# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — LaBombard v. United States

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 2001
- **Citation:** 534 U.S. 895

## Text

—

No.

Ol-227

In The

Supreme Court of the Anited States

Richard LaBombard,
Petitioner(s)
v.

United States

On Petition For Writ of Certiorari
To The United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 00-1651

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Richard LaBombard
Propria Persona
12 Peters Drive
Leominster, MA 01453
978-840-0541

ee a ee Oooo

QUESTIONS TO BE REVIEWED

_ Areview of the District Court extending government’s
time to respond to a court order but not granting the

same privilege to petitioner.

_ Areview of petitioner’s brief not being brought to the
attention of the Court.

_ A review of the failure of the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) to respond to letters asking for an explanation of
assessment.

_ A review of the failure to properly explain IRS letter of
resolvement.

_ Areview of the failure to explain why a military
pension was returned, in full, to petitioner after IRS
letter of resolvement.

_ A review of the charge of failure to file tax returns.

. Areview of the court’s charge that assessments were

not challenged.

_ A review of all briefs submitted to the courts by
petitioner.

LIST OF PARTIES

All parties appear in the caption of the case on the cover
page. :

TABLE OF CONTENTS

OPINIONS BELOW eessecsscsoccscossssssssesesescensesenes
SEE 2
STATEMENT OF CASE.csssesssssssssesssecsseesnsee 3
REASON FOR GRANTING WRIT. csssscssssssess 5

CONCLUSION. .......:c:sssssessseessseesreeserseeenneennnesenes 6

INDEX TO APPENDICES

APPENDIX A --- US COURT OF APPEALS .... 7
JUDGMENT

APPENDIX B --- US COURT OF APPEALS....12
REHEARING DENIED

APPENDIX C --- US COURT OF APPEALS .. 14
EXTENSION OF TIME

APPENDIX D --- US DISTRICT COURT ...... .16
JUDGMENT

APPENDIX E --- US DISTRICT COURT ...... 30
DOCKET SHEET

APPENDIX F --- LETTER FROM IRS .........-. 36
DATED OCTOBER 1, 1990

APPENDIX G --- CERTIFICATE OF ...........- 38
ASSESSMENT SHOWING
RETURN OF MILITARY
PENSION 04/02/90 TO
09/30/96

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES:

Clearfield Trust Co v. US 318 US 363-371 --

US v. Burr 309 US 242

US v. Taylor 350 F2nd 183-187

MISCELLANEOUS

Federal Rule of Evidence
Section 902 Par 9

House Report 93-650

Treasury IR Manual, Legal Reference Guide,
Fiduciary Manual 8(21), P58(10) 0-200
Section 11

UCC 3-501

PAGE 6
PAGE 6
PAGE 6

PAGE 6

PAGE 6

PAGE 6

PAGE 6

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari issue
To review the judgment below.

OPINIONS BELOW

For cases from federal courts:
The opinion of the United States court of appeals appears at

Appendix A to the petition and is unpublished.

The opinion of the United States district court appears at
Appendix D to the petition and is unpublished.

JURISDICTION

For cases from federal courts:

The date on which the United States Court of Appeals
decided my case was December 7, 2000.

A timely petition for rehearing was denied by the United
State Court of Appeals on the following date: March 8,
2001, and a copy of the order denying rehearing appears at
Appendix B.

An extension of time to file a writ of certiorari was granted
to and including February 22, 2001 on January 24, 2001 and
appears at Appendix C.

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C.
1254 (1).

STATEMENT OF CASE

1. The District Court granted the government an extension
of time to respond to a court order by 6 (six) days.
There is no indication, on docket sheet, that a request
was made by the government for an extension of time.
It took 5 (five) days for government’s brief to be
received, by US mail, by petitioner. As petitioner could
not respond to government's brief, until it was received,

. the court allowed 9 (nine) days for a reply, not 14
(fourteen) days as the court ordered. The same
extension of time was not given to petitioner as given to
the government.

2. Petitioner’s brief was not brought to the attention of the
court, “it appears that LaBombard’s response simply
was not brought to the district court’s attention. Having
excused the lateness of the government’s filing, we
assume that the court would have similarly excused any
tardiness on LaBombard’s part, if that filing had been
brought to its attention”. US Court of Appeals
December 7, 2000.

3. All letters and presentments, from the IRS, were
challenged using the procedure in the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC) which the IRS is governed by.
See defendant’s brief US District Court 20 Apr., 99 and
CONCLUSION Page 6.

. Petitioner has shown that any dispute with the IRS was
resolved in a letter dated 1 Oct. 90. The government has
failed to explain what was resolved other than by saying,
“something was resolved”, but not what. The IRS sent
the letter and petitioner accepted it with the
understanding that all disputes were settled. See
APPENDIX F.

