# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Miller v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 2003
- **Citation:** 538 U.S. 908

## Text

er ooo

Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED

oe 1026 JAN 6 2003

NO. orrtee-or-THE CLERK

Sun the
Supreme Court of the Anited States

MIcHAEL L. MILLER,
Petitioner,

V.

SOUTHWESTERN BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY,
Respondent.

On PetiTION For Writ Or CERTIORARI
To Tue Unitep States Court Or APPEALS
For THe Firts Circuit

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

ELLEN SPROVACH
Counsel of Record

c/o GreGG M. ROSENBERG
& ASSOCIATES

11 GREENWAY PLAZA

SurrE 2810

Houston, TX 77046

(713) 960-8300 (TEL)

(713) 621-6670 (Fax)

Counsel for Petitioner

BECKER GALLAGHER LEGAL PUBLISHING, INC.,
CINCINNATI, OHIO 800-890-5001

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Whether there is a compelling reason to grant the
Petition for Writ of Certiorari because the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has decided an important
question of Federal Law that has not been but should be
settled by this Court.

1. Specifically, the Fifth Circuit determined that
Petitioner Miller did not check the correct box on the EEOC
complaint form or otherwise disclose his retaliation claim and
thereby exhaust his administrative remedies. The Fifth Circuit
referred to a Seventh Circuit case’ in making its argument.
However, the Fifth Circuit misinterpreted the Seventh Circuit
precedent’. Because the Fifth Circuit misapplied and
misinterpreted Seventh Circuit precedent and this Court has
not ruled on this issue, there is compelling reason to grant this
Petition for Writ of Certiorari.

y i Whether doctor prescribed limitations on
ability to work overtime is a substantial limitation when
overtime is mandatory. The Fifth Circuit determined that
Petitioner’s ability to work overtime was not a substantial

"Cable v. Ivy Tech State College, 200 F.3d 467,477 (7 Cir.
1999).

2 The Fifth Circuit stated that the Cable Court, “found that there
was no indication form the EEOC charge boxes, narrative or
supplemental material that the Plaintiff sought redress for the
retaliation claim...” Order affirming summary judgment, page 8.
When in actuality, the Cable Court found that the dismissal of
Cable’s retaliation charge for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies was error as Cuble had put the Respondent on notice of
his retaliation charge and exhausted his administrative remedies. Id.
at 473.

limitation on Petitioner Miller’s ability to work under the
Americans with Disabilities Act. Again, this Court has not
ruled on this issue and the cases cited by the Fifth Circuit did
not take into account scenarios like Petitioner’s where
overtime was substantial and mandatory, there is compelling
reason to grant this Petition for Writ of Certiorari. *

* Cotter v. Ajilon Servs., Inc., 287 F.3d 593 (6" Cir. 2002) and
Brennan v. Nat'l Tei. Directory Corp., 850 F.Supp. 331 (E.E. Pa.
1994). In the instant case, Defendant was requiring Plaintiff and
others to work seven days at a total of 84 hours per week. Plaintiff
was restricted to 50 hours per week. Appeliant’s brief to the 5®
Circuit, page 6.

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CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 29.6, Petitioner is not
required to file a corporate disclosure statement.
Petitioner/Plaintiff is an individual. Respondent/Defendant
Southwestern Bell Telephone Company is a Missouri
Corporation. SBC Communications Inc. is a Delaware
Corporation and the parent company of Southwestern Bell

Telephone Company.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ........-.- a
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT ....... ili
TABLE OF CONTENTS ........-.:+.--; sees iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...........--+:+-: Vii
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ........-.--- 1
OPINIONS BELOW - 0 wc cme ereecnens 1
I STATEMENT OF THE CASE ..........--- | 1

A, Statutes Involved as the Basis for
Federal Jurisdiction in the Court of the
free ee ee ee ee 1

B. Facts Material to the Consideration of

the Questions Presented ...........- 2
Il SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ........ 4
Ill REASONS FOR GRANTING WRIT ........ 7

A. Michael Miller Has Brought an
Important Question of Federal Law
That Has not Been, but Should be
Settled by this Court. .......++-+++: 7

B. The Standard Necessary to Survive
Summary Judgment/Application of Law

2 Eka eee A ee we eee 10
1. Miller established a Prima
Facie Case of Discrimination
and Retaliation pursuant to the
Americans with Disabilities
a tea og 66 eek OS be 4 10
2. Defendant does not have a
legitimate business reason to
explain why it dismissed Miller
after 24 years of work. ....... 12
: H Miller has established a Prima
Facie Case of Retaliation ...... 14
4. Inference of Retaliation........ 15
IV I Gs ba ak ad 6 6a be eee 16
APPENDIX
Appendix A
Fifth Circuit Opinion - 10/7/02 ............ la
Appendix B
District Court Memorandum and Order -
PR soo ee a ea we es be 19a
Appendix C
District Court Final Judgment - 10/24/01 .... 21a

Appendix D
District Court Memorandum and Order -

ME oko O44 8 0 080 0 8 94 60:40 8 eo ws 23a

vi

a ee rs — —— - —

emmaminannetit

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES: PAGE

Alexander v. Gardner-Denver,
ae TE oy sb a oe 006 hoe eae 7

Brennan v. Nat’l Tel. Directory Corp.,
850 F.Supp. 331 (E.D. Pa. 1994) ......... 6,9

Bridges v. City of Bossier,
Pe bee Le A eer arr 10

Cable v. Ivy Tech State College,
200 F.3d 467 (7th Cir. 1999) ............ ey

Cotter v. Ajilon Servs., Inc.,
poe el | er ere ii, 6, 9

Downes v. Volkswagen of America, Inc.,
41 F.36 1152 (7 Ce. -199S) 0 ww ccc cee 7-8

Long v. Eastfield College,
Be Pie ee GP es BUD wc cee cc cccese 15

Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
Fe & fhe | ere 14

Mayberry v. Voight Aircraft Co.,
Se ee SO Get CR. BGPP wc ccc ccc ccces 15

McDaniel v. Temple Indep. Sch. Dist.,
770 F.2d 1340 (Sth Cir. 1985) ............ 15

Vii

McInnis v. Alamo Community College Dist.,

207 F.3d 276 (Sth Cir. 2000) ........--- 10, 12
Nowlin v. Resolution Trust Corp..,

33 F.3d 498 (Sth Cir. 1994) .......----5es 15

~ Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.,

530 U.S. 133 (2000)... . 2... - eee reese 15, 16
Sherrod v. American Airlines, Inc.,

132 F.3d 1112 (Sth Cir. 1998) .......-- 10, 11
Taylor v. Virginia Union Univ.,

193 F.3d 219 (4th Cir. 1999) .......------> 8
Webb v. Cardiothoracic Surgery Ass'N.,

139 F.3d 532 (Sth Cir. 1998) .......--- 14-15
STATUTES:
28 U.S.C. $2101) .. 1. eee eer ere ceeenes l
SiR Leg br) ee ee 1

SUPREME COURT RULES:
Supreme Court Rules 12.1, 13.1, 13.3 amd DD .. 220s 1

Supreme Court Rule 29.6 .....--- ++ seer ee reees i

Viii

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This Honorable Court has jurisdiction to hear this case
under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101
(1994). Jurisdiction is also proper and timely pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2101 (c), Supreme Court Rules 12.1, 13.1, 13.3,
and 29.

OPINIONS BELOW
Appellant is appealing an Order affirming Summary

Judgment entered October 7, 2002 by the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

The United States District Court for the Southern
District of Texas entered a final order on November 20, 2001
and a Summary Judgment order on October 24, 2001.

I
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. r isdiction
in the C. F the First I

42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.
§ 12112 Discrimination
(a) General Rule

No covered entity shall discriminate
against a qualified individual with a disability
because of the disability of such individual in
regard to job application procedures, the

1

hiring, advancement, or discharge of
employees, employee compensation, job
training, and other terms, conditions, and
privileges of employment.

B. Facts Material to the Consideration of the
Questions Presented

Summary Judgment was granted for the Defendant and
Miller appealed to the Fifth Circuit. The case was ultimately
dismissed by an order entered on October 7, 2002.

Petitioner Michael L. Miller was a 24-year veteran of
Defendant Southwestern Bell’s workforce who began
employment in 1974 as a splicer’s helper and ultimately
became a customer service technician. In 1996 and again in
1998, Mike Miller underwent heart surgery. Miller went out
on disability leave from July 17, 1998 through September 7,
1998 for surgery related to his heart: Alcohol Septal
Reduction Procedure. Miller’s doctor diagnosed him with
Hypertropic Obstructive Cardiomyopathy.

Immediately upon return to work in September of
1998, Miller informed his supervisor Dale Dugas, that his
doctor restricted him to work only 40 hours a week. Miller’s
doctor then restricted Plaintiff to work only 10 hours of
overtime. During that time frame, and contemporaneously
with Miller’s overtime restrictions, Defendant declared a
service emergency and required all individuals in Miller’s job
position to work 12 hour shifts seven days a week, a total of
84 hours per week mandatory. Though to many, a restriction
of 50 hours per week does not sound like a serious job
restriction, it impacted Miller severely, as his doctor
mandated restriction required him to work 34 hours less per
week than his fellow employees.

2

meen: wom cael:

Mr. Miller began to experience chest pains in the
middle of September 1998. In fact, Defendant’s agent and
Miller’s supervisor, Dale Dugas stated that in the short, less
than three week period, that Miller was back on the job, she
noticed that on the days Miller worked 10 hours a day, he
appeared more tired. On September 21, 1998, Miller’s heart
condition worsened, he experienced chest pains and he had to
stop working and rest.

On the day Miller had to stop working and rest, he
was assigned two jobs at 17534 Golden Glade. Another
customer service technician, Tony Figliola, was assigned to
the same job site on that same day.

On September 21, 1998, Miller left a job site
(Cedarwood), drove to the Golden Glade site, put out the
cones to secure the road, inspected the job and realized that it
had been repaired. When Miller left the site, he drove to the
Central Office, received phone calls from customers and
returned a page from his daughter. While Miller was at the
Central Office he experienced those chest pains hit so he also
stopped working, rested and took some medication. Miller
went from the Central Office to the garage where he cleaned
out his truck, gassed it up and went into the office.

Miller attributed driving to Golden Glade, setting out
the cones, inspecting the site, driving to the Central Office,
returning, the phone calls and resting and taking medication at
the Central Office, driving from the Central Office to the
garage, and cleaning and gassing up his truck as time for the
Golden Glade job pursuant to Southwestern Bell policy.

|

Mike Miller worked 13 hours on September 21, 1998.

Defendant’s policy as it related to “charging time” is
to charge time to the new job as soon as they completed the
old job. Policy dictates discretion for travel, cleaning the
trucks and gassing up the vehicle. In fact, if a technician
gassed up in the afternoon, they would probably charge the
time to the last job in the afternoon and if they did it in the
morning they would charge that activity to the first job of the
new day. Miller did not commit fraud or forge any
documents.

