# Appendix — Adler v. Duval County School Board

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386014_2315%3A2

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 2001
- **Citation:** 534 U.S. 1065

## Text

FILED
O01 287 auc - 8 2003
No. :
IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

EMILY ADLER, et al.,
Petitioners,
vs.
DUVAL COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, et al.,

Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

APPENDIX TO
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
(VOLUME I)

Wm. J. Sheppard, Esquire Alan B. Morrison, Esquire
COUNSEL OF RECORD ss Public Citizen Litigation Group
D. Gray Thomas, Esquire 1600 20" Street, N.W.

Sheppard, White and Washington, D.C. 20009
Thomas, P.A. (202) 588-7720
215 Washington Street

Jacksonville, Florida 32202
(904) 356-9661

COUNSEL FOR PETITIONERS

August 8, 2001

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
En Banc Opinion of the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals, dated
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En Banc Opinion of the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals, dated
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[PUBLISH]

FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
MAY 11, 2001
THOMAS K. KAHN

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

NO. 98-2709

D.C. Docket No. 98-00460-CIV-J-10C

EMILY ADLER, individually; on behalf

of herself and all persons similarly situated,
SETH FINCK, individually; on behalf of
himself and all persons similarly situated, et al.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

versus

DUVAL COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD,
DUVAL COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 98-2720

la

D.C. Docket No. 98-00460-CIV-J-IOC

EMILY ADLER, individually; on behalf of
herself and all persons similarly situated,

SETH FINCK, individually; on behalf of
himself and all persons similarly situated, et al.,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,
versus

SUSAN BOLES, as parent & next friend of
Rebecca Boles, a minor child and on behalf

of all public school students within the Duval
County Public School District, .

Movants-Appellants.

Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida

(May 11, 2001)

Before ANDERSON, Chief Judge, TJIOFLAT,
EDMONDSON, BIRCH, DUBINA, CARNES, BARKETT,
HULL, MARCUS, WILSON, KRAVITCH and COX",
Circuit Judges.**

MARCUS, Circuit Judge:

*Circuit Judges Kravitch and Cox elected to participate in
this decision, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 46(c).
**Circuit Judge Susan H. Black did not participate in this

decision.

2a

On March 15, 2000, this Court ruled that Duval
County's facially-neutral policy permitting high school
seniors to vote upon the delivery by a student of a message
entirely of that student's choosing as part of graduation
ceremonies did not violate the Establishment Clause. Adler
v. Duval County Sch, Bd., 206 F.3d 1070 (11th Cir.) (en
banc), pet. for cert. granted and judgment vacated, 121 S. Ct.
31 (2000). Plaintiffs thereafter petitioned the Supreme Court
for certiorari. Meanwhile, on June 19, 2000, the Supreme
Court rendered its decision in Santa Fe Independent School
District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 120 S.Ct. 2266 (2000),which
invalidated a Texas school board's policy permitting

students to vote upon the delivery of a "statement or
invocation," subject to officials' approval, at each home high
school football game. On October 2, 2000, the Court vacated
our decision* and remanded it for further consideration in
light of Santa Fe. The case was returned to us on December
19, 2000, and we proceeded to rehear the case en banc.

Having carefully reviewed the Supreme Court's
opinion, and considered supplemental briefs from the
parties and amici, we conclude that Santa Fe does not alter
our previous en banc decision, and accordingly we reinstate
that decision and the judgment in favor of Duval County.
Nevertheless, we take this opportunity to explain why we
believe that Santa Fe does not alter the outcome of this case.
Simply pvt, after (as before) Santa Fe, it is impossible to say
that the Duval County policy on its face violates the
Establishment Clause without effectively banning all
religious speech at school graduations, no matter how

3a

private the message or how divorced the content of the

message may be from any state review, let alone censorship.

Santa Fe does not go that far, and we are not prepared to
take such a step.

—_

At the outset, it is helpful to summarize briefly the facts
and analysis of our prior en banc opinion. The Duval
County policy provides in relevant part:

a 8 The use of a brief opening and/or
closing message, not to exceed two minutes, at
high school graduation exercises shall rest within
the discretion of the graduating senior class;

y The opening and/or closing
message shall be given by a student volunteer, in
the graduating senior class, chosen by the
graduating senior class as a whole;

a If the graduating senior class
chooses to use an opening and/or closing message,
the content of that message shall be prepared by
the student volunteer and shall not be monitored
or otherwise reviewed by Duval County School
Board, its officers or employees;

4a

The purpose of these guidelines is to allow
students to direct their own graduation message

without monitorin g or review by school officials."

206 F.3d at 1072 (emphasis added). We defined the issue
then before us as “whether the Duval County school
system's policy of permitting a graduating student, elected
by her class, to deliver an unrestricted message of her choice
at the beginning and/or closing of graduation ceremonies is
facially violative of the Establishment Clause." Id. at 1073.
Analyzing this policy under the Supreme Court's opinions
in Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) and Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), we concluded that the policy
did not violate the Establishment Clause on its face.

Although we offered multiple reasons for that decision,
our Lee analysis turned on several key facts. First, we
emphasized that under Duval County's policy school
officials have no power to direct that a message (let alone a
religious message) be delivered at graduation ceremonies,
or control in any way the content of any message actually to
be delivered. As we explained:

"We expressly declined to consider at that time any as-applied
objection to the policy's constitutionality. 206 F.3d at 1073 n.4 (“We do not
address any potential ‘as-applied’ claims raised below by Appellants.’).
Accordingly, we did not consider Appellants’ objections regarding the
policy's alleged application after 1993. Nothing in Santa Fe in any way
affects that decision or supports consideration of Appellants’ as-applied
challenges now.

5a

[U]nder the Duval County graduation
policy ... neither the School Board nor its principals
may ordain, direct, establish, or endorse a religious
prayer or message of any kind. Indeed, by the very
terms of the policy, a religious message may not
even be offered at graduation. The Duval County
policy explicitly divorces school officials from the
decision-making process as to whether any
message -- be it religious or not -- may be delivered
at graduation at all. Moreover, decisional control
over the most crucial elements 0@ - tie graduation
policy rests with the students and not the state....
Under the policy, the School Board and its agents
have no control over who will draft the message (if
there be any message at all) or what its content
may be. The School Board also does not suggest in
any way, let alone require, that the graduating
class consider religious or any other criteria in
deciding whether to have a student message or in
selecting a particular student speaker. And most
notably, if the graduating class chooses to have a
message, the content of the message shall be
prepared by the student speaker alone and no one
else. The Duval County School Board is expressly
prohibited by the very terms of its policy from
influencing or editing the message in any way.
[The] decision [as to content] rests solely with the
elected student speaker - with neither the senior
class nor the school exercising any sort of editorial
oversight. Therefore, on the face of the policy itself,
the students unambiguously understand that any
student message is utterly divorced from any state
sponsorship.

206 F.3d at 1076.

6a

Second, we rejected the argument that the state's role in
providing a vehicle for a graduation message by itself
transformed the student's private speech into state-
sponsored speech. We accepted the assumption that the
school board "exerted overwhelming control over the
graduation ceremony," but stressed that the board "did not
have control over the elements which are most crucial in the
Establishment Clause calculus: the selection of the
messenger, the content of the message, or most basically,
the decision whether or not there would be a message in the
first place." Id. at 1080.

We likewise rejected the argument that Duval County's
policy would have the impermissible effect of coercing
unwilling listeners to participate in a state sponsored
religious exercise. As we explained:

[N]either the Duval County schools nor the
graduating senior classes even decide if a religious
prayer or message will be delivered, let alone
"require" or "coerce" the student audience to
participate in any privately-crafted message.
While schools may make private religious speech
their own by endorsing it, schools do not endorse
all speech that they do not censor. We cannot
assume ... that Duval County seniors will interpret
the school's failure to censor a private student
message for religious content as an endorsement of
that message -— particularly where the students are
expressly informed as part of the election process

7a

Te

that they may select a speaker who alone will craft
any message.... No religious result is preordained.

Id. at 1084.

-

Citing these and other facts, we found as well that the
policy met all three prongs of the Lemon test. We
concluded that the policy had a secular purpose, including
"affording graduating students an opportunity to direct
their own graduation ceremony," and "permitting student
freedom of expression." Id. at 1085. We also noted that the
text of the policy did not reveal a religious purpose, and
that the limited pieces of background evidence highlighted
for the contention that the policy's secular purpose was a
sham could not "strip the policy of [its] secular purpose. No
matter what an individual board member may have hoped -
- and they said nothing on the record about codifying this
policy -- Duval County's policy is facially neutral and
undeniably evinces a secular purpose." Id. at 1089. We
closed our prior en banc opinion by defining our holding
narrowly, stating that Duval County's policy of "permitting
graduating students to decide through a vote whether to
have an unrestricted student graduation message at the
beginning and/or closing of graduation ceremonies does
not facially violate the Establishment Clause." Id. at 1091
(emphasis added).

II.

Three months after we issued our prior en banc
opinion, the Supreme Court decided Santa Fe. By a 6-3

8a

vote, the Court found that a school district policy permitting
students to vote upon the delivery by a student of a
‘statement or invocation" prior to high school football
games violated the Establishment Clause. Because the facts
of Santa Fe are fundamentally different in many crucial
respects from the facts of this case, they are worth
presenting in some detail.

For a period of time leading up to and including the
1992-93 and 1993-94 school years, the Santa Fe school
district allowed students to read overtly Christian prayers
from the stage at graduation ceremonies and over the public
address system at home football games. The prayers were
characterized as "invocations" or "benedictions" for these
events, and typically were given by officers of the student
council. Similar prayers were recited by the student council
"chaplain" prior to the start of football games.

In 1994, responding to the Supreme Court's decision in
Lee. the district drafted a written policy that prohibited
clerics from delivering invocations or benedictions at
graduation ceremonies, but otherwise did not prohibit
prayer at school functions. After graduation ceremonies
that year, the district amended its written policy to say that
a school "may permit the graduating senior class(es), with
the advice and counsel of the senior class sponsor, to elect to
choose student volunteers to deliver nonsectarian, non-
proselytizing invocations and benedictions for the purpose
of solemnizing their graduation ceremonies." The same
policy was adopted for football games.

9a

In April 1995, several students and parents filed suit in
federal court, in part to prevent the district from violating
the Establishment Clause at imminent graduation exercises.
In their complaint the plaintiffs alleged that the district
engaged in other proselytizing practices, such as promoting
attendance at a Baptist revival meeting, encouraging
membership in religious clubs, chastising children who held
minority religious beliefs, and distributing Gideon Bibles on
school premises. Santa Fe, 120 S. Ct. at 2271-72.

In response to a court order, Santa Fe again revised its
policies dealing with prayer at school functions. Policies
enacted in May and July 1995 for graduation ceremonies
provided the format for the District's August 1995 policy
regarding high school football games. That August policy
authorized two student elections, the first to determine
whether an "invocation" should be delivered, and the
second to select the spokesperson to deliver it. On August
31, 1995, according to the parties' stipulation, "the district's
high school students voted to determine whether a student
would deliver prayer at varsity football games .... The
students chose to allow a student to say a prayer at football
games." A week later, in a separate election, they selected a
student ... to deliver the prayer at varsity football games."
Id. at 2273 (emphasis added).

Subsequently, in October 1995, the school district
slightly modified the August policy. The October version of
the policy was (in the Supreme Court's words) "essentially
the same as the August policy, though it omits the word

10a

Baits toon 2

Prayer' from its title, and refers to 'messages' and
‘statements' as well as 'invocations."" Id. The October policy
provided in relevant part:

The board has chosen to permit students to
deliver a brief invocation and/or message to be
delivered during the pre-game ceremonies of home
varsity football games to solemnize the event, to
promote good sportsmanship and student safety,
and to establish the appropriate environment for
the competition.

Upon advice and direction of the high
school principal, each spring, the high school
student council shall conduct an election, by the
high school student body, by secret ballot, to
determine whether such a statement or invocation
will be a part of the pre-game ceremonies and if so,
shall elect a student from a list of student
volunteers, to deliver the statement or invocation.
The student volunteer who is selected by his or her
classmates may decide what message and/or
invocation to deliver, consistent with the goals and
purposes of this policy.

