-employment physical by Dr. Howard
Nelson. He was cleared to perform heavy duty after the
testing was reviewed. He had no cervical or lumbar com-
plaints or problems. The defendant has not proven by a
preponderance of the evidence that another event caused
the injuries claimed by the plaintiff. The plaintiff proved
by a preponderance of the evidence that the injury to the
C5-6 level of his back was caused by the accident on the
Ocean Lexington. The testimony of both Dr. Adatto and
Dr. Watermeier, by deposition, provides the proof neces-
sary to meet the threshold burden provided in Mart. The
injuries that led Dr. Adatto to perform the fusion were,
according to him, a direct result of the fall, (Adatto dep. Pg
36.) There is more of a difference of opinion regarding the
future fusion in the lumbar region; however, the plaintiff
carried his burden in that it is more probable than not
that the injuries in the lumbar region were caused by the
accident. Again, Dr. Cenac’s view of the plaintiffs injuries
do not persuade the Court. Evidence is again found in the
deposition testimony of Dr. Adatto and Dr. Watermeier.
Dr. Watermeier states that Sadat was asymptomatic
before the accident, but continually symptomatic after the

App. 31

accident; therefore, lumbar surgery was a reasonable
solution to the lumbar problem. (Watermeier dep. Pgs. 14,
15.) Dr. Adatto also referred his decision for further
approval to Dr. Adinolfi who gave the approval for surgery
to the lumbar area.

Maintenance costs are due until the plaintiff reaches

maximum medical recovery. Jordan v. Intercontinental
Bulktank Corp, 621 So.2d 1141 (La.App 1st Cir 2/19/93.)

The plaintiff was being paid a rate of $15 a day when
the payments stopped on November 8, 1997. This Court
finds that the plaintiff had not reached maximum medical
recovery at that point, and still has not because of the
future surgery needed in the lumbar area of the plaintiff;
and awards the plaintiff maintenance at a rate of $15 a
day from November 8, 1997 until he reaches maximum
medical recovery.

This Court finds that the defendant improperly
withheld maintenance and cure when it stopped payments
in November of 1997. This was egregious conduct and the
Court is persuaded by the deposition testimony of Dr.
Adatto regarding the extent of the plaintiffs injuries.
Therefore, the plaintiff is awarded his past and future
medical costs for his injuries as part of the cure obligation
owed by the defendant.

This Court calculates the following to be awarded to
Sadat Muhammad:

Past Medical Cost: $ 59,599.53
Future Medical Cost: $ 46,309.00 -

Maintenance at the rate of $15 per day from No-
vember 8, 1997.

App. 32

The defendant, Diamond Offshore Company, is cast
for all court costs. Pre-judgment interest is awarded, at
the discretion of the Court.

ATTORNEY’S FEES:

Because the Court has found that maintenance and
cure were wrongfully terminated, the plaintiff should be
awarded attorney’s fees. Consistent with the agreement of
counsel during the trial, the attorney for the plaintiff
will move for a hearing on the amount of attorney’s fees
to be awarded, and the Court will hear evidence on that
issue at that time.

Let a formal judgment consistent with these Reasons
for Judgment be prepared by the attorney for the plaintiff,
submitted to the attorneys for Diamond for approval as to
form, then presented to the Court for signature.

Officially in Chambers, New Iberia, Iberia Parish,
Louisiana. March 28, 2001.

App. 33

APPENDIX D

16TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE PARISH OF IBERIA

STATE OF LOUISIANA
NO. 86-273 DIVISION “D” DOCKET NO.
SADAT MUHAMMAD
VERSUS
DIAMOND OFFSHORE COMPANY
FILED:

DEPUTY CLERK

JUDGMENT
(Filed May 16, 2001)

This cause was tried before the Honorable William D.
Hunter on November 14 and 15, 2000, and taken under
advisement to be held open for the submission of addi-
tional depositions and post-trial memoranda. After sub-
mission to the Court, the Court finds for the written
reasons assigned on the 28th day of March, 2001, in favor
of Diamond Offshore Company, dismissing with prejudice
any and all claims by plaintiff against Diamond Offshore
Company herein, except as follows:

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED, that
there be judgment herein in favor of plaintiff, Sadat
Muhammad, and against defendant, Diamond Offshore
Company, for past medical costs for his injuries as part of
the cure obligation owed by the defendant in the sum of
Fifty-Nine Thousand Five Hundred Ninety-Nine and
53/100 ($59,599.33) Dollars with pre-judgment judicial
interest from March 8, 1997, until paid;

App. 34

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
DECREED that there be judgment granted herein in favor
of Sadat Muhammad and against Diamond Offshore
Company for the future medical costs for his injuries as
part of the cure obligation owed by the defendant in the
amount of Forty-Six Thousand Three Hundred Nine and
No/100 ($46,309.00) Dollars with pre-judgment judicial
interest from March 8, 1997, until paid;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
DECREED that maintenance at the rate of $20.00 a day
be paid Sadat Muhammad from November 8, 1997, until
Sadat Muhammad reaches maximum medical recovery
with judicial interest on the past due amount from No-
vember 8, 1997, until paid;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
DECREED that maintenance and cure was wrongfully
terminated and that Sadat Muhammad be awarded
attorneys fees in an amount to be determined after
hearing on motion of plaintiff.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
DECREED that Diamond Offshore Company is liable for
costs of court.

JUDGMENT READ, RENDERED AND SIGNED, in
Chambers in New Iberia, Iberia Parish, Louisiana, this 14
day of May, 2001.

/s/ William D. Hunter
WILLIAM D. HUNTER,
JUDGE

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386015_1192%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
