# Appendix — Langdon v. Swain

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386015_0040%3A3

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 2002
- **Citation:** 537 U.S. 947

## Text

‘

No.

In The
Supreme Court of the Gnited States

Christopher Langdon, Petitioner,
v.
Lyndo Tippett, Roy Cooper et al.
consolidated with:
Christopher Langdon, Petititoner,
v.
J.J. Swain, Jack Murdock, F.D. Martin et al.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari
To The United States Court of Appeals
For the Fourth Circuit

APPENDIX, PART II, FOR
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Christopher Langdon
Pro Se
1835 Edwin Blvd.
Winter Park, Fla. 32789
407-647-7539

38
[EXHBIT #1]

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
ASHEVILLE DIVISION
CASE NO:1:01-CV-107

FILED: 2001 MAY 21
P.M. 2:09
U.S DIST. COURT
W. DIST. OF N.C.

CHRISTOPHER LANGDON,
PLAINTIFF,

v.
LYNDO TIPPETT, SECRETARY OF TRANSP.
OF THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA; THE
NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION (NCDOT); ROY COOPER,
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NORTH CARO-
LINA, THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA;
THE NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE & THE OFFICE OF ATTORNEY
GENERAL,

DEFENDANTS

CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT CHALLENGING

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF NORTH
CAROLINA STATUTES & FOR DECLAR-
ATORY JUDGEMENT AND_INJUNCTIVE

RELIEF & INCORPORATED MEMORANDUM
OF LAW

39

(1) The plaintiff hereby seeks to have North
Carolina General Statutes 136-103 through
136- 112, NCGS-40A-1, NCGS-1-51, NCGS
1-53 and NCGS -1-35 declared unconstitu- ©
tional and that an injunction be issued
barring the defendants from utilizing those
statutes as defenses, or otherwise. The
aforesaid statutes deny equal protection
under the law, due process of lay anda
proper procedure for a redress of grievances
against the government. Therefore, the
aforesaid statutes are in violation of USCA’s
I, V, & XIV. More specifically:

a. 4

(2) NCGS 136-111 is unconstitutional
because it does away with prior notice be-
fore the taking of property and an opportun-
ity to be heard. The only exception to the
right to notice and an opportunity to be
heard prior to a taking is in emergency
situations. See: Boddie v. Connecticutt,
401 US 371 at 379 ; Davis v. Scherer, 468
US 183 at 200-201 (1984); Wisconsin v.
Constantineau, 400 US 433, 91 S. Ct. 507
at 510; Windsor v. Mc Veigh, 93 US 274
(1876).

Particularly enlightening is the Court’s
ruling in Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 US 67 at
83, 92 S.Ct. 1983 at 1995 (1972). The
Court has repeatedly held that “constructive
notice” is not sufficient: Mullane v. Central a
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 US 306,

40

314, 70 S.Ct. 652, 657 (1950); Schroeder v.
New York City, 371 US 208, 83 S.Ct. 279;
Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, 462
US 791,103 S.Ct. 2706 (1983). The low-

er courts agree: Miles v. District of Colum-
bia, 354 F. Supp. 577 (1973), 510 F. 2d 188
(1975). See also: Caveness V. Raleigh C. &
S. R. Co., 90 Se 244 at 246(N.C.S.Ct.-1916)
The right to prior notice and opportunity to
be heard before the taking of one’s property
is extended to all members of society, even
the most downtrodden.

For example, prisoners are allowed prior
notice and a hearing before their good time
credits are taken away Wolff v. McDonnell,
418 US 539, 557 -558 (1974). Mental
patients are allowed hearings before being
deprived of their civil rights: Zinermon v.
Burch, 494 US 113, 110 S.Ct. 975 (1990). ;
Those aliens who are charged with being in
this country illegally are entitled to notice
and a hearing prior to being deported:
Kwang Hai Chew v. Colding, 73 S. Ct. 472,
344 US 590.

States have always recognized the right to
prior notice and opportunity to be heard
when one’s property is taken by a govern-
mental entity: See: Bernard v. Brewer,
Virginia Reports, Volume II, {77}, pages 99-
100 (1795) ( this case was argued by John
Marshall as a practicing attorney); Case of
Neeld’s Road, 1 Pa 353 at 355; Stuart v.

41

Palmer, 74 NY-29 Sickels (183) at(190)
(New York-1878). North Carolina cases are
in agreement: Phelps v. Chesson, 34 NC
(197), page 189 (1851); Marshall v. Love-
lass, 1 NC 412; McMillan v. Robeson
County, 262 NC 413, 137 Se 2d 105 at 108
[4] (1964); Mc Donald’s Corp. v. Dwyer, 338
NC 445, 450 Se 2d 888 at 891 [6] (1994);
Bowie v. Town of West Jefferson, 57 Se 2d
369 at 371 [1] (1950); Beaufort County v.
Mayo, 176 Se 753 at 755 (NC S.Ct.-1934).
Board of Commissioners of Roxboro v.
Bumpass, 233 N.C. 190, 63 Se 2d 144 at
147 [9-12] (1951). Because there is no
requirement of prior notice and opportunity
to be heard in NCGS 136-111 when the
NCDOT takes property, it is in violation of
USCA’s I, V, & XIV.

(3) Federal law prohibits any federal
employee from intentionally making it
necessary for a property owner to institute
legal proceedings to prove that a taking has
occurred. See: 27 Am Jur 2d, EMINENT
DOMAIN, Sections 826, 1108; 42 USCS
4651 (8); UEDC Section 213; Many states
have the same prohibition: Alabama Codes-
18-1A-33. The reason for this prohibition is
that any government employee must inform
a citizen of the taking of that citizen’s
property if they are aware of the taking.
However, NCGS 136-111 has no such

Pa ew

42

requirement. NCGS 136-111 as written,
and as interpreted in the NC courts, allows
the NCDOT to simply take a citizen’s
property and say “sue us.” This has
happened on numerous occasions in N.C.
Therefore, NCGS 136-111 violates USCA’s I,
V, & XIV.

