# Appendix Vol IV — Joneson v. Illinois

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386014_2325%3A5

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix Vol IV
- **Published:** January 1, 2001
- **Citation:** 534 U.S. 896

## Text

(6) Supreme Court, U.S
is FILED
01 297 ave | 0 200%

OPFICE OF THE GLEWK
NO.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES
October term 2000

EUGENE JONESON-PETITIONER
VS.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF
ILLINOIS

IN THE INTEREST OF
LUELLA JONESON

On Petition For Writ of Certiorari to the United = -
States Court For the 1* District of
Illinois

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI OF
EUGENE HERMAN JONESON
APPENDIXES J -K

Eugene Joneson

Pro Se

11732 S, Prairie
Chicago, Illinois 60628
773-568 -4132

Date August 8th, 2001

90401
In The Supreme Court of the State of Illinois

IN THE INTEREST )

OF: )Appeal from The Circuit
LUELLA JONESON ) Court of Cook County
No 94JA1107 )
Minor-Respondent ) .
Appellee )

) Appellate No. 98-3336
PEOPLE OF THE )
STATE OF ILLINOIS )
Petitioner-Appellee )
V. )
)
EUGENE JONESON ) Mary Mulhern,
Respondent-Appellant ) Judge Residing.

EUGENE JONESON, Pro Se_
2043 W. Dickens

Chicago, Illinois 60647
telephone 773-645-9695

“Appendix J”

213

Alternative Prayer For Leave To Appeal And Appeal
AS Of Right

Eugene J. Pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court
Rule 315 (a), respectfully petitions this court for leave
to appeal from the Judgement of the Appellate Court of
Illinois 1* District to use its discretionary power and
accept the appeal due to the need for supervisory
authority, the finality of judgement of this case.
(preponderance of the evidence that the petitioner was
thwarted by the efforts of the caseworkers and others
related to this case v, father was unable to make
reasonable progress in his parenting skills for the return
home of the children) and conflicts between jurisdiction
interpretation (manifest weight of evidence measured by
evaluator or caseworker reports vs manifest weight of
that brought the case into care),
Petitioner also petitions under rule 317 petition
for appeal as a matter of both nght and discretion as
several questions under the constitution of the United
States and Illinois has arisen for the first time in the
appellate court with respect to religion, children’s and
putative father’s rights with respect to visitation and
custody before and after adoption, and the mentally ill.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AMD
JUDGEMENT BELOW
On December 2™, 1997 judgement was passed
from the Circuit Court of Cook County finding the
father, Eugene Joneson, unfit to parent. On April 7“,
1998 the father and mother’s parental rights to Luella

214

Joneson were terminated. Post trial motions to
reconsider unfitness and termination of parental rights
and to reinstate visitation were denied on August 6th,
1998. The Notice of Appeal was filed on. On
September 3” 1998. On August 24, 1999 the appellant
brief was allowed to be filed instanter.
The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s decision
and entered an order affirming the trial court decision
on June 30", 2000. After one extension of time, the
Petition to rehear was filed on 8/15/2000. It was denied
on September 7", 2000. On September 25", 2000 an
affidavit of intent to file was m ailed to the clerk’s office
of the appellate court |" District. On October 12",
2000 a motion for the extension of filing time was filed
with the Illinois Supreme Court Clerk. The |* extension
of time was allowed til November 14th, 2000.
POINTS RELIED UPON FOR REVERSAL

Under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 315 (a) the
Illinois Supreme Court can use its discretionary power
and accept the appeal due to the need for supervisory
authority, the finality of judgement. And because of
conflicts between jurisdiction interpretation of this
case

In this case the finding of unfitness of the father
Eugene Joneson was:

1. against the preponderance of the evidence, II].
Revised Statues Domestic Relations 40 @ 1501 and
Inre Bentsen v. Bentsen 412 N. E. 2d 1167 It shall be
an affirmative defense to any allegation under subsection
(N\2) that the father’s failure was due to circumstances
beyond his control or to impediments created by the

215

mother or any other person having legal custody. Proof
of such fact need only be by a preponderance of the
evidence. Countless exampies are listed in the argument
section of this petition.

2. not clear and convincing_Kubisz v. Johnson 329
N.E. 2d 815 Where there is failure to produce clear
and convincing evidence that parent is unfit within
statutory definition, reversal of order terminating parental
rights is proper, In this case substantial evidence has
been presented that contradicts the conclusions that the
State of Illinois Department of Children and Family
Services agencies and hired evaluators have made.

3. against the manifest weight of the evidence in re
Perez 528 N.E. 2d 815 A trial court’s findings of
parental unfitness in a proceeding to terminate parental
rights and appoint a guardian with authonity to consent to
adaption will not be reversed by appellate court unless
finding of unfitness is against the manifest wight of the
evidence.. In this case the manifest weight of the
evidence presented by the state and guardian is basically
that which the state has provided through court ordered
evacuations and agency progress reports and not
supported by actual case reports, court records and
evidence presented in court from the day the case came
into care as is the manifest weight of the evidence for the
petitioner is.

4. in violation of Due Process in People vs, Fierer 529
N. E. 2d 972 constitutional errors must be show to be
harmless beyond reasonable doubt in_Santosky V.
Kramer. 102 S. Ct. 1388 m (1982) 1397 [8] The
extent to which procedural due process must be

216

afforded the recipient is in influenced by the exteni to
which he may be condemned to suffer grievous loss
5. An abuse of discretion of the trial court judge .in
interest of L.L.S 577 NE 2d 1387 a reviewing court
will not substitute its judgement for that of the circuit
court unless an abuse of discretion is shown.
It was also not in the best interest of Luella
Joneson to be adopted when her fathers nghts to
custody and visitation were lost due to termination of
parental rights because all safeguards to protect her
rights to her birth family which are also protected by the
14" amendment of the Constitution were not taken or
provided by the Catholic Charities agency or the State
of Illinois.
Supreme Court Rule 317 provides for appeals
to the Supreme Court as a matter of right when a
question under the Constitution of the United States and
or Dlinois has arisen for the first time in the Appellate
Court.
This included:
1..her right to an interview with regard to her
preferences of custodian or visitation in re Custody of
Krause Ill. App.,444 N.E. 2d 647 Subsection (2)
directs the court to consider the wishes of the child as to
his custodian, in 750 ILCS 5/602 (a) (2) A child’s
preference is an important factor in deciding custody, In
Deyoung v. Devoung 379 N.E. 2d 399 at (9) The law
requires that competing custody be resolved in
accordance with the best interest of the child, and the
places upon the court the burden of determining where
the interest resides. At 3-5) The second sentence says

217

that counsel shall “ shall be present unless otherwise
agreed upon by the parties “ thus expressly allowing the
parties to waive the right to have counsel present. The
third sentence states that the “ court shall causes a court
reporter to be present “ This provision does not
authorize a waiver by the parties and we believe the
imperative “ shall mandates that a record be made of the
interview Records of in chambers interview of child to
ascertain child’s wishes as to his custodian and as to
visitation is mandatory and cannot be waived by the
parties

