# Appendix — Nova Chemicals Inc. v. Adams

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386015_1023%3A2

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 2003
- **Citation:** 538 U.S. 944

## Text

la

COURT OF APPEAL OF LOUISIANA
FOURTH CIRCUIT

In re NEW ORLEANS TRAIN CAR LEAKAGE FIRE
LITIGATION

No. 2000-CA-0479
June 27, 2001

This is a class action. It arises out of a chemical leak and
fire involving a railroad tank car. After a two-phase trial,
the jury found all defendants liable for compensatory
damages and several defendants liable for punitive damages.
The quantum of compensatory damages was determined as
to each of twenty selected plaintiffs. The quantum of
punitive damages was determined as to each of the several
defendants found liable for punitive Ccamages. All but three
of the defendants settled. The three non-settling defendants
bring the present appeal.

Defendant-appellant CSX Transportation, Inc. (“CSX”)
was held liable for 15% of the compensatory damages and
was held liable for punitive damages. Defendant-appellant
AMF-BRD, Inc. (“AMF-BRD”) was held liable for 5% of the
compensatory damages but was not held liable for punitive
damages. Defendant-appellant Nova Chemicals, Inc.
(“Polysar”) was held liable for 5% of the compensatory
damages but was not held liable for punitive damages.
AMF-BRD and Polysar appeal as to liability for
compensatory damages. AMF-BRD, Polysar and CSX all
appeal as to the quantum of compensatory damages. CSX
appeals as to liability for, and quantum of, punitive damages.
The plaintiffs have answered these appeals and seek
additional damages and prejudgment interest on punitive
damages. For the reasons given below, we affirm the
judgment of the trial court. Additionally, we remand this

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| case to the trial court for proceedings as to the quantum of
compensatory damages with respect to the remaining class
members and for any other proceedings as are necessary to
| conclude this action.

On September 9, 1987, a pressurized railroad tank car
which was loaded with butadiene (“GATX 55996”) was
parked on the interchange tracks of CSX in a residential
area, Gentilly, of New Orleans. At about 1:50 a.m., GATX
55996 leaked and ignited. Butadiene is a carcinogenic
hazardous chemical. It is flammable and also volatile, so that
it can explode. The chemicals produced by burning
butadiene include several carcinogenic hazardous chemicals.
The butadiene leaked from.GATX 55996 as a heavier-than-
air gas so, as it leaked from GATX 55996, it spread out along
the ground to the surrounding residential areas. Eventually,
the butadiene reached an ignition source, possibly the hot
water heater of a home, ignited, and flashed back to GATX
| 55996, which itself ignited. Five other pressurized tank cars
loaded with butadiene were coupled to the now-flaming
GATX 55996.

GATX 55996 burned for two days and, throughout that
time, butadiene and the products of burning butadiene were
carried by the wind, and deposited as soot, throughout the
surrounding residential area. There was a danger that
GATX 55996 might either explode, possibly destroying a
number of city blocks, or even take off like a missile and
travel as far as a mile through the surrounding residential
area. There also was a danger that the fire might spread
from GATX 55996 to the other five pressurized tank cars of
butadiene to which'GATX 55996 was coupled. Such a spread
of the fire would result in further hazardous chemical release
and further danger of explosions.

The neighborhood around the fire was evacuated. As it
turned out, GATX 55996 did not explode (although some of

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the released butadiene did explode) and, after two days, the
fire burned itself out. Also, the other five pressurized tank
cars loaded with butadiene were successfully uncoupled and
moved away from GATX 55996, so the fire never did spread
to those five tank cars. After the fire burned itself out, the
people of the Surrounding areas were allowed to return
home.

Class action suits were filed against nine defendants
which, after some corporate name changes, are now known
as: The Alabama Great Southern Railroad Company
(“AGS”), AMF-BRD, Inc. (“AMF-BRD”), CSx
Transportation Inc. (“CSX”), GATX Terminals Corporation
(“GATX”), General American Transportation Corporation
(“GATC”), Illinois Central Railroad Company (“Illinois
Central”), Mitsui & Company (U.S.A.), Ine. (“Mitsui”), Nova
Chemicals, Inc. (“Polysar”), and Phillips Petroleum Company
(“Phillips”). The plaintiffs sought not only compensatory
damages, but also punitive damages under Article 2315.3 of
the Civil Code; because the butadiene leak and fire involved
a hazardous or toxic substance. The roles of the nine
defendants are, briefly and generally described, as follows:
AMF-BRD manufactured the pressurized tank which was
installed in GATX 55996. The installation of the tank, and
the overall assembly of GATX 55996, was done by non-party
North American Car Corporation (“NACC”), which is now
out of business. The pressurized tank on GATX 55996 which
was manufactured by AMF-BRD had a “manway” (an
opening through which the car is cleaned) on the bottom.
The bottom manway was sealed using an asbestos gasket.
NACC sold GATX 55996 to Phillips. During the course of
apparently routine maintenance, Phillips replaced the
asbestos gasket with a rubber gasket. Butadiene can react
with a rubber gasket causing a leak. Also, Phillips
misaligned the rubber gasket and this; too, could cause a

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leak. Phillips then sold GATX 55996 to GATC. GATC
labeled GATX 55996 as a butadiene tank car and owned
GATX 55996 at the time of the butadiene leak and fire at
issue. At the time of the butadiene leak, GATX 55996 was
leased by GATC to Mitsui. On September 4, 1987, five days
before the butadiene leak and fire, GATX, which is an
affiliate of GATC, loaded GATX 55996 with butadiene at
GATX’s Good Hope, Louisiana terminal. The butadiene was
owned by Polysar and was being shipped to a Polysar plant
in Chattanooga, Tennessee. Polysar bought the butadiene
overseas and arranged for it to be brought by ship to
Louisiana and then off loaded to rail tank cars at GATX’s
Good Hope terminal. Polysar did not send anyone to Good
Hope to inspect the rail tank cars or observe their loading.
On September 5, 1987, Illinois Central, at GATX’s Good
Hope terminal, put GATX 55996 into a train with other
butadiene tank cars and transported it to an Illinois Central
train yard. Illinois Central then moved GATX 55996 to
interchange tracks where Illinois Central and AGS exchange
railroad cars. (An “interchange” is an area of track where
one railroad leaves rail cars for another railroad.) AGS then
moved GATX 55996 to CSX’s interchange tracks in Gentilly.
AGS delivered GATX 55996 and some other rail cars to CSX,
and notified CSX’s employees to pick up GATX 55996 and
the other rail cars, at about 7:25 p.m. on September 8, 1987.
GATX 55996 remained on CSX’s interchange tracks for over
six-and-a-half hours until the fire broke out.

Another panel of this court affirmed the trial court’s
certification of a class. See Adams v. CSX Railroads, 615
So.2d 476 (La.App. 4th Cir.1993). Later, on defense writ
applications, another panel of this court reversed the trial
court’s denials of motions for summary judgment with
respect to punitive damages, and granted summary
judgment with respect to punitive damages, as to defendants

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AMF-BRD, Phillips and GATC, but affirmed the trial court’s
denials of motions for summary judgment by other
defendants with respect to punitive damages. In re New
Orleans Train Car Leakage Fire Litigation, 95- 27 10, 95-
2721, 96-0016, 95-2734, 95-2811, 96-0017, 95-2797, 96-0015 (La.
App 4 Cir. 3/20/96), 671 So.2d 540, writ denied, 96-0972, 96-
0984, 96-1287, 96-0977, 96-1311, 96-0978 (La.6/28/96), 675
So.2d 1120-22, cert denied, 519 U.S. 1009, 117 S.Ct. 512, 136
L.Ed.2d 402 (1996). Just prior to trial, the Louisiana
Supreme Court, on defense writ applications, ruled that the
jury should not be instructed to determine the amount of
punitive damages (if any) by applying a multiplier to the
amount of compensatory damages. In re New Orleans Train
Car Leakage Fire Litigation, 97-1150, 97-1161 (La.6/27/97),
697 So.2d 239.

In the first phase of the trial, the jury determined
liability for compensatory damages, quantum of
compensatory damages as to twenty plaintiffs (ten selected
by plaintiffs’ counsel and ten selected by defense counsel)
and liability for punitive damages (but not quantum of
punitive damages). The jury found all nine defendants liable
for compensatory damages and fixed varying amounts of
compensatory damages for each of the twenty selected
plaintiffs. Defendant-appellant CSX was assessed 15% of the
liability for compensatory damages while defendant-
appellants AMF-BRD and Polysar were each assessed 5% of
the liability for compensatory damages. The jury found five
of the defendants liable for punitive damages—CSX, AGS,
GATX, Illinois Central and Mitsui. In the second phase of
the trial, the jury determined the amounts of punitive
damages—$2.5 billion as to CSX, and a total of $865 million
in varying amounts against GATC, AGS, Mitsui and Illinois
Central.

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On September 25, 1997, the trial court rendered a
judgment in accordance with the jury’s verdicts which
judgment assessed liability for compensatory damages,
assessed liability for punitive damages, awarded
compensatory damages to the twenty selected plaintiffs and
awarded punitive damages “payable to class members who
now or hereafter are awarded compensatory damages....”
Subsequently, upon a CSX writ application, the Louisiana
Supreme Court ruled that “the trial court erred in rendering
a judgment awarding damages prior to rendering a
judgment adjudicating all liability issues”. In re New
Orleans Train Car Leakage Litigation, 97-2547
(La.10/13/97), 702 So.2d 677. The trial court then, on June 17,
1998, rendered a judgment that awarded neither
compensatory damages nor punitive damages.
Subsequently, upon defense writ applications and a plaintiff's
motion for clarification, the Louisiana Supreme Court held
that the trial court should “enter judgment in favor of the
twenty phase I plaintiffs on the issue of liability, allocation of
fault and damages, both compensatory and exemplary” and
designate that judgment as final “for purposes of post-trial
motions and appellate review”. In re New Orleans Train
Car Leakage Litigation, 98-2399, 98-2622 (La. 2/24/99), 728
So.2d 853.

On April 8, 1999, the trial court rendered a judgment as
directed by the Supreme Court. All of the defendants filed
post-judgment motions. Those post-trial motions raised
issues as to liability for compensatory damages, quantum of
compensatory damages, liability for punitive damages and
quantum of punitive damages. Prior to the trial court’s
ruling upon those defense post- judgment motions, six of the
defendants, AGS, GATX, GATC, Illinois Central, Mitsui and
Phillips, settled. Thus, as of the time of the trial court’s
decision of the post-judgment motions, the three remaining

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defendants were CSX, AMF-BRD and Polysar and, of those
three, only CSX was Subject to a judgment for punitive
damages. On November 5, 1999, the trial court rendered
reasons for judgment on the post-judgment motions and: (1)
upheld the determination of liability for compensatory
damages: (2) set aside the awards of compensatory damages
as to every one of the twenty selected plaintiffs and awarded
lower compensatory damages to each of the twenty selected
plaintiffs; (8) upheld the determination of CSX’s liability for
punitive damages and (4) reduced the quantum of punitive
damages imposed upon CSX from $2.5 billion to $850 million.
The trial court also held that interest would run on
compensatory damages from the date of judicial demand and
interest would run upon punitive damages from the date of
signing of judgment. On November 17, 1999, the trial court
rendered a judgment in accordance with its November 5,
1999 reasons for judgment. With respect to punitive
damages, the trial court allocated small fractions of the $850
million awarded to the twenty selected plaintiffs (using a
formula proposed by CSX and the plaintiffs and agreed to by
the trial court) which totaled about $2.1 million and, as to the
remainder of the punitive damages award, held that it should
be paid into escrow and allocated to the remaining 8,000 +
class members in accordance with further proceedings. The
trial court certified its judgment for immediate appeal.

CSX, AMF-BRD and Polysar appeal the trial court’s
November 17, 1999 judgment and the plaintiffs have
answered that appeal.

CSX’s Appeal As To
Punitive Damages

CSX argues on appeal that the punitive damages
judgment against it should be reversed, vacated or reduced
to no more than $1 million. CSX advances four arguments.