(4) The Supreme Court of the State of North
Carolina has repeatedly held that a statute
which allows the taking of property without
PRIOR notice and opportunity to be heard is
unconstitutional: Mc Donald’s Corp. v.
Dwyer, 338 NC 445, 450 Se 2d 888 at 891
(N.C.S.Ct.- 1994); Bowie v. Town of West
Jefferson, supra. For NC to make an excep-
tion to this rule for the NCDOT is not equal
protection under the law and due process of
law.

There are other state’s which agree that
statutes which allow the taking of property
without prior notice and opportunity to be
heard are unconstitutional: Violet’s Heirs
et al. v. City Council of Alexandria, 53 Am
St. Rep. 825, 23 Se 909 (Supreme Court of
Virginia- 1896); Savannah F. & W. Ry. Co. Vv.
Mayor of Savannah, 96 Ga. 680 at 680
(Ga.S.Ct.-1895); Dodd v. Hart, 68 A. 397 at
397 [1] (Court of Chancery of Deleware-
1900); Janes v. West Puerto De Luna
Community Ditch,169 P. 309 at 310
(Supreme Court of New Mexico-1917); Re

Dace

43
Opinion of Justices, 313 Ne 2d 561 (Mass.)

(5) NCGS 136-111 and NCGS 136-112
do not, as far as I am aware, appear in the
Index to the N.C. General Statutes. I have
checked under “Dept. of Transp.,” “Transp.
Dept.,” “N.C. Dept. of Transp.,” “ Just
Compensation,” “Taking,” “Inverse Condem-
nation,” “Condemnation” and “Eminent Do-
main.” If NCGS 136-111 is an exclusive
remedy, as the courts in NC have ruled,
notice that the statute exists must be given.
The government can’t hide the existence of
a statute, expect a citizen to be aware that
it exists and then punish them if they don’t
comply with it. Notice that a statute exists
is particularly important for pro se party,
particularly if they live in a remote county
with no law library. From 1980 to 1998 I
lived in Polk county N.C. which has no law
library. However, a copy of the NC General
Statutes was available.

The failure to include NCGS’s 136-111
and 112 in the Index is particularly harmful
to pro se parties who can’t afford legal
representation, thus, it is an economic,
class based discrimination. This type of
discrimination is unconstitutional: Harper
v. Va. Board of Elections, 383 US 663
(1966).

The failure to give proper notice to the
general public that NCGS 136-111 and 136-

Me

44

112 exist is a denial of due process of law
and equal protection under the law in
violation of USCA’s I, V and XIV.

(6) NCGS 136-111 states that a
property owner may file a complaint within
two years of the taking. However, it does
not specify what happens when a taking is
caused by a series of events over a period of
time, rather than by a single event. The US
Supreme Court addressed this question in
US v. Dickinson, 331 US 745, 67 S.Ct. 1382
at 1384-1385 (1947). In that case the
Court ruled that when a taking occurs over
a period of time, a statute of limitations, if
any, does not begin to run until the taking
is complete.

The reason for this rule is to avoid
premature and multipie lawsuits. See also
Gregorio P.Castro v. U.S., 500 F. 2d 436 at
440 (1974); Barbaccia v. County of Santa
Clara, 451 F. Supp. 260 at 266 (1978);
Juda v. U.S., 6 Cl. Ct. 441 (1984); Silver-
berg v. U.S., 155 Ct. Cl. 436 (1961); Avery v.
U.S., 300 F. 2d 640 (1964); Terteling v.
U.S., 334 F. 2d 250 (1964); Pierpont Inn v.
California, 449 P. 2d 737 (1969).

Rather than running any statute of
limitations from the time that the taking is
complete, the courts in N.C. have been
known to run a statute of limitations for a
taking from the first injury, no matter how

48

small it might be, regardless of whether or
not the taking is complete: Robertson v.
City of High Point, 497 Se 2d 300 (N.C.
App.-1998). NCGS 136-111, as written and
as interpreted, does not ensure that the
suggested statute of limitations, if applic-
able, runs from the last event in the taking,
rather than the first, therefore, NCGS 136-
111 is in violation of USCA’s I, V, & XIV.

(7) NCGS 136-112 states that interest
should run from the date of the taking.
However, when a taking occurs by a series
of events over a period of time, rather than
by a single event, the federal courts have
ruled that interest should run from the mid-
point of the taking: Drakes B.L. Co. v. U.S.,

459 F. 2d 504 at 511-512, 198 Ct. Cl. 598
at 608 (1965); Fonnaledes v. U.S., 107 F.
Supp. 1019, 1022, 1023, 123 Ct. Cl. 483,
503-504 (1952); Gregorio Castro v. U.S.,
SOOF. 2d 436 at 443 (1974). Therefore,
NCGS 136-112 is not constitutional and is
in violation of USCA’s I, V & XIV.

(8) NCGS 136-111 is unconstitutional
because it is too vague. A “taking” has been
recognized as substantial damage to a
citizen’s property which creates a servitude
or easement on the property: U.S. v. Dick-
inson, 67 S. Ct. 1382 at 1383 (1947); Wade
v. Car. Tel. & Tel. Co.,147 N.C. 219, 60 Se

ee Ot ilo as le ae tee Fal

46

987 at 988 (S.Ct. of N.C.-1908); Geer v.
Durham Water Co., 37 Se 474 At 475.

The question is “What amount of damage
must be reached to create a taking?”
Historically, if the damage to the citizen’s
property was not substantial enough to be a
taking, it was considered a tort and no com-
pensation was available, unless the
government had waved its sovereign
immunity with regards to tort claims. ~

“ The distinction is made between a
‘taking’ and ‘damage.’ Compensation to the
owner required as to the former, but not as
to the latter.” Kirkpatrick v. City of
487 at 4

“ Continuing trespass or nuisance may
ripen into a taking.” City of Jacksonville v.
Schumann, 167 So. 2d 95 at 95 [3] (Fl.-
1964).

“ Property is not ‘taken’ within meaning
of takings clause of State Constitution if it
is simply damaged.” Hawkins v. City of La
Grande, 843 P. 2d 400 (Oregon)

See also: Sanguinetti v. U.S., 264 US 148
at 149 (1924).