Three days later on September 23, 1998, Defendant's
agent, Dale Dugas spoke with Miller and asked him about the
Golden Glade job. Miller did not remember some of the
information and Dugas said she would meet with him the next
day. Dugas and another manager went to the Golden Glade
address to see what work was done. However, they did not,
at any time, retrace Miller’s steps to validate or justify the
length of time Miller had attributed to the Golden Glade job -
pursuant to policy.

Less than three weeks after returning from a disability
leave and after requesting accommodations regarding
overtime and to rest due to chest pains, Defendant suspended
then terminated a 24-year long employee. Miller was not on
any progressive discipline at the time of his suspension.

Il
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Both the District Court and the United States Court of

Appeals for the Fifth Circuit decided, erroneously, an
important question of Federal law that has not been, but

4

should be, settled by this Court. There are compelling reasons
why this Court should grant this Petition for Writ of
Certiorari and consider these important questions.

First, Specifically, the Fifth Circuit determined that
Petitioner Miller did not check the correct box on the EEOC
complaint form or otherwise disclose his retaliation claim and
thereby exhaust his administrative remedies. The Fifth Circuit
referred to a Seventh Circuit case* in making its argument.
However, and with due respect, the Fifth Circuit
misinterpreted the Seventh Circuit precedent’. Because the
Fifth Circuit misapplied and misinterpreted Seventh Circuit
precedent and this Honorable Court has not ruled on this
issue, there is compelling reason to grant this Petition for
Writ of Certiorari.

Additionally, the Fifth Circuit determined that
restrictions on working overtime were not substantially
limiting on the major life activity of working. However, the
cases cited by the Fifth Circuit do not deal with cases such as
the instant case where large amounts of overtime (34 hours)
are required. The cases cited do not consider any required

* Cable v. Ivy Tech State College, 200 F.3d 467,477 (7 Cir.
1999).

° The Fifth Circuit stated that the Cable Court, “found that there
was no indication form the EEOC charge boxes, narrative or
supplemental material that the Plaintiff sought redress for the
retaliation claim...” Order affirming summary judgment, page 8.
When in actuality, the Cable Court found that the dismissal of
Cable’s retaliation charge for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies was error as Cable had put the Respondent on notice of
his retaliation charge and exhausted his administrative remedies. Jd.
at 473.

overtime. Finally, the two cases cited® are in the Sixth Circuit
and Eastern District of Pennsylvania, respectively, and the
Supreme Court of the United States has not ruled on whether
limitations on mandatory overtime is substantially limiting on
the major life activity of working.

The District Court and the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning
was incorrect that the District Court misapplied (and
misinterpreted from other circuits) law to fact and settled an
important question of law that should be settled by this
Honorable Court. Moreover, Miller further asserts that in
evaluating the summary judgment standard, the District Court
inappropriately weighed the evidence in favor of Southwestern
Bell Telephone Company. In effect, the District Court
assumed there was fact issues present and went on to assume
the role of fact finder. The District Court granted summary
judgment on its own factual determinations, which are best
left to the proper fact finder, the jury. Therefore, despite the
existence of Miller’s prima facie case, the District Court
denied Miller his right to a jury trial. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit went on to affirm that
ruling.

” Cotter v. Ajilon Services, Inc., 287 F.3d 593 (6" Cir. 2002) and
Brennan v. National Telephone Directory Corporation, 850F.Supp.
331 (1994).

iil

REASONS FOR GRANTING WRIT

Michael Miller Has Brought an Important
Question of Federal Law That Has not Been,
but Should be Settled by this Court.

Actually, Michael Miller has brought two important
questions of Federal Law that have not been but should be
settled by this Court. Generally, a Plaintiff may not bring
claims that were not in the EEOC charge. Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36 (1974). This requirement
allows the EEOC to investigate the claim while also providing
the employer with full notice of the charges against it. Jd. In
its Order dated October 7, 2002, the Fifth Circuit stated that
Miller is precluded from making a retaliation claim regarding
his disability claim because he did not check a box or
otherwise disclose that claim. There are two things inherently
wrong with that reasoning.

First, the case utilized by the Fifth Circuit to support
its reasoning is from the Seventh Circuit and does not purport
to rule the way the Fifth Circuit says it does. The Fifth
Circuit stated that the Cable court deemed the plaintiff's
narrative to have given insufficient indication to the EEOC or
the employer that he was seeking redress for unlawful
retaliation. Order affirming summary judgment, page 18.
Actually, Cable supports a reversal of summary judgment.
The Cable Court found that the dismissal of Cable’s
retaliation charge for failure to exhaust the administrative
remedy was [emphasis ours] error. Cable, 200 F.3d 467. The
EEOC charge filing requirement is not intended to “let the
form of the purported charge prevail over its substance”.
Downes v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 41 F.3d 1132 (7"

7

PO

Cir. 1994). Courts have allowed various types of filings to
satisfy the EEOC filing requirement. Taylor v. Virginia Union
Univ., 193 F.3d 219 (4" Cir. 1999).

In the instant case, Miller went to the EEOC and
completed a charge of discrimination along with a charge
information form, which was filed with the EEOC. In that
charge information form, Miller stated that he was
discriminated for age and disability, “heart condition, Grade
II spondlylithesis and degenerative arthritis in knee and
shoulder.” He went on to say, “[t]he alleged misconduct was
a subterfuge to fire an employee nearing retirement. I had
taken a break from work due to chest pains and had included
this time on my time report. They alleged fraud”. In other
words, Miller who had requested accommodations by way of
reduced mandatory overtime stemming from his heart
condition, took a break for chest pains and was retaliated
against by being fired. Miller gave notice to the EEOC and
the employer that he was retaliated against for engaging in
protected activity relating to his disability.

On page 10 of its Order affirming Summary Judgment,
the Fifth Circuit cited to Miller’s narrative, however, ignoring
and omitting the language, “[t]his charge is amended to cure
a technical defect in the omission of an additional basis and
statute, “Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990", indicated
on the Charging Party’s initial information. (See Attached).
The Fifth Circuit went as far as to say, “[w]orth noting is that
there was no continuation sheet for t his narrative filed, nor
a supplemental documents of any kind in the trial record,”
Order affirming Summary Judgment, page 19.’

‘ This amended charge was attached as Exhibit “B” to Plaintiff's
Original Complaint.

The Fifth Circuit applied the law of another Circuit,
misinterpreted it and misinterpreted the facts, specifically that
Miller did not supply a continuation sheet or amendment. This
Honorable Court has not ruled as to whether when Plaintiff
fails to mark a box for retaliation but supplies information to
the EEOC indicating such a claim whether administrative
remedies are exhausted. Therefore, Petitioner Miller prays
this Writ be granted.

The second important area of Federal law that has not
been decided by this Court is whether restrictions on overtime
qualify as a substantial limitation to one’s ability to work. In
its Order affirming Summary Judgment at page 12, the Fifth
Circuit determined that courts have held that the inability to
work overtime is not a substantial limitation on the ability to
work under the ADA. Cotter v. Ajilon Servs., Inc., 287 F.3d
593 (2002). The Court of Appeals also cited Brennan v. Nat'l
Tel. Directory Corp., 850 F.Supp. 331 (E.D. Pa. 1994), for
its premise that the inability to work overtime hardly makes
a plaintiff handicapped. While one of these cases is from a
sister circuit and one from district court, neither address the
issues in Miller’s case. Both cases cited by the Fifth Circuit
involve situations where there are overtime restrictions but no
evidence of overtime. In Méiller’s case, the overtime
restrictions were significant as he was only allowed to work
50 hours per week and was required to work 84. As this
Court has never addressed the issue of whether restrictions of
Overtime in a mandatory overtime situation constitute a
substantial limitation on an individual’s ability to perform the
major life task of working, Petitioner Miller prays this Court
grant this Petition for Writ.

Therefore, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit decided an important issue of law that should

properly be decided by this Court and this Petition should be
granted.

B.

Plaintiff has offered evidence to this Court that 1) he
is disabled or is regarded as disabled; 2) that he is qualified
for the job; 3) that he was subject to an adverse employment
action on account of his disability or perceived disability; and
4) that he was replaced by or treated less favorable than non-
disabled employees. McInnis v. Alamo Community College
Dist. 207 F.3d 276 (5" Cir. 2000). Defendant has stipulated
that Plaintiff was qualified for his job and that an adverse
employment action occurred.

Plaintiff fulfills the required elements to prove a prima
facie discrimination case. Plaintiff has established that he was
regarded as having a disability and that he was treated less
favorably than a non-disabled employee. The adverse
employment action occurred because of the disability. Sherrod
v. American Airlines, Inc., 132 F.3d 1112 (5" Cir. 1998)
citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). First, Plaintiff must offer
evidence that he falls within the meaning of “disabled”.
Bridges v. City of Bossier, 92 F.3d 329 (5" Cir. 1996).

Plaintiff must establish that he has a disability or is
qualified as disabled by one of three ways: Plaintiff must
show that (1) he has a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more major life activity, or (2) a

10

record of such impairment, or (3) that Defendant regarded
him as having such an impairment. Sherrod v. American
Airlines, Inc., 132 F.3d 1112 (5" Cir. 1998). Plaintiff is only
required to satisfy one prong of this test but he can clearly
meet at least two.

First, Defendant regarded Mike Miller as disabled.
The evidence that Defendant regarded Plaintiff as being
disabled is powerful and overwhelming. As shown
previously, a reasonable jury could find - indeed would be
compelled to find - that the Plaintiff meets the definition of
disabled because Defendant Southwestern Bell regarded him
as disabled. It was only after Miller returned from a six week
disability leave, began to look tired after 10 hour days, and
Miller gave his restriction of being able to only work 50 hours
a week (in a mandatory 84 hour work week) that Defendant
began the process of dismissing Miller. Miller’s restriction of
only 10 hours overtime might not normally seem significant.
In the instant case, all Miller’s comparators were required to
work mandatory 12-hour day, seven day a week shifts. Miller
informed Defendant that on the day of the Golden Glade job
(less than three weeks after returning from disability leave)
that he had chest pains, needed to rest and take medication
that Defendant suspended and then fired Plaintiff for
something that Dale Dugas freely admits is policy (attributing
travel time and down time to certain jobs). Ms. Dugas admits
in page 85 of her deposition that other technicians have
arrived at a job site only to find the work already done, and
that they attribute travel time and inspection time to that job
and that these employees are not considered to be falsifying
records.