1205S. Ct. at 2273 n.6.
After the Fifth Circuit held that both the August and

October policies violated the Establishment Clause, the
Supreme Court granted the District's petition for certiorari,

lla

limited to the following question: "Whether petitioner's
policy permitting student-led, student-initiated prayer at
football games violates the Establishment Clause." Id. at
2275 (emphasis added). The Court did not propose to
address, and did not address in its ensuing opinion, the
district's graduation policies.

A majority of the Court found that the October policy
violated the Establishment Clause. The Court analyzed the
policy under the principle of Lee that “government may not
coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its
exercise, or otherwise act in a way which establishes a
[state] religion. . . . "" 120 S. Ct. at 2275 (quoting Lee, 505 U.S.
at 587). Initially, the Court determined that messages
delivered by students pursuant to the policy would
constitute state-sponsored speech rather than private
speech. The Court offered essentially four reasons for that
finding: (1) the student's speech would be authorized by a
government policy that explicitly and implicitly encouraged
one particular kind of message, see 120 S. Ct. at 2275, 2279;
(2) it would take place on school property at a school event,
see id. at 2275, 2278; (3) the government had broad power to
regulate the content of the student's speech, see id. at 2276-
77; and (4) the electoral system would yield only a single
speaker and would completely prevent dissenting
viewpoints from being heard, see id. at 2276-77.

Having found that student speech under the policy

was, and would be perceived as, state-sponsored, the Court
then found that the religious content of the “statement or

12a

invocation” permitted by the Santa Fe policy was
impermissibly coercive. The Court explained that "[t]he
electoral mechanism, when considered in light of the
history in which the policy in question evolved, reflects a
device the District put in place that determines whether
religious messages will be delivered at home football
games." Id. at 2280. The Court also reasoned that, even
though the case was brought as a facial challenge, it was
appropriate as part of the facial inquiry to consider the
purpose of the policy. Id. at 2282 (citing Lemon). The Court
stressed that "the text of the October policy alone reveals
that it has an unconstitutional purpose," and added that the
events leading up to the enactment of the October policy
further conveyed the school board's purpose to ensure a
place for prayer in school functions. Id. For these reasons,
the Court concluded that the Santa Fe's football game policy
was unconstitutional.

III.

In Santa Fe itself the Supreme Court reiterated just
how case-specific Establishment Clause analysis must be
under its precedent. As the Court explained:

Whether a government activity violates the
Establishment Clause is "in large part a legal
question to be answered on the basis of judicial
interpretation of social facts .... Every
government practice must be judged in its

t

unique circumstances....

13a

ee ees ee

120 S. Ct. at 2282 (citation omitted). We spoke similarly in
our prior en banc opinion:

Establishment Clause jurisprudence calls
for the difficult task of separating a student's
private message, which may be religious in
character, from a state-sponsored religious
message, protecting the former and prohibiting the
latter. This determination is of "necessity one of
line-drawing," see Lee, 505 U.S. at 598, "sometimes
quite fine, based on the particular facts of each
case," Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the
Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 847 (1995) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). Indeed, our courts have recognized
that "at graduation time and throughout the course
of the education process, there will be instances
when religious values, religious practices, and
religious persons will have some interaction with
the public schools and their students." See Lee, 505
U.S. at 598-99.

206 F.3d at 1074 (citations omitted).

The Court in Santa Fe did not attempt to sweep with a
broad brush; rather, it found based on the facts then before
it that Santa Fe's policy allowing students to elect a speaker
to give a "statement or invocation" of plainly religious bent,
at every single home football game, subject to content
review by school officials and potential state censorship of
non- or anti-religious messages, violated the Establishment
Clause. The facts of this case are fundamentally different,

14a

and in our view require exactly the same result today as
they did at the time of our prior opinion.

A.

Critical to the Supreme Court's conclusion was its
finding that the speech delivered by students pursuant to
the Santa Fe policy was state-sponsored rather than private.
In reaching that conclusion, the Court relied in substantial
part on two facts: (1) the speech was "subject to particular
regulations that confine the content and topic of the
student's message," Santa Fe, 120 S. Ct. at 2276; and (2) the
policy, "by its terms, invites and encourages religious
messages,’ id. at 2277 (emphasis added). Those two
dispositive facts are not present here, and that makes all the

difference.

First, the Duval County policy does not contain any
restriction on the identity of the student speaker or the
content of the message that might be delivered. Indeed,
school officials are affirmatively forbidden from reviewing
the content of the message, and are expressly denied the
opportunity to censor any non-religious or otherwise
disfavored views:

"If the graduating senior class chooses to use an
opening and/or closing message, the content of
that message shall be prepared by the student
volunteer and shall not be monitored or otherwise

reviewed by Duval County School Board, its

officers or employees. [] The purpose of these

15a

guidelines is to allow students to direct their own

graduation message without monitoring or review

by school officials.”

206 F.3d at 1072 (quoting policy) (emphasis added). This is
in sharp contrast to the Sante Fe policy, under which any
message was subject to content regulation by the state. The
Santa Fe policy dictated that the process of selecting a
speaker and delivering the message was subject to the ...
advice and direction of the high school principal." 120 S. Ct.
at 2273 n.6. As part of that process, school officials were
effectively authorized to review the message itself to ensure
that it was ... “consistent with the goals and purpose of
th[e] policy.’” Id. The policy therefore created virtually no
check on school officials' power to regulate the proposed
student message, giving almost unfettered discretion to
state officials acting under the guise of determining that the

message would be "appropriate."' Id.

The ability to regulate the content of speech is a
hallmark of state involvement, and the Supreme Court
returned repeatedly to that theme in Santa Fe. The Court
highlighted that "[t]he statement or invocation ... is subject
to particular regulations that confine the content and topic
of the student's message." Id. at 2276. The Court observed
that "Santa Fe’s student election system ensures that only
those messages deemed ‘appropriate’ under the District's
policy may be delivered." Id.; see also id. at 2279. And the
Court expressly characterized the Santa Fe policy as "not a
content-neutral regulation" because of its "content

l6a

restrictions." Id. at 2282; see also id. at 2277 (emphasizing
that "the policy mandates that the 'statement or invocation’
be 'consistent with the goals and purposes of this policy"
and that accordingly "the District has failed to divorce itself
from the religious content of the invocations"). The ability
of the state to regulate the content of the students' message
was a critical factor in the Court's reasoning, and is
indisputably not present in this case. Under the Duval
County policy, if the senior class elects to have a message,
the student elected to give that message is totally free and
autonomous to say whatever he or she desires, without
review or censorship by agents of the state or, for that
matter, the student body. No reasonable person attending a
graduation could view that wholly unregulated message as
one imposed by the state.

Second, unlike Santa Fe's policy, the Duval County
policy does not "by its terms, invite[] and encourage[]
religious messages." 120 S. Ct. at 2277. On the contrary, the
policy is entirely neutral regarding whether a message is to
be given, and if a message is to be given, the content of that
message. Although the Supreme Court did not limit its
analysis to the text of the Santa Fe policy, it placed heavy
emphasis on the text's express and unambiguous preference
for the delivery of religious messages.

The policy itself states that the purpose of the
message is "to solemnize the event." A religious
message is the most obvious method of
solemnizing an event. Moreover, the requirements

17a

that the message "promote good citizenship" and
"establish the appropriate environment for
competition" further narrow the types of message
deemed appropriate, suggesting that a solemn, yet
nonreligious, message, such as commentary on
United States foreign policy, would be prohibited.
Indeed, the only type of message that is expressly
endorsed in the text is an "invocation" -- a term that
primarily describes an appeal for divine assistance.
In fact, as used in the past at Santa Fe High School,
an "invocation" has always entailed a focused
religious message. Thus, the expressed purposes of
the policy encourage the selection of a religious

message.

Id. The fact that the text of the Santa Fe policy expressed a
clear preference for religious messages was a key factor in
the Court's determination that student speech delivered
pursuant to that policy would be viewed as state-sponsored.
Id. at 2278-79; compare also id. at 281 ("[N]Jothing in the
Constitution ... prohibits any public school student from
praying .... But the religious liberty protected by the
Constitution is abridged when the State affirmatively
sponsors the particular religious practice of prayer.")
(emphasis added). In this case, the text setting forth the
Duval County policy contains no language approving an
"invocation" and no other provision that could fairly be read

to require or approve a "religious" theme.

18a

an

These important facts demonstrate why Santa Fe is
distinguishable from this case, and more particularly why
the speech at issue here -- unlike the speech contemplated
by the Santa Fe policy -- cannot reasonably be described as
state-sponsored. These key facts also help illustrate why the
speech permitted by Duval County cannot reasonably be
described as state "coercion" of religion.

The linchpin of the Court's analysis on this issue was its
finding that Santa Fe's policy "subject[ed] the issue of prayer
to a majoritarian vote." 120 S. Ct. at 2281; see also id. at 2283
("Simply by establishing this school-related procedure,
which entrusts the inherently nongovernmental subject of
religion to a majoritarian vote, a constitutional violation has
occurred."). In essence, the Court found that the policy, by
specifically permitting students to vote upon an
"invocation" and authorizing school officials to ensure that
any message proposed by the chosen student was
"appropriate," made it virtually impossible for the election
to be anything other than a referendum on conducting
prayer. Indispensible to this analysis was the school
district's unambiguous concession that the vote authorized
by. the policy was indeed a vote up-or-down on prayer:

The Chief Justice contends that we have
“misconstrue[d] the nature ... [of] the policy as
being an election on 'prayer' and 'religion.” We
therefore reiterate that the District has stipulated to
the facts that the most recent election was held "to
determine whether a student would deliver prayer

19a

at varsity football games," that the "students chose

to allow a student to say a prayer at football
games," and that a second election was then held
"to determine which student would deliver the

prayer.”

120 S. Ct. at 2283 n.24 (citations omitted). There has been no
such critical concession in this case, and it cannot plausibly
be argued that, on its face, the Duval County policy calls for
a student vote on whether to mandate the inclusion of

prayer in a graduation ceremony.

The Duval County policy, unlike the Santa Fe policy,
does not subject the issue of prayer to an up-or-down vote;
students do not vote on whether prayer, or its equivalent,
should be included in graduation ceremonies. Rather,
students vote on two questions that do not expressly or
inherently concern prayer: (1) whether to permit a student
"message" during the ceremony, and (2) if so, which student
is to deliver the message. Santa Fe does not remotely state
or suggest that the term "message" connotes prayer, nor
could it plausibly give so narrow a meaning to so broad a
term. Instead, the Court repeatedly focused on the Santa Fe
policy's use of the additional term "invocation," and drew
from that term and the school district's concessions the
conclusion that Santa Fe's policy mandated a vote on
prayer. See id. at 2277. Similarly, there is no suggestion in
Santa Fe that the terms "opening" and "closing" as used in
Duval County's policy connote prayer. Indeed, those terms
did not even appear in Santa Fe's policy. Simply put,

20a

"[w]hatever majoritarian pressures are attendant to a
student-led prayer pursuant to a direct student plebiscite
on prayer are not facially presented by the Duval County
policy." 206 F.3d at 11083 (emphasis added).

Although it is possible that under Duval County's
policy the student body may select a speaker who then
chooses on his or her own to deliver a religious message,
that result is not preordained, and more to the point would
not reflect a “majority” vote to impose religion on unwilling
listeners. Rather, it would reflect the uncensored and
wholly unreviewable decision of a single student speaker.

It cannot seriously be argued that Duval County's policy
ensures that persons with minority" views will never
prevail in the student electoral process, whether we define
“minority" in this context as persons opposed to the delivery
of student-selected speech at graduation, persons opposed
to the delivery of religious messages generally, or persons
opposed to the delivery of a religious message that does not
coincide with their chosen faith. In fact, the limited record
before us proves just the opposite; in seven of the 17
instances reflected in the record, students voted for no
message at all or for a student speaker who subsequently
delivered an entirely secular message. 206 F.3d at 1083-84.
Yet in Santa Fe, the Court rested its holding in large part on
the assumption that "the majoritarian process implemented
by the district guarantees, by definition, that minority

2la

candidates will never prevail and that their views will be
effectively silenced." 120 S. Ct. at 2276 (emphasis added).