Because of the confusion as to what level
of damage was necessary to reach the level
of a taking, most states now have constitu-
tional amendments which require just
compensation for the ‘taking’ and
‘damaging’ of property by the government.

47

The first to do so was Illinois in the 1870’s.
North Carolina is not one of those states.
Therefore, a plaintiff must wait until the
damage reaches the level of a taking before
his cause of action accrues. Unfortunately,
North Carolina has at least three different
definitions as to what minimum level of
damage constitutes a taking:

“ And ‘taking’ under the power of eminent
domain may be defined as.. ‘informally
appropriating or injuriously affecting it
[property] in such a way as substantially to
oust the owner and deprive him of a//
beneficial enjoyment thereof.” Penn v.
Coastal, 231 NC 481lat 484 (1950).

Is a taking a complete destruction of
value, or is it substantial damage? The
quote above contains two different defi-
nitions of a taking because it gives two
different levels of damage necessary to
constitute a taking. Substantial damage
can be less than a complete destruction of
value, perhaps much iess, depending
on a particular judge’s, or jury’s interpre-
tation of the word “substantial.”
“Substantial” is a subjective term.

Some may consider a 10 % diminution in
value substantial, others 25%, 50%, or
75%. Is $500 worth of damage substan-
tial? Is $1,000 worth of damage sub-
stantial? Is $5,000 worth of damage
substantial? The above definition of a

48

‘taking’ appears in several NC cases and is
cited in the case notes of the NC General
Statutes. Another definition of a taking is:

“ In inverse condemnation action, prima
facie showing of substantial physical
damage measurable in monetary terms is
required.” Lea v. N.C. Board of Transp.,
291 Se 2d 844 at 845 [12] (N.C. App.-1982
304 Se 2d 164 at 166 [14] (N.C.S.Ct.-1983

The NC Court of Appeals has
further confused the matter by stating in
Robertson v. City of High Point, 497 Se 2d
300 (1998) that any statute of limitations
for inverse condemnation runs from the
first injury. One can draw two conclusions
from that: (A) The court believes that a
‘taking’ is a any injury, no matter how
small, or; (B) The statute of limitations for
a taking can begin running before a cause
of action accrues.

For example, if a NCDOT road/dam
malfunctions and destroys Mr. Abercrom-
bie’s barn, doing $20, 000 worth of damage,
the damage would probably be considered
substantial enough to be a taking. The
statute of limitations, according to
Robertson, would begin to run when
Abercrombie’s cause of action accrued.

However, if the same road/dam caused
$200 damage to Barnaby’s property, the
purported statute of limitations would,
according to Robertson, begin running,

49

although the damage was not substantial
enough to be a taking.

If Barnaby’s property was injured again
a year later by the same structure in the
amount of $400, Barnaby still couldn’t sue
for a taking. If Barnaby’s property was
injured again in the amount of $25,000, 26
months after the first injury, Barnaby
couldn’t sue because, according to Robert-
son, the statute of limitations began to run
from the first injury and had expired
before his cause of action had accrued.
Under Robertson, plaintiffs have different
time periods, or none at all, for filing.

In states which have constitutional bars
against the taking of property, without a bar
against damaging property, the courts and
plaintiff's are faced with the difficult task of
determining when the damage rises to the
level of a taking.

“ No simple test exists for determining
when a taking occurs...a particularized
judgment of the facts of the individual case
is necessary.” Jensen v. U_S., 305 F.
2d 444 (1962)

The Robertson rule is a simple rule that is
basically a tort rule. However, courts
throughout the U.S. have always held that a
‘taking’ is not a tort.

“ Constitutional provision against taking
private property ...without adequate
compensation..that liability is not in tort.”

50
29A CJS, Eminent Domain, Sect. 375, page
745.
Generally, the federal courts require a
high amount of damage to constitute a

taking. In Sanguinetti v. US, 264 US 148 at

149, the Court cited US v. Cress, 243 US
316, in which the value of Cress’ property
was diminished by 50%, therefore, a
“taking” had occurred. I am not asserting
that the courts in N.C. must accept the
federal levels of damage that trigger a
taking. States may be more protective of
constitutional rights than the federal
government. Many states allow a small
level of damage to constitute a taking (I
believe S.C. is one).

Whatever level of damage that N.C.
decides constitutes a taking, it must be
consistent. If a plaintiff is to comply with a
statute of limitations for a taking, particu-
larly a pro se plaintiff, there must be a uni-
form definition of a “taking.” In NC it has
been defined as a complete destruction of
value, a substantial diminution of value
and, by inference, a small injury.

Therefore, NCGS 136-111 and NCGS
136-112 are in violation of USCA I, USCA V
& USCA XIV.

(9) A more complete definition of a taking is
a substantial interference with a property
right. Property is not a physical thing but a

31

bundle of rights; the right to sell, to enjoy,
to use and to damage the physical entity,
are all property rights. Whenever a
government entity exercises one of these
property rights, it must pay just compen-
sation. For example, if a government floods
private property, it is both using and
damaging the property. Joe Smith may
flood his own property, even if it diminishes
its value. However, the government must
pay just compensation if it substantially
damages/uses a citizen’s property.
Historically, in N.C., whenever a
government agency used/damaged private
property substantially, without resorting to
the statutory condemnation proceedings
(particularly notice and opportunity to be
heard), the property owner had until the
expiration of the period of adverse
possession/ prescription to file a complaint
for just compensation. State v. Fisher, 23
SE 158 (Supreme Court of N.C.-1895).
Upon payment of just compensation,
sometimes called permanent damages, the
appropriator acquired an easement/
servitude to cont: »ue the damage/ use.