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g First, CSX argues that its conduct was not sufficiently
egregious to warrant the imposition of punitive damages.
| Article 2315.3 of the Civil Code, at the time of the chemical
| leak and fire, provided that:
In addition to general and special damages,
exemplary damages may be awarded, if it is
proved that plaintiffs injuries were caused by
the defendant’s wanton or reckless disregard
for public safety in the storage, handling, or
transportation of hazardous or _ toxic
substances. (emphasis added).
The leading case on liability under Article 2315.3 is Billiot v.
BP Oil Co., 98-1118 (La.9/29/94), 645 So.2d 604. In Billiot,
the Supreme Court stated the purposes of Article 2315.3
thus:

Accordingly, we conclude that the purpose of
Article 2315.3 is threefold: (1) to penalize and
punish defendants for engaging in wanton or
reckless disregard for public safety in the
storage, handling, or transportation of
| hazardous or toxic substances that causes
| injury to others; (2) to deter the tortfeasor
and others who might follow their example
from exposing the public to dangers of that
kind in the future; and (3) to provide victims
injured by such conduct with the incentive to
act as the prosecutors of penal laws against
such wrongdoers. Article 23153 is not
designed to repair the injuries of tort victims.
645 So.2d at 612-13.

The Supreme Court’s Billiot decision also identifies four
elements of a cause of action under Article 2315.3:

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In establishing the Separate and distinct right
to seek the exemplary or punitive award,
however, the introductory clause of Article
2315.3 does not relieve the plaintiff of the
burden of proving the basic factual elements
of a tort case. To the contrary, Article 2315.3
itself, by its narrow authorization of punitive
damages awards under special circumstances,
imposes a more onerous proof requirement
than plaintiffs face in ordinary negligence
cases. In order to obtain an award of
exemplary or punitive damages, the plaintiff
first must prove that the defendant’s conduct
was wanton or reckless. In practice, this
standard obliges the plaintiff to prove at least
that the defendant proceeded in disregard of a
high and excessive degree of danger, either
known to him or apparent to a reasonable
person in his position. Prosser & Keeton,
supra, § 34, at 213-14. In other words, the
“wanton” or “reckless” conduct that must be
proved is highly unreasonable conduct,
involving an extreme departure from ordinary
care, in a situation where a high degree of
danger is apparent. Id. at 214; see also
Griffin v. Tenneco Oil Co., 531 So.2d 498, 501
(La.App. 4 Cir.1988) (quoting Cates v.
Beauregard Electric Cooperative, Inc., 316
So.2d 907, 918 (La.App. 3 Cir.1975)). Second,
the plaintiff must show that the danger
created by the defendant’s wanton or reckless
conduct threatened or endangered the public
safety. Third, the statute requires proof that
the defendant’s wanton or reckless conduct

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occurred in the storage, handling or
transportation of hazardous or _ toxic
substances. Finally, the plaintiff is required
to prove that his or her injury was caused by
the defendant’s wanton or reckless conduct
consisting of all of these elements.

645 So.2d at 613. See also Gaspard v. Orleans Parish School
Board, 96-1754 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2/5/97), 688 So.2d 1298."

| It is clear from Billiot that liability under Article 2315.3
| does not require any intentional wrong. Instead, the degree
of culpability required under Article 2315.3 and Billiot
“fall[s] somewhere between simple negligence and
intentional wrong doing”. Griffin v. Tenneco Oil Co., 625
So.2d 1090, 1091 (La.App. 4th Cir.1993), writ denied, €31
So.2d 449 (La.1994). The requisite conduct is, in effect,
“gross negligence”. Id. See Sharp v. Daigre, 555 So.2d 1361,
1364 n. 10 (La.1990) (“Wanton negligence is still
negligence[.]”).

We review the jury’s determination of liability for
punitive damages under the clearly wrong-manifestly
erroneous standard of review. See Dekeyser v. Automotive
Cas. Ins. Co., 97-1251 (La.App. 4th Cir 2/4/98), 706 So.2d 676,
684 (discussing punitive damages under Article 2315.4).
Thus, we may not set aside the jury’s finding if it is one as to
which reasonable minds could differ. See, e.g., Stobart v.
State Through DOTD, 617 So2d 880 (La.1993). The
question is not whether we, as an initial matter, would make
the same finding as did the jury on the issue of liability for

! The Billiot opinion’s reference to “a more onerous proof requirement”
refers to the four elements that need to be shown rather than to the
evidentiary burden of proof. Rivera v. United Gas Pipeline Co., 96-502,
96-508, 97-161 (La.App. 5th Cir 6/30/97), 697 So.2d $27, 834-35. The usual
“preponderance of the evidence” standard applies to claims under Article
2315.3. Id.

——————

lla

punitive damages but, instead, whether, in light of the record
as a whole, the jury’s finding was unreasonable. Id. This is a
function of the allocation of responsibility between the finder
of fact and the appellate court.

It is undisputed that, from the time GATX 55996 and the
other five pressurized butadiene tank cars were left at CSX’s
interchange by AGS, about six and one-half hours passed
before the leaking butadiene ignited. It is also undisputed
that, during that six and one-half hours, no inspection was
made of GATX 55996 or the other five pressurized butadiene
tank cars. There was expert testimony that a simple
inspection of GATX 55996 would have detected the leak.
Butadiene has a low odor threshold and can be smelled at
concentrations in the air of two parts per million. For

fact, the ignition source was some ways away from GATX
55996 and, nearer the source of the leak (i.e. the tank car),
the concentrations of butadiene in the air must have been

car leaks in Gentilly, it dealt with the situation by isolating
the leaking tank car, repairing the leak or offloading the
hazardous cargo onto trucks. In short, the jury reasonably
could have concluded that a simple inspection of GATX 55996
would have prevented the butadiene fire.

The issue boils down to whether the jury reasonably
could find that, by not inspecting GATX 55996 and the other
five pressurized butadiene tank cars for a period of six and
one-half hours while they sat on CSX’s interchange tracks in
the Gentilly residential area, CSX acted in “wanton or
reckless disregard of the public safety”, Civ.Code art. 2315.3,
as that element is described in Billiot. The actual
explanation for why CSX did not inspect GATX 55996 for so
long is that GATX 55996 was never brought from CSX’s

'

12a

interchange tracks into CSX’s main yard. CSX’s Gentilly
yard employees testified that CSX’s Gentilly interchange
tracks are located outside of CSX’s main Gentilly yard.
After rail cars are left for CSX on CSX’s interchange tracks,
they are brought into the main yard by CSX. Once the rail
cars are brought into the main yard, they are inspected for
leaks. Rail cars are not inspected for leaks while they are on
CSX’s interchange tracks.

CSX’s employees testified that there were two possible
reasons why rail cars would be left upon CSX’s interchange
tracks for such an extended period. First, there could be a
shortage of track space in the main yard upon which to park
the rail cars. Second, there could be insufficient CSX
personnel on duty to move the rail cars into the main yard in
the timely manner. In the present case, there were tracks
available in the main yard on the night of September 8- 9,
1987, so the lengthy delay in moving GATX 55996 and the
other five pressurized butadiene tank cars into the main yard
was caused by lack of sufficient CSX personnel on duty. In
any event, the important issue is not per se the delay in
moving GATX 55996 and the other pressurized butadiene
tank cars into the main yard but, rather, the delay in
inspecting the tank cars for leaks. Put another way,
regardless of whether CSX brought the tank cars into the
main yard and inspected them for leaks there, or whether
CSX broke with its standard practice and inspected the tank —

-- cars for leaks while they were still on CSX’s interchange
tracks, the fire would have been prevented if GATX 55996
had been inspected in a timely manner.

The several CSX employees who worked in the Gentilly
yard and testified gave no explanation for CSX’s apparent
policy of not inspecting hazardous materials tank cars so long
as they were on CSX’s interchange tracks. The rationale for
CSX’s apparent policy as to inspection of hazardous material

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tank cars in Gentilly, ice. inspecting them for leaks
(apparently promptly) once they are brought into CSX’s
main yard but not inspecting them at all so long as they
remained on CSX’s interchange tracks, regardless of how
long they remain on CSX’s interchange tracks, is not
apparent to us. The tank cars would in no way be any less
hazardous while they were on CSX’s interchange tracks (as
might be the case if, for example, the interchange tracks
were located in a remote, unpopulated area). The issue of
Safety is affected by how promptly the tank cars are
inspected for leaks, not whether they are located on the
interchange tracks versus tracks in the main yard.

The record reveals at least five circumstances that could
have led the jury to find that failure to inspect for leaks in a
timely manner pressurized butadiene tank cars on CSX’s
interchange tracks constituted “wanton or reckless
disregard for public safety” as provided in Article 2315.3 and
discussed in Billiot. First, butadiene is an extremely
hazardous substance and, in fact, is considered one of the 100
most hazardous substances. It is carcinogenic, flammable
and volatile/explosive. The products of burning butadiene
include several carcinogenic hazardous chemicals. Thus, any
release of butadiene creates a very substantial risk. An
inspection of a tank car or other rail car carrying non-
hazardous cargo might be deferred properly as a matter of
convenience. However, a rail car carrying a hazardous
cargo, particularly a pressurized tank car carrying a liquid or
gaseous ultrahazardous chemical cargo, should be inspected
promptly for leaks.

Second, the six pressurized butadiene tank cars parked
on CSX’s interchange tracks, including GATX 55996,
contained a very large quantity of butadiene. GATX 55996
carried 30,000 gallons of butadiene and, presumably, each of
the other five tank cars carried a similar amount. The leak

l4a

and two-day fire involving GATX 55996 alone contaminated
many city blocks of homes with butadiene as well as soot
containing the carcinogenic products of burning butadiene.
Obviously, if the fire had spread from GATX 55996 to the
other five tank cars, the amount of butadiene and butadiene
burn products released would have been increased fivefold.
The explosion of GATX 55996 alone could have destroyed
city blocks of homes. The explosion of all six tank cars
would, of course, have been even more devastating. There
also was the possibility that GATX 55996 would take off like
a missile, flying as much as a mile in any direction and
wrecking havoc far and wide. It is difficult to imagine the
death and destruction that could result from a single such
missile, much less six. Thus, the risk presented by a
butadiene leak was, in the present case, massive because of
the large amount of butadiene involved. The large quantity
of butadiene involved made the need for prompt inspection
for leaks more urgent.

Third, CSX’s interchange tracks, where the butadiene
tank cars were left until GATX 55996 caught fire, are located
in a densely-populated residential area. A butadiene leak on
a remote stretch of railroad track in an uninhabited rural
area is not nearly so serious as such a leak in an urban area
and, in particular, in a residential area. Thus, while an
inspection of a hazardous tank car in some locations properly
might be deferred as a matter of convenience, a hazardous
cargo tank car arriving in a densely-populated residential
area, such as Gentilly, presents the strongest possible need
for prompt inspection for leaks. In fact, the New Orleans
Fire Chief, well prior to the leak and fire at issue, had
requested of CSX that, when tank cars were parked near the
residential area of the French Quarter for more than two
hours, CSX have someone keep watch over them. CSX
argues that this request was related specifically to the

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French Quarter and did not relate to Gentilly. That is correct
but the point that CSX should have drawn from the Fire
Chief's request is that the Fire Department did not want
tank cars left unattended near residential areas for more
than two hours. The hazard presented to the residents of
Gentilly was the same as the hazard presented to the
residents of the French Quarter. 4

Fourth, as testified to by defense expert witness William
Cruice, the railroad industry is well aware that all tank cars
leak. Thus, the butadiene leak in this case was not at all an
unforeseeable type of accident. Obviously, it is because of:
CSX’s knowledge that rail tank cars leak that CSX inspects
them for leaks once they are brought into CSX’s main yard
at Gentilly. Yet, there is no reason that rail tank cars are
any less likely to leak while on CSX’s Gentilly interchange
tracks than while in CSX’s Gentilly main yard. Thus, CSX’s
knowledge that rail tank cars leak, combined with the
obvious fact that rail tank cars can leak on the interchange
tracks just as easily as they can leak in the main yard, could
well have suggested to the jury that there was a need for
CSX to inspect promptly for leaks pressurized butadiene
tank cars delivered to CSX’s interchange tracks.