2. “ The agency Catholic Charities falsified their
reports in order to present evidence that would support
adoption due to their budget financial reasons This is
evidenced by their falsely reporting that Luella was in a
home of similar ethnic and cultural background, and a
home of the same religion. This reporting continued even
after Mr. Joneson had his daughter Luella baptized
Methodist and is evidenced in all the case review reports
from the beginning of this case until the end under
placement listing (Vol 6 of 9, TE 111 11/7/94, TE 186
10/18/95, TE 244, 04/09/96, Vol 7 of 9, TE 47
10/08/96, TE 84 4/7/97) This all being done without
regards to Luella’s birth family religion her right to be
brought up in that same religion, and ethnic and racial
heritage. I n Family Law Quarterly, Volume XXV,
Number 2 Summer 1991 adoption across religious lines
is further discouraged by imposing an additional
procedural requirement, if adoption is granted a person
of a religion different than that of the child, the court
must recite for the record the facts that compel the

218

decision also ince Santos 105 N.Y. S. 2d 7163 In 331
Mass. 647.121 N.E. 2d the court held that the children
had a natural and legal nght to their religious faith, which
temporary exposure to another religion could not erase
(Adoption denied to Jewish couple who had custody for
three years of twins born to Catholic mother.) Also in 66
ALR 2d 1410 Religion as a factor in awarding child
custody

3. Luella’s right to visitation and custody by her
birth father. In Interest of Otto B. 393 N.E. 2d 676
While a parent may be unfit to have custody of children,
it does not automatically follow that such parent is unfit
to remain the child’s legal parent with attendant rights
and privileges; on the other hand, the fact that parent
makes an attempt to rehabilitate himself it does not
necessarily preclude a finding of unfitness where such an
attempt is unavailing Also in re Hurley (1976), 44 III.
App. 3d 260, 2 Ill. Dec. 595 , 357 N_E. 2d 815)

UNDER Rule 315 Ist Argument Finality of
Decision the finding of unfitness of the father Eugene
Joneson was ;

1. against the preponderance of the evidence, [Jl
Revised Statues Domestic Relations 40 @ 1501 and
In. re Bentsen v, Bentsen 412 N. E. 2d 1167 It shall be
an affirmative defense to any allegation under subsection
(N\2) that the father’s failure was due to circumstances
beyond his control or to impediments created by the
mother or any other person having legal custody. Proof
of such fact need oniy be by a preponderance of the
evidence.

219

In this case the appellate court simply refused to
accept any evidence presented in the record as being
- able to support that Luella’s caseworkers were bias in
their efforts to complete her adoption and thus thwarted
her father, Mr. Joneson, in his attempts for her return..
This even though substantial evidence was produced for
review from the record.

The Substantial evidence that Mr. Joneson was
thwarted by the efforts of the caseworkers is included
the following:

(1). Telephone calls were never retumed to his therapist
for feedback and services. Tod Harrison, Mr. Joneson's
therapist, also noted the non-cooperation of the
Catholic Charities agency and testified about this in tial
court. This was also evidenced by letters he wrote to
Catholic Charities during this period of time.. Testmony
and evidence indicate the caseworkers did not
cooperate with Tod Harrison by either writing or
returning phone calls when written or telephoned for
recommendations or suggestions on what could be done
toimprove Mr. J's parenting ability for the return of Mr.
J's children (Vol 5 of 6, R 65 In 15-18 and Vol 3 of 9,
TE 15 letter dated 1 1/6/96)

(2). At the beginning of Luella's case, caseworker
services and help provided to the father were non-
existent and unqualified unless father was to determine
the services needed and than request them (Vol 5 of 9,
TE 156 Case review 8/12/94 Task at 3 DCFS and CC
workers will continue to offer services to parents should
they request them. ) This even though the service plan
task objectives specifically state in every review that the

220

C.C. worker will provide parents with the appropriate
referral for services recommended in the plan (vol 5 of
9, R 57 at 2)
. The only services available were those that existed
from Luella’ older sibling sister's being in care and
intense psychotherapy by LCSW Tod Harrison because
the caseworkers were not aware of what services to
provide (Vol. | of 9, TE 66 and Vol 2 of 9, Gal ex. #3,
184 or TE 155) . Also services needed were not
provided in a timely manner and could not be as case
workers and evaluators alike had no training in analyzing
parents for parenting skills. This was true NOT ONLY
for Julie Yalowitz, (Vol 3 of 6, R 70 In 10- 14, R 72 In
5-10) and Christine Foley, ( Sr 1 of 2 1/8/99 C 109)
caseworkers for Luella (Vol 5 of 6, R 221 In 3-8), but
the coordinator of the parenting assessment team, Kathy
Pesek (Vol 4 of 6, R 98 In 20-24, R 99 In 1-7). She
was the states main evaluator along with the above
mentioned caseworkers used as witnesses for
determining the unfitness of the father Eugene Joneson.
This evaluator was also responsible for conclusion of
unfitness on hundreds of other parents evaluated by the
parenting assessment team §, CT. Rule 236 All other
circumstances of the making of the writing of the record
including the lack of personal knowledge by the maker,
may be shown to affect its weight, but shall not affect it's
admissibility

What is even worse, Pesek's conclusion that
nothing could be done to improve Mr. Joneson's
parenting skills, was used by both the state and the
guardian in their conclusion why no reasonable progress

221

could never be made in Mr. Joneson's parenting skills
(Vol 5 of 6, R 229 In 17- R 230 In 5). In actuality, no
progress was made because the evaluators and
caseworkers had no training in evaluating parents for
improving the skills of parents as evidenced above.
. (3) . Caséworkers provided the wrong services or
none at all. The following includes just a few examples..

A. Because of confusion over volunteer parental
stress group attendance and parenting classes by the
caseworker Hector Rivera, H. R. testified that Mr.
Joneson had been attending parenting skills classes for
over 9 years and still was unable to improve in setting
limits and the disciplining of his children at visits ( Vol 1
of 6, R 137 In 24- R 138 In 1, R 145 In 6-8, R 186 In
14-22, R 206 In 22-24- R 207 In 1, R 210 In 14-16). In
reality Mr. Joneson had attended only one parenting
class in ten years due to this error by the Catholic
Charities agency ( Voi 1 of 6, R 193 In 13-16 and Vol
3 of 9, TE 176). This new substantial evidence
reviewed by the trial court judge in a motion to vacate
the unfitness judgement of Luella Joneson and obtained
through the Cook County Commissioner's Office clearly
indicates that parenting class services said to be offered
for a period of nine years by the caseworker Hector
Rivera could not have been.(Vol | of 6, R 228 In 18-R
229 In 4 and Sr 1 of 2, C 227) Even Mr. Joneson's
testimony was that he had attended only one parenting
Class in ten years. (Vol 3 of 9, TE 176) This certainly
could be viewed as another reason no progress could be
seen in the parenting skills of Mr. Joneson Cormack v.
Marshall 211 fil. 519, 71 N. E. 1077. 671 LR.A. 787

222

new conditions must have arisen to warrant the changing
its pnior custody determination

B. An evaluation update of the parenting
assessment team to provide a measure of progress on
the petitioner's ability to parent was ordered by the
court. It was ordered on August 6th 1996 and given 30
days to complete (Vol | of 2, September 25th, C 126-
127, and 142).. But It was not completed through
Catholic Charities. Therefore there was no measure of
progress that could be used through the parenting
assessment team reports (Vol 4 of 6, R 120). IN
Interest of Austin 378, N.E.2d 543 without referring to
a prior status, current status and the process by which
movement from one status to the other occurred,
absence of evidence regarding the prior status would
render a determination of "reasonable progress"
meaningless.