Mike Miller had a physical impairment that
substantially limited one of his major life activities, working.
A major life activity includes “caring for oneself, performing

11

manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing speaking breathing,
learning and working.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2. Plaintiff was
substantially limited because he was restricted as to the
duration under which he could perform that life activity,
working. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2. This is a substantial limitation
because out of an 84 hour work week, Miller could only work
50 - almost part time under the service emergency.

Put simply, Defendant may not fire Mike Miller
because it perceived him to be disabled regardless of whether _
Plaintiff asked for, or received, an accommodation (the
overtime restriction or the rest on September 21, 1998
because of the chest pains).

Mike Miller may have had no impairment at all but
Defendant treated him as having a substantial limiting
impairment. McInnis v. Alamo Community College Dist., 207
F.3d at 281. Miller clearly demonstrated to the District Court
that his impairments, as perceived by Defendant, were
substantially limiting.

Miller has shown this Court that he made a prima facie
case that he was discriminated against because he was
regarded as disabled and summary judgment at the District
Court level was not merited.

2. Defendant does not have a legitimate
busi gpm sag age

r r 24
work

Unfortunately, once the smoke clears, theré is nothing
left of this defense but a lingering and distasteful smell.

12

Defendant asserts in its motion and supporting
evidence that Defendant fired Plaintiff for violations of the
Code of Business Conduct, specifically that Plaintiff falsified
documents. Plaintiff did not falsify documents. Plaintiff
merely followed company policy with regard to keeping track
of his time.

As a service technician, Plaintiff was required to keep
time reports even though he did not charge actual funds for
jobs. The term “charging time” refers to the time reports, not
to actual billing of clients as no clients are actually billed.
When charging time, employees would begin charging time
to the new job as soon as they completed the old job.
Employees had discretion to charge time for travel, cleaning
the truck and gassing up the vehicle. For instance if Plaintiff
cleaned his truck in the afternoon and gassed it up he would
probably charge the time to the last job of the day even
though Plaintiff had not done any work on that specific job.
All service technicians were instructed as such. Dale Dugas
again agrees with Plaintiff as was evidenced during her
deposition.

Q. Okay. And there are situations from time to
time where a technician will get to a job and
then somebody has already done the work; is
that right? A. On occasions. Q. And they still
attribute the time to travel time and the getting
out and inspecting and checking to see if
there’s something wrong, correct? A. The
time—you’re talking about hours they report?
Q. Yes, ma’am. A. Yes. Q. And you wouldn’t
say they’re falsifying records, are you? A. As
far as the time, no.

Deposition of Dale Dugas, page 85.

13

When Defendant offers the general description of its
time keeping policies for service technicians, Plaintiff is in
compliance. Defendant can offer no evidence that Plaintiff did
not comply with its policies with regard to time keeping other
than the fact that Plaintiff may not actually have repaired the
job at Golden Glade. However, according to the time keeping
policy, Plaintiff is not required to repair the job. Dale Dugas
admitted in her deposition that many factors (i.e., travel,
cleaning the vehicle) go into record keeping. She even
admitted that the technicians had complete discretion as to
which job to attribute it to. Not only did Defendant not have
a legitimate reason to fire Plaintiff, according to Plaintiff's
own supervisor, Plaintiff followed the procedures to a “T”.
At the very least, the issue of whether Plaintiff complied with
company policy regarding time keeping is not a matter of law
but rather a matter of fact for the jury.

In paragraph 6.6 of Mike Miller’s Amended Original
Complaint, he asserted that he was retaliated against for
engaging in a protected activity. Defendant does not dispute
that Miller engaged in a protected activity by seeking
accommodations for his overtime restrictions. In fact, in its
Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant failed to address
Plaintiff's retaliation claims and as such, at the very least, that
claim should have survived for trial before a jury. Mattern v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702 (5" Cir. 1997). As Miller
as shown, supra, he did exhaust his administrative remedies.

Plaintiff has shown this Court that he engaged in
protected activity (by requesting accommodations via
restrictions from his doctor) and that he suffered an adverse
employment action. Webb v. Cardiothoracic Surgery Ass'n.,

14

139 F.3d 532 (5" Cir. 1998). All that is left for Plaintiff to
show is that there was a causal connection between that
protected activity and the adverse employment action. /d.

In establishing the causal link between Plaintiff's
protected activity and Defendant’s adverse employment
action, Plaintiff must simply prove that either a discriminatory
reason more than likely than not motivated Defendant, or by
showing that the proffered legitimate reason is unworthy of
credence. McDaniel v. Temple Indep. Sch. Dist., 770 F.2d
1340 (5" Cir. 1985). The burden of proving the causal link is
much less stringent than proving that Plaintiff's protected
activity was the sole motivating factor for the Defendant’s
adverse employment action. Long v. Eastfield College, 88
F.3d 300(5" Cir. 1996).

The Fifth Circuit has held that the timing of the
protected activity and the bad event or adverse action can be
a significant factor. Mayberry v. Voight Aircraft Co., 55 F.3d
1086 (5 Cir. 1995). Miller engaged in the protected activity
of requesting accommodations by way of overtime restrictions
three weeks after coming back from major heart surgery.
Miller need not show the Court that the protected activity was
the sole motivating factor for the adverse action, but he must
show that “but for” the protected activity, he would not have
been subjected to the adverse employment action. Nowlin v.
Resolution Trust Corp., 33 F.3d 498 (5" Cir. 1994).

4. Inference of Retaliation

On June 12, 2000, the United States Supreme Court
issued its opinion in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products,
Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000). Although Reeves is an age
discrimination case, the method of proof in an age
discrimination case is similar to the method of proof used in

15

a retaliation case arising under the ADA and therefore, a
review of Reeves will be helpful at bar. In Reeves, the
plaintiff successfully sued his employer for age discrimination
after he was terminated from his position as a hinge-
department supervisor in a toilet seat plant. He was 57 years
old at the time and had worked at the plant for 40 years. This
Court vacated the trial court verdict in Reeves’ favor holding
that Reeves did not offer enough proof of an illegal bias. The
Supreme Court overturned the decision because Reeves
introduced enough evidence to show discrimination based on
the prima facie case and evidence to show that the proffered
reason was false. The Supreme Court unanimously held that
a jury can, but is not required, to find intentional
discrimination from a plaintiff’ s prima facie case and evidence
that the proffered reason for terminating the plaintiff was
false.

IV
CONCLUSION

Michael Miller has shown this Court that at least one
if not two important federal questions of law should be, but
have not been decided by this Court and that compelling
reasons exist to do so. Michael Miller has met his prima facie
case of discrimination and retaliation and offered evidence to
rebut the “legitimate” ~ business reason offered by
Southwestern Bell Telephone Company for its actions toward
Michael Miller. Michael Miller respectfully requests that his
Petition for Writ of Certiorari be GRANTED.

Respectfully submitted,

ELLEN SPROVACH

Counsel of Record

Gregg M. Rosenberg & Associates
11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 2810
Houston, Texas 77046

(713) 960-8300

(713) 621-6670 (Facsimile)

of Counsel:
GREGG M. ROSENBERG & ASSOCIATES

ATTORNEYS FOR PETITIONER

17

APPENDIX A

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
' FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 01-21318
Summary Calendar

[riled October 7, 2002]

MICHAEL L. MILLER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.
SOUTHWESTERN BELL

TELEPHONE COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee

Ne NN Nee Nee See”

Appeal from the United States — sirict Court
for the Southern District of Texas
No. H-00-1869 |

Before KING, Chief Judge, and WIENER and PARKER,
Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:”

Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. KR.
47.5.4.

la

OPINION

Plaintiff-Appellant Michael L. Miller appeals from the
district court’s decision granting summary judgment to
Defendant-Appellee Southwestern Bell Telephone Company
(“SWBT”) on Miller’s claims for disability discrimination and
retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42
U.S.C. § 12101 (1994) (“the ADA”) For the reasons set
forth below, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of
summary judgment to SWBT.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff-Appellant Miller is a fifty-three year-old male
who has been employed by SWBT since 1974. Miller began
his career at SWBT as a cable splicer’s helper and, by 1998,
had advanced within the company ranks to the position of
customer service technician, or “CST.” Also by 1998, Miller
had developed a condition called spondylolisthesis, which is
the displacement of vertebrae, as well as arthritis in both of
his knees. In addition to these maladies, Miller suffered from
a heart condition that required surgery in 1994,1996, and
1998.

While working at SWBT, Miller received disciplinary
action from his employer on several occasions. On January
11, 1993, SWBT suspended Miller for one day, with pay, for
shopping at an Academy Store during a period of time in
which he should have been working. In May 1997, SWBT
gave Miller a written reprimand for failing to allot the actual
amount of time he worked on his time report.

The record indicates that Miller’s case of
spondylolisthesis and arthritis of the knees did not impede his
ability to perform in his occupational capacity at SWBT. After

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Fifth Circuit Opinion - 10/7/02

undergoing heart surgery, Miller returned to his CST position
in September 1998. Following his return to work, Miller’s
physician provided Dale Dugas, Miller’s immediate
supervisor, a written note indicating the limitations of Miller’s
post-operation work schedule. According to physician’s
orders, Miller was permitted to work forty hours per week
plus ten hours of overtime without physical restriction, but
only under the condition that Miller received two consecutive
days off per week. When Miller initially returned to work,
Dugas scheduled Miller to work six days (excluding
Sundays), but altered the schedule to allow him to work no
longer than fifty hours with two consecutive days off per
week. Miller concedes that SWBT fully accommodated the
physician’s proposed work schedule.

On November 10, 1998, SWBT fired Miller for
misrepresenting his time reports because, according to SWBT,
he indicated on his reports that he performed work that he
never performed. SWBT eventually replaced Miller with a
fifty-six year-old male. Miller maintains that he did not falsify
his time report on September 21, 1998, but instead designated
the time taken for travel, cleaning, and gassing his vehicle, on
his time report.

On October 21, 1999, Miller filed a charge with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”),
claiming that he was discriminated against on account of his
age and disability. Miller received a right to sue letter from
the EEOC on April 20, 2000. Miller filed the instant action in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Texas on June 5, 2000, alleging, inter alia, (i) that SWBT
violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29
U.S.C. § 621 et seg. (1994) (“ADEA”) because age was a

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Fifth Circuit Opinion - 10/7/02

motivating factor and made a difference in the decision to
replace Miller with a person that was younger and less-
qualified; (2) that SWBT violated the ADA by discriminating
against and treating Miller in a light less favorable than its
non-disabled workers; (3) that SWBT retaliated against Miller
because he had informed SWBT of his disability and asserted
his rights under the ADA; (4) that SWBT acted intentionally
or with reckless disregard to cause Miller severe emotional
distress; and (5) that Miller violated the Fair Labor Standards
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seg. (1994) (“FLSA”).