Fifth, at least ten tank car leaks were detected in
Gentilly’s main yard in the three and one-half year period
prior to the GATX 55996 butadiene leak and fire and, in fact,
six of them occurred in the seven months preceding the
GATX 55996 leak and fire. This certainly put CSX on notice
of the need to inspect hazardous materials tank cars in
Gentilly. CSX argues that these ten prior leaks are of no
import to this case because these leaks were detected in the
Gentilly main yard rather than on the Gentilly interchange
tracks. The fact that the ten leaks were detected in the CSX
main yard, rather than on the CSX interchange tracks, is
explained simply by the fact that CSX does not inspect tank

16a

cars for leaks while they are on the interchange tracks and,
instead, inspects them only once they are brought into the
main yard. The general point is that CSX was aware that,
from time to time, leaking tank cars were arriving in Gentilly
and the jury could reasonably find that this was another
reason for CSX to inspect promptly for leaks in arriving tank
cars carrying hazardous materials even while they were on
the interchange tracks.

CSX argues that there is no evidence that its employees
actually knew that GATX 55996 was leaking prior to the
ignition of the butadiene. However, the issue is whether
CSX should have known of the GATX 55996 leak in time to
prevent the fire. If CSX should have known that GATX
55996 was leaking, then, in legal terms, CSX is said to have
“constructive knowledge” of the leak even if it had no actual
knowledge of the leak.

The Louisiana Supreme Court discussed the concept of
constructive knowledge in tort law at some length in its
decision in Levi v. Southwest Louisiana Electric
Membership Cooperative, 542 So.2d 1081 (La.1989). The
question in Levi was whether the defendant power company
should be held liable for an electrical hazard of which it did
not have actual knowledge. The Levi court analyzed the
issue thus:

A power company is required to recognize
that its conduct involves a risk of causing
harm to another if a reasonable person would
do so while exercising such attention,
perception of the circumstances, memory,
knowledge of other pertinent matters,
intelligence and judgment as a reasonable
person would have ... If the company has in
fact more than a minimum of these qualities, it
is required to exercise the superior qualities

———

17a

that it has in a manner reasonable under the
circumstances ... The standard becomes, in
other words, that of a reasonable person with
such superior attributes ...

It is well recognized that those who engage in
certain activities or come into certain
relationships with people or things are under
a peculiar obligation to acquire knowledge and
experience about that activity, person or
thing. A carrier owes to its passengers the
duty of discovering all detectable defects.
Manufacturers must learn of dangers that
lurk their products _... Traditionally,
professionals as well as manufacturers must
keep reasonably abreast of current advances
in their fields ...

By the same token, a company which
maintains and employs high power lines is
required to exercise the utmost care to reduce
hazards to life as far as practicable...
Pursuant to this duty, a power company has
an obligation to make reasonable inspections
of wires and other instrumentalities in order
to discover and remedy hazards and defects ...
Consequently, a company will be considered
to have constructive knowledge of an
electrical hazard which has existed for a
period of time which would reasonably permit
discovery had the company adequately
> performed its duties ...
542 So.2d at 1085-86 (citations omitted).
In Levi, the power company was held to have a duty to
make reasonable inspections to discover hazards and was
held to have constructive knowledge of hazards which had

18a

existed for a sufficient length of time to permit discovery had
reasonable inspections been made. We believe that a similar
analysis applies to the present case because the
transportation of hazardous materials involves risks at least
as great as those involved with the provision of electricity.

As a professional transporter of hazardous substances by
rail, CSX has an obligation to be knowledgeable about the
possible hazards involved and the means and methods of
preventing or remediating them. This would include
knowledge of both the possibility of leaks in pressurized tank
cars and the hazardous nature of butadiene. CSX also has
“an obligation to make reasonable inspections” “in order to
discover and remedy hazards and defects”, Levi, supra, in
pressurized tank cars carrying hazardous materials in urban
areas. CSX also is properly considered to have constructive
knowledge of a leak of hazardous cargo “which has existed
for a period of time which would reasonably permit discovery
had the company adequately performed its duties [of
inspection]}”. Id.

There is substantial evidence in the record from which
the jury reasonably could have concluded that GATX 55996
was already leaking when it was delivered to CSX’s
interchange tracks six-and-a-half hours before the leaking
butadiene ignited. The plaintiffs expert mechanical
engineer, Andrew McPhate, opined that GATX 55996 began
leaking as soon as it was loaded with butadiene in Good Hope
and that the leak became worse and worse up to the start of
the fire. CSX’s expert witness Steve Verret found physical
evidence, in the form of higher butadiene readings along the
tracks in the direction from which GATX 55996 had come to
CSX’s interchange tracks, which suggests that the tank car
already was leaking when it was delivered to the interchange
tracks. Thus, the jury reasonably could conclude that CSX
had a period of six-and-a-half hours, prior to the fire, to

19a

inspect GATX 55996 and discover and remediate the leak.
The jury also reasonably could conclude that an inspection of
the six pressurized butadiene tank cars should have taken
Place less than six-and-a-half hours after their delivery to
CSX’s interchange tracks. In making such a finding, it is
appropriate to consider that, even if the chance of any
particular tank car leaking and igniting is small, the possible
harm that can occur from even a single leak is enormous, and
the additional cost of a more timely inspection is little or
nothing. Levi, 542 So.2d at 1086-87.

We recognize that the Levi case did not involve Article
2315.3 and that Levi dealt with ordinary negligence and not
the “reckless or wanton” conduct addressed in Article 2315.3
and discussed in Billiot. Thus, we hold that, while it is
permissible to apply the Levi rule of constructive knowledge
in an Article 2315.3 case, it must be done in the context of
proving reckless or wanton misconduct and not mere
ordinary negligence. While the doctrine of constructive
knowledge can be used to prove fault in both ordinary
negligence cases and in Article 2315.3 cases, the Article
2315.3 plaintiff must use it to prove “highly unreasonable
conduct, involving extreme departure from ordinary care”,
Billiot, 645 So.2d at 618 (emphasis added), as opposed to the
ordinary negligence plaintiff who need prove only any
unreasonable conduct and any departure from ordinary care.

doctrine of constructive knowledge in an Article 2315.3 case.
We disagree because the doctrine of constructive knowledge
is, as we have just discussed, a means of proof rather than a
standard as to what must be proven. Further, we believe
CSX’s argument is foreclosed by the Billiot decision which
States that wanton or reckless conduct involves the
defendant proceeding in the face of danger either known to
him “or apparent to a reasonable person in his position”. 645

20a

So.2d at 613. This language in Billiot appears to embrace the
concept of constructive knowledge and obviate any
requirement of actual knowledge of danger in Article 2315.3
cases.”

CSX’s second argument as to punitive damages is based
upon the procedural circumstance that the quantum of
punitive damages was determined when the quantum of
compensatory damages had been determined as to only 20 of
8,047 plaintiff class members. CSX argues that there is a
constitutional Due Process requirement of a “reasonable
relationship” between the amount of punitive damages and
the amount of compensatory damages. Thus, so CSX’s
argument goes, as the jury did not know the amount of
compensatory damages for the class as a whole, it could not
have determined the amount of punitive damages in a
constitutionally proper way. Consequently, CSX argues,
there must be a new trial as to the amount of the punitive
damages. (Thus, CSX is not, by this argument, literally
challenging liability for punitive damages, which was decided
in the Phase I trial, but rather the Phase II trial which
determined the amount of punitive damages.) Although
CSX does not explicitly so state, the logical implication of
CSX’s argument is that the new trial as to the amount of
punitive damages would not take place until there have been

? CSX points out that there is no evidence that CSX was cited by any
regulatory authority in connection with the GATX 55996 leak and fire.
Neither Billiot nor Article 2315.3 itself makes regulatory citation a
predicate to an Article 2315.3 action. In fact, it already has been held, in
an Article 2315.3 case, involving the GATX 55996 leak and fire, that
compliance with government regulations does not preclude tort liability.
Galjour v. General American Tank Car Corp., 764 F.Supp. 1093, 1101
(E.D.La.1991).

2la

determinations of the compensatory damages to be awarded
to each one of the 8,047 class members.?

punitive damages.

The status of the “reasonable relationship” factor as part
of a Due Process constitutional analysis of whether an award
of punitive damages is excessive was established by BMW of
North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 116 S.Ct. 1589,
1601-1603, 134 L.Ed.2d 809 (1996), and was discussed in TXO
Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443,
113 S.Ct. 2711, 2721-22, 125 L.Rd24 366 (1993), and was
mentioned in Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1,
111 S.Ct. 1082, 1045-46, 1138 L.Ed.2d 1 (1991). In all three of
these cases, the “reasonable relationship” Due Process factor
was addressed in the context of appellate review of the
quantum of punitive damages awards. None of these three
cases holds that the “reasonable relationship” factor must be
considered by the jury. In Haslip, the jury instruction on
punitive damages did not include any reference to the

* There has been an additional Phase III trial in which there have been
determinations of the compensatory damages to be awarded to each of an
additional 20 selected plaintiffs.

22a

“reasonable relationship” factor, see 111 S.Ct. at 1087 n. 7,
but, despite the fact that the Haslip court “carefully
reviewed” that jury instruction, 111 S.Ct. at 1044, it was
found to be acceptable. Also, the Haslip court appears to
have contemplated that the “reasonable relationship” factor
would be applied on appeal when it stated: “The Alabama
Supreme Court’s postverdict review ensures that punitive
damages awards are not grossly out of proportion to the
severity of the offense and have some understandable
relationship to compensatory damages.”

The Louisiana Supreme Court, in a decision upon a
defense writ application in this case, closely approached the
question of whether the jury should consider the amount of
compensatory damages in setting the amount of punitive
damages:

In addition to compensatory damages, the
class seeks punitive damages under former
Louisiana Civil Code article 2315.8. Under
the trial plan set out in the trial court’s case
management orders, the trial court’s plan
indicates that after the jury has determined
whether or not to assess punitive damages:
The jury will determine punitive damages for
the class as a whole as punishment for the
defendant’s conduct by use of a multiplier
based on what the compensatory damages to a
given plaintiff are. -
It is this instruction, that the jury should use
a multiplier in assessing punitive damages, to
which defendants complain.

In BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517
U.S. 559, 116 S.Ct. 1589, 184 L.Ed.2d 809
(1996), the United States Supreme Court, in

- 23a

reviewing the punitive damages award to the
plaintiff for excessiveness, examined the
amount of punitive damages and
compensatory damages awarded and
compared the ratio between the two. Thus, a
multiplier is used as a standard of review to
determine if the punitive damage award is
excessive and unreasonable. BMW of North
America, 517 U.S. at 580-581, 116 S.Ct. at
1601.

Therefore, considering the foregoing, in the
event the jury in this matter determines that
defendants are liable for punitive damages,
the trial court is prohibited from instructing
the jury that it may use a multiplier when
determining the amount of punitive damages
that can be awarded, but should instruct the
jury to determine that amount of punitive
damages by consideration of all relevant
factors.

In re New Orleans Train Car Leakage Fire Litigation,
97-1150, 97- 1161 (La. 6/27/97), 697 So2d 239 (emphasis
added) (footnotes omitted). It appears that the Louisiana
Supreme Court, using the term “multiplier” to refer to the
BMW “reasonable relationship” factor, held that factor to be
applicable to appellate (or trial court) review of jury verdicts
rather than to the jury’s determination of the amount of
punitive damages as an initial matter. Thus, under the
Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision, there is certainly no
Due Process requirement that the jury, in setting the
amount of punitive damages, consider the amcunt of
compensatory damages.