. The government has failed to explain why petitioner’s
military pension was returned in full after the IRS sent
the letter of resolvement. If there had been outstanding
disputes this should not have happened. See
APPENDIX G.

. Petitioner has shown that any disputes with the IRS
were resolved and that returns were filed and the IRS
made refunds. See USDC 28 Mar. 00.

. District Court contends that petitioner did not question
correctness of assessments is incorrect. All
presentments were challenged. See USDC 20 Apr. 99.
Petitioner has shown that just because an agent makes
computations does not legally determine a tax liability.
See USCA 18 July, 2000 and Page 6.

. Acomplete and unbiased review of all briefs, sent to the
courts, will show that the government has made
incorrect statements.

Pe een

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE
WRIT

This might not be an international landmark case, but
petitioner believes that it shows the bias and prejudice of the
federal courts when the Internal Revenue Service is
involved. Petitioner could not hire an attorney after they
found out that the IRS was involved. Most of them stated
that they “did not need the aggravation”. The District Court
allowed the government leeway not allowed petitioner,
verified by USCA. The District Court allowed the
government 27 days to answer a court order allowing 21
days, but did riot grant the same to petitioner even though
there was a 5-day delay in receiving government’s reply.
Petitioner’s brief was not given to the court although filed.
The government was allowed not to answer important
questions raised by the petitioner. The court claimed that
petitioner did not challenge assessments when it was shown
that he did. Is this why the American Public has no faith in
the federal courts when the IRS is involved?

The Court should grant this WRIT OF CERTIORARI to
help restore faith in our federal judicial system.

Prepared by:

Richard LaBombard

Propria Persona

12 Peters Drive

Leominster, Massachusetts 01453

CONCLUSION

Petitioner has shown that the government did not respond in
a timely matter to a court order. That the IRS is governed
by the Uniform Commercial Code as is any other
corporation.

“governments descend to the level of a mere private corporation and
take on the characteristics of a mere private citizen, where private
corporate commercial paper is concerned.....for purposes of suite, such
corporations and individuals are regarded as entities entirely separate
from the government.” Clearfield and Trust v. United States
318 US 363-371 United States v. Burr 309 US 242,
Treasury IR Manual, Legal Reference Guide, Fiduciary
Manual 8(21):P58(10) 0-200 Section 11, Federal Rules of
Evidence Section 902 Par 9; House Report 93-650.

Petitioner received but did not accept papers with
computations on them and returned them to Internal
Revenue Service, Inc. “without dishonor UCC 3-501” and
requested, using the Uniform Commercial Code,
information about how the determination was made and by

whom. The IRS did not respond.
“the mere computations of an agent do not legally determine a tax

liability” US v. Taylor 350 F2nd 183, 187.

Petitioner has done everything possible to solve this matter
but the IRS has failed. The IRS is operating with unclean
hands.

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.
Respectfully submitted, 4

Date: 4 Queuid Loo!

6

APPENDIX “A”: UNITED STATES COURT
OF APPEALS JUDGMENT

(NOT FOR PUBLICATION-NOT TO BE CITED AS
PRECEDENT)
United States Court of Appeals
~- For the First Circuit

No. 00-1651
UNITED STATES,
Plaintiff, Appellee,

v.
RICHARD LABOMBARD
Defendant, Appellant.

\

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

(Hon. Nathaniel M. Gorton, U.S. District Judge)

Before

Torruella, Chief Judge,
Selya and Boudin, Circuit Judges

Richard LaBombard on brief pro se.

Paula M. Junghans, Acting Assistant Attorney General,
Ann B. Durney and Regina S. Moriarty, Attorneys, Tax
Division, Department of Justice, on brief for appellee.

December 7, 2000

Per Curiam. Appellant, Richard LaBombard,
appeals a decision of the district court denying his
motion to dismiss and granting summary judgment in
favor of the United States and the court’s subsequent
entry of a judgment in favor of the United Sates in the
amount of $138,857.75 plus statutory interest and
penalties accrued since October 19, 1998. LaBombard
complains that the district court unfairly considered what
LaBombard alleges was an untimely filing submitted by
the government and failed to consider what LaBombard
alleges was his own timely response.

Although it appears that the government’s
supplemental memorandum was tardy, see district court’s
order of February 15, 2000, setting a deadline of 21 days,
it was within the court’s discretion to excuse the
tardiness, if any. As for LaBombard’s own response,

contrary to his assertion, it appears that that response was

also tardy. The mailing rule to which LaBombard refers
9

(adding 3 days to the prescribed period) applies when a
party is required to respond after service of a paper by
the opposing party. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(¢). The district
court’s February 15 order recited that LaBombard had 14
days to respond after the government's filing of its
supplemental memorandum. See also Dist. Ct. Loc. R.
7.1(B) (reciting that a party opposing a motion shall file
an opposition within 14 days and “(t)he fourteen day
period is intended to include the period specified by the

civil rules for mailing time”). Because LaBombard’s

response was entered on the docket on the same day as
the date of the court’s memorandum and order, however,
it appears that LaBombard’s response simply was not
brought to the district court’s attention. Having a
the lateness of the government’s filing, we assume that
the court would have similarly excused any tardiness on
LaBombard’s part, if that filing had been brought to its

attention.

