# Appendix — Salvador v. Lake George Park Commission > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386015_0355%3A4 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Appendix - **Published:** January 1, 2002 - **Citation:** 537 U.S. 1002 ## Text Supreme Caurt, U.S. FILED / fe se U SEP - 3 2009 No. OFFICE OF THE CLERK IN THE Supreme Court of the United States JOHN SALVADOR, JR. and KATHLEEN A. SALVADOR, Petitioners, v. ADIRONDACK PARK AGENCY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, THE LAKE GEORGE PARK COMMISSION, et al, Respondents. PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT APPENDIX - VOLUME Iil Madeline Sheila Galvin Counsel of Record c/o Galvin and Morgan 217 Delaware Avenue Delmar, New York 12054 (518) 439-7734 Attorneys for Petitioners ait 299 a TABLE OF CONTENTS VOLUME I: UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, FE SAME Reh rAS eR eee ube eed oes UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONAL PERT TPONEEEE Sivcevesesccescsccivecsvsrs FUE 65k IA Chek Miu wr ne ehesehcawnens ADA ACCESSIBILITY GUIDELINES FOR BUILDINGS AND FACILITIES ............ VOLUME II: ADA ACCESSIBILITY GUIDELINES FOR BUILDINGS AND FACILITIES, cont ....... CERTIFICATION OF STATE AND LOCAL PEE Foc cnsiseieceiscscesewe 300 a APPLICABLE LAWS, RULES AND REGULATIONS; LEGISLATIVE HISTORY; PLAINTIFFS' COMPLIANCEKND PERMITS RECEIVED 112. Upon information and belief, during the 1960 session of the New York State Legislature, certain legislation was proposed for the purpose of creating a Park Commission for Lake George. 113. Upon information and belief, the legislation proposed in the 1960 Legislative session did not pass. 114. Upon information and belief, legislation creating a Commission for the Lake George area again was introduced in the 1961 session of the New York State Legislature. 115. Upon information and belief, said legislation passed and became Chapter 454 of the Laws of 1961. 116. Upon information and belief, the stated legislative intent of said Chapter was to preserve and to develop recreational facilities for "the people". 117. Upon information and belief, said legislation also established "zones". 118. Upon information and belief, said zones were to be included within the physical boundaries of an area which was undefined in said legislation. 119. Upon information and belief, nowhere in said Chapter or previously was a "park" defined. 120. Upon information and belief, in creating the Lake George Park Commission, the powers of such entity related to the designation of the proposed non-commercial "zones". 121. Upon information and belief, contained in the SS NS Ra 301 a Bill Jacket for Chapter 454 of the Laws of 1961, L. Judson Morhouse, hereinafter referred to as "Morhouse", in his then capacity as Chairman of the New York State Republican Committee, wrote by Memorandum dated January 25, 1961 to Robert MacCrate stating Morhouse's belief that the method of "zoning", as set forth in Chapter 454 of the Laws of 1961, was "one of the only ways" to achieve the desired regulation of the Lake George area. 122. Upon information and belief, also included in said Bill Jacket was a copy of a letter from Morhouse to Assemblyman R. Wayne Pomeroy referring to said bill as "my baby". 123. Upon information and belief, an typewritten paragraph titled MORHOUSE PLAN and captioned as an excerpt from Adirondack Sportsman by Bill Roden also is contained in the Bill Jacket. 124. Upon information and belief, yet another letter from Morhouse, this dated March 9, 1961, and addressed to then Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller, supported the "final version" of said bill. 125. Upon information and belief, also contained in said Bill Jacket was a newspaper clipping noted as purportedly having been taken from the Sunday, March 28, 1961 Albany Times-Union, which pointed out that Morhouse, described as the "moving force behind" what became Chapter 454 of the Laws of 1961, owned a home located on Lake George on the shore outside Ticonderoga. 126. Upon information and belief, at some time thereafter Morhouse became the Chairman of the Commission as established by Chapter 454 of the Laws of 1961. 127. Upon information and belief, a clear statement of opposition to Chapter 454 of the Laws of 1961 was set forth in a formal Resolution of the Town of Queensbury, formally adopted by the Town Board of that Town. 302 a 128. Upon information and belief, said Town was and is directly impacted by such legislation. 129. Upon information and belief, the Town of Queensbury specifically objected top the approval of what became Chapter 454 of the Laws of 1961 in part on the grounds that ". . . the powers and duties of the Commission as set forth in the bill infringe upon the power of the Town t o [sic.] regulate the use of property in the Town of Queensbury in the area described in the bill." 130. Upon information and belief, based upon the content of said Resolution of the Town of Queensbury was sent by said Town to Assemblyman Richard Bartlett and Senator Eustice Pain, the two (2) elected representative whose areas of representation included the Town of Queensbury. 131. Upon information and belief, the State Council of Parks, a part of the Division of Parks within the . Conservation Department, by letter dated April 7, 1961, and included in the above mentioned Bill Jacket, also opposed the approval of what became Chapter 454 of the Laws of 1961. 132. Upon information and belief, the zones and zone concept set forth in Chapter 454 of the Laws of 1961 was altered on two (2) occasions by legislative enactments following the original 1961 Chapter Law. 133. Upon information and belief, Defendant DEC derived legislative authority with respect to Lake George by regulation 6 NYCRR Part 646 dated July 3, 1981. 134. Upon information and belief, pursuant to and by the exercise of such apparent authority legislatively granted and delegated to Defendant DEC as a sub-unit of the Executive branch of New York State government, by ECL 3-0301.2, ECL 9-0105.3 and 43-0107.5 (since recodified och nai tet Selena ' aN a ll A Sn HEM APIA PAN ch ANC Ie peel tea 303 a as 43-0107.19) DEC required that owners of marina facilities situated on Lake George were required to complete an application for a non-revocable Permit to Operate a Marina “on Lake George”. 135. Upon information and belief, as part of the implementation of said requirement Defendant DEC issued a form bearing issuance date in lower left hand corner of "8/81" for that purpose. 136. Upon information and belief, pursuant to the requirements established by DEC each such applicant for the above mentioned Marina permit was to select and specify from a DEC predetermined limited menu of "marina" activities being provided by the entity making application. 137. Upon information and belief, each such responding applicant was required to respond in a timely manner to the DEC to specific questions with respect thereto. 138. Plaintiffs responded to and complied with all the requirements of 6 NYCRR 646 (July 3, 1981). 139. By letter signed by Defendant White then Secretary to Defendant LGpC, dated December 15, 1981, DEC, acknowledged receipt of Plaintiffs' application to operate a marina on Lake George. 140. By notice issued December 16, 1981, the DEC by its agent, White, distributed notification of Plaintiffs' application to other persons and entities, identifying the Salvadors' "Dunham's Bay Lodge" as an "Existing Marina". 141. The above mentioned Notification included notification to Defendant Town of the DEC's intent to issue a Permit to Operate a Marina to Plaintiffs “on Lake George” in the DEC Lake George Recreation Zone (6 NYCRR Part 190.27), as a pre-existing non-conforming use within a 304 a Residential Zone of Defendant Town and within a Vessel Regulation Zone of Defendant Town. 142. Thereafter by Permit Number 50-81-0071 MA, dated March 22, 1982, and duly executed by Permit Administrator Richard A. Wild, the DEC issued to Plaintiffs a non-revocable Marina Permit pursuant to Article 9, Title 1 of the Environmental Conservation Law and the provisions of 6 NYCRR Part 646. 143. Said Marina Permit Application specifically affirmed that the services provided included the sale or rental of watercraft, the sale or rental of marine products, the rental, lease or accommodation for boats and other, etc., 75 parking spaces for vehicles, provision of trash receptacles and rest room facilities, as well as establishing 67 boat slips and one mooring as the vessel berthing capacity, all being maintained and operated at Plaintiffs' facility. (Other activities include boat storage, fuel dispensing, etc.) 144. The resulting non-revocable Marina Permit, incorporating the provisions of the application, recited only in part inclusion-among other things of "Sale or rental of marine products, services and dock space for 67 boats." 145. At this time, the term watercraft as used within the existing 6 NYCRR Part 646 regulation language was encompassed in the defined term "vessel", stating specifically" Vessel: means every description of water craft, other than a seaplane, used or capable of being used as a means of transportation on water. 146. The above mentioned definition did not differentiate in any way among the various types of available watercraft, including but not limited to motorized boats, canoes, jetskiis, PWCs of any type or kind, or 305 a sailboats. 147. Plaintiffs, in compliance with their application and with the terms and conditions of the duly issued non- revocable Marina Permit, continuously conducted business at the site specified therein from that time forward to and including the date hereof. 148. Plaintiffs conducted said business in reliance upon the validity of said non-revocable permit and the authority of the DEC to issue such non-revocable Marina Permit as an extension of the legislative grant of authority to the DEC. 149. The regulations set forth in 6 NYCRR Part 646 —-—_—— dated July 3, 1981, established the Lake George Park Recreational Zone Regulations operating on the Lake George Recreation Zone. (6 NYCRR Part 190.27) 150. Defendant DEC's regulations thereby required two (2) separate and different applications, one (1) for the registration of legally pre-existing wharfs and one (1) for the continued operation of a marina. 151. Plaintiffs duly complied with both of the above requirements. 152. The requirement with respect to wharfs, established by Defendant DEC, pursuant to 6 NYCRR Part 646, also required registration of "wharfs legally in existence on Lake George prior to the effective date of the Lake George Recreational Zone Regulation". 153. The provisions of 6 NYCRR Part 646 (July 3, 1981) were promulgated as the Lake George Park Recreation Zone Regulations. 154. The Lake George Recreation Zone did not and does not include private lands. 155. The definition of the "Lake George park" did 306 a and does include within its scope private lands. 156. There exists a clear differentiation between the area and property encompassed by the Lake George Recreation Zone and the Lake seed park as set forth and specified by statute. 157. Plaintiffs also duly and timely complied with the requirements of the Lake George Recreational Zone Regulations and by registration form dated November 14, 1981, duly registered their existing wharfs. 158. Defendant DEC acknowledged Plaintiffs' above mentioned wharf registration and issued a confirming letter on April 1, 1982. 159. The Certificate of Registration of said wharfs duly executed by Richard A. Wild was not issued to Plaintiffs until October 14, 1982. 160. In a letter of Charles Hawley letter dated April 1, 1982, at the time at which Hawley as the Chairman of Defendant LGpC, advised that new construction would require a permit from Defendant DEC. 161. Plaintiffs completed all previously DEC authorized wharf construction in its entirety prior to April 1, 1982, the date of the above mentioned Hawley letter. 162. Defendant LGpC was created as an "Independent Agency within the Department", referring to the DEC, pursuant to Chapter 454 of the Laws of 1961. 163. Since the original LGpC entity lacked legislatively granted authority to act, starting in 1962, with the enactment of Chapter 794 of the Laws of 1962, and continuing forward to the present date, Defendant LGpC obtained expansion of the legislative grant of authority given to it. 164. With the reorganization of Defendant DEC in PLEA AA wT Rha 0 AE BI AME me Me ily I a nk Se ee 307 a 1972 and the recodification of Article 43 of the Environmental Conservation Law, hereinafter referred to as the "ECL", to include ECL section 43-0117, entitled the "Lake George park Commission", the powers of Defendant LGpC again were expanded. 165. In 1987, with the enactment of Chapter 617 of the Laws of 1987, amending only the Environmental Conservation Law, the Navigation Law, the Vehicle and Traffic Law, and purportedly amending the State Finance Law, the Lake George Park Commission Trust Fund was attempted to be created. 166. Chapter 617 of the Laws of 1987 effectively and substantially impacted numerous areas of regulatory authority not previously related to the scope of legislatively delegated authority of Defendant LGpC. 167. Chapter 617 of the Laws of 1987 expanded the authority of Defendant LGpC to grant to Defendant LGpC powers of zoning regulation and taxation and purportedly established Defendant Trust Fund. 168. Chapter 617 of the Laws of 1987 gave an expansive grant of power and authority to Defendant LGpc. 169. Under the provision of that Chapter, Defendant LGpC even obtained police powers under the auspices of the Vehicle and Traffic law and the Criminal Procedure Law 170. Chapter 617 of the Law of 1987 with the grant of police powers to Defendant LGpC authorized the arming of Defendant LGpC's employees and agents as Peace Officers. 171. Between Plaintiffs' 1981 application for a Marina Permit with the subsequent issuance of a Marina Permit to Plaintiffs by Defendant DEC, Plaintiffs duly complied with all applicable laws, rules and regulations with respect to their commercial operation on their private 308 a lands and to the extent their operation was on public land, and continue to do so to the date hereof. 172. During the period following the initial grant of authority to Defendant LGpC in the 1987 legislative enactment, Defendant LGpC filed regulations under Subpart 646-2 of Chapter IX, Independent Agencies Within the Department section of the NYCRR relating to Defendant DEC. 173. Said regulations were created with respect to registration of "recreational uses". 174. Those Regulations as noticed and published, as required by statute (Section 5 of Chapter 617 of the Laws of 1987 amended ECL 43-0117), set forth provision for "registration" of all (private and commercial) recreational uses with Defendant LGpC. 175. ECL 43-0117 in its entirety refers to activities on Lake George; i.e., upon the waters of Lake George. 