Lastly, to the extent that CSX is arguing that, because
there has not yet been a determination of the amount of

24a

| compensatory damages as to all of the plaintiff class
members, CSX is denied Due Process by a lack of appellate
(or trial court) review of the “reasonable relationship” factor,
we disagree with CSX’s argument for a new trial on the
quantum of punitive damages for two reasons. First, even if
the present lack of a determination of the amount of
| compensatory damages prevented appellate court (or trial
| court) review of the jury’s determination of the amount of
| punitive damages (a position with which we do not agree),
that would not require a new trial on the quantum of
\ punitive damages. Rather, it would be necessary merely to

| await the determination of the amounts of compensatory

| damages before subjecting the jury verdict on amount of
| punitive damages to appellate (or trial court) review. CSX’s
| appeal could be stayed or dismissed without prejudice
| perhaps with a stay of execution of judgment. Second, and
| more to the point in light of our appellate review of the

| quantum of punitive damages set forth below, we believe
| that the BMW mandated Due Process review of the jury’s
| verdict can be performed on the present record despite the
procedural circumstance that the amounts of compensatory

| damages for most of the plaintiff class members have not yet
been determined. We will address this point further below in
our review of the quantum of punitive damages.

CSX’s third argument on appeal as to punitive damages
is that, by entering a judgment on punitive damages as to
the whole plaintiff class, rather than limiting the judgment
on punitive damages to the 20 selected plaintiffs whose
compensatory damages were determined in the Phase I trial,
the trial court violated the instructions of the Louisiana
Supreme Court given in two decisions upon writ
applications. In the first of those two decisions, In re New
Orleans Train Car Leakage Fire Litigation, 97-2547
(La.10/31/97), 707 So.2d 677, the Louisiana Supreme Court

|

25a

did hold that the trial court should not render a judgment
upon punitive damages until “all liability issues” had been
adjudicated. The Court based this upon Article 593.1 of the
Code of Civil Procedure. However, in the second decision
upon writ applications, the Court took a different approach.
In re New Orleans Train Car Leakage Fire Litigation, 98-
2399, 98-2622 (La.2/24/99), 728 So.2d 853. In its February 24,
1999 decision, the Court directed the trial court to enter
judgment in favor of the 20 selected plaintiffs as to liability,
allocation of fault and damages, both compensatory and
punitive, and to designate that judgment as final for
purposes of post-trial motions and appellate review. Id.
However, the Court did not prohibit the trial court from
entering a judgment as to punitive damages with respect to
the entire class. Thus, in its February 24, 1999 decision,
which appears to supercede its October 31, 1997 decision, the
Court appears to have left open for the trial court to decide,
at least as an initial matter, whether to enter judgment on
punitive damages as to all class members.

Also, the October 31, 1997 decision, which prohibited
entry of any judgment as to punitive damages, was based
upon Article 593.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure and, in its
February 24, 1999 decision, the Court stated:

On reconsideration, we have some doubt that
Article 593.1 (now repealed) was applicable at
all, since all issues of the liability of the
defendants apparently had been adjudicated
by the trial court, although there are still
causation issues to be decided as to the
remaining plaintiffs.
728 So.2d at 854 n. 3. As the issue of CSX’s liability for
punitive damages was decided in the Phase I trial, and even
the issue of the overall quantum of punitive damages was
decided in the Phase II trial, so that the only punitive

26a

damages issue left to be determined is the allocation of the
total punitive damages award among the individual class
members (an issue in which CSX has no interest), it does
appear that Article 593.1 does not bar entry of a judgment as
to the total amount of punitive damages owed to the entire
class.

Lastly, in its February 24, 1999 decision, the Court
remarked “given the size of this verdict and the length of
time since its entry, as well as the length of this litigation
over the 1987 incident, immediate review of this judgment
would be beneficial to both sides”. 728 So.2d at 854. It
seems more consistent with the Court’s expressed intent
(now over two years ago) to speed the resolution of this long-
running litigation, for the trial court to proceed with entry of
an immediately-appealable judgement as to the total
punitive damages owed to the entire class than to defer
entry of that judgment to what could be a much later date.
The trial court did not err by entering a judgment as to the
total punitive damages owed to the entire class.

CSX’s fourth and final argument as to punitive damages
is that the $850 million judgment (which the trial court
entered after rejecting the jury’s $2.5 billion verdict) is so
excessive as to constitute (1) an unconstitutional arbitrary
deprivation of property without due process of law and (2) an
abuse of discretion under Louisiana tort law.

We will address first CSX’s Due Process argument. We
turn to the guidance supplied by the United States Supreme
Court in its BMW, TXO and Haslip decisions. While BMW
provides the most recent, and perhaps most systematic,
analysis of whether a punitive damages award is so large as
to constitute a denial of Due Process, BMW does not
overrule TXO or Haslip and, in fact, relies upon those two
earlier decisions. Thus, we will apply all three of the Court’s
pronouncements upon this issue. We address the Due

27a

Process issue on a de novo review basis. Cooper Industries,
Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group Inc., 582 U.S. 424, 121 S.Ct.
1678, 149 L.Ed.2d 674 (2001).

In BMW, the defendant was found liable for $4,000 in
compensatory damages for purely economic harm because it
sold a car to the plaintiff without disclosing that the car had
been repainted prior to sale. The BMW jury awarded
$4,000,000 in punitive damages which was reduced to
$2,000,000 by the Alabama Supreme Court. The Court looked
to three “guideposts”, 116 S.Ct. at 1598, as to whether the
$2,000,000 punitive damages award was unconstitutional:
the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct, the
ratio of punitive damages to the compensatory damages (i.e.
the “reasonable relationship” factor) and the difference
between the punitive damages and the criminal and civil
penalties that could be awarded by statute.

The BMW court described the degree of reprehensibility
of the defendant’s conduct as “perhaps the most important”
of the guideposts to the constitutionality of a punitive
damages award. The Court then stressed that the harm in
the BMW case was “purely economic” and presented no
danger to health or safety:

In this case, none of the aggravating factors
associated with particularly reprehensible
conduct is present. The harm BMW inflicted
on Dr. Gore was purely economic in nature.
The presale refinishing of the car had no
effect on its performance or safety features, or
even its appearance for at least nine months
after his purchase. BMW’s conduct evinced
no indifference to or reckless disregard for the
health and safety of others. |

116 S.Ct. at 1599 (emphasis added). Both the potential harm
in the present case, widespread death, injury and destruction

28a

for miles across a city, and the actual harm in the present
case, particularly the exposure of an entire residential
neighborhood to carcinogenic hazardous chemicals, make the
harm in the BMW case the very antithesis of the present
case. The jury determined that CSX acted wantonly or
recklessly, a finding which we have found to not be clearly
wrong/manifestly erroneous, and that wantonness or
recklessness created a danger to the health and safety of
others of truly extraordinary magnitude. Clearly the “degree
of reprehensibility” guidepost, perhaps the most important
guidepost, weighs heavily in favor of the conclusion that the
punitive damages award is not unconstitutionally excessive.

CSX argues that the second BMW “guidepost”, the ratio
of punitive damages to the compensatory damages (i.e., the
“reasonable relationship” factor), cannot be applied here
because the amounts of compensatory damages to be
awarded to each of the bulk of the plaintiff class members
have not yet been determined. Therefore, CSX argues, it is
necessarily deprived of one element of a constitutionally-
mandated appellate (or trial court) review of the jury’s
verdict. We disagree with CSX for two reasons.

First, in BMW, the Court compared the punitive -
damages to only the compensatory damages because, in
BMW, there was only factual harm and no potential harm.
However, in 7TXO, there had been a large amount of
potential harm. In fact, in BMW, the Court, after discussing
the “potential harm” analysis of TXO, distinguished TXO by
stating that “there is no suggestion that Dr. Gore [the BMW
plaintiff] or any other BMW purchaser was threatened with
any additional potential harm by BMW’s nondisclosure
policy”. 116 S.Ct. at 1602. Usually, juries are asked to
determine the amount of actual harm (i.e. compensatory
damages) but are not asked to determine the amount of
potential harm that could have occurred. In TXO, the jury

se

29a

determined the compensatory damages to be $19,000 and
awarded $10,000,000 in punitive damages. Yet, in finding the
TXO punitive damages not unconstitutional, the TXO Court
compared the punitive damages, not to the compensatory
damages, but, rather, to the potential harm that could have
occurred despite the fact that there was no jury
determination of the amount of such potential harm. If
CSX’s argument were correct, that there can be no
constitutionally-adequate review of punitive damages in the
absence of a determination of the amount of compensatory
damages, then the bulk of the analysis in TXO would have
been impossible and the BMW Court would not have
approved of T.X0’s potential harm analysis.

Second, we do not agree with CSX’s position that we
have no way to compare the amount of the punitive damages
to the actual harm in this case. CSX argues that the awards
of compensatory damages to just 20 of the 8,047 plaintiff
class members are meaningless because 20 plaintiffs are such
a small percentage of the overall class and because those
plaintiffs were selected half by the plaintiffs’ counsel and half
by the defense counsel rather than by any statistically valid
sampling technique. We disagree because, while we
recognize that the trial court’s determinations of the
compensatory damages (made after the trial court rejected
the jury’s awards) may not be sufficient evidence from which
to draw an inference of the average compensatory damages
of all members of the class, we believe that the
determinations do give an indication of the likely range and
approximate order of magnitude of the compensatory
damages of all of the plaintiff class members. The trial
courts’ awards range from a high of $116,800 to a low of
$5,500. We presume that this wide range reflects the fact
that the plaintiffs’ counsel would have selected plaintiffs who
were closest to the fire and suffered the worst. damages

30a

while the defense counsel would have selected plaintiffs who
were farthest from the fire and suffered the least damages.
Four plaintiffs were awarded less than $10,000, eight were
awarded between $11,000 and $29,900, six were awarded
$33,900 to $63,000 and two were awarded $116,800 and
$116,000 respectively. From this, we generalize to say that a
typical award of compensatory damages in this case is in the
low to middle tens of thousands of dollars albeit with a
significant number of atypical awards. The $850 million
punitive damages award averages $105,562.42 per class
member (although we understand that, ultimately, it may be
allocated among the class members differently) so there does
not seem to be an outrageous ratio of punitive damages to
compensatory damages and nothing at all like the 526 to 1
ratio approved in 7'‘XO or the 500 to 1 ratio disallowed in
BMW.

Although the term “ratio”, used by the BMW Court in
relation to the “reasonable relationship” factor, conjures up
notions of exact mathematical calculation, the BMW Court in
fact emphasized that the analysis involves, not mathematical
formulae, but, instead, general concerns of reasonableness:

Of course, we have consistently rejected the
notion that the constitutional line is marked
by a simple mathematical formula, even one
that compares actual and potential damages
to the punitive award. TXO, 509 U.S., at 458,
113 S.Ct., at 2720. Indeed, low awards of
compensatory damages may properly support
a higher ratio than high compensatory
awards, if, for example, a particularly
egregious act has resulted in only a small
amount of economic damages. A higher ratio
may also be justified in cases in which the
injury is hard to detect or the monetary value

3la

of noneconomic harm might have been

difficult to determine. It is appropriate,

therefore, to reiterate our rejection of a

categorical approach. Once again, “we return

to what we said ... in Haslip: ‘We need not,

and indeed we cannot, draw a mathematical

bright line between the constitutionally

acceptable and the constitutionally

unacceptable that would fit every case. We

can say, however, that [a] general concer[n] of

reasonableness ... properly enter[s] into the

constitutional calculus.’ “ Id., at 458, 113

S.Ct., at 2720 (quoting Haslip, 499 U.S., at 18,

111 S.Ct., at 1043). In most cases, the ratio

will be within a constitutionally acceptable

range, and remittitur will not be justified on

this basis. When the ratio is a breathtaking

500 to 1, however, the award must surely

“raise a suspicious judicial eyebrow.” TX O,”

509 US. at 481, 113 S.Ct. at 2732

(O'CONNOR, J., dissenting).
BMW, 116 S.Ct. at 1602-16038 (emphasis added).
Consequently, in view of BMWs eschewing of mathematical
exactitude, in favor of what we would describe as a ratio
used as a rough quantitative aid toa qualitative judgment as
to reasonableness, we feel that our above use of the limited
number of awards of compensatory damages (in terms of
range of awards and rough order of magnitude) is
appropriate.

