# Amicus Curiae Brief — Eastern Pilots Merger Committee v. Continental Airlines, Inc

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2002
- **Citation:** 537 U.S. 944

## Text

MOTION FILED (1)

AUG 4.2 2002 ___No. 02-58 :

IN THE
Supreme Court of the Anited States

EASTERN PILOTS MERGER COMMITTEE,

Petitioner,
Vv.

—————_ “

CONTINENTAL AIRLINES, INC.,
Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF
AMICUS CURIAE AND BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF
THE ALLIED PILOTS ASSOCIATION
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER

DAVID PALMER DEAN *
JESSICA RACHEL ARONS
JAMES & HOFFMAN, P.C.
1101 17th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
* Counsel of Record (202) 496-0500

WILSON-EPES PRINTING Co., INC. — (202) 789-0096 — WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001

® << v0

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States
No. 02-58

EASTERN PILOTS MERGER COMMITTEE,
Petitioner,
Vv.

CONTINENTAL AIRLINES, INC.,
Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF
AMICUS CURIAE OF THE
ALLIED PILOTS ASSOCIATION

The Allied Pilots Association (“APA”) is the collective
bargaining representative for 12,000 pilots at American Air-
lines, Inc. (“AA”), the largest airline in the world. APA
moves for leave to file the attached brief amicus curiae
in support of the Petition for Certiorari. Petitioner granted
consent. Respondent’s counsel refused APA’s request
for consent.

APA views the issues in this case from the perspective of a
labor organization with ongoing obligations under the Rail-
way Labor Act (“RLA”) to negotiate successorship rights and
remedies for its pilots, and the further obligation to resolve
disputes over the interpretation and application of its labor
agreement through the adjustment board process mandated by

the RLA. In addition, AA pilots now include 2,000 pilots
who formerly flew for Trans World Airlines, Inc. (“TWA”).
Those pilots participated in section 1113 procedures under the
Bankruptcy Code before AA purchased TWA’s assets out of
bankruptcy in April 2001.

_ APA shares petitioner’s concern: the panel decision below
grants airline management the same relief from collectively
bargained obligations that management should have achieved,
if at all, through the procedure for rejecting collective
bargaining agreements prescribed in section 1113. The deci-
sion thus effectively negates both procedural and substantive
employee protections mandated by the Bankruptcy Code, in
fuvor of ad hoc inquiry by a bankruptcy court.

The panel decision also, however, in remarkably clear
terms, infringes upon the exclusive jurisdiction of RLA
adjustment boards to decide disputes growing “out of the
interpretation or application” of labor agreements, including
the jurisdiction to determine contractual remedies. 45 U.S.C.
§ 184. _The panel decision thereby violates this Court’s
rulings in Hawaiian Airlines v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 252-53
(1994), and Consolidated Rail v. Railway Labor Executives’
Ass'n, 491 U.S. 299, 303 (1989) (“Conrail”). Both cases
clearly mandate primary and exclusive adjustment board
jurisdiction over the interpretation of disputed contractual
terms. Inadvertently or not, the panel decision opens the
doors of federal courts to issues of contract interpretation
formerly reserved for adjustment boards.

Because the airline industry faces unprecedented financial
instability in the wake of September 11, 2001, including the
potential bankruptcy of several carriers that AA may be
interested in buying; because APA is currently negotiating a
new labor agreement with AA, including expanded succes-
sorship rights; because AA, a Delaware corporation, is based
in Dallas and thus peculiarly subject to the circuit split over
bankruptcy law identified in the Petition for Certiorari; and

because the appropriate jurisdiction of RLA adjustment '
boards is a continual concern, and repeated subject of liti-
gation, for APA and its pilots,’ the APA asserts an interest in
this proceeding and urges this Court to grant APA’s motion
for leave to file this brief amicus curiae.

Respectfully submitted,

DAVID PALMER DEAN *

JESSICA RACHEL ARONS

JAMES & HOFFMAN, P.C.

1101 17th Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036
* Counsel of Record (202) 496-0500

' See, e.g., Whitaker v. Am. Airlines, 285 F.3d 940 (11th Cir. 2002)
(challenged discharge of probationary employee not a minor dispute);
Veta v. Am. Airlines, No. 95-56299, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 4049 (9th Cir.
Feb. 3, 1997) (challenged discharge of acquired airline’s employee a
minor dispute); Anderson v. Am. Airlines, 2 F.3d 590 (Sth Cir. 1993)
(allegation of retaliation for filing state workers’ compensation claim not a
minor dispute); Renneisen v. Am. Airlines, 990 F.2d 918 (7th Cir. 1993)
(challenge to contract’s validity not a minor dispute); Davies v. Am.
Airlines, 971 F.2d 463 (10th Cir. 1992) (state law wrongful termination
claim not a minor dispute); Chandler v. Am. Airlines, No. 91-5079, 1992
U.S. App. LEXIS 6796 (10th Cir. Apr. 10, 1992) (claimed breach of
collective bargaining agreement a minor dispute); Allied Pilots Ass’n v.
Am. Airlines, 898 F.2d 462 (Sth Cir. 1990) (alcohol testing policy subject
to mandatory arbitration because minor dispute).