The evaluation was done eventually by Doctor

Marty Blackman who Mr. Joneson hired personally in
1997 ( Vol 7 of 9, TE 146-154) It was considered
inadequate by the state because it only measured
progress of Mr. Joneson's mental and financial stability
but did not provide any e vidence for the parenting skills
progress because the children were not evaluated with
it (Vol 5 of 6, R 230 In 9-13) In Ballweg v, City of
Springfield 114 Il. 2d 107 499 N_E. 2d 1373, 102 Ill.
Dec. 360 (1986) Evidentiary error, namely the
improper admission or exclusion of evidence, is an
important ground for a new trial when the error was

C. Dyadic therapy also was never offered to

223

i ai |

Mr. Joneson by Catholic Charities although it was
recommended by Amy Anson of Michael Reese
Hospital (Vol 7 of 9, TE 196 Dispositions and
Recommendations) This even though Mr. Joneson's
therapist Tod Harrison repeatedly wrote letters asking
for services and therapy so Mr. Joneson could have his
children returned(Vol 8 of 9 TE 128 trusting a copy of
this letter was delivered to C.C. about providers for
family therapy 2/25/97, TE 115 Mr. Harrison requests
a further conference to define planning and measurable |
goals in order to have the children returned to Mr.
- Joneson,. TE 131& 132 Please write me to let me know
how I can better serve Mr. Joneson 11/27/95, TE 137
Please grant Mr. Joneson all the support and services to
which you feel he is entitled to.)..
(4) Caseworker testimony and information they passed
on to evaluators was bias and oriented for adoption.
Evidence given is ; |
A. Luella came into the system because Ms.
O’Neill gave birth at home ( with father attending) in
_order to prevent the Department of Children and Family
services (DCFS) from finding about Luella’s existence.
Testmony by caseworker Julie Yalowitz stated this was
done because they were afraid that if they had gone to
the hospital Luella would have been taken initially from
the hospital. (Vol 2 of 6, R 246 In 15-18) This was also
part of Judge Mulhern’s judgement reading (Vol 2 of 6,
R211 In 12-17)
As argued in appellant’s argument DCFS knew
there was another baby to be born. In fact Mr.
Joneson had told and written a letter to Willa Henning in

224

court (Vol | of 2, 1/8/99 C 137-140) several days after
the baby had been born and that is how DCFS originally
knew to go to the Joneson household. Substantial
records are available that Luella Joneson was brought to
Weiss Memorial after delivery at home by ambulance so
both mother and daughter could receive proper medical
treatment through Willa Henning’s testimony (Vol 1 of 6,
R 1031 ,In 7-10), and DCFS records. (Vol 3 of 9, TE
194-210) and the defendant’s own records (Vol | of 2,
1/8/99 C 132-136) This evidence found in the record
of both the state and the guardian certainly contradicts
the above testimony of the caseworker Julie Yalowitz,
the accusations of the state, and the judgement reading
of the trial court judge, Judge Mulhern..

B. The caseworkers allege in their statements
that the defendant had been under a court order with
Emily and Marilyn’s case (Luella’s older sisters) not to
reside with the mother. This court order has never been
found in the record of Luella Joneson or been presented
as evidence and therefore should be considered as an
invalid argument. DCFS has had many years to present
certified copies of this court order but have never done
so.(Vol 1 of 6, R 101, In 21-24-R 1021-7) Agency
workers and attorneys have used this order in many of
their testimonies but have never supported it with the
evidence that it ever existed. This statement which has
caused serious bias against the appellant with respect to
the court should be considered as hearsay unsupported
by fact and moot as to argument. Evidentiary error,
namely the improper admission of evidence is important
ground for a new trial when the error was prejudice

225

Ballweg v. City of Springfield 499 N.E .2d 1373

C. The caseworkers and attomeys also bring up
the issue of feeding adult cereal to Luella fourd in the
initial intake investigation. Again the caseworkers do
not give the complete story. The actual intake report
only indicates cereal ( Vol | of 9, Te 19, 21) It does
not indicate adult cereal as the guardian plaintiff
argued(Vol 5 of 6, R 233 In 21-23) or that it was of a
liquid consistency fed in a bottle as this defendant
motioned in his order to vacate (Vol 1 of 2, 3/5/99, C
174)

D Caseworker reports throughout Luella's case
since Julie Yalowitz became a worker have indicated
that Mr. Joneson threw the mother and Luella's older
sister, Emily, out of the apartment and they had no
where to go (Vol. 6 of 9,.TE 152) This contradicts the
actual hearing because nothing of this nature was
indicated or said ( Vol 1 of 6,R 127 Emily O'NEILL
was abandoned by the natural mother Frances O'Neill
at a Catholic Charities office located at 721 North
Lasalle. The staff there reported that mother had stated
that she could not care for the child. ).

E. Another example of how caseworkers
passed on bias information about the father of Luella
Joneson. is in the letters wntten when they were
searching for Luella's mother. The letters were written
as if the father was the only one they were searching for.
In (Vol 3 of 9, TE 103) Since we do not know the
whereabouts of the child's father, we are contacting all
F. O'NEILL as in an attempt to locate the correct
person. ) The agency knew all the time where to find the

226

emer, Eee aN ee ne anal

father of Luella all the time but really wanted to locate
the mother (Vol 5 of 6, R 219 In 15- R 220 In 10).

F. Before Luella's case came in to care,
caseworkers started indicating that there was a court
order that father was not to be with the mother of the
children ( Vol 9 of 9, TE 31 1.at the time of Luella's
birth, Mr. Joneson was court ordered not to be living
with mother) But to this very day None has ever been
presented this order as indicated by Judge Swzed ( Vol
1 of 6, R 101, In 21-24-R 102 In 1-7)

G Testimony and reports by Julie Yalowitz also
indicates a bias about a knife incident reported at a visit.
It was also withdrawn as a conclusion under cross
examination (Vol 6 of 6, In 6-23). Numerous other
examples of these false reports are given in the appellant
brief which included accusations of: (1) the children
swimming in the lake of which evidence in the transcript
record contradicts (Vol | of 6, R 177 In 9-24- R 179)
and (2) non evidenced statements by an evaluator that
the father struck a two year(Vol 4 of 6, R 58 1-10) This
the father denied and argued as here say in an appeal
letter written on 5/18/96 (SR 1 of 2, App. stamp 3/5/99,
C 155) and Vol 9 of 9, TE 99) and no case worker
notes or recordings of the interview that contained this
information were ever presented in court to validate the
evaluators testimony
(5).. Visitation appointments lost were never
rescheduled by Julie Yalowitz, Luella J’s caseworker
On June 21, 1995 Jude Swzed ordered and granted in
part the return of visits every week (Vol 1 of 2, 9/25/98
C 42) On November 9", 1995 actual visits were