We also believe that, implicit in CSX’s argument, is the
notion that an award of compensatory damages is the only
possible information about the amount of harm suffered by
the plaintiff class members. However, there was eyewitness
and expert testimony as to the exposure of the plaintiff class

32a

members to carcinogenic hazardous chemicals (butadiene
and its burn products), expert testimony about the risks
associated with that exposure due to the soot in the
plaintiffs’ homes, and eyewitness testimony about the
sudden, forced middle-of-the-night evacuation of the
residential neighborhood around the fire. Fright and shock
among the plaintiffs must have accompanied and followed
the fire and evacuation. We believe that the BMW Court’s
“general concern of reasonableness”, discussed in the above.
quotation from BMW, is sufficiently broad to allow us to
compare the amount of the punitive damages, not just to
dollar amounts of compensatory damages, but also to the
type and severity of the actual harm suffered by the
plaintiffs which gives rise to their claims for compensatory
damages.

As mentioned above, the quantum of punitive damages
awarded by the trial court (after it rejected the jury’s
verdict) amounts to $105,562.42 per plaintiff. Is that amount
of punitive damages too great relative to the actual harm
suffered by a typical member of the plaintiff class? If a
single member of the plaintiff class had sued CSX
individually and been awarded $105,562.42 in punitive
damages, would the acute and long-term exposure of the
plaintiff to carcinogenic hazardous chemicals and the shock
and fright of the fire and evacuation have been insufficient to
justify constitutionally a punitive damages award of that
quantum? We think not. The $105,562.42 figure is not
shocking relative to the eyewitness and expert evidence of
actual harm. The $850 million figure is driven by the fact that
so very many people, as many as 8,047, were harmed by
CSX’s wanton or reckless conduct. The fact that one’s
wanton or reckless conduct has harmed thousands, as
opposed to a few, is hardly the basis for striking down a

33a

punitive damage award as unconstitutional (if anything, the
opposite seems more likely).

We also assess the quantum of punitive damages relative
to, not only the actual harm that occurred, but also relative
to the potential harm that could have occurred as a result of
the wanton or reckless conduct of CSX. This assessment of
the ratio of the quantum of punitive damages to the potential
harm (i.e., assessing whether there is a “reasonable
relationship” between the quantum of punitive damages and
the potential harm) was a key factor in the determination of
the TXO Court that the $10,000,000 punitive damages award
in that case, while 526 times the amount of the $19,000 actual
damages, was not unconstitutional. 118 S.Ct. at 2721-22.
The TXO Court discussed a hypothetical in which a man fires
a gun wildly into a crowd, by sheer chance injuring no one,
but damaging a $10 pair of glasses. The jury reasonably
could find only $10 in compensatory damages but thousands
of dollars in punitive damages. 113 S.Ct. at 2721. (The “$10
pair of glasses” and “thousands” of dollars in punitive
damages reflect the fact that the hypothetical was derived
from a 1931 law review article.) The BMW Court approved
the TXO opinion’s comparison of the amount of punitive
damages to the potential harm from the defendant’s conduct.
BMW, 116 S.Ct. at 1602.

In the present case, the potential harm that could have
resulted from CSX’s wanton, reckless conduct is truly
extraordinary. If GATX 55996 had exploded, whole city
blocks of a residential area could have been destroyed. No
doubt if all six of the pressurized butadiene tank cars had
exploded, the devastation would have been even greater. If
such an explosion had occurred prior to the evacuation of the
residential area surrounding CSX’s interchange tracks,
hundreds or even thousands of deaths and injuries could
have ensued. GATX 55996 could have taken off like a

34a

missile, as could have the other five pressurized butadiene
tank cars, wreaking death and destruction for up to a mile in
any direction from the scene of the fire. It is difficult to even
imagine, in financial terms, the extent of liability for such a
monumental catastrophe, but it is apparent that the
compensatory damages resulting from it could easily exceea
the quantum of punitive damages in this case. It most
certainly cannot be said that the ratio of the punitive
damages to the potential harm is_ unconstitutionally
excessive. Indeed, the potential harm in this case could
cause a reasonable trier of fact to award, and a reasonable
court to approve, a sum more than $850 million.

The third Due Process “guidepost” applied by the BMW
Court to the quantum of punitive damages is a comparison to
the civil or criminal penalties that could be imposed for
comparable conduct. CSX argues that the maximum fine
that could be imposed for violation of Louisiana
environmental law is a little more than $1,000,000 under La
R.S. 30:2025. Thus, CSX argues, the maximum quantum of
punitive damages that can be imposed in this case is
$1,000,000. We disagree.

The BMW Court applies three “guideposts” to the Due
Process analysis of quantum of punitive damages. It is a safe
assumption that the BMW Court did not select and use the
term “guideposts” without reason. The term “guideposts”
does not connote or suggest a cumulative series of three
“tests” or “elements” which must each be met. Rather, we
see the three guideposts as (a) considerations to be expressly
taken into account in order to give coherence and some
degree of structure to the Due Process analysis of quantum
of punitive damages and (b) a multifactor balancing test in
which the three guideposts might give contradictory
indications which must be weighed against one another to
achieve a final result. In the present case, the first

35a

guidepost, reprehensibility, fully supports the quantum of
punitive damages awarded, the second guidepost,
comparison to the actual harm and, especially, to the
potential harm, would support a quantum of punitive
damages much larger than was awarded, and the third
guidepost, fines for comparable conduct, suggests a much
lower award. Giving each of the three guideposts equal
weight leads to the conclusion that Due Process is not denied
by the quantum of punitive damages in this case. Thus, we
reject the notion that the third guidepost, comparable fines,
standing alone, “caps” punitive damages in this case at $1
million.

The $850 million punitive damages award in this case is
not so “grossly excessive”, BMW, 116 S.Ct. at 1595, as to
amount to a denial of Due Process.

We turn now to the question of whether, under Louisiana
tort law, the $850 million punitive damages award must be
reduced. The question is whether the trial court abused its
“much discretion” in setting the amount of the award.
Dekeyser v. Automotive Cas. Ins. Co., 97-1251 (La.App. 4
Cir. 2/4/98), 706 So.2d 676, 685. Accord Chinigo v. Geismar
Marine, Inc., 512 So.2d 487, 498 (La.App. 1st Cir.), writ
denied, 514 So.2d 457 (La.1987).

“Many factors may be considered when determining the
amount of a reasonable award of punitive damages, including
‘the defendant, the defendant’s conduct, the magnitude of the
potential harm arising from it, and even the defendant’s net
worth, to assess the probability of deterrence”. Dekeyser,
706 So.2d at 687 (quoting Laris v. Parker, 92-1448 (La.App. 4
Cir 3/29/94), 685 So.2d 442, 444). Thus, Louisiana tort law, as
previously determined in this Circuit by the Dekeyser
decision, does not use a fixed list of exclusive factors to be
considered in order to determine whether a punitive

36a

damages award is so great (or small) as to constitute an
abuse of discretion.

We do believe, however, that the selection and evaluation
of factors to consider in any particular case, and the
evaluation of whether or not a particular quantum of
punitive damages is an abuse of discretion, must be governed
by the three purposes of punitive damages identified in the
Billiot decision: punishment of the defendant, deterrence of
the defendant and others, and incentive to plaintiffs. 645
So.2d at 612-613. The punitive damages should be sufficient
in amount to clearly and fully meet the three Billiot
purposes but should be no more than that amount.

Two of the three examples of factors to consider given in
the Dekeyser decision, “the defendant’s conduct” and “the
magnitude of the potential harm” are paralleled in two of the
three BMW “guideposts” and what we said above as to the
“reprehensibility” and “ratio” (of potential harm to punitive
damages) BMW guideposts is applicable to the question of
whether or not the quantum of punitive damages in this case
is an abuse of discretion. Thus, those two Dekeyser factors
strongly suggest that there is no abuse of discretion in the
quantum of punitive damages in this case. (The third BMW
guidepost, comparison to civil and criminal penalties for
comparable misconduct, is addressed more narrowly to the
question of “prior notice” of large financial consequences to
particular misconduct, and thus is peculiar to the Due
Process analysis and is inapplicable to the Louisiana tort law
abuse of discretion analysis.)

The Dekeyser decision also suggests that the net worth
of the defendant is a proper factor to be considered “to
assess the probability of deterrence”. 706 So.2d at 687. We
believe net worth is also a proper factor to consider with
respect to the effectiveness of punishment. The importance
of the defendant’s financial situation to the goals of

37a

punishment and deterrence is obvious: What “may be
awesome punishment for an impecunious individual
defendant [may be] wholly insufficient to influence the
behavior of a prosperous corporation”. Continental Trend
Resources, Inc. v. OXY USA, Inc., 101 F.3d 634, 641 (10th
Cir.1996) (post-BMW analysis of quantum of punitive
damages), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1241, 117 S.Ct. 1846, 137
L.Ed.2d 1049 (1997). Thus, in order to assess the extent of
the punishment and deterrence that will be inflicted by a
particular amount of punitive damages, it is necessary to
consider the financial situation of the defendant. We note
that consideration of the financial situation of the defendant
is noted approvingly in TXO, 113 S.Ct. at 2722 n. 28, and
Haslip, 111 S.Ct. at 1045, and does not appear to be excluded
by the BMW decision. Continental Trend, supra. The
question is, in effect, how much will this defendant be
punished or deterred by an $850 million punitive damages
award? The record reflects that CSX has a net worth of
about $4.8 billion. The $850 million punitive damages award
is about 18% of CSX’s net worth. We do not find that
percentage to be an abuse of discretion in this case because
we cannot say that 18% is indisputably more than necessary
to effectuate the Billiot purposes of punishment and
deterrence.‘

Quantum of Compensatory Damages

The three defendants-appellants all argue that the
awards of compensatory damages made by the trial court

‘ The plaintiffs, in their Answer To Appeal, argue that the trial court
erred by rejecting the jury’s $2.5 billion punitive damages verdict against
CSX. We share the trial court’s conviction that the $2.5 billion verdict was
manifestly excessive. The sum of $2.5 billion is more than necessary to
fully effect the three purposes of punitive damages as set out in Billiot.
We are convinced that punishment beyond what is purposeful is not
authorized by Article 2315.3.

38a

(after it rejected all of the jury’s verdicts) to the 20 selected
plaintiffs are excessive and should be reduced. The
defendants-appellants’ first argument is that the testimony
of two expert witnesses for the plaintiffs, which testimony
was introduced to support the reasonableness and extent of
the plaintiffs’ fear of increased risk of cancer, should have
been excluded. In particular, the defendants-appellants
argue that, under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), as
adopted by State v. Foret, 628 So.2d 1116 (La.1993), the trial
court, as the “gatekeeper” with respect to expert testimony,
should have excluded the testimony of plaintiffs’ experts Dr.
Lawrence Miller and Dr. Drew Gouvier.

Dr. Miller is a physician and medical researcher. He
testified that the plaintiff class members, including the 20
selected plaintiffs, were at a “small” but “definite” increased
risk of cancer as a result of their exposure to butadiene and
its breakdown products and burn products following the
GATX 55996 fire.

Dr. Miller is a graduate of Harvard Medical School and
has been a physician for more than twenty years. He did his
internship and residency in Internal Medicine at
Massachusetts General Hospital. He also did fellowships in
Pulmonary Disease and Critical Medicine at Massachusetts
General Hospital. He did a two-year fellowship in Clinical
Pharmacology at Tufts University School of Medicine. He
received a Master’s in Public Health, in toxicology, from the
Boston University School of Public Health. He is associated
with the Department of Pharmacology and Experimental
Therapeutics at Tufts University where he does research on
the effects of drugs and other chemicals on the human brain.
He teaches part-time at Harvard Medical School and at Tufts
University School of Medicine. He has hospital privileges at
Massachusetts General Hospital and sees patients on a

ee

39a

weekly basis. He is Board Certified in Internal Medicine,
Pulmonary Disease, Critical Medicine and _ Clinical
Pharmacology. He has treated patients for cancer resulting
from exposure to butadiene and styrene (styrene is a burn
product of butadiene). At the time of the GATX 55996 fire,
he was teaching at LSU Medical Center in New Orleans. He
was accepted as an expert witness, and testified in court,
fourteen times in the twelve years prior to trial in this case.

