# Opposition Brief — Green v. Gianos

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2002
- **Citation:** 537 U.S. 1029

## Text

No. 02-410 OCT15 2002

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OFFICE OF TPR CLERK

In The uses
Supreme Court of the Anited States
2
JOHN GREEN,
Petitioner,
V.

WILLIAM GIANOS, ALBERT RYLAK,
JEFFREY MARTIN, LAW FIRM OF
RYLAK & GIANOS AND STEPHEN RUBIN,

Respondents.

ry
Vv

On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari
To The United States Court Of Appeals
For The Third Circuit

r-S
v

RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

2
Vv

Victor A. ROTOLO, Esq.*

ROTOLO @ MIDLIGE

2200 Route 31 — Suite 12

Clinton Township

Lebanon, New Jersey 08833

(908) 735-0330

Attorneys for Respondents,
William Gianos, Albert
Rylak, Honorable Jeffrey
Martin, Law Firm of Rylak
& Gianos and Honorable
Stephen Rubin

*Counsel of Record

SS EeEeEeEeEeEeeeees eee
COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO. (800) 225-6964
OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of Contents..........sseereeeeeeeeeees ‘ caecminaied iad i
Table of Authorities .........::ssscccessesreteessrncenstersstneeees ili
Counter-Statement of the Case .........-.-+ssererrrerrrerees 1
Reasons for Denying Petition for Writ of Certiorari... 5

I.

II.

Since the Lower Courts’ Rulings Were in
Accord With Precedent Established By This
Court in Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226
(1991), Review is Not Warranted ...........sseeee

Petitioner’s First Argument Why This Court
Should Grant Certiorari is Entirely Without

A. Petitioner's Claim That, Absent This
Court’s Intervention, Municipal Prosecu-
tors Will Deny Future Defendants the
Right to a Fair Trial and Equal Protec-
tion, is Moot Since the Current New Jer-
sey Court Rules Expressly Address the
Imposition of Discovery Fees in Munici-
pal Matters..........cssesesserreerreerees caine

B. The Record Below Clearly Demonstrates
That Mr. Gianos and Mr. Rylak Did Not
Demand an Administrative Discovery
Fee in Order to Further a Personal In-

C. Petitioner Has Failed to Present a Le-
gitimate Argument That the District
Court’s Decision Concerning Qualified
Immunity Conflicted With Applicable
Precedent ..........:::seseeeeeeeeeeeeeeenenetteneeenenes

10

11

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS — Continued
Page

III. Petitioner’s Argument That the District
Court Failed to Instruct Him on the Proce-
dure for Answering Defendants’ Summary
Judgment Motion is Without PB ao iicisvvcceecs 17

IV. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982)
Clearly Illustrates Discovery Was Not
Stopped Too Soom. .........sseseceseesseessseeresensensreses 19

Conclusion .........ccccccssccsssccecessescssooeseeseonerssosscoosanooseres 21

ili

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page
CASES:
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (2GBT)...cncresenrscvensines 16
Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 (1980)...........secessersceserees 5,17
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).......... 5, 6, 19, 20
Jackson v. Gates, 975 F.2d 648 (Oth Cir. 1992)...........eeeeeeee 8
Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238 (1980) Tee aan 13, 14
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) ......-sseceereeseees 7,8
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) .......cscccsssscssreeesessroees 19
Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226 (1991) ......-ccceeseseerrereeeees 6, 16
State v. Green, 327 N.J. Super. 334 (App. Div. 2000)......... 2
State v. Zucconi, 93 N.J. Super. 380 (App. Div.

I <1 seiesivgnsnvasneneronennssanivatncensentesessewinonguansreet® 8
Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975) ....-..-:+sssersterseees 17
STATUTES:

AD U.G.C. § 19BB...0020.0000-s0ncsccsrsrnooerernrsrsorconesesnonecssenosoesonsees 19
New Jersey Tort Claims Act, N. J.S.A. 59:1-1, et seq. ......-. 18
RULES:

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56...........-:s:ssssssserssrereerees 18
New Jersey Court Rule 7:7-7......-.s:sssssssrssereesereessenerneess 2,10

aii i

RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

Pursuant to United States Supreme Court Rule 15,
Respondents William Gianos, Albert Rylak, Jeffrey Mar-
tin, Law Firm of Rylak & Gianos, and Stephen Rubin,
hereby submit this Brief in Opposition to the Petition for a
Writ of Certiorari.

4
.

COUNTER-STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Respondents respectfully ask that this Court consider
the following Counter-Statement of the Case.’

At the time of the subject dispute, William J. Gianos,
Esq. and Albert D. Rylak, Esq. (hereinafter “Mr. Gianos”
and “Mr. Rylak”, respectively) were municipal prosecutors,
as well as partners in a private practice, the Law Firm of
Rylak & Gianos.

Mr. Gianos and Mr. Rylak’s procedure for providing
discovery to municipal defendants was the same as any
other New Jersey municipal prosecutors they knew. See
Petitioner’s Appendix at 98A-30A. Upon receipt of a
twenty-five dollar ($25.00) administrative fee, they pro-
vided defendants any permissible discovery requested. In
fact, Respondents were personally aware that prosecutors
in other New Jersey municipalities often charged & higher
fee than they did. Id.

! ‘The facts conferred herein were thoroughly presented to the
district court and Third Circuit.

2

Until 2001, the New Jersey Court Rules did not
address whether prosecutors could charge a fee for provid-
ing discovery in municipal cases. Thus, the Rules Mr.
Gianos and Mr. Rylak referred to for guidance did not
suggest there was anything improper about their discov-
ery practice. Moreover, since most municipal prosecutors
are also local practicing attorneys, it is only logical the cost
associated with providing a defendant discovery is going to
be borne by these private attorneys. In this regard, the
$25.00 discovery charge was in no way intended to place a
burden on municipal defendants. Rather, it provided
reimbursement for time expended and copying costs
incurred by the Law Firm of Rylak & Gianos as a result of
supplying discovery. See Pet. App. 30A-31A.

Finally, the New Jersey Appellate Division acknowl-
edged the prevalence of administrative discovery fees in
State v. Green, 327 N.J. Super. 334 (App. Div. 2000). The
Court stated: “(W]e have a sense that the heart of the
contention, the $25 administrative fee, may be the rule
rather than the exception.” Id. at 342.

After receiving a summons for traveling fifty-one (51)
miles per hour in a twenty-five (25) mile per hour school
zone, John Green (hereinafter “Mr. Green”) requested a
large quantity of discovery from Mr. Gianos. Specifically,
Mr. Green requested:

? Since 2001, the Comment to New Jersey Court Rule 7:7-7, citing
State v. Green, 327 N.J. Super. 334 (App. Div. 2000), provides: “[N]o fee
other than a per-page copying fee may be imposed as a condition for
complying with a discovery demand. . .”

3

(1) all documents Mr. Gianos intended to use to
prove the speed limit had been legally set on
Harrison Street (where Mr. Green was issued the
‘speeding ticket); (2) the arresting officer’s log
book for the date of the incident; (3) both sides of
the officer’s ticket; (4) a description of the device
used to measure the speed of Mr. Green’s vehicle,
the record of when this device was calibrated,
and its maintenance and repair history; (5) the
calibration slip for the tuning forks used to cali-
brate the radar unit; and (6) the officer’s training
record on the radar device.

See Respondents’ Appendix at 1A-4A.*

Mr. Gianos informed Mr. Green that all documents
relevant to the ticket would be provided upon payment of
$25.00 to cover the administrative cost associated with
locating, compiling and copying this voluminous discovery.

Without making a claim of insolvency, Mr. Green
refused to pay this fee.

On March 12, 1997, an initial hearing regarding the
speeding ticket was held in Frenchtown Municipal Court
before the Honorable Jeffrey M. Martin, J.M.C. (hereinaf-
ter “Judge Martin”). Mr. Green alleged he had been denied
discovery and threatened a civil suit against Mr. Gianos.

In an effort to help both parties resolve this dispute
amicably, Judge Martin suggested photocopies of the
relevant documents be made for Mr. Green at the court in

* Respondents’ Appendix, identified as pages 1A-35A, is annexed to
the end of this Brief.

exchange for a release not to sue Mr. Gianos.* However,
Mr. Green refused to sign a release or pay for discovery.

Moreover, even though the good faith efforts of Mr.
Gianos and Judge Martin failed to resolve this dispute, at
the March 12, 1997 hearing, Mr. Green was permitted to
view all discovery the State intended to use in its prosecu-
tion. See Resp. App. 5A-7A.

Mr. Green’s trial took place eighteen (18) months later
on September 9, 1998. Thus, having viewed the State’s
evidence, Mr. Green clearly had ample time to prepare his
defense. Although Mr. Green was convicted of speeding,
that judgment was overturned by the New Jersey Superior
Court, Appellate Division.