176. The provisions of Subpart 646-2.2 (b) clearly set forth the intent to "grandfather" prior existing commercial and private uses and to provide for a period of two (2) years in which Defendant LGpC could "create" the necessary registration form(s), provide them to pre-existing users, both commercial and private, and allow for their filing on or before June 3, 1988. 177. The "grandfathering" provisions clearly relate to prior existing uses. 178. Absent the "grandfathering" of such prior existing uses the provisions would be subject to challenge and invalidity resulting from implementation of ex-post facto regulation. 179. Subpart 646-2.2 governing the above referred to Registration enumerates a listing of activities included in the items for registration. 309 a 180. The history of Subpart 646-2 is significant including the fact that after its original filing May 13, 1988, it was thereafter renumbered to 646-1.6, with Rule Making Activities Publication in the March 6, 1991, State Register, for the stated purpose of amending Subparts 646-1 and 646-2 and repeal of section 646-2.2 and amendment of Subparts 645-3, 645-5 and 645-7 of Title 6 of the NYCRR. 181. The above referenced publication contained reference to the adoption of "Stop gap rules governing certain ‘recreational activities’ . . . ." by the LGpC on June 3, 1988, the above referenced provisions of Subpart 646-2. 182. The statement in the State Register continued in pertinent part to state that the purported "interim provisions" of Subpart 646-2 were intended ".. . as a means to provide controls over new commercial enterprises involving the specified recreational activities ... ." 183. This provision only related to commercial and did not in any way deal with non-commercial activities. 184. Continuing, the Notice contained in the State Register went on to state: Section 646-2.2 contains definitions of the recreational activities which will be subject to one or more limitations: new recreational activities, parasailing, personal watercraft (trade names jetskiis, wave runners, etc.), scuba diving, seaplanes, tour boats and towing. 185. The State Register went on to elaborate, by way of explanation, as follows: Section 646-2.4 establishes permit requirements for any new recreational activity such as a new type of craft not 310a previously operated on the waters of Lake George. Under these provisions a new use, such as private submarines, would be subject to review by Defendant LGpC prior to being allowed to operate on Lake George, prior to issuing the permit... . 186. The recitations contained in the State Register did not regulate any non-commercial use. 187. Again, continuing, the Notice set forth in the State Register went on to specify: Existing operations, that is, tour boats, seaplanes and parasails operated on the lake prior to the effective date of the rules would be granted a permit after an application had been duly filed. 188. When the regulations referred to in the State Register publication ultimately were filed and effective, by their terms, those regulations specified the definition of New Recreational Activity as follows: 4 (1) New recreational activity or use ; means a recreational activity not introduced on the waters of Lake George as of January 1, 1991. [Emphasis Added] 189. By regulation effective August 14, 1991, and contained in Subpart 646-2.4, Special Navigational Rules, Permits, the permitting process with respect to those activities enumerated in Subpart 646-2.3 specifically was limited to ". .. any new recreational activity or use... ." 190. Plaintiffs' compliance with Defendant LGpC's original Registration of Recreational Uses, clearly met and by the responses submitted therewith, exceeded in detail the responses required for such registration by Defendant 3lla LGpc. 191. Plaintiffs' filing was both timely under the original provisions of the 1988 regulations of Defendant LGpC and certainly a record of prior existing recreational uses claimed by Plaintiffs as of the January 1, 1991, date establishing a new, extended date for the base-line determination of recreational uses. 192. Nowhere in the regulations as adopted, or in the Notice contained in the State Register was there any language of limitation relating to continuous usage or usage before 1988, between 1988 and 1991, or other specification of such dates of limitation. 193. Plaintiffs first "registered" their recreation uses with the DEC on November 21, 1981. 194. Plaintiffs both met and exceeded the Recreational Uses Registration requirement pursuant to the written request of Defendant White made on behalf of Defendant LGpC, in some cases to the point of redundancy since Plaintiffs already had registered the "Sale or Rental of Watercraft" with Defendant DEC. 195. Plaintiffs relied upon the representations of Registration in the belief that the uses as registered had been accepted by Defendant LGpC Commission and were, therefore, "grandfathered" for any future permitting purposes of Defendant LGpC. 196. Defendant LGpC in no way contested Plaintiff's filing with respect to the Registration of Recreational Uses. 197. Defendant LGpC allowed Plaintiffs’ Registration of Recreational Uses to stand unchallenged from April 1990 until the notification of the requirement for application to Defendant LGpC for a Class A Marina Permit was sent by Defendant LGpC to Plaintiffs. 198. While Plaintiffs attempted to comply with the 312a request of Defendant LGpC for application, Plaintiffs' position remained that their existing filings and application to Defendant DEC for Recreational Uses remained as a valid registration of activities thereby grandfathered. 199. Plaintiffs' interests were established by their registration and acceptance by Defendant DEC and could not later be abridged by unilateral action of the very entity which accepted that filing, Defendant LGpC. 200. If nothing else, Plaintiffs were entitled to rely upon Defendant LGpC's acceptance of these filings when over fifteen (15) and seven (7) years respectively passed before any action was initiated by Defendant LGpC which in any way or manner could be viewed as even a questioning of the grandfathering efficacy of that filing. 201. The basis doctrine of laches prohibits such bureaucratic laxity without even considering the Constitutional ramifications of such attempted action. 202. Plaintiffs were operating and continue to operate under and by virtue of an affirmed application and a validly issued and continuing permit from Defendant DEC, specifically Permit Number 50-81-0071 MA, dated March 22, : 1982. 203. Pursuant to law, no legislation has been adopted to supplant the authority of Defendant DEC to r issue such operating permit, and said permit still validly authorizes Plaintiffs' operation. 204. On or about March 6, 1990, Defendant White corresponded with Plaintiffs, sending to Plaintiffs the "Lake George Park Commission Application for a Class A Marina Permit". 1. A "Simplified Form" was received by Plaintiffs from Defendant LGpC, furnished by Defendant LGpC agent Keith Fish to be used for recreational uses. 205. After receiving Fish correspondence, Plaintiff 313 a John Salvador responded by letter dated April 23, 1990. 206. Included therewith, Plaintiffs forwarded the duly completed application for registration of recreational uses to Defendant LGpC. 207. Enumerated in Plaintiff's response and registration is the specific request of Plaintiffs for the recording of all recreational uses which as of the date thereof, or in the past, prior to the statutory date of January 1, 1988, were conducted at Dunham's Bay Lodge. 208. Based upon applicable laws, rules and regulations, there existed no requirement that such uses were to be either continuous or occasional. 209. As specified in the Application for registration, Plaintiffs submitted a detailed listing of the recreational activities which Plaintiffs were registering with Defendant LGpC pursuant to Defendant White's request. 210. The original request, as well as the content of Subpart 646-2.2 did not limit such registration of pre- existing uses to facilities owned, offered or controlled by the Marina owner or operator. 211. Subpart 646-2.2 (c) specifically stated that the activities in question were those which were "owned, operated and engaged in on the waters of Lake George". 212. Subpart 646-2.1 also filed May 13, 1988, the stated Intent ot the regulations was to "regulate commercial and private recreational activities on the waters of Lake George ...." 213. With the stated intent of the provisions in question being regulation of the use of property, those recreational activities which were pre-existing and some beyond the scope of Defendant LGpC regulation, clearly were and are entitled to be afforded the protection of "grandfathering" of "pre-existing" registered activities. ] 3l4a 214. The mandated registration of pre-existing uses for the purpose of establishing a base-line for future determinations of what activities did and did not qualify for the "grandfathering" protection is rational and an apparent reasonable quasi-legislative requirement for a pexson or entity to afford itself of this protection. 215. Plaintiffs acted in reliance, not only on the letter of Defendant White and the forwarding of a new registration form developed by Keith Fish, but also upon the promulgated provisions of Subpart 646-2 concerning recreational uses and registration. 216. Plaintiffs complied with the specific request of Defendant White and the requirements of Subpart 646-2. 217. When Plaintiffs met the above mentioned requirement, Plaintiffs became entitled to the benefits of “grandfathering" clearly afforded to them by the regulations as promulgated. 218. Upon meeting said requirements, Plaintiffs also became entitled to the benefits of "grandfathering" as part of the provisions of the recreation uses permitted by the DEC in 1982, "sales or rental of watercraft". 3 219. At the time of the filing of Plaintiffs' response to ; Defendant White's request, the duly completed Recreational 4 Use Registration was filed and was in the hands of j Defendant LGpC pzior to the June 3, 1990, date specified in ; Subpart 646-2 (b) wherein the two (2) year "grace" period 4 was established for registration of existing uses. 220. The cover letter of Defendant White and the form provided to Plaintiffs was both vague and unclear concerning what was to be included and how the information was to be submitted in response to the request. 221. Defendant LGpC re-issued a new and separate Application for Registration of a Recreational Use. 315 a 222. The vagaries of the form provided by ___ Defendant LGpC to existing users, to a significant extent, followed the vagaries of Subpart 646-2 itself. 223. When Plaintiffs responded and timely filed their Registration with Defendant LGpC pursuant to Defendant White's request, Plaintiffs did not respond with vagaries. 224. Plaintiffs in their filing with Defendant LGpC provided detailed specifics concerning the recreational uses which Plaintiffs affirmed as pre-existing uses for the purpose of the Subpart 646-2.2 registration. 225. Plaintiffs relied upon the clear implication of and implicit representation of intent to "grandfather" such activities for the purpose of future regulation by Defendant LGpc. 226. Following Plaintiffs' completion of and filing of the above referenced Registration of Recreational Uses with Defendant LGpC, Plaintiffs heard nothing further from Defendant LGpC concerning such uses until June 24, 1996, when Plaintiffs first were informed of the requirement by Defendant LGpC for Plaintiffs to "apply" to Defendant LGpC for a Class A Marina Permit. LGpC APPLICATION AND LGpC'S POSITION ON NAME OF APPLICANT 227. Plaintiffs are the holders of a certain Marina Permit duly issued by the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation on March 22, 1982, Marina Permit No. 50-81-0071MA authorizing the operation of a Marina at the designated location of Plaintiffs' property in the Town of Queensbury situated in the area more 3l6a commonly known as Dunham's Bay. 228. On or about June 24, 1996, Plaintiffs received written notification from Defendant LGpC that Plaintiffs were to be required to apply for a Permit to Operate a Class A Marina. 229. Upon information and belief, Defendant LGpC established two (2) classes of Marine Permits which it issued, specifically Class A Marina Permits and Class B Marina Permits. 230. Upon information and belief, Class A Marina Permits were to be applicable to entities defined in Chapter IX of Title 6, New York State Codes, Rules and Regulations, hereinafter referred to as the "NYCRR", Environmental Conservation, Independent Agencies Within Department, section 646-1.2. 231. Upon information and belief, Class B Marina Permits were applicable to entities defined in Chapter IX of Title 6 of the NYCRR, Environmental Conservation, Independent Agencies Within Department, Section 646-1.3. 232. On or about May 13, 1997, by correspondence directed to Defendant DeSantis, as Chairman of Defendant LGpC, relating to the application of Plaintiffs with respect to Defendant LGpC's Update/ Renewal process, certain documents were forwarded to Defendant LGpC. 233. The above specified submission was made on behalf of Plaintiffs in accordance with the instructions of Defendant LGpC personnel in form content and timing, in support of Plaintiff's Update. 234. The documents submitted therewith were: Cover letter of submission from Plaintiff John Salvador, Jr., as President/ Manager of Dunham's Resort Corp. d/ b/a Pe eee eee 317 a Jr., as President/ Manager; and "Draft" Permit for the Operation of a Class A Marina as amended and corrected by Permittee with applicable Exhibits and attachments, including written explanation and summary of corrections and amendments to Defendant LGpC staff's original proposed "Draft". 235. By that correspondence request was made that the matter be set down for scheduling on the Commission's agenda and that Plaintiffs be notified promptly of such scheduling. 236. By that correspondence on behalf of Plaintiffs, the request also was made that if any additional information was required or if Defendant LGpC or its staff had any questions concerning the matter, response would be made by or on behalf of Plaintiffs. 237. The position of Defendant LGpC, best expressed by their Attorney, Martin Auffredou at the April 29, 1998, public meeting of Defendant LGpC, strongly recommended ta Defendant LGpC that Plaintiffs, as "landowners" be named personally as the applicants and potential Class A Marina Permit holders, a requirement not imposed on other applicants or permittees by Defendant LGpC stating in pertinent part at that meeting that if"... there are problems down the road where Defendant LGpC has to get involved with somebody for an enforcement matter or litigated matter, my advice to you is to have the landowner for the purposes of legality, the landowner name has to be included." 