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..........:ssessssssessreeteseessneeees
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ..........scssssseeeseeeeneneenenes

ARGUMENT .........sccsssssssssesseceseeeneessnsensceeennsessnsensneenees

I.

Il.

BY RE-AFFIRMING CONTINENTAL I!
BASED ON THAT PANEL’S INTERPRE-
TATION OF DISPUTED REMEDIAL
TERMS IN A LABOR AGREEMENT, THE
PANEL BELOW VIOLATED WELL
ESTABLISHED PRECEDENTS OF THIS

A. Under the Railway Labor Act, interpretive
disputes over labor agreements are subject
to exclusive adjustment board jurisdiction,
and resulting awards may be set aside only
on statutorily prescribed grounds..........++++++.

B. Whereas Continental I misapplied a prop-
erly stated rule of law, Continental II
directly conflicts with this Court’s prior
decisions and should be reversed...........++++

1. Background ........scssesesssssersereereerenereesers
2D. Continental ..........ccccccccsscoscsccccceseesesseoes
3. Continental II ...........scscccrscccsccsecceeeeseeceees

CONTINENTAL II CREATES UNCER-
TAINTY OVER MATTERS THAT ARE
CURRENTLY VITAL TO NATIONAL BAR-
GAINING IN THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY ......

CONCLUSION ..........cscessscesseeesressnsessrescensennasessnsssnseoenss

17
19

il

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES Page
Air Line Pilots Ass’n v. E. Airlines, 632 F.2d
1321 (St Cae. ISG) nccccsinisnitnbininsasnsenienninneintinies 8
Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 406 U.S.
SRO OND T ED cacssinvitrssnissninnctiiniitnanialianiieeninnaid 6
Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs v. Louisville &
Nashville R.R., 373 U.S. 33 (1963).........ccceeeeeees 9
Consol. Rail Corp. v. Ry. Labor Executives’
Ass’ n, 491 U.S, 299 (1989).....crcccccrscessceee 2,5, 6, 7, 14
E. Air Lines v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, 130
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2284 (11th Cir. 1988)............ 16
Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711
(TOAD) nttiisssacinnevenesstinensiaiiaininneniainailaias 5, 6, 14
English v. Burlington N. R.R., 18 F.3d 741 (9th
Cid, IPG) nccssrnieitisiassiinisensisinitinsssiiieliinatliabadilialianionaa 8
Gen. Comm. of Adjustment v. CSX R.R., 893 F.2d
SB6 (38 Cie. BOD) cscesriscinnenctninihanetaiciiinianainn 7, 8, 14

Hawaiian Airlines v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246 (1994)... 2, 5,6
Hunt v. Northwest Airlines, 600 F.2d 176 (8th

CO, UTD cececnccesccdiinsivecnstantniiicneeenniasiteninadiasins m
In re Continental Airlines, Inc., 279 F.3d 226 (3d

COP, BEIGE) sscciivasusnssnccscdssinedaseusessisiinebesipeniaibmanimseide passim
In re Continental Airlines, Inc., 125 F.3d 120 (3d

Cle, FRITS vcracasensctnetcbitnnieiccteictaiaiiiaaiaaaiiaie passim
In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 114 B.R. 379

(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd, 922 F.2d 984

(AG CAR, TR cisuisicseitidiciasstainaaindiaiimiabiamdiiiais 13
In re Torwico Elecs., 8 F.3d 146 (3d Cir. 1993)... 9
Loveless v. E. Airlines, 681 F.2d 1272 (11th Cir.

6

Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274 (1985) .........cccseeeeeee 9
Union Pac. R.R. v. Sheehan, 439 U.S. 89

(EFT scvinvnctaecciteeinisinnabaaipuiniadaiiamaeaianls 8

ill
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page
Union Pac. R.R. v. United Transp. Union, 3 F.3d
Re scainithccitehaniiubistitinepntaiibilianidbb ata 8
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel
& Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960) ......ccccccseeees 7, 16
STATUTES
ak ioe Bt TILT aici gtineidiaianmidiinianbiaianiniaaieds 2,9, 14
5 Srsreiee UF it icesicsinieaiessinibesetedadiensneeidelniaideclidmahimenas 13
0 Mien Wb i instrsisnciicaiinesicheenieasiisnnntaeibaiabiig 4, 14, 17, 18
ese Ie eee onndibiaieeichesbaceniceieeatecetithcanceitnndsisbaeas a ae
iP GPAs OE Cate WMIUE Cl Pascrisnncscnannnseusinsiesbtiihebuntiainie 5
Ge Shean Bae FUE CN chciancsnsinsierenstntentinsnsnnsion 3, 8,9, 15
SD UA & DS, FRE CD vccnecesesseseccnresenessnsnnvensen 3, 6, 8, 15
A EE Be OI sedsictsinsissnesctseniniinnnntasecdainisiniennas 5
Fa Nida PEE eh estealsnisitendhehtedhiaieiteatinbieiieiiaiaiiect 5,6
MISCELLANEOUS
148 Cong. Rec. S4939-41 (daily ed. June 4,
TD cesecrticleeiiibiiaitietimiatinn hiatal dice 17-18

Air Transportation Safety and System Stabil-

ization Act, 49 U.S.C. § 40101 note (Supp.