Nonetheless, Mr. Green subsequently filed a civil suit
in federal court against Mr. Gianos, Mr. Rylak, the Law
Firm of Rylak & Gianos, Judge Martin, and the Honorable
Stephen B. Rubin (hereinafter, occasionally referred to
collectively as “Defendants”), who at the time of the
dispute was Hunterdon County Prosecutor.

In dismissing Mr. Green’s civil suit on summary
judgment, the district court ruled that although Mr. Green
may have been somewhat limited in his access to informa-
tion he deemed important, enforcement of the discovery
fee by Mr. Gianos and Mr. Rylak did not deny him an
opportunity to be heard. See Pet. App. 19A.

* Petitioner's Brief misleadingly implies that Judge Martin
conditioned any provision of discovery on the signing of a release. See
Petition at 3.

5

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals clearly agreed
with this reasoning. See Pet. App. 8A.

Respondents further note that Mr. Green filed a
petition for panel and en banc rehearing, which was
denied in both regards by the Third Circuit.

Instead of directly challenging the constitutional basis
of these lower court holdings, Mr. Green’s Petition at-
tempts to divert this Court’s attention by focusing on moot
and ancillary issues: whether future municipal defendants
will be denied a fair trial; the amount of additional guid-
ance a pro se litigant should be afforded when responding
to a summary judgment motion; and whether discovery
ended too soon.

+

REASONS FOR DENYING PETITION
FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

I.

SINCE THE LOWER COURTS’ RULINGS WERE IN
ACCORD WITH PRECEDENT ESTABLISHED BY
THIS COURT IN SIEGERT V. GILLEY, 500 U.S. 226
(1991), REVIEW IS NOT WARRANTED.

This Court has unequivocally determined the frame-
work for determining whether a plaintiff’s ailegations are
sufficient to overcome a defendant’s defense of qualified
immunity asserted in a motion for summary judgment. See
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982); Gomez uv.
Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 (1980).

In this regard, Harlow held: “On summary judgment,
the judge appropriately may determine, not only the

6

currently applicable law, but whether that law was clearly
established at the time an action occurred. . .” Jd. at 818.

Referring to the holding in Harlow, this Court later
added in Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226 (1991):

A necessary concomitant to the determination of
whether the constitutional right asserted by a
plaintiff is ‘clearly established’ at the time the de-
fendant acted is the determination of whether the
plaintiff has asserted a violation of a constitu-
tional right at all.

Decision of this purely legal question permits
courts expeditiously to weed out suits which fail
the test without requiring a defendant who
rightly claims qualified immunity to engage in
expensive and time consuming preparation to de-
fend the suit on its merits.

One of the purposes of immunity, absolute or
qualified, is to spare a defendant not only unwar-
ranted liability, but unwarranted demands cus-
tomarily imposed upon those defending a long,
drawn-out lawsuit. (emphasis added)

Id. at 232.

It is clear in the case at bar that both the district
court and the Third Circuit determined Mr. Green did not
establish a violation of a constitutional right.

Before addressing Defendants’ summary judgment
argument concerning qualified immunity, the district court
held:

[T]he Court declines to find that the enforcement
of the twenty-five dollar fee amounts to a constitu-
tional violation. (emphasis added)

'

See Pet. App. 19A. The district court’s reasoning in this
regard was that Defendants’ insistence on the fee did not
“so infect the proceedings with unfairness” as to violate
the basic tenants of due process. Citing Mathews v. EI-
dridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), the court concluded that
although Plaintiff was somewhat limited in his access to
discovery he may have personally deemed important,
enforcement of the $25.00 discovery fee did not deny
plaintiff the opportunity to be heard in a “meaningful
manner”.

The Third Circuit’s opinion also cited Mathews, and
settled:

We agree with the District Court that, although
[Plaintiff] was somewhat limited in his access to
information he believed was relevant to his de-
fense of the speeding ticket, the refusal to pro-
vide copies at a reasonable cost of all items

_ requested in discovery did not deny him the
opportunity to be heard in a meaningful manner.
This possible violation of the state court rules of
discovery does not amount to a federal constitu-
tional violation. (emphasis added)

See Pet. App. 8A.

Petitioner contends the district court and Third
Circuit inappropriately relied on Mathews.

In Mathews, this Court held that due process is a
concept which is not unrelated to time, place and circum-
stances, and thus established a balancing test to deter-
mine whether procedural due process requirements have
been satisfied. Id. at 334-335.

Petitioner argues this balancing test was only in-
tended to be used in an administrative law context, not a

8

criminal context, which he alleges was the nature of the
speeding charge against him. He therefore reasons that
the lower courts were incorrect to have applied the
Mathews balancing test.

First, it is clear that neither the district court nor the
Third Circuit applied, or even cited, Mathews’ balancing
test. They merely alluded to Mathews for the proposition
that “the fundamental requirement of due process is the
opportunity to be heard ... in a meaningful manner.” Jd.
at 333; Pet. App. 8A,19A.

Furthermore, contrary to Mr. Green’s assertion, under
New Jersey law traffic violations are only “quasi-criminal”
in nature. See State v. Zucconi, 93 N.J. Super. 380, 388-
392 (App. Div. 1967) (holding that Miranda rules with
respect to implementation of rights to counsel and against
self-incrimination did not apply in “quasi-criminal” traffic
offense context).

Petitioner also contends the lower courts’ rulings that
a possible violation of state discovery rules does not
amount to a federal constitutional violation conflicts with
a Ninth Circuit holding.

In this regard, Petitioner cites Jackson v. Gates, 975
F.2d 648 (9th Cir. 1992) for the proposition that “a policy
itself need only cause a constitutional violation; it need not
be unconstitutional per se.” Id. at 654. However, beyond
citing this language, Petitioner offers no elaboration on
how the lower court decisions in the present case conflict
with Jackson.

In fact, it is evident that the cited language does not
illustrate a conflict. The crux of this quotation is that a
policy may cause a constitutional violation without the

9

policy itself being per se unconstitutional. The district
court’s ruling, which the Third Circuit unequivocally
affirmed, was that Defendants’ actions in demanding a
$25.00 discovery fee did not cause a constitutional violation.

Accordingly, Respondents respectfully submit that
this case does not merit Supreme Court review.

Il.

PETITIONER’S FIRST ARGUMENT WHY THIS
COURT SHOULD GRANT CERTIORARI IS EN-
TIRELY WITHOUT MERIT.

In a transparent attempt to grab this Court’s atten-
tion, Petitioner argues that his case occasions an issue of
“great public importance”. See Pet. 8.

In this regard, Petitioner avers that without this
Court’s intervention, municipal prosecutors will continue
to impose administrative discovery fees, and that these
fees will vary among municipalities depending on the
prosecutors’ personal motives.

As explained in Point A, infra, this contention is moot.

Moreover, the record below clearly illustrates that Mr.
Gianos and Mr. Rylak did not demand a $25.00 fee from
Mr. Green in order to further a personal interest. Rather,
this charge was to cover the anticipated administrative
expenses to their private firm associated with providing
Mr. Green’s discovery.

Mr. Gianos and Mr. Rylak’s reasonable belief that
their demand was appropriate, as demonstrated by the
record below, supports the district court’s decision concern-
ing qualified immunity.

10

Finally, Petitioner has failed to present a legitimate
argument that the district court’s decision in this regard
conflicted with applicable precedent.

A. Petitioner’s Claim That, Absent This Cour't’s
Intervention, Municipal Prosecutors Will
Deny Future Defendants the Right to a Fair
Trial and Equal Protection, is Moot Since the
Current New Jersey Court Rules Expressly
Address the Imposition of Discovery Fees in
Municipal Matters.

Petitioner misleadingly contends:

This [CJourt should grant this petition for certio-
rari [sic] this is a matter of great public impor-
tance... If this decision stands it would mean that
we continue with municipal prosecutors setting
fees at whatever they want, fees that they have a
personal interest in, because it goes into their
private pockets. The fees would vary from town
to town, depending on what town you were
charged in, and the lifestyle the prosecutor
wanted to maintain.

See Pet. 8.

Referral to the 2002 and 2003 New Jersey Court Rules
demonstrates that Petitioner’s argument in this regard is
moot.

The Comment to New Jersey Court Rule 7:7-7 states:
“[N]o fee other than a per-page copying fee may be

11

imposed as a condition for complying with a discovery

demand. . .” J

Therefore, Petitioner is arguing an issue which has
already been addressed, and thus preempted, by the New
Jersey Supreme Court and Administrative Office of the
Courts of New Jersey.’ By providing that only a per-page
copying fee may be charged for discovery in municipal
cases, the current New Jersey Court Rules expressly
prohibit municipal prosecutors from charging any fee they
wish.

Accordingly, Respondents respectfully submit that
this issue is moot and does not merit Supreme Court
review.

B. The Record Below Clearly Demonstrates That
Mr. Gianos and Mr. Rylak Did Not Demand an
Administrative Discovery Fee in Order to
Further a Personal Interest.