238. Even one of Defendant LGpC members was wise enough to recognize the discriminatory treatment being afforded Plaintiffs and their application by Defendant LGpC and stated, "Martin, we just issued one to the Flamingo Restaurant [sic. Resort] on Lake George, and we didn't require George Pestinak's name. Is there any, what's 318 a the differénce between .. ." 239. At the conclusion of Plaintiffs' presentation at said April 29, 1998, meeting Plaintiffs attempted to withdraw the pending application for a Class A Marina Permit from consideration by Defendant LGpC. | 240. In response to Plaintiffs' attempted withdrawal, Defendant LGpC raised the issue of pursuant to what authority Plaintiffs could continue operation, in response to which Salvador pointed out that the operation was and is governed by the existing DEC permit issued to Plaintiffs, specifically DEC Permit to Operate a Marina on Lake George No. 50-81-0071MA. 241. Defendant LGpC went so far, at that meeting, as to question Plaintiffs' (as applicants) right to withdraw such application, to which Mr. Auffredou first responded vaguely, in response to a further question stated, "I don't want to see John withdraw the application. . .", thereby clearly acknowledging the right of the applicant to withdraw such application. 242. As recently as the notification sent to Plaintiffs advising them of the scheduling their matter for the September 29, 1998, meeting of Defendant LGpC, Defendant LGpC reversed legal course and have stated unilaterally that Plaintiffs may not withdraw their pending application, even after the statement of clearly discriminatory intent with respect to the treatment of their application. 243. Following the conclusion of the April 29, 1998, meeting of the LGpC, Plaintiffs despite their formal withdrawal of their pending application, in an effort at conciliation, agreed to continue in "negotiations" with Defendant LGpC for the purpose of attempting to resolve outstanding differences. 244. To that end, Plaintiffs continued to provide voluminous documents and responses to Defendant LGpc. a ee — o 319 a 245. By letter dated August 13, 1998, on behalf of Plaintiffs to Defendant Auffredou, as Counsel to Defendant LGpC, response was made to correspondence from Defendant Auffredou concerning a proposed meeting on a number of issues relating to Plaintiffs' Marina Permit. 246. By said correspondence on behalf of Plaintiffs, Defendant Auffredou was informed that, as part of Plaintiffs' attempts to resolve outstanding issues relating to said permit, Plaintiffs had been attempting to set up a meeting with the appropriate officials of the Department of Environmental Conservation to discuss a number of issues which are holdovers from Plaintiffs' existing Permit issued by the Department of Environmental Conservation. 247. Defendant Auffredou was advised that the issues to be addressed by the Department of Environmental Conservation were identical to a number of the issues considered by Defendant LGpC. 248. Defendant Auffredou was advised that it was Plaintiffs' position that it would be of assistance to the resolution of Defendant LGpC''s issues if the meeting with the Department of Environmental Conservation were held prior to Defendant LGpC taking action on the pending application. 249. Since the Department of Environmental Conservation had not, as of that date, scheduled the proposed meeting, a face to face discussion on a number of these issues as well as others was requested with Defendant Commission and its counsel. 250. Proposed dates for such a meeting were requested from Defendant Auffredou. 251. On behalf of Plaintiffs, by said correspondence, request also was made that final action on Plaintiffs' permit be delayed by Defendant LGpC until these outstanding issues have been resolved in order to avoid unnecessary 320 a litigation. 252. Defendant Auffredou was advised in that correspondence that at the proposed meeting responds would be made to Defendants’ your questions concerning personal watercraft. 253. A meeting date was scheduled for August 18, 1998, at the offices of Defendant LGpC in Lake George, New York. 254. Said meeting was attended by counsel for Plaintiffs, Defendants Auffredou, White and Gallagher. 255. At said August 18, 1998, meeting, Defendant White, specifically conceded the intent of Defendant LGpC to utilize the Registration of Recreational Uses (referred to above in statutory history) as a method whereby such prior existing uses would be "grandfathered" and not subject to Defendant LGpC future limitation or required to proceed for "variance" before Defendant LGpC. 256. Upon information and belief, Defendant White's backing and filling on the topic wherein he stated that Defendant LGpC later altered the playing field for those, including Plaintiffs, who had diligently complied with Defendant LGpC's own regulatory requirement, was, at best disingenuous and at worst an exercise in Clintonian verbal manipulation. 257. Upon information and belief, according to Defendant White, after requiring the filing of the Recreational Use Registration, above described, deviated from its original intended purpose as set forth in Subpart 646-2 as promulgated on May 13, 1988, effective June 3, 1988, and unilaterally elected to promulgate new, revised regulations governing such recreational uses. 258. By repeal of Subpart 646-2 and replacement of it with new Subpart 646-1.4 relating to "Special Permits for 321 a Recreational Uses", Defendant LGpC attempted to accomplish by administrative fiat what it did not have the authority to do by valid legislative authorization; i.e., develop recreation uses regulations for both commercial and private users on Lake George. 259. Plaintiffs' compliance with Defendant LGpC's original Registration of Recreational Uses, clearly met and by the responses submitted therewith, exceeded in detail the responses required for such registration by Defendant LGpc. 260. Plaintiffs' filing was both timely under the original provisions of the 1988 regulations of Defendant LGpC and certainly a record of prior existing recreational uses claimed by Plaintiffs as of the January 1, 1991, date establishing a new, extended date for the base-line determination of recreational uses. 261. Nowhere in the regulations as adopted, or in the Notice contained in the State Register was there any language of limitation relating to continuous usage or usage before 1988, between 1988 and 1991, or other specification of such dates of limitation. 262. Plaintiffs first "registered" their recreation uses with the Department Environmental Conservation on November 21, 1981. 263. Plaintiffs both met and exceeded the Recreational Uses Registration requirement pursuant to the written request of Defendant White, in some cases to the point of redundancy since Plaintiffs already had registered the "Sale or Rental of Watercraft" with the Department of Environmental Conservation. 264. Plaintiffs relied upon the representations of Registration in the belief that the uses as registered had been accepted by Defendant LGpC and were "grandfathered" for any future permitting purposes of Defendant LGpC. 322 a 265. Defendant LGpC in no way contested the filing of Plaintiffs with respect to the Registration of Recreational Uses. 266. Defendant LGpC allowed Plaintiffs' Registration of Recreational Uses to stand unchallenged from April 1990 until the notification of requirement for application to Defendant LGpC for a Class A Marina Permit was sent by Defendant LGpC to Plaintiffs in June 1996. 267. While Plaintiffs, attempted to comply with the request of Defendant LGpC for application, Plaintiffs continued and continue affirmatively to assert that their existing filings, and application to the Department of Environmental Conservation of Recreational Uses continue, as a valid registration of activities thereby grandfathered, to protect Plaintiffs’ interests and could not later be abridged by unilateral action of the very entity which accepted that filing, Defendant LGpC. 268. Following the completion of said meeting on August 18, 1998, Plaintiffs’ timely submitted their responses to the LGpC. 269. By letter dated September 10, 1998, counsel for Plaintiffs corresponded with Defendant Auffredou as counsel to Defendant LGpC. 270. Said correspondence dealt with additional information discussed at the August 18, 1998, meeting, and enclosed additional material for consideration by Defendant LGpc. 271. By said correspondence, it was reiterated that by submitting this information, Plaintiffs were in no manner accepting that Defendant LGpC had any authority to refuse to allow Plaintiffs to withdraw their application at any time during the pendency of its consideration by Defendant LGpC or any subpart thereof. ilies da ala tant Pi Een tate Ra Ale Rae My Lah PS a tn es, otis ote bl DiGaina ies. tata ld. Dai did nda Saee eshte 64 ataleok 323 a 272. It also was requested on behalf of Plaintiffs that if there were any preliminary response from Defendant LGpC staff or Defendant Auffredou prior to the Committee's meeting date, such response(s) be provided to counsel for Plaintiffs within a reasonable time before the meeting date. 273. In the response to the issues and questions discussed at the August 18, 1998, meeting, a summary of the meeting and attendees was set forth, and the subject matter of the meeting identified as the application referred to for the purposes of that response collectively as the "Salvador's Application", but reiterating the fact that said collective reference herein shall in no way or manner was to be deemed to or considered to constitute any acknowledgment or acquiescence to any mingling of entities, each of which shall remain as legally constituted individual and separate entity(ies). 274. Said response next addressed issues relating to the legal authority of Defendant LGpC with respect to specific matters relating directly to Plaintiffs' application. 275. Next followed a brief recitation of the background and statutory authority involved, which has been dealt with more specifically elsewhere in this Complaint. 276. Before specific issues may be considered, this issue must be addressed and resolved. 277. In part, said background information supplied to Defendants reiterated information-both already in the possession of Defendant LGpC and also previously submitted by Plaintiffs as apart of the process before Defendant LGpC, but necessary to restate to clarify the position of Plaintiffs. 278. In said response it was stated that when Plaintiffs, in reliance not only on the letter of Defendant White and the forwarding of a new registration form 324 a developed by Keith Fish, but also upon the promulgated provisions of Subpart 646-2 concerning recreational uses and registration thereof, complied with the specific request of Defendant White and the requirements of Subpart 646-2, they became entitled to the benefits of "grandfathering" clearly afforded to them not only by the regulations as promulgated, but also as by the recreation uses permitted by the DEC in 1982 (sales or rental of watercraft) and ultimately as protected by the United States Constitution, including but not limited to their right to be protected against a regulatory diminution of use of their property, without just compensation (non-revocable DEC permit) and equal protection of the law. 279. Continuing, said statement explained that rather than compensating Plaintiffs, through imposition of additional fees and charges, Plaintiffs, in effect were compelled to pay for the "privilege" of having Plaintiffs' properly registered and protected rights eroded. 280. At the time of the filing of Plaintiffs' response to Defendant White's request, Plaintiffs duly completed Recreational Use Registration filed it with Defendant LGpC prior to the June 3, 1990, date specified in Subpart 646-2 (b) wherein the two (2) year "grace" period was established for registration of existing uses. 281. Upon information and belief, thereafter Defendant LGpC re-issued a new and separate Application for Registration of a Recreational Use. 282. The vagaries of the form provided by Defendant LGpC to existing users, to a significant extent, followed the vagaries of Subpart 646-2 itself. 283. When Plaintiffs responded and timely filed their Registration with Defendant LGpC pursuant to the Defendant White request, Plaintiffs provided detailed pipe cadens Saale iat LP ie Bib 325 a specifics concerning the recreational uses which Plaintiffs affirmed as pre-existing uses for the purpose of the Subpart 646-2.2 registration. 284. As set forth in the response to Defendant LGpC, Plaintiffs relied upon the clear implication of and implicit representation of intent to "grandfather" such activities for the purpose of future regulation by Defendant LGpC. 285. Following Plaintiffs' completion of and filing of the above the Registration of Recreational Uses with Defendant LGpC, no communication about these matters was received by Plaintiffs until June 24, 1996. 286. At that time, Plaintiffs first were informed of a purported "requirement" of Defendant LGpC for Plaintiffs to "apply" to Defendant LGpC for a Class A Marina Permit. 287. In said response, it was asserted on behalf of Plaintiffs that, if nothing else, Plaintiffs entitled to rely upon Defendant LGpC's acceptance of their filings, when over fifteen (15) and seven (7) years respectively passed before any action was initiated by Defendant LGpC which in any way or manner could be viewed as even a questioning of the grandfathering efficacy of such filings. 288. As stated in said response, Plaintiffs relied upon the basis doctrine of laches would prohibit such bureaucratic laxity without even considering the Constitutional ramifications of such attempted action. 289. Plaintiffs were operating and continue to operate under and by virtue of an affirmed application and a — validly issued and continuing permit from the Department of Environmental Conservation, specifically Permit Number 50-81-0071 MA, dated March 22, 1982. 290. Under and by virtue of existing statute of the State of New York, no legislation has been adopted to supplant the authority of the Department of Environmental sat aa a af ; si i 326a Conservation to issue such operating permit, and said permit still validly authorizes Plaintiffs' operation. 291. Also included in said response to Defendants was an analysis of Defendant LGpC's challenge to the grandfathering of certain specific activities previously conducted, documented, permitted to and registered by Plaintiffs. 292. Specifically, the activities challenged by Defendant LGpC include Balloon/ parasail, PWCs, and sales and service of boats. 