A physical invasion of the land was not
required, as claimed in Lea v. BOT, supra.
In Geer v. Durham Water Co., 37 Se 474 the
upstream prevention of the normal flow of
water to the plaintiff's property was deemed
an appropriation of an easement. Because

92

the appropriator had not used the statutory
condemnation procedures, the 20 year time
limit of adverse possession/ prescription
was applicable. This was the ancient,
common law remedy under the Magna
Carta: Bowman v. Middleton, 1 Bay 252 at
253-254 (S.C.-1792). Mo. & N. A.R. Co. v.
Chapman, 234 Sw 171 (S.Ct. of Ark.-1921).
See also: Caveness v. Railroads 172 NC
305, 90 Se 244; Land v. Railroad, 107 NC
72, 12 Se 125; Livermon v. Roanoke &
T.R.R. Co., 109 NC 52, 13 Se 734 (1891);
Query v. Postal Tel. &Tel. Cable Co., 101
Se 390 at 391; Carolina & N.W. R. Co. v.
Piedmont Wagon, 51 Se 2d 301.

Most states (approximately 35) agree that
if a government body or a quasi-public
corporation appropriates a property interest
without utilizing the statutory condem-
nation procedures, including notice and
opportunity to be heard, the plaintiff
property owner has the right to file suit for
just compensation until the expiration of
the period of adverse possession / prescrip-
tion. See: Aylmore v. City of Seattle, 171 P.
2d 659 (extremely explanatory); White Pine
Lumber Co .v. City of Reno, 801 P. 2d 1370
(Nevada-1990); Carter v. Ridge Turnpike
Co., 208 Pa. 565, 57 A. 988 (1904); Faulk
v. Mo. River & N.W. R. Co., 28 SD 1,

132 NW 233 at 237(1911); Ackerman v.
Port of Seattle, 55 Wash. 2d 400, 348 P. 2d

a

664; Frustruck v. City of Fairfax, 28 Cal.
R. 357 at 361 [45-48] (1963); Fairbanks v.
N. Stor. Bor. v. Lakeview Enterp.,897 P. 2d
47 at 54 (Alaska-1995); Underwood v.
Dept. of Transp., 849 P. 2d 1113 at 1117
Oklahoma-1993); Barker v. St. Louis Cnty.,
104 Sw 2d 371 (Mo.-1937); Galway v.
Metropolitan El. R. Co., 28 Ne 2d 479 (NY-
1891); Di Santo v. Warrenville, 376 Ne 2d
288 at 289 (Ill.-1978);Gray v. Haas, 67 Nw
394 (S.Ct. of lowa-1896); Tucker v.
Chicago, St. P. M. & O. Ry. Co.,65 Nw 515
(S.Ct. of Wisconsin-1895); Schilling v. Carl
T. P., Grant Cnty., 235 Nw 126 (S.Ct. of
N.D.-1931); Fries v. Wheeling & L.E. Ry.
Co., 46 Ne 516 (Ohio S.Ct.-1897); uUinkins
v. City of Jal, 386 P. 2d 599 (N.M.-1963);
Maricopa Cnty. v. Warford, 206 P. 2d 1168
(Ariz.- 1949); Cheyenne Airport Board v.
Rogers, 707 P. 2d 717 (Wyo.-1985); Sundell
v. Town of New London, 409 A. 2d 1315
(S.Ct.of N.H.); Appeal of Kraus, 618 A.

2d 1070 (Penn.-1992); Kime v. Cass Cnty.,
101 Nw 2 (S.Ct. of Nebraska- 1902);
Chenevert v. La. St. Dept. of Hwys., 345 So
2d 960 at 960 [3] (1977); Mc Farlan v.
Morris Canal & Banking Co., 44 NJ Law
471 at 472 (NJ-1882); Tarrant Co. v. Reid,
203 Sw 2d 290 at 293 (Texas-1947); Ajji v.
City of Garnett, 804 P. 2d 950 at 955
(Kansas-1951); Salt Lake Inv. Co. v. Oregon
Short Line Co., 148 P. 439 at 441 (S.Ct.of

Ss dis goss piss Gand Bias Bight

54

Utah-1915), citing Land v. Railroad, supra.;
Katsos v. Salt Lake City Corp., 634 F. Supp.
100 (1986); Scates v. Indianna Hwy.
Comm., 383 Ne2d 491 (1978); Rosen-
thal v. Crystal Lake, 525 Ne 2d 1176 (Ill.-
1988); State Hwy Comm. v. Stumbo, 352 P.
2d 478 at 479 (Ore.-1960); Di Franzo v.
Village of Port Sanilac, 419 Nw 756 (Mich.-
1988); Yazoo-Mississippi Delta Levee
Beard v. Dancy, 3 So. 568 (Miss.-1888).
Further evidence that a plaintiff is not

bound by any statute of limitations for a
taking is the Supreme Court of N.C.’s ruling
in Hoyle v. City of Charlotte, 276 NC 292,
172 Se 2d 1(1970).

“ The common law action for inverse
condemnation has been recognized by this
court...“ Hoyle v. City of Charlotte.” Long Vv.

City of Charlotte, 293 Se 2d 101 at 108 [4]

NCSCt. 1982).
“ D.C.N.C.-1981. Under North Carolina

law, there is no statute of limitations
applicable to a claim for just compensation
and, thus...plaintiff is entitled to just com-
pensation under the Constitution regardless
of when the taking occurs and the time of
the is relevant for purposes of valuing just
compensation due...Ocean Acres Ltd.
Partnership v. Dare Cnty. Board of Health,
514 F. Supp 1117, affirmed 707 F. 2d

103.” West’ Federal Digest, key 288 (1) 35
FPD 3d 256.

95

See also: West’s NC Digest, Exhibit 1. Of
course, the defendants can cite statutes
which state that NCGS 136-111 is an
exclusive remedy, including the 2 year
suggested statute of limitations. According
to Shepherd’s Citations, Hoyle has never
been vacated or overruled. It is clear that
NCGS 136-111 is unconstitutional because
it violates the rights to due process of law
and equal protection under the law as
guaranteed in USCA I, V & XIV.