Petitioner claims Mr. Gianos and Mr. Rylak demanded
a $25.00 discovery fee in order to raise money for their
private law firm. §

* As will be discussed more fully in Point B, infra, the Comment to
this Rule does not impact Defendants’ entitlement to qualified immu-
“nity because Plaintiff’s dispute arose in 1997 and his speeding trial
was in 1998. Both the 1997 and 1998 Comments pertaining to munici-
pal discovery make no mention of discovery fees. It is undisputed that
Mr. Gianos and Mr. Rylak were, at all relevant times, guided by the
1997 and 1998 New Jersey Court Rules.

* These are the entities responsible for formulation and approval of
the New Jersey Court Rules.

12

Although the New Jersey Court Rules applicable at
the time of the dispute did not expressly authorize charg-
ing a fee for discovery, they did not expressly prohibit this
charge either. In fact, the Rules made no mention of
discovery fees in municipal cases. See 1997 and 1998 New
Jersey Court Rules.

Moreover, the record below clearly illustrates that Mr.
Gianos and Mr. Rylak had personal knowledge that
prosecutors in numerous other New Jersey municipalities
‘engaged in the same practice, and often set their fixed
charge at a higher rate.

In this regard, Mr. Gianos and Mr. Rylak each certi-
fied the following in affidavits that were submitted in
support of Defendants’ summary judgment motion in
district court:

Based on my understanding that some years ago
the New Jersey Supreme Court determined all
discovery would be handled through the Prosecu-
tor’s Office, I adopted the process utilized by
every prosecutor I kncw, which is to charge for
discovery.

Moreover, I adopted this procedure with the
knowledge that I must provide discovery in ac-
cordance with New Jersey Court Rules, and that
such Rules did not [at the time] expressly pro-
hibit charging a discovery fee.

The fee I charged for the provision of discovery
was a flat administrative fee of twenty-five dol-
lars ($25.00). I have always considered this a fair
fee since I am personally aware prosecutors for

13

the following New Jersey municipalities charge a
higher amount: (14 municipalities are listed).

See Pet. App. 28A-30A.

Additionally, these affidavits explained that since
most municipal prosecutors are also local practicing
attorneys, absent reimbursement for the expenses of
providing discovery, such costs would have to be borne by
these attorneys and their firms. See Pet. App. 30A.

Unlike attorneys from the County Prosecutor’s Office.
a municipal prosecutor is not appointed a secretarial staff
to handle discovery requests. As a result, this administra-
tive work is usually performed by secretaries from the
prosecutor’s own practice. Jd.

Finally, these private law firms often bear the addi-
tional financial burden of having to pay local police de-
partments for their copying costs and the like.’ Jd.

Respondents would also like to address the Supreme
Court case Petitioner cites as precedent that a constitu-
tional issue is raised when a prosecutor has a personal
interest in litigation before him.

In this regard, Petitioner cites Marshall v. Jerrico,
Inc., 446 U.S. 238 (1980) for the proposition that “[a]

" Plaintiff asked for discovery items that, while not unusual or
necessarily unfair requests, were in the possession of the police
department. These items included, but were not limited tw, the arrest-
ing officer’s log book for the date Plaintiff was issued a speeding
summons, and the officer's training record on the radar device. It is
likely procurement of this discovery would have cost Mr. Gianos and
Mr. Rylaks’ private law firm both time and money.

14

scheme injecting a personal interest, financial or other-
wise, into the enforcement process may bring irrelevant or
impermissible factors into the prosecutorial decision and
in some contexts raise serious constitutional questions.”
(emphasis added) Jd. at 249-250.

In Marshall, an employer brought a federal action
challenging a provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act
that provided money collected as civil penalties for em-
ployment of child labor was to be returned to the Depart-
ment of Labor to reimburse the cost of investigating the
violation.

This case, while seemingly analogous to the case at
bar in that it involved reimbursement of a prosecutorial
entity for the procedural aspects of its work, is clearly
distinguishable in a crucial respect.

The plaintiff claimed the Fair Labor Standard Act’s
reimbursement provision created an impermissible risk of
bias because a greater effort by a regional Department of
Labor office to uncover violations would increase the
amount of penalties assessed, thus increasing the reim-
bursements for that office. Jd. at 238.

However, this Court stated:

. we need not say with precision what limits
there may be on a financial-or personal interest
of one who performs a prosecutorial function, for
here the influence alleged to impose bias is ex-
septionally remote. No government official
stands to profit economically from vigorous en-
forcement of the [procedure at issue].

Id. at 250.

15

In the case at bar, the potential for bias clearly was
even more remote. As explained, the diminutive fee Mr.
Gianos and Mr. Rylak received for providing discovery was
reimbursement for the necessary administrative costs
incurred by their private law firm.

It is axiomatic that receipt of $25.00 for this purpose
would not have prompted Mr. Gianos and Mr. Rylak to
increase their prosecutorial efforts. They only prosecute
those individuals issued a summons by a police officer in a
municipality they serve.

In this regard, Mr. Gianos and Mr. Rylak have no
connection to, or influence upon, a police officer’s decision
to issue a summons. They are simply forwarded a copy of
the summons once it has been issued. It is the police
officer who has the discretion whether or not to issue a
particular summons.

Therefore, there is not even arguably an appearance
of impropriety raised by their discovery procedure.

Accordingly, Respondents respectfully submit that
this Court’s review is not warranted.

C. Petitioner Has Failed to Present a Legitimate
Argument That the District Court’s Decision
Concerning Qualified Immunity Conflicted
With Applicable Precedent.

Petitioner’s sole argument challenging the district
court’s qualified immunity holding is that the Third
Circuit did not address the issue. According to Petitioner,
the Third Circuit’s decision in this regard reveals that it
disagreed with the district court.

16

This argument is not only disingenuous, it is mislead-
ing. A full reading of the Third Circuit’s opinion leaves no
doubt that the Court chose not to discuss qualified immu-
nity because it was an unnecessary step in its analysis.

As discussed in Point I, supra, the Third Circuit
agreed with the district court that the possible violation of
state court rules of discovery in this matter does not
amount to a federal constitutional violation.

Pursuant to Supreme Court precedent, this legal
finding ended the inquiry and entitled Defendants to
judgment as a matter of law. See Siegert, 500 U.S. at 232.

Thus, Petitioner’s assumption that the Third Circuit’s
silence demonstrated disagreement with the district
court’s holding is without merit.

Furthermore, this assumption highlights Petitioner’s
failure to present a legitimate argument that the district
court’s decision concerning immunity conflicts with valid
precedent.

The district court in fact supported its qualified
immunity decision with unequivocal Supreme Court
precedent. It cited Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635
(1987) for the principle that qualified immunity is avail-
able if “a reasonable [official] would have believed [his or
her] actions to be lawful, in light of the clearly established
law and the information the .. . [official] possessed.” Jd. at
641.

The district court found that “there appears to be no
law prior to this incident even suggesting that [an admin-
istrative discovery] fee was improper, much less clearly
establishing the impropriety of such a fee.” See Pet. App.
20A.

17

The court did not end its inquiry here. It examined the
subjective element of qualified immunity as mandated by
Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 (1980). This Court held in
Gomez that the qualified immunity “test focuses not only
on whether the official has an objectively reasonable basis
for [his] belief, but also whether {tJhe official himself [is]
acting sincerely and with a belief that he is doing
right....’” Id. at 641 (quoting Wood v. Strickland, 420
U.S. 308, 321 (1975)).

In this regard, the district court determined that Mr.
Gianos and Mr. Rylak’s knowledge of the prevalence of
fixed discovery fees in other New Jersey municipalities
“suggests [they] believed the administrative fee was
proper.” See Pet. App. 20A.

The district court’s findings on this issue are entirely
consistent with the record below. See Pet. App. 28A-314A;
and footnote 5.

Accordingly, Respondents respectfully submit that
this case does not merit review.

ITI.

PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT THAT THE DISTRICT
COURT FAILED TO INSTRUCT HIM ON THE
PROCEDURE FOR ANSWERING DEFENDANTS’
SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION IS WITHOUT
MERIT.

Petitioner claims various other Circuits have ruled
that pro se litigants should be provided extra guidance by
a district court when served with an adversarys summary
judgment motion.

18

In this regard, essentially two arguments are pre-
sented.

First, Petitioner alleges he was not informed that his
summary judgment opposition brief needed to address his
emotional distress claim, in light of the fact that Defen-
dants’ moving brief did not do so.

Second, Petitioner contends Respondents did not
request dismissal of any State actions in their motion, and
thus he again was unaware he had to address the same.

At the outset, Petitioner does not provide any evidence
that the Third Circuit has ruled pro se litigants should be
given special guidance by a district court on summary
judgment procedure.

More importantly, concerning the first issue, Respon-
dents’ district court summary judgment motion requested
dismissal, with prejudice, of “any and all claims made by
Plaintiff.” Thus, Petitioner was provided with clear notice
that Defendants’ motion was challenging all his claims.

Moreover, the district court afforded Petitioner addi-
tional time to submit his summary judgment opposition
after he complained to the judge in writing that he was not
sure he completely understood Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56. See Resp. App. 8A-9A.