293. Plaintiffs constantly attempted to traverse Defendant LGpC's regulatory maze and consistently complied with each and every, requirement, filing and registration mandated by the ever-changing laws, rules and regulations of Defendant LGpC and as interpreted by Defendant LGpC. 294. Plaintiffs consistently and continually relied upon the grandfathering of each and every activity so filed, registered, and documented as required by the Department of Environmental Conservation. 295. Plaintiffs also detailed in said response the fact that in their original Application for a Permit to Operate a Marina, the application grandfathering the marina operation at that location dating back over twenty-five (25) years prior to that Application. 296. Plaintiffs had applied to the Department of Environmental Conservation and Plaintiffs were granted a non-revocable Permit to Operate a Marina, specifying services provided including, in part: Sale or rental of Water Craft (undefined and unlimited by the application and regulatory definition); Sale or rental of Marine Products; Rental, Lease or accommodation for Boats not Registered to the Owner (also undefined and unspecified by application Bid staid Saba ole Wei des NSN aad hel MRO BR BL WH ERS lt ao Fe! Oc sea BRD “eB BRAS, iene! weds ATM grec A a 327 a form and/or regulation); Parking Spaces for 75 Customer Vehicles; Trash Receptacles; Rest Room Facilities; and 67 slips. 297. Plaintiffs in their application provided to the Department of Environmental Conservation, the proper issuing authority, all material requested. 298. Plaintiffs were granted the non-revocable permit in accordance and based upon the terms of said application. 299. In 1990, Plaintiffs duly complied with the regulatory requirements of registration of recreational uses specifying in detail the recreational uses engaged in prior to the regulatory enactment, at Plaintiffs' facility by the “owners" and Plaintiffs' guests while using the facilities offered by Plaintiffs. 300. Responding to the vaguely worded regulatory demand for registration, in their response, Plaintiffs specified, with respect to several particular activities, that while Plaintiffs did not themselves provide the equipment for their guests to engage in certain specified activities, either the guests themselves or other guests had provided, for fee or otherwise, then provided and in the future would provide such equipment or mechanisms for engaging in such activities. 301. Plaintiffs specified that said activities included, but were not limited activities involving Balloon/ parasail, PWCs, and sales of boats. 302. Plaintiffs went into detail in their submission and, in said document, under sub-heading of said registration titled "(2) Offering of Parasailing Rides" "Balloon" one (1) "engaged in" and under the sub-heading "(The Operation of a Seaplane" "Balloon" "0" "Owned - "0" "Operated" but "engaged in" one (1) by the facility and 328 a others by Guests. 303. Plaintiffs established that the parasail operation ‘engaged in" directly relates to the Balloon operation also engaged in, since not all parasail operations require motorized towing. 304. As explained in their submission in response to the questions of Defendant LGpC and its staff, the prevailing wind intensity and direction at the Dunham's Bay site allows parasailing at vessel speeds within those permitted within the Town of Queensbury Vessel Regulatory Zone. 305. Plaintiffs also addressed the issue of the use of PWCs in their response. 306. As early as November 1981, Plaintiffs registered said use: The "Sale or Rental of Watercraft including Jet Skis" and noted that in Defendant LGpC's own definitions set forth in the State Register Notice Defendant LGpC defines at reference to Section 646-2.3 "personal watercraft" as "jetskiis", equating the jetski term with the more generic ‘personal watercraft" above referred to) "(5) Rental of Jet Skis or other Recreational Devices" under the "Type" heading of "Jet Skis" the Salvadors responded that Jet Skis under the heading of "Guests" as used and operated by Guests at the Salvadors' facilities. 307. In their response to Defendant LGpC's request for information, Plaintiffs also addressed the issue of the sale of boats. 308. As detailed to Defendant LGpC, Plaintiffs, in their registration specified under item "(4) Rental OR OFFERING OF VESSELS" responded their engagement in said activities with respect to all enumerated types, including but not limited to "Power Boats, Sailboats, Tour Boats, Sail Fish, Sun fish, Row Boats, Canoes & Kayaks". er —_— — eee ieee nn Sa a a aa a Fe atl ae sila One eke Wet eR ANE MT Wl hele Spats ban ti we ll BR hae Old sede Vee. hee We none rere enero a te ee ce ee aS —— ed SN AE AN PONT. NT 329 a 309. Explaining in their submission to Defendant LGpC, in the original non-revocable Marina Permit issued to Plaintiffs by the Department of Environmental Conservation upon the original application of Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs were authorized by the Department of Environmental Conservation without objection from the Town of Queensbury to engage in the Sale or Rental of Water Craft and Marine Products. 310. As recited to Defendant LGpC by Plaintiffs in their response, Defendant LGpC by statutory mandate Chapter 617 of the Laws of 1987 (ECL 43-0117(5)) took legal status which it might enjoy from its regulatory predecessor the Department of Environmental Conservation to administer 6 NYCRR Part 646 (july 3, 1981). 311. Defendant LGpC, therefore, could not constitutionally deprive those landowners within the regulatory area assigned to Defendant LGpC of the landowners' Constitutional rights and property interests. 312. As a governmental entity, Defendant LGpC was and is not allowed to take private property without just compensation, and the limitation of an existing property constitutes such taking. 313. Plaintiffs detailed in the above mentioned response that by issuing the original non-revocable Marina Permit to Plaintiffs, after noticing the Town of Queensbury of its intent, the Department of Environmental Conservation acknowledged the existing "grandfathered" rights of Plaintiffs to certain specified and outlined operations. 314. After accepting said filing, and issuing the original non-revocable Marina Permit, the Department of Environmental Conservation placed Plaintiffs irrevocably into a class of specifically protected persons and entities entitled to the protection of their pre-existing uses and rights. 330a 315. As explained by Plaintiffs with the enunciation of the mandate for the registration of recreational uses, and the subsequent filing and compliance therewith by Plaintiffs, Defendant LGpC, placed Plaintiffs into a further protected class with respect to the "grandfathering" of those uses. 316. Plaintiffs clearly established in their submission to Defendant LGpC that Defendant LGpC could not later be heard to complain that it "didn't mean it" or that it "changed its mind" or that it "decided to do something else" and thereby years later attempt to deprive Plaintiffs of these clearly established uses. 317. Plaintiffs explained to Defendant LGpC, that Plaintiffs, in yet another attempt to provide Defendant LGpC with information which has not been required of other applicants to establish ‘pre-existing uses" often which were not even registered by those applicants, provided Defendant LGpC voluminous testimony, photographs and documentation of Plaintiffs' basis establishing Plaintiffs' their entitlement to such uses. 318. In the notification sent to Plaintiffs advising them of the scheduling their matter for the September 29, 1998, meeting of Defendant LGpC, Defendant LGpC reversed legal course and stated unilaterally that Plaintiffs MAY NOT WITHDRAW their pending application, even after the statement of clearly discriminatory intent with respect to the treatment of Plaintiffs application. 319. Plaintiffs, however continued to cooperate with Defendant LGpC and its staff and submitted further additional and not legally mandated or required documentation establishing Plaintiffs' engaging in the activities challenged by Defendant LGpc. 320. Plaintiffs included in their submission to Defendant LGpC, a specific reservation of rights and —=— eee ee eS ee ee me 6 ee ee ee ee ne ene Pn AA ol atl Ah SFO Lhd 33la specifically affirmatively stated therein that by the submission of said statement and documentation, Plaintiffs in no way conceded the legitimacy of the demand of Defendant LGpC staff and advisors. 321. Plaintiffs also noted that the extent and nature of the "proof" required of Plaintiffs far exceeded the requirements placed upon other applicants before Defendant LGpC for the same or similar Permits, as is set forth in the minutes and records of Defendant LGpC itself. 322. By way of example of the failure of Defendant LGpC even to check, verify or accept the records kept in the ordinary course of business of agencies of the State of New York. 323. As part of their submission to Defendant LGpc, Plaintiffs, in support of their business activities as boat dealers, submitted documentary evidence that Plaintiffs were and are duly licensed by the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles as a registered "Boat Dealer" pursuant to the provisions of the New York State Vehicle and Traffic Law, with the current facility identification number of 7081805. 324. As set forth in Plaintiffs’ prior filings with the Department of Environmental Conservation and with Defendant LGpC, Plaintiffs' facility has been and continues to include the operation of a Boat Dealer, with all of the legally associated functions affiliated therewith. 325. Earlier in the proceedings before Defendant LGpC, Defendant White challenged the legitimacy of Plaintiffs' operation to conduct repairs and to have the required State permits for a repair shop. 326. Defendant White failed to prepare properly and fully on behalf of Defendant. 327. If a full and complete search of applicable 332a records been made on behalf of Defendant LGpC, and had Defendant White made himself acquainted with the applicable laws relating to such "repair shops", Defendant White would have been aware of the fact that no separate "permit" is required for the referred to "repair shop" activities on the part of a State permitted Boat Dealer such as Plaintiffs. 328. Before Plaintiffs could seek a State Permit as a Boat Dealer, Plaintiffs were required to have, as Plaintiffs did have as a pre-existing non-conforming use, Town Zoning allowance for such operation. 329. The State could not have issued the existing certification to Plaintiffs as a Boat Dealer without the proper Town Zoning requirements having been met. 330. Other activities engaged in by Plaintiffs and duly "grandfathered", permitted and allowed were challenged or questioned by Defendant LGpC and its staff, and were addressed throughout the permitting and hearing process by Plaintiffs. 331. In their September 1998 response, Plaintiffs incorporated by reference all of their previous submissions and responses to Defendant LGpC. 332. That response of Plaintiffs in no way was intended to concede nor did it assent to agreement with Defendant LGpC with respect to any points not specifically addressed therein. 333. Said response of Plaintiffs was directed specifically only to those issues raised by Defendant LGpC staff and Defendant Auffredou at the August 18, 1998, meeting. 334. Plaintiffs took the position which they continue to hold that the activities which Plaintiffs are authorized to engage, in compliance with law, rules and regulation, have oe ae : a 333 a been duly filed, registered, and noticed as required, with the State of New York, the Town of Queensbury, the Department of Environmental Conservation and Defendant LGpC in conformance with applicable laws, rules and regulations in proper and timely manner. 335. Plaintiffs and their guests, as allowed by the rights flowing to them from Plaintiffs, have engaged in numerous activities legally allowed, a fact which Plaintiffs placed Defendant LGpC on timely and proper notice. 336. Plaintiffs obtained and hold a duly issued non- revocable Permit from the Department of Environmental Conservation which Permit, by its nature and terms has no specified duration. 337. The Class A Marina Permit which now was the subject matter of the prior consideration by Defendant LGpC, its staff and its attorney, would constitute a Revocable Permit of five (5) year duration. 338. Plaintiffs clearly and consistently have stated that the ex post facto enactment of and attempted enforcement of new laws, rules or regulations now is viewed as an attempted limitation of pre-existing, and in this case, also specifically "grandfathered" activities. 339. Plaintiffs maintain that the activities of their marina are, have been and shall continue to be authorized and permitted pursuant to their existing Department of Environmental Conservation non-revocable Marina Permit and that any issue with respect to grandfathering of any activities specified in either or both Plaintiffs' Department of Environmental Conservation permit filing or the Recreational Uses filing with Defendant LGpC itself, are legally authorized and allowed. 340. Plaintiffs also submitted extensive documentary evidence in support of their position along with their 334a statement of response to Defendant LGpC. 341. Thereafter, upon information and belief, Defendant Auffredou, as counsel for Defendant LGpCc, made request for clarification of certain information and for additional information concerning certain matters relating to Plaintiffs' marina operation. 342. By letter dated September 14, 1998, and transmitted via facsimile and mail, counsel for Plaintiffs' responded to the requests of Defendant Auffredou. 343. Information was provided on behalf of Plaintiffs concerning requested additional information relative to the time that various services were offered by Plaintiffs. 344. Said response related that the approximate times of service of the brochures submitted as exhibits were: Lake George Sailing Unit - 1984-1989; Bill and Sally Engelhardt - 1996 - Present Sailing; Bill Robinson - 1997 - Present. 345. Defendant Auffredou also was informed that Plaintiffs had offered other services over the last twenty-five (25) years but the records concerning those activities were not available. 346. Plaintiffs' response also advised Defendant Auffredou that dock space was rented to the specified individuals and no other fees or money are received from such persons or entities. 347. Plaintiffs confirmed to Defendant Auffredou that all of said individuals were registered marina clients. 348. On behalf of Plaintiffs, the willingness to provide additional information and/or documentation again was renewed if Defendant Auffredou or Defendant LGpC had any further inquiries concerning Plaintiffs' marina operation. 