227

changed to once every two weeks. Coincidentally
visitation anxiety continued throughout the summer for
Luella Joneson because Julie Yalowitz, her caseworker
would not and did not comply with the court order of
every two weeks. In fact the visits remained at
approximately once a month all summer long until
Yalowitz retumed them to at least twice a month. but not
every two weeks. In court Julie denies she had any
problem in determining the number of visits (Vol 3 of 6,
R 140 In 12-14) The appellant Mr. Joneson also wrote
a letter to Catholic Charities about June of 96 indicating
that CC was not following the court order made by
Judge Swzed and that unto that date they had missed at
least 14 visits due lo manipulating the visits to twice a
month instead of every two weeks as ordered by court
order (Vol 3 of 9, TE 25-26) This was also brought up
in the appeal letter written on May 23, 1996 to DCFS
(Vol 3 of 9, TE 67. Mr. Joneson asked for mediation
with C.C. because Catholic Charities had constantly
ignored the court order of visitation for Luella for every
_2 weeks for the last 9 months (Vol 3 of 9, TE 64) (Also
note the complete documenting of appellant’s letter for
the file of CC by Catholic Charities

(6)..Caseworkerreports by Julie Yalowitzand Christine
Foley were inaccurate and only included information
that would not benefit Mr. Joneson There are lots of
guod example of this. In the ACR Case Review for
11/7/94- 5/95. On one page it states that the CC
worker will aid father in developing an appropriate care
plan for Luella if requested to do so, and father will
develop an appropniate care plan if she is returned home

228

ym

SR

(Vol 6 of 9, TE 97, 101) Father also will do the same
thing in individual therapy with Tod Harmson as agreed
upon in the letter sent by C.C. on what Mr. Joneson
can do to have his children returned to him (Vol 6 of 9,
TE 64, 4). But in his case review evaluation Mr.
Joneson was given unsatisfactory progress with regards
to this issue because he was discussing day care
arrangements with Tod Harrison (Vol 6 of 9, R 134
bottom of page) This was a no win situation for Mr.
Joneson as the caseworkers were onented towards
adoption..

Nothing could be done to convince CC that Mr.
Joneson had the proper parenting skills. Even actions
such as_ bringing flash cards was considered
inappropriate and unsatisfactorily progress because
Luella was not at an age where she could recognize
words (Vol 3 of 6, R 45 In 10-15)
or the game of hearts or using glitter to make a picture
(Vol 3 of 6, R 80 In 12-17) Inre SJ. 233 Ill. App. 3d at
121, 598 N.H. 2d at 477 (" To place compliance with
DCFS plans ahead of the ultimate fact of progress
would to let the tail wag the dog”) Furthermore, there
exist a danger of “bootstrapping” which would occur if
the parents fails to do things on a service plan which
were not necessarily related to previous shortcomings.,

(7) Bonding with Mr. Joneson and his daughters,
Luella also had tow older sibling sisters in custody was
hindered when letters written to his daughters were
edited for content (SR 2 of 2, C 272)

(8). Previous case reviews before this case came into

229

care had been canceled for over three years not allowing
the father feedback for improvement of his parenting
skills as confirmed by the case notes of Mr, J's family
counselor Minna Greene (Vol 5 of 9, YE 239 canceled
4/30/02, TE 243 /13/93, Vol 4 of 9, TE 23 held a case
review without notifying, TE 34 no case reviews for 2
years, TE 42 the Sth case review canceled, TE 106 no
notification of case reviews that were held in October
1990 and Apmil of 1991) The state argues that even
though services were offered Mr. Joneson was unable to
make reasonable progress in his parenting skills. This
completely contradicts the evidence which indicates the
state never even tried to provided services for Mr.
Joneson and if they did it would be services that did not

apply to his parenting problems.

Under Rule 315 2nd argument on Finality of Decision
and Conflicts between Jurisdiction Interpretation
The appellate court erred when it found the

father of Luella Joneson unfit using evidence that the _

state had ordered for an evaluation and caseworker
testimony as the manifest weight of the evidence instead
of using the benchmark measure of progress from when
the case came into care and progress made within 12
months afterwards. ©

The father of Luella Joneson was found unfit and
his parental nights were terminated for failure to make
reasonable progress for the return home of Luella
Joneson.. Reasonable progress should have been
determined by an objective judgement The bench mark
for measuring such progress is the situation which

230

triggered the initial removal of the children. Inre MC.
201 Til. App.2d 792 , 559 N.E. 2d 236 ,239 (1* Dist
1980) Certain courts have interpreted this statue to hold
that “reasonable progress” involves an objective
judgement. The benchmark for measuring such progress
is the conditions in existence when custody was taken
from the parents. Also in re Interest of L. N. 278 Ill.
App. 2d 50-51 and Inre S.J. 598 N..E 2d 477. But
instead the manifest weight of the evidence presented by
the state was from reports ordered and created by the
state. In 34_POF 2d 424 Child custody 34-407
annotation 10 Use of investigators In some jurisdictions,
the court may have an independent investigation made in
court proceedings, by virtue either of statutory
authorization or the exercise of the court’s discretion, in
order to obtain information needed by the court to make
its decision. As to the weight to be given the results of
the independent investigation, on the one hand they are
advisory only and may be disregarded by the court. On
the other hand, they may not be made the conclusive
basis of the court’s decision, since that would mean that
the court would be delegating its power to decide
questions of child custody, and the court may not do
that.

In this case the cause for Luella Joneson’s
removal was the possible risk of harm that could occur
to Luella Joneson due to her parents mental illness or by
Mr. Joneson living with Luella’s mother who was noi
cooperating by going through services with DCFS for
her mental illness diagnosis. But Mr. Joneson the
defendant completed over 60 session of therapy through

231

Tod Harrison his therapist who was accepted by
Catholic Charities as adequately prepared to counsel
Mr. Joneson for the return home of Luella Joneson and
also moved away from the mother of his children.
All charges of mental illness were dropped at
pretrial hearing as reason for a unfitness argument (Vol
2 of 6, R 136) due to this substantial psychotherapy
progress provided by Tod Harrison, LCS (SR | of 2,
Jan. 8*, 1998, C 90-93) and validated by Doctor Marty
Blackman ,psychologist (Vol 2 of 6, R 180), Doctor
Childers psychiatrist (Vol 8 of 9, Te 137), and John
Lietzau, family interventionist (SR | of 2 Jan, 8", C 94)
Even so the state submittea as the basis of their
evidence reports that indicate mental illness. This
includes for the state |. the entire parenting assessment
team report cover to cover, 2. a clinical Services report
done by doctor Reebe from down stairs (ordered by the
court and completed by a state psychologist), and 3. a
psychiatric evaluation of the father by Doctor Tepas
(Vol 4 of 6, R 128 In 17-R 129 In 14). Again 34 POF
2d 424 Child custody 34-407 annotation 10 Use of

investigators applies to this situation.
Also when mental illness of the father lrving with

the mother was no longer an issue for the return of Luella
workers monitoring L.J.’s case due to a recent
restructuring of the Department Of Children and Family |
Services, began to create objectives for parenting for
Mr. Joneson and demanded strict compliance to them.
In re L.L.S., 218 Ill. App 3d at 461, 577 N.E.2d at
1387 which erected the standard that progress is

232

ee

measured by the compliance with the court’s directives,
DCFS service plans or both such that the court will be
able to return the child to the parent in the near future.
This standard has been criticized as too mechanical:
These plans are a means to an end, not an end in and of
itself. Inte S.J., 233 ll. App. 3d at 121, 598 N. E.2d
at 477 (“ To place compliance with DCFS plans ahead
of the ultimate fact of progress would be to let the tail
wag the dog”) Furthermore, there exist a danger of
“bootstrapping” which would occur if the parents fails to
do things on a service plan which were not necessarily
related to previous shortcomings. Many unsatisfactory
progress reports were given even though Mr. Joneson
had cooperated with all services demanded by Catholic
Charities. In Interest of Drescher Ill. App. 415 N_E. 2d
641 The law emphasizes that it is the efforts of the
parent to carry out parental responsibilities, rather than
their success, which should be considered in determining
the correctness of a finding of unfitness.