STE \srctasnictaconiistshetiinsiaeihbeibniiablicititedpsenibtiandiaaiaeniaed 17
Allegheny-Mohawk Merger, 59 CAB 22 (1972).... 1]
Decision Eastern Air Lines Pilots System Board

of Adjustment (Elkouri), ALPA Case No. 1-86,

Se AEIy Ft cccnciatsctonqnssenapishbemtnenvenonte 11-13, 16
National Mediation Board website, http://www.

nmb.gov/activ-rpts/odarch. htm] ............ccsscseeeees 6, 18

IN THE
Supreme Court of the Anited States

No. 02-58

EASTERN PILOTS MERGER COMMITTEE,
Petitioner,

Ve

CONTINENTAL AIRLINES, INC.,
Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF THE
ALLIED PILOTS ASSOCIATION
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER

The Allied Pilots Association (“APA”) files this brief
amicus curiae contingent on the Court granting the above
motion.’

' The APA General Counsel’s office authored this brief amicus
curiae in whole. The Eastern Pilots Merger Committee (“EPMC”)
contributed funds toward APA’s attorney fees and expenses. In addition,
APA counsel provided advice to the EPMC on its Petition for Certiorari.

2
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The panel decision below (“Continental IT’) found that an
earlier panel’s decision in the same case (“Continental I’) .
had “interpreted” a collective bargaining agreement
(“Agreement”) between Eastern Air Lines, Inc. and the Air
Line Pilots Association (“ALPA”) to construe “the seniority
provisions of the Agreement as a basis of providing a right of
payment in lieu of injunctive relief after considering a variety
of factors to include feasibility.” Appendix to the Petition for
Certiorari (“Pet. App.”) 6a-7a. Based on the foregoing
rationale, Continental II declined to reconsider the earlier
panel’s holding that the pilots’ rights to sen_ority integration
constituted “claims” under section 101(5) of the Bankruptcy
Code, 11 U.S.C. § 101(5).

Continental II conflicts with well established precedents of
this Court. Those precedents mandate exclusive adjustment
board jurisdiction over disputed terms of labor agreements in
industries covered by the Railway Labor Act (“RLA”)—
disputes growing “out of the interpretation or application of
agreements covering rates of pay, rules, or working con-
ditions.” Hawaiian Airlines v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 252-53
(1994); Consol. Rail Corp. v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’ n,
491 U.S. 299, 303 (1989) (“Conrail’’). Continental II
erroneously approved court, rather than adjustment board,
resolution of disputed remedial terms of the Agreement.

Correcting this error in Continental II would require
more than adopting the rationale previously set forth in
Continental I to maintain the same result. Unlike Continental
Il, Continental I correctly stated this Court’s holding in
Conrail, and disclaimed any need to interpret the Agreement.
~ But Continental I then misapplied the RLA by ignoring the

? Continental I was reported as In re Continental Airlines, Inc., 125
F.3d 120 (3d Cir. 1997). Continental II was reported as In re Continental
Airlines, Inc., 279 F.3d 226 (3rd Cir. 2002)

ee

3

limitations on a court’s power to set aside adjustment board
awards prescribed in 45 U.S.C. § 153, First (p) and (q).
Rather, Continental I found, prospectively, that “any”
adjustment board award based on the pilots’ seniority rights
would give rise to a right of payment. Continental I thus
effectively set aside any award of specific performance, even
if based on an otherwise valid adjustment board deter-
mination that the parties had contracted exclusively for
specific performance. Accordingly, neither Continental I nor
Continental II is viable. While Continental I’s misapplication
of the RLA to the facts did not warrant this Court’s review,
Continental II’s direct violation of this Court’s precedents
requires reversal, and a consequent reconsideration of the
result in Continental I.

The errors in both Continental I & II flow from the panels’
erroneous resolution of the issue identified in the Petition for
Certiorari. The panels below did not require rejection of the
Agreement, but sought to set aside or interpret away any right
to specific performance that might arise from the Agreement.
But the RLA, as construed by this Court, permits lower courts
neither to interpret disputed contract terms nor to set aside
adjustment board awards except on the narrow bases
prescribed in that Act. Absent rejection, the contract must be
given effect through the adjustment board mechanism.

By creating a circuit split over bankruptcy law, and
violating this Court’s precedents on the appropriate role of
courts in interpreting labor agreements under the RLA, the
panel decision undermines current collective bargaining in
the airline industry. The panel decision creates uncertainty
over the enforceability of successorship rights and seniority
integration just as many carriers and their employees must
adjust, and negotiate responses, to the financial instability in
the industry following September 11, 2001. Increased
instability in airline labor relations at this time is clearly an
issue of national import.

OE

4

Because Continental II conflicts with this Court’s
established precedents, creates a circuit split over bankruptcy
law, and concerns issues of vital national importance,
EPMC’s Petition for Certiorari should be granted.

