# Appendix — Williams v. Illinois

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386015_0921%3A2

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 2003
- **Citation:** 537 U.S. 1193

## Text

(a) | oe
02 957 DE 1 7208

NAFFIOE OF THE GLERK

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 2002

TYRESE WILLIAMS,
Petitioner,

Vs.

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,
Respondent.

Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the
Illinois Appellate Court, First District

SEPARATE VOLUME APPENDIX
PURSUANT TO SUPREME COURT RULE 14.1.(i)
RELATIVE TO:

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

DENNIS DOHERTY
150 N. Wacker Drive
Suite 2020

Chicago, Illinois 60606
(312) 580-0935
Attorney for Petitioner

APPENDICES |

App. i

TABLE OF CONTENTS TO SEPARATE
VOLUME APPENDIX PURSUANT TO
SUPREME COURT RULE 14.1.(i)

Page of App.

1. The Order entered in conjunction with the
judgment sought to be reviewed (Supreme Court Rule
14.1(i) (i)) -

APPENDIX A: Order of the Supreme Court of Illinois,
entered October 2, 2002, People v. Williams, No.
94136, denying petition for leave to appeal...App. 1

2. The Order entered in conjunction with the |
judgment sought to be reviewed (Supreme Court Rule i

14.1@)(@)) -

APPENDIX B: Order of the Appellate Court of Illinois,
First Judicial District, entered June 10, 2002,
People v. Williams, No. 1-00-0570, denying
petition for rehearing.....................cccccssssssees App. 2

3. The Order entered in conjunction with the
judgment sought to be reviewed (Supreme Court Rule

14.1(i)(i)) -

APPENDIX C: Order of the Appellate Court of
Illinois, First District, No. 1-00-0570 , April 15,
2002, affirming petitioner’s conviction and
SOTIETIOR.... .csvecresckninesesnsonalanesenibanamntltl App. 3

App. ii

4. Material required by subparagraph 1(f)
(Supreme Court Rule 14.1(i)(v)) -

APPENDIX D: The Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
NN ccccnsnosdsivvonsnessenensovesesonntnvncnseneees App. 20

5. Material required by subparagraph 1(g) (i)
(Supreme Court Rule 14.1(i)(v)) -

APPENDIX E: Raising the Federal Question......App. 21

* * * *

———— ee

App. 1
APPENDIX A

94136 SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS
CLERK OF THE COURT
SUPREME COURT BUILDING
SPRINGFIELD, ILLINOIS 62701
(217) 782-2035

October 2, 2002
Mr. Dennis Doherty
Attorney at Law

601 South LaSalle St., Suite 700
Chicago, IL 60605

No. 94136 - People State of Illinois, respondent, v.
Tyrese Williams, petitioner. Leave to
appeal, Appellate Court, First District.

The Supreme Court today DENIED the petition

for leave to appeal in the above entitled cause.

The mandate of this Court will issue to the

Appellate Court on October 24, 2002.

App. 2

APPENDIX B

IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE
STATE OF ILLINOIS,

)

)

J )
| Plaintiff-Appellee, )
)
V. ) No. 1-00-0570

)
TYRESE WILLIAMS, )
)
)

Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER

Upon consideration of defendant-appellant’s
petition for rehearing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that said petition for
rehearing is DENIED.

ORDER ENTERED Presiding Justice

JUN 10 2002 Judith Cohen
APPELLATE COURT,

FIRST DISTRICT

Justice William Cousins

Justice Jill K. McNulty

App. 3

APPENDIX C

FIRST DIVISION
April 15, 2002

NOTICE

The text of this order may be changed
or corrected prior to the time for filing
of a Petition for Rehearing or the

disposition of the same.

No. 1-00-0570
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
PEOPLE OF THE ) Appeal from the
STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Circuit Court of
) Cook County.
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
)
v. ) No. 98 C6 61478
)
TYRESE WILLIAMS, ) Honorable
) George Morrissey,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Presiding.