Dr. Miller testified at length as to the carcinogenic
nature of butadiene and its breakdown products and burn
products. In the daytime, butadiene breaks down into
several other chemicals due to exposure to the sun’s
ultraviolet rays and, at night, butadiene breaks down into
several other chemicals due to interaction with nitrates from
automobile exhaust. Butadiene and at least one of its
breakdown products are clearly established in the scientific
literature as carcinogenic. The Federal Agency for Toxic
Substance and Disease Registry, the International Agency
for Research In Cancer, and OSHA all classify butadiene as
very likely a carcinogen in humans.

The burn products of butadiene (i.e. the chemicals
produced by burning butadiene) are even more dangerous.
Another expert witness, Dr. Catallo, did a burn test and
researched the literature to determine the burn products of
butadiene. Dr. Miller testified that several of the chemicals
that are burn products of butadiene are known to be “very
powerful carcinogens” and that they include one of the most
powerful carcinogens ever studied. Dr. Catallo’s burn test
showed that these carcinogenic chemicals are contained in
the soot produced by burning butadiene.

Dr. Miller opined that the members of the plaintiff class
had a small but definite increase in their risk of cancer due to
their exposure to butadiene and its breakdown products and
burn products from GATX 55996. He based his opinion on a

40a

four-part toxicological methodology which includes
consideration of: (1) the particular chemicals to which
someone is exposed; (2) an estimate of the amount of the
chemical to which someone is exposed; (3) the length of time
to which someone is exposed to the chemical; and (4) the
genetic background of the person exposed to the chemical
(although he testified that not much is yet known about this
fourth factor).

The defendants-appellants argue that Dr. Miller’s
methodology in this case was so flawed as to have made his
testimony completely inadmissible. However, the only part
of Dr. Miller’s methodology which they specifically attack is
the second (amount of the chemical) factor. They argue that
Dr. Miller did not know the “dose” of chemical to which the
plaintiffs were exposed.

Dr. Miller did address the question of “dose” in his
testimony. He explained that, in toxicology, the “dose” is a
matter of both the quantity of the chemical and the length of
time to which someone is exposed to the chemical. Dr. Miller
testified that exposure to the chemicals involved in this case
in a concentration of thousands of parts per million for a
period of weeks to months would result in an increased risk
of cancer. (He did not testify that lesser exposure
necessarily would not result in a greater risk of cancer.
There is no known safe exposure level.) Dr. Miller also
testified that the members of the plaintiff class, including the
20 selected plaintiffs, were exposed to thousands of parts per
million for a period of weeks to months.

Dr. Miller explained that, because chemical concentration
measurements are often not taken at the time people are
exposed to hazardous chemicals, it is often necessary to
estimate the concentrations after the fact. There were
several facts upon which Dr. Miller relied as to the
concentration of chemicals and period of exposure. A large

4la

quantity, some 30,000 gallons, of butadiene was released or
burned into the air. The ignition source of the fire was four-
and-a-half blocks away, and the flash point of butadiene is
20,000 parts per million, so the concentration of the
butadiene in the atmosphere was at least 20,000 parts per
million at a distance of four and-a-half blocks from GATX
55996. Also, the concentration of butadiene in the
atmosphere would have been even higher closer to the tank
car.

What seems to be of most concern to Dr. Miller was the
soot produced by the burning butadiene. Dr. Miller
emphasized that this soot contained several extraordinarily
powerful carcinogens. This soot, which was carried by the
plumes of smoke that shifted in all directions from the
burning tank car, was observed in the homes of the plaintiffs
and took up to a month to clean up. Dr. Miller testified that,
despite ordinary clean-up efforts, the plaintiffs would remain
exposed to the carcinogenic soot. The soot remains in air
conditioning filters where it is recirculated back into the
homes, collects in vacuum cleaners and is blown back into the
homes each time the vacuum cleaner is used, and collects in
attics and other inaccessible places. Dr. Miller testified that
there are “known protocols” to remove carcinogens in these
types of situations but that the plaintiffs had not been
instructed as to them. The result is that the carcinogenic
soot remains in homes indefinitely. Dr. Miller conceded that
he could not measure precisely the exposure of the plaintiffs
but, he testified, he concluded that the exposure was
sufficient to create an increased risk of cancer. Lastly, the
defendants’ brief cites no expert testimony in rebuttal to Dr.
Miller’s methodology. The points raised by the defendants
with respect to Dr. Miller’s methodology were proper ones
for cross-examination and for consideration by the jury and

42a

by the trial court as trier of fact, but they do not render Dr.
Miller’s opinion so unreliable as to be inadmissible.

Dr. Gouvier is a clinical psychologist, a Ph.D., who is a
tenured Associate Professor at LSU in Baton Rouge. He
also has a private practice in Clinical Psychology, is a
licensed clinical psychologist, and sees patients regularly.
He is on the boards of editors of several scholarly journals,
has extensive publications in peer-reviewed journals and has
qualified as an expert witness in federal and state courts on
several dozen occasions.

He conducted a study, in the summer and fall of 1988, as
to the psychological effects of the GATX 55996 fire on the
residents of the neighborhood in the vicinity of the fire. He
selected one hundred families, made up of two hundred
eighteen individuals, to interview and test. The families
were selected using statistical sampling techniques. Among
other things, Dr. Gouvier drew three “rings” at a distance of
a half-mile, one mile and one-and-a-half miles from the site of
the GATX 55996 fire and sampled all three of the areas. He
also divided the area into northeast, northwest, southwest
and southeast quadrants and sampled all four of those areas.
Interviews with and tests of the one hundred selected
families were pursued diligently in order to avoid self-
selection bias. The result of these procedures, Dr. Gouvier
testified, is a sample of the plaintiffs which is representative
of the class as a whole.

The one hundred families of two hundred eighteen
individuals were interviewed and subjected to a series of
standardized psychological tests. These tests included the
Zung Depression Inventory, the Anxiety Sensitivity Index
and an Anxiety Inventory. He also interviewed and tested a
comparison group of new residents who had moved into the
neighborhood since the tank car fire and then used statistical
analysis to compare the two groups.

43a

The testing of the two hundred eighteen individuals of
the plaintiff class revealed that they suffered from increased
depression, anxiety and anxiety sensitivity after the GATX
55996 fire. (Dr. Gouvier referred some persons to mental
health care providers.) The depression decreased a year
after the fire but anxiety remained high. Of the two hundred
eighteen individuals, 98.9% had been exposed to smoke or
fumes from the fire and 76% had been evacuated. Those
further away from the fire were much less likely to have
evacuated but they also tended to suffer anxiety about risks
they might have incurred due to their lack of evacuation. Dr.
Gouvier opined that, based upon studies of other disasters,
the increased anxiety among members of the plaintiff class
was unlikely to go away by itself for a very long time.
Lastly, Dr. Gouvier testified that the findings of his study of
the plaintiff class were consistent with studies done in
connection with other disasters.

The defendants-appellants make four very brief
arguments that Dr. Gouvier’s testimony should have been
excluded: First, they complain that the twenty selected
plaintiffs were not examined by Dr. Gouvier and were not
among the two hundred eighteen individuals interviewed
and tested. However, Dr. Gouvier was in court for most of
the trial and heard all or most of the twenty selected
plaintiffs testify. He read proof of claim forms by and heard
taped interviews with all of the twenty selected plaintiffs.
Second, the defendants-appellants complain that the two-
hundred eighteen individuals who were studied by Dr.
Gouvier had been told that he was working with the
plaintiffs’ lawyers in connection with their case. However, -
this source of possible bias of the two hundred individuals
studied was made known to the jury and to the trial court as
trier of fact, the two hundred eighteen individuals studied
were warned of the anticipated discovery and cross-

44a

examination and the need to be completely truthful, and Dr.
Gouvier’s interviews and testing included measures to detect
fabrications or exaggerations. Third, the defendants-
appellants complain that Dr. Gouvier was unable to study a
control group of residents of the affected area who were not
plaintiffs. However, Dr. Gouvier was able to study a
comparison group of persons who moved to the affected area
after the GATX 55996 fire. Fourth, the defendants-
appellants complain that Dr. Gouvier’s study has not been
subjected to “formal” peer review. Dr. Gouvier’s study in
connection with the GATX 55996 fire has not been subjected
to “formal” peer review because it has not been submitted
for publication. However, it has been subjected to peer
review by other professors at LSU who are not connected to
the study. Moreover, a similar railroad tank car disaster
study performed by the same group at LSU had been
published and, presumably, subject to formal peer review.
None of these complaints about Dr. Gouvier’s testimony,
either individually or collectively, amounts to a reason to
exclude Dr. Gouvier’s testimony (although all were fair game
for the vigorous cross-examination to which Dr. Gouvier was
subjected before the trial court and jury).

Lastly, we believe that if there was any error in
admission of Dr. Gouvier’s testimony, it was harmless. The
twenty selected plaintiffs testified as to their experiences
and their distress. Based upon that testimony, the trial
court would almost certainly have concluded that the twenty
selected plaintiffs, having been traumatized by the GATX
55996 fire, would tend to suffer short-term depression and
long-term anxiety (particularly about the CSX tracks and
the tank cars which remain in their neighborhood). The trial
court, as finder of fact, is unlikely to have given undue
weight to Dr. Gouvier’s testimony when setting the amount
of compensatory damages.

45a

The defendants-appellants also argue that the trial court,
as finder of fact, awarded excessive damages to each of the
twenty selected plaintiffs. Almost all of the damages
awarded to the twenty selected plaintiffs were general
damages for physical pain and suffering, mental anguish and
evacuation and inconvenience. Appellate review of general
damage awards is quite limited. The trial court, as finder of
fact, has “vast discretion” in setting the amount of general
damages. E.g., Youn v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 623 So.2d
1257 (La.1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1114, 114 S.Ct. 1059,
127 L.Ed.2d 379 (1994). So long as the amount of general
damages awarded is not clearly higher (or lower) than
reasonable minds could accept, it may not be disturbed upon
appeal. We may not look to other cases as to the amount of
general damages in the absence of an abuse of discretion by
the trier of fact. Id.

The testimony of the twenty selected plaintiffs
regarding their experiences varies a fair amount which, no
doubt, accounts for the broad range in the amounts of the
awards of damages made by the trial court. The amounts of
the differences between the jury verdicts (which were
rejected by the trial court) and the trial court’s awards vary
also and, presumably, this reflects the trial court’s own
observations of the demeanor and credibility of the twenty
selected plaintiffs. These factors make it somewhat difficult
to generalize about the evidence and the amounts awarded
by the trial court. They also highlight the highly subjective
nature of general damages and the need to avoid second-
guessing the trier of fact in the absence of a clear abuse of
discretion. |

Nevertheless, a few general themes emerge from the
plaintiffs’ testimony and bear noting. The sound of an
explosion, the sight of flames, the smell of smoke and fumes
and the middle-of-the night evacuation combined to produce

46a

fear and confusion which aggravated the fear. The plaintiffs
were exposed to chemical fumes which irritated their eyes —
and respiratory systems and, most of all, made them fearful
for their health. Although their fears are not always
particularized towards cancer, they have the general sense
(correctly) that the chemical exposure they underwent is a
threat to their health. The fact that tank cars continue to
arrive in the neighborhood is a reminder of the GATX 55996
fire and a source of continued anxiety. The security which
one normally feels in one’s home has been eroded and that is
exhibited by behaviors such as keeping a packed suitcase by
the door or sleeping with one’s clothes on.