335a 349. By correspondence dated September 15, 1998, via Express Mail to Defendant DeSantis, as Chairman of Defendant LGpC, counsel for Plaintiffs forwarded eleven (11) [one (1) each for Defendant DeSantis and each member of Defendant LGpC] copies of a submission of Plaintiffs with respect to the Application for a Class A Marina Permit before Defendant LGpC for Dunham's Bay Lodge provided as a courtesy to Defendant LGpC to facilitate understanding of the position of and additional proof and documentation submitted by Plaintiffs. 350. Defendant DeSantis also was advised by that correspondence that said material previously was provided to Defendant Auffredou as attorney for Defendant LGpC as requested by Defendant Auffredou and staff of Defendant LGpC at the August 18, 1998, meeting between counsel for Plaintiffs and Defendant Auffredou and LGpC staff. 351. In said correspondence, the rights of Plaintiffs were specifically reserved. 352. Defendant DeSantis was advised in said letter that submission of said material was offered ina spirit of cooperation with Defendant LGpC, but in no way constituted a waiver of any right(s), cause(s) of action or legal remedy(ies) available to Plaintiffs. 353. Plaintiffs, in reliance upon the statements made by Defendant Auffredou, Defendant White and Defendant Gallagher at the above mentioned August 18, 1998, meeting with counsel for Plaintiffs, believed that the matter of the previously withdrawn application was not to be considered or discussed at the scheduled meeting of the Committee for August 19, 1998. 354. Plaintiffs, in reliance upon said statements and representations of the above specified Defendants believed that the matter, instead would be considered at the September 23, 1998, Committee meeting. 336a 355. The September 23, 1998, meeting of the Committee was the logical date for the Committee to consider these matters, since, upon information and belief, that would be the first date for meeting of the Committee following the date for submission of the explanatory and additional material by Plaintiffs flowing from the August 18, 1998, meeting. 356. Plaintiff John Salvador, Jr., attended said September 23, 1998, meeting of the Committee accompanied by counsel. 357. According to a "Statement Concerning Purpose & Conduct of LGPC Project Review Committee Meetings" made at the commencement of a certain meeting of the LGpC Project Review Committee, hereinafter referred to as the "Committee", occurring on September 23, 1998, the purpose of that Committee is". . . to review permit applications pending before Defendant LGpC in order to make recommendations to the full Commission concerning the issuance, modification, or denial of the application as well as any State Environmental Quality Review Act determinations." 358. According to said statement, the Commitiee is composed of three (3) members of Defendant LGpC and is chaired by Defendant Stewart. 359. Also set forth therein is the policy statement that "Permit Applications are initially received by Park Commission staff and are reviewed by an Environmental Analyst." 360. The statement also sets forth that public comment also is solicited as part of the process. 361. According to that document, the public comment usually is fifteen (15) days, and that, in general, the Committee only makes its decisions concerning "issuance" only after the conclusion of the specified public 337 a comment period. 362. Said policy declaration also specifically stated that while the meetings of the Committee are open to the public, "It should be noted that it is not the purpose of this meeting [referring to the meeting of 9/23/98] to disseminate information to the general public about a particular project not to engage in public debate concerning the merits of any application." [Emphasis added] 363. The Statement went on to specify the procedures which would follow the conclusio.: of the Committee's meeting, stating as follows: "The recommendations of the Project Review Committee will be taken before the full Park Commission at their next meeting at which time the full Commission will vote on each recommended action." 364. At the conclusion of said policy statement the following language, attempting by unilateral action of Defendant LGpC retroactively to attempt to create revocable permits (including non-LGpC issued permits), recites: "It should be noted that Commission permits may be suspended, modified or revoked for good cause at any time by the Commission." 365. The above language implies that such "suspension", "modification" or "revocation" is may be undertaken by Defendant LGpC without notice or hearing. 366. Defendant LGpC's stated "suspension, "modification" or "revocation" would be by unilateral action of Defendant LGpC. 367. Said policy statement also provided for and contemplated not process for appeal of any such action by Defendant LGpC. 368. Upon information and belief, at said September 23, 1998, meeting of the Committee, the above mentioned 338 a Statement was read or otherwise incorporated into the record of the Committee meeting. 369. Thereafter, a typewritten copy of said statement was obtained from staff of the LGpC on behalf of Plaintiffs. 370. Plaintiffs had been informed by staff of Defendant LGpC that the matter of their pending application was to be considered at the September 23, 1998, meeting of the Committee. 371. At said September 23, 1998, Committee meeting, Plaintiffs learned for the first time that, despite the representations made by Defendant LGpC staff and by Defendant Auffredou to Plaintiffs' attorneys at the meeting held on August 18, 1998, that the matters relating to Plaintiffs would not be considered until the September 23, 1998, Committee meeting of Defendant LGpC to allow time for Plaintiffs to respond to questions raised, including questions raised by Defendant LGpC staff at said August 18, 1998, meeting, the matters invoking Plaintiffs were considered at a certain meeting of the Committee held, upon information and belief, on August 19, 1998. 372. The August 19, 1998, Committee meeting took place even before the date agreed to among counsel for Plaintiffs and Defendant LGpC staff and Defendant Auffredou. 373. Following this revelation, following the conclusion of the Committee meeting of September 23, 1998, by letter dated September 23, 1998, addressed to Defendant DeSantis, as Chairman of Defendant LGpC, Defendant LGpC, its members and staff were reminded on behalf of Plaintiffs that at the April 29, 1998, meeting of Defendant LGpC, Plaintiff John Salvador, Jr. withdrew, on the record the then pending application for a Class A Marina Permit which also had been the subject of discussion at the 339 a September 23, 1998 Defendant LGpC's Project Review Committee. 374. By that correspondence, Defendant DeSantis and Defendant LGpC also were reminded on behalf of Plaintiffs that, since the April 29, 1998, withdrawal of said application, Plaintiffs continued to work ina spirit of cooperation with Defendant LGpC and its staff to resolve various outstanding issues with respect to said original Class A Marina Permit Application. 375. Plaintiffs, Defendant DeSantis and Defendant LGpC were informed, continued to take the position that said original application is withdrawn, despite conflicting statements both on and off the record made by or on behalf of Defendant LGpC. 376. Defendant DeSantis and Defendant LGpC were informed that many of the items in contention remained unresolved. 377. Plaintiffs also advised Defendant DeSantis and Defendant LGpC that it was Plaintiff’ intention to submit a new Class A Marina Permit Application to Defendant LGpC, but that Plaintiffs' prior Application remained withdrawn as stated by Plaintiff John Salvador, Jr. on the record on April 29, 1998, at the meeting of the LGpCc. 378. Defendants DeSantis and the LGpC were informed that since that application remained withdrawn, Plaintiffs would not be participating in the scheduled meeting of Defendant LGpC on September 29, 1998. 379. Upon information and belief, at the time of said correspondence, there was an agenda item with respect to the application of Plaintiffs on Defendant LGpC's schedule for the September 29, 1998, meeting. 380. Defendant DeSantis and Defendant LGpC were reminded that, the applicant, here Plaintiffs, can legally 340 a withdraw an application at any time prior to final action. 381. A request was made in said correspondence on behalf of Plaintiffs that documentation be provided by Defendants that the agenda item relating to Plaintiffs’ application was withdrawn from consideration prior to the date of the September 29, 1998, meeting of Defendant LGpC. 382. On behalf of Plaintiffs, Defendant LGpC was informed that a new Class A Marina Permit application would be submitted to the Commission when completed based upon all existing facts and any additional information obtained as a result of the September 23, 1998, Committee meeting. 383. Defendant LGpC was informed on behalf of Plaintiffs, that Plaintiffs intended to continue to function, as in the past, under the irrevocable Permit previously issued by the Department of Environmental Conservation, Defendant LGpC's supervising parent agency. 384. Based upon representations made to Plaintiffs by Defendants, it was the understanding of Plaintiff that the matter of a Class A Marina Permit application relating in any manner to Plaintiffs would not be considered by Defendant LGpC at a certain meeting of the LGpC held on August 18, 1998, to allow for submission of additional material by Plaintiffs, pursuant to discussions between Plaintiffs' attorneys and Tepresentatives of Defendant LGpC, specifically Defendants White, Gallagher and Auffredou. 385. Ata certain meeting of the Project Review Committee, at which Plaintiffs had been informed the matter of a Class A Marina Permit relating to their property would be considered based upon the submission of additional material as specified at said August 18, 1998 meeting, Plaintiffs learned that the matter of said Class A Marina Permit, instead had been considered and dealt with at the August 19, 1998, meeting. 341 a 386. Plaintiffs also learned for the first time at said Project Review Committee meeting that Defendant Gallagher had, on behalf of Defendant LGpC, unilaterally rewritten said Permit and that it had been put "in the mail" to Plaintiffs so that it would be received by Plaintiffs only after the conclusion of the September 23, 1998, Project Review Committee Meeting. 387. Plaintiffs also learned, therefore, that the information considered by Defendant LGpC at the meeting at which the content of said "Revised" Permit was determined could not possible have included the material provided by Plaintiffs in response to issues raised by Defendant LGpC which were discussed with Plaintiffs attorneys at the above mentioned August 18, 1998 meeting with Defendants White, Gallagher and Auffredou. 388. The responses, which had been submitted within the time frame agreed to at said meeting related to the specific issues/ objections raised by Defendant LGpC, Defendants White, Gallagher and Auffredou. 389. Upon information and belief, at the meeting at the offices of Defendant LGpC held on August 18, 1998, was clearly stated by Plaintiffs' attorneys as in no way or manner to be deemed agreement to, conceding of or reinstatement with respect to the previously pending application of Plaintiffs. 390. Upon information and belief, the underlying basic issue of Defendants LGpC, White, Gallagher and Auffredou focused upon the scope of legal authority of Defendant LGpC. 391. Plaintiffs contended and do contend that by regulation 6 NYCRR Part 646 dated July 3, 1981, Defendant DEC, pursuant to the authority legislatively granted and delegated to Defendant DEC authority over owners of marina facilities situated on Lake George were required to 342 a complete an application for a non-revocable Permit to Operate a Marina on Lake George. 392. As above set forth, Plaintiffs duly complied with all applicable requirements relating to the operation of such marina and the obtaining of the required non- revocable permit. 393. Plaintiffs continue to operate their marina to the date hereof under, by virtue of and in accordance with said Non-revocable Marina Permit issue to them by Defendant DEC. 394. As above specified, Plaintiffs also complied with the Registration of Recreational Uses when requested. 395. Defendant LGpC challenged the grandfathering of certain specific activities previously conducted, documented, permitted to and registered by Plaintiffs. 396. Specifically, the activities challenged by Defendant LGpC include Balloon/ parasail, PWCs, and sales and service of boats. 397. In responding to the issues raised by Defendant LGpC, Plaintiffs have constantly attempted to traverse Defendant LGpC's regulatory maze and have consistently complied with each and every, requirement, filing and registration mandated by the ever-changing Commission laws, rules and regulations. 398. Plaintiffs consistently and continually have relied upon the grandfathering of each and every activity so filed, registered, and documented as required by the DEC and its statutory successor(s) in interest. 399. Plaintiffs in their original Application for a Permit to Operate a Marina to Defendant DEC the - application grandfathering the marina operation at that location dating back over twenty-five (25) years prior to that Application, Plaintiffs applied to DEC and were granted a 343 a non-revocable Permit to Operate a Marina specifying services provided including, in part: Sale or rental of Water Craft (undefined and unlimited by the application and’ regulatory definition); Sale or rental of Marine Products; Rental, Lease or accommodation for Boats not Registered to the Owner (also undefined and unspecified by application form and/or regulation); Parking Spaces for 75 Customer Vehicles; Trash Receptacles; Rest Room Facilities; and 67 boat slips. 400. Plaintiffs provided to Defendant DEC, the proper issuing authority, all material requested, and Plaintiffs were granted the non-revocable permit in accordance and based upon the terms of said application. 401. In 1990 Plaintiffs again duly complied with the regulatory requirements of registration of recreational uses, specifying in detail the recreational uses engaged in prior to the regulatory enactment, at their facility by the "owners" and their guests while using the facilities offered by Plaintiffs. 402. In said registration, responding to the vaguely worded regulatory demand for registration, Plaintiffs specified, with respect to several particular activities, that while they did not themselves provide the equipment for their guests to engage in certain specified activities, either the guests themselves or other guests had provided, for fee or otherwise, and in the future would provide such equipment or mechanisms for engaging in such activities. 403. With respect to the activities involving Balloon/parasail, PWCs, and sales of boats Plaintiffs in said registration specified as follows: Under sub-heading of said registration titled "(2) Offering of Parasailing Rides" "Balloon" one (1) "engaged in" and under the sub-heading "(The Operation of a Seaplane" "Balloon" "0" "Owned - "0" "Operated" but "engaged in" one (1) by the facility and 344 a others by Guests. 