ARGUMENT

The APA joins Petitioner in respectfully urging this Court
to review the judgment below for the reason set forth in the
Petition for Certiorari: to resolve a circuit conflict over the
effect of an employer’s failure to reject a collective
bargaining agreement under section 1113 of the Bankruptcy
Code. The APA writes separately, however, to emphasize
that the panel’s effective nullification of section 1113 also led
the panel to violate this Court’s well established precedents
under the RLA.

In light of the financial difficulties in the airline industry
precipitated by the events of September 11, 2001, the
conflicts created by the panel decision assume particular
national import. The decision undermines the effect of
collectively bargained successorship and seniority integration
clauses in bankruptcy just as several large employee groups,
including the APA, are seeking to reach new contracts in the
wake of September 11. By forcing unions to seek new and
expanded protections against the negative effects of mergers,
the panel decision contributes to already volatile labor
relations in the airline industry.

5

I. BY RE-AFFIRMING CONTINENTAL I BASED
ON THAT PANEL’S INTERPRETATION OF
DISPUTED REMEDIAL TERMS IN A LABOR
AGREEMENT, THE PANEL BELOW VIOLAT-
ED WELL ESTABLISHED PRECEDENTS OF
THIS COURT

A. Under the Railway Labor Act, interpretive
disputes over labor agreements are subject to
exclusive adjustment board jurisdiction, and
resulting awards may be set aside only on
statutorily prescribed grounds

The RLA establishes a comprehensive framework for
resolving labor disputes in the rail and airline industries.
Pursuant to that scheme, the statute divides contractual
disputes into two classes. The first class concerns disputes
over the creation of new collective bargaining agreements or
attempts to change the terms of existing agreements.
Adopting language traditionally used in the rail industry, this
Court has termed such disputes “major disputes.” Norris, 512
U.S. at 252; Conrail, 491 U.S. at 302-03; Elgin, Joliet & E.
Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 723 (1945). Major disputes are
subject to a lengthy process of bargaining and mediation, and
failing agreement, parties may resort to economic force.
Conrail, 491 U.S. at 302-03.

In contrast, the RLA establishes a “mandatory arbitral
mechanism to handle disputes ‘growing out of grievances or
out of the interpretation or application of agreements
concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions.’”
Norris, 512 U.S. at 248 (citing 45 U.S.C. § 153, First (i)).’

* Enacted in 1926, the RLA was extended-to the airline industry in
1936. See 45 U.S.C. §§ 181-88. Although § 201 of the RLA, 45 U.S.C. §
181, extends all provisions of the RLA to the airlines save 45 U.S.C.
§ 153, “congressional intent requires identical court treatment of airline
board decisions under section 184 and railroad board decisions under
section 153, and this has been the continuing policy of the courts.” Hunt

6

In the airline industry, the Act mandates that carriers and
employee representatives establish “boards of adjustment” to
arbitrate such disputes. 45 U.S.C. § 184. This Court termed
such disputes “minor disputes.” Elgin, 325 U.S. at 723
(“minor disputes” relate, inter alia, “to the meaning or proper
application of a particular provision with reference to a
specific situation”).

Adjustment board jurisdiction to resolve minor disputes is
compulsory, binding and exclusive. Conrail, 491 U.S. at
303-04 & n.4; Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 406
U.S. 320, 322-25 (1972) (“the notion that the grievance and
arbitration procedures provided for minor disputes in the
Railway Labor Act are optional, to be availed of as the
employee or the carrier chooses, was never good history and

is no longer good law”). The reasons for this rule are well -

established and have been articulated repeatedly by this
Court.* First, of course, the statute demands it. 491 U.S. at
303-04 & n.4; 406 U.S. at 322-25. But in addition, this Court
has recognized the special competence of industry arbitrators
to resolve such disputes based on custom and practice in the
industry—and in particular to formulate remedies:

The federal policy of settling labor disputes by
arbitration would be undermined if courts had the final

v. Northwest Airlines, 600 F.2d 176, 178 (8th Cir. 1979); see also
Loveless v. E. Airlines, 681 F.2d 1272, 1275 (11th Cir. 1982) (“A court
may overturn the decision of an airline system adjustment board only on
the basis of one of the grounds listed in 45 U.S.C. § 153, First (q)”); see
generally Norris, 512 U.S. 246 (1994).

* One reason that appears central to this Court’s supervisory
responsibilities is important but rarely mentioned. Opening the doors of
federal courts to RLA contract interpretation issues would likely inundate
the lower courts with such cases. In the railroad industry alone, the
National Mediation Board reports 6,643 currently pending cases before
government-funded adjustment boards as of July 26, 2002. See “Weekly
Activity Report,” National Mediation Board website, http://www.nmb.
gov/activ-rpts/odarch.html (last visited Aug. 6, 2002).

——a

7

say on the merits of the awards. . . . [T]he arbitrators
under these collective agreements are indispensable
agencies in a continuous collective bargaining process.
They sit to settle disputes at the plant level—disputes
that require for their solution knowledge of the custom
and practices of a particular factory or of a particular
industry as reflected in particular agreements.

* * * *

When an arbitrator is commissioned to interpret and
apply the collective bargaining agreement, he is to bring
his informed judgment to bear in order to reach a fair
solution of a problem. This is especially true when it
comes to formulating remedies. There the need is for
flexibility in meeting a wide variety of situations.