In response to Miller’s complaint, SWBT moved for
summary judgment on August 31, 2001, arguing (i) that
Miller’s ADA and ADEA claims should be dismissed because
he could not establish a prima facie case of discrimination; (2)
that SWBT had provided a legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason for dismissing Miller; and (3) that Miller could not
show that SWBT’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
his dismissal was a pretext for discrimination. SWBT also
urged summary judgment on Miller’s infliction of emotional
distress claims, asserting that he could not provide evidence
of either severe emotional distress or intentional or reckless
conduct.

In its Memorandum and Order of October 22, 2001,
the district court awarded summary judgment in favor of
SWBT on all claims, finding that Miller had not demonstrated
a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation under either
the ADA or the AEDA, and that he had failed to adduce
evidence of extreme and outrageous conduct supporting the
intentional infliction of emotional distress or FLSA claims.
The district court then dismissed Miller’s case with prejudice.

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Fifth Circuit Opinion - 10/7/02

Miller timely appeals the district court’s grant of
summary judgment on his disability discrimination and
retaliation claims under the ADA.’

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review the district court’s grant of summary
judgment to SWBT de novo, applying the same standards as
the district court. Rivers v. Cent. & S.W. Corp., 186 F.3d
681, 683 (Sth Cir. 1999). Summary judgment is appropriate
if no genuine issue of material fact exists, and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See FED. R.
Civ. P. 56(c). A factual dispute is genuine when a reasonable
jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

The substantive law dictates which facts are material,
Stewart v. Murphy, 174 F.3d 530, 533 (Sth Cir. 1999), and
an issue is material if its resolution could affect the outcome
of the action, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Moreover, in
summary judgment proceedings, the record is considered in
the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Dupre v.
Charter Behav. Health Sys. of Lafayette, Inc., 242 F.3d 610,
613 (Sth Cir. 2001) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-66 (1986). Summary

' This court need not address whether plaintiff raised a
genuine issue of material fact regarding his claims for
discrimination under the ADEA, infliction of emotional distress,
and violation of the FLSA. Miller waived review of these issues by
not incorporating them into the Argument of his Brief. See, e.g.,
Sherrod v. Am. Airlines, 132 F.3d 1112, 1119 n.5 (Sth Cir. 1998)
(citing cases and FED. R. APP. P. 28).

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Fifth Circuit Opinion - 10/7/02

judgment is ultimately appropriate if the non-movant fails to
establish facts supporting an essential element of his prima
facie claim. Mason v. United Air Lines, 274 F.3d 314, 316
(Sth Cir. 2001) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 322 (1986)).

III. MILLER’S ADA CLAIM BASED ON .
REGARDED DISABILITY

The ADA: prohibits discrimination by private
employers against any qualified individual with a disability.
See, e.g., Dupre, 242 F.3d at 613. When claiming
discrimination based on disability, a plaintiff must establish
that: (1) he was disabled; (2) he was none-the-less qualified to
do the job; (3) an adverse employment action was taken
against him; and (4) that he was replaced by or treated less
favorably than non-disabled employees. E.g., id. If a plaintiff
can assert a prima facie case for disability discrimination, the
burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action;
should the employer succeed in doing so, the burden the shifts
back to the plaintiff to establish that the articulated reason was
merely a pretext for discrimination. Mcinnis v. Alamo Cmty.
Coll. Dist., 207 F.3d 276, 282 (Sth Cir. 2000).

An individual qualifies as disabled under the ADA if
he demonstrates: (1) he has a physical or mental impairment
that substantially limited one or more of his major life
activities; (2) he has a record of such impairment; or (3) he is
regarded as having such an impairment. E.g., Aldrup v.
Caldera, 274 F.3d 282, 286 (Sth Cir. 2001); Mcinnis, 207
F.3d at 279-80.

Fifth Circuit Opinion - 10/7/02

When asserting a regarded disability, a plaintiff such
as Miller is required to demonstrate that his employer
mistakenly believed that either (1) he had a physical
impairment that substantially limited one or more major life
activities; or (2) he had an actual, non-limiting impairment
that substantially limits one or more major life activities.
Aldrup, 274 F.3d at 287 (citing Sutton v. United Air Lines,
527 U.S. 471, 489 (1999)). Under each of these scenarios, an
employer must “entertain some misperception regarding the
individual-either that he has a_ substantially limiting»
impairment that he does not have or the impairment is not so
limiting as believed.” /d.

On appeal, Miller insists that his employer regarded
him as suffering a physical impairment that substantially
limited a major life activity. Hence, the key inquiry is
whether SWBT mistakenly perceived that Miller had an
impairment that substantially limited his major life activity of
“working.”? The Supreme Court recently reemphasized that

2 Miller does not argue that SWBT had the mistaken
perception that he had a substantial, non-limiting impairment.

3 The Supreme Court has defined major life activity as
those activities that are “of central importance to daily life.” Toyota
Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 122 S. Ct. 681,
691 (2002). Examples of major life activities include speaking,
breathing, learning, and working. E.g., Aldrup, 274 F.3d at 286.
Throughout this litigation, Miller has asserted only that his major
life activity of working has been implicated. Had Miller. asserted
another major life activity, the analysis on substantial limitation
would be drastically different. Williams, 122 S. Ct. at 693. (“Sutton
did not suggest that a class-based analysis should be applied to any
major life activity other than working.”).

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Fifth Circuit Opinion - 10/7/02

when working is the major life activity under consideration,
the statutory phrase “substantially limits” requires a plaintiff
to allege that he was unable to work in a broad range or class
of jobs, rather than one specific job. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky.,
Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, - - -, 122 S. Ct. 681, 692
(2002) (quoting Sutton, 527 U.S. at 491). Combining the
relevant analytical criteria yields the following standard,
which is directly applicable to the instant case: To
demonstrate that SWBT regarded him as disabled, Miller must
produce evidence that SWBT mistakenly believed that he had
an impairment that made him unable to work in a broad class
or range of jobs, as opposed to one specific job.

In granting summary judgment to SWBT, the district
court determined that Miller had not met the requirements for
being regarded as having a disability. The trial court found
that Miller had not offered sufficient evidence to raise any
inference that SWBT believed that Miller’s Impairments
would substantially limit him in the major life activity of
working. This precluded Miller from successfully asserting
his prima facie case for disability discrimination. The court
also concluded that even had Miller established a prima facie
case, he still would not have been able to advance a viable
claim that SWBT’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reason was
a mere pretext for discrimination. We find it unnecessary to
discuss whether SWBT’s proffered reason was
nondiscriminatory because it is quite clear that Miller did not
fulfill his initial burden of meeting his prima facie case for
disability discrimination.

Miller asserts that he can fulfill his summary judgment
burden by demonstrating that SWBT did regard him as being

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Fifth Circuit Opinion - 10/7/02

disabled prior to his termination.‘ He offers the following
arguments for consideration: that it was only after he returned
from six-week disability leave that SWBT began the process
of dismissing him; that he was substantially limited because
he was restricted as to the duration he could work under the
physician’s orders, and his work schedule was thus cut from
eighty-four hours per week to fifty; and that three weeks afer
his return from disability leave, upon his request for rest and
medication, he was suspended and then fired.

On the other hand, SWBT contends that the summary
judgment evidence established that SWBT did not regard
Miller as having an impairment that substantially limited a
major life activity. SWBT also asserts that an employer
should not be held liable under the ADA for “regarding” an
individual with having a disability where the employer merely
relies upon restrictions placed upon the employee by the

* In his Brief, Miller asserts that he can “clearly meet at
least two” of the factors, i.e., that he had a substantially limiting
physical impairment (actually disabled) and that he was regarded as
such, that would qualify him as disabled. However, he offers no
real support for this contention. The district court recognized that
Miller did not contend that he was actually disabled, but only that
SWBT regarded him as disabled, and therefore did not rule on the
actual disability. Further, on appeal, Miller states that he “may
have had no impairment at all but Defendant treated him as having
a substantial limiting impairment.” Given this statement, it appears
that Miller is not taking his claim of actual disability very seriously;
but in the unlikely circumstance that he were, this argument cannot
be asserted for the first time on appeal since Miller’s initial
argument on the issue was insufficient for the district court to rule
on it. See, e.g., Brown v. Ames, 201 F.3d 654, 663 (Sth Cir.
2000).

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Fifth Circuit Opinion - 10/7/02

employer. It argues further that Miller was allowed to work
as a fully functioning CST without any restrictions beyond
those prescribed by his doctor

Viewing any factual disputes in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, we will assume that all of
Miller’s allegations are true. However, even in the light most
favorable to him, Miller’s contentions fall short of raising a
genuine issue of fact. Initially, Miller fails to adduce evidence
to support a claim that SWBT believed that he was unable to
participate in a broad range of jobs. He does not even appear
to introduce evidence that SWBT believed that he was unable
to participate in one specific job, as he was allowed to
continue working as a CST subsequent to his return from
disability leave. Moreover, Miller’s supervisor Dugas testified
that it was his understanding that Miller had difficulty with his
knees if he squatted for too long and his back hurtifhe sat for _
long periods of time. Miller does not dispute the additional
testimony in which Dugas indicated that these kinds of
complaints were not unusual from members on his crew, and
therefore he did not perceive these physical ailments as
significantly limiting.

The fact that Miller was terminated weeks after his
return and that he was suspended after his request for rest and
medication does not sufficiently establish that SWBT believed
that he was unable to work a broad range of jobs. While his
termination may (merely in a circumstantial sense) indicate
that SWBT believed that he was unable to be employed as a
CST, this .... does not sufficiently raise a genuine issue as to
whether SWBT believed that Miller was unable to work in a
range of occupational positions. See Dupre, 242 F.3d at 616
(denying plaintiff's regarded disability claim even though

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Fifth Circuit Opinion - 10/7/02

defendant fired plaintiff because “an employer does not
necessarily regard an employee as having a substantially
limiting impairment simply because it believes the employee
is incapable of performing a particular job”).

Miller’s assertion that he suffered a substantial
limitation on his ability to work because instead of laboring
for his usual eighty-four hour week, he had to work fifty, is
equally problematic. When evaluating the traditional forty-
hour work week, courts have determined that the inability to
work overtime is not a substantial limitation on the ability to
work under the ADA. E.g., Cotter v. Ajilon Servs., Inc., 287
F.3d 593, 598-99 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing cases); see also
Brennan v. Nat’! Tel. Directory Corp., 850 F. Supp. 331, 343
(E.D. Pa. 1994) (“The inability to work overtime hardly
makes a plaintiff handicapped.”). In addition, this argument
does not address the critical issue of whether Méiller’s
supervisors regarded him as being unable to work a broad
range of jobs. Indeed, the uncontroverted evidence indicates
that Miller’s supervisor believed that he could and would,
despite his physician’s directions, exceed his allotted work
time.

Further, SWBT cannot be considered tc have regarded
Miller as being disabled simply because of its receipt of the
note from Miller’s physician. Significantly, Miller forgets that
the standard for regarded disability hinges on the mistaken
belief of impairment. “[I]f the employer’s belief [about the
employee’s condition] corresponds to the employee’s or his
physician’s description of his limitations, the employer cannot
be viewed as improperly regarding him as disabled.” Eber v.
Harris County Hosp. Dist., 130 F. Supp. 2d 847, 863 (S.D.
Tex. 2001). Even assuming arguendo that this evidence

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Fifth Circuit Opinion - 10/7/02

satisfactorily raises the issue of SWBT’s belief of his
impairment, Miller’s introduction of the doctor’s note is
ultimately counterproductive to his cause because it suggests
hat SWBT was correct, i.e., not mistaken, to assume some
sort of impairment.

Because Miller has not demonstrated that SWBT
regarded his physical condition to substantially limit his
ability to perform the major life activity of working during his
tenure at SWBT, a reasonable jury could not find that he was
qualifiedly disabled. Miller’s failure to introduce facts
supporting this essential element of his prima facie claim of
disability discrimination indicates that the trial court acted
properly in granting summary judgment to SWBT on Miller’s
claim of disability discrimination.

IV. MILLER’S CLAIMS BASED ON RETALIATION

Miller also asserts that he suffered unlawful retaliation
for participating in an act protected by the ADA. On this
claim, we find it important to delve into issues that are more
procedural in nature than those discussed by the district court.
SWBT has asserted both at the trial level and on appeal that
bliller failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to his —
claim for retaliation. Throughout the course of this litigation,
Miller, for reasons unknown to this court, has completely
disregarded this line of argument. Miller’s failure to articulate
some modicum of rebuttal argument on this point proves
injurious to his cause, as the failure to exhaust administrative
remedies serves as an independent basis to affirm summary
judgment. See Randel v. United States Dep’t of Navy, 157
F.3d 392, 395 (Sth Cir. 1998) (stating that a plaintiff asserting

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Fifth Circuit Opinion - 10/7/02

racial discrimination must exhaust his administrative remedies
on the claim before seeking review in federal court).

The trial court did not rule on this issue, instead opting
to evaluate the substantive requirements of Miller’s retaliation
claims, concluding eventually that he failed to raise a genuine
issue of material fact on one element of his prima facie case.
Since we conclude that the district court lacked jurisdiction to
consider Miller’s retaliation claim on the merits, we need not
address the merits.

The jurisdictional problem here relates to the fact that
in the charge Miller filed with the EEOC, he did not check
the box corresponding with “retaliation,” but did so for “age”
and “disability.” From a procedural standpoint, SWBT

argues, Miller only properly raised allegations of intentional
discrimination under the ADA and the ADEA. Citing a
number of cases, SWBT asserts that because the alleged
retaliation in the instant case occurred before Miller filed the
initial EEOC charge, Miller should have exhausted his
administrative remedies on that claim prior to filing.

Given this argument, directly at issue is whether
Miller’s failure to fill in the appropriate box for retaliation,
when he already marked the box for disability and age
discrimination, compels the conclusion that he failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies before filing a lawsuit
under the ADA. A review of this case using the same
standards as the lower court produces the same exact
outcome, but on a dissimilar basis: Summary judgment is
appropriate because Miller failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies on his claim for retaliation.

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Fifth Circuit Opinion - 10/7/02

There are several reasons why we believe this the
correct outcome in this matter. First, the federal anti-
discrimination statutes, most notably, Title VII have
consistently required claimants to fill in the appropriate
corresponding boxes when filing their claim for unlawful
employment action. See, e.g., Price v. Harrah’s Md, Heights
Operating Co., 117 F. Supp. 2d 919, 921-22 (E.D. Mo.
2000) (granting summary judgment on failure to exhaust
administrative remedies grounds for employer because
plaintiff did not check the box for retaliation and did not
specifically allege retaliation in the text of the charge);
McCray v. DPC Indus., Inc., 942 F. Supp. 288, 294 (E.D.
Tex. 1996) (informing that when asserting a claim for
discrimination under Title VII, it is necessary for the
appropriate box be checked in the EEOC claim).° By simply
checking the box corresponding to the alleged basis for
unlawful employment action, a plaintiff sufficiently exhausts
his administrative remedies prior to a Title VII lawsuit. See,
€.g., id.

° It is well-established that summary judgment may be

granted against a non-movant solely on the basis of failure to
exhaust administrative remedies. E.g., Inst. for Tech. Dev. v.
Brown, 63 F.3d 445, 447 (Sth Cir. 1995). The Supreme Court has
held that a plaintiff may not bring claims in a lawsuit that were not
included in the filed EEOC charge. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
_ Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974). This requirement serves to enhance
the administrative enforcement process by ensuring that the EEOC
can conduct a full investigation while also providing the employer
with advanced notice of the claim and an opportunity to resolve the
dispute. See Harper v. Godfrey Co., 45 F.3d 143, 148 (7th Cir.
1995).

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Fifth Circuit Opinion - 10/7/02

Second, the same procedural requirements for Title
VII have been interpreted to apply to EEOC charges filed
under the ADA as well. This court has also held that the ADA
incorporates by reference the administrative procedural
requisites found in Title VII, Dao v. Auchan Hypermarket, 96
F.3d 787, 789 (Sth Cir. 1996), and that adherence to these
prerequisites is necessary: prior to commencing an ADA
action in federal court against an employer, id.Although this
court has not addressed the issue of whether an ADA case cab
be dismissed for failure to fill in the appropriate box, other
courts encountering this issue support the granting of
summary judgment. See, e.g., Talbot v. U.S. Foodservice,
Inc., 191 F. Supp. 2d 637, 640 (D. Md. 2002) (“Where a
litigant has neither checked the box for discrimination, nor
mentioned disability discrimination or the ADA anywhere in
his charge of discrimination, the EEOC cannot reasonably
have been expected to have investigated disability
discrimination.”); cases cited infra. Hence, the “box filling”
requirement cited by SWBT appears to arise in the ADA
context as well as the Title VII context.

Third, one of our sister circuits has indicated that in
the ADA context, a plaintiff's failure to fill in the appropriate
box in the filed charge, coupled with the inability to describe
the general nature of the claim in the narrative section of the
charge, forms a sufficient basis for summary judgment. The
Seventh Circuit decided that when a plaintiff fails to mark the
appropriate box for “retaliation” but continues to seek relief
for disability discrimination and retaliation, the plaintiff has
nevertheless failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as
to the retaliation claim. Cable v. Ivy Tech State College, 200

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Fifth Circuit Opinion - 10/7/02

F.3d 467, 477 (7th Cir. 1999).° The Cable court observed that
the body of the plaintiff's EEOC charge did not even “hint at
retaliation, much less develop [a] factual basis for the claim.”
Id. Even when viewed in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, the statement of discrimination did not implicate the
behavior that plaintiff asserted to be the basis of his retaliation
claim. Jd. The Seventh Circuit deemed the plaintiff's narrative
to have given insufficient indication to the EEOC or the
employer that he was also seeking redress for unlawful
retaliation. Jd.

In affirming summary judgment on plaintiff's
retaliation claim, the Cable court found that there was no
indication from the EEOC charge boxes, narrative, or
supplemental material that the plaintiff sought redress for the
retaliation claim, or even, for the matter, that the alleged
retaliation “was like or reasonably related to” his statutory
rights stemming from the ADA. Id.; see also Thompson v. KN
Energy, Inc., 177 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1254-55 (D. Kan.
2001)(granting summary judgment against plaintiff for failing
to exhaust administrative remedies under the ADA when
marked boxes for “sex” and “disability” but not
“retaliation”). The similarity between Cable and the instant —
case is marked, particularly with the absence of narrative or
other supplemental EEOC materials indicating that Miller was
seeking redress for unlawful retaliation, The information, or

® In his EEOC charge, Cable checked the “Other” box
only, but did not write in the narrative portion of the claim that he
was discriminated against on the basis of his disability.

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lack thereof,’ included on Miller’s filed EEOC charge creates
a strong presumption in favor of a finding of failure to
exhaust administrative remedies.

Further compounding the difficulty for Miller is the
timing of the alleged retaliation and his filing of the
complaint. Miller would be able to file a supplemental or
additional charge if the retaliation claim, in the parlance of
this court, “grow[s] out” of his claims for disability. Gupta v.
E. Tex. State Univ., 654 F.2d 411, 414 (Sth Cir. Unit A Aug.
1981). SWBT is correct to emphasize that the alleged adverse
employment action prompting Miller’s claim for retaliation
occurred prior to the filing of his discrimination charge. Since

7 The entirety of Miller’s narrative reads as follows:

I. On or about November 10, 1998, I was discharged
from the position of Customer Services
Technician. Respondent is public telephone
system.

Il. On or about November 10, 1998, Ernie Carey,
Division Manager, Installation and Repair,
informed me that I was discharged for allegedly
falsifying a time report and a form called 6218,
trouble ticket.

Il. I believe that I was discriminated against because
of my age, 48, in violation of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967.

Worth noting is that there was no continuation sheet for this
narrative filed, nor a supplemental document of any kind in the trial
record.

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Fifth Circuit Opinion - 10/7/02

the alleged retaliation occurred prior to his filing of the
complaint, Miller was well aware of the conduct and actions
that would give rise to his claim of retaliation under the ADA.
Given these factual circumstances, Miller’s retaliation cause
of action would not fall under the Gupta exception; thus he is
precluded from filing a new EEOC charge based on disability.
See id.

Despite the trial court’s disregard of this issue, SWBT
persisted in its failure to exhaust administrative remedies
argument. This court concludes that because Miller did not
check the check the correct box on the EEOC complaint form
or otherwise disclose his retaliation claim and thereby exhaust
its administrative remedies, he is procedurally precluded from
asserting a retaliation claim under the ADA.

V.CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment
of the district court.

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APPENDIX B

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
CIVIL ACTION NO. H-00-1869

[Filed November 20, 2001]

MICHAEL L. MILLER,
Plaintiff,

V.