App. 4

ORDER

Following a bench trial, defendant Tyrese
Williams was convicted of possession of a controlled
substance with intent to deliver and sentenced to a
prison term of 12 years. On appeal, defendant
contends that: (1) the State failed to prove his guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) he received ineffective
assistance of trial counsel; and (3) the court erred in
denying his motion for scientific testing of certain
evidence.

Harvey police officer T. Brooks testified that at
about 6:30 p.m. on July 21, 1998, he observed a
vehicle obstructing traffic at 146th Street and Myrtle.
Brooks stated that there were two individuals inside
the vehicle and identified defendant as the passenger.
Brooks stopped the vehicle, and moments later Officer
Annette Avant arrived to assist Brooks. At that time,
the driver informed Brooks that his driver’s license was
suspended and that [p. 2] the vehicle was uninsured.
Brooks handcuffed the driver and put him in a police
vehicle. Brooks then walked back to the stopped
vehicle and asked defendant for a valid driver’s license
so that Brooks could release the vehicle-to defendant.
Defendant stated that he did not have a driver’s
license. Brooks then instructed him to exit the vehicle.
As defendant exited the vehicle, Brooks noticed that
“from his right pocket was a clear plastic bag with a
green leafy substance sticking out of his pants.”
Brooks retrieved the bag from defendant’s pocket,
informed defendant that he was under arrest and

App. 5
instructed Avant to handcuff defendant.

Thereafter, Brooks conducted an inventory
search of the vehicle before it was towed. Brooks
recovered a pager, cellular telephone, $4,000, and a
scale with traces of a white powdery residue.
Additionally, Avant recovered two plastic bags from
defendant’s person. Brooks secured the items in his
vehicle.

On cross-examination, Brooks testified that the
driver asked him to release the vehicle to defendant.
Brooks told the driver that he would release the
vehicle to defendant if he could produce a valid
driver’s license. He testified that defendant did not
produce a driver’s license but stated that he was from
Texas.

Harvey police officer Annette Avant testified
that at about 6:38 p.m. on July 21, 1998, she was
dispatched to assist Officer [p. 3] in a traffic stop at
146th Street and Myrtle. When Avant arrived, she
positioned herself at the passenger’s side of the
stopped vehicle while Brooks spoke to the driver. The
driver was arrested after he informed Brooks that his
license was suspended. Avant further testified that the
driver asked Brooks to release the vehicle to _
defendant. Avant stated that Brooks walked back to
the vehicle and asked defendant whether he had a
valid driver’s license. She stated that defendant was
asked to exit the vehicle after he told Brooks that he
did not have a valid driver’s license. Avant stated that

° App. 6

she was standing by the bumper when defendant
stepped out of the vehicle. Avant stated that Brooks
was standing by the driver’s side of the vehicle at that
time. As defendant exited the vehicle, Brooks
instructed Avant to “hook him up,” which meant to
place defendant under arrest. Meanwhile, Brooks
approached defendant, retrieved the plastic bag from
defendant’s pocket and informed him that he was
under arrest. Avant testified that she noticed a plastic
bag “hanging out of the left pants pocket” as
defendant stepped out. However, Avant admitted that
she did not see the bag before Brooks instructed her to
handcuff defendant.

The parties stipulated that Officers Avant and
Brooks recovered and inventoried a plastic bag
containing a green leafy substance (Item 1), a plastic
bag containing four smaller bags of a white substance
(Items 2-A, B, C, and D), and a plastic bag [p. 4]
containing a white powder (Item 3). The parties
further stipulated that a forensic scientist received the
items in a sealed condition and that a proper chain of
custody was maintained at all times. The parties
stipulated that Item 1 was tested and determined to
contain 1.7 grams of cannabis. Items 2A and 2B were
tested and determined to contain 248.7 grams of
cocaine. Items 2C and 2D weighed a total of 95.4
grams but no chemical analysis was performed.
Lastly, Item 3 was tested and determined to contain
251 grams of cocaine.