Finally, Petitioner’s second argument is untrue.
Defendants’ brief in fact called for dismissal of Mr. Green’s
action based upon two different State grounds.

First, Defendants argued that in addition to qualified
immunity under federal law, they were afforded immunity
by the New Jersey Tort Claims Act, N.J.S.A. 59:1-1, et seg.

19

Second, Defendants argued that Mr. Green had not
made the factual showing required to support his mali-
cious prosecution claim. See Resp. App. 26A-27A, 30A-32A.
In fact, Mr. Green’s summary judgment opposition re-
sponded to this argument at length.

Accordingly, Respondents respectfully submit that
this case does not merit review.

IV.

HARLOW V. FITZGERALD, 457 U.S. 800 (1982)
CLEARLY ILLUSTRATES DISCOVERY WAS NOT
STOPPED TOO SOON.

Petitioner challenges the Third Circuit’s holding that
he was not entitled to discovery in this federal action
because his complaint could have been dismissed for
failure to state a claim.

In this regard, Petitioner claims that discovery he was
seeking to compel at the time his case was dismissed by
the district court would have provided evidence of official
abuse that goes to the heart of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Petitioner cites Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961),
in which this Court stated that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was
meant to provide a remedy te individuals deprived of a
constitutional right by a government official’s abuse of his
position. Jd. at 172.

As discussed in Point I, supra, both the district court
and Third Circuit clearly ruled there was no constitutional
violation. ;

Respondents also noted earlier in this Brief that
Harlow held: on a summary judgment motion in which the

20

defendant has invoked qualified immunity, the judge may
appropriately determine not only the applicable law, but
whether that law was clearly established at the time of the
alleged violation. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.

Importantly, enunciation of this principle was followed
by the explicit pronouncement:

Until this threshold immunity question is re-
solved, discovery should not be allowed. (empha-
sis added)

Id.

Therefore, since pursuant to Supreme Court prece-
dent Mr. Green was not entitled to continue discovery,
Respondents respectfully submit that this case does not
warrant review.

bal

21

CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons, Respondents respect-
fully pray that this Honorable Court deny the Petition for
Writ of Certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

Victor A. ROTOLO, Esq.

Counsel of Record

ROTOLO @ MIDLIGE

2200 Route 31 — Suite 12

Clinton Township

Lebanon, New Jersey 08833

(908) 735-0330

Attorneys for Respondents,
William Gianos, Albert Rylak,
Honorable Jeffrey Martin, Law
Firm of Rylak & Gianos and
Honorable Stephen Rubin

DATED: October, 2002

APPENDIX

John P. Green
69 Duclos Lane
Edison NJ 08817
Pro-Se
908-572-6273

Town of Frenchtown

Plaintiffs, Summons and Complaint No. B 3284
Vs.
John Green

Defendants.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION
OF DOCUMENTS AND THINGS

The Defendant, John Green, request pursuant to rules of
the New Jersey Rule’s Governing the courts. Please
forward the documents and tangible things within 30 days
after service of this request to John Green 69 Duclos Lane
Edison NJ 08817.

DEFINITIONS AND INSTRUCTIONS

The term “documents” as used in this request is defined to
include without limitation all original and non-identical
copies of accounts, acknowledgments, advertisements,
affidavits, agreements, appointment books, bills, bills of
sale, calendars, charges, checks, client list, computer
printouts, computer readable disks, contracts, correspon-
dence, customer call records, customer lists, diaries,
descriptions, drafts, files, income statements, insurance
policies, insurance records and reports, inventories,
invoices, journals, ledgers, letters, licenses, log books,

9 Sone eee

2A

loose-leaf binders, messages, newspapers, notices, notes,
orders, papers, photographs, policies, receipts, reports,
Rolex cards, statements, tangible things, tape recordings,
tax returns, telephone bills, telephone lists and logs,
warranties, work orders and sheets, wrappers and writ-
ings.

The words “you” or “your” as used in this request shall be
construed to mean any of the following: Town of French-
town, or any employee, agent or representative within the
control of town of Frenchtown.

You shall produce original copies of all requested docu-
ments and copies thereof that bear any mark or notation
not present on the original. In all cases where originals pr
non-identical copies are not available, “document” or
“documents” also mean identical copies of original docu-
ments and non-identical copies thereof.

The term “relates to” shall mean consist of, refer to, reflect
or be in any way logically or factually connected with the
matter discussed.

If you withhold any information on the ground that you
contend it is privileged or otherwise protected from disclo-
sure, state specifically the legal basis for withholding,
state all facts which support your withholding; identify all
persons receiving or having knowledge of any of the
information; and identify all documents containing any of
the information. If a claim of privilege is asserted with
respect to any document, provide the above information,
as well as: (a) author; (b) addressee; (c) distribute; (d) date;
(c) type of document; (f) topic; (g) grounds and factual basic
for assertion of privilege.

an ee

3A

If any document described in any paragraph of this re-
quest for documents is no longer in your possession,
custody or control, state whether it: (a) is missing or lost,
(b) has been destroyed, (c) has been transferred voluntar-
ily or involuntarily to others, or (d) has been disposed of
through other means. In each instance, explain the cir-
cumstances surrounding such disposition, and identify the
person directing or authorizing same, and the date thereof.

REQUEST

1. All documents or things relating to the establishment
of the speed limit on Harrison St., time and date of town
meeting to set limit, newspaper ads to inform public of the
town meet, notice in newspapers of the establishment of
sped limit on Harrison St., all documents that you intend

to use to prove that the speed limit on Harrison St. Was

legally set.

2. Copies of the arresting officers log books for his shift
on Jan. 14, 1997.

3. Copies of Both sides of the arresting officer’s copy of
the tickets.

4. A description of the device used to measure my speed
when it’s was Calibrated and how, and it’s maintenance
and repair history.

5. Copy of Calibration slip for tuning forks use daily to
Calibrate radar unit in the three speeds.

6. Copy of the Calibration of the police car’s speedometer.

| BES ee en oe a

4A

7. The officer’s training records on that device, and his
employment history.

DATED Jan 19 1997

John Green

eC

5A

JOINT COURT OF MILFORD
FRENCHTOWN, NEW JERSEY
HUNTERDON COUNTY

STATE OF NEW JERSEY ) TRANSCRIPT
VS. OF
JOHN P. GREEN ) HEARING
PLACE: FRENCHTOWN MUNICIPAL
BUILDING.
DATE: MARCH 12, 1997
BEFORE:

HONORABLE JEFFREY MARTIN, J.M.C.
TRANSCRIPT ORDERED BY: JOHN P. GREEN
APPEARANCES:

FOR THE STATE: WILLIAM GIANOS, ESQ.
FOR THE DEFENDANT: PRO SE

PRINTED WORDS

EMMA STORR CLOWES, CCT
123 PETTICOAT LANE
LEBANON, NEW JERSEY 08833

[20] I don’t know what the ordinance or the thing
with the county is setting the speed limit. I have not, I
can’t do no research without the proof (sic) I asked for.
Give me the information, I'll pay for it, like I did in a letter
to him.

THE COURT: Even though you objected, if
there’s a release here, do you object to doing it my way?

6A

MR. GIANOS: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. All right. So -

MR. GIANOS: But Your Honor, I want it on the
record to state that we have present in court today every-
thing that we will rely on to prosecute this case.

There’s nothing additional that we are going to rely on
to prosecute this case, other than what is sitting on the
table to the right of me nght now.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. GIANOS: That's -

THE COURT: And that’s what you're basically
entitled to, sir. You're not entitled to what we call a fishing
expedition for what they don’t rely on.

JOHN P. GREEN: Well they rely -

THE COURT: Sir, if they fall short in what they
say they need to prove their case —

JOHN P. GREEN: Right.

THE COURT: - then they fall short and they
lose. But they don’t have to supply what they say they
don’t need.

tal ~ »

[23] I’m going to play this, rather than trying that, then
I'll play it by the book too. Which is not to say — okay
prosecutor, even though he’s not happy with me — let’s
forget going through your office, let’s just make the copies
give the man his copies and set this case up for trial.

You don’t want to do that?

7A

JOHN P. GREEN: I'm happy to do that.

THE COURT: No, no sir. You’re happy your way
but not happy for the trade off.

JOHN P. GREEN: Iam not-

THE COURT: I’m only happy with what I get,
not with what I have to give.

JOHN P. GREEN: I-I won't sign a release.

THE COURT: Okay. Then you will not sign a
release, then I’m not going to order it be done.