SOUTHWESTERN BELL
TELEPHONE CO.,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Defendant. )
)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Plaintiff Michael Miller (“Miller”) moves for
Rehearing and Reconsideration of Summary Judgment (Entry
#36) entered on behalf of Defendant. See Final Judgment
(Entry #35). Miller maintains that entry of Judgment in favor
of Defendant Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. (“ SWBT”)
was improper, as genuine issues of material fact were
presented indicating that SWBT discriminated against Miller
because he was regarded as disabled; and, that SWBT
retaliated against Miller. See Plaintiff's Motion for Rehearing
and Reconsideration (Entry #36). The Court, having reviewed

19a

the motion, finds that it lacks merit, as it fails to persuade that
the Court erred in finding that Miller failed to show that
genuine issues of material fact existed because among other
things, he did not demonstrate that his impairments were
perceived, by SWBT, as substantially limiting, see McGinnis
v. Alamo Community College Dist., 207 F.3d 276, 281
(S"Cir. 2000); Deas v. River West, L.P., 152 F.3d 471,476
n.10 (5 Cir. 1998); or, that Miller suffered an adverse
employment action causally connected to a protected activity
and, therefore, suffered retaliation. See McKennon v.
Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 513 U.S. 352, 359-60
(1995); Chaney v. New Orleans Public Facility Management,
179 F.3d 164, 168 (5" Cir. 1999). It is, therefore,

ORDERED that Miller’s Motion for Reconsideration
and Rehearing (Entry #36) is DENIED.

The Clerk of Court shall file this Memorandum and
Order and provide the parties a true copy.

SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on this the 19" day of
November, 2001.

/s/
Calvin Botley
| United States Magistrate Judge

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APPENDIX C

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION |

CIVIL ACTION NO. H-00-1869

[Filed October 24, 2001]

MICHAEL L. MILLER,
Plaintiff,

V.

SOUTHWESTERN BELL
TELEPHONE CoO.,
Defendant.

Ne eee eee ee ee”

FINAL JUDGMENT

Following this Court’s review of this matter, as recited
in the Memorandum and Order (Entry #31) and for the
reasons set forth therein, it is

ORDERED that Defendant Southwestern Bell
Telephone Co.’s (“SWBT”) Motion for Summary Judgment
(Entry #24) is GRANTED. Further, it is

2la

ORDERED that summary judgment is entered in
SWBT’s favor and this matter is DISMISSED with prejudice
from the dockets of this Court.

The Clerk of Court shall file this Final Judgment and
provide the parties with a true copy.

SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on this the 22nd day of
October, 2001.

/s/
Calvin Botley
United States Magistrate Judge

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APPENDIX D

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
CIVIL ACTION NO. H-00-1869

[Filed October 24, 2001]

MICHAEL L. MILLER,
Plaintiff,

V.

SOUTHWESTERN BELL
TELEPHONE Co.,
Defendant.

i A i a a a

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Defendant Southwestern Bell Telephone Company
(“SWBT”) moves, pursuant to Rule 56(c), Fed. R. Cir, P.,
for summary dismissal of Plaintiff Michael L. Miller’s
(“Miller”) employment discrimination lawsuit, in which
Miller alleges that SWBT is culpable for intentional infliction
of emotional distress, retaliation and violations of the ©
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) at 42 U.S.C. §
12102,*et seq., the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29
U.S.C. § 216, et seq., and the Age Discrimination in

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District Court Memorandum and Order - 10/24/01

Employment Act (“ADEA”) at 29 U.S.C.§ 621, ef seq. See
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Entry #24) and
Reply to Plaintiff's Response to Motion for Summary
Judgment (Entry #30). SWBT maintains that Miller has failed
to establish a prima facie case of age or disability
discrimination and has no viable claims for retaliation or
FLSA violations. See id. Miller contends that summary
judgment would be improper as SWBT’s attempts to articulate
legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for terminating his
employment are a mere pretext for its actual discriminatory
motives and, accordingly, requests that Defendant’s Motion
for Summary Judgment (Entry #24) be denied. See Plaintiff's
Response to Motion for Summary Judgment (Entries #25 and
#27).

BACKGROUND

Miller, a fifty-three (53) year old male, began working
for SWBT as a cable splicer’s helper in March of 1974. By
1998, Miller had advanced with the company to the position
of customer service technician (“cst”) and developed
spondylolisthesis,” arthritis in both knees and a heart
condition, requiring surgery in 1994, 1996 and 1998. See
Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint (Entry #17); affidavit of .
Miller (Entry #27). On January 11, 1993, Miller was

! Michael L. Miller’s affidavit in support of his Response
to Motion for Summary Judgment (Entry #25) was submitted and
filed as Entry #27, but on occasion may be referred to herein as if
it were incorporated with the Response to Motion for Summary
Judgment, as Entry #25.

2 the displacement of a vertebrae.

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suspended from work one day, with pay, for shopping at an
Academy Store during a period of time he was to be working.
-See Miller deposition at p. 56, Exhibit B, Defendant’s Motion
for Summary Judgment (Entry #24). In May of 1997, Miller
was given a written reprimand for failing to allot the actual
amount of time he worked on his time report. See affidavit of
Dale Dugas at para. 9, Exhibit C, Defendant’s Motion for

Summary Judgment (Entry #24).

Miller’s spondylolisthesis and arthritis of the knees did
not impede his ability to perform his job at SWBT. See
deposition of Miller at pp. 146-147, Exhibit B, Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment (Entry #24). In September of
1998, however, Miller returned to his cst position at SWBT,
after undergoing heart surgery. See deposition of Dale Dugas
at pp. 98-99, Exhibit B, Plaintiff's Response to Motion for
Summary Judgment (Entry #25); affidavit of Dale Dugas at
para. 3, Exhibit C, Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (Entry #24). Following his return to work, Miller’s
physician provided Dale Dugas (“Dugas”), Miller’s
immediate supervisor, a written note indicating that Miller
was able to work fifty hours per week (including ten hours of
overtime) with no physical restrictions, if Miller was allowed
two consecutive days off. See affidavit of Miller at para. 4
(Entry #27). During a service emergency that followed shortly
thereafter, Miller requested that he be allowed to work
Sunday thru Friday, having Friday and Saturday off, rather
than the customary twelve hour shifts, seven days per week
that csts were required to work during emergencies. See
affidavit of Miller at para. 5-6 (Entry #27). SWBT surmises
that Miller sought to work on Sundays because that was a pay
differential day, mandating pay at overtime computations. See
affidavit of Dale Dugas, Exhibit C, Motion for Summary

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Judgment (Entry #24). Initially, Dugas scheduled Miller to
work six days (excluding Sundays) per week, but altered the
schedule allowing him to work no longer than fifty hours per
week with two consecutive days off. See deposition of Miller
at pp. 149-150, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment
(Entry #24). Miller concedes SWBT fully accommodated his
physician’s request to limit his work schedule to more than
fifty hours (including ten hours overtime) with two
consecutive days off.’

Miller was fired by SWBT on November 10, 1998, for
indicating on time reports that he performed work (i.e., drop :
cut - two pair) that he did not perform. See affidavit of Dugas ;
at paras. 5-8, Exhibit C, Defendant's Motion for Summary é
Judgment (Entry #24); affidavit of David M. Mehaffey
(“Mehaffey”), id. at Exhibit D; see also written and
mechanized time reports at pp. 135-136, 141-148, attached to
affidavit of Claire Milliken (“Milliken”), SWBT Senior
Human Resources Manager, Exhibit E, Defendant’s Motion
for Summary Judgment (Entry #24). SWBT replaced Miller
with a fifty-six (56) year old male. See affidavit of Dugas at
para. 11, Exhibit C, Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment (Entry #24). Miller maintains that he did not falsify
his time report on September 21, 1998, but attributed the time -
taken for travel, cleaning and gassing his vehicle, to his time

3 Miller does not appear to urge that SWBT did not

comply with his physician’s suggested limitations of his work, but
rather is contending that SWBT’s refusal to allow him to work on
Sundays like the other technicians, was discriminatory. See Miller’s
deposition at pp. 149-150, Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment (Entry #24); see also Miller’s affidavit, para. 6, Entry
#27.

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District Court Memorandum and Order - 10/24/01

report. See affidavit of Miller at para. 10, Entry #27. On
October 21, 1999, Miller filed a charge with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, contending that he
was discriminated against because of his age and disability.
See EEOC Charge at p. 3, Exhibit I, Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment (Entry #24). Miller received his right to
sue letter from the EEOC on April 20, 2000. See id. at p. 2.
On June 5, 2000, Miller filed his lawsuit, invoking the
Court’s jurisdiction, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1331.‘

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Motion for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. See Celotex Corp v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317,322 (1986); see also Fed. R. Cir. P. 56(c). A
factual dispute is “genuine” when a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); see also PYCA
Industries, Inc. v. Harrison County Waste Water Management
District, 177 F.3d 351,361 (Sth Cir. 1999). The substantive
law dictates which facts are material. See Stewart v. Murphy,

-174 F.3d 530, 533 (Sth Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 906
(1999); Duplantis v. Shell Offshore, Inc., 948 F.2d 187, 189
(Sth Cir. 1991). An issue is material if its resolution could
affect the outcome of the action. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby

‘ The parties consented to trial before a magistrate judge,
in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636, the Cost and Delay Reduction
Plan under the Civil Justice Reform Act and Rule 72, Fed.R. Cir.
P. See Consent (Entry #16)

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District Court Memorandum and Order - 10/24/01

Inc., 477 U.S. at 248. Facts may be gleaned from reviewing
the pleadings, answers to interrogatories, admissions and
affidavits on File. See Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d
1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994)(en banc). In deciding whether a
fact issue has been created, the facts and any inferences to be
drawn from them, must be viewed in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party, and questions of law are reviewed de
novo. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods. Inc., 530
U.S. 133,, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 2110 (2000); Merritt-Carnpbell,
Inc. v. RxP Prods. Inc., 164 F.3d 957,961 (Sth Cir. 1999);
Horton v. City of Houston, 179 F.3d 188, 191 (Sth Cir.
1999). If the summary judgment motion is properly
supported, the nonmovant may not rest on mere allegations or
denials, but must set forth specific and supported material
facts, of significant probative value, establishing that there
exists a genuine issue of material fact. See Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,586 (1986);
Hamilton v. Seque Software Inc., 232 F.3d 473, 477 (Sth Cir.
2000); Union Planters National Leasing Inc. v. Woods, 687
F.2d 117, 119 (Sth Cir. 1992).

DISCUSSION
I. The Fair Labor Standards Claim

Miller does not dispute SWBT’s claim that he has
failed to state a viable claim in alleging that SWBT has
violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) by
terminating his employment with the company. Despite
Miller’s allegation that SWBT is culpable for FLSA
violations, Miller now contends that he is not asserting such
claims. See First Amended Complaint, para. 1.3 (Entry #17);
but contra. Plaintiff's Response to Motion for Summary

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ARERR ATO

DRESS OL IE LE ANIC ert

District Court Memorandum and Order - 10/24/01

Judgment (Entry #25) at p. 1. Miller has failed to satisfy his
burden of proving the FLSA violations, as plead. Samson v.
Apollo Resources, Inc., 242 F.3d 629, 636 (Sth Cir. 2001).
It is, therefore, determined that there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact with respect to Miller’s allegation of
FLSA violations and, accordingly, summary judgment as to
this claim is proper.