Defendant, testifying in his own behalf, stated

—_——_~

App. 7

that he lived with his father in Mesquite, Texas. He
stated that on July 21, 1998, he went to visit his
grandmother in Harvey, Illinois. He arrived at his
grandmother’s house at about 3:30 p.m. Shortly
thereafter, defendant’s cousin, Sherone Watkins,
‘invited him to visit his girlfriend’s apartment.
Defendant agreed and the two drove to Watkins’
apartment. After about 45 minutes, they left the
apartment to drive back to their grandmother’s house.

A few moments later, they were stopped by
Officer Brooks. Watkins attempted to step out of the
vehicle but Brooks instructed him to remain inside.
Brooks approached the driver’s side of the vehicle and
asked Watkins for his driver’s license. Meanwhile,
Officer Avant arrived at the scene and stood by the
passenger's side of the vehicle, where defendant was
seated. Watkins was asked to step out of the vehicle
after he said that [p. 5] he did not have a driver’s
license. As Brocks searched Watkins, Avant instructed
defendant to exit the vehicle. Avant did not handcuff
defendant but asked him to stand by the passenger’s
side door. According to defendant, Avant then
reached behind the passenger’s seat and retrieved a
bag containing “cigar paper” and leaves. Defendant
told Avant that the bag did not belong to him.
Thereafter, Avant escorted defendant to the rear of the
stopped vehicle and performed a pat-down search of
defendant.

Defendant further testified that on that day he
wore a red T-shirt and basketball shorts underneath

App. 8

white windbreaker pants. He testified that he had
about $160 and his Texas driver’s license in his right
pants pocket. According to defendant, Officer Avant
asked whether he had a valid driver’s license.
Defendant responded affirmatively but denied being
asked whether he wanted to drive the vehicle home.
Defendant further denied that Avant found cocaine
hidden in his pants and stated that only money was
recovered from his person.

At the police station, Avant showed defendant a
grocery bag and said, “Look what we found.”
According to defendant, he then overheard Avant tell
an officer that she found the bag under the seat of her
police car. Defendant stated that he was then strip
searched by Officer Brooks.

In finding defendant guilty, the trial court
expressly found the testimony of the officers to be
credible. The court reasoned [p. 6] that the two
officers did not work together as partners, that one
was a community service officer and the other was a
patrol officer. The court found that the officers
testified truthfully and that their descriptions of the
events were “straight forward”.

On appeal, defendant first contends that he was
not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt because
there were defects in the chain of custody. In
particular, defendant asserts that the evidence seized
and inventoried did not match the evidence analyzed
by the forensic scientist. Defendant argues that

App. 9

Officers Avant and Brooks testified that a clear plastic
bag containing 1.7 grams of cannabis was recovered
from defendant’s pocket, whereas the laboratory
report indicated that the bag contained “1.7 grams of
plant material and one cigar.” Further, defendant
notes that on cross-examination, Avant testified that
she recovered a bag containing four separate bags of
rocky substance, but on direct examination, she
testified that she recovered a clear plastic bag
containing three bags of white rocky substance and
one bag of green leafy substance.

When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of
the evidence, the relevant question on review is
whether, after considering the evidence in the light
most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Jimerson, 127
Ill. 2d [p. 7] 12, 43-44 (1989). We will not substitute
our judgment for that of the trial court regarding
witness credibility. People v. Digirolamo, 179 Ill. 2d
24, 46 (1997). Rather, it is the responsibility of the
trier of fact to determine the credibility of witnesses,
the weight to be given to their testimony, and the
reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.
People v Brisbon, 106 Ill. 2d 342, 360 (1985). A
criminal conviction will not be set aside on review
unless the evidence is so unlikely or inadequate that a
reasonable doubt of defendant’s guilt remains.
Jimerson, 127 Ill. 2d at 43.

Here, the evidence, when viewed in the light

App. 10

most favorable to the State, was sufficient to prove
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The
discrepancies noted by defendant are not sufficient to
create a reasonable doubt as the testimony of the
officers was consistent with the results of the
laboratory report. Any issues regarding the chain of
custody were properly attributed by the trial court to
weight and not admissibility. See People v. Herrero,
324 Ill. App. 3d 876, 883 (2001).