For all of these reasons, the private speech delivered by
a student pursuant to the Duval County policy does not
become state-sponsored as a matter of law simply by virtue
of the logic of Santa Fe.

Santa Fe also does not alter the analysis under the
three-part test of Lemon. Santa Fe only addresses one part

of the Lemon test: whether the policy at issue has a secular
purpose. 1205S. Ct. at 2282-83. The Court's treatment of this

*In his dissent, Judge Carnes asserts that "[t]he majority of the
senior class selects and endorses the message because the majority selects
the messenger." Infra at 44. But we think Judge Carnes's core assumption --
that the student speaker is nothing more than a puppet to give voice to the
student body majority's demands for prayer -- is deeply flawed. To begin
with, it ignores the express language of the policy, which does not allow
(indeed, forbids) any regulation of the content of the speech. Under Duval
County's policy, the student is free to give whatever message he chooses,
regardless of whether that message comports with the views on religion,
school prayer, or any other subject held by the majority that elected him.
Ignoring the language of the policy is particularly dangerous where, as here,
we are considering only a facial chalienge, in which the primary focus by
definition must be the text. Judge Carnes's reasoning also takes no account
of students’ ability -- and willingness -- to exercise the free and untrammeled
speech authorized by the policy. Graduating seniors are squarely on notice,
from the very language of the policy, that any speaker they may choose will
have complete autonomy over the message he eventually delivers at
graduation. Students recognize this fact when voting in favor of a message,
and the speaker himself recognizes that fact in choosing what kind of
message to deliver. The notion that "the content of the message is censored
in advance through the majority selection process," infra at 47, is as
pessimistic about the exercise of First Amendment freedoms as it is hostile
to the text of the policy.

issue, however, underscores the differences between the
Santa Fe policy and this policy. As discussed above, the text
setting forth the Duval County policy does not evince a
religious purpose. The text of the Santa Fe policy
unambiguously did precisely that, a fact upon which the
Court placed great emphasis. Id. at 2282 ("the text of the ...
policy alone reveals that it had an unconstitutional

purpose").

The Supreme Court's additional discussion of
circumstances surrounding enactment of the Santa Fe policy
is not inconsistent with our prior en banc opinion. We did
not decline to explore the background to the Duval County
policy. On the contrary, we did so at considerable length,
concluding that "whether standing alone or in concert, the
evidence marshaled by the Appellants to allege that the
policy's secular purpose was a sham "cannot strip the policy
of a secular purpose." 206 F.3d at 1089; see generally id. at
1086-89. More to the point, we found specifically that the
limited record before us did not permit us "to fairly infer the
motivation of those who promulgated or distributed the
policy." Id. at 1086. Obviously, nothing in Santa Fe resolves
that inescapable threshold problem.’

*Much of Judge Kravitch's dissent is devoted not to considering
Santa Fe, but rather to disputing this Court's conclusion in its prior en banc
opinion that the Duval County policy has a secular purpose. As we have
emphasized, nothing in Santa Fe in any way affects our earlier findings on
that issue, which were based on the unique record of this case. Of the
dissent's remaining objections, only two points need be noted separately.
First, contrary to the dissent's suggestion, our prior opinion did not turn on
an assumption that the school district created a public forum at graduation.

23a

Moreover, the circumstances at issue in Santa Fe were
vastly different in several important respects. Among other
distinctions, the final version of the Santa Fe policy was
found to be nothing more than the product of repeated
efforts by the school district to inject prayer and other
religious activities into school events even after Lee. v.
Weisman. See 120 S. Ct. at 2272-73; see also id. at 2279
(describing Santa Fe's policy as nothing more than a direct
"evolution ... from the long-sanctioned office of 'Student
Chaplain"). In addition, in Santa Fe, school officials stated
unabashedly that the policy was designed to permit a
student vote for prayer at graduation. Quite simply, Santa
Fe does not undermine our finding that Duval County's
policy, on this record in this facial challenge, has a secular
purpose.

B.

For the reasons we have discussed, the facts of Santa Fe
are not so similar to the facts of this case as to require us to
alter our prior decision. On the contrary, the differences

We simply observed in passing that "[i]n one sense" such an analogy could
be drawn. 206 F.3d at 1077. Second, contrary to the dissent's suggestion, we
plainly did not reject the Appellants' facial challenge because it was
premature. Instead, we expressly rejected that challenge on the merits. See
id. at 1090-91. Finally, we observe that the dissent does not answer our
discussion of the two critical distinctions between this case and Santa Fe (the
absence here of content regulation and a policy that by its ten-ns invites
religious messages). Aithough we certainly agree that those facts were not
the only ones considered by the Court in Santa Fe, they were absolutely
essential to the Court's decision, and simply are not present in this case.

24a

nee ee ee

between this case and Santa Fe are substantial and material.
The only basis for us to alter our prior decision, therefore,
would be if the Supreme Court had promulgated new rules
of law that we failed to apply in our prior decision. The
Court did no such thing, however. The analysis in Santa Fe
proceeded under the very same framework of Lee and
Lemon that we applied in our prior decision.

The Supreme Court did not rule that an election process
itself is always incompatible with the Establishment Clause.
Nor did it rule that a student elected to speak to the student
body is necessarily a state-sponsored speaker. Rather, the
Court stressed that it was not invalidating all student
elections, but merely concluding on the facts before it "that
the resulting religious message under this policy would be
attributable to the school, not just the student." Id. at 2283
Bo

Second, the Court did not rule that, simply because the
speech at issue is "authorized by a government policy and

*'The Court did remark that "student elections that determine, by
majority vote, which expressive activities shall receive or not receive school
benefits are constitutionally problematic." 120 S. Ct. at 2276 (citing Board of
Regents of Univ. of Wis. Svs.. v. Southworth, 120 S. Ct. 1346 (2000)). As
noted above, however, the Duval County policy does not mandate a student
election to determine by majority vote whether school facilities should be
used to disseminate a religious message at graduation. The "expressive
activities" as to which students vote -- whether to permit a student to deliver
a message (totally unreviewable and uncensored by the state) at graduation,
and who if anyone may deliver the message of his or her choosing -- are
neutral.

25a

took place on government property at a government-
sponsored, school-related event" it always constitutes state-
sponsored speech. On the contrary, the Court expressly
acknowledged that "not every message delivered under
such circumstances is the government's own." Santa Fe, 120
S. Ct. at 2275. What turns private speech into state speech in
this context is, above all, the additional element of state
control over the content of the message. Id. at 2275-76. But
it is the element of potential censorship, and the attendant
risk recognized by Santa Fe that non-religious messages (or
messages hostile to religion) will be suppressed, that is
conspicuously absent from the record of this case. Notably,
in our prior en banc opinion, we explained how affording
students the opportunity to vote on whether or not to have
a message that would be entirely of the student's choosing
bore no more the imprimatur of the state than the process of
selecting a homecoming queen. 206 F.3d at 1082. Presented
with a similar "prom queen" argument by the dissenters in
Santa Fe, the Court gave as its only distinction “[t]he fact
that the District's policy provides for the election of the
speaker only after the majority has voted on her message....”
120 S. Ct. at 2276 n. 15. That distinction plainly does not
exist in this case.

Third, our prior en banc opinion fully considered the
purpose of the Duval County policy. Accordingly, the
opinion is consistent with the Supreme Court's observation
that "[o]ur Establishment Clause cases involving facial
challenges ... have not focused solely on the possible
applications of the statute, but rather have considered

26a

whether the statute has an unconstitutional purpose." Id. at
2281.°

Finally, our conclusion that the purpose of Duval
County's policy is secular did not turn entirely or even
largely on our finding that one of the purposes of the policy
is to "allow students to solemnize graduation." 206 F.3d at
1085. As noted above, we identified three genuine secular
purposes driving the policy; permitting solemnization of
this seminal education experience is only one of those
purposes. In any event, the Court's own words demonstrate

*'In our prior en banc opinion we observed that "[a] facial challenge
to be successful 'must establish that no set of circumstances exists under
which the Act would be valid." 206 F.3d at 1083-84 (quoting United States
v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)). We did not decide the appeal on that
basis, however, and made that observation in connection with explaining
why one of Appellants' arguments ona subject other than the purpose of the
statute was more suited to an as-applied challenge. 206 F.3d at 1083
("Appellants also assume that allowing the senior class to vote whether to
have a graduation ‘message’ unrestricted in content and to select an
autonomous student speaker will have the effect of coercing any chosen
speaker into placating the majority's religious sensibilities by offering a
sectarian message of which the majority approves. This argument is highly
remote and speculative [and also] would be far better suited to anas-applied
challenge . . . ."). Moreover, the Court did not hold that government action
violates the Establishment Clause simply by virtue of the fact that it has a
non-secular purpose along with one or more secular purposes. On the
contrary, the Court reiterated that under the Lemon standard, a court must
invalidate a statute only if it lacks ... a secular legislative purpose. "1205S.
Ct. at 2282 (quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612) (emphasis added). The Court
viewed the Santa Fe policy as having a single, wholly religious purpose and
no secular purpose. See, e.g., 120S. Ct. at 2282. By contrast, in this case the
plaintiffs did not establish — and we did not find -- a sectarian purpose.
Rather, we have found, after painstaking review of the entire record, that the
policy had genuinely secular purposes.

27a

that it was not purporting to declare that the desire to ae
solemnize so important and isolated an educational event as

a graduation ceremony is never a secular purpose. On the

contrary, the Court merely said that "regardless of whether

one considers a sporting event an appropriate occasion for
solemnity, the use of an invocation to foster such solemnity

is impermissible wh¢n, in actuality, it constitutes prayer

sponsored by the school." 120 S. Ct. at 2279. As discussed

above, the Duval County policy does not call for an

"invocation," and does not on its face sponsor prayer.

The issue before us today is extremely narrow: whether
in light of Santa Fe we should alter our prior en banc
decision in this case. We conclude that the answer is no.
Indeed, by its reasoning Santa Fe reinforces the crucial point
that "[t]he total absence of state involvement in deciding
whether there will be a graduation message, who will
speak, or what the speaker may say combined with the
student speaker's complete autonomy over the content of
the message [means] that the message delivered, be it
secular or sectarian or both, is not state-sponsored." 206 F.3d
at 1071.

The Court in Santa Fe had every opportunity to declare
that all religious expression permitted at a public school
graduation ceremony violates the Establishment Clause; it
did not do so. We could not invalidate Duval County's
policy, on its face, without taking the very step the Court
declined to take. Santa Fe does not alter our prior en banc
decision, nor does it erase the critical facts -- the complete

28a

—_—— er

absence in the text of code words such as "invocation"
unequivocally connoting religion, the policy's outright
prohibition on state content review of non -or -anti-religious
messages, the lack of any evidence (let alone stipulation as
in Santa Fe) that students must vote up-or-down on prayer,
and the sparseness of the record, to name a few -- that
underlay our opinion. Accordingly, we reinstate our
original en banc decision and judgment in favor of the
County.°

OPINION AND JUDGMENT REINSTATED.

*The Movants-’Intervenors’ “ motion to clarify intervention status”
is denied.

29a

KRAVITCH, Circuit Judge, dissenting, in which
ANDERSON, Chief Judge, CARNES and BARKETT, Circuit

Judges, join:

When the Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case
and vacated this Court's en banc decision, it directed us to
address the single issue whether the Duval County policy
on graduation messages survives Establishment Clause
scrutiny in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Santa Fe
Indep . Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000). See Adler v.
Duval County Sch. Bd., 121 S. Ct. 31 (2000). As a lower
court, we are bound to follow rulings of the Supreme Court;
thus our sole task today is to reevaluate the Duval policy in
accordance with the legal principles enumerated in Santa
Fe. A review of the Santa Fe decision and the record in this
case convinces me that the Duval County policy is facially
unconstitutional. Therefore, I respectfully dissent from the
majority opinion reinstating this court's prior en banc

decision.