(10) In N.C. the plaintiff is not required
to utilize the statutory remedy (and the
statute of imitations therein) when the
appropriator does not utilize the statutory
procedures. See: Eller v. Board of Educa-
tion, 89 Se 2d 144 at 145 [7] (NCSCt-1955);
29A CJS, EMINENT DOMAIN, Section 376,
page 747, citing Lowman v. Abee, 131 Se
277, 191 NC 147; Mason v. Commissioners,
96 Se 110 at 110 [1] (NCSCt-1918); White
v. Nw. N. C. Ry. Co., 18 Se 330 at 334
(NCSCt-1893). Other jurisdictions agree:
Hamor and others v. Bar Harbor Water
Co.,78 Me 127, 3 A. 40 at 40 (1886); De
Salvo v. Arkansas La. Gas Co., 239 Fed
Supp. 312 (E.D..Ark.), cited in 27 Am Jur
2d, Sect. 823, page 341-342; Cook v.Lehigh
Valley R. Co., 18 1NYS 217 at 220 (NY-
1920). Also, the cases cited in the previous
section (#9) are in agreement. This is

96

| because the statutory condemnation

; proceedings are in derogation of common
right and are mandatory. The condemnor
must prove compliance with the mandatory >
statutory procedures to effect a legal taking.
See: State v. Core Bank Properties, 275 NC
328, 167 Se 2d 385 at 385 [1] (NCSCt.-
1969); N.C. St. Ports Authority v. South
Felt, 161 Se 2d 47 at 49; Carolina & Nw.T.
Ry. Company v. Penncarden L. & Mfg. Co.,
44 Se 358, 361 (NCSCt-1903); City of
Charlotte v. McNeely, 8 NC App. 649, 175

: Se 2d 348 at 351 [1-3] (1970); Cook v.
Lehigh Valley R. Co., supra.; Bernard v.
Brewer, 2 Wash. 76, Virginia Reports,
Volume II, page 99 (1795) (argued by John
Marshall).

NCGS 136-103 states that:

“ In case condemnation shall become
necessary the Department of Transportation
shall institute a civil action.”

Strangely, the courts in N.C. allow the
NCDOT to escape the mandatory statutory
requirements in NCGS 136-103 through
136-110.

FL Te Pn ees Raia

(11) There is other evidence that NCGS
136-111 is a special law for the NCDOT. It
has already been shown herein that in N.C.
when the appropriator fails to utilize the
mandatory statutory procedures, the
plaintiff is not required to utilize the statu-

97

tory remedy and his right to file a complaint
doesn’t expire until the end of the period of
adverse possession/prescription. In the
late 18001the N.C. Legislature passed
special laws for some railroad companies
which limited the time in which plaintiffs
could sue for just compensation for unauth-
orized takings: See: Teeter v. Postal Tele-
graph Co., 90 Se 941 at 942 (NCSCt.-1916).
This began the process in which sim-
ilarly situated plaintiffs were granted dif-
ferent times in which to file complaints for
just compensation, depending upon wheth-
er there was a taking by private individuals,
quasi-public corporations, municipalities or
state agencies. Such arbitrary classifica-
tions are a denial of due process of law,
equal protection under the law and the right
to a redress of grievances against the gov-
ernment. Statutory classifications must
treat similarly situated individuals alike:
Reed v. Reed, 404 US 71, 92 S.Ct. 251;
Hooper v. Bernalillo Cnty. Assessor, 472 US
612, 105 S. Ct. 2862 (1985). This is true
with regards to time periods for filing
complaints.: Picket v. Brown, 462 US 1,
103 S. Ct. 2199 (1983). What NC did was
lessen the period of adverse possession /
prescription for some entities, but not ail.
NCGS 136-111 is a special
limitation for filing complaints against a
particular state agency, the NCDOT. It does

A a cs: ae
VK. ee

58

not apply to other state agencies, qausi-
public corps., municipalities or contro-
versies between private individuals.

Under NCGS 146-24 state agencies, after
making an attempt to purchase property
from citizens, are authorized to use the
condemnation procedures under NCGS 136.
NCGS 136-111 does not require that the
NCDOT first make an attempt to purchase
the property appropriated. Attempts to
purchase are notice, albeit not necessarily
adequate constitutionally. There is nothing
in NCGS 146-24 or NCGS 136-111 that
requires property owners whose property
rights have been substantially interfered
with by state agencies other than the
NCDOT, to file a complaint within two
years.

For example, if Albert’ property is
damaged by a road put through his property
by the NC Dept. of Corrections without the
utilization of the statutory procedures and
constitutional safeguards, Albert may treat
the taking as legal (See: Ay/more v. City of
Seattle, 171 P. 2d 659)and prevent the
creation of an easement or servitude upon
his property, if he files a complaint within
20 years (NCGS 1-40). This might be seven
years under NCGS 1-38.

If the same inroads on Albert’s property
rights are made by a private citizen, he has
twenty years, or seven years to file a com-

99

plaint. If the inroads on his property rights
are made by a railroad, he would have 2 or
5 years, depending on the circumstances, to
file a complaint under NCGS- 1-51. This
statute is vague and contradictory.

If the same inroads on Albert’s property
rights are made by a quasi-public corpo-
ration (railroads excluded) or by a munici-
pality, he has three years in which to file a
complaint (NCGS-40A-51). Robertson v. City
of High point, supra. Under the same cir-
cumstances, he has only two years to file a
complaint if the inroads on his property
rights are made by the NCDOT.

Strangely, the NCDOT can intentionally
ignore all statutory and constitutional
safeguards and put a road through a
citizen’s property and acquire an easement
within two years under NCGS 136-111.