Additionally, defendant contends that the State
failed to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
because the testimony of the State’s witnesses was
inconsistent. Defendant asserts that the officers
testified inconsistently as to where they were standing
when defendant exited the vehicle and [in] which
pants pocket the clear plastic bag containing a green
leafy substance was [p. 8] first observed. The trial
court acknowledged that the crux of this case was an
issue of witness credibility and found the testimony of
the officers to be credible. Despite the inconsistencies
in the officers’ testimony, a rational trier of fact could
have found that defendant possessed a large amount
of narcotics and that he intended to sell them. We will
not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court.

Next, defendant contends that trial counsel was
ineffective for: (1) failing to file a motion to quash
arrest and suppress evidence; (2) failing to present
readily available evidence to corroborate his
testimony; and (3) stipulating to a defective chain of
custody.

App. 11

In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80
L. Ed. 2s 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984), the United
States Supreme Court set forth a two-prong test to
determine whether a defendant has been denied
effective assistance of counsel: first, the defendant
must show that counsel’s representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness and second, the
defendant must show that the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687,
60 L Ed.2d at 693, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. Moreover, in
adopting Strickland, our supreme court observed that
the defendant bears a heavy burden to overcome the
strong presumption that counsel’s actions were a
matter of “sound trial strategy.” People v. Albanese,
104 Ill. 2d 504, 525-26 (1984). [p. 9]

Defendant contends that trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to file a motion to quash arrest
and suppress evidence because the police did not
possess the authority to ask for his identification. Trial
counsel’s failure to file a motion to suppress evidence
is not per se incompetence. People v. Gierbolini, 128
Ill. App. 3d 794, 797 (1984). Generally, whether to
file a motion to quash an arrest and suppress evidence
is considered a matter of trial strategy, and a
reviewing court “will not indulge in hindsight analysis
to determine whether counsel’s decision was adequate
under the circumstances.” People v. Rodriguez, 312
Ill. App. 3d 920, 925 (2000). Moreover, trial counsel
may reasonably consider a motion to suppress to be
futile where the arrest or search is proper; counsel is
not obligated to file futile motions to render effective

App. 12

assistance. People v. Robinson, 299 II]. App. 3d 426,

435 (1998). Thus, to establish that trial counsel was

different had the evidence been suppressed.
Robinson, 299 II}. pp. 3d at 434, Furthermore, a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel] cannot be
based on mere speculation. Gierbolini, 128 1]. App.
3d at 797,

A defendant is lawfully stopped when he isa
Passenger in a [p. 10] vehicle Stopped for a traffic
violation. People v, Sorensen, 196 Ill. 2d 425, 433
(2001) (defendant Passenger lawfully stopped where
the officer observed a traffic violation). Moreover, an
officer may order the driver and any passengers out of
a lawfully stopped vehicle without raising fourth
amendment concerns. Sorensen, 196 Ill. 2d at 433.
This is true even where the officer does not Suspect
that the passenger has been involved in a crime.

People v. Gonzalez, 184 Ill, 2d 402, 415 (1998).
Maryland vy. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 137 L. Ed.

2d 41, 117S. Ct. 882 (1997), is factually similar to
the case at bar. In Wilson, an officer Stopped a vehicle
for traffic violations. The officer noted that the driver
and the defendant, who Was a passenger, appeared
nervous. When the officer instructed the Passenger to
exit the vehicle, a bag of cocaine fell to the ground as
he stepped out. The Passenger sought to suppress the

App. 13

evidence, contending that the officer ordered him out
of the vehicle in violation of the fourth amendment.
The Supreme Court held that a police officer, pursuant
to a valid traffic stop, may order a passenger to step
out of the vehicle even if he does not suspect that the
passenger has been involved in any wrongdoing.
Wilson, 519 U.S. at 413-14.

Here, similar to Wilson, the drugs were found
“sticking out of’ defendant’s pants as he complied with
the officer’s lawful order to exit the vehicle. A motion
to suppress would have been [p. 11] futile because the
officer did not violate the defendant’s fourth
amendment rights by ordering him out of the vehicle.