404. Plaintiffs position is and has been that the activities of their marina are, have been and shall continue to be authorized and permitted pursuant to their existing Defendant DEC non-revocable Marina Permit and that any issue with respect to all legally pre-existing activities specified in either or both their DEC permit filing or the Recreational Uses filing with Defendant LGpC itself, continuing to be legally authorized and allowed. 405. By Resolution No. 98-69 of Defendant LGpC dated September 29, 1998, Defendant LGpC acted upon the application which Plaintiffs repeatedly had withdrawn starting on April 29, 1998. 406. Said Resolution referred incorrectly to Dunham's Bay Resort Corp., Inc. despite the fact that Plaintiffs repeatedly had informed Defendant LGpC, its employees and its attorney of the identification of the applicant. 407. In said Resolution, Defendant LGpC acknowledged the fact that Plaintiffs' facility had been issued a marina permit by the Department of Environmental Conservation. 408. Said Resolution only recited the letter of September 23, 1998, withdrawing Plaintiff's application to Defendant LGpC. 409. Said Resolution did not acknowledge the verbal withdrawal of application by Plaintiff John Salvador, Jr. on the record at the April 29, 1998, meeting of Defendant LGpC. 410. Defendant LGpC in said resolution also incorrectly stated that Plaintiffs' facility only commenced in 1997. 411. At the time at which the staff of Defendant LGpC conducted site inspection of Plaintiffs' facility, they 345 a did not observe PWCs on site due to the fact that PWCs were in winter storage at that time, a situation which Plaintiffs' had informed Defendant LGpC staff of at the time of said inspection. 412. Additionally, Defendant LGpC's Resolution incorrectly stated that the rental of PWCs was not an activity by the Department of Environmental Conservation permit under and by virtue of which Plaintiffs operate their facility. 413. Defendant LGpC's Resolution also states as fact the incorrect premise that Plaintiffs purportedly extended their wharfs from twenty-four (24) to thirty (30) feet in length. 414. As Plaintiffs had repeatedly informed Defendant LGpC and its staff, the extension of the docks in question was duly authorized and permitted by the Department of Environmental Conservation. 415. All applicable applications were timely and properly made by Plaintiffs to the applicable regulatory authority at the time, that being the Department of Environmental Conservation. 416. No extensions of docks was done by Plaintiffs without first having all applicable permits and authorizations. 417. In fact, commencing in 1988, Defendant LGpC charged Plaintiffs for dock registration fees based upon said docks being thirty (30) feet in length. 418. Defendant LGpC continually assessed Plaintiffs on the basis of the thirty (30) foot length docks and to demand payment based on said linear footage. 419. Defendant LGpC accepted payment from Plaintiffs for thirty (30) foot dock length for said docks. 420. The thirty (30) foot length of said docks was 346 a grandfathered by the Department of Environmental Conservation permitting previously legally approving said dock extensions. 421. In said resolution Defendant LGpC unilaterally stated that while Defendant LGpC acknowledged the withdrawal of said application by Plaintiffs, Defendant LGpC claimed that such withdrawal did not "negate" Defendant LGpC's jurisdiction over the "subject facility". 422. Further statements contained in Defendant LGpC's Resolution set forth a specific finding that". . . the continued operation of the subject facility without a Class A marina permit from the Commission is a violation of Commission regulations, . . .". [Emphasis added] 423. Said resolution went on to find that ". . . the NYSDEC marina permit for the subject facility was superseded by the enactment of the Commission's regulat- ions applicable to Class A marinas on June 3, 1988, .. .". 424. Defendant LGpC in said resolution did not even attempt to justify the alleged "superseding" of an existing permit granting to Plaintiffs a valid property right. 425. Defendant LGpC did not even attempt to allege any notice to Plaintiffs of the alleged "superseding" of or elimination of Plaintiffs! existing rights. 426. In a vain attempt to deal with the effective attempted termination of Plaintiffs! rights, Defendant LGpC, in a back-handed statement ". . . acknowledges that the NYSDEC permit may be utilized to establish a baseline level of marina activity offered at the subject facility which would form the basis of a Class A marina permit from the Commission, . . .". 427. Defendant LGpC, did not, however, acknowledge or admit that Plaintiffs' existing and continuing permit from the Department of Environmental 347 a Conservation allowed Plaintiff to continue their operation as legally authorized, permitted and approved by the appropriate permitting entity. 428. Defendant LGpC cannot by attempted ex post facto legislation and/or attempted application to Plaintiffs deny Plaintiffs of a validly existing property right and liberty interest. 429. Defendant LGpC, in said resolution also incorrectly made a finding that ". . . the offering of PWC rental at the subject facility constitutes an expansion of the subject facility. . ." and Defendant LGpC required a further permit for such operation. 430. Despite the clear documentation presented by Plaintiffs of the pre-existing timely authorization of PWC rental at Plaintiffs' facility by the appropriate permitting governmental entity, Defendant LGpC specifically ignored the facts as they existed with respect to Plaintiffs. 431. Defendant LGpC, in said resolution also incorrectly set forth a finding that the wharfs ". . . have been extended and/or modified without a permit, the permits are maintained in violation of the permit requirements and design standards of 6 NYCRR Part 646, .. .". 432. As set forth elsewhere in this Complaint, Plaintiffs specifically detailed in their proof to Defendant LGpC Plaintiffs timely compliance with the applicable provisions of law, rule and regulation. 433. Prior to any extension of wharfs by Plaintiffs, - Plaintiffs first obtained the necessary permits and authorizations from the Department of Environmental Conservation, the governmental entity charged with the duty of regulating such extensions. DESPERATE TREATMENT OF PLAINTIFFS BY 348 a DEFENDANTS, INCLUDING DEFENDANT LGpC 434. Upon information and belief, on or about August 21, 1996, application was made to Defendant LGpC for a Class A Marina Permit by Frank J. Parillo, hereinafter referred too as the "Parillo Application". 435. Upon information and belief, on or about the 12th day of March, 1991, Frank J. Parillo, hereinafter referred to as "Parillo", or his agent(s) recorded a deed purporting to acquired title from the Estate of an Allison Ellsworth to certain real property located in the area more commonly referred to as Dunham's Bay, Lake George. 436. Upon information and belief, on or about the 31st day of October, 1985, Parillo, or his agent(s) recorded a deed purporting to acquired title from an Robert Ellsworth to certain real property located in the area more commonly referred to as Dunham's Bay, Lake George. 437. Upon information and belief, during approximately 1989, Parillo sought a zoning variance from the Town of Queensbury Zoning Ordinances then in effect, specifically designated as Use Variance No 98-1989. 438. Upon information and belief, said application dealt with exemption sought from various zoning provisions on the claim of "pre-existing use" by Parillo. 439. Upon information and belief, in support of said Use Variance Parillo submitted an affidavit entitled "Affidavit to Demonstrate Pre-Existing Use", sworn to on September 20, 1989. 440. Upon information and belief, as is set forth in said Affidavit no reference is made to any existing permit in the name of Robert Ellsworth. 441. Upon information and belief, based upon the + at alls 349 a records of the Town of Queensbury, in addition to said affidavit in support of application Parillo also submitted a form designated as "14-16-4 (2/87)- Text 12" and titled "617.21, Appendix C, State Environmental Quality Review, Short Environmental Assessment Form, For Unlisted Actions Only", with two (2) page attachment thereto. 442. Upon information and belief, although said Environmental Assessment Form is unsigned, the copy of said document submitted herewith is in the form as obtained from the records of the Town of Queensbury, and a portion of the record upon which the Town of Queensbury Zoning Board based its determination in the matter of the application of Parillo for a use variance. 443. Upon information and belief, in Paragraph "III" of the attachment, specifically refers to one (1) existing permit from Defendant LGpC only held by Parillo and also specifies that "nor are commercial boat repairs conducted on the property." 444. Upon information and belief, said document purports to set forth the entire operation run by Parillo and clearly does not establish or even allege the existence of any permit issued to Robert Ellsworth pursuant to which Parillo claimed any right to operate. 445. Upon information and belief, according to correspondence from Karl E. Parker of Defendant LGpC addressed to Lee York of Defendant Town of Queensbury dated October 25, 1989, concerning the above referred to Zoning variance application of Parillo, reference therein by Defendant LGpC clearly indicated the existence of only one (1) permit for the areas involved, that being the Allison Ellsworth permit, identified therein as marina permit #50- 82-0146. 446. Upon information and belief, according to the terms of the Allison Ellsworth permit and the application 350 a submitted by Allison Ellsworth in support thereof the underlying application and, therefore, the permit resulting therefrom, relates to 95 vessels, which vessel count specifically included ten (10) vessels on the lake, not in the brook, in that count. 447. Upon information and belief, in considering the above mentioned Parillo Zoning variance application, testimony and submissions were taken by the Queensbury Zoning Board of Appeals at their second regular meeting held on December 27, 1989. 448. Upon information and belief, based upon the minutes of said Zoning Board meeting, at said meeting testimony and submissions were taken on the record concerning the Parillo (then pending) application and specific reference to the marina operations by Parillo were made by or on his behalf. 449. Upon information and belief, a person identified in the minutes of said meeting to be a Mr. Richards, speaking on behalf of Parillo at said meeting detailed the marina operations and explained the acquisition process from both Allison Ellsworth and Robert Ellsworth. 450. Upon information and belief, continuing in support of the Parillo zoning variance application, in the presence of Parillo and at Parillo's behest, Mr. Richards went on to state according to said minutes, in pertinent part: MR. RICHARDS-Stated what we've got is a permit. I think Allison Ellsworth had a permit. Frank had applied to have the permit transferred over to him which he received this Spring. In his application he estimated a boat launch of 20+- boats a day and that's where the figure 35la comes from. That was part of his application when the permit was given. 451. Upon information and belief, continuing in support of his zoning variance application, Parillo stated in his presentation to the Queensbury Zoning Board of Appeals also supporting the existence of only one (1) marina permit according to the minutes of said meeting, as follows: MR. PARILLO-Stated we didn't examine any records. You want to keep in mind that the Ellsworth's [sic.] were over 80 years old. We signed the contract to divide this in 1988 under the assumption that the launch was an intrical [sic.] part of the marina, that it could be reopened. It was never advised that it couldn't be. I had conversations with Dave Hatin and until the day which was, I believe, in July, we were under the assumpt- ion that it was a part of the marina and that there would be no problems. We got the permit transferred from DEC. There was a year lapse from the time we signed the contract until we bought it because Mr. Ellsworth [Allison] had passed away. To answer your question, there weren't any records to examine. 452. Upon information and belief, the Queensbury , Zoning Board thereafter acted, in reliance upon the 352a information, evidence and testimony provided to the by and on behalf of Parillo and summarized their finding in Motion and action there on December 27, 1989. 453. Upon information and belief, thereafter, in support of Parillo position with respect to Parillo's marina operation, John W. Caffrey provided an Affidavit sworn to December 2, 1992, wherein specific reference is made to the authority pursuant to which Parillo operated his marina, said authority resting solely upon the transfer of the above referenced Allison Ellsworth permit. 454. In the early 1990's Plaintiffs filed requests under the Freedom of Information Law, hereinafter referred to as "FOIL", requests filed by Plaintiffs with (Defendant LGpC and/or Defendant DEC requesting copies of all Marina permits issued by them as of the date thereof for all marinas operating on Lake George, including but not limited to the area on or abutting Lake George more commonly known as Dunham's Bay. 455. On or about the 11th day of October, 1996, Plaintiffs received response to one of their above mentioned FOIL request from LGpC. 456. Included in said FOIL request response received by Plaintiffs was a copy of a marina permit purportedly issued to Allison Ellsworth (permit no 50-82-0146) on December 20, 1982 by the Defendant DEC. 457. Included in said FOIL request response received from the LGpC was a copy of an alleged transfer of the marina permit purportedly issued to Allison Ellsworth on December 20, 1982, by Defendant DEC transferred to Parillo by Defendant LGpC on June 20, 1989. 458. Nowhere in response to the FOIL request was there included any marina permit for Robert Ellsworth. 459. Upon information and belief, in the Parillo a ase. See 353 a application for Permit made to the LGpC Parillo specifically identified by tax parcel identification number those parcels for which and in relation to which his application was made, nowhere in said permit application by Parillo is the tax map identification number for the parcel acquired by Parillo from Robert Ellsworth included. ; 460. Upon information and belief, said application as made by Parillo, on page two of the application it is specifically limited to prior permit or registration of Mabel and Allison Ellsworth, no reference is made therein to any alleged permit held by Robert Ellsworth. 461. By Notice which Plaintiffs received from Defendant LGpC dated August 1, 1996, Plaintiffs became aware of the fact that Parillo had applied to Defendant LGpC for what was identified therein to be a "Class A Marina Permit". 462. Said Notice received by Plaintiffs contained no reference to claim of two (2) purportedly existing permits transferred to Parillo. 463. By letter dated August 21, 1996, Plaintiff John Salvador, Jr. responded to the LGpC to the Notice concerning the Parillo application. 464. Prior to that time, Parillo had commenced litigation against Plaintiffs claiming title to certain docks which Parillo operated on property titled in Plaintiffs and to which he made claim under color of title through Quit Claim Deed, which litigation went to trial and judgment with order dated October 30, 1996. 465. A copy of decision and order of Judge Moynihan in said action was made a part of the record before the LGpC at the committee meeting held on February 19, 1997 at 1:00 P.M. at the Lake George Town Hall. 466. In that decision the Court held that Parillo did 354 a not have title to the land on which said docks were situated. 467. Other statements contained in said decision and order were beyond the scope of the matters at issue in the trial and the gratuitous comments contained therein are not law of the case nor are they res judicata as to the issues set forth therein; rather, they constitute non-binding dicta. 468. Thereafter, Parillo filed a Notice of Appeal of said Order. 469. After the appeal was perfected by Parillo and heard by the Appellate Division,-the decision of Judge Moynihan wes altered somewhat and returned to Judge Moynihan for further proceedings what have not occurred as of the date hereof. 470. No stay pending appeal of said Order ever was sought or obtained by Parillo, to allow his continued use of said parcel under claim of right of title contrary to the statements made by Mr. Sweeney at the above referenced February 19, 1997, meeting. 471. Upon information and belief, with reference to the issue of "quick launch" which was considered by Defendant LGpC with respect to the Parillo application, Plaintiffs requested any information submitted by Parillo in accordance with the requirements for registration of recreational uses which has been mandated for such users. 472. Plaintiffs did not receive from Defendant LGpC any information supplied by Parillo for consideration of such submission and registration of Parillo. 473. Plaintiffs also pointed out to Defendant LGpC in their consideration of the Parillo application the fact that other issues remained outstanding and unresolved, including but not limited to the issues raised by the Town of Queensbury through its representative James Martin, in his letter to Defendant Gallagher of Defendant LGpC dated 355a August 21, 1996. 474. Upon information and belief, the proposed submission of Parillo as considered by Defendant LGpC would constitute an expansion of the previously allowed use as allowed in accordance with the Town of Queensbury ordinances and rules. 475. Upon information and belief, Parillo did not submit an adequate parking plan to Defendant LGpC. 476. Upon information and belief, a map with generalized markings indicating vague locations and number of "cars" was considered by the sub-committee of Defendant LGpC, such map clearly did not constitute a "parking plan". 477. Upon information and belief, no designation of size and location of parking spaces, traffic isles, allowing adequate space for backing and turning and specification of methods and designated areas of ingress and egress in conformance with standards as set forth in generally accepted AASHTO guidelines and specifications was submitted or considered by Defendant LGpC with respect to the Parillo application. 478. Upon information and belief, Defendant LGpC was placed on notice by Richard J. Cipperly of Defendant DEC of serious outstanding issues which, as stated by Mr. Cipperly in his letter to Defendant LGpC dated September 25, 1996, in which he stated in pertinent part, "... would ask the Commission to delay any new or renewal [of Parillo permits] until the ownership issue is resolved ... ." 479. Upon information and belief, thereafter, the matter of said application came on before Defendant LGpC for consideration. 480. Plaintiffs attended certain public meetings of Defendant LGpC at which the Parillo Application was an -356a agenda item. 481. At the meeting held on June 25, 1997, Plaintiffs were in attendance, and information was presented by them and on their behalf with respect to the position of Plaintiffs concerning the Parillo Application. 482. Written statements also were submitted by and on behalf of Plaintiffs with respect to the Parillo Application. 483. One (1) issue raised by and on behalf of Plaintiffs with respect to the Parillo Application related to the wharf registration compliance of the Parillo predecessor(s) in interest. 484. Upon information and belief, the wharf registration of Allison Ellsworth underlying the issuance of the Parillo Class A Marina Permit was unsigned and the verification thereon had been stricken. 485. Upon information and belief, despite the fact that the form was signed on behalf of Defendant DEC by Defendant White accepting the registration form. 486. It was and is Plaintiffs' position that any permit(s) flowing from the above mentioned registrations and permit(s) were and are inherently defective and, therefore, void ab initio. 487. Since, as Defendant Auffredou stated at the June 25, 1997, meeting, the Marina Permits run with the land, transferring to the succeeding property owner, Plaintiffs contended to Defendant LGpC that the only rights which are and have been in the past transferred to Parillo were and are those legally pre-existing uses which he operates under and by virtue of his predecessors in title and interest, specifically, Allison Ellsworth and Robert Ellsworth. 488. Plaintiffs argued to Defendant LGpC that, if the initial filing (Allison Ellsworth's unsigned and unverified 357 a initial registration) was and is defective, no rights can flow to Parillo from such void initial filing. 489. Plaintiffs raised the issue to Defendant LGpC that a civil servant (Defendant White), acting ultra vires, purportedly on behalf of Defendant DEC, cannot unilaterally correct such inherent underlying defect. 490. Plaintiffs also raised the issue to Defendant LGpC that no notice was given to Plaintiffs or to any other members of the public or affected parties of the intention of Defendant LGpC to "merge" two (2) permits, specifically the _ Allison Ellsworth and the Robert Ellsworth permits. 491. Plaintiffs pointed out to Defendant LGpC that this issue was raised specifically at the February 19, 1997, meeting of Defendant LGpC reviewing the Parillo application for a Class A Marina Permit. 492. The issue concerning the expansion of said permit also was raised at the February 19, 1997 meeting. 493. Plaintiffs also referenced additional information obtained from the tax record cards relating to the both the Robert Ellsworth property and the Allison Ellsworth property clearly establishing the uses which the prior owners of the property in question claimed for said property and established the basis upon which the parcels were taxed by the applicable municipalities. 494. Plaintiffs presented to Defendant LGpC the fact that the tax records determine the only use which one of the prior owners, specifically Robert Ellsworth, which relates in any way to the uses claimed to be prior commercial uses in the Parillo Application, is the operation of a limited number of docks (less than asserted to be the base dock use number in the Parillo permit for the former Robert Ellsworth property) and operation of a marine gas pump. - 495. Upon information and belief, based upon the 358 a material contained in the above mentioned tax records, it was presented by Plaintiffs to Defendant LGpC that it appeared that the marine gas pump operation was abandoned by Robert Ellsworth well before the termination of his ownership of the property. 496. Plaintiffs, therefore, contended to Defendant LGpC that, according to those tax records, there was only limited commercial use of the Allison Ellsworth property in question, prior to the conveyance of the property out of Allison Ellsworth and not at the levels claimed by Parillo. 497. Plaintiffs also pointed out to Defendant that no statutory authority exists for the purported attempted merger by the Commission of Robert Ellsworth and Allison Ellsworth permit in Parillo. 498. Plaintiffs further referred Defendant LGpC to testimony of Parillo before the Town of Queensbury Zoning Board of Appeals in a related matter previously before that body, and, upon information and belief, statements made to that body by Parillo in apparent contradiction te the position taken by Applicant Parillo before Defendant LGpC. 499. Plaintiffs also referred Defendant LGpC to issues previously raised before the sub-committee of Defendant LGpC concerning parking, safety factors and hazardous conditions created as a result of such parking, specifically relating to parking along the Bay Road (County road by use) right-of-way, adequacy of size of parking spaces, and jurisdiction of Defendant LGpC, the Town of Queensbury, Defendant DOT and other applicable entities. 900. Plaintiffs further asked Defendant LGpC to direct its attention to questions regarding the property line(s) in the area of the brook and the docks along the brook which also are the subject of the Parillo Application, the Proper location of property lines in the area of the brook, Plaintiffs contended, is key to determination as to the valid 359 a and proper existence of many of the docks in that area. 501. Plaintiffs informed Defendant LGpC that the proper location of that line is key to determining whether or not certain of the Parillo docks in question are on the lands of the State of New York and specifically in areas designated as Forever Wild, areas designated as Critical Environmental area, and/or lands of the Forest Preserve. 502. At the June 25, 1997, meeting Defendant LeBarron specifically was requested to consider the significance of this issue as the representative of Defendant DEC Commissioner and Defendant DEC. 503. Plaintiffs reported to Defendant LGpC that it - was and is their belief that a survey of the area in question is or should be in the possession of Defendant DEC, the successor in interest to a least a portion of said property from the Nature Conservancy which took title from Plaintiffs. 504. Plaintiffs pointed out to Defendant LGpC that ownership of the underlying title is essential to the validation of the issuance of any Marina Permit(s) by Defendant LGpC for the area in question. 505. Plaintiffs pointed out to Defendant LGpC that specifically at issue is the location of the property line either at the center of the brook or on the East bank. 506. At that time, Plaintiffs brought to the attention of Defendant LGpC the fact that critical to the determination of the status of the Parillo Class A Marina Permit was the determination of the applicable jurisdiction of overlapping State and Municipal entities. 507. Plaintiffs contended that definition of lines of responsibility for issues of zoning, permitting and title determination needed to be resolved before permit issuance - in accordance with all applicable laws, rules and 360 a regulations. JURISDICTION 508. This is an action of law to redress the deprivation under color of statute, custom or usage of a right, privilege and immunity secured to Plaintiffs by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and Title 42 of the United States Code, The Public Health and Welfare, Section 1983, and arising under the laws and statutes of the State of New York. 909. This is also an action of law to redress the deprivation through a conspiracy on the part of Defendants acting under color of statute, custom, and usage of a right, privilege and immunity secured to the Plaintiffs by Title 42, Section 1985(3) arising under the laws and statutes of the State of New York. 510. This is also an action under the First Amendment, Fourth Amendment and Fifth to the Constitution of the United States and Title 42 of the United States Code, The Public Health and Welfare, Section 1983, and 1985. 511. This is also an action under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and Title 28 of the United States Code, The Public Health and Welfare, Section 1983, and 1985(3). 912. Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. sections 451, 1331, 1337, 1343 and 1345. 513. The actions of Defendants, both individually and collectively, have violated Plaintiffs' rights of free speech, freedom of association and freedom to petition government under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of 361 a the United States Constitution. 514. The actions of Defendants, both individually and collectively, have violated the rights of Plaintiffs to petition the government. 515. The actions of Defendants, both individually and collectively, have violated the rights of Plaintiffs in the conduct of their business and said acts of Defendants are in violation of Plaintiffs' rights under 15 U.S.C Section 1 in restraint of trade. 516. The actions of Defendants, both individually and collectively, have violated Plaintiffs’ rights by in derogation of the Article 1, Section 9, Clause 3 of the United States Constitution by applying to Plaintiffs ex post facto law and regulation. 517. The actions of Defendants, both individually and collectively, have violated Plaintiffs’ rights in derogation of the commerce clause of the Untied States Constitution, Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3. 518. All of the acts alleged herein were committed by the Defendants herein within the territorial jurisdiction of the Northern District of New York. 519. Proper venue is in this Court as the unlawful action occurred within this District. AS AND FOR A FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION, PLAINTIFFS ALLEGE 520. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every allegation contained in paragraphs numbered "1" through "519" of this Complaint as if more fully and at length set forth herein. 362 a 521. Defendants herein have individually and collectively acted in such a manner as to create a negative business environment for the Plaintiffs herein, despite repeated efforts made by Plaintiffs to seek only the rights due Plaintiffs. 522. Those efforts of Defendants even expanded beyond just the taking of Plaintiffs's property by their effective seizure of Plaintiffs's property interests, but also expanded to place Plaintiffs, commercial operation and personal reputation up to ridicule by the public with the charges and legal threats and allegations made against Plaintiffs and by placing Plaintiffs "on display" as an object of ridicule with respect to the uses to which they put their property by making such matters the subject of legal proceedings purportedly for the purpose of engaging in regulatory enforcement. 523. These actions have placed the Plaintiffs in a position where they are threatened with the loss of their Marina Permit through and enforcement action based upon false charges to be prosecuted by Defendants following the Defendants' initial and continuing illegal and unconstitutional actions of keeping their from proceeding with legal uses of their property. 524. Defendants herein have purposely carried on efforts to intimidate and harass the Plaintiffs by using every means up through and including threat of seizing their business and personal property, thereby making Plaintiffs’ continued business operation all but untenable. 525. This discrimination by Defendants is carried on under color of State law and under color of custom and usage enforced by the officials of Defendant LGpc. 526. The actions of Defendants complained of have caused Plaintiffs to be threatened with the loss of their legally granted marina permit issued which is integral to ON et nani La OO Pa hs Dart te BIE TY 8 Vad Ove Ta Naa Cet 363 a their business, to incur expenses and to suffer damage to their business, loss of potential future business and business reputation as well as personal anger and stress. AS AND FOR A SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION, PLAINTIFFS ALLEGE 527. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every allegation contained in paragraphs numbered "1" through "596" hereof as if more full and at length set forth herein. 528. The actions of Defendant Auffredou and the individual Defendants violated Plaintiffs' right of free speech under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. 529. Plaintiffs have, as citizens of the United States, residents of the State of New York and resident within the territorial boundaries of the Town of Queensbury raised issues concerning improper use of power and authority by officials of Defendant LGpC and raised issues concerning the inequitable application of ordinances and rules by Defendant LGpC and officials, agents, servants and employees of Defendant LGpC with respect to resident and land owners targeted by Defendants within their jurisdictional boundaries, all based upon Plaintiffs' personal knowledge of applicable facts. 530. Plaintiffs also challenged certain actions of officials of the State of New York, members of the same political party to which individual Defendants named herein owe their allegiance and from which political party said individual Defendants derive their political power. 531. Plaintiffs's actions with respect to appointed State officials resulted in Plaintiffs challenging actions taken against them by those persons in several legal forums, 364 a including but not limited to the New York State Supreme Court.and Defendant LGpC itself. 532. The above actions of Plaintiffs were and are matters of public record. 533. It was following and during the course of Plaintiffs' challenges to the bureaucratic then entrenched hierarchy of Defendant LGpC that Defendants commenced the above actions against Plaintiffs, 534. The actions of Defendants effectively placed Plaintiffs under threat of legal prosecution and seizure of assets. 535. All of the above recited actions of Defendants are in direct derogation of State Law, Rules, Regulations and policy and applicable Federal Law. 936. The actions of Defendants complained of have caused Plaintiffs to incur expenses and to suffer loss of business and potential future business and damage to their business reputation as well as personal anger and stress. AS AND FOR A THIRD CAUSE OF ACT ION OF ACTION, PLAINTIFFS ALLEGE 937. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and eve allegation contained in paragraphs "1" through "536" hereof as if more full and at length set forth herein. 538. Plaintiffs found themselves the objects of Defendants’ actions whereby Plaintiffs was more closely scrutinized than other similarly situated property owners within the territorial limits of Defendants LGpC through selectively enforcing the Regulations of Defendant LGpc. 539. Plaintiffs were ostracized by the individual 365 a Defendants while attempting to construct a pretextural reason for forcing them to close their business, all while attempting to provoke Plaintiffs enough to create a pretext for enforcement actions against them and making every attempt to undermine the basic rights to which Plaintiffs are entitled under the Constitution. 540. The actions of Defendants complained of have caused Plaintiffs to incur expenses and to suffer loss of business and potential future business and damage to their business reputation as well as personal anger and stress. AS AND FOR A FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION, — PLAINTIFFS ALLEGE 541. Plaintiff repeat and reallege each and every allegation contained in paragraphs "1" through "540" hereof as if more full and at length set forth herein. 542. The actions of Defendants LGpC were maliciously designed to bring discredit upon the Plaintiffs before their family, friends, neighbors and associates. 543. Through the public charge of Defendant LGpC, its employees and agents that Plaintiffs had illegally constructed dock extensions which Defendants alleged were in violation of the law and was a planned, calculated attempt to maliciously, publicly to slander and libel the Plaintiffs. 544. The actions of Defendants complained of have caused Plaintiffs to incur expenses and to suffer loss of business and potential future business and damage to their business reputation as well as personal anger and stress. 366 a AS AND FOR A FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION, PLAINTIFFS ALLEGE 945. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every allegation contained in paragraphs "1" through "544" hereof as if more full and at length set forth herein. 546. Plaintiffs found themselves the object of a review process which actually was an investigation which superficially, upon information and belief, was described as being an investigation into the actions of a property owner trying to preserve their property in the face of continual regulatory enforcement by Defendant LGpC. 547. The actions of Defendant LGpC, its employees and agents in failing to "grandfather" prior existing recreational uses constitutes an ex post facto regulation in violation of the Untied States Constitution. 548. The actions complained of in this Complaint were a result of Plaintiffs's opposition to the illegal and improper practices of the Defendants which they reasonably believe to be a clear form of retaliation against them. 949. The actions of Defendants complained of have caused Plaintiffs to incur expenses and to suffer loss of business and potential business and damage to their business reputation as well as personal anger and stress. AS AND FOR AN SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION, PLAINTIFFS ALLEGE 950. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every allegation contained in paragraphs "1" through "549" as if fully set forth herein. PUPAE Sih Bhar A ee SBI KS, Wisi Shes ele ALOT ee NR ¥ 367 a 551. Pursuant to the requirements of the Town of Queensbury's Zoning Code in its application and interpretation thereof as applied to Plaintiffs' property is another example of the actions of Defendants impinging on and violating the rights of Plaintiffs. 552. At all times hereinafter mentioned, Plaintiffs as a property owners within the Town of Queensbury and citizens of the United States, Plaintiffs were and are entitled to the privileges and :mmunities afforded their as a result of said citizenship. 553. Upon information and belief, Plaintiffs’ property has been targeted by the Town of Queensbury, its employees and agents, for specific action not authorized by or contemplated in the existing zoning scheme of the Town of Queensbury at the request or direction of Defendant LGpCc. 554. Defendant LGpC and the Town of Queensbury, acting at Defendant LGpC’s request or direction, knew or had reason to know that the acts of selective enforcement and excessive regulation would cause Plaintiffs damage. 555. Plaintiffs were singled out by Defendants for abusive action in retaliation for their course of conduct seeking to obtain the rights and privileges to which they were and are entitled. 556. Defendants knew or had reason to know that Plaintiffs were engaged in a commercial business whose clientele come from throughout the Untied States and from foreign countries. 557. Defendants engaged in a course of conduct of continuous harassment, the end result of which was to interfere with and reduce Plaintiffs’ business in violation of the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. 558. Asa direct result of the actions complained of 368 a Defendants both individually and collectively, Plaintiffs suffered damage. 559. Upon information and belief, Defendants’ violation of Plaintiffs' rights is a proximate cause of injury to Plaintiffs. 560. The injuries sustained by Plaintiffs were not due to any contributory negligence on behalf of Plaintiffs. 561. The actions of Defendants complained of have caused Plaintiffs to incur expenses and to suffer loss of business and potential future business and damage to their business reputation as well as personal anger and stress. AS AND FOR A SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION, PLAINTIFFS ALLEGE 562. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every allegation contained in paragraphs numbered "1" through "561" hereof as if more fully and at length set forth. 563. Upon information and belief, Defendants are liable for tort in said Defendants' adoption of an inadequate and inherently defective regulatory system which is overlapping, conflict ridden and excessive the legislative authority given them 564. Upon information and belief, Defendants are liable for tort in said Defendants' inequitable application of Defendants Regulations with respect to Plaintiffs. 565. Upon information and belief, at all times mentioned herein, Defendants failed to use even slight care in said Defendants’ duty to protect and fully warn Plaintiffs as a property owners within Defendants' zone of influence of the intended application of its legally defective and ambiguous regulatory system with respect to Plaintiffs and Sa BSN ES 369 a engaged in conduct that is so careless as to show complete disregard for the rights and safety of Plaintiffs. 566. Upon information and belief, Defendants are liable for gross negligence. 967. Upon information and belief, Defendants are also liable for willful misconduct. 568. Upon information and belief, Defendants have intentionally acted or neglected to act knowing that their conduct will probably result in injury or damage to Plaintiffs. 569. Upon information and belief, Defendants are liable for their gross and continuing negligence and their willful misconduct towards Plaintiffs resulting in damage to Plaintiffs. 970. Upon information and belief, Defendants are liable for their gross and continuing negligence and their willful misconduct towards Plaintiffs resulting in Plaintiffs's injuries, 971. The actions of Defendants complained of have caused Plaintiffs to incur expenses and to suffer loss of business and potential future business and damage to their business reputation as well as personal anger and stress. AS AND FOR AN EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION, PLAINTIFFS ALLEGE 972. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every allegation contained in paragraphs "1" through "571" hereof as if more full and at length set forth herein. 973. Plaintiffs found themselves the object of Defendants' actions whereby Plaintiffs became the subject of 370a and the object of attack and scrutiny in a New York State Court proceeding wherein Plaintiffs found that they had no available rights or remedies under the laws of the State of New York. 574. Plaintiffs was slandered, defamed and attacked in litigation as a PRETEXTURAL reason for Defendants purported enforcement and others to "punish" Plaintiffs for the attempted exercise their legally available rights with respect to, upon information and belief, political allies and cronies of Defendants. 575. Defendants knowingly caused holds to be placed upon Plaintiffs' personal assets in violation of State law as a part of this enforcement action. 576. Defendant LGpC, acting under color of state law, engaged in a course of conduct intended to deprive Plaintiffs of their constitutionally afforded rights to property while attempting to provoke Plaintiffs in a setting in which Plaintiffs has no rights, enough to create a pretext for their false claims against their and making every attempt to undermine Plaintiffs's credibility the Court. - 577. This intent was clearly underscored by the comments of Defendant Auffredou at the April 29, 1998 meeting of Defendant LGpC, setting forth the intent to "go after" Plaintiffs' personal assets and circumvent any protection of corporate existence which might exist. 578. This intent is further underscored by the actions of Defendant LGpC and its representatives in seeking attachment and seizure of Plaintiffs' personal assets in the New York State Court proceeding when Defendant LGpC and their agents were fully aware that Plaintiffs operated their businesses in a corporate form. 579. The actions of Defendants complained of have caused Plaintiffs to incur expenses and to suffer loss of business and potential future business and damage to their 37la business reputation as well as personal anger and stress. AS AND FOR A NINTH CAUSE OF ACT ION, PLAINTIFFS ALLEGE 980. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every allegation contained in Paragraphs "1" through "579" hereof as if more full and at length set forth herein. 981. Plaintiffs found themselves and their assets as the target of attack in the above mentioned Supreme Court enforcement proceedings. 982. Plaintiffs quickly found that, as Defendants White and Gallagher proceeded to change the charges against Plaintiffs at will and without notice to Plaintiffs, they effectively found themselves without the ability to defend themselves and their interests within the existing structure of the purported marina permit review process which had in effect been converted into an enforcement proceeding being run as a Star Chamber Proceeding by Defendant LGpC and its personnel. 583. Whenever Plaintiffs attempted to defend themselves within the existing confines of Defendant LGpC's procedures, they found that, sin [Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.] --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386015_0355%3A4. Public record. Not legal advice.