We believe that there was no abuse of discretion by the
trial court in its awards of compensatory damages to the
twenty selected plaintiffs. The defendants-appellants’
concerns that the jury acted out of bias and prejudice in
setting the amounts of compensatory damages are obviated
because the trial court rejected the jury’s verdicts and set
the amounts of the compensatory damages itself. While this
court, or some other court, may have selected different
general damages awards as an original matter, that isnot the
issue. The trial court’s awards of compensatory damages,
being within a reasonable range, must be affirmed.°

Polysar’s Appeal As To Liability

Polysar was assessed 5% of the liability for compensatory

damages but found not liable for punitive damages. (The

overall assessment of liability for compensatory damages
was: Phillips, 20%; GATC, 20%; CSX, 15%; Mitsui, 15%;

5 In their Answer To Appeal, the plaintiffs argue that the trial court
erred by rejecting the jury verdicts as to compensatory damages and
request that the jury verdicts be reinstated. A review of the facts as to
the compensatory damages as to each of the twenty selected plaintiffs
convinces us that the trial court did not err and that the awards of
compensatory damages made by the trial court were fair and reasonable.

i eeahiiiiimeiaaaaaitailiiaaaaaiaiiaaitiiiiiaiiiiiaiditeaisiiiliiand

47a

AGS, 5%; Illinois Central, 5%, AMF-BRD, 5%; and Polysar,
5%.) Polysar appeals and argues that it should not have been
assessed any liability.

We will pretermit a number of Polysar’s arguments as to
jury instructions, standard of review, whether certain
regulatory duty issues are ones of law or fact, and
admissibility of certain testimony as to regulatory duty
issues by conducting a de novo review of Polysar’s liability.
In doing so, we do not hold that the trial court erred in any
respect. We are simply giving Polysar every benefit of the
doubt so as to simplify the analysis by obviating certain
issues raised by Polysar. Also in the interest of
simplification, we will base our analysis upon only the
plaintiffs’ negligence theory and not upon strict liability. In
accordance with Polysar’s argument, we will analyze the
applicability of the relevant federal regulations as an issue of
law rather than fact.

Polysar argues that it was “simply awaiting delivery” of
the butadiene at the time of the tank car fire. However, it is
also true that Polysar: owned the butadiene when it was
loaded onto GATX 55996 and at the time of the fire;
coordinated the shipment of the butadiene from Good Hope,
Louisiana, through New Orleans and on to Chattanooga;
paid for that shipment; had the authority to tell Mitsui
which tank cars to use; and chose the shipping route through
New Orleans. Polysar was not merely a passive recipient of
the butadiene but was, instead, an active participant in the
transportation of the butadiene. What Polysar did not do
was make any inspection of GATX 55996 (or the other
pressurized tank cars) or take any other actions to determine
whether its butadiene was being transported safely. Polysar
in effect admits that it did nothing to determine whether the
butadiene was being transported safely but contends that it
had no duty to do so.

48a

Whether Polysar had a duty with respect to the safety of
the transportation of its butadiene is an issue of law which
we address de novo:

This court has adopted a duty-risk analysis to
determine whether liability exists under the
particular facts presented. Under this
analysis the plaintiff must prove that the
conduct in question was the cause-in-fact of
the resulting harm, the defendant owed a
duty of care to the plaintiff, the requisite duty
was breached by the defendant and the risk of
harm was within the scope of protection
afforded by the duty breached. Syrie v.
Schilhab, 96-1027, p. 4-5 (La.5/20/97), 693
So.2d 1173, 1176-77; Berry v. State, 93- 2748,
p. 4 (La.5/23/94), 687 So.2d 412, 414. Under
the duty-risk analysis, all four inquiries must
be affirmatively answered for plaintiff to
recover. LeJeune v. Union Pacific R.R., 97-
1843, p. 6 (La.4/14/98), 712 So.2d 491, 494.

A threshold issue in any negligence action is
whether the defendant owed the plaintiff a
duty. Meany v. Meany, 94-0251, p. 6
(La.7/5/94), 689 So.2d 229, 233. Whether a
duty is owed is a question of law. Peterson v.
Gibraltar Sav. & Loan, 98-1601, 98-1609, p. 7
(La.5/18/99), 733 So.2d 1198, 1204; Mundy v.
Dep't of Health & Human Resources, 620
So.2d 811, 818 (La.1998); Fauwcheaux v.
Terrebonne Consol. Gov't, 615 So.2d 289, 292
(La.1993). In deciding whether to impose a
duty in a particular case, the court must make
a policy decision in light of the unique facts
and circumstances presented. See Socorro v.

49a

City of New Orleans, 579 So.2d 931, 938
(La.1991). The court may consider various
moral, social, and economic factors, including
the fairness of imposing liability; the
economic impact on the defendant and on
similarly situated parties; the need for an
incentive to prevent future harm; the nature
of defendant’s activity; the potential for an
unmanageable flow of litigation; the historical
development of precedent; and the direction
in which society and its institutions are
evolving. See Meany, 639 So.2d at 238; Pitre
v. Opelousas Gen. Hosp., 580 So.2d 1151, 1161
(La.1988); Entrevia v. Hood, 427 So.2d 1146,
1149 (La.1983).

Posecai v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 99-1222 (La.11/30/99), 752

So.2d 762, 765-66.

The key dispute with respect to Polysar’s duty revolves

around several federal regulations, which provide as follows:
49 C.F.R. § 171.2(a): General requirements:
No person may offer or accept a hazardous
material for transportation in commerce
unless that person is registered in
conformance with subpart G of part 107 of this
chapter, if applicable, and the hazardous
material is properly classed, described,
packaged, marked, labeled, and in condition
for shipment as required or authorized by
applicable requirements of this subchapter
(including § § 171.11, 171.12, and 176.11 ...).
49 C.F.R. § 172.204(a): Shipper’s
certification: ...Each person who offers a
hazardous material for transportation shall
certify that the material is offered for

50a

transportation in accordance with this
subchapter by printing...on the shipping
paper containing the required shipping
description the certification contained in
paragraph (a)(1) of this section...[ (a) (1) ]
“This is to certify that the above-named
materials are properly classified, described,
packaged, marked and labeled, and are in
proper condition for transportation according
to the applicable regulations of the
Department of Transportation.”

49 C.F.R. § 178.1(b): Purpose and scope: A
shipment of hazardous materials that is not
prepared in accordance with this subchapter
may not be offered for transportation by air,
highway, rail, or water. It is the duty of each
person who offers hazardous materials for
transportation to instruct each of his officers,
agents, and employees having any
responsibility for preparing hazardous
materials for shipment as to applicable
regulations in this subchapter.

49 C.F.R. § 178.81(b)(1): Loading and
Shipping: When tanks are loaded and prior to
shipping, the shipper must determine to the
extent practicable, that the tank, safety
appurtenances and fittings are in proper
condition for the safe transportation of the
lading. Tanks with bottom discharge outlets
must have their outlet caps off, or outlet cap
plugs open, during the entire time tanks are
being loaded. After loading, tanks...which
permit more than a dropping of the liquid
with the outlet caps off...must not be offered

5la

for transportation until proper repairs have
been made. Tanks which show any dropping
or leaking of liquid contents at seams or
rivets, must not be offered for transportation
until proper repairs are made.

49 C.F.R. § 173.31(b)(8): Securing closures:
All closures of openings in tank cars and of
their protective housings must be properly
secured in place by the use of a bar, wrench or
other suitable tool...Manway covers...must be
made tight against leakage of vapor and
liquid, by use of gaskets of suitable materials,
before cars are tendered to carrier for
transportation...all closures of openings in
tenk cars must be inspected to the extent
practical for corrosion of or damage to the
gasket seating surface and for serviceability
of packing, gaskets, and hold-down bolts. All
defective packing, gaskets, bolting or
threaded elements must be replaced.

These regulations, promulgated by the federal
Department of Transportation, do not create any private
right of action for damages. Any claim for damages in this
case arises under Louisiana tort law. However, public safety
regulations such as these, issued by an agency presumed to
have expertise in the relevant subject matter and
statutorily-charged with protecting public safety, are very
useful in determining the standard of care applicable in a
negligence action (i.e. defining the “duty” that is owed by
someone).

It is undisputed that GATX 55996 did not comply with
the above-quoted regulations, and that the required
documentation applicable to GATX 55996 was incorrect, at
the time Polysar’s butadiene was loaded onto GATX 55996

aaa icc ie me es ncn cane

52a

and at the time of the fire. Polysar’s position is that the
federal regulations are not applicable to Polysar. Polysar’s
argument is as follows: The regulations apply only to a
“shipper”, the regulations do not define “shipper” but, in the
present case, Mitsui, and not Polysar, is the “shipper”. We
disagree with Polysar’s initial proposition. The federal
regulations quoted above do not state that, as a group, they
are applicable only to a “shipper” (whatever a “shipper” is).
Section 171.2(a) applies to any “person [who] may offer or
accept a hazardous material for transportation in commerce”.
This seems as applicable to Polysar, whose butadiene was
being transported, as it is to Mitsui. Section 172.204(a)
applies to “[eJach person who offers a hazardous material for
transportation”. This seems more applicable to Polysar,
whose butadiene was being transported, than to Mitsui.
Section 173.1(b) applies to “each person who offers hazardous
materials for transportation”. Again, this seems to apply
more to Polysar, whose butadiene was being transported,
than to Mitsui. Section 173.31(b)(1) refers to the “shipper”
without specifying what is a “shipper”. This could apply ts
either Polysar, the owner of the butadiene seeking to have it
transported, or to Mitsui, the party supplying the tank cars
to carry the butadiene. Section 173.31(b)(8) says nothing as
to whom it is applicable.

Our interpretation of these federal regulations is that
they are applicable to, and thus impose duties upon, both
Polysar and Mitsui. Because of the importance of those
duties to the public safety, we view those duties as non-
delegable as a matter of Louisiana tort law. (Thus, whether
Mitsui is an “independent contractor” to Polysar is of no
moment.) The result is that Polysar (along with Mitsui) had
a duty, as a matter of Louisiana tort law, to exercise the
degree of care specified in the federal regulations. Polysar’s
acknowledged failure to meet the standard of care specified

53a

in the federal regulations mandates the finding that Polysar
was negligent.
AMF-BRD’s Appeal As To Liability

AMF-BRD was held liable for 5% of the compensatory
damages but was held not liable for punitive damages.
AMF-BRD argues that it should not have been held liable at
all or, in the alternative, some of its 5% share of liability
should have been assigned to NACC. AMF-BRD also argues
that, because certain jury charges it requested were not
given, the issue of its liability should be reviewed de novo on
appeal.

We will review de novo the issue of AMF-BRD’s liability.
We will do so not because we decide that the trial court
erred, but in order to simplify the analysis and give AMF-
BRD every possible benefit of the doubt.

AMF-BRD argues that NACC, not AMF-BRD, was at
fault. AMF-BRD manufactured the pressure tank which
NACC then placed on the GATX 55996 rail car chassis.
AMF- BRD notes that it was NACC that specified a bottom
manway for the tank. Thus, AMF-BRD argues, it was not at
fault with respect to the design of the rail car.

However, we do not believe that specification of a bottom
manway is what is most important as to the causation of the
leak and fire. It was established at trial that only an
asbestos gasket should ever have been used with the GATX
55996 bottom manway and, if the asbestos gasket had not
been replaced by Phillips with a rubber gasket, then the leak
and fire would not have occurred. Thus, the key issue with
respect to the liability of AMF-BRD is the failure of AMF-
BRD to stencil or otherwise place a warning on the bottom
manway advising that only an asbestos gasket should be
used.

54a

AMF-BRD argues that it did, in effect, give such a
warning because the specifications and drawings which it
supplied to NACC provided for an asbestos gasket.
However, for a piece of equipment such as a rail car, which is
likely to remain in service for many years, which may well
change hands over the years, and which will undergo
periodic maintenance and repair and perhaps modification,
the specificationsand drawings delivered to the original
owner are no substitute for a warning appearing on the piece
of equipment itself.