Other evidence done by evaluators appointed by
State appointed agencies submitted by the state was a
bonding assessment done by Amy Anson of Michael
Reese Hospital (Vol 4 of 6, R 128, In 7 - 16) and the
parenting assessment team. State Law that is applicable
to the weight of this evidence is read in Blakey v. Blakey
391 NE. 2d 222 the inability to nurture or interact is not
a proper statutory basis for the removal of children in
this state. The children were originally take away
because of the injurious environment and the parents
should not have their parental rights terminated for these
other nebulous, uncharged reasons. To decide

233

otherwise would allow the state to terminate parental
rights for non-statutory reasons which were originally
uncharged and which parents have no reason to know
are possible bases for the removal of their children.

Where a parent has made substantial progress
toward correcting the condition that led to the removal
of the child, the lack of what DCFS deems satisfactory
interaction between parent and child in not justification
for the termination of parental rights._in re S.J. 598 N.E.
2d 477

In this case in interest of Luella Joneson, the
lower courts have completely overlooked or
misapprehended the evidence presented in the record
which show progress has been made by correcting the
parent Eugene Joneson. This includes the dropping of
risk of harm charges due to mental illness, separation
from the mother, and substantial improvement in
parenting skills as indicated by the record.

. In Interest of A.T. 555 N 2d 409 it reads the
first interpretation of unfitness must be based solely on
parenting efforts or progress during the penod beginning
with adjudication and ending 12 months thereafter. The
second interpretation must be based upon parenting
efforts or progress made during the entire period
between adjudication and filing of the termination
petition. Under this latter interpretation, the length of the
period is not limited by the statue.

The Catholic Charities caseworkers who
supervised this case for almost all of the first year, Nora
Rodriguez ( Vol 1 of 9, R 91 Case Planning

234

<>

Acknowledgment 1 1/7/94)and Laura Scott (Vol 1 of 9,
R 43-46 Transfer Summary , R 63 Service plan
evaluation of progress 6/13/94, R 92 Case Planning
Acknowledgment | 1/7/94) did not even testify in court
as witnesses and neither did Terry Weck from the
Department of Children and Family Services (Vol 1 of
9, R 50 Client Service Plan ),

Luella Joneson’s case came into care on

2/8/94. (Vol 1 of 9, R 18). Adjudication was on
3/28/95 where she was found abused due to injurious
environment (Vol | of 2,1/8/99, C 26)
The dispositional order was on 6/21/95 where it was
determined reasonable efforts had been made and
appropriate services aimed at family intervention were
unsuccessful. (Vol 1 of 2, C 38). The supplemental
petition for appointment of a guardian with right to
consent to adoption was filed on May 10, 1996 (Vol |
of 2, 1/8/99 C 65) a little over one year after case was
adjudicated...

The issue in argument is wether the appropriate
services offered in the 12 month after adjudication and
during the entire period between adjudication and the
filing of the termination petition resulted in reasonable
progress for the return home of Luella Joneson.

This includes the arguments that reasonable
progress was made because; 1. the charges of mental
illness were dropped , one of the main reasons the
petitioner believes the case came into care(Vol 1 of 2, C
10). Thus mental illness was also one of the benchmarks
from which to measure reasonable progress. 2 The
father stopped seeing the mother of Luella Joneson as

235

she would no longer cooperate with DCFS in the retum
home of Luella and as it was recommended by Catholic
Charities as a condition for reasonable progress for the
return home of Luella Joneson. 3. Case aid reports and
cross examination of witnesses indicated that the
manifest weight of the evidence was not clear and
convincing that Mr. Joneson was unfit to parent his
children. 4 Father complied with all service plan
objectives which included a. documented A.A.
attendance and sponsorship b. over 100 hours of
parenting classes to improve his parenting abilities In
Interest of L.L.S 577 N.E. 2d 1375 Infants 156 the
Standard by which progress is to be measured is
parental compliance with court’s directives, the service
plan or both In interest of Drescher Ill. App. 415 N. E.
2d 641 Both the Guardian and the State testified that
Mr. Joneson had undeniably made the efforts in
following their final arguments (Vol 5 of 6 R 219 In21-R
220 In 21), but the bottom line was that he could not
parent because his efforts were unsuccessful.(Vol 5 of 6,
R 220 In 22-R 222 In 22).
The law emphasizes that it is the efforts of the parent to
Carry out parental responsibilities, rather than their
success, which should be considered in determining the
correctness of a finding of unfitness. But the reverse has
happened in the ruling of the trial court Judge Mulhern.
Rule 317. A parenting Assessment was used in
court whose basis for selection was that of the parent
being mentally ill and tts original purpose was to provide
recommendations for the father to improve his parenting
skills (Vol 1 of 2, 9/25/98 C 80)

236

. The petitioner was also informed that this assessment
or team would not be used to make decisions about
custody but was only to determine |.what the parent
could do and cannot do about what could improve
parenting problems and to help develop the best
possible service plan to improve the parenting ability of
the parent This is evidenced by the pamphlet given to
the petitioner before the assessment (SR 1 of 2, 1/8/99
C 85). As these reports were used as evidence in court,
this petitioner believes it is a violation of due process
through fraud and is reversible error to invalidate this
adoption Racine Fuel Co. v. Rawlins, 377 Ill. 375, 36
N.E. 2d 710 (1941)

It was objected to by Mr. Joneson at the Best
interest hearing in trial court on 4/17/ 98 as to its
constitutionality (Vol 1 of 1, Nov. 17", 1998 R 27 line
14-17).. Itisa violation of the 14" amendment because
it is discriminating against a certain class of parents with
regards to mental illness. In People vs, Fierer 529 N.E.
2d 972. It reads Constitutional errors must be shown to
be harmless beyond reasonable doubt. This petitioner
believe that this has not been proven in this case.

Govermor Edgar of the State of Illinois mandated
that a commission to assess the parents of parents
suspected of mental illness and the parenting assessment
team was a result of this commission. (Vol 7 of 9, R
155) Even though the father did not meet the
requirements for being severely ill , being hospitalized for
over 5 years , the report was still done and included and
concentrated on this perspective of mental illness. This
is evidenced by the assessment made by Laura Miller,

237

psychiatrist , and Teresa Jacobson, psychologist.(Vol 2
of 9 ,R 159).