In Santa Fe, the Supreme Court held that a school
district policy permitting the student body to select by
majority vote a student to deliver a “statement or
invocation” prior to high school football games facially
violates the Establishment Clause. 530 U.S. at 317. It further
decided several corollary issues pertinent to our analysis
here. First, the Court noted that the school district did not
create a public forum by allowing a single student to deliver
a statement or invocation prior to football games. Id. at 303
(stating that “selective access does not transform

30a

government property into a public forum”) (quoting Perry
Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n. 460 U.S. 37, 47
(1983)). This conclusion belies the assertion in this Court's
prior en banc opinion that "[iJn one sense, the [Duval]
policy can be analogized to a line of open forum cases in
which the Supreme Court has held that neutral secular
policies that merely accommodate religion or individual
free exercise rights do not amount to an unconstitutional

state endorsement of religion." See Adler v. Duval County
Sch. Bd., 206 F.3d 1070, 1077 (11" Cir. 2000) (en banc).

Second, the Court in Santa Fe flatly rejected the school
district's argument that a facial challenge to the validity of
the District's policy is premature until a student actually
delivers a solemnizing message under the policy. See 530
U.S. at 313-14 (explaining that even if a student never
delivers a prayer pursuant to the District's policy, a
constitutional violation occurs by "the mere passage ... of a
policy that has the purpose and perception of governmental
establishment of religion"). The Supreme Court's decision
on this issue negates the proposition in this court's prior en
banc opinion that because the Duval policy does not by its
terms guarantee that a prayer will be delivered at every
graduation, a facial challenge to the policy is premature.
See Adler, 206 F.3d at 1083-84. Despite the majority's
position, the Supreme Court makes clear in Santa Fe that
facial Establishment Clause challenges must not focus
"solely on the possible applications of the statute, but rather
[on] whether the statute has an unconstitutional purpose.”
Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 314 (emphasis added). This Court's

3la

nN ge a ee ee

prior en banc opinion states that "[a] facial challenge to be
successful 'must establish that no set of circumstances exists
under which the Act would be valid." Adler, 206 F.3d at
1083-84 (emphasis in original; citation omitted). What the
opinion overlooks is that, under Santa Fe, if the Duval

policy has an unconstitutional purpose, then there is no set
of circumstances under which the policy would be valid,
notwithstanding that some of the graduation messages
delivered pursuant to the policy might be totally devoid of
religious content. See 530 U.S. at 314.

Finally, the Santa Fe Court explicitly determined that
the election mechanism in the District's policy did not
render the policy immune to constitutional scrutiny. See
530 U.S. at 304-05 ("[S]tudent elections that determine, by
majority vote, which expressive activities shall receive or
not receive school benefits are constitutionally
problematic... ‘[F]}undamental rights may not be submitted
to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections."
(citation omitted). The Supreme Court's decision on this
issue renders untenable the majority's position that the
Duval policy survives constitutional scrutiny because the
school board "did not have control over the elements which
are most crucial in the Establishment Clause calculus: the
selection of the messenger, the content of the message, or
most basically, the decision whether or not there would be a
message in the first place." Adler, 206 F.3d at 1080. The
majority's reasoning ignores the fact that Duval's
"majoritarian election might ensure that most of the students
are represented, [but] does nothing to protect the minority."

32a

CO

See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 305. Indeed, the very mechanism
that the majority of this Court claims removes any
impermissible coercion from the Duval policy serves to
silence students espousing minority views, and forces them
to participate in a state-sponsored exercise in which the
message is determined by students holding majority views.
The First Amendment does not permit such coercion. See
id. at 317 ("Simply by establishing this school-related
procedure, which entrusts the inherently nongovernmental
subject of religion to a majority vote, a constitutional
violation has occurred.").

Although the policy at issue in Santa Fe and the Duval
policy are not identical, their few distinctions are without
significant differences, such that the Supreme Court's
opinion in Santa Fe compels the conclusion that the Duval
policy also facially violates the Establishment Clause. A
minor distinction between the Santa Fe policy and the
Duval policy is that the Santa Fe policy dealt with football
games, whereas the Duval policy deals with graduation.
This distinction is insignificant because the Supreme Court
in Santa Fe implied that graduation prayers are more
offensive to the Establishment Clause than are football
game prayers because "we may assume that ... the informal
pressure to attend an athletic event is not as strong as a
senior's desire to attend her own graduation ceremony." Id.
at 311. A second distinction is that the Santa Fe policy
allowed students to vote whether to have a "statement or
invocation," whereas the Duval policy allows students to
vote whether to have a "message." This too is a distinction

33a

— —i—s

—

without a difference. Although a "message" is a more
general type of address than an "invocation," the mere use
of the less specific word "message" in its text will not shield
Duval County's policy from Establishment Clause scrutiny,
because such scrutiny must include an examination of the
policy's purpose, history, and the context in which it was
adopted to determine whether the policy has a permissible
secular purpose or an impermissible religious one. See id.
at 308 ("When a governmental entity professes a secular
purpose for an arguably religious policy, it is nonetheless
the duty of the courts to 'distinguis[h] a sham purpose from
a sincere one.’”) (citation omitted). "It is therefore proper, as
part of this facial challenge, for us to examine the purpose of
the [Duval] policy.... We [must] refuse to turn a blind eye to
the context in which this policy arose, and that context
quells any doubt that this policy was implemented with the
purpose of endorsing school prayer." Id. at 314-15.

The majority, by extracting the core policy from the
remaining text of the memorandum promulgating the
policy (the "Policy Memo"), ignores the mandate of the

"The Policy Memo was entitled "GRADUATION PRAYERS" and
stated:

"You will recall that after the 1992 Supreme court case of Lee v. Weisman
[sic], you received a memorandum from me instructing that because of the
decision, we would no longer be able to have prayers at graduation
ceremonies. Most of you have recently been bombarded with information,
as have I, regarding whether or not student initiated and led prayers are
acceptable based upon a recent Fifth Circuit opinion. The purpose of this
memorandum is to give you some guidelines on this issue if the graduating
students at your school desire to have some type of brief opening and/or

34a

Supreme Court that an evaluation of the purpose of a policy
like Santa Fe's or Duval's is not complete without an
examination of the context in which the policy was enacted.
See id. at 308 ("The text and history of this policy, moreover,
reinforce [the] objective student's perception that ... prayer
is, in actuality, encouraged by the school."). By considering
only the terms of the policy itself, the majority fails to
address contextual evidence that evinces an impermissible
religious purpose.

closing message by a student.

This area of the law is far from clear at this time, and we have been
threatened by lawsuits from both sides on the issue depending on what
action we take. The key to the Lee v. Wiseman [sic] decision was that the
prayer given at that graduation ceremony was directed and initiated by the
school system, which made it unconstitutional, rather than by permissive
student choice and initiative. With that premise in mind, the following
guidelines may be of some assistance:

1. The use of a brief opening and/or closing message, not to exceed two
minutes, at high school graduation exercises shall rest within the discretion
of the graduating senior class;

2. The opening and/or closing message shall be given by a student
volunteer, in the graduating senior class, chosen by the graduating senior
class as a whole;

3. If the graduating senior class chooses to use an opening and/or closing
message, the content of that message shall be prepare d by the student
volunteer and shall not be monitored or otherwise reviewed by Duval
County School Board [sic], its officers or employees;

The purpose of these guidelines is to allow students to direct their own
graduation message without monitoring or review by school officials."

cin 35a

First, the Policy Memo is entitled "GRADUATION
PRAYERS," Although a statute's title cannot limit or extend
the statute's plain meaning, tities are "tools available for the
resolution of a doubt." Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen v.
Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 529 (1947). Here, we are
charged with resolving the issue whether the purpose of a
school policy allowing student messages" at graduation is to
endorse prayer at graduation. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602, 612 (stating that in order to survive Establishment ie:
Clause scrutiny, a challenged provision must inter alia.
"have a secular legislative purpose"). It is proper, therefore,
for us to look to the Policy Memo's title in order to resolve
any doubts we may have that the policy has a secular
purpose. A policy with the word "prayer" in its title is more
likely to have a religious purpose than a policy not similarly
styled.

policy is intended as an "end run" around the law against
state-sponsored graduation prayers set forth in Lee v.
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992). The Policy Memo begins by
stating that after Lee, the policy's author circulated a memo
instructing that "we would no longer be able to have
prayers at graduation ceremonies." The Policy Memo then
presents the new issue "whether or not student initiated and

|
Second, the text of the Policy Memo indicates that the

Interestingly, the policy that the Supreme Court struck
down in Santa Fe did not contain the word "prayer," although
earlier versions of the Santa Fe policy were entitled "Prayer at
Football Games."

36a

”
¥
x
of
»

led prayers are acceptable" (second emphasis added), and
states that "[t]he purpose of this memorandum is to give
you some guidelines on this issue . . ." (emphasis added).
The words "on this issue" can only mean prayer. This
preamble to the Duval policy thus makes clear that the
policy's purpose is to create a vehicle for the delivery of
student-initiated-as contrasted with school-initiated-prayers
at graduation. Indeed, the second paragraph of the policy's
preamble states that the "key" to the Lee decision "was that
the prayer given at that graduation ceremony was directed
and initiated by the school system, which made it
unconstitutional, rather than by .permissive student choice
and initiative" (emphasis added). The Policy Memo then 36
sets forth the Duval policy "with that premise in mind,"
which indicates that the policy's purpose is to endorse
student-initiated rather than school-initiated prayers at
graduation, not merely to allow students to deliver a

generic message.

The Duval policy's purpose of endorsing student-
initiated prayer at graduation is evidenced further by the
discussion among school board members during the
meeting in which the board rejected a proposal to institute a
“moment of silent meditation" at graduation in lieu of the
policy allowing student "messages." The transcript of that
meeting, which contains seventeen instances of the words
“prayer,” “pray,” or “prayed,” conveys the context in which
the Duval policy implicitly was adopted, and shows that the
board adopted the policy in an effort to make prayer a part

37a

of graduation.’ Finally, the very terms of the Duval policy
belie any purpose other than that of increasing the
probability that graduation ceremonies will include prayer:
the student "messages" are to be delivered at the beginning
or end of the ceremony (a time typically reserved for
prayers), and are to be no longer than two minutes (a
duration consistent with a prayer).

Because the record reflects that the purpose of the
Duval policy is to endorse prayer at graduation ceremonies,
and because the scheme allowing the student majority to
decide whether to include prayer does not cure the problem
of the policy's impermissible, religious purpose, in my view
the Duval policy fails to comply with the Supreme Court's
directive in Santa Fe and thus facially violates the
Establishment Clause. The majority attempts to escape this
conclusion by emphasizing the fact that under the Santa Fe
policy, the student election was to be conducted "[u]pon the
advice and direction of the high school principal," and the
student speaker's message was required to be "consistent
with the goals and purposes of this policy," whereas the
Duval policy placed no restrictions on the election, and
stated that the student's message "shall not be monitored or
otherwise reviewed by Duval County School Board, its
officers or employees." These distinctions do not save the

For example, one board member remarked that ‘in good
conscience I cannot vote [in favor of] silent meditation when we all know
that in the past someone has prayed out loud to thank the Lord......

“

38a

Duval policy, however, because it was enacted for the
impermissible purpose of increasing the probability that a
prayer will be delivered at graduation, and because the
majoritarian procedure for selecting a speaker ensures that
minority viewpoints will be silenced, and that those
possessing such viewpoints will be forced to participate in
the majority's "message." The majority opinion concludes
that there is no Establishment Clause violation in this case
because, according to the majority, the Santa Fe Court relied
mainly on two facts, which are not present here, in reaching
its result: "(1) the speech [in Santa Fe] was ‘subject to
particular regulations that confine the content and topic of
the student's message,’ and (2) the policy, ‘by its terms,
invites and encourages religious messages."’ (citations
omitted). It was not solely the existence of two facts,
however, but rather a contextual analysis of the District's
entire policy, including its history and purpose, that
persuaded the Santa Fe Court that the policy impermissibly
coerced students to participate in a religious exercise chosen
by the majority of the graduating class.