United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,
363 U.S. 593, 596-97 (1960).

There can be no question that the exclusive jurisdiction of
RLA adjustment boards extends not just to the substantive
rights under a labor agreement, but to nonfrivolous disputes
over agreed remedies for violation of those rights as well. A
core holding of Conrail was that the burden on the party
seeking to invoke adjustment board jurisdiction is “light.”
If the party “asserts a contractual right to take the contested
action, the ensuing dispute is minor if the action is arguably
justified by the terms of the parties’ collective-bargaining
agreement. Where, in contrast, the [party’s] claims are
frivolous or obviously insubstantial, the dispute is major.”
Conrail, 491 U.S. at 307. By making a nonfrivolous assertion
of right to a particular remedy under a labor agreement, a
party meets its burden to vest the adjustment board with
jurisdiction to decide that issue.

Thus, for instance, in General Committee of Adjustment v.
CSX Railroad., 893 F.2d 584 (3d Cir. 1990), where a railroad
sought to sell a line without bargaining over its effects, the

8

court dismissed a union complaint seeking to enjoin the sale
by noting that “[t]he merits of [the] issue [of the impact on
union jobs] will be before the Adjustment Board as will the
question of what remedy may be appropriate if it decides for
the Union.” Jd. at 592. Citing Conrail, the court declined to
retain jurisdiction pending arbitration, noting that “[iJn minor
disputes, the Board has full authority to resolve the matter
and can grant a complete and adequate remedy to the
prevailing party.” /d. at 593.°

Buttressing the exclusive jurisdiction of adjustment boards
to decide interpretive disputes in the first instance, judicial
review of adjustment board decisions is “among the
narrowest known to the law.” Union Pac. R.R. v. Sheehan,
439 U.S. 89, 91, 93 (1979) (quoting the circuit court below,
and noting that “[w]e have time and again emphasized” that
the statutory language specifying three “limited” and
“specific” grounds for review “means just what it says”).

RLA subsections 3, First (p) and (q) permit federal courts
to set aside adjustment board decisions on only three bases:
(1) failure of the Adjustment Board to comply with the
requirements of the RLA; (2) failure of the Adjustment Board
to conform or confine itself to matters within the scope of
its jurisdiction; or (3) fraud or corruption. 45 U.S.C. § 153,
First (p) & (q).°

> See also Air Line Pilots Ass’n v. E. Airlines, 632 F.2d 1321, 1323
(Sth Cir. 1980) (“The Supreme Court has recognized the need for
flexibility in the formulation of arbitration remedies. As long as the
award is essentially drawn from the essence of the agreement, it is valid
and effectively etched in stone”).

© In addition, some courts have reviewed adjustment board awards on
due process or public policy grounds. See, e.g., English v. Burlington
N. R.R., 18 F.3d 741 (9th Cir. 1994) (due process); Union Pac. R.R. v.
United Transp.-Union, 3 F.3d 255 (8th Cir. 1993) (public policy). This
Court has not yet spoken on these additional bases.

9

Nor may a party circumvent the remedial powers of an
adjustment board through methods of review outside the
RLA. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs v. Louisville & Nashville
R.R., 373 U.S. 33, 38-39 (1963) (“BLE”). In BLE, the
National Railroad Adjustment Board refused the parties’
request to clarify the scope of a remedial award mandating
“pay for time lost as the rule is construed on the property.”
Id. at 34. The carrier sued for injunctive relief when the
union threatened a strike to enforce its interpretation of the
disputed term. This Court affirmed the lower courts’
judgment that the union was limited to the judicial
enforcement procedure established in § 3, First (p) of the
RLA, 45 U.S.C. § 153, First (p), and could not strike to
enforce its interpretation. /d. at 35-36. The Court based its
holding on the principle that “the process of decision through
the Adjustment Board cannot be challenged collaterally by
methods of review not provided for in the statute.” /d. at 38.

B. Whereas Continental I misapplied a properly
stated rule of law, Continental II directly conflicts
with this Court’s prior decisions and should
be reversed

Continental I & II both concern, in central part, how
Eastern pilots’ rights to seniority integration were treated in
the bankruptcy court. Whether those rights constituted
bankruptcy “claims” under the Bankruptcy Code depends on
whether they gave rise to a “right of payment.” 11 U.S.C.
§ 101(5). Continental I analyzed this Court’s and its own
precedents construing § 101(5) and concluded that the “right
to payment” is “essentially, an obligation to pay money.”
Pet. App. 74a-77a (citing Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274
(1985); In re Torwico Elecs., 8 F.3d 146 (3d Cir. 1993)). To
decide whether the pilots’ claim constituted a bankruptcy
claim, the Continental I court concluded, “the issue we must
decide is whether monetary payment is an alternative for the
equitable remedy of seniority integration.” Pet. App. 77a.