Also the main coordinator of the Parenting
Assessment Team, Kathy Peek, who was a child
development specialist had 1.no prior or previous
training at evaluating the parenting capabilities of parents
for the improvement of their parenting skills (Vol 4 of 6,
R 98 In 20-24, R 99 In 1-7), 2. No experience for
evaluating fathers (SR 1 of 2, C 84-88 The agency
doing the evaluation The Thresholds for Mothers Project
only provided services for women) and 3. No training in
evaluating emotionally disturbed adults (Vol 4 of 6, R
93) In her case report summary and in trial court
testimony
until she actually started doing the evaluations agency
was

Mr. Harmison, Mr. Joneson’s therapist and the head

supervisor of the Community Health Center testified at
the unfitness hearing that it was not the standard of the
medical health industry that nothing could be done to
help a patient, but this is exactly what the P. AT. did.
As mentioned earlier this probably had to do with the
_ inexperience of the coordinator Kathy Peek at analyzing
parents with parenting skills.
Supreme Court Rule 317 provides for appeals to the
Supreme Court as a matter of right when a question
under the Constitution of the United States and or Illinois
has arisen for the first time in the Appellate Court Under
Rule 317

The appellate court erred in affirming the trial
court’s decision to terminate parental right. One of the

238

reasons being that there was no recorded interview
made or presented in court with regards to Luella

Joneson’s wishes _ In 3 Ill Fam Law & Practice

annotation 9:367 Practice Commentary The law is now
that the custody and visitation sections in the [Ilinois

Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act apply to
parentage cases. In re Marriage of Ronald R. Slavenas
487 N.E 2d 739 Infants Record of in-chambers
interview of child to ascertain child’s wishes as to his
custodian and as to visitation is mandatory and cannot
be waived by parties. At 741 (3,4) It was therefore
error to conduct the interview without making a record
In Lear v. Robertson 463 U.S. 248, 261-262 (1983)
Clearly that fathers who have participated in raising their
illegitimate children and have developed a relationship
with them have constitutionally protected parental rights.
Also in_3 Illinois Family Law and Practice reads at
annotation 9,322 on interviews that the court may
interview the child in chambers to ascertain the child’s
wishes as to his or her custodian. If counsel desires the
court to cover any specific areas in the interview or ask
any questions, they should submit those in writing and
have then on record. Counsel must be present at the
interview unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties,
and the court must provide a court reporter who will
make a complete record of the interview instantaneously
to be part of the record in the case. The requirement that
the interview of a child be recorded cannot be waived
by the parties Petitioner interprets these statues as
indicating that it was a violation of due process by not
recording Luella Joneson's wishes with regards to

239

custody and visitation for the court.

The department of Children and family Services
also should have considered important racial, ethnic and
religious differences between her birth family's ethnic
and cultural background and the prospective adoptive
parents as is legislated for Illmois Department of
Children and Family Services’ Policy and thus as
determined by legislative law.

The trial court Judge even admitted herself that
there is no case law that indicates that a parent can have
custody or visitation nghts after their children are
adopted (Vol | of 1, R 22 In 119), but state statues
indicate differently.

Conclusion

The court should accept this case for review
because it conflicts with the basic rules and statues for
determining the finding of unfitness of a parent,
Especially determining wether the manifest weight of the
evidence should be measured by the evidence produced
by the state through its evaluators and caseworkers
reports or the progress made from the conditions that
brought the case into care). Also to determine the
_ finality of judgement of the state, if the state in its efforts
to cut down the over bloated system of foster care
actually thwarted the efforts of the father in the return of
his daughter Luella Joneson. In this case. did the
preponderance of the evidence show that the petitioner
was thwarted by the efforts of the caseworkers and
others related to this case. This is largely due to the new
social policy to cut down state caseloads for monetary
reasons, and caseworker personal error and the loss of

240

representation of the department of Children and family
services to provide caseworkers to monitor the services
of Catholic Charities for the same financial reasons .
This virtually puts the determination factors for unfitness
of the parents of children accused of abuse and neglect
soles in the hands of a private agency and whoever they
hire. This case is a prim example of how this abuse
occurs with countless examples of how this happens.
Also several important basic violations of due
process and 14th amendment rights provided by the
United States Constitution for all parents have been
violated with respect to: | religion... adoption across
religious faiths not condoned by parent 2. mental
health.... use of report based on mental health that was
fraudulently represented as being used to determine what
could be done to improve parenting skills 3. visitation
and custody with regards to illegitimate children’s
nghts...no court recorded interview was made of the
petitioner's daughter Luella Joneson with regards to her
preferences of custody and visitation rights and 4
putative father’ . rights before and after adoption has

Thin whibininy ventions the Sepieriis ctvirvot
Illinois's supervisory authority. This especially since the
act of adoption severs all ties with the birth parent and.
. Childand undercurrent legislation offers no alternatives
to this tragic conclusion. In this case, further legislation is
needed that will allow the return of a child on a joint
custody basis when there has been no evidence proven
of severe mental , emotionnal or physical abuse of child

241

by the parent only a lack of parenting skills that the
untrained social system is uncomfortable with for the
children's return. This occurring when substantial efforts
had been made to improve these skills by the parent by
complete participation in DCFS plans and visitation of
the children .Simply stated further legislation needs to be
developed on the lines with that in Lael V. Warga 508
N.E. 2d 1095 and In re Hurley (1976), 44 Ill. A.. 3d
260, 2 Ill. Dec. 595, 357 NE 2d 815) Although a
parent may be unfit to have custody of children, it does
not follow that parent is unfit to remain children's legal
parent with attendant nghts. Petitioner requests the court
to review as further legislation is needed to clarify what
conditions under the above statues will apply to this
case. In Lear v. Robertson 463 U.S. 248, 261-262
(1983) Clearly fathers who have participated in raising
their illegitimate children and have developed a
relationship with them have constitutionally protected
parental rights.

Again this case should also be considered under
the 14th amendment as a constitutional right for putative
parents with respect to custody and visitation,
Especially when they are found unfit due to
unreasonable progress in parenting skills and have
maintained contact with their children and there is no
dispute that reasonable efforts had been made for the for
the return of their children. -

Petitioner prays that this Court grant his request
for leave to appeal
Respectfully submitted,

242

tae

243

90401244
In The Supreme Court of the State of Illinois

IN THE INTEREST _)

OF: )Appeal from The Circuit
LUELLA JONESON _) Court of Cook County
No 94JA1107 )
Minor-Respondent ) -
Appellee )

) Appellate No. 98-3336
PEOPLE OF THE )
STATE OF ILLINOIS )
Petitioner-Appellee )
V. )
)
EUGENE JONESON _) Mary Mulhern,
Respondent-Appellant ) Judge Residing.
Motion For reconsideration of Motion For denying
Leave To Appeal

EUGENE JONESON, Pro Se_
2043 W. Dickens

Chicago, Illinois 60647
telephone 773-645-9695-

“Appendix K*

244

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION OF THE ORDER FOR DENYING
PETITION TO LEAVE TO APPEAL

Eugene J. birth father acting pro se, respectfully
motions the Illinois Supreme Court for motion for leave
to file motion for reconsideration of the order for denying
petition to leave to appeal.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND
JUDGEMENT BELOW

On December 2™, 1997 judgement was passed
from the Circuit Court of Cook County finding the
father, Eugene Joneson, unfit to parent. On April 7",
1998 the father and mother’s parental rights to Luella
Joneson were terminated. Post trial motions to
reconsider unfitness and termination of parental rights
and to reinstate visitation were denied on August 6th,
1998. The Notice of Appeal was filed on. On
September 3" 1998. On August 24, 1999 the appellant
brief was allowed to be filed instanter.
The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s decision
and entered an order affirming the trial court decision
on June 30", 2000. After one extension of time, the
Petition to rehear was filed on 8/15/2000. It was denied
on September 7”, 2000. On September 25", 2000 an
affidavit of intent to file was mailed to the clerk’s office
of the appellate court 1* District. On October 12",
2000 a motion for the extension of filing time was filed
with the Illinois Supreme Court Clerk. The 1* extension
of time was allowed til November 14th, 2000. The
petition for leave to appeal was filed timely on that date.