I'm going to reschedule this for trial. I will point out to
you sir, that you’ve now — so that you're clear with what
I’m saying — when you come back next time and you're still
in this (inaudible), okay, I’m reminding you of two things -
it was made available to you here in court and you've seen
it and you could have had it by simply saying — I'll forget
this thing about law suits —- and I would have made you a

copy.
JOHN P. GREEN: That is -—

THE COURT: In my mind you've been given
every opportunity for your discovery at this point. I’m
going to give

8A

John Green

69 Duclos Lane
Edison NJ 08817
732-572-6273
PRO-SE

April 5, 2001

Honorable Anne E. Thompson
United States Magistrate Judge

United States District Court (Filed Apr. 10, 2001)
Clarkson S. Fisher Federal Building &

Federal Courthouse

402 E. State Street

Trenton NJ 08608

Re: Green vs. Gianos, et als
Docket No.: CV-00-1959(AET)

[So Ordered Anne E. Thompson 4/9/01)
Dear Judge Thompson:

Thank you for your letter of April 3, 2001. I do ask for an
adjournment to May 7, 2001 for a few reasons.

I did not receive the defendant’s motion until March 26,
2001, by First Class Mail. I was a little confused about
Federal Civil Rule 56(c), “The adverse party prior to the
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits.” I mistak-
enly took this to mean any day.

Since I did receive this motion until late on March 26,
2001, and being a pro-se and not totally understanding
Rule 56(c), I ask that I be given until April 30th 2001 to
file my affidavit and brief.

I might also note that I have talked to Mr. Rotolo office on
March 26, 2001 concerning the missing pages and mixed
up affidavit in his appendix. I also faxed Mr. Rotolo today

ee ee ee

9A

a letter asking if he was going to correct his appendix or
not. Depending what he does may change my brief.

On December 21, 2000, the defendants applied for an
Extension of time to complete discovery, I did not oppose
this and Judge Wolfson on January 16, 2001, granted their
request. This is the first adjournment or extension that I
have asked for.

I certify that I am fully familiar with the facts of this
matter and that the statements made by me are true. I am
aware that if any of the foregoing statements made by me
are willfully false, I am subject to punishment.

Respectfully yours,

/s/ John Green
John Green
CC: Mr. Victor A. Rotolo by fax April 5, 2001

10A

ROTOLO « MIDLIGE
2200 Route 31 — Suite 12

Clinton Township WILLIAM GIANOS,
Lebanon, New Jersey 08833 ALBERT RYLAK,
(908) 735-0330 HONORABLE

Attorneys for Defendant(s): JEFFREY MARTIN,
File 9000.12/9000. 13/2102.00 LAW FIRM OF RYLAK

VAR: sjr (5682) & GIANOS and
HONORABLE
STEPHEN RUBIN
Plaintiffs), UNITED ST ATES
JOHN GREEN - DISTRICT COURT
-_ . DISTRICT OF
NEW JERSEY
Defendant(s), .
WILLIAM GIANOS, : Civil Action No.
ALBERT RYLAK, JEFFREY : 001959(AET)
MARTIN, LAW FIRM OF
RYLAK & GIANOS AND
STEPHEN RUBIN.

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS’ MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

OF COUNSEL AND ON THE BRIEF:
Victor A. Rotolo, Esq.

Preliminary Statement. ........----sssrseserenerersenseneenees 6

Statement of Facts ..........:sssscseereeesnneressnneenenenssnrenens 10

LEGAL ARGUMENT...........:::sscesessssseeeenneneesensnnenseeens
Point I .....c0ccccecessssvesssessnesecsesevecsnnennsesssensnnssossssncens

PLAINTIFF WAS PROVIDED DISCOVERY IN
ACCORDANCE WITH NEW JERSEY COURT
RULES AND THUS NOT DEPRIVED OF HIS
DUE PROCESS RIGHTS.

Pott II ....ccccccecessssovsssccosncecsseesccnsvocnsennssnsscssossscnees

MR. GIANOS, MR. RYLAK AND MR. RUBIN
ARE ENTITLED TO THE AFFIRMATIVE DE-
FENSE OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY UNDER
BOTH FEDERAL AND STATE LAW BECAUSE
THEIR ACTIONS WERE BOTH OBJECTIVELY
AND SUBJECTIVELY REASONABLE.

A. FEDERAL LAW......::::::ccceeeseseesssnsensntsnenenees®
B. STATE LAW. ........:::sesceeeesseseeenneeeenennnneaneneness
Point III .........00sesssssesecsvesssessnssscccocenonevonsvccsnansouonees

JUDGE MARTIN IS ENTITLED TO ABSO-
LUTE JUDICIAL IMMUNITY FROM LIABIL-
ITY AS ESTABLISHED BY THE THIRD
CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS.

PLAINTIFF CANNOT MAKE THE FACTUAL
SHOWING REQUIRED TO SUPPORT HIS
BARE ALLEGATION THAT MR. GIANOS AND
MR. RYLAK ARE LIABLE FOR MALICIOUS
PROSECUTION.

A. EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE..........
B. ABSENCE OF MALICE OR INTENT.........--

15

15
21
23

27

SS RO ER aN CRE or or Tor weleey we ew oN Ee

SINCE MR. GIANOS AND MR. RYLAK ARE
NOT LIABLE FOR THEIR ALLEGED WRONG-
FUL ACTIONS, THE LAW FIRM OF RYLAK &
GIANOS, AS A PARTNERSHIP, CANNOT BE
LIABLE AND IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY
JUDGMENT.

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT SHOULD BE GRANTED BE-
CAUSE NO GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL
FACT EXISTS.

i oe ole nietheada aneaeasatabdant

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
New Jersey Court Rule 7:7-7 (BR. 7:7-7)......ccsssssesseeeeeeeeeeees
State v. Langella, 144 N.J.Super. 268 (App. Div.

Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994) ..........ceseeeessesseeeees

Plummer v. Department of Corrections, 305
N.J.Super 365 (App. Div. 1997) ..............cccc-ccsssssserreseors

Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 (1980) ..............cececeeeeseeerees

N.J.S.A. 59:1-1, et seg. (New Jersey Tort Claims
GOD ivi ticsesicacapnshetcticireniihleattadageniiatinnnetitennemneinreiah bien

Canico v. Hurtado, 144 N.J. 361 (1996) .......... cc cceeeeeeeeeeeees
K.D. v. Bozarth, 313 N.J.Super. 561 (App. Div.

32

13A

Figueroa v. Blackburn, 39 F.Supp.2d 479 (D.N.J.

WI a ccsciisichuicsitscscestbasauvinvinhaepedvssedesasbabebentenvebiseensevienncetn 23
Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, 508 U.S. 429 (1993)........... 23
Pierson v. J.L. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) .......::ccceeseeeeeseeeeee 23
Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325 (19838) .............ceceeeeeeeeeeeees 23
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978).......sesesesereens 23
Figueroa v. Blackburn, 208 F.3d 435 (3rd Cir. 2000)........25
Cooper v. Smith, 936 F.Supp. 515 (1996) ..........seseeeeres 27
Russell v. Smith, 68 F.3d 33 (1995)........cccccceeeseeeeeeeeeerereees 27
Treece v. Village of Naperville, 903 F.Supp. 1251

CD oc siitliicinsnnnsdsasiniaprostarenvicnemucionctovenrepienienansassrots 27
LoBiondo v. Schwartz, 323 N.J.Super. 391 (1999)............ 27
Berg v. County of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261 (8rd Cir.

IY: <3 cisaslionsrudindpandavesicsenadvivarntuonNenisnabivipnevesanbieviys 29
NJS.A. 4221-18 .....scccccccrsssrsseessccscecsccvescscersnssesncscosscoessosenss 31
Eule v. Eule Motor Sales, 34 N.J. 537 (1961).......ssssss0see 31
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) ..........se00+ 32

Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. Lacey Town-
ship, 772 F.2d 1103 (3rd Cir. 1985), cert. denied,

475 U.S. 1018 (1986).......cccrrssssscsscorcccssssersersessesssscsscoooess 32
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986)....... 32>
Pollock v. American Tel. & Tel. Long Lines, 794

F.2d 860 (3rd Cir. 1986).............ccccccsssssrcreereceeeceeeeeesereees 33

14A

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Plaintiff's suit must fail because the crux of his claim
revolves around the alleged inappropriateness of an
administrative fee for discovery in municipal cases, when
in fact, the imposition of such a fee is common practice
among municipal prosecutors in New Jersey.

This case arises out of Plaintiff's refusal to pay an
administrative fee to the Frenchtown, New Jersey Munici-
pal Prosecutor for discovery concerning a speeding ticket
he chose to contest.

After receiving a summons for traveling fifty-one (51)
miles per hour in a twenty-five (25) mile per hour school
zone, Plaintiff requested a large quantity of discovery from
Mr. Gianos, Frenchtown Municipal Prosecutor. Specifi-
cally, Plaintiff requested:

(1) all documents Mr. Gianos intended to
use to prove the speed limit had been le-
gally set on Harrison Street (where Plaintiff
had been issued the speeding ticket); (2) the
arresting officer’s log book for January 14,
1997; (3) both sides of the officer’s ticket; (4)
a description of the device used to measure
Plaintiff’s speed, when it was calibrated,
and the maintenance and repair history; (5)
the calibrations slip for the tuning forks
used to calibrate the radar unit; and (6) the
officer’s training record on the radar de-
vice. See Exhibit C. _

Mr. Gianos informed Plaintiff all documents relevant
to the ticket would be provided upon receipt of twenty-five
dollars ($25.00) to cover the administrative cost associated
with locating, compiling and copying this discovery.