10

The Continental I panel found that monetary payments
were an alternative remedy to seniority integration, but
appeared to disclaim any need to interpret the Agreement to
resolve this issue, asserting it was merely deciding how the
pilots’ claims under the Agreement would be “treated” in -
bankruptcy after an arbitral award was rendered:

We take care to note the boundaries of our holding. It is
not our purpose to suggest the award the arbitrator
should grant, if an award is warranted upon disposition
of the LPP [Labor Protective Provisions] dispute. Our
holding is limited to how the claims should be treated in
bankruptcy. Simply put, we hold that any claim based
on an award of seniority integration arising out of the
resolution of the LPP dispute will be treated as a claim
in bankruptcy giving rise to a right of payment.

Pet. App. 83a.

The Continental II panel, however, insisted that the first
panel had looked to the labor agreement to resolve this central
issue, by interpreting the seniority provisions of that
Agreement:

In Continental I, this court, as did the bankruptcy court
and the district court, did not reject the Agreement. We
interpreted it. We construed the seniority provisions of
the Agreement as a basis of providing a right of payment
in lieu of injunctive relief after considering a variety of
factors to include feasibility.

Pet. App. 6a-7a (emphasis supplied).

Turning first, briefly, to Continental I, we show below that
if an award were rendered for specific performance, based on
a finding that the parties had agreed to specific performance,
the court would not be free to set the awarded remedy aside,
as the Continental I court effectively did, except on narrow

=

11

statutory grounds not present here. In turn, we show that
whether the remedial terms of the Agreement’s seniority
integration provisions themselves gave rise to a right of
payment, as asserted in Continental II, is clearly a contested
and nonfrivolous issue. As such, it is one over which an
arbitrator would have exclusive jurisdiction and over which
an arbitrator had already asserted jurisdiction pursuant to
clear language in the parties’ Agreement. Whereas the
Continental I court erred, sub silencio, by failing to account
for, or misapplying, the RLA’s explicit strictures on court
review of adjustment board awards, the Continental II court
expressly trenched on adjustment board jurisdiction and the
relevant precedents of this Court.

1. Background

In February 1986, in anticipation of a “possible sale or
bankruptcy” of Eastern Air Lines, Eastern and its pilots
entered into a labor agreement to slash labor costs and
provide successorship labor protection for pilots. Pet. App.
217a-20a (Decision Eastern Air Lines Pilots System Board of
Adjustment (Elkouri), ALPA Case No. 1-86, dated Sept. 22,
1989). An Eastern adjustment board (“System Board”’) found
that this Agreement incorporated a subset of the LPPs first
drafted by the Civil Aeronautics Board in Allegheny-Mohawk
Merger, 59 CAB 22, 45-49 (1972), specifically sections 2a, 3
and 13 of these standard LPPs. Pet. App. 250a. The
provisions grant, in relevant part, a right to fair and equitable
seniority integration in the event of a merger and refer “any
dispute” over that integration to “final and _ binding”
arbitration:

Section 3. Insofar as the merger affects the seniority
rights of the carriers’ employees, provisions shall be
made for the integration of seniority lists in a fair
and equitable manner, including, where applicable,
agreement through collective bargaining between the

12

carriers and the representatives of the employees
affected. In the event of failure to agree, the dispute
may be submitted by either party for adjustment in
accordance with section 13.

* * * *

Section 13(a). In the event that any dispute or
controversy . . . arises with respect to the protections
provided herein, which cannot be settled by the parties
within 20 days after the controversy arises, it may be
referred by any party to an arbitrator selected from a
panel of seven names furnished by the National
Mediation Board for consideration and determination.
The parties shall select the arbitrator from such panel by
alternatively striking names until only one remains, and
he shall serve as arbitrator. Expedited hearings and
decisions will be expected, and a decision shall be
rendered within 90 days after the controversy arises,
unless an extension of time is mutually agreeable to all
parties. The salary and expenses of the arbitrator shall
be borne equally by the carrier and (i) the organization
or organizations representing the employee or employees
or (ii) if unrepresented, the employee or employees or
group or groups of employees. The decision of the
arbitrator shall be final and binding on the parties.

(b) The above condition shall not apply if the parties
by mutual agreement determine that an alternative
method for dispute settlement or an _ alternative
procedure for selection of an arbitrator is appropriate in
their particular dispute. No party shall be excused from
complying with the above condition by reason of having
suggested an alternative method or procedure, unless
and until that alternative method or procedure shall
have been agreed to by all the parties.

Pet. App. 245a-46a (emphasis supplied).

13

Although other provisions of the Allegheny-Mohawk LPPs
provide a right of payment to affected pilots in the event of a
merger, the System Board found that the Agreement included
none of these rights to pecuniary allowances. Pet. App. 244a-
45a. After reviewing the negotiating history, the Board
rejected carrier arguments to undercut the equitable right to
seniority integration, asserting its view that “the Board should
not issue any award in this case which is not definitely
intended and calculated to recognize meaningful LPP
protection for pilots as a matter of contractual right.” Pet.
App. 247a. As the Board had noted earlier, “even without the
pecuniary allowances . . . the protection of seniority itself by
application of sections 3 and 13 is of such critical importance
that this without more does constitute meaningful protection
under the February 23 Agreement. . . . Sections 3 and 13 are
the ‘heart’ of the Allegheny-Mohawk LPP’s ‘because they
control seniority.’” Jd. at 245a (adopting testimony).