II. The Discriminatiou Claims :
A. Alleged Violations of the Americans With Disabilities Act
(ADA)

The Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”)
prohibits discrimination to ensure that individuals are not
denied jobs or other benefits because of the prejudiced
attitudes or the ignorance of others toward individuals
perceived to be disabled. See Deas v. River West, L.P., 152
F.3d 471,482 (5th Cir. 1998), quoting School Bd. of Nassau
County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 107 S.Ct. 1123, 1129
(1987). Miller maintains that he was terminated by SWBT,
despite the fact that SWBT regarded him as disabled and that
SWBT’s conduct was in violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act. See Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint
(Entry #17). SWBT seeks summary judgment, contending that
Miller had no disability, was not terminated because of any
disability and, accordingly, can make no prima facie case of
discrimination under the ADA. Further, SWBT maintains that
its belief that Miller falsified time reports, in violation of its
Code of Business- Conduct, applicable to all SWBT
employees, provided SWBT with a_ legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for firing Miller, for which Miller
is unable to establish pretext. See Defendant’s Motion for

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Summary Judgment (Entry #24) and Reply to Plaintiff’ s
Response to Motion for Summary Judgment (Entry #30); see
also affidavit of Milliken at paras. 2-3, Exhibit E,
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Entry #24).

(i) The Prima Facie Case

To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under
the ADA, Miller must demonstrate that 1) he is disabled or is
regarded as disabled; 2) that he is qualified for the job; 3) that
he was subjected to an adverse employment action on account
of his disability or perceived disability; and 4) that he was
replaced by or treateded less favorably than non-disabled
employees. See McInnis v. Alamo Community College Dist.,
207 F.3d 276, 279-280 (Sth Cir. 2000); Burch v. Coca-Cola
Co., 119 F.3d 305, 320 (Sth Cir. 1997), cert. denied 522
U.S. 1084 (1998). If Miller is able to establish a prima facie
case, the burden shifts to SWBT to articulate a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action;
and, if successful, the burden then shifts back to Miller to
establish by sufficient evidence that the articulated reason was
merely a pretext for unlawful discrimination. See id., citing
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
Miller must first establish that he is disabled or, was regarded
by SWBT as being disabled. See McInnis v. Aiamo
Community College Dist., id at 280; Sherrod v. American
Airlines, Inc., 132 F.3d 1112, 1119 (Sth Cir. 1998), quoting
Bridges v. City of Bossier, 92 F.3d 329, 332 (Sth cir. 1996),
cert. denied, _ U.S. _, 117 S.Ct. 770 (1997).

The ADA defines the term “qualified individual with

a disability” as someone who has a disability, but who, “with
or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the

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6 LPL EIN I RR oy ape

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RARE edad icra

District Court Memorandum and Order - 10/24/01

essential functions of the employment position that such
individual holds or desires.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8); Giles v.
General Elec. Co., 245 F.3d 474,483 (Sth Cir. 2001). SWBT
does not dispute that Miller was qualified for his position or
that he suffered a negative employment action when
terminated. See Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment
(Entry #24). SWBT, however, denies that Miller was disabled
or regarded as disabled, and that if Miller were to be found
disabled, that the disability in anyway was a factor in his
termination. Jd. The ADA definition of “disability,” with
respect to an individual, means

(A) a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of the major
life activities of such individual;

(B) a record of such an impairment, or

(C) being regarded as having such an
impairment.

42 U.S.C. § 12102(2); see also Albertsons, Inc. v.
Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. _, 119 S.Ct. 2162, 2167 (1999).

SWBT does not dispute that Miller’s back condition
(spondylolisthesis), arthritis of the knees and heart condition
constituted physical impairments, i.e., “a condition affecting
one or more of the ... body systems...” See Albertsons, Inc.
v. Kirkingburg, id.; 29 C.F.R § 1630.2(h)(1). SWBT
maintains, however, that Miller’s impairments do not
substantially limit one or more of his major life activities and,
accordingly, fail to rise to the level of “disabilities.”
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Entry #24).

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District Court Memorandum and Order - I 0/24/01

SWBT points out that Miller returned from his heart surgery,
in September of 1998, with no restrictions on his physical
abilities to perform work, but merely with some limitations as
to the overtime his physician recommended he perform. See
id, deposition of Miller at pp. 136-140, 169, Exhibit B.
Furthermore, SWBT argues that Miller concedes that his
physical impairments did not limit his ability to perform his
job, see id. at pp. 138-140, 146-47; and, that in seeking a
transfer to a technician’s position in February of 1998, Miller
indicated on the Job Vacancy Request, that he was not
disabled and required no accommodations. See Job Vacancy
Request, Exhibit F-3, Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (Entry #24). Miller maintains, in rebuttal, that
although he had no physical impairment that substantially
limited one or more of his major life activities, he was
regarded by SWBT as having such an impairment, and that
this is evidenced by Dugas’ acknowledgment that Miller
returned from ‘disability leave’ in September of 1998, and
that Dugas noticed Miller would tire when putting in overtime
hours. See Plaintiff's Response to Motion for Summary
Judgment at at pp. 7-9 (Entry #25); see also affidavit of Dale
Dugas at paras. 3-4, Exhibit C, Defendant’s Motion for

Summary Judgment (Entry #24).

“A major life activity” includes “caring for oneself,
performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking,
breathing, learning, and working.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2. The
regulation further provides that an individual is “substantially
limited” in a major life activity if he is:

(i) [uJnable to perform a major life

activity that the average person in the
general population can perform; or

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(ii) — [s]ignificantly restricted as to the
condition, manner, or duration under
which an individual can perform a
particular major life activity as
compared to the condition, manner, or
duration under which the average
person in the general population can
perform that same major life activity.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2

Miller is not arguing that he was actually disabled but, merely
regarded as disabled by SWBT. See Plaintiff's Response to
Motion for Summary Judgment at pp. 7-9 (Entry #25). To
determine, in this instance, whether Miller was regarded as
having a disability by SWBT, Miller has the burden of
establishing that he 1) has a physical or mental impairment
that does not substantially limit major life activities, but was
treated as such by SWBT; 2) has a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life
activities, but only because of the attitudes of others toward
the impairment; or 3) has no actual impairment at all, but be
treated by an employer as having a substantially limiting
impairment. See McGinnis v. Alamo Community College
Dist., 207 F.3d at 281. Further, Miller must demonstrate that
his impairments, if they existed as perceived, would be
substantially limiting. See id.; Deas v. River West, L.P., 152
F.3d at 476 (Sth Cir. 1998).

Miller has adduced evidence indicating that he was off
of work from July thru September, 1998, following an alcohol
septal reduction surgical procedure to correct a physical
impairment of his heart. See Exhibit A-3, Plaintiff's Response
to Motion for Summary Judgment (Entry #25). Further, the

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deposition testimony of Dale Dugas indicates that as his direct
supervisor she was aware of Miller’s heart impairment and
that he had some difficulty with his knees and back. See id.,
pp. 12-14, deposition of Dugas, Exhibit B. Miller, however,
has not offered sufficient evidence to raise any inference that
SWBT believed that Miller, because of his impairments,
either singly or cumulatively, was either unable to perform a
major life activity expected of the average person, or that he
was significantly restricted as to the manner in which he could
perform a major life activity. In other words, Miller has failed
to demonstrate that his impairments, as perceived by SWBT,
would be substantially limiting. Miller, himself, has testified
that his physical impairments did not limit his ability to
perform his job. See deposition of Miller at pp. 138, 14647,
Exhibit B, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Entry
#24). Further, Miller indicates that his physician’s only
limitation as to the manner he performed his job, was to limit
the amount of time in excess of the average work week, to ten
hours and to allow two consecutive days off. See id. at pp.
136-40, 169; see also affidavit of Miller at para. 4 (Entry
#27). Miller offers nothing indicating that he was limited by
his physician or by his impairments in any major life activity.
More importantly, Miller fails to demonstrate that SWBT
believed that he was substantially limited in the manner he
could perform his job or any other major life activity. Dugas
testified that it was her understanding that Miller had
difficulty with his knees if he squatted for too long, and his
back hurt if he sat for long periods of time. Dugas also
indicated, however, that these were not unusual complaints
from individuals on her crew, and she did not testify that she
viewed these physical ailments as significantly limiting. See
deposition of Dugas at p. 14, Exhibit B, Plaintiff's Response
to Motion for Summary Judgment (Entry #25). The evidence

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District Court Memorandum and Order - 10/24/01

indicates that Dugas, in fact, felt that Miller could and would,
despite his physician’s directions, exceed the work time
allotted Miller. See id. at paras. 3 and 4, affidavit of Dugas,
- Exhibit C. SWBT’s absence of a belief that Miller was
substantially limited in a major life activity is further
bolstered by his indicating, on a job transfer request, that he
was not disabled and requested no accommodations. See id.,
Exhibit F-3. Miller’s argument that Dugas perceived him to
be disabled because she referred to his leave for surgery and
recuperation as, “disability” leave, is specious at best, when
at most Dugas’ statement merely indicates that she was
mistaken as to the type of leave he was on, as is evinced by
Miller’s use of both the terms, “medical” and “disability,”
when describing his leave. See affidavit of Miller at para. 3
(Entry #27). Dugas’ use of the phrase disability leave, without
more, does not infer that she believed Miller to be disabled.

Miller’s failure to establish that his impairments were
believed by SWBT to be significantly limiting, does not
demonstrate that SWBT regarded him as disabled. See
McGinnis v. Alamo Community College Dist., 207 F.3d at
281; Deas v. River West, L.P., 152 F.3d at 476, n. 10. Miller
has, therefore, failed to make a prima facie showing that he
was discriminated against by SWBT because he was regarded
as disabled and, accordingly, summary judgment as to this
issue is merited.

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District Court Memorandum and Order - 10/24/01

(ii) Defendant’s Articulation of a Legitimate,
Non-Discriminatory Reason For its
Employment Action

If Miller had established a prima facie case, he would
have created a presumption that SWBT discriminated against
him in violation of the ADA. See St. Mary’s Honor Center v.
Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 525 (1993); Texas Dept. of Community
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981); Bauer v.
Albemarle, 169 F.3d 962,966 (Sth Cir. 1999). SWBT, in
facing the prima facie case, would then have the burden of
rebutting the presumption by articulating a legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason that motivated its decision to
terminate Miller. See id.; Haynes v. Pennzoil Co., 207 F.3d
296, 300 (Sth Cir. 2000). The Defendant’s burden, however,
is one of production only and not of persuasion. See Texas
Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 25556;
Evans v. City of Bishop, 238 F.3d 586, 590 (5th Cir. 2000).

SWBT contends that it terminated Méiller’s
employment because Miller falsely reported on a time report
that he performed work on a customer account that he did not
perform. Further, SWBT maintains that the false report of
work performed is in violation of the employer’s internal
regulations for all employees. See affidavits of Dugas,
Mehaffey and Milliken, Exhibits C, D and E, Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment (Entry #25). SWBT’s
explanation for terminating Miller’s employment, satisfies
SWBT’s burden to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for its actions. See id.; Meinecke v. H & R Block, 66
F.3d 77, 83 (Sth Cir. 1995).

District Court Memorandum and Order - 10/24/01

(iii) Plaintiff's Claim that Defendant’s Reasons are a
Mere Pretext for Discriminatory Motives

A prima facie showing by Miller, would have allowed
him to establish that SWBT’s articulated reasons for his
termination, are a mere pretext for discriminatory conduct.
See Russell v. McKinney Hospital Venture, 235 F.3d 219,
222-23 (Sth Cir. 2000). Miller contends that he did not falsify
any reports and that, with respect to the September 21, 1998
incident that generated his termination, he merely charged his
travel time and the time needed to clean and gas his vehicle to
the disputed account.’ See affidavit of Miller at paras. 8-11
(Entry #27. Miller maintains that such time reporting is
customary with SWBT csts. /d. at para. 9-10. Miller,
however, was not terminated by SWBT for charging his travel
and gas time to the customer account, but was fired for
claiming that he performed work (i.e., drop cut - 2 pair) that
he did not perform. See Time Report at Exhibit E, bate stamp
number 135; see also affidavits of Dugas, Mehaffey and
Milliken at Exhibits C, D and E, Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment (Entry #25). In light of previous similar
infractions by Miller, SWBT’s belief that he made false
reports on the September, 1998 time record, would not prove
unreasonable. Miller’s claim that SWBT’s advanced reason
for terminating him, i.e., the falsifying of the job performed
on a time report, is a mere pretext for discrimination would
not, therefore, be persuasive if Miller had established a prima
facie case.

° The time charged by Miller to the customer account is
not utilized as a billing item, but is merely a time report, utilized by
SWBT to account for the time of its csts. See Miller affidavit at
para. 8 (Entry #27).

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B. Alleged Violations of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA)

The same burden-shifting framework advanced by
McDonnell Douglas, as discussed with respect to Miller's
ADA claim, is utilized to demonstrate his claims of violations
of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) at
29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq. Miller must first establish a prima
facie case of age discrimination. SWBT must then respond by
producing a legitimate, non-discriminatory rationale for its
decision. Once SWBT offers a legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason for Miller’s termination, the burden shifts back to
Miller to “raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
the employer’s proffered reason was merely a pretext for age
discrimination.” Medina v. Ramsey Steel Co., Inc., 238 F.3d
674, 680 (Sth Cir. 2001). “[A] plaintiff's prima facie case,
combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer’s
asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to
conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated.” Reeves
v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148
(2000). If Miller is able to show that SBWT’s justification for
its employment decision is mere pretext for discriminatory
conduct, that showing, together with Miller’s prima facie
demonstration, will be sufficient to survive summary
judgment as to the claim of age discrimination. /d. at 142-43;
see also Auguster v. Vermilion Parish School Bd, 249 F.3d
400, 402 (Sth Cir. 2001); Russell v. McKinney Hospital
Venture, 235 F.3d at 222-23.

(i) The Prima Facie Case

In order to establish a prima facie case for age
discrimination, Miller must show that 1) he was in the

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protected class, i.e., over 40 years of age; 2) he was qualified
for the position; 3) that he suffered an adverse employment
action; and, 4) that his replacement was under forty years of
age. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. at
142; Holtzclaw v, DSC Communications Corp., 255 F.3d
254, 260 (Sth Cir. 2001); Evans v. City of Bishop, 238 F.3d
at 590. SWBT concedes that Miller was over the age of forty,
that he was qualified for his position, and that he was fired,
thereby, suffering an adverse employment action. See
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Entry #24).
SWBT maintains, however, that Miller is unable to establish
that he was replaced by a younger individual. Jd.

Miller admits that he does not actually know who
replaced him. See id., Miller deposition at p. 141, Exhibit B.
SWBT contends that it replaced Miller with Jim Osteen. See
id., affidavit of Dugas at para. 11, Exhibit C. Miller does not
dispute that he was replaced by Jim Osteen. See Miller
deposition, Jd. SWBT maintains that when Osteen replaced
Miller, Osteen was fifty-six (56) years old and Miller does not
refute this. See id., Miller deposition at p. 141. Miller is,
therefore, unable to establish that he was replaced by a
younger individual and, accordingly, is unable to demonstrate
a prima facie case of age discrimination. Evans v. City of
Bishop, id.

(ti) Defendant’s Legitimate, Non-Discriminatory
Reason and Lack of Pretext

If Miller were able to establish a prima facie case of
discriminatory conduct violative of the ADEA, his allegations
would fail for the same reasons advanced in the discussion of
SWBT’s articulation of a legitimate and non-discriminatory

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reason for its actions and Miller’s failure to establish pretext
as to his claims of disability discrimination. Méiller’s
allegation of age discrimination is, therefore, as susceptible to
summary judgment as is his ADA discrimination claim.

Ill. The Retaliation Claim

Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to retaliate
against an employee for opposing an unlawful employment
practice. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); see also Mato v.
Baldauf, C.A. 00-50522, slip op. 91, 96 (Sth Cir. October 9,
2001). In order for Miller to prevail on his retaliation claim,
he must establish that he engaged in activity protected by Title
VII, that SWBT took adverse employment against him, and
that a causal connection exists between the protected activity
and the adverse action, /d.; Holtzclaw v. DSC
Communications Corp., 255 F.3d at 259. Miller maintains
that the protected activity he engaged in was seeking an
accommodation from SWBT as to his claimed disability, and
that SWBT fired him for seeking the accommodation. See
para. 1.2 and 6.6, Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint (Entry --
#17); Plaintiff's Response to Motion for Summary Judgment
(Entry #25). SWBT does not dispute that seeking an
accommodation for disability is protected activity.° Further,
SWBT’s termination of Miller’s employment is the adverse
consequence contemplated by Title VII. See Walker v.
Thompson, 214 F.3d 615,628-29 (Sth Cir. 2000); Mattern v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707 (Sth Cir. 1997).

6 SWBT also claims that Miller failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies because he did not claim retaliation when
filing his EEOC Charge. See Defendant’s Reply to Plaintiff's
Response to Motion for Summary Judgment (Entry #30).

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Miller, however, has failed to establish a causal nexus
between his seeking an accommodation for his physical
condition and SWBT’s termination of his employment. As has
been discussed, SWBT has articulated a legitimate, non-
discriminatory motive for dismissing Miller that would have
successfully rebutted the presumption of a prima facie case of
discrimination, had Miller established such a case. Further,
each relevant decision maker has averred that Miller’s
dismissal was not the result of seeking an accommodation, but
his employment was terminated due to misconduct. See
affidavits of Dugas, Mehaffey and Milliken, Exhibits C, D
and E, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Entry
#24). Additionally, Miller testified that the only post-surgical
accommodation Miller’s physician sought was that Miller be
given two consecutive days per work week off, and SWBT
accommodated that request. See deposition of Miller at pp.
139-140, Exhibit B, Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (Entry #24). Miller, not his doctor, requested that
one of his day’s off not include a Sunday and, accordingly,
being allowed to work on a Sunday was not an
accommodation that would have assisted Miller, in light of his
physical condition, to perform his job. As the probative
evidence does not establish that Miller suffered an adverse
employment action causally connected to a protected activity,
Miller’s claim of retaliation is unable to survive summary
dismissal. See McKenon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co.,
513 U.S. 352, 359-60 (1995); Chaney v. New Orleans Public
Facility Management, 179 F.3d 164, 168 (Sth Cir. 1999).

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IV. The Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Claim

Miller seeks damages for SWBT’s alleged tortious
intentional infliction of emotional distress. See First Amended
Complaint at paras. 6.7-6.9 (Entry #17). In Texas, an
employee must prove the following elements to establish
intentional infliction of emotional distress, that 1) the
employer acted intentionally or recklessly; 2) the conduct was
extreme and outrageous; 3) the employer’s actions caused the
plaintiff emotional distress; and, 4) the emotional distress that
the plaintiff suffered was severe. Hughes Training Inc. v.
Cook, 254 F.3d 588, 594 (Sth Cir. 2001); Wornick Co. v.
Casas, 856 S.W.2d 732, 734 (Tex. 1993). In order for
SWBT’s conduct to be considered extreme and outrageous it
must be behavior “so outrageous in character and so extreme
in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency,
and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a
civilized community.” Hughes Training Inc. v. Cook, id.
Generally, ordinary employment disputes will not support a
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, Jd.
Miller’s claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress in
this “discrimination in employment context” is only viable if
he is able to establish that SWBT knew that he was peculiarly
susceptidle to emotional distress, by reason of some physical
or mental condition or peculiarity. [d. at 595.

Miller, himself, indicates that SWBT fully
accommodated his post-surgical requests. See deposition of
Miller at pp. 139-140, Exhibit B, Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment (Entry #24). Miller does not allege that
SWBT harassed him with respect to his request for post-
surgical assistance, but appears to contend that his firing,

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alone, constituted SWBT’s intentional infliction of emotional
distress. See Plaintiff's Response to Motion for Summary
Judgment (Entry #25). Miller’s termination or SWBT’s
investigation of the matters underlying the termination,
without more, is not enough to constitute the intentional
infliction of emotional distress. Hughes Training Inc. v. Cook, —
254 F.3d at 594-95; see also Shaboon v. Duncan, 252 F.3d
722, 734 (Sth Cir. 2001). Miller’s failure to adduce evidence
raising an inference that SWBT’s conduct was extreme and
outrageous or that he suffered extreme emotional distress will
not defeat summary judgment as to his claim of intentional
infliction of emotional distress.

CONCLUSION

Miller’s failure to demonstrate prima facie cases of age
or disability discrimination, retaliation or to adduce evidence
of extreme and outrageous conduct constituting the intentional
infliction of emotional distress or FLSA violations, does not
raise a genuine issue as to material fact asserted by his
lawsuit. Miller’s claims of age and disability discrimination,
retaliation, FLSA violations and the intentional infliction of
emotional distress must, therefore, be sumarily dismissed. See
Haas v. Advo Systems, Inc., 169 F.3d 732, 733 (Sth Cir.
1999); see also Chaney v. New Orleans Public Facility
Management, 179 F.3d at 167. It is, therefore,

ORDERED that Southwestern Bell Telephone

Company’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Entry #24) is
GRANTED. Further, it is

ORDERED that this matter is DISMISSED with
prejudice from the dockets of this Court.

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The Clerk of Court shall file this Memorandum and
Order and provide the parties with a true copy.

SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on this the 22nd day of
October, 2001.

/s/

Calvin Botley
United States Magistrate Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386015_0986%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