10

In any event, we review both the denial of a
motion to dismiss and the grant of summary judgment de
novo. See Souza v. Pina, 53 F.3d 423, 424 (1* Cir.
1995) (motion to dismiss); Nichols v. Land Transport
Corp., 223 F.3d 21, 22 (1 Cir. 2000) (summary
judgment). We have reviewed the parties’ briefs and the
record on appeal. The allegations in the government’s
complaint sufficed to state a claim for which relief can be
granted and there existed no genuine issue of material
fact precluding entry of summary judgment in its favor.
We affirm essentially for the reasons stated in the district

court’s memorandum and order, dated March 31, 2000.

Affirmed.

11

A

APPENDIX “B”: UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS
DENIAL OF REHEARING

12

ee

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit

No. 00-1651
UNITED STATES, | |
Plaintiff, Appellee, |
V.
RICHARD LABOMBARD,

Defendant, Appellant.

Before

Torruella, Chief Judge,
Selya and Boudin, Circuit Judges.

ORDER OF COURT
Entered: March 8, 2001

The petition for rehearing is denied.

By the Court:

PHOEBE D. MORSE, Clerk

By: s/ Janice M. O’Neil
Chief Deputy Clerk

(cc: Mr. LaBombard, Ms. Durney, Ms. Moriarty, Ms.
France, and Ms. Poswistillo)

13

APPENDIX “C”; UNITED STATES COURT
OF APPEALS
GRANTING EXTENSION OF TIME

14

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

No. 00-1651

UNITED STATES
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
RICHARD LABOMBARD
Defendant - Appellant

ORDER OF COURT
_ Entered: January 24, 2001

Upon consideration of motion,

It is ordered that the time for the appellant to file his petition
for rehearing be enlarged to and including February 22,
2001.

This Court is disinclined to grant further extensions.

By the Court:

Phoebe Morse, Clerk

By s/ Phoebe Morse
Chief Deputy Clerk

ce:

Susan M. Poswistilo, Esq.
Michelle C. France, Esq.
Regina S. Moriarty, Esq.
Ann B. Durney, Esq.
Richard LaBombard

15

APPENDIX “D” UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
JUDGMENT

16

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS ~
)
United States of America, )
Plaintiff )
)
¥. ) Civil Action No.
) 99-40019-NMG
Richard LaBombard, )
Defendant )
. )
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
GORTON, J.

This case arises from the alleged failure of the
Defendant, Richard LaBombard (“LaBombard”), to pay
federal income taxes for the tax years 1983 through
1989. The United States has filed suit to reduce to
judgment federal tax assessments against LaBombard in
the amount of $138,857.75 in unpaid taxes, penalties and
interest, plus statutory interest since October 19, 1998.
The United States has filed a motion for summary
judgment (Docket No. 2) and LaBombard has filed a

motion to dismiss (Docket No. 5).
17

Because some issues in the pending motions were not
fully addressed in the initial briefs, the Court directed the
parties to submit supplemental memoranda. The
government has done so and LaBombard’s time to respond
having expired, the Court now considers those pending
motions.

I. Background

The following facts are presented by the United States
and are not disputed by LaBombard. LaBombard failed to
file any federal income tax returns for the tax years 1983
through 1989. The Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”)
prepared substitute returns pursuant to 26 U.S.C. S 6020 (b)
for LaBombard basing his purported tax liability upon
information it had received with respect to income he had
received from a military pension.

The government made assessments based upon those |

substitute returns on February 6, 1989 for the 1983, 1984

and 1985 tax years and on September 21, 1992 for the
18

1986, 1987, 1988 and 1989 tax years. The government
commenced the instant action on February 3, 1999 to
obtain judgment against LaBombard for all unpaid taxes,
interest and penalties, plus statutory interest accrued to
date. The United States served the complaint on
LaBombard at his residence at 12 Peters Drive,
Leominster, Massachusetts on March 10, 1999.
II. Motion to Dismiss

LaBombard argues, in his motion to dismiss, that the
Court lacks subject matter and personal jurisdiction and
that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted.

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

The United States asserts that this is a valid suit to
reduce federal tax assessments to judgment. It asserts
that the Court has subject matter jurisdictiqn pursuant to
28 U.S.C. S 1340 (“district courts shall have original

jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act of
19

Congress providing for internal revenue”), 28 U.S.C. S
1345 (“Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress,
the district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all
civil actions, suits or proceedings commenced by the
United States...”) and 26 U.S. C. S 7402(a) (conferring
jurisdiction on district courts for actions necessary or
appropriate for enforcement of internal revenue laws).
Given three ania all of which confer jurisdiction, there
is no doubt that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction
over this case.