After Continental’s parent corporation acquired Eastern in
1986, the parties disputed various aspects of the LPPs,
including whether a “merger” between Continental and
Eastern had occurred. ALPA initiated the dispute resolution
process provided for in the Agreement. After filing for
bankruptcy, both carriers attempted to avoid arbitrating the
dispute by appealing to § 362 of the Bankruptcy Code. 11
U.S.C. § 362. Those attempts ultimately failed. See In re
Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 114 B.R. 379, 381 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1989), aff d, 922 F.2d 984 (2d Cir. 1990); Continental I, Pet.
App. 87a. The parties proceeded to arbitration under section
13 of the LPPs before Arbitrator Richard Kasher, who
concluded that he had jurisdiction both to determine if a
merger had occurred, and if so, to fashion the proper
remedies. Pet. App. 94a-95a.

Meanwhile, to safeguard its interests, ALPA filed proofs of
claim in the Continental bankruptcy proceeding, asserting,
inter alia, the pilots’ equitable rights to seniority integration

14

and also seeking money damages for the time period after
merger and before seniority integration was achieved. Pet.
App. 93a-94a. In response, Continental filed an adversary
proceeding, seeking a declaration that, at best, all of ALPA’s
claims were “general, dischargeable, pre-petition, unsecured
claims” compensable with monetary damages. The clear
predicate to Continental’s position, under the Bankruptcy
Code, was that a breach of the equitable right to seniority
integration under the Agreement gave rise to a “right of
payment.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5).

2. Continental I

As noted above, the Continental I panel identified as a core
issue in bankruptcy whether the right to seniority integration
under the LPPs gave rise to a right of monetary payment. Pet.
App. 53a. The Continental I panel noted the “tension
between bankruptcy law and labor law,” and was careful to
disclaim any bankruptcy court jurisdiction over the
“disposition of the merits of the underlying LPP dispute.”
Pet. App. 52a, 69a. Rather, the panel cited to this Court’s
holdings in Conrail and Elgin, and noted specifically that the
courts could not decide “what remedy is appropriate if the
agreement is interpreted to require recovery of a remedy”
(citing Gen. Comm. of Adjustment, 893 F.2d at 592-93). Pet.
App. 68a-69a. Moreover, the panel recognized that
Continental’s failure to reject the Agreement under § 1113
meant that Continental’s duty to arbitrate the disputed LPP
provisions remained intact. Pet. App. 87a.

Having properly stated much of the relevant law, the
Continental I panel proceeded to misapply it. The panel
framed the issue, in essence, as whether an adjustment board
award for seniority integration, once rendered, might be
enforceable by money damages. But rather than turn to the
RLA provisions pertinent to enforcement of board awards,
the panel examined a number of cases, none of which were

15

RLA cases. Ignoring § 153, First (p) and (q), the panel
concluded that the courts had previously enforced monetary
awards as an alternative to the equitable remedy of
reinstatement. Pet. App. 78a-81a. The panel principally
relied on one Ninth Circuit case in which that court upheld an
arbitral award for money damages in lieu of seniority
integration. The Ninth Circuit court based its decision on the
arbitrator’s finding that the labor agreement at issue not only
permitted such a remedy, but arguably required it, since an
award of seniority integration would exceed the arbitrator's
jurisdiction under a contract term that prohibited him from
deciding any jurisdictional dispute with another union. Pet.
App. 79a. Little wonder, then, that the Continental II panel
believed that the Continental I panel had also based its
decision on an interpretation of the Agreement.

Clearly, none of these precedents cited in Continental |
support setting aside an adjustment board award of specific
performance under the RLA, if based on an arbitral finding
that the parties had agreed to such an award as an exclusive
remedy. The non-RLA cases shed no light on the appropriate
treatment of awards under § 153, First (p) and (q). The Ninth
Circuit case cannot support setting aside an arbitral award, if
based on the same sort of arbitral interpretation to which that
court deferred. As shown above, the sole grounds for setting
aside such an award are spelled out in § 153, which the panel
entirely failed to address.

’ The panel attempted to buttress its holding by reference to the
language of the Agreement, and by reference to its own conclusion, based,
apparently, only on some general sense of the panel that “the particular
circumstances of this case might make the enforcement of the equitable
remedy of seniority integration impractical,” citing “employee morale”
and the effect on “employer-employee relations.” Pet. App. 78a n.10,
82a-83a. The panel’s additional rationales fail, however, for at least three
reasons. First, the panel had already recognized that the adjustment board
had exclusive jurisdiction to interpret the remedial terms of the

16
3. Continental II

Clearly, the contractual question on which the Continental
II panel focused—whether the parties intended to provide for
a right of payment concurrent with or in lieu of seniority
integration—is a classic interpretive dispute over contractual
terms. As shown above, under the RLA, such disputes are
committed to the exclusive jurisdiction of adjustment boards.
The basic negotiating history for the provisions is spelled out
in the System Board opinion that found that the parties had
agreed to “meaningful protection” in the form of LPPs, Pet.
App. 242a, and by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
opinion that found the existence of a labor agreement
between ALPA and Eastern. E. Air Lines v. Air Line Pilots
Ass’n, 130 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2284, 2291 (11th Cir. 1988).
Whether ALPA knowingly traded away millions of dollars in
wage and work rule concessions on the verge of Eastern’s
sale or bankruptcy, in return for an unsecured right to front
pay ultimately dischargeable in bankruptcy, is a question of
fact and intent that the RLA wisely commits to arbitral
jurisdiction. Clearly the Petitioners have a nonfrivolous
argument that ALPA could not conceivably have intended
such a trade.