15A

Despite the volume of the request and the fact that
charging such a diminutive flat fee for discovery is a
common practice among municipal prosecutors in -New
Jersey, Plaintiff refused to pay.

On March 12, 1997, an initial hearing regarding the
speeding ticket was held in Frenchtown Municipal Court
before Judge Martin. Plaintiff alleged he had been denied
discovery and threatened suit against Mr. Gianos.

In an effort to help both parties resolve this dispute
amicably, Judge Martin suggested copies of the discovery
documents be made for Plaintiff at the Court in exchange
for a Release not to sue Mr. Gianos. However, Plaintiff
refused to sign a release or pay for discovery.

Significantly, even though the good faith efforts of Mr.
Gianos and Judge Martin failed to resolve this matter,
Plaintiff did view all relevant discovery at the March 12,
1997 hearing.

The trial for Plaintiff's speeding ticket ultimately took
place eighteen months later on September 9, 1999, at
which time he was convicted of this offense. Thus, having
viewed the State’s evidence, Plaintiff had ample time to
prepare his defense.

Plaintiff appealed this Municipal Court conviction to
New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division, where it was
defended by the Hunterdon County Prosecutor’s Office. On
de novo review, the Law Division affirmed the guilty
finding.

On January 19, 2000, the Appellate Division over-
turned Plaintiff's speeding conviction because the State
_had not proven every element of the speeding offense
beyond a reasonable doubt.

amas ccaaaamaeaaaa Na i ii,

16A

The Appellate Division briefly addressed the discovery
fee dispute, but opted not to make any affirmative rulings
on the issue. However, significantly, the Court expressly
acknowledged the practice of charging an administrative
discovery fee by stating:

[Wle have a sense that the heart of [Defen-
dant’s] contention, the $25.00 administra-
tive fee, may be the rule rather than the
exception. See Exhibit G at page 342.

On April 25, 2000, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in
Federal District Court alleging he had been deprived of his
due process rights by Mr. Gianos, Mr. Rylak, Judge
Martin, the Law Firm of Rylak and Gianos, and Mr.
Rubin, the Hunterdon County Prosecutor.

For the following reasons, Defendants are entitled to
judgment as a matter of law and Plaintiff's Complaint
should, respectfully, be dismissed with prejudice:

(1) Plaintiff was not deprived of his due process
rights because he viewed the discovery made available to
him in accordance with New Jersey Court Rules;

(2) Mr. Gianos, Mr. Rylak, and Mr. Rubin are
entitled to the affirmative defense of qualified immunity
under Federal and State law because their actions were
objectively reasonable and performed with subjective good
faith;

|

(3) Judge Martin is entitled to absolute judicial
immunity from liability for his alleged actions and/or
inactions; |

(4) Plaintiff’s laim against Mr. Gianos and Mr.
Rylak for malicious rosecution fails because he cannot

|
|
|
|

|

17A

make a factual showing which supports his bare allegation
these Defendants acted with malice; and

(5) since Mr. Gianos and Mr. Rylak are not liable for
their alleged wrongful actions, the Law Firm of Rylak &
Gianos, as a partnership, cannot be held liable.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The material facts underlying Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment are fully set forth in Defendants’
attached Statement of Undisputed Facts submitted
pursuant to Local Federal Practice Rule 56.1. For the sake
of brevity, these facts will not be reiterated herein, but are
incorporated and adopted by reference.

LEGAL ARGUMENT
POINT I

PLAINTIFF WAS PROVIDED DISCOVERY
IN ACCORDANCE WITH NEW JERSEY
COURT RULES AND THUS NOT DE- -
PRIVED OF HIS DUE PROCESS RIGHTS.

FRIVEY UP tin eee ene sees ems”

In January, 1997, Mr. Gianos informed Plaintiff
copies of all relevant discovery would be provided upon
payment of a twenty-five dollar fee. Plaintiff refused to
pay this fee.

Nevertheless, at the March 12, 1997 initial hearing,
Mr. Gianos offered Plaintiff an opportunity to review this
discovery.

In addition, Judge Martin, in a good faith effort to aid
the parties in their discovery dispute, suggested copies be

18A

made for Plaintiff in return for a signed Release promising
not to sue Mr. Gianos.

Even though Judge Martin’s suggestion was declined,
Plaintiff did view the relevant discovery that was made
available to him in accordance with New Jersey Court
Rule 7:7-7(b).

New Jersey Court Rule 7:7-7(b) governs municipal
practice and provides a defendant “shall be allowed to
inspect, copy and photograph or be provided with copies
and any relevant reports ... within the custody of the
prosecuting attorney.” R. 7:7-7(b). (emphasis added)

Accordingly, it cannot be disputed that the mandate of
Rule 7:7-7(b) was adhered to in this matter.

Furthermore, discovery relevant to a_municipal
prosecution will be in the possession of municipal prosecu-
tors, who are almost always local practicing attorneys.
Therefore, it is only logical the cost associated with provid-
ing this discovery is going to be borne by these private
attorneys.

Moreover, there is no provision in the New Jersey
Court Rules that directly addresses the imposition of
discovery fees.’ Thus, under applicable New Jersey Court

' Although the 2001 comments to New Jersey Court Rule 7:7-7
reference charging a per-page copying fee for discovery in municipal
cases. Plaintiff’s dispute arose in 1997 and his speeding trial was in
1998. Both the 1997 and 1998 comments pertaining to municipal
discovery make no mention of discovery fees. Mr. Gianos and Mr. Rylak
were, at all relevant times, guided by the 1997 and 1998 New Jersey
Court Rules. Moreover, since the Appellate Division in State v. Green
failed to make any affirmative rulings in regard to discovery fees, it

(Continued on foliowing page)

19A

Rules there was nothing improper about the Prosecutors’
fee request.

Plaintiff was initially informed he could have copies of
all discovery upon payment of the twenty-five dollar
administrative fee. Plaintiff refused and never made any
claim on insolvency. Plaintiff was then given an opportu-
nity to copy all discovery at the March 12, 1997 hearing
before Judge Martin. Plaintiff again refused.

Finally, Plaintiff was allowed to view all of the mater-
ials, which he did, at this hearing. Therefore, there can be
no doubt Plaintiff was permitted ample opportunity to
review the discovery as required by New Jersey Court
Rule 7:7-7(b).

Moreover, the trial for Plaintiff's case was not heard
until September 9, 1998, more than eighteen months after
Plaintiff was permitted to view the discovery on March 12,
1997. This provided Plaintiff substantial time to prepare
his defense.

Due process in its constitutional sense is little more
than another name for fair play. See State v. Langella, 144
N.J.Super. 268, 284 (App. Div. 1976).

Due process connotes fundamental fairness. It is an
element which, when missing, produces the reaction
accorded to that which is “shocking to the universal sense
of justice”. See id. (citing United States v. Russell, 411 U.S.
423, 432 (1973)).

appears the 2001 comments, which cite to the Appellate Division case,
inaccurately rely on this case.

20A

The actions of Defendants did not violate Plaintiffs
right to fundamental fairness because Plaintiff ultimately
viewed the discovery concerning the charges against him.
After viewing this discovery, he had over a year and a half
to consider and prepare a defense to the State’s case.

Moreover, charging a diminutive fee that is commonly
charged throughout the State cannot be considered “shock-
ing to the universal sense of justice”.

Plaintiff was clearly provided discovery in accordance
with New Jersey procedural law and not deprived of his
due process rights.

Accordingly, the crux of Plaintiff's case, ie., that his
due process rights were violated because discovery was not
provided, cannot be proven and his Complaint should,
respectfully, be dismissed.

WERE BOTH OBJECTIVELY AND SUB-
JECTIVELY REASONABLE.

GEV Liv ees See

A. FEDERAL LAW

In the subject litigation, Plaintiff claims his due
process rights guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution were
violated by Defendants’ alleged failure to provide discovery
relative to his speeding ticket.

21A

Accordingly, Plaintiff seeks redress pursuant to 42
U.S.C. Sec. 1983 (hereinafter “Section 1983”).

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for “depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws of the United States” by any person
acting under “color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, or any State or Territory.” 42 U.S.C.
Section 1983.

Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive
rights. Rather, it merely provides the methed for vindicat-
ing Federal rights elsewhere conferred. See Albright v.
Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994).

Thus, to sustain a successful Section 1983 claim,
Plaintiff must prove he has been deprived of a Federal
right, and the person or entity that deprived him of that
right acted under “color of law”.

Significantly, qualified immunity base on “good faith”
is an affirmative defense to Section 1983 claims against
public officials. See Plummer v. Department of Corrections,
305 N.J.Super. 365, 370 (App. Div. 1997) (citing Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982)).

This immunity is available to public officials perform-
ing discretionary functions and protects “all but the
plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the
law”. Id. (referring to Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341
(1986)).

Although the provision of discovery is mandated by
Rules of Court, the administrative manner in which such
discovery is provided must logically involve the use of
discretion. Mr. Gianos and Mr. Rylak are both private
practicing attorneys and municipal prosecutors.

22A

In order to perform these roles simultaneously, they
needed to develop a method for compiling, copying and
providing discovery that would allow for compliance with
the new Jersey Court Rules, yet minimize the burden on
the time and finances of their private practice. Accord-
ingly, it was within their discretion to adopt the commonly
used administrative fee as a way to balance these inter-
ests. (See Exhibit F).

Mr. Rubin was also acting in a discretionary manner
when he chose not to take action against Mr. Gianos and.
Mr. Rylak. -

Plaintiff informed him Mr. Gianos and Mr. Rylak
were engaging in an allegedly inappropriate practice.
However, being aware that this dispute was a municipal
matter, Mr. Rubin exercised his supervisory discretion in
directing Plaintiff to the Frenchtown Municipal Court and
Offices of the Municipal Prosecutor.

Public officials acting in a discretionary role are thus
generally “shielded from liability under Section 1983
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly estab-
lished statutory or constitutional rights of which a reason-
able person would have known.” Jd.

A “clearly established right” is one where the contours
are sufficiently clear so that a reasonable official would
understand when his actions violate that right. See id.

Accordingly, a public official will be immune from a
Section 1983 suit if his/her conduct was justified by
objectively reasonable beliefs. See id.

In addition, the United States Supreme Court held in
Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 (1980):

23A

“lit is] the existence of reasonable grounds for the
belief formed at the time and in light of all the
circumstances, coupled with a good faith belief,
that affords a basis for qualified immunity of
[public officials] for acts performed in the course
of official conduct. The test focuses not only on
whether the official has an objectively reasonable
basis for that belief, but also on whether the offi-
cial was acting sincerely and with a belief he was
doing right.” Id. at 641. (emphasis added).

Therefore, a public official’s subjective belief is also an
appropriate consideration in determining whether immu-
nity applies.

This subjective belief may be based on state or local
law, advice of counsel, administrative practice, or some
other factor of which the official alone is aware. See id.

In the present matter, Mr. Gianos, Mr. Rylak, and Mr.
Rubin each qualify for the good faith immunity available
to public officials, insulating them from the current
Section 1983 claims.”

They each acted objectively reasonable and with
subjective good faith while carrying out their respective
duties.

? In Point II, the immunity of Defendants Rylak, Gianos and Mr.
Rubin is explained. The immunity of Judge Martin will be discussed in
Point ITI, infra.

24A

MR. GIANOS AND MR. RYLAK

Mr. Gianos and Mr. Rylak demanded a discovery fee
from Plaintiff with the understanding it was a reasonable
and permissible practice under State procedural laws
governing municipal practice. This understanding was
based on their knowledge and perception of New Jersey
Court Rules and the practice of other local municipal
prosecutors. (See Exhibit F).

Specifically, Mr. Gianos and Mr. Rylak, in part, took
guidance from New Jersey Court Rule 7:7-7(b), which as
discussed in Point I, supra, governs municipal practice
discovery and provides: “a defendant is entitled to discov-
ery in all cases involving a consequence of magnitude or
when ordered by the court.” R. 7:7-7(b). (See Exhibit F.)

There is no provision in the Rules that directly ad-
dresses the imposition of discovery fees. The relevant New
jersey Court Rule merely provides the defendant “shall be
allowed to inspect, copy, and photograph or be provided
with copies and any relevant reports ... within the cus-
tody of the prosecuting attorney.” R. 7:7-7(b). (emphasis
added).

As also discussed in Point I, supra, it is implicit that
discovery relevant to a municipal prosecution will be in
the possession of municipal prosecutors, who are almost
always local practicing attorneys. Therefore it is logical
the cost associated with providing this discovery is going
to be borne by these attorneys.

Accordingly, Mr. Gianos and Mr. Rylak believed they
were entitled to reimbursement of the expenses borne by
their office. Further evidencing this belief was Mr. Gianos

25A

and Mr. Rylak’s reliance on their personal knowledge that
numerous similarly situated prosecutors charge an equiva-
lent or greater fee. (See Exhibit F).

Finally, this practice was specifically noted to exist by
the New Jersey Appellate Division in State v. Green, 327
N.J. Super. 334 (App. Div. 2000). The Court stated: “[Wle
have a sense that the heart of the contention, the $25
administrative fee, may be the rule rather than the excep-
tion.” (See Exhibit G at page 342).

Clearly, therefore, it was objectively reasonable based
on the nature of local practice and New Jersey procedural
law for Mr. Gianos and Mr. Rylak to charge a nominal fee
for providing discovery.

Moreover, in good faith both Mr. Gianos and Mr.
Rylak subjectively believed they were entitled to reim-
bursement of the expenses borne by their office in making
discovery available to Plaintiff. (See Exhibit F).

MR. RUBIN

As Hunterdon County Prosecutor, the claims against

Mr. Rubin are derivative of those-against-Mr.Gianos and
Mr. Rylak.

Moreover, Mr. Rubin never had any direct contact
with Plaintiff. Plaintiff contacted Mr. Rubin’s office by
telephone and was informed, through Mr. Rubin’s secre-
tary, that he should direct his complaint to either French-
town Municipal Court or the Offices of the Municipal
Prosecutor, which is where the discovery dispute would be
resolved.

26A

Finally, the March 5, 1997 letter Plaintiff sent to Mr.
Rubin complaining of the Prosecutors’ actions in no way
discredits Mr. Rubin’s good faith belief the fee request was
appropriate. (See Exhibit L).

There simply is no evidence whatsoever that Mr.
Rubin’s response in this matter was not objectively rea-
sonable and premised on the subjective good faith belief
Plaintiffs dispute was a municipal matter.

Accordingly, Mr. Gianos, Mr. Rylak, and Mr. Rubin
are each entitled to qualified immunity under Federal law.

B. STATE LAW

In Plaintiffs Complaint, he invoked the Court's
jurisdiction to consider claims arising under State law.
(See Exhibit E). Although it is unclear whether this
invocation was in regard to all claims asserted, Defen-
dants are also entitled to immunity under New Jersey law.

Under the Tort Claims Act, N.J.S.A. 59:1-1, et seq., a
public employee is afforded immunity if he acts in good
faith in the execution or enforcement of any law. See
N.J.S.A. 59:3-3.

In order to meet this “good faith” standard, a public
employee’s actions must be objectively reasonable or
performed with subjective good faith. See Canico v. Hur-
tado, 144 N.J. 361 (1996).

As discussed above in reference to Federal immunity,
the actions of Mr. Gianos, Mr. Rylak, and Mr. Rubin were
both objectively reasonable and exercised with subjective
good faith.

27A

Accordingly, the affirmative defense of qualified
immunity is equally warranted under New Jersey law.

POINT ITI

JUDGE MARTIN IS ENTITLED TO ABSO-
LUTE JUDICIAL IMMUNITY FROM LIABIL-
ITY AS ESTABLISHED BY THE THIRD
CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS.

Well-established law dictates judges are absolutely
immune from liability for their judicial acts. See K.D. v.
Bozarth, 313 N.J.Super. 561, 568 (App. Div. 1998).

“'TJhe doctrine of judicial immunity is justified by
strong public policy which recognizes that the independ-
ence ... of the judiciary might be compromised if judges
are exposed to threats of civil liability for actions taken in
their judicial capacity.” Figueroa v. Blackburn, 39
F.Supp.2d 479, 485 (D.N.J. 1999); see also Antoine v. Byers
& Anderson, 508 U.S. 429, 435 (1993). :

It is also “well settled that judicial immunity applies
to Section 1983 actions”, and applies “even as to judicial
acts that are wrong, malicious, or beyond the judge’s
authority.” Id.; see also Pierson v. J.L. Ray, 386 U.S. 547,
553-54 (1967); Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 334 (1983);
and Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978).

Judicial immunity has two prerequisites: (1) the act
complained of must be a judicial act; and (2) the judge
must have subject matter jurisdiction at the time he acts.
See K.D., 313 N.J.Super. at 568.

A “judicial act” is an act normally performed by a
judge in his judicial capacity. See id. In the present case, it
is clear that addressing a procedural dispute such as the

28A

method for providing discovery is a normal function
performed by a judge.

Thus, for purposes of the present case, the important
inquiry is whether Judge Martin had subject matter
jurisdiction at the time he intervened.

New Jersey Municipal Courts are clearly courts of
limited jurisdiction. See Figueroa, 39 F.Supp.2d at 489.
However, whether a judge has subject matter jurisdiction
must be broadly construed in the immunity context, such
that immunity will only be denied where the judge acted
in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. See K.D., 313
N.J.Super. at 568.

' Furthermore, United States Magistrate Judge Freda
L./ Wolfson held in Figueroa that “application of the
absolute judicial immunity standard to a court of limited
jurisdiction is appropriate.” Figueroa, 39 F.Supp.2d at 490.

In Figueroa, a municipal court judge was sued for
entering a Contempt of Court Order against an individual
who was being arraigned on harassment charges. The
plaintiff filed a civil rights complaint alleging the judge
failed to provide him with an automatic five-day stay of
his sentence as provided by New Jersey Court Rules
preventing him from filing an immediate appeal of his
prison sentence. See id. at 481-83.

Judge Wolfson granted summary judgment in favor of
the municipal judge because the municipal judge was
acting in a judicial capacity when holding the plaintiff in
contempt, and as explained above, the doctrine of immu-
nity applies to courts of both limited and general jurisdic-
tion. See id. at 495.

29A

This decision was affirmed by the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals in Figueroa v. Blackburn, 208 F.3d 435 (3rd
Cir. 2000).

The Court held that judges of courts of limited juris-
diction, such as New Jersey municipal court judges, are
entitled to absolute judicial immunity because “it is clear
the role of [such a judge] is functionally comparable to that
of a judge of a court of general jurisdiction.” Id. at 442.

In the instant case, it is clear Judge Martin was: (a)
acting in his judicial capacity when considering the dis-
covery dispute; and (b) had subject matter jurisdiction
over Plaintiffs Municipal Court Summons.

Moreover, Judge Martin did not make any decision
concerning whether the State’s evidence was properly in
the possession of Mr. Gianos and Mr. Rylak. There was no
need for Judge Martin to address this issue because, as
discussed in Point I, supra, the Court Rules expressly
provide discovery will be in the possession of the prosecut-
ing attorney(s).

As also discussed in Point I, supra, it is therefore
implicit that discovery relevant to a municipal prosecution
will be in the possession of municipal prosecutors, who in
this case, as in most municipalities, are local practicing
attorneys.

Accordingly, Judge Martin is entitled to absolute
judicial immunity from liability for his “judicial acts”
regarding the discovery fee dispute in this matter.

30A

POINT IV
PLAINTIFF CANNOT MAKE THE FAC:

TUAL SHOWING REQUIRED TO _ SUP-
PORT HIS B ALLEGATION _MR.
GIANOS AND MR. RYLAK ARE LIABLE
FOR MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.

To state a claim for malicious prosecution under
Section 1983, Plaintiff must satisfy the elements of a state
law malicious prosecution action. See Cooper v. Smith, 936
F.Supp. 515 (1996); Russell v. Smith, 68 F.3d 33 (1995);
and Treece v. Village f Naperville, 903 F.Supp. 1251
(1995).

|

Plaintiff in « malicious prosecution action under New-
Jersey law must prove the original action complained of
was: (1) brought without probable cause; (2) actuated by
malice; (3) terminated favorably to the plaintiff; and (4)
Plaintiff suffered a special grievance. See LoBiondo v.
Schwartz, 323 N.J.Super. 391, 423 (1999).

In the present matter, Plaintiff alleges Mr. Gianos
and Mr. Rylak are guilty of malicious b acenanecaea of
process.

However, this bare allegation is not supported by any
facts adduced. First, there was probable cause as a matter
of law, and in fact, for Plaintiff to be issued a speeding
ticket on January 14, 1997. Second, there are no facts
adduced which support Plaintiffs allegation Mr. Gianos
and Mr. Rylak acted with malice or intent.

A. EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE

Plaintiff was allegedly driving through a twenty-five
(25) mile per hour school zone at a clocked speed of fifty

31A

one (51) miles per hour. However, as discussed in the
January 19, 2000 Appellate Division decision, the statute
establishing this twenty-five mile per hour zone indicates
this speed limit is only applicable “during recess, when the
presence of children is clearly visible from the roadway, or
while children are going to or leaving school during open-
ing or closing hours . . . ” (See Exhibit G at page 338).

The Appellate Court found it was not established
beyond a reasonable doubt that school children were in
motion at the time Plaintiff was stopped. The officer
testified his patrol car was stationed directly across from
school at the time of the stop because school ordinarily let
out at that time.

Since the officer could not testify he had actually
witnessed children present, the court held the State failed
to establish beyond a reasonable doubt Plaintiff was
subject to the twenty-five mile per hour speed limit. (See
Exhibit G at pages 338-339).

Nevertheless, Plaintiff was clocked at a speed of fifty-
one miles per hour on the residential road of Harrison
Street, Borough of Frenchtown, New Jersey, in front of an
elementary school. (See Exhibit G at page 337). Thus,
regardless of whether the twenty-five mile per hour speed
limit was applicable at the time, Plaintiff's speed exceeded
that which is otherwise permitted on this residential
road’. Accordingly, there was probable cause as a matter of
law for the officer to stop Plaintiff.

* According to the Clerk at Frenchtown Borough Hall, the speed
limit on Harrison Street is always 25 miles per hour, and is 15 miles
(Continued on following page)

32A

In addition, the appropriate inquiry in determining
whether probable cause existed in fact for Plaintiffs
speeding ticket is whether a reasonable officer could have
believed there was probable cause in light of the informa-
tion in the officer’s possession. See Berg v. County of
Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 272 (3rd Cir. 2000).

A reasonable officer, based on his experience of
parking across from a school every day to ensure the
safety of entering or exiting children, would have believed
the twenty-five mile per hour speed limit was applicable.

Therefore, the officer who issued Plaintiffs speeding
ticket had probable cause to do so, even if it was not
established beyond a reasonable doubt that children were
actually present.

B. ABSENCE OF MALICE OR INTENT

The facts adduced do not support Plaintiffs bare
allegation Mr. Gianos and Mr. Rylak acted with malice or
intent to deprive him of due process rights. To the con-
trary, the evidence clearly indicates Mr. Gianos and Mr.
Rylak made every effort, short of waiving the disputed fee,
to make discovery available to Plaintiff.

Accordingly, Mr. Gianos and Mr. Rylak are entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.

per hour when the school zone limit is applicable. Although this slightly
differs from the Appellate Division’s description of the school zone
speed limit, it clearly indicates the permissible speed on Harrison
Street is no greater than fifty (50) miles per hour.

33A

POINT V

SINCE MR. GIANOS AND MR. RYLAK
ARE NOT LIABLE FOR THEIR ALLEGED

WRONGFUL ACTIONS, THE LAW FIRM
OF RYLAK & GIANOS, AS A PARTNER-

SHIP, CANNOT BE LIABLE AND IS ENTI-
TLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

Regarding partnerships, N.J.S.A. 42:1-13 provides
“where, by any wrongful act ... of any partner acting in
the course of the business of the partnership ... loss or
injury is caused to any person, the partnership is liable
therefor to the same extent as the partner so acting”.
N.J.S.A. 42:1-13; see also Eule v. Eule Motor Sales, 34 N.J.
537, 542 (1961).

The Law Firm of Rylak & Gianos is a partnership, of
which Mr. Gianos and Mr. Rylak are partners. (See Ex-
hibit F).

Mr. Gianos and Mr. Rylak, in part, were acting in the
course of their partnership’s business when they sought a
discovery fee from Plaintiff as a means to reimburse the
anticipated cost to their firm of obtaining such discovery.

In Point II and Point IV, supra, it wes explained that
Mr. Gianos and Mr. Rylak are not liable for any wrongful
act. Accordingly, the Law Firm of Rylak & Gianos cannot
be liable and is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

34A

POINT VI

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT SHOULD BE GRANTED BE-
CAUSE NO GENUINE ISSUE OF MATE-
RIAL FACT EXISTS.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides a court
should enter summary judgment if there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and the moving party is-
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See F.R.C.P. 56;
see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).

Once the moving party has satisfied this initial
burden, the opposing party must establish that a genuine
issue exists. See Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. Lacey
Township, 772 F.2d 1103, 1109 (8rd Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1013 (1986).

However, not every issue of fact will be sufficient to
defeat a motion for summary judgment; issues of fact are
genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

Furthermore, the opposing party cannot rest upon
mere allegations; it must present actual evidence that
creates a genuine issue of material fact. See id. at 249
(citing First Nat'l Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Co.,
391 U.S. 253, 290 (1968)).

The court must draw all reasonable inferences in the
opposing party’s favor, and must accept the party's evi-
dence when considering the merits of the summary judg-
ment motion. See Pollock v. American Tel. & Tel. Long
Lines, 794 F.2d 860, 864 (3rd Cir. 1986).

35A

Accordingly, it is respectfully submitted that in
consideration of all the material evidence, Defendants are
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

CONCLUSION ~

Based on the foregoing, it is respectfully requested the
Court enter an Order granting summary judgment and
dismissing any and all claims against each Defendant with
prejudice.

Respectfully submitted,
ROTOLO ¢ MIDLIGE
| Attorneys for Defendants,

WILLIAM GIANOS,
ALBERT RYLAK,
HONORABLE JEFFREY
MARTIN, LAW FIRM OF
RYLAK & GIANOS and
HONORABLE STEPHEN
RUBIN

By: /s/ Victor A. Rotolo
Victor A. Rotolo, Esq.

DATED: March 22, 2001

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386015_0411%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.