See: Ledford v. N.C .St .Hwy. Comm.
279 NC 188, 181 Se 2d 466 (1971).
However, the state of N.C. has 30 or 21
years in which to prevent the uncom-
pensated acquirement of an easement upon
its property under NCGS-1-35. The only
legitimate, constitutionally valid reason for
a statute of limitations is to prevent the
prosecution of stale claims. However, it is
ludicrous to hold that a claim against the
state grows sale in two years, while
the state’s claim under the same circum-
stances grows stale only after 30 years; that

er ee eee

ee ere

60

a claim against this stale after two years,
while claims against other state agencies
are stale only after twenty years; thata
claim against the NCDOT is stale after two
years and an identical against a municipal-
ity grows stale after three years. Statutes of
limitations which discriminate in the favor
of governments and against the citizenry
are unconstitutional: Reich v. State Hwy.
Dept., 194 Nw 2d 700 at 700 [2] (S.Ct. of
Mich.-1972); O’WNeil v. City of Parkersburg,
237 Se 2d 504, 508, 509 (Supreme Court of
Appeals of W. Virg.- 1977); Miller v. Boone
Cnty. Hosp., 394 Nw 2d 776 at 779 (S.Ct. of
Iowa-1986). Turner v. Staggs, 510 P. 2d
879 (Nev.S.Ct.-1973), cert. den. 414 US
1079. Hutchingsv. Kraject, 215 NE 2d 274
(Ill.-1966); Lorton v. Brown, 220 Ne 2d 161.
There are only two reasons for giving
plaintiffs a shortened period of time to file
complaints against government agencies
like the NCDOT, neither of which is consti-
tutional. The first is to save the state
money by limiting the number of valid
claims pursued: Hunter v. N. Mason High
School, 539 P. 2d 845, 850 (S.Ct. of Wash.-
1975); The second is for the administrative
convenience of the NCDOT. NCGS 136-111
allows the NCDOT to avoid all the time and
expense of utilizing the statutory proce-
dures in NCGS 136-103 through 136-110.
However, administrative convenience is not

61

a legitimate reason to discriminate in

statutes: Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 US
at 689, 93 S.Ct. at 1772 [3-5] (1973).

I am not stating that the period of
adverse possession/prescription is the
proper time limit to file a complaint for an
appropriation of a property interest by the
federal government when the statutory
procedures have not been utilized by the
federal government. The federal govern-
ment has no laws or time limits with re-
gards to adverse possession/ prescription.
The federal government does not allow a
citizen to acquire an easement or create a
servitude upon federal land at all. The
federal government does have one statute of
limitations for a taking by the federal
government when the statutory condem-
nation procedures aren’t used. That is the
six year limitation in the Tucker Act.

It applies to all takings without notice, etc.,
by all federal agencies.

The federal government does not have
one statute of limitations for takings by the
Dept. of Defense, another for the USDOT
and another for the Dept. of Treasury. The
federal government does not have one time
limit for complaints by citizens for the tak-
ing of their property by the government and
another for the government to file claims
against private citizens to prevent the tak-
ing of a property interest, as North

2 ih ita Latinas aorcva Notte Thera IETS ANA ii A

Carolina does.

“ Once right or privilege is granted it
must be applied equally and indiscrimi-
nately.” State v. Stafford, 164 Se 2d 371 at —
37 N.C.S.Ct.-1968).

Therefore, NCGS 136-111 is in violation
of USCA I, USCA V & XIV.

(12) NCGS 136-111 is not constitutional
in the way that is interpreted by the courts
in NC and as utilized by the defendants.
NCGS 136-111 states that a property owner
“MAY” file a complaint within 24 months of
the taking. “May” in statutes is permissive.
Felton v. Felton, 195 Se 533 at 533 [3]
(Supreme Court of N.C.-1938) This is par-
ticularly true where “may” and “shall” are
both used in the statute: See: Curlee v.
National Bank of Fayetville, 121 Se 194 at
197 (N.C.S.Ct.-1924); Kelly v. City of Cedar
Falls, 123 lowa 660, 99 Nw 556 at 557, last
paragraph (1904); Jenney v. Assessors of
Mattapoisett, 76 Ne 2d at 126[2] (Mass.-
1947); Scannel v. City of Seattle, 648 P.
2d 435, 436 [2] (S.Ct. of Wash.-1982). Sam-
uel v. American Mortgage Co., 78 Sw 2d
1036 at 1037 [3] (Texas-1935); Moraitis v.
Delany, 46 F. Supp. 425 at 426 [10] (Mary-
land-1942); Billings Utility Co. v. Fed. Res.
Bank , 46 F. Supp. 691 at 692 [5] (1942);
Weiner v. Hospital, 144 A. 2d 575 at 575
[2]; Continental Cas. v. Rio Grande Fuel,

63

119 P. 2d 618, 618 [1] (1941); Matter of
Fasi, 634 P. 2d 98 at 101 [4-6]( Hawaii-
1981); Federal Land Bank v. Hansen, 113 F
2d 82 at 84 (1940): See: Sutherland’s Sta-
tutory Construction, 5” Edition, Section
57.11, page 31.

Please note that NCGS 136-107 uses
the mandatory “shall” with regards to the
statute of limitations therein. It is obvious
that the legislature intended that the sta-
tute of limitations in136-107 was intended
as mandatory and the statute of limitations
in 136-111 was intended as permissive.

Further evidence that NCGS 136-111,
particularly the statute of limitations there-
in, is permissive, not mandatory is the fact
that there is no penalty for failing to abide
by the statute of limitations in 136-111.
See: State v. Schade, 167 Sw 2d 135 at 136
[8] (Mo.-1943); Meister v. Moore, 96 US 76,
24 L. Ed 826 at 826 [1] (1877); Duthchess
Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Van Wagonen, 30 Ne
971 at 972 (NY App.-1892); Juliand v.
Rathbone, 39 NY 369 at 372 (1868); Suth-
erland’s Statutory Construction, 5™ Ed.
(1992-1993), Section 57.08, page 24, last
paragraph.

Additional evidence of a permissive
interpretation of 136-111 is the fact that
there are no negative words in the statute
with regards to the statute of limitations,
particularly negative words restraining the

64

filing of a complaint after the suggested 24
months. This is an ancient rule of statutory
construction: See: Townsend’s Case, 75
English Reports 173 at 175, 177, (England- —
1554 A.D.) Pond v. Negasus, 3 Mass 230, 3
Am Dec 131 at 132 (1807); Dutchess Cnty.
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Van Wagonen, supra;
Diamond Match Co. v. U.S., 181 F. Supp.
952 at 953,959 (1960); Sutherland's
Statutory Construction, 5™ Edition (1992-
1993), Section 57.08, page 24, last para-
graph. There is a penalty for failing to
abide by the statute of limitations in NCGS
136-107, not for NCGS 136-111.

Furthermore, there is nothing in the
136-111 that states that it is the exclusive
remedy and that other remedies are re-
pealed. It has already been shown herein
that there is a common law remedy for the
taking of property without just compen-
sation under the Magna Carta and a remedy
under the N.C. Constitution. In fact the
term “Law of the Land” in the N.C. Consti-
tution comes from the Magna Carta.

No repeal of the common law is to be
presumed, repeal by implication is not
acceptable. See: 29A CJS, EMINENT
DOMAIN, Section 376, p. 747; Allen v.
Standard Crankshaft & Hydraulic
Co., 210 F. Supp. 844 at 846 [16](W.D.N.C.-
1962); Farrington against Lee, Case 191, 86
English Reports 1092 at 1092 (England

65

1600’s); Wetmore v. Tracy, 14 Wendell 252
at 253 (NY 1835); Newman v. District of
Columbia, 518 A. 2d 698 at 703 (DC-1968);
Skorpios Properties v. Waage, 172 Conn.
152, 374 A. 2d 165 (1976); Hardy v. State,
482 A. 2d 474 at 474 [1] (Maryland-1984);
U.S. v. Professional Air Traffic Controllers,
653 F. 2d 1134 at 1135 [5] (1981); Schar-
field v. Richardson, 133 F. 2d 340 at 341[2-
5]; Sand Key Associates v. Board of Trus-
tees, 458 So 2d 369 at 369 [4] (F1.-1984);
Allen v. Houn, 757 at 757 [4] (Wyo. S. Ct.-
1923); Pineo v. White, 70 Ne 2d 294 at 295
[16] (Mass.-1946); Bruce v. Schuyler, 4
Gilman 221, 46 Am Dec 447 at 448 (IIl.-
1847); Sutherland’s Statutory Construc-
tion, 5" Edition; Hummer v. Schools of City
of Hartford, 112 Ne 2d 891 (Indiana-1953):
Souza v. OHara, 395 A. 2d 1060 at 1060 [4]
(S.Ct. of R.I.-1978); Bolduc v, Herbert
Schneider Corp., 374 A. 2d 1187 at 1188 [2]
(S.Ct. of N.H.-1977); Ferguson v. Joliet
Mass Transit, 526 F. Supp. 222 at 222 [1]
(1981).

Because there is nothing in 136-111
that eliminates the common law remedy
under the Magna Carta and the constitu-
tional remedy under the NC Constitution,
136-111 is merely cumulative, not exclus-
ive. See: City of Zanesville v. Fannan, 53
Ohio 605; Juliand v. Rathbone, 39 NY 369
(1868); Cook v. Lehigh v. R. Co., 181 NYS

66

217; Farrington against Lee, 86 English
Reports at 1092 (England 1600’s);

City of Atlanta v. Hunnicutt, 22 Se 130 at
132 (S.Ct. of Ga.- 1894); City of Rock Hill v.
Cothran, 40 Se 2d 239 at 239 [9] (S.C.S.Ct.-
1946); Proprietors of Fryeburg Canal v.
Frye, 5S Maine 38 at 43 (1827); Schuykill
Navigation Co. v. McDonough, 33 Penn 73
at 73 (1859). Therefore, rulings that indi-
cate that NCGS 136-111 is the exclusive
remedy for an unauthorized taking by the
NCDOT are in violation of USCA I, USCA V
& USCA XIV.

(13) According to the courts in NC,
before proceedings are taken under NCGS
136-111, the courts are to proceed under
NCGS 136-108: See: Lautensiager v. Board
of Transportation,212 Se 2d 551 at 552
(N.C. App.-1975). However, no mention of
NCGS 136-108 is made in NCGS 136-111
and no mention of NCGS 136-111 is made
in NCGS 136-108. Therefore, NCGS 136-
111 does not give proper notice of what
procedures are to be taken under it,
denying due process of law and equal
protection under the law. In addition,
courts in NC have not enforced this rule of
law in all situations.

Therefore, NCGS 136-111 violates USCA I,
USCA V & USCA XIV.
(14) Returning to Robertson v. City of

67

High point, supra, it should be noted that
the NC Court of Appeals ruled that the
statute of limitations for a taking runs
from the first injury. However, NCGS 136-
111 states that the suggested statute of
limitations runs from the “taking.” The
statute never uses the term “first injury” or
“injury” at all. In fact NCGS 136-103
through NCGS 136-112 uses some form of
the word “taking” 60 times. The term “first
injury” never appears in those statutes at
all. What the NC Court of Appeals did in
Robertson was to rewrite the statute and
over-throw the legislative intent. Therefore,
NCGS 136-111 is in violation of USCA I,
USCA V & USCA XIV.

(15) In North Carolina there is a rule of
law that a government entity with the power
of eminent domain eminent domain shall
not plead a statute of limitations as a
defense and, at the same time, deny the
plaintiff's right to recover. The denial of
liability may be a denial of the plaintiff’s
ownership. See: Mason v. Commissioners
of Durham Cnty., 96 Se 110 at 11 (NCSCt.-
1918);Keener v. Asheville, 177 NC 4, 97
Se 725; Fleming v. Congleton (Pitt Cnty.),
177 NC 186, 98 Se 449; Kistler v. City of
Raleigh, 136 Se 2d at 79 [1] (NCSCT.-1964);
“ ..where the owner brings an action for
damages, the appropriator, by denying

68

liability for damages and the plaintiff’s
ownership, may waive its right to insist that
the statutory method should have been
pursued.” 27 Am Jur 2d, Eminent Domain, -
Section 823, page 341, citing Rouse v.
Kinston, 188 NC 1, 123 Se 482, 35 ALR
1203.

In Mason v. Commissioners, supra, the
defendants eventually admitted the
plaintiff's ownership. However, because
they continued to deny the plaintiff’s right
to recover, the plaintiff was not required to
follow the statutory remedy. However, one
court has ruled that this rule does not
apply to the NCDOT. See: Latham v. State
Hwy. Commn., 131 Se 385 (NCSCt.-1926).

To excuse the NCDOT from the rule of law
outlined above is not equal protection under
the law and due process of law. Therefore,
NCGS 136-111 is in violation of USCA I,
USCA V, USCA XIV.

(16) In N.C., certain condemnors, includ-
ing municipalities, are required to make a
good faith effort to purchase property before
appropriating it by other means. However,
the courts and the N.C. legislature have
relieved the NCDOT of this obligation,
through the special, discriminatory laws in
NCGS 136-103 et seq. See: City of
Charlotte v. Robinson, 163 Se 2d 289
(1968).

69

Therefore, NCGS 136-103 through NCGS
136-111 are unconstitutional and in
violation of USCA I, V & XIV.

(17) NCGS-1-51 allows the taking of
property by a railroad in two years or five
years when the statutory condemnation
proceedings haven’t been followed. It has
already been shown herein that the time
period for filing complaints for takings
outside the statutory method have histor-
ically been twenty years. NCGS -1-51
allows the acquirement of an easement in
only two years or five years. Property
owners in N.C. have 2 years, 3 years, 7
years, 20 years, 21 years or 30 years in
which to file a complaint to prevent the un-
compensated acquirement of an easement
upon their property, depending on who the
property owner is and who the acquirer is.

Therefore, NCGS-1-51 is in violation of
due process and equal protection under the
law in violation of USCA V & USCA XIV.

(18) NCGS 1-52 states that the
statute of limitations upon a contract is
three years. NCGS-1-53 shortens the
statute of limitations to two years for
complaints against municipalities upon a
contract. Therefore, NCGS-1-53 is a special
law for municipalities and denies due
process of law and equal protection under

70
the law, violating USCA I & XIV.

(19) NCGS 40A-51 allows the taking of a
property interest, without the use of the
mandatory statutory condemnation
procedures, in 3 years, which is a different
time limit than similarly situated people
have under different statutes, as outlined in
this complaint.

Therefore, NCGS 40A-51 denies due
process of law and equal protection under
the law, in violation of USCA I, USCA V &
USCA XIV.

(20) NCGS-1-35 gives 21 or 30 years to
the state to file a complaint when similarly
situated entities in N.C. have considerably
less time under other statutes, i.e. 2, 3, 5, 7
or 20 years, as described herein. Therefore,
NCGS-1-35 denies due process of law, equal
protection under the law in violation of
USCA I, USCA V & XIV.

(21) Respectfully, the plaintiff asks for
the following relief: (A) That the statute of
limitations in NCGS 136-111 be declared
unconstitutional and in violation of USCA I,
USCA V & USCA XIV, or, alternatively, that
the statute of limitations in NCGS 136-111
be declared permissive, not mandatory; (B)
That an injunction be issued barring the
defendants from pleading the statute of

71

limitations in NCGS 136-111 as a defense;
(C) That NCGS 136-112 be declared
unconstitutional and in violation of USCA I,
USCA V, & USCA XIV; (D) That an injunc- —
tion be issued barring the calculating of
interest from any date earlier than the mid-
point of the taking, when the taking occurs
over a period of time, in any complaint for
just compensation for the uncompensated
taking of property by any entity with the
power of condemnation; (E) That the
statutes of limitations in NCGS-40A-51,
including the 3 year statute of limitations
granted by the courts under 40-51, be
declared unconstitutional in violation of
USCA I, USCA V & USCA XIV; (F) That an
injunction be issued barring the defen-
dants, local condemnors, corporations and
any other entities from pleading the defense
of the 2 or 3 year limitations in NCGS 40A-
51; (G) That NCGS -1-51 be declared
unconstitutional and in violation of USCA I,
V & XIV for the reasons stated in this
compiaint; (H) That an injunction be
issued barring the any entity from pleading
the statutes of limitations in NCGS-1-51 as
a defense; (I) That NCGS -1-35 be declared
unconstitutional and in violation of USCA I,
USCA V & USCA XIV for the reasons stated
in this complaint; (J) That the defendants
be barred from pleading the statutes of
limitations in NCGS-1-35 as a defense in

72

any proceeding; (K) That NCGS 136- 103 —
through 136-110 be declared
unconstitutional and in violation of USCA I :
V & XIV; (L) That an injunction be issued
barring the defendants from pleading any
statute of limitations contained in NCGS
136-103 through 136-111 as a defense if
the defendants have not made a good faith
effort to purchase the property. (M) That
NCGS -1-53 be declared unconstitutional
and in violation of USCA I, XIV. (N) That
an injunction be issued barring any munici-
pality or other entity from pleading the
statute of limitations contained in NCGS -1-
93; (O) That the court keep in mind
that the right to just compensation for the
taking of property is a civil right; that civil
rights’ complaints, particularly those of pro
se parties, are to be liberally construed;
that statutes providing a remedy for just
compensation for the appropriation of
property are to be strictly construed with
regards to whether or not the common law
remedy is abrogated and liberally construed
to protect the rights of property owners to
just compensation, due process of law and
equal protection under the law; that USCA
XIV is to be liberally construed to protect
the civil rights of US Citizens against state
action.
(22) Because the Honorable Lacey
Thornburgh was the Attorney

73

General of the State of North Carolina, I
respectfully request that a change of venue
be granted and that the matters herein be
heard and decided in the Charlotte Division —
of the Western District.

(23) The plaintiff has been engaged in
the real estate development in N.C. and is
planning to file a complaint in the Western
District of North Carolina against several
NCDOT engineers for the taking of his
property without just compensation under
diversity of citizenship and under federal
statutes as well.

I, Christopher Langdon, hereby depose
and state, under oath, that the facts herein
are true, except those asserted on informa-
tion and belief, and those matters I believe
are true; that I believe that I am entitled to
the relief sought herein.

Christopher Langdon, Plaintiff “s/ er
1835 Edwin Blvd., Winter Park, Fla. 32789-
--407-647-7539

Suscribed to and sworn before me, this the
17™ day of May, 2001.

Notary Public “s/ Rs
Permanand Bikha
My Commission DDO09669

Expires March 15", 2005

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386015_0040%3A3. Public record. Not legal advice.