Finally, the majority opinion makes the overbroad
assertion that "it is impossible to say that the Duval County
policy on its face violates the Establishment Clause without
effectively banning all religious speech at school
graduations, no matter how private the message or how
divorced the content of the message may be from any state
review." This simply is not true. The Supreme Court
emphasized in Santa Fe that "nothing in the Constitution as
interpreted by this Court prohibits any public school

39a

vy bse

ao ee ee a re aeKe

student from voluntarily praying at any time." 530 U.S. at
313; see also Adler, 206 F.3d at 1106 n.32 (Kravitch, J.,
dissenting) ("Nothing in this dissent suggests that all
religious expression at a public high school graduation
would run afoul of the Establishment Clause.... Audience
members could pray quietly in their seats., and students
could organize a prayer service immediately before or after
the graduation ceremony."). Prayer at graduation does not
by itself violate the First Amendment. If, however, "the
‘degree of school involvement! makes it clear that the
[graduation] prayers bear 'the imprint of the state," then a
constitutional violation has occurred. See Santa Fe, 530 U.S.
at 305 (quoting Lee, 505 U.S. at 590). A policy aimed at
encouraging the delivery of a majority-selected prayer via
the school's public address system at a "regularly scheduled,
school-sponsored function conducted on school property,”
530 U.S. at 307, does not merely facilitate the free exercise of
religion; it promotes the establishment of the majority's
religion,’ and thus violates the Constitution. Therefore,

respectfully | dissent.

‘4Because at graduation the majority-elected student delivers her
message at a preordained point in a program planned by school officials
who determine the piace, time, attire, and all other aspects of the ceremony,
“members of the listening audience must perceive the [student's] message

as a public expression of the views of the majority of the student body
delivered with the approval ofthe schoo! administrations See Santa Fe, 530

US. at 308. = _—

40a

CARNES, Circuit Judge, dissenting, in which ANDERSON,
Chief Judge, and BARKETT, Circuit Judge, join:

I join Judge Kravitch's dissenting opinion in its entirety
and write separately to add a few points of my own.

When this case was last before us, I joined the majority
opinion in large part because it reasoned, | thought
correctly, that "[a] facial challenge to be successful ‘must
establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the
Act would be valid," Adler v. Duval County School Bd., 206
F.3d 1070,1083 - 84 (I 11, Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quoting
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095
(1987), and I was not convinced that had been established
insofar as the Duval County policy is concerned. But the
Supreme Court has now unequivocally held that principle
of facial challenge law does not apply in the Establishment
Clause area. Santa Fe Indep. School Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S.
290, 313-17, 120 S.Ct. 2266, 2281-2283 (2000). Since that prop
has been knocked out from under our reasoning, and in
light of the additional guidance the Santa Fe decision has
given us, I am persuaded that the conclusion I reached
before is wrong. The Duval County "Graduation Prayers"
policy is facially unconstitutional under the Establishment

Clause.

In discussing what we should do with this case in light
of Santa Fe, the majority opinion approaches the matter as
though the question were whether Santa Fe requires us to
alter our prior en banc decision in this case. That approach

4la

is weighted too heavily in favor of inertia. The question is
less about what Santa Fe requires than it is about what the
Establishment Clause, read in light of Santa Fe, permits. We
are not bound in any respect by our prior, vacated decision,
but instead are free to revisit any and all issues addressed in
it. See Moore v. Zant, 885 F.2d 1497, 1501-03 (1989) (en
banc). For that reason, we ought to spend less time
comparing the factual and procedural details of the Santa Fe
case to this one and more time considering the lessons that

decision teaches.

One of those lessons is that a school board may not
delegate to the student body or some subgroup of it the
power to do by majority vote what the school board itself
may not do. Santa Fe, 530 USS. at 304-12, 120 S. Ct. at 2276-
80. We should apply that lesson to what we have
recognized as the "elements which are most crucial in the
Establishment Clause calculus." Adler 206 F.3d at 1080. We
agreed when this case was last before us that the "most
crucial" elements in our decision were "the selection of the

messenger, the content of the message, or most basically,
the decision whether or not there would be a message in the
first place." Id. It is undisputable that under the Duval
County policy, whether there is a message and the selection
of the messenger are decided by majority vote of the
students in the senior class. That means those two of the
three “most crucial” elements weigh against the
constitutionality of the policy, because a school board policy
may not authorize a student majority to do what the
Establishment Clause prohibits the board itself from doing.

42a

The other of what we termed the three “most crucial”
elements of the Establishment Clause calculus is the content
of the message. In our pre-Santa Fe decision, we took
refuge in what we repeatedly described as the “autonomy”
of the student-selected messenger, relying upon what we
characterized as her “complete autonomy” over the
message. See, e.g., Adler, 206 F.3d at 1071 (“the student
speaker’s complete autonomy over the content of the
message”); id. (“how autonerhous the speaker may be in
crafting her message”); id. at 1074 (it “does not violate the
Establishment Clause merely because an autonomous
student speaker may choose to deliver a religious
message”); id. at 1077 (“The graduation policy...allows an
autonomous elected speaker, selected by her class, to deliver
a religious or secular message on an equal basis.”); id. at
1079 (“and the student as complete autonomy over
content”). That supposed autonomy is also a crucial
premise of the reasoning in the present majority opinion.
And a faulty one.

Santa Fe makes clear what should have been apparent
all along: the messenger is not autonomous from the
majority who chooses her any more than a political figure is
autonomous from the majority who selects him. The
majority opinion attempts to deal with this truth by
characterizing the dissent as assuming that the popularly
elected representative of the student majority will be
"nothing more than a puppet to give voice to the student
body majority's demands for prayer." Majority Op. at 21 n.2.
I do not assume that any more than we assume that a

43a

popularly elected official, selected after a one-issue
campaign, will be no more than a puppet for the majority
which elects him. The messenger need not be puppetized in
order to serve the majority will. There will be among the
majority of students who desire prayer at graduation any
number of people who are more than happy to deliver the
prayer themselves, just as there are some politicians who
genuinely do believe in the same policies that they espouse
in order to get elected.

The majority of the senior class selects and endorses the
message because the majority selects the messenger. All the
majority has to do to ensure that a religious message is
delivered at graduation is select as its messenger one whom
it can rely upon to give such a message. There is no reason
at all to believe that will be difficult to do. The Supreme
Court in Santa Fe presumed that thére would be debate
before each of two elections authorized by the policy of the
school board in that case. See 530 U.S. at 310-11, 120 S.Ct. at
2279-80 ("The two student elections authorized by the
policy, coupled with the debates that presumably must
precede each, impermissibly invade that private sphere.").
And there is no reason not to presume the same in this case.
After all, that is how majority rule is typically exercised in a
democratic setting. Issues are discussed and debated, and
then a vote is taken to ascertain the will of the majority.
Unlike the majority opinion, id. at 21 n.2. I do not think it is
"pessimistic" to assume that election processes will result in
selection of a representative who can be relied upon to carry
out the will of the majority of those who vote. To the

44a

contrary, faith in the notion that the majority can and will
select representatives who will carry out its will is the
optimistic assumption behind democracy.

It would be naive to expect the debate over the first
question subjected to majority rule by the Duval County
policy not to include discussion about whether there should
be prayer. Prayer is what gave rise to the aptly named
"Graduation Prayers" policy. Prayer is what a majority of
people expect and usually want to hear at graduation. Once
the majority will is expressed in favor of a student-delivered
message, all the majority has to do to ensure that message
includes prayer is select someone who can be counted upon
to deliver a prayer. If there is any doubt about who will do
so, that doubt can be resolved in the usual way that
candidates' positions are identified in a democracy -
through campaigning and debate. Insofar as we can tell, the
policy seems to have worked as intended for the most part.
Approximately sixty percent of the times when the policy
has been applied, it has resulted in student-led prayer at
graduation. Sixty percent is not perfection, but it is close
enough for government work, and Duval County's
"Graduation Prayers" policy is government work.

Duval County's "Graduation Prayers" policy may serve
as a valuable teaching tool to show students how issues can
be decided by majority vote and how representatives can be
selected to carry out the will of the people. The problem is
that because of the First Amendment religious issues are not
supposed to be decided by vote of the people, and the

45a goon

nee

aula Soke eR al asia + ates ak hai BSR he de tS DST RS ie ON bi isthe tle

Peereeer were

majority should not be allowed to force its religious views
on those in the minority. Our Constitution ensures that
when it comes to religion, it is the conscience of the
individual rather than the will of the majority that rules.
The lesson the students are being taught under the Duval
County policy conflicts with the Establishment Clause.

The majority opinion concludes that no reasonable
person attending a graduation ceremony could view the
message the selected student delivers "as one imposed by
the state." Majority Op. at 16. I believe that a reasonable
person could view the message delivered by a student
messenger, who is selected by a majority of the senior class
to deliver the message, as one reflecting the views of the
majority. And where a governmental unit, such as a school
board, allows its power and authority to be wielded
according to the will of a majority of students, the resulting
message delivered on government property during a
government-controlled event is the message of government.
The government endorsement of the message comes not just
from the setting in which it is delivered but also from the
use of government-delegated power to select the messenger
and message. The identity of the messenger is controlled
and the content of the message is censored in advance
through the majority selection process.

Judge Kravitch's dissenting opinion ably demonstrates
that the purpose of Duval County's "Graduation Prayers"
policy is consistent with its name. In disputing that, the
majority opinion says the policy is not about prayer, but

46a

instead is about student messages in general and permitting
student participation in graduation ceremonies. Majority
Op. at 7. 1 disagree. The policy is not entitled “Student
Messages" or "Student Participation in Graduation," but
"Graduation Prayers." There is nothing about a general
student message or student participation that would cause
the school board to dictate that it come at the beginning or
end of the ceremony; that is, however, exactly when prayer
traditionally occurs in a ceremony. And the board's
mandate that the student "message" be no longer than two
minutes comports nicely with the length of a good, short
prayer. The memorandum that became the board's policy
refers repeatedly not to free speech or democratic
participation cases but to a school prayer decision. See
Adler, 206 F.3d at 1072.

The "Graduation Prayers" memorandum refers to the
board having "been threatened by lawsuits from both sides,"
id,, and those threatened lawsuits were not about whether
there would be student participation or a student message
in general, but about whether there would be prayer. Even
in our litigious society, no one sues about student
participation in graduation ceremonies, but people do sue
about whether prayer is allowed or prohibited at graduation
and other school-related events. In response to the threats
of lawsuits from both sides about whether there would be
prayer at graduation, the school board sought to pass the
buck to the senior class, thereby allowing the students, in
the policy's words, "to direct their own graduation message
without monitoring or review by school officials." Id. By

47a

majority vote, the students direct their own graduation

message by deciding whether there will be one and who
will deliver it. And in that way a majority of the senior class
determines whether its message will be prayer. The school

ae Lele et A te ll te gs

board policy not just permits but invites that determination
by the majority regardless of the views of the minority. As
interpreted in Santa Fe, the Establishment Clause forbids

| that type of exercise of majority power. Government is not
allowed to aid in the establishment of religion by giving

a majority of students a proxy to use government

power to do that which government itself may not do.

. a ee ee sae

[PUBLISH]

FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
MAR 15, 2000
THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

98-2709

D. C. Docket No. 98-460-CIV-J-10C
EMILY ADLER, individually; on behalf
of herself and all persons similarly situated,
SETH FINCK, individually; on behalf of
himself and all persons similarly situated, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

versus

DUVAL COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD,
DUVAL COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 98-2720
D.C. Docket No. 98-460-CIV-J-10C

EMILY ADLER, individually; on behalf

of herself and all persons similarly situated,
SETH FINCK, individually; on behalf of
himself and all persons similarly situated, et al.,

49a

i ' _ Plaintiffs-Appellees,
versus

SUSAN BOLES, as parent & next friend of
Rebecca Boles, a minor child and on behalf
of all public school students within the Duval
County Public School District,

Movants-Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida

(March 15, 2000)

;
‘ Before ANDERSON, Chief Judge, TTOFLAT, EDMONDSON,
; COX, BIRCH, DUBINA, CARNES, BARKETI, HULL,
i MARCUS, WILSON, Circuit Judges,* and KRAVITCH, Senior
: Circuit Judge.**

q

i

MARCUS, Circuit Judge:

At issue today is whether the Duval County, Florida
school system's policy of permitting graduating students to
vote on whether to select a student to deliver a message
wholly of her own choosing at the beginning or closing of a

high school graduation ceremony violates the Establishment
Clause. Because the Duval County policy unambiguously
recognizes the "crucial difference between government
speech

———
*Judge Susan H. Black did not participate in this decision.

50a

Se.

**Senior U.S. Circuit Judge Phyllis A. Kravitch elected to
participate in this. decision pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 46(c).
endorsing religion, which the Establishment Clause forbids,
and private speech [] [that may contain a prayerful
message], which the Free Speech and Free Exercises Clauses
protect," Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250, 1 10
S.Ct. 2356, 110 L.Ed.2d 191 (1990) (emphasis added), we find
the policy constitutional on its face and affirm the judgment
of the district court. The total absence of state involvement
in deciding whether there will be a graduation message,
who will speak, or what the speaker may say combined
with the student speaker's complete autonomy over the
content of the message convinces us that the message
delivered, be it secular or sectarian or both, is not state-
sponsored. To conclude otherwise would come perilously
close to announcing an absolute rule that would excise all
private religious expression from a public graduation
ceremony, no matter how neutral the process of selecting
the speaker may be, nor how autonomous the speaker may
be in crafting her message.

The facts of this case are straightforward,
uncontroverted, and laid out fully by the district court in
Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 851 F. Supp. 446, 448 (M.D.
Fla. 1994) ("Adler I’). Invocations, benedictions, and other
religious prayers or messages were traditionally offered, by
clergy and others, at public high school commencement
ceremonies in the Duval County School District. In 1992,

5la

the Supreme Court in Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 112
S.Ct. 2649, 120 L.Ed.2d 467 (1992), held that a Providence,
Rhode Island high school principal, acting in accord with
school board policy, violated the Establishment Clause by
inviting a local clergyman to deliver a nonsectarian prayer
at graduation. In response to Lee, the Duval County
Superintendent, Larry Zenke, at the behest of Vicki R.
Reynolds, the school district's legal affairs officer, issued a
memorandum instructing all school officials in the Duval
County school system that no "prayer, benediction, or

invocation” should be offered at "any graduation
1

ceremonies.”

In the ensuing months, Superintendent Zenke received
a number of letters from students and members of the
community discussing the graduation policy. Some of these
letters suggested that student-initiated, student-led prayer
might be constitutional under Lee, and Zenke directed
Reynolds to further research the issue. Reynolds later
advised Zenke that it would be constitutional to allow
student-initiated, student-led prayer during the graduation
ceremony so long as the administration and faculty were
not involved in the decision-making process. Zenke then
authorized Reynolds to issue another memorandum (the
"Reynolds Memorandum"), dated May 5, 1993, to all area

'The memorandum, dated July 22, 1992, read,“ [t]his memorandum
is to remind you that due to the recent Supreme Court Ruling in Lee v.
Weisman, there should be no prayer, benediction, or invocation at any
graduation ceremonies.

52a

high school principals. The memorandum was entitled

"Graduation Prayers" and stated:

You will recall that after the 1992 Supreme court case
of Lee v. Wiseman [sic], you received a
memorandum from me instructing that because of
the decision, we would no longer be able to have
prayers at graduation ceremonies. Most of you have
recently been bombarded with information, as have
I, regarding whether or not student initiated and led
prayers are acceptable based upon a recent Fifth
Circuit opinion. The purpose of this memorandum
is to give you some guidelines on this issue if the
graduating students at your school desire to have
some type of brief opening and /or closing message
by a student.

This area of the law is far from clear at this time, and
we have been threatened by lawsuits from both sides
on the issue depending on what action we take. The
key to the Lee v. Wiseman [sic] decision was that the
prayer given at that graduation ceremony was
directed and initiated by the school system, which
made it unconstitutional, rather than by permissive.
student choice and initiative. With that premise in
mind, the following guidelines may be of some
assistance:

1. The use of a brief opening and/or closing
message, not to exceed two minutes, at high school

53a

graduation exercises shall rest within the discretion
of the graduating senior class;

2. The opening and/or closing message shall be
given by a student volunteer, in the graduating
senior class, chosen by the graduating senior class as
a whole;

ae If the graduating senior class chooses to use
an opening and/or closing message, the content of
that message shall be prepared by the student
volunteer and shall not be monitored or otherwise
reviewed by Duval County School Board [sic], its
officers or employees.

The purpose of these guidelines is to allow students
to direct their own graduation message without
monitoring or review by school officials.

This policy never was directly voted on or debated by the
School Board.

Instead, at a June 1, 1993 School Board meeting, a

motion was made to substitute a "moment of silence’ for any

student-initiated messages that might otherwise be given
pursuant to the graduation policy announced in the
Reynolds Memorandum. The motion failed by a vote of

four to three. As a result, the Reynolds Memorandum was

"left in force with the acquiescence or tacit approval of the
Board as its official policy governing the 1993

54a

——~™ |

commencement exercises." Adler I, 851 F.Supp. at 449. In
1993 under this policy, student speakers, at ten of seventeen
high school graduation ceremonies, delivered some form of
religious message. Notably, at the other seven graduations,
there were no student messages at all or the messages were
entirely secular in character. There is no tabulation in the

record of comparable statistics for subsequent graduations.

In June 1993, various Duval County public school
students sued the Duval County school system, alleging
that the policy embodied in the Reynolds Memorandum
constituted an establishment of religion and infringed on
their free exercise of religion. These students sought
equitable relief declaring the policy unconstitutional and
enjoining the Duval County School Board from permitting
prayers at high school graduation ceremonies as well as
money damages. The students also sought to certify their
action as a class action.” The district court denied the motion
to certify the class and granted summary judgment in favor
of the Duval County school system, holding that its policy
was constitutional. See Adler I, 851 F.Supp. at 451-56. The
students appealed, and a panel of this court found that
because the students had all graduated, their claims for
declaratory and injunctive relief were moot. See Adler v.
Duval County Sch. Bd., 112 F.3d 1475, 1477-78 (11" Cir.

2These original plaintiffs consisted of the following students: Leslie
Adler, Laura Jaffa, and Robin Zion. Doug Rand later joined the action.
Karen Adler and Robin Rand, the mothers of Leslie Adler and Doug Rand,
were named as plaintiffs to bring the claims of their minor children.

55a

1997) [hereinafter Adler II. The Adler II court also held that
the students waived their damages claims on appeal. See
Adler II, 112 F.3d at 1480-81. The Reynolds Memorandum

thus remained the operative high school graduation policy
for Duval County.

In May 1998, Appellants brought the instant action
against the Duval County school system, again alleging that
the policy embodied in the Reynolds Memorandum
constituted an establishment of religion and infringed on
their free exercise of religion. Appellants sought
preliminary and permanent injunctive relief against the
Duval County School Board to prevent it from permitting,
conducting, or sponsoring any religious exercises or prayer
and instruction within the Duval County Public School
District, including at School Board-sponsored graduation
ceremonies. Appellants also sought monetary damages and
class certification.’ The district court, at the hearing on
Appellants' motion for a preliminary injunction and with
the consent of the parties, consolidated the merits of
Appellants' claims with Appellants’ preliminary injunction

>A ppellants in the instant action include: Emily Adler, a June 1998
graduate of Mandarin High School; Seth Finck, a June 1998 graduate of
Stanton College Preparatory School; Stella Finck, mother of Duval County
public school students Rachel Finck, who was scheduled to graduate from
Stanton College Preparatory School in 1999, Aaron Finck, who was
scheduled to graduate from Stanton College Preparatory School in 2000, and
Benjamin Finck, a Duval County public school student; Roberta Nord,
mother of Duval County public school students Lucy Nord, age 9, and Tyler
Hurley, age 12; and Jonathon Rand, a June 1998 graduate of Stanton College
Preparatory School.

56a

motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a)(2).

The district court then denied Appellants’ motion for
preliminary injunction and entered final judgment in favor
of the Duval County School Board.

Appellants filed a motion for expedited appeal and a
panel of this Court heard oral argument on November 16,
1998. The panel reversed the district court's judgment and
remanded for further proceedings. On June 2, 1999, we
vacated this opinion and granted rehearing en banc.

II.

The central issue presented is whether the Duval
County school system's policy of permitting a graduating -
student, elected by her class, to deliver an unrestricted
message of her choice at the beginning and/or closing of
graduation ceremonies is facially violative of the
Establishment Clause. *

4'We construe this appeal as the appeal of a final judgment strictly
pertaining to the facial constitutionality of the Duval County graduation
policy. We do not address any potential "as-applied" claims raised below
by Appellants. This result is driven by the procedural history of the case.
Initially, Appellants sought a preliminary injunction in addition to their
facial and as-applied claims on the merits. At the pretrial hearing on the
preliminary injunction, the district court indicated that it thought that
Appellant's claims on the merits should be consolidated with the
preliminary injunction motion because the claims were duplications of
earlier claims it had evaluated in Adler ]. The district court asked whether
any operative facts had changed and the parties stipulated that there had
been no substantive changes. As the district court explained:

57a

:

This is, for all practical purposes, the second time this
case has appeared before this court in 1994 a similar
group of Plaintiffs represented by the same counsel
sought the same injunctive relief with respect to high
school graduation or commencement ceremonies then
scheduled to be conducted in the spring of that year. |
decided at that time that the Plaintiffs’ constitutional
rights were not infringed. This action presents precisely
the same claims predicated upon the same constitutional
theories or contentions; and, at today’s hearing, counsel
stipulated that the operative facts remain unchanged.

The only factual difference is that a new series of
graduation ceremonies is scheduled for 1998. The present
case was filed for the purpose of relitigating the issue
upon the contention of Plaintiffs’ counsel that the law has
now evolved in their favor as manifested by [] [several]
intervening decisions...

See Adier v. Duval County Sch. Bd., No. 98 460-CIV-J-10C (M.D.Fia. May
27, 1998) (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added). The district court
then took judicial notice of its opinion in Adler Land consolidated the action
on the merits with Appellants’ motion for preliminary injunction. Finally,
the district court distinguished the intervening decisions cited by Appellants
and concluded:

[T]he proper decision in this case is dictated by the
decision | reached in Adler |, and that the application for
preliminary injunctive relief should be denied now as it
was then. Furthermore, as counsel agreed during today’s
hearing, there is no just reason in fact or law as to why
the action should not be advanced on the merits and
consolidated with the hearing of the instant application
so that final judgment may be entered and the
controversy may proceed to the Court of Appeals.

Id. (emphasis added). Both parties consented to the consolidation and
Appellants did not object to the effect this consolidation would have on their
as-applied claims. Because of the consolidation, discovery was truncated as
to the policy's application and effect for graduation ceremonies after 1993
and Appellants’ as-applied claims were never fully developed or litigated
below. Appellants’ consent to the district court's consolidation constituted
a knowing waiver of their as-applied claims, circumscribing the action and

58a

Close attention to the operative features of the Duval

County policy yields the conclusion that the policy is
constitutional on its face. Simply put, the selection of a
graduation student speaker by a secular criterion (not
controlled by the state) to deliver a message (not restricted
in content by the state) does not violate the Establishment
Clause merely because an autonomous student speaker may
choose to deliver a religious message. See Lee, 505 U.S. at
630 n.8, 112 S.Ct. 2649 (Souter, J., concurring) (observing that
"[i]f the State had chosen its graduation day speakers
according to wholly secular criteria, and if one of those
speakers (not a state actor) had individually chosen to
deliver a religious message, it would have been harder to
attribute an endorsement of religion to the State”) (citing

Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S.
481, 106 S.Ct. 748, L.Ed.2d 846 (1986)).

the district court's final judgment to the facial constitutionality of the
graduation policy. See Warehouse Groceries Management, Inc. v. SAV-U-
Warehouse Groceries, Inc., 624 F.2d 655, 657-58 (Sth Cir. 1980) (noting that
district court, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a(2), may
properly consolidate the merits of a case with a preliminary injunction
hearing so long as parties are given adequate notice); Fenstermacher v.
Philadelphia Nat'l Bank 493 F.2d 333, 337 (3rd Cir. 1974) (noting that party's
failure to object to district court's consolidation of the merits with a
preliminary injunction hearing constituted a waiver of any defects stemming
from the consolidation because the party had "acquiesced in the procedure
followed in the district court’). We therefore restrict our review today to the
facial constitutionality of the graduation policy.

ple igen ints RN Re ENTAIL G 8 | BTA one

GP Ae AT a EAI STU

Establishment Clause jurisprudence calls for the
difficult task of separating a student's private message,
which may be religious in character, from a state sponsored
religious message, protecting the former and prohibiting the
latter. This determination is of "necessity one of line-
drawing," see Lee, 505 U.S. at 598, 112 S.Ct. 2649,
"sometimes quite fine, based on the particular facts of each
case," Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va.,
515 US. 819, 847, 115 S.Ct. 2510, 132 L.Ed.2d 700 (1995)
(O'Connor, J., concurring). Indeed, our courts have

recognized that "at graduation time and throughout the
course of the education process, there will be instances
when religious values, religious practices, and religious
persons will have some interaction with the public schools
and their students." See Lee , 505 U.S. at 598-99, 112 S.Ct.
2649 (citing Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 US. 226, 110
S.Ct. 2356, 110 L.Ed.2d 191 (1990)). But at the core of
Establishment Clause jurisprudence is the notion that the
state may not favor, endorse, or oppose the propagation of
religious doctrine by its citizens. In this case, the absence of

state involvement in each of the central decisions-whether a
graduation message will be delivered, who may speak, and
what the content of the speech may be—insulates the School
Board's policy from constitutional infirmity on its face.

We measure the facial constitutionality of the policy
against both the standards enunciated by the Supreme
Court in Lee, 505 U.S. 577, 112 S.Ct. 2649, the Court's only
occasion to directly examine the issue of school prayer at a
public high school graduation, and the more general

60a

Establishment Clause test articulated in Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971).°
A.

In Lee, the Supreme Court scrutinized the Providence,
Rhode Island public school system policy of permitting
middle and high school principals to invite clerics to offer
invocation and benediction prayers at formal high school |
graduation ceremonies. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 580, 112 S.Ct. |
2649. In particular, the Court considered the 1989
graduation at Nathan Bishop Middle School where the
principal invited a local rabbi to offer a religious invocation
and benediction at the school's graduation ceremony. The
principal also provided the rabbi with a pamphlet entitled
"Guidelines for Civic Occasions,” prepared by the National

While the Lemon test has drawn considerable criticism from both
Members of the Court and legal commentators, see, e.g., Board of Educ. v.
Grumet. 512 U.S. 687, 721,114 S.Ct. 2481,129 L-Ed.2d 546 (1994) (O'Connor,
J., concurring) (noting that "the slide away from Lemon's unitary approach
is well under way"); Kent Greenawalt, Quo Vadis: The Status and Prospects
of "Tests" Under the Religion Clauses, 1995 Sup.Ct. Rev. 323, 361 (1996)
(declaring that "now that Lemon lacks any defenders on the Court, other
judges would perform a shallow exercise were they to continue to apply its
terms. They should recognize that the Supreme Court has definitely
abandoned Lemon."), it is still binding precedent see Lamb's Chapel v.
Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 395 n.7,113 S.Ct. 2141,
124 L.Ed.2d 352 (1993) (stating that "we return to the reality that there is a
proper way to inter an established decision and Lemon, however
frightening it might be to some, has not been overruled"); see also Chabad-
Lubavitch of Georgia v. Miller, 5 F.3d 1383, 1388 (11th Cir. 1993) (en banc)
(explaining that "[a]lthough [the Lemon test] has been criticized severely, it
still controls our Establishment Clause inquiry"); Bown v. Gwinnett County
Sch. Dist., 112 F.3d 1464, 1468- 74 (11th Cir.1997) (applying Lemon)-

6la

_——————————— <<<

Conference of Christians and Jews, and advised the rabbi
that the prayer should be nonsectarian. See id. at 581, 112
S.Ct. 2649.

In declaring the school system policy unconstitutional
under the Establishment Clause, the Supreme Court pointed
at two "dominant facts" as marking the boundaries of its
decision: first, the Providence school officials ordained and
directed the performance of a religious exercise by deciding
to include prayer in the graduation ceremony, by selecting a
clergyman to deliver the prayer, and by providing the
clergyman with guidelines informing the content of the
prayer; and second, pressure was exerted on students to
attend graduation and conform with their peers by either
standing as a group or remaining in respectful silence
during the invocation and benediction. Id. at 586-88, 112
S.Ct. 2649. What the Supreme Court found striking and
troubling about Lee was that the government clearly
directed a formal religious exercise - -albeit in the form of a
nonsectarian prayer—under such circumstances as to oblige
the participation of many who objected. As Justice Kennedy
wrote for the majority:

These dominant facts mark and control the
confines of our decision: State officials direct the
performance of a formal religious exercise at
promotional and graduation ceremonies for
secondary schools. Even for those students who
object to the religious exercise, their attendance and
participation in the state-sponsored religious

62a

rai,

activity are in a fair and real sense obligatory,
though the school district does not require

attendance as a condition for receipt of the
diploma.

Id. at 586, 112 S.Ct. 2649. There can be little doubt, then, that
in Lee the Providence, Rhode Island school system ordained
and established a religious exercise at a graduation
ceremony, and that the graduation prayer delivered by a
rabbi was in every sense endorsed and supported by the
state.

In striking contrast, under the Duval County —
graduation policy, however, neither the School Board nor its
principals may ordain, direct, establish, or endorse a
religious prayer or message of any kind. Indeed, by the
very terms of the policy, a religious message may not even
be offered at graduation. The Duval County policy
explicitly divorces school officials from the decision-making
process as to whether any message-be it religious or not—
may be delivered at graduation at all. Moreover, decisional
control over the most crucial elements of the graduation
policy rests with the students and not the state. According
to the policy, school officials merely allow a graduating
class to decide by an election whether to have a "brief
opening and/or closing message" at graduation. If the class
votes to have a message, it elects a student volunteer to
deliver the message. That student is then free to deliver a
message "not monitored or otherwise reviewed" in any way
by the school. Under the policy, the School Board and its

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agents have no control over who will draft the message (if
there be any message at all) or what its content may be. The
School Board also does noi suggest in any way, let alone
require, that the graduating class consider religious or any
other criteria in deciding whether to have a student message
or in selecting a particular student speaker. And most
notably, if the graduating class chooses to have a message,
the content of the message shall be prepared by the student
speaker alone an no one else. The Duval County School
Board is expressly prohibited by the very terms of its policy
from influencing or editing the message in any way.

These operational features distinguish the Duval
County policy from approximating even an arguably similar
level of state control to the graduation policy struck down in
Lee. Unlike the Providence policy in Lee , the Duval County
policy, in no way, authorizes a school to "direct the
performance of a formal religious exercise." Lee, 505 U.S. at
586, 112 S.Ct. 2649. And unlike a direct student plebiscite on
graduation prayer, not even the senior class exercises
control over the content of the graduation message. That
decision rests solely with the elected student speaker-- with
neither the senior class nor the school exercising any sort of
editorial oversight. Therefore, on the face of the policy
itself, the students unambiguously understand that any
student message is utterly divorced from any state
sponsorship.

Lee does not stand for the proposition that all religious
expression, even the private religious expression of an

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elected student speaker, must be excised from public high
school graduation ceremonies. Rather, Lee prohibits the
state from ordaining, directing, endorsing, or sponsoring a
religious message at such ceremonies but not from adopting
neutral secular policies which simply permit the possibility
of private religious expression. See id., 505 US. at 589, 112
S.Ct. 2649 (observing that "[t]he First Amendment's Religion
Clauses mean that religious beliefs and religious expression
are too precious to be either proscribed or prescribed by the
State"); id. at 604-05 (Blackmun, concurring) (explaining that
"[t]he Establishment Clause proscribes public schools from
‘conveying or attempting to convey a message that religion
or a particular religious belief is favored or preferred"’)
(quoting County of Alleghanv v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU,
492 U.S. 573, 593, 109 S.Ct. 3086, 106 L.Ed.2d. 472 (1989)); see
also Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 231, 117 S.Ct. 1997, 138
L.Ed.2d 391 (1997) (noting that there is no advancement of
religion where "aid is allocated on the basis of neutral,
secular criteria that neither favor nor disfavor religion, and
is made available to both religious and secular beneficiaries
on a nondiscriminatory basis"); Rosenberger, 515 US. at 839,
115 S.Ct 2510 (stating that ([a] central lesson of our decisions
is that a significant factor in upholding governmental
programs in the face of Establishment Clause attack is their
neutrality towards religion"); Grumet, 512 U.S. at 696, 114
S.Ct. 2481 (declaring that "'fa] proper respect for both the
Free Exercise and the Establishment Clauses compels the
State to pursue a course of ‘neutrality’ toward religion"’)
(quoting Committee for Public Educ. & Religious Liberty v.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 792-93, 93 S.Ct. 2955, 31 L.Ed.2d 948

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=

(1973)); Chandler v. James, 180 F.3d 1254, 1258-59, (11th Cir.
1999) (noting that "ordinarily religious speech by private
parties cannot establish religion, even if it occurs in a public
institution, such as a school") (citation omitted).

The School Board's policy is perfectly consistent with
the theme of neutrality in Establishment Clause
jurisprudence. As Justice Souter explained in his
concurrence in Lee:

While the Establishment Clause's concept of
neutrality is not self-revealing, our recent cases
have invested it with specific content: the State may
not favor or endorse either religion generally over
nonreligion or one religion over others. This
principle against favoritism and endorsement has
become the foundation of Establishment Clause
jurisprudence, ensuring that religious belief is
irrelevant to every citizen's standing in the political

community....

Lee, 505 U.S. at 627, 112 S.Ct. 2649 (internal citations
omitted). No feature of the Duval County policy favors or
endorses religion. The graduation policy is simply content-
neutral, and allows an autonomous elected speaker, selected
by her class, to deliver a religious or secular message on an

equal basis.

In one sense, the policy can be analogized to a line of
open forum cases in which the Supreme Court has held that

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neutral secular policies that merely accommodate religion or
individual free exercise rights do not amount to an
unconstitutional state endorsement of religion.° First, in
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 102 S.Ct. 269, 70 L.Ed.2d
440 (1981), the Court struck down a University of Missouri
regulation that denied "equal access" to school facilities for
religious groups as a violation of the Free Speech Clause.

Id. at 274-75, 102 S.Ct. 269. In so ruling, the Court explained
that an "open forum" policy, which permitted access to both

religious and secular student groups in a neutral manner,
did not offend the Establishment Clause because "an open
forum in a public university does not confer any imprimatur
of state approval on religious sects or practices" anymore
than such a policy "'committed [the University] to the goals
of the Students for a Democratic Society, the Young Socialist
Alliance,’ or any other group eligible to use its facilities." Id.
at 274, 102 S.Ct. 269 (citation omitted).

The Supreme Court extended this reasoning to public
secondary schools in Mergens. There, the Court upheld the
constitutionality of the Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C. § 4071 et
seq., which explicitly codified the reasoning of Widmar by
prohibiting public secondary schools in receipt of federal

*'For purposes of our decision, we find it unnecessary to decide
whether the Duval County graduation policy creates a "designated public
forum” or a "nonpublic forum" as these terms have come to be defined by
our public forum caselaw. See Arkansas Educ. Tele. Comm’n v. Forbes,
523 US, 666,118 S.Ct. 1633,1641-43,140 L.Ed.2d 875 (1998). We rely on
public forum doctrine only in so far as it informs Establishment Clause
jurisprudence regarding principles of state endorsement and neutral
accommodation towards private religious speech.

67a

funds from denying student access to "limited open
forum{s]" on the basis of the religious content of their
speech. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 235, 110 S.Ct. 2356. The Court
elaborated a core tenet of its neutrality jurisprudence in the

process:

[T]here is a crucial difference between government
speech endorsing religion, which the Establishment
Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing
religion, which the Free Speech and Free Exercise
Clauses protect. We think that secondary school
students are mature enough and are likely to
understand that a school does not endorse or
support student speech that it merely permits on a
nondiscriminatory basis.... Although a school may
not itself lead or direct a religious club, a school
that permits a student-initiated and student-led
religious club to meet after school, just as it permits
any other student group to do, does not convey a
message of state approval or endorsement of the
particular religion.