245

The petition for leave to appeal was denied on January
29", 2001. A motion for extension of time to file motion
for leave to file motion for reconsideration of the order -
for denying petition to leave to appeal was filed on
February 9", 2001. The extension of time was granted
and the due date to file motion for leave to file motion for
reconsideration of the order denying petition for leave to
appeal was ordered for March |*, 2001 and was timely
filed on March 1*, 2001.

POINTS RELIED UPON FOR REVERSAL FOR
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE
ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR LEAVE TO
APPEAL \

UNDER RULE 317

1. Factors balancing the nature of due process due
parental rights termination were in direct violation of the
fourteenth amendment and inconsiderate of gnevous
loss. Mathews v. Eldridge 424 U.S., at 343, 96 S. Ct.
At 893 & 903, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 The nature of the
on balancing three factors: the private interests affected
by the proceedings, the risk of error created by the
state’s chosen procedure: and the countervailing
governmental interest supporting use of the challenge of
the procedure The fourteenth amendment Article 14,
Section | Due Process and Equal Protection Aill
persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States and of the state wherein they reside. No

246

state shall make or enforce any law which shall abnidge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law: nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.

Santosky v. Kramer 102 S. Ct. 1388 m(1982) 1397 [3]
The extent to which procedural due process must be
afforded the recipient is influenced by the extent to which
he may be * condemned to suffer grievous loss”

These constitutional violations include

A. a parenting assessment that was used that
selects parents for evaluation of parenting skills solely on
the reason of wether they have been diagnosed as
mentally ill in the past. Psychologicals and psychiatric
reports were very negative and supported the finding of
unfitness based on a mental illness or impairment of the
father Eugene Joneson. People v, Fierer 529 Ne2d 972
constitutional errors must be shown to be harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt

Adding even more in violation of due process is
that none of the evaluators or social workers involved
in the case of Luella Joneson had any previous training
in assessing parents for parenting skills. What knowledge
they had was learned from the experience of the job
which all had recently started. But their testimonies and
reports provided the basis and manifest weight of the
evidence for the finding of unfitness and termination of
parental nights of the birth father In 34 POF 24 424

Child Custody at 34-407 annot. 10 Use of investigators

247

In some jurisdictions, the court may have an independent
investigation made in court proceedings, by virtue either
of statutory authorization or the exercise of the court’s
discretion, in order to obtain information needed by the
court to make its decision. As to the weight to be given
the results of the independent investigation, on the one
hand they are advisory only and may be disregarded by
the court. On the other hand, they may not be made the
conclusive basis of the court’s decision, since that would
mean that the court would be delegating its power to
decide questions of child custody, and the court may not
do that. In re Perez 528 N.E. 2d 815 A tnal court’s
findings of parental unfitness in a proceeding to terminate
parental rights and appoint a guardian with authority to
consent to adaption will not be reversed by appellate
court unless finding of unfitness is against the manifest
wight of the evidence
B.Unsupported adoption by the birth father
across religious lines. (Vol 6 of 9, TE 111 11/7/94, TE
186 10/18/95, TE 244, 04/09/96, Vol 7 of 9, TE 47
10/08/96, TE 84 4/7/97) The birth father was Methodist
and the adoptive parents were Catholic. In Family Law
Quarterly, Volume XXV, Number 2 Summer 1991
adoption across religious lines is further discouraged by
imposing an additional procedural requirement; if
adoption is granted a person of a religion different than
that of the child, the court must recite for the record the
facts that compel the decision also in_re Santos 105
N.Y. S. 2d 7163 In 331 Mass. 647.121 N.E. 2d the
court held that the children had a natural and legal right
to their religious faith, which temporary exposure to

248

another religion could not erase (Adoption denied to
Jewish couple who had custody for three years of twins
born to Catholic mother.) Also in 66 ALR 2d 1410
Religion as a factor in awarding child custody

C. Visitation and custody rules for putative
father were denied by the trial court judge even though
reinstatement of visitation , a stay of judgement, was
motioned for by the birth father in post trial motions
before the notice of appeal was filed. This was solely
for jurisdiction reasons which petitioner argues is an
erroneous ruling

Also. Luella J’s right to an interview with regard
to her preferences of custodian or visitation was
overlooked by the trial court judge. In re Custody of
Krause Ill. App.,444 N.E. 2d 647 Subsection (2)
directs the court to consider the wishes of the child as to
his custodian, in 750 ILCS 5/602 (a) (2) A child’s
preference is an important factor in deciding custody, In
Deyoung v. Deyoung 379 N.E. 2d 399 at (9) The law
requires that competing custody be resolved in
accordance with the best interest of the child, and the
places upon the court the burden of determining where
the interest resides. At 3-5) The second sentence says
that counsel shall “ shall be present unless otherwise
agreed upon by the parties “ thus expressly allowing the
parties to waive the right to have counsel present. The
third sentence states that the “ court shall causes a court
reporter to be present “ This provision does not
authorize a waiver by the parties and we believe the
imperative “ shall mandates that a record be made of the
interview) Records of in chambers interview of child to

249

ascertain Child’s wishes as to his custodian and as to
visitation is mandatory and cannot be waived by the
parties
D. The trial court judge also abused her

discretion by not allowing a continuance of the best
interest hearing and not allowing new substantial
evidence and testimony to be presented or heard in post
trial motions which indicated it was in Luella’s best
interest to maintain contact with her father.

In Hearson v. Graudine 87 [ll 115, it reads that a court
should not refuse a continuance where the ends of justice
clearly require it and an abuse of discretion in doing so
will justify a reversal. And in Czyzewski v.Gleeson -
364 NE 2d at 560 It is not necessary for the reviewing
court to determine, as a matter of law, that the trial court
exceeded or abused its discretion, but only to resolve
wether justice is being done. In Santosky V. Kramer_
102 S. Ct. 1388 m (1982) 1397 [8] The extent to which
procedural due process must be afforded the recipient
is in influenced by the extent to which he may be
condemned to suffer grievous loss
| In Lehr v. Robertson 463 U.S.248, 261-262
(1983) clearly that fathers who have participated in -
raising ther illegitimate children and have developed a
relationship with them have constitutionally protected
parental nghts:

Under Rule 315

2. The Preponderance of the evidence indicated it was
not in the best interest of Luella Joneson to be
permanently separated from her father permanently

through adoption and no compelling evidence presented

250

was clear and convincing _In Cebrzynski v. Cebrzynski
(1978), 63 Ill. App.3d 66,72,19 Ill. Dec. 841,379 N.E.

2d 713) in a custody dispute between a natural parent
and a third person, the latter must demonstrate a “
compelling reason” why the natural parent should not be
granted custody of a child. In Re Custody of Krause cite
as, Ill. App., 444 N.E. 2d 647 Six factors for custody
determination subsection (1) thereof states that the
wishes of the child’s parent or parents as to his custody _
is one of the relevant factors., subsection (2) directs the
court to consider the wishes of the child as to his
custodian, subsection(3) is the interaction and
interrelationship of the child with his parent or parents,
siblings, and any other person who may significantly
affect his best interest, subsection (4) lists the child’s
adjustment to his home, school and community as a
relevant factor for consideration., subsection (5) directs
the court to consider the mental and physical health of all
the individuals involved, subsection (6) allegations or
threats of physical violence.

The trial court has completely ignored these
factors in determining the best interests of Luella
Joneson. No interview had been made of Luella
Joneson with regards to her wishes with regards to
custody. Luella’s adoptive father was not of the same
race as Luella or Luella’s father. The adoptive parents
were not of the same religion as Luella was baptized in
or her father was raised with. Adjustment to the
community was considered residing in a day care center
because both of Luella’s parents had to work in order to
afford her upbringing.

251

Since the above factors were ignored by the
trial court along with the efforts of the Catholic Chanties
agency to prevent the return of Luella, special attention
for this case should be given to subsection (5) which
directs the court to consider the mental and physical
health ofall the individuals involved. The father of Luella
Joneson believes that if the order is not granted to
reverse the adoption.or retrial granted at least some type
of open adoption should be allowed to remedy any
damage caused by the current separation during
litigation. In Lael V. Warga 508 N.E. 2d 1095 and In
re Hurley (1976), 44 lll. A.. 3 d 260, 2 Ill. Dec. 595,
357 NE 2d 815) Although a parent may be unfit to
have custody of children, it does not follow that parent
is unfit to remain children's legal parent with attendant
nights. Petitioner requests the court to review as further
interpretation is needed to clarify what conditions under
the above statues will apply in this case.

3. Terminating parental nghts solely for the reason of
_ failure to make reasonable progress when parent
complied withall service requests demanded by Catholic
Charities Agency but was unable to convince them there
would be a safe home return for Luella Joneson was not
clear and convincing. In re Woods (1* Dist 1977,54
Ill.App.3d 729, 735, 12 IllDec. 342, 369
N.E.2d1356).The law emphasizes that it is the efforts of
the parent to carry out parental responsibilities, rather
than their success, which should be considered in
determining the correctness of a finding of unfitness. In
re Taylor (1* dist. 1975) 80 Ill.aPP.3D 906, 909,
334N.E.2D 194 Traditionally, one of the obstacles that

252

could thwart a parent’s actual visitation of his child
7 included the misconduct of Department employees. This
is especially true in the case of Luella Joneson because
. there is substantial evidence that Mr. Joneson’s efforts
for the return of Luella Joneson were thwarted by the
efforts of the caseworkers. _In Ill, Revised Statues
Domestic Relations 40 @ 1501 and In re Bentsen v.
Bentsen 412 N. E. 2d 1167 It shall be an affirmative —
defense to any allegation under subsection (N\2) that
the father’s failure was due to circumstances beyond his
control Or to impediments created by the mother or any
other person having legal custody. Proof of such fact
need only be by a preponderance of the evidence These
impediments included: (1). Telephone calls were never
returned to his therapist for feedback and services Vol
5 of 6, R 65 In 15-18 and Vol 3 of 9, TE 15 letter dated
11/6/96). (2). At the beginning of Luella’s case,
caseworker services and help provided to the father
were non- existent and unqualified unless father was to
determine the services needed and than request them
(Vol 5 of 9, TE 156 Case review 8/12/94 Task at 3
DCFS and CC workers will continue to offer services to
parents should they request them. ) (vol 5 of 9, R 57 at
2), (3) . Caseworkers provided the wrong Services or
none at all because of inadequate training(Vol. 1 of 9,
TE 66 and Vol 2 of 9, Gal ex. #3, 184 or TE 155\Vol
3 of 6, R 70 In 10- 14, R 72 In 5-10 Sr 1 of 2 1/8/99
C 109) (Vol 5 of 6, R 221 In 3-8),(Vol 4 of 6, R 98 In
20-24, R 99 In 1-7).(4) Caseworker testimony and
information they passed on to evaluators was bias and
oriented for adoption.(Vol 4 of 6, R 98 In 20-24, R 99

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In 1-7).(Vol 3 of 9, TE 176), (5).. Visitation
appointments lost were never rescheduled by Julie
Yalowitz, Luella J’s caseworker, (6)..Caseworker
reports by Julie Yalowitz and Chnistine Foley were
inaccurate and only included information that would not
benefit Mr. Joneson, (7) .Bonding with Mr. Joneson
and his daughters, Luella also had two older sibling
sisters in custody, was hindered when letters written to
his daughters were edited for content

(8). Previous case reviews before this case came into
care had been canceled for over three years not allowing
the father feedback for improvement of his parenting
skills as confirmed by the case notes of Mr, J's family
counselor Minna Greene ;

There is also conflict in jurisdictional
interpretation of the determination of unfitness statues.
This being the benchmark for progress of the 1 “district
versus strict compliance to Catholic Chanities directives
and court orders The appellate court erred when it
found the father of Luella Joneson unfit using evidence

that the state had ordered for an evaluation and

caseworker testimony as the manifest weight of the
evidence instead of using the benchmark measure of
progress from when the case came into care and
progress made within 12 months afterwards.

The father of Luella Joneson was found unfit and
his parental nghts were terminated for failure to make
reasonable progress for the return home of Luella
Joneson.. Reasonable progress should have been
determined by an objective judgement The bench mark
for measuring such progress is the situation which

254

triggered the initial removal of the children. Inre M.C.
201 Ill. App.2d 792 , 559 N.E. 2d 236 ,239 (1" Dist
1980) Certain courts have interpreted this statue to hold
that “reasonable progress” involves an objective
Judgement. The benchmark for measuring such progress
is the conditions in existence when custody was taken
from the parents. Also in re Interest of L. N. 278 Ill.
App. 2d 50-51 and InreS. J. 233 Ill. App.3d at 121,
598 N..E 2d 477 The ultimate issue is the
reasonableness of the progress that the parent has made,
in light of all the circumstances in “ moving beyond the
parental deficiencies that led to initial removal of the
child.

But instead the manifest weight of the evidence

presented by the state was from reports ordered and
created by the state evaluators and caseworkers.
Re _In_re L.LS., 218 Ill. App 3d at 461, 577
N.E.2d at 1387 which erected the standard that
progress is measured by the compliance with the court’s
directives, DCFS service plans or both such that the
court will be able to return the child to the parent in the
near future. This standard has been criticized as too
mechanical: These plans are a means to an end, not an
end in and of itself. In re S.J., 233 Dl. App. 3d at 121,
598 N. E.2d at 477 (“ To place compliance with DCFS
plans ahead of the ultimate fact of progress would be to
let the tail wag the dog”) Furthermore, there exist a
danger of “bootstrapping” which would occur if the
parents fails to do things on a service plan which were
not necessarily related to previous shortcomings.

Many unsatisfactory progress reports were

255

given even though Mr. Joneson had cooperated with all
services demanded by Catholic Charities. In Interest of
Drescher Ill. App. 415 NE. 2d 641 The law
emphasizes that it is the efforts of the parent to carry out
parental responsibilities, rather than their success, which
should be considered in determining the correctness of
a finding of unfitness.

The father Eugene J., petitioner pro se, again pleads with
the court to reconsider the order denying the petition for
leave to appeal as serious violations of due process and
equal protection have occurred in the Illinois judicial
system, there is a need for review of the finality of the
judgement of unfitness and best interest and there is also
conflict in jurisdictional interpretation of the
determination of unfitness statues. This being the
benchmark for progress of the 1* district versus 4"
district’s strict compliance to court directives and DCFS
service plans with Catholic Charities as their
representative agency.

Respectfully submitted,

petitioner

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386014_2325%3A5. Public record. Not legal advice.