Moreover, the dispute over whether the provisions include
a right to payment in lieu of specific performance is a
“dispute . . . with respect to the protections” provided by the

Agreement. Pet. App. 68a-69a. Second, the principal language on which
the panel relied was never part of the Agreement. See Pet. App. 78a n.10
(citing “section 1” of the LPPs); Pet. App. 250a-51la (adjustment board
finding that the Agreement incorporated only sections 2(a), 3 and 13, and
possibly 2(d) of the LPPs). Third, the effect and manner of seniority
integration is precisely the kind of question best left to an arbitrator
schooled in the industry and the detailed custom and practices of the
particular “shop,” and not to the unsupported reflections of appellate
judges. See Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 596-97.

17

LPPs that the parties themselves expressly agreed to submit
to final and binding arbitration. See supra pages 11&12.

The errors in both Continental I & II flow from the same
source. That source is the panels’ erroneous resolution of the
issue identified in the Petition for Certiorari: the effect of the
carrier’s failure to proceed under section 1113. Continental
Airlines did not reject the Agreement, yet sought to reduce
seniority rights under the Agreement to bankruptcy claims,
dischargeable in the bankruptcy proceeding. Petition for
Certiorari at i. Rather than require Continental to follow the
procedures of section 1113 to avoid the obligations of the
Agreement, the panels purported to set aside or interpret away
any right to specific performance that might arise from the
Agreement. As shown above, this Court has construed the
RLA to prohibit such court interference with the
interpretation or enforcement of labor agreements. Absent
rejection, the contract must be given effect through the RLA’s
adjustment board mechanism.

II. CONTINENTAL II CREATES UNCERTAINTY
OVER MATTERS THAT ARE CURRENTLY
VITAL TO NATIONAL BARGAINING IN THE

~ AIRLINE INDUSTRY

By creating a circuit split over bankruptcy law, and
violating this Court’s precedents on the appropriate role of
courts in interpreting labor agreements under thé RLA, the
panel decision in Continental IT undermines current collective
bargaining in the airline industry. One result may be
increasing instability in airline labor relations at a time when
the country can least afford it.

In the wake of the events of September 11, the airline
industry has entered a period of prolonged and severe
financial difficulty. Several carriers face potential bank-
ruptcy. See, e.g., Air Transportation Safety and System
Stabilization Act, 49 U.S.C. § 40101 note (Supp. 2002); 148

18

Cong. Rec. $4939-41 (daily ed. June 4, 2002) (statements of
Sens. Bond, Hutchison, Allen, Snowe, Kennedy, Carnahan).
Management in the post-September 11 period has been
forced to consider potential merger, acquisition and/or
bankruptcy options. |

At the same time, the National Mediation Board has, since
mid-June 2002, docketed for mediation open contract
negotiations between the APA and American, between the
Teamsters and Continental over their mechanics contract,
between the Teamsters and Continental Micronesia over the
Fleet and Passenger Service contract, between the Teamsters
and Southwest Airlines over their mechanics contract and
between ALPA and Mesaba Aviation, Inc. See “Weekly
Activity Report,” National Mediation Board website, http://
www.nmb.gov/activ-rpts/odarch.html (June 21, 2002, June 28,
2002 & July 1, 2002).

By creating new uncertainty over the enforceability of
successorship rights, the panel decision below “raises the bar”
for unions seeking employee protections in the event of
mergers and bankruptcy. The plain language of section 1113
provides that the Bankruptcy Code shall not be construed to
alter labor agreements absent the bargaining mandated by
section 1113. 11 U.S.C. § 1113(f). The panel decisions
below alter the Agreement to nullify any right to specific
performance of seniority integration, even though Continental
never engaged in the prescribed bargaining. The implication
for unions is that contract terms that were formerly adequate
under section 1113 to protect workers, or at least guarantee

bargaining, are now subject to ad hoc nullification-by a |

bankruptcy judge. Unions must seek expanded protections
for mergers and bankruptcy at the same time that carrier
management is forced to seek flexibility in navigating
those same possibilities. The potential conflict increases
the chances of national disruption. attendant on failed
negotiations—solely because of the uncertainties created by
the Third Circuit panels below.

19
CONCLUSION

For all the reasons set forth above, the APA respectfully
requests that this Court. grant certiorari in this matter and
reverse the panel decision below.

Respectfully submitted,

DAVID PALMER DEAN *

JESSICA RACHEL ARONS

JAMES & HOFFMAN, P.C.

1101 17th Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036
* Counsel of Record (202) 496-0500

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386015_0083%3A4. Public record. Not legal advice.