Our holding does not conflict with our recent
decision in People v. Bunch, No. 1-00-3245 (2002).
There, the officer stopped the vehicle in which
defendant was a passenger after observing a traffic
violation. The officer instructed the defendant to exit
the vehicle, and he complied. Unlike the case at bar,
no evidence was recovered as a result of the
defendant’s compliance with the officer’s demand to
exit the vehicle. Instead, the officer then shined his
flashlight on the defendant’s face and asked the
defendant his name and where he was coming from
because the officer was “curious to find out exactly
who [the defendant] was.” When the defendant
answered, the officer saw a small clear plastic object
containing suspected drugs in the defendant’s mouth.
At that point, the officer arrested the defendant and
ordered him to spit out the object which turned out to

App. 14

be heroin. Relying on People v. Gonzalez, 324 Ill.
App. 3d 15 (2001), leave to appeal allowed, No.
92305 (December 5, 2001), we reversed the denial of
the defendant’s motion to suppress on the basis that
the officer had no authority to ask the defendant for
identification. -Here, it is clear that the contraband
was recovered as defendant exited the vehicle
pursuant to the officer’s lawful request and not as a
result of the officer’s request for identification. [p. 12]

Next, defendant contends that his trial counsel
was ineffective for failing to introduce defendant’s
Texas driver’s license to corroborate his testimony that
he had a driver’s license on the day in question.
However, defendant has failed to demonstrate that but
for counsel’s failure the result of the proceedings
would have been different. The officers did not
suspect defendant of any wrongdoing. Defendant was
merely asked for his driver’s license to determine
whether he could drive the vehicle away. He was free
to decline the officer’s request for identification.
Probable cause to arrest defendant did not arise until
the officers saw a clear plastic bag containing green
leafy substance in defendant’s pants pocket. Showing
that defendant actually had a driver’s license would
not have undermined the testimony of the officers to
the extent that the outcome of the proceedings would
have been different. We find no deficiency in trial
counsel’s performance. See People v. Kelley, 304 Ill.
App. 3d 628, 635 (1999) (counsel’s failure to
investigate depends upon the significance of the
evidence and the closeness of the case).

App. 15

Additionally, defendant contends that he
received ineffective assistance because his trial counsel
failed to present seven character witnesses. We find
defendant’s claim to be wholly without merit.
Counsel’s decision whether to present certain
witnesses is a matter of trial strategy and a reviewing
court will not substitute its judgment absent a showing
of [p. 13] substantial prejudice. People v. Bodoh, 200
Ill. App.3d 415, 423-24 (1990). Defendant has failed
to demonstrate that his counsel’s actions prejudiced
him to the extent that the outcome of the proceedings
would have been different. See Bodoh, 200 Ill. App.3d
at 424 (lack of proffered testimony did not prejudice
the defendant to the extent that the outcome of the
trial would have been different). In light of the police
officers’ testimony and the drugs and paraphernalia
recovered, testimony by character witnesses would not
likely have changed the outcome.

Next, defendant contends that he received
ineffective assistance because his trial counsel
stipulated to a defective chain of custody.

“Generally speaking, a defendant is precluded
from attacking or otherwise contradicting any facts to
which he has previously stipulated.” People v. Gibson,
287 Ill. App. 3d 878, 880 (1997).

Real evidence is admissible when a sufficient
foundation is laid to establish that the item is the one
involved in the alleged offense and is substantially
unchanged since its seizure by authorities. People v.

App. 16

Terry, 211 Ill. App. 3d 968, 972-73 (1991). However,
where the evidence is not readily identifiable or is
susceptible to alteration, the burden is upon the State
to establish a chain of custody that is sufficiently
complete to render it improbable that the item has
been tampered with, [p. 14] exchanged, or
contaminated. People v. Slaughter, 149 Ill. App. 3d
183 (1986). The rationale behind this rule is to
connect the object to the defendant and the crime.
People v. Lach, 302 Ill. App. 3d 587, 593 (1998).

A chain of custody requires proof of delivery,
presence, and safekeeping. Gibson, 287 Ill. App. 3d at
882. To succeed, the State need not exclude every
possibility of tampering. People v. Ziehm, 120 Ill.
App. 3d 777, 782 (1983). Rather, the State need only
demonstrate that reasonable protective measures were
taken to maintain a chain of custody, and that it was
probable the evidence was not altered or substituted.
Lach, 302 Ill. App. 3d at 594. Significantly, absent
any actual evidence of tampering or substitution,
deficiencies in the chain of custody go to the weight
and not the admissibility of the evidence. Lach, 302
Ill. App. 3d at 594. Even where there is a missing link
in the chain of custody, evidence is properly admitted
where testimony that sufficiently described the
condition of the evidence when delivered matches the
description of the evidence when examined. Bynum,
257 Ill. App. 3d at 510.

In our earlier discussion of the sufficiency of the
evidence, we concluded that there was no defect in the

App. 17

chain of custody. Defendant has therefore failed to
establish that his trial counsel was ineffective for
stipulating to the chain of custody. [p. 15]

Finally, defendant contends that the trial court
erred in denying his posttrial motion for scientific
testing of the cigar that was recovered based upon his
claim of actual innocence.

Section 116-3 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure of 1963 provides in pertinent part:

[“] (b) The defendant must
present a prima facie case that:

(1) identity was the issue
in the trial which resulted in his
or her conviction; and

(2) the evidence to be
tested has been subject to a chain
of custody sufficient to establish
that it has not been substituted,
tampered with, replaced, or
altered in any material aspect.

(c) The trial court shall allow the
testing under reasonable
conditions designed to protect the
State’s interests in the integrity of
the evidence and the testing
process upon a determination

Pas ERT? YO

App. 18
that:

(1) the result of the testing
has the scientific potential to
produce new, noncumulative
evidence materially relevant to
the defendant’s assertion of actual
innocence; [p. 16]

(2) the testing requested
employs a scientific method
generally accepted within the
relevant scientific community.”
725 ILCS 5/116-3 (West. 1998).

Concededly, section 116-3 is not limited to instances
that would completely exonerate the defendant.
People v. Savory, 197 Ill.2d 203, 214 (2001).
However, section 116-3 requires that the evidence at
issue be “materially relevant to the defendant’s
assertion of actual innocence.” Savory, 197 Ill.2d at
214.

Here, defendant has failed to establish the
significance of scientific testing of the cigar with
regard to his claim of actual innocence. Defendant’s
identity was not at issue. Testimony indicated that a
clear plastic bag was observed hanging out of
defendant’s pocket and that a subsequent search of the
vehicle revealed a bag containing cigar paper and
leaves. We find that the trial court properly denied
defendant’s motion because scientific testing of the

App. 19

cigar would not have produced any relevant
information as to defendant’s guilt or innocence.

Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court is
affirmed.

Affirmed.

McNULTY, J., with COHEN, P.J. and COUSINS,
J., concurring.

App. 20

APPENDIX D

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution

U.S. Const., amend. XIV, Section 1:
",..nor shall any State deprive any

person of... liberty. . . without due
process of law... ."

App. 21

APPENDIX E

RAISING THE FEDERAL QUESTION

The federal question relative to DNA analysis
was raised by petitioner in the trial court, the Illinois
Appellate Court, and Illinois Supreme Court.

Petitioner’s post-trial motion for DNA analysis
was couched and argued in federal due process terms.
(R 162-69; 172-89; C 59)

In the Appellate Court of Illinois, First District,
petitioner raised the issue of DNA analysis at Point 6
of petitioner’s Brief. Federal due process was argued
in said Point, with federal cases cited in support
thereof.

In the Supreme Court of Illinois, petitioner
raised the issue of DNA analysis at Point 1 of
petitioner’s Petition For Leave To Appeal. Federal due
process was argued in said Point, with federal cases
cited in support thereof.

* * * *

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386015_0921%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.