Id. at 250-52, 110 S.Ct. 2356. In recent years, the Court has
reaffirmed this principle by finding that the inclusion of
private religious groups in "open forums" through neutral
selection principles does not violate the Establishment
Clause or constitute a state endorsement of religion. See
Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 US.
753, 763, 115 S.Ct. 2440, 132 L.Ed.2d 650 (1995) (plurality
opinion) (concluding that the allowance of a private

68a

a

religious display in an open public forum, selected by the

same application process and on the same terms as other
private displays, did not amount to state endorsement);
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 832, 115 S.Ct. 2510 (holding that a
public university subsidy for a religious student
organization's publication costs, under a program that
funded other student organization publications through
neutral selection criteria, did not violate the Establishment
Clause); Lamb's Chapel,. 508 US. at 395, 113 S.Ct. 2141
(finding that a policy, which allowed private student
religious groups equal after-school access to school property
through neutral secular criteria, would not violate the
Establishment Clause).

These cases strongly suggest that a policy, like the
Duval County graduation policy, which provides an
opportunity for student-selected, student-initiated private
expression through a neutral selection criterion, does not
violate the Establishment Clause simply because the venue
is equally available for religious or secular expression.
Government neutrality towards religion is all that is
required by the Establishment Clause. And it is worth
emphasizing that while the state must be neutral and cannot
advance or endorse religion, similarly, it need not, indeed it
cannot, act in a hostile manner in the face of private
religious speech publically uttered. See Lee. 505 U.S. at 598,
112 S.Ct. 2649 (observing that "[a] relentless and all-
pervasive attempt to exclude religion from every aspect of
public life could itself become inconsistent with the
Constitution’) (citation omitted); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S.

69a

306, 314, 72 S.Ct. 679, 96 L.Ed. 954 (1952) (stating that “we
find no constitutional requirement which makes it necessary

for government to be hostile to religion and to throw its
weight against efforts to widen the effective scope of
religious influence").

In essence, this case is substantially like Doe v. Madison
Sch. Dist. No. 321, 147 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 1998), vacated on
other grounds , 177 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc)
(vacating for mootness because the student plaintiffs
already had graduated). In Doe, the Ninth Circuit examined
a graduation policy which mirrors Duval County's policy in
its neutrality. The Doe policy allowed for a minimum of
four student graduation speakers to be selected according to
their academic standing. If a student accepted the speaking

invitation, she could choose to deliver an "address, poem,
reading, song, musical presentation, prayer, or any other
pronouncement” -- the content, of which, she alone
controlled. Doe, 147 F.3d at 835. The Doe court upheld the
constitutionality of the policy against a facial challenge on
Establishment Clause grounds and distinguished Lee. It
explained that graduation speech does not bear the
imprimatur of the state when the speaker is a student, not a
cleric; the student speaker is selected on neutral and secular
criteria; and the student has complete autonomy over
content. Doe, 147 F.3d at 835-36.’

"The other federal circuit cases that have considered student-led,
student initiated prayer at graduation are of limited assistance. All of these
cases involve direct student plebiscites on graduation prayer. Of these

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cases, Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992), is
the only one which has permitted students to vote directly on whether to
have prayer at graduation. In Jones, the Fifth Circuit upheld the Clear
Creek, Texas school district's policy allowing graduating students to vote
whether student volunteers would deliver “nonsectarian and
nonproselytizing" invocations at graduation. The court found: that the Clear
Creek policy (1) reserved to the students the decision whether to have an
invocation, (2) precluded anyone buta student volunteer from delivering an
invocation, and (3) placed less psychological coercion on the student
audience than the prayers given in Lee because students were aware that
any prayers given represented the will of their peers. See id. at 970-71.

Both the Third and Ninth Circuits have come to an opposite
conclusion. In ACLU of New Jersev. Black Horse Pike Regional Bd. of
Educ., 84 F.3d 1471 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc), the Third Circuit, sitting en
banc, held as unconstitutional a school board's policy that permitted the
senior class to vote on whether to include a prayer at high school graduation
ceremonies. See id. at 1477-88. The policy in Black Horse Pike allowed
senior Class officers to conduct a poll of the graduating class to determine,
by plurality vote, whether seniors wanted "prayer, a moment of reflection,
or nothing at all" to be included in their graduation ceremony. Id. at 1475
(citation omitted). In Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241, 41 F.3d 447 (9th Cir.
1994), vacated as moot, 515 U.S. 1154, 115S.Ct. 2604, 132 L.Ed.2d 849 (1995),
high school students themselves, pursuant to a school district policy,
planned every aspect of their graduation, without interference from school
officials, and voted by written ballot on whether or not to have prayer. The
Harris court found that the state involvement in the case was pervasive
enough to offend Establishment Clause concerns, noting that "[t]he message
of the speakers is [] chosen by the majority; the relevant speakers are
instructed to pray." Id. at 456-57.

In contrast to each of these policies, Duval County students vote on
whether to have a message of unspecified content delivered by a student.
This is a meaningful distinction.

The Fifth Circuit recently revisited the issue of student-initiated
prayer in Doe v. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 806 (5th Cir.), cert.
granted in part, 118S.Ct. 494 (1999). There, the Fifth Circuit examined what
it considered to bathe holding of Jones--"that student-selected, student-
given, nonsectarian, nonproselytizing invocations and benedictions at high
school graduation ceremonies" are constitutional—and concluded that the

7la

Appellants, however, advance two arguments for why
we should regard a student-selected graduation speaker,
who is selected through a wholly neutral process and who is
given complete autonomy over the content of her speech, as
a public, state-sponsored speaker. First, they contend that
by providing the platform and opportunity, the state has
created a sufficient link to the student speaker to convert the
student's private speech into public, state-sponsored speech.
Second, they suggest that the majoritarian process of
selecting the speaker shrouds the otherwise private speech

constitutionality of a student-selected, student led prayer policy depends on
its "nonsectarian and nonproselytizing” features. Id. at 816-19. The Santa.
Fe court also struck down a school policy which allowed student-led,
student-initiated prayer before high school football games. The Supreme
Court recently has granted certiorari in Santa Fe. However, the Court has
limited its review to whether student-led, student initiated prayer at football
games violates the Establishment Clause. The Court did not grant certioran
on the constitutionality of the Santa Fe graduation policy. Appellants cite
Santa Fe for the proposition that a policy which "permits’ sectarian and
proselytizing prayers, is facially unconstitutional. As discussed in greater
detail infra, this argument proves too much and is offensive to the
Constitution. The Duval County policy, of course, permits sectarian and
proselytizing prayers because it places no limitations, either secular or
sectarian, on the content of a graduation message. A policy of free
expression is far more consonant with the commands of the First
Amendment than is a policy of censorship. See, e.g., Mergens, 496 US. at
253 (stating that "a denial of equal access to religious speech might well
create greater entanglement problems in the form of invasive monitoring to
prevent religious speech at meetings at which such speech might occur’);
Santa Fe, 168 F.3d at 829-35 (Jolly, J., dissenting).

72a

argument-that by providing the platform, the speech
becomes public—-goes too far. The second argument—that
the speaker somehow gainers state authority by virtue of the
plebiscite-has no logical rationale.

First, we reject the notion that the religious content of
speech at a graduation ceremony is attributable to the school
merely because of the school's sponsorship of the event or
its control over the graduation's schedule, timing, decorum,
or sequence of events. The Supreme Court did not suggest
in Lee that school sponsorship of the graduation event,
standing alone, was sufficient to find the Providence policy
unconstitutional, or it would have banned all religious
expression at graduation. If Appellants were right on this
point, graduation speakers as diverse as athletes, politicians,
academics, entertainers, and maybe even judges would bear
the imprimatur of the state because they were handpicked
by the school (or, in our case, elected by the senior class) to
speak at an event over which the school has great control.
Schools then would have to prevent these speakers from
discussing a religious topic, engaging in prayer, OF
imploring the guidance of the Lord, to ensure no
Establishment Clause violation and protect themselves from
42 US.C. § 1983 liability should an audience member
perceive the school to be endorsing the speaker's religious
message. Indeed, the same logic would apply to a student
graduation speaker selected by other neutral criteria such as
academic achievement. But a graduation free of all religious
expression, compelled by the school's sponsorship of the
event is not required by the Establishment Clause.

73a

Even if we accept that the Duval County School Board

exerted overwhelming control over the graduation
ceremony in terms of the event's sequence, venue, dress,
and facilities, it is clear that it did not have control over the
elements which are most crucial in the Establishment Clause
calculus: the selection of the messenger, the content of the
message, or most basically, the decision whether or not
there would be a message in the first place. It is beyond
imagination to say that everyone on the platform at a high
school graduation ceremony, including a local politician or
celebrity, is a state speaker merely because the state has
provided the platform, onto which private individuals may
be invited to share their privately-held views. Such views
do not become the state's views merely by being uttered at a
state event on a state platform. Otherwise, each “open
forum’case in which the Supreme Court found that
granting religious groups access to generally available
public facilities or benefits through neutral selection criteria
was not an unconstitutional state endorsement of religion
would be wrongly decided. See Pinette. 515 U.S. at 762-70,
115 S.Ct. 2440; id. at 772-83, 115 S.Ct. 2440 (O' Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment); id. at 783-94, 115 S.Ct. 2440
(Souter, J., concurring in the judgment); Rosenberger, 515
US. at 839-46, 115 S.Ct. 2510; Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at
395-97, 113 S.Ct. 2441; Mergens, 496 U.S. at 248-53, 110 S.Ct.
2356; Widrnar, 454 US. at 271-79, 102 S.Ct. 269. For by
Appellants’ logic, the mere provision of a state-controlled
forum or subsidy to private speakers automatically converts

private speech into government speech.

In addition, a per se rule that all speech on a state-
controlled platform is state speech, raises core free
expression concerns and would likely run afoul of the Free
Exercise and Free Speech clauses. See Chandler, 180 F.3d at
1261 (stating that "[b]ecause genuinely student-initiated
religious speech is private speech endorsing religion, it is
fully protected by both the Free Exercise and Free Speech
Clauses of the Constitution”’) (emphasis added). Even if we
were to construe a graduation ceremony as a "nonpublic
forum," Duval County students still would possess free
speech rights there. The Supreme Court has consistently
held that in nonpublic fora the government may not engage
in viewpoint discrimination. See Cornelius v. NAACP

., 473 US. 788, 806, 105
S.Ct 3439, 87 L.Ed.2d 567 (1985) (finding that "[cJontrol over
access to a nonpublic forum can be based on subject matter
and speaker identity so long as the distinctions drawn are
reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum and
are viewpoint neutral") (emphasis added); Perry Educ.
Assn. v. Perry Local Educators’ Assn., 460 US. 37, 46, 103
S.Ct. 948, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983) (observing that "the state
may reserve [] [a nonpublic] forum for its intended
purposes, communicative or otherwise, as long as the
regulation on speech is reasonable and not an effort to
suppress expression merely because public officials oppose
the speaker's view"). The Court has also concluded that
religion is a viewpoint which, for First Amendment
purposes, may provide "a specific premise, a perspective, a
standpoint from which a variety of subjects may be

discussed and considered.” Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831, 115
S.Ct. 2510.

Presumably, a student's religious perspective would
inform his views on a variety of subjects ordinarily dealt
with at graduation such as expressing gratitude to his
family or religious community, reflecting on the meaning of
his school experience, or defining his future goals. The
extremely personal and subjective nature of such views
helps to explain why the School Board policy yields private
rather than public speech. To unnecessarily classify student
speakers as government actors could render Duval County
students powerless to express religiously-inspired or
religiously-influenced opinions at graduation. It also would
effectively compel the Duval County School Board, if it
wants to have any speech on topics where religion might
motivate opinion or mould perspective, to engage in
viewpoint discrimination, "an egregious form of content
discrimination," Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829, 115 S.Ct. 2510,
in the name of secular purity.

The expression of religious beliefs, which are sacred to
some listeners, may be offensive to others. Appellants'
desire to insulate students and other attendants at
graduation from the offense that they may well experience
at hearing religious expression with which they strongly
disagree is altogether understandable. Graduation
ceremonies are designed to be joyous occasions for the
celebration of student achievement. But the Constitution
does not prohibit the exercise of offensive speech at

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anne
wed ET

graduation ceremonies, religious or otherwise; it only
prohibits state expressions of religion. While the School
Board is under no compulsion to provide an opportunity for
free expression by one or more students at a graduation *
ceremony, the Constitution certainly does not prohibit the
Scho

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386014_2315%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