AMF-BRD also argues that the GATX 55996 rail car was
intended to be used by sophisticated users and, therefore,
there was no need for AMF-BRD to provide any warning.
However, while intended use by sophisticated users might
weigh against the need for a warning in some circumstances
(at least prior to the enactment of the Louisiana Products
Liability Act), we do not believe that it obviates the need for
a warning when there is a grave and substantial risk to the
public safety at stake. In view of the great risk presented to
the public at large from a leak in a chemical tank car, the fact
that GATX 55996 was intended to be used by professional
rail shippers or railroads does not eliminate the need for an
adequate warning. In that connection, we note that AMF-
BRD, as the designer of the hatch mechanism which closed
the manway, had greatly superior knowledge of the critical
need for an asbestos gasket, and thus should have been well
aware of the need for a warning as to the gasket.

AMF-BRD further argues that, when it placed the
designation “114A” on each end of the tank, it provided a
warning to use an asbestos gasket. However, what the
designation “114A” actually calls for is an asbestos gasket or
an approved high pressure temperature-resistant
equivalent. Thus, the “114A” designation relates to pressure
and temperature. In the present case, the problems with

55a

substituting a rubber gasket for an asbestos gasket result
from the fact that a rubber gasket could be displaced
(apparently because rubber gaskets are less rigid than
asbestos gaskets) and because rubber gaskets, unlike
asbestos gaskets, can react with butadiene so as to develop
leaks. In any event, in light of the critical nature of the need
for an asbestos gasket, and the potential for great danger to
the public, the designation “114A” on the ends of the tank
was not a substitute for an express warning on the manway
to use only asbestos gaskets.

Lastly, AMF-BRD argues that prudent maintenance of
the rail car would have called for substitution of parts of like
kind, i.e., an asbestos gasket for an asbestos gasket.
However, designation “114A” contemplates the possibility of
substitution with a non-asbestos gasket. Moreover, in view
of the critical need for an asbestos gasket and the potential
for danger to the public, it should not be simply assumed that
only an asbestos gasket will be installed during periodic
maintenance. There should be an express warning to use
only an asbestos gasket. We do not mean to suggest that
AMF-BRD’s negligence is equivalent to the fault of Phillips.
However, the 20% allocation of fauit to Phillips was four
times the 5% allocation of fault to AMF-BRD, and that
seems perfectly reasonable. We believe the allocation of a
small percentage of the liability for compensatory damages
to AMF-BRD, 5%, is appropriate.

Interest on Punitive Damages

The trial court awarded prejudgment interest on the
compensatory damages and interest from the date of
judgment on the punitive damages. The plaintiffs, by their
Answer To Appeal, argue that the trial court erred by not
awarding prejudgment interest on the punitive damages.
Based upon the limited available authority from the

56a

Louisiana Supreme Court, we believe that the trial court did
not err.

In Jordan v. Intercontinental Bulktank Corp., 621 So.2d
1141 (La.App. Ist Cir.), writ denied, 623 So.2d 1335, 1336
(La.1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1094, 114 S.Ct. 926-27, 127
L.Ed.2d 219 (1994), it was held:

The trial court also erred in awarding prejudgment
interest on the punitive damages award. Under both
Louisiana and federal law, a plaintiff is entitled to interest on
punitive damages only from date of judgment. Alexander v.
Burroughs Corp., 359 So.2d 607, 613-614 (La.1978);
Malbrough v. Wallace, 594 So.2d 428, 438 (La.App. Ist
Cir.1991), writ denied, 596 So.2d 196 (La.1992); United
States v. Reul, 959 F.2d 1572 (Fed.Cir.1992); Wickham
Contracting Co. v. Local Union No. 3, 955 F.2d 831 (2d
Cir.1992).

621 So.2d at 1158. .

Later, in Sharbono v. Steve Lang & Son Loggers, 97-0110
(La.7/1/97), 696 So.2d 1382, the Louisiana Supreme Court, in
holding that interest on penalties in worker’s compensation
cases runs only from the date of judgment, cited the Jordan
decision with apparent approval:

Finally, there is the matter of interest on
penalties. Both federal and _ state
jurisprudence is nearly uniform in holding
that penalty interest is entirely of the post-
judgment variety, and thus is calculated only
from the date the penalties are awarded until
the date they are paid. E.g., United States v.
Reul, 959 F.2d 1572 (Fed.Cir.1992)
(“Prejudgment interest may not be awarded
on punitive damages.”); Jordan v.
Intercontinental Bulktank Corp., 621 So.2d

57a

1141 (La.Ct.App. Ist Cir.1993), cert. denied,
510 U.S. 1094, 114 S.Ct. 926, 127 L.Ed.2d 219
(1994) (“Under both Louisiana and federal
law, a plaintiff is entitled to interest-on
punitive damages only from date of
judgment.”), citing Alexander, 359 So.2d at
613-14.

696 So.2d at 1389. From this, we believe it most likely that
the Louisiana Supreme Court adopted the Jordan-rule that
prejudgment interest is not to be applied tc punitive
damages. See also Owens v. Anderson, 93-1566 (La.App. 4
Cir. 1/27/94), 631 So.2d 1318, writ denied, 94-0462, 94-0494
(La.4/7/94), 635 So.2d 1135 (rendering decree with
prejudgment interest on compensatory damages and with
interest from date of judgment on punitive damages). The
plaintiffs cite Demarest v. Progressive American Ins. Co.,
552 So.2d 1329 (La.App. 5th Cir.1989), but that case predates
both Sharbono and Jordan and relies upon much earlier
decisions awarding prejudgment interest on penalties and
attorney’s fees, 552 So.2d at 1338-39.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the
trial court. We also remand this case to the trial court for
proceedings as to the question of compensatory damages
with respect to the remaining class members and for any
other proceedings as are necessary to conclude this action.

AFFIRMED. CASE REMANDED FOR FURTHER
PROCEEDINGS.

795 So.2d 364, 2000-0479 (La.App. 4 Cir. 6/27/01)

58a

COURT OF APPEAL OF LOUISIANA
FOURTH CIRCUIT

In re NEW ORLEANS TRAIN CAR LEAKAGE FIRE
LITIGATION.
No. 2000-CA-0479.
Aug. 1, 2001.

Appeal from Civil District Court, Orleans Parish No. 87-
16374, Division “Ad Hoc-B”, Honorable Wallace A. Edwards,
Judge Ad Hoc.

ON APPLICATION FOR REHEARING
JOAN BERNARD ARMSTRONG, Judge.

The application for rehearing of Nova Chemicals, Inc.
(“Polysar’”) is denied. The duty and liability of Polysar was
not determined solely by the ownership of the butadiene, or
by any other single factor, but by the several factors
discussed in our opinion on original hearing.

794 So.2d 956, 2000-0479 (La.App. 4 Cir. 8/1/01)

59a

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

In re NEW ORLEANS CAR LEAKAGE FIRE
LITIGATION

No. 2001-C-2492
Oct. 14, 2002
Prior report: La.App., 795 So.2d 364

In re AMF/BRD Inc.;-Defendant; Applying for Writ of
Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District
Court Div. B, Nu. 87-16374; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth
Circuit, No. 2000-CA-0479.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant the writ.
TRAYLOR, J., would grant the writ.
WEIMER, J., would grant the writ.
827 So.2d 411, 2001-2492 (La. 10/14/02)

STATUTORY PROVISIONS
TITLE 49 -APPENDIX. TRANSPORTATION

CHAPTER 27—HAZARDOUS MATERIALS
TRANSPORTATION

NOTE (1993)
(Congressional! Findings: 1990 Amendment)
(Quoting Pub. L. No. 101-615, § 2, 104 Stat. 3244, 3245
(Nov. 16, 1990))

§ 1801. Congressional Declaration of Policy.

* * *

“(3) many States and localities have enacted iaws and
regulations which vary from Federal laws and regulations
pertaining to the transportation of hazardous materials,
thereby creating the potential for unreasonable hazards in
other jurisdictions and confounding shippers and carriers
which attempt to comply with multiple and conflicting
registration, permitting, routing, notification, and other
regulatory requirements,

“(4) because of the potential risks to life, property, and
the environment posed by unintentional releases of
hazardous materials, consistency in laws and regulations

governing the transportation of hazardous materials is.

necessary and desirable,

“(5) in order to achieve greater uniformity and to
promote the public health, welfare, and safety at all levels,
Federal standards for regulating the transportation of
hazardous materials in intrastate, interstate, and foreign
commerce are necessary and desirable.”

“(6) in order to provide reasonable, adequate, and cost-
effective protection from the risks posed by the
transportation of hazardous materials, a network of

6la

adequately trained State and locai emergency response
personnel is required,

“(7) the Office of Technology Assessment has
estimated that approximately 1,500,000 emergency response
personnel need better basic or advanced training for
responding to the unintentional release of hazardous
materiais at fixed facilities and in transportation, and

“(8) the movement of hazardous materials in
commerce is necessary and desirable to maintain economic
vitality and meet consumer demands, and shall be conducted
in a safe and efficient manner.”

* * *

62a

TITLE 49 -APPENDIX. TRANSPORTATION

CHAPTER 27—HAZARDOUS MATERIALS
TRANSPORTATION
(1990)

§ 1811. Relationship to other laws

(a) General
Except as provided in subsection ‘b) of this section, any
requirement, of a State or political subdivision thereof,
which is inconsistent with any requirement set forth in
this chapter, or in a regulation issued under this chapter,
is preempted.

(b) State laws
Any requirement, of a State or political subdivision
thereof, which is not consistent with any requirement set
forth in this chapter, or in a regulation issued under this
chapter, is not preempted if, upon the application of an
appropriate State agency, the Secretary determines, in
accordance with procedures to be prescribed by
regulation, that such requirement (1) affords an equal or
greater level of protection to the public than is afforded
by the requirements of this chapter or of regulations

- issued under this chapter and (2) does not unreasonably

burden commerce. Such requirement shall not be
preempted to the extent specified in such determination
by the Secretary for so long as such State or political
subdivision thereof continues to administer and enforce
effectively such requirement.

(c) Other federal laws
The provisions of this chapter shall not apply to pipelines
which are subject to regulation under the Natural Gas
Pipeline Safety Act of 1968 (section 1671 et seq. of this
title) or to pipelines which are subject to regulation

63a

under Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Act of 1979 [49
U.S.C.A. § 2001 et seq.].

(Pub.L. 93-633, Title I, § 112, Jan. 3, 1975, 88 Stat. 2161.)

(As amended Pub.L. 96-129, Title II, § 216(a), Nov. 30,
1979, 93 Stat. 1015.)

64a

TITLE 49. TRANSPORTATION

SUBTITLE III—GENERAL AND INTERMODAL PROGRAMS

CHAPTER 51—TRANSPORTATION OF HAZARDOUS
MATERIAL

§ 5125. Preemption

(a) General.--Except as provided in subsections (b), (c),
and (e) of this section and unless authorized by another
law of the United States, a requirement of a State,
political subdivision of a State, or Indian tribe is
preempted if—
(1) complying with a requirement of the State,
political subdivision, or tribe and a requirement of
this chapter or a regulation prescribed under this
chapter is not possible; or

(2) the requirement of the State, political subdivision,
or tribe, as applied or enforced, is an obstacle to
accomplishing and carrying out this chapter or a
regulation prescribed under this chapter.

(b) Substantive differences.—(1) Except as provided in
subsection (c) of this section and unless authorized by
another law of the United States, a law, regulation,
order, or other requirement of a State, political
subdivision of a State, or Indian tribe about any of the
following subjects, that is not substantively the same as a
provision of this chapter or a regulation prescribed under
this chapter, is preempted:

(A) the designation, description, and classification

of hazardous material.

(B) the packing, repacking, handling, labeling,
marking, an placarding of hazardous material.

65a

(C) the preparation, execution, and use of
shipping documents related to hazardous material
and requirements related to the number,
contents, and placement of those documents ....

66a

ARTICLE I—THE CONGRESS /

Section 8, Clause 3. Regulation of Commerce
The Congress shall have the power . . . To regulate

Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States, and with the Indian Tribes.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386015_1023%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