B. Personal Jurisdiction

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide guidance
on how district courts obtain jurisdiction over a person.
Specifically, Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(k) (1) provides that district |

courts acquire personal jurisdiction over a defendant by

~ service of a summons a person “who could be subjected to

the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the

state in which the district court is located.” Thus, a federal
20

district court is permitted to exercise personal jurisdiction
over an individual to the extent authorized under state law
of the forum in which it sits. In Massachusetts, the state in
which this Court sits, a court of general jurisdiction may
exercise personal jurisdiction over a person within or
domiciled in the Commonwealth. M.G.L. c. 223A S 2;
Mas&.R.Civ.P. 4 (d) (1).

LaBombard admits that he is a citizen of, and is
domiciled in, Massachusetts. He was served with a
summons and complaint at his home in Leominster,
Massachusetts. This Court may, therefore, properly
exercise personal jurisdiction over LaBombard.

C. Failure to State a Claim

1. Standard
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim may be

granted only if it appears, beyond doubt, that the plaintiff

can prove no facts in support of its claim that entitle it to

relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
21

The Court must accept all factual averments in the
complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in
the plaintiff's favor. Garita Hotel Ltd. Partnership v.
Ponce Fed. Bank, F.S.B., 958 F.2d 15, 17 (1* Cir. 1992).
The Court is required to look only to the allegations of
the complaint and, if under any theory they are sufficient
to state a cause of action, a motion to dismiss the
complaint weed denied. Knight v. Mills, 836 F.2d
659, 664 (1% Cir. 1987).
2. Analysis

Title 26, Section 7401 of the United States Code
requires that any civil action for the collection or
nanny of taxes, or of any fine, penalty or forfeiture
must be commenced with the permission of the Secretary
of the Treasury and at the direction of the Attorney
General or an appropriate delegate. The United States
asserts in its complaint that this action was commenced
by the United States Attorney at the direction of the

22

Attorney General with the authorization from the Chief
Counsel, Internal Revenue Service, a delegate of the
Secretary of the Treasury. Based upon that assertion, the
United States has complied with the requirements of the
applicable statute.

~ The United States assessed a tax deficiency against
LaBombard for unpaid taxes for the tax years 1983
through 1985 on February 6, 1989 and for the tax years
1986 through 1989 on September 21, 1992. The United
States issued notice of those assessments to LaBombard,
but, despite notice and demand, LaBombard refused to
pay the amount due.

Under 26 U.S.C. S 6501(a), the United States must
assess any unpaid tax within three (3) years after the
return was filed, unless no return was filed or the return
was filed fraudulently to evade taxes. In the latter
circumstance, there is no limit on when the United States

must act. LaBombard filed no tax returns for the years in
23

“question so there is no time limit on when the United
States may assess tax deficiencies against him.

Finally, under 26 U.S.C. S 6502(a), the United States
has ten (10) years from the date of assessment either 1) to
levy the property or 2) to commence a lawsuit. This
lawsuit was commenced on February 3, 1999, within the
ten-year statute of limitations for both the February 6,
1989 and the Sagres 21, 1992 assessments.

D. The 1988 Tax Year

LaBombard argues that a letter to him from the IRS
dated October 1, 1990 indicates that the IRS had resolved
some issues related to the 1988 tax year. The letter is
ambiguous with respect to what the IRS had actually
resolved. In any event, the IRS assessed a tax deficiency
for that tax year on September 21, 1992.

By assessing a deficiency for the 1988 tax year after

the IRS sent LaBombard the subject letter, it is clear that

the IRS persisted in its contention that LaBombard was
24

delinquent for that tax year. Thus, the IRS did not view
his tax deficiency for the 1988 tax year as resolved and,
because a presumption of correctness attaches to a tax
assessment made by the IRS, Geiselman v. United States,
961 F.2d 1, 6 (1* Cir. 1992), the assessment for that tax
year is valid.
Il. Summary Judgment

A. Summary Judgment Standard

The role of summary judgment is “to pierce the
pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether
there is a genuine need for trial.” Mesnick v. General
Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 822 (1° Cir. 1991) (quoting
Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 50 (1* Cir. 1990).
The burden is upon the moving party to show, based upon
the pleadings, discovery and affidavits, “that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving

party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”

25

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Once the moving party has satisfied
its burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to
set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine,
triable issue. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
324 (1986). The Court must view the entire record in the
light most hospitable to the non-moving party and
indulge all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.
O’Connor v. een 994 F.2d 905, 907 (1% Cir. 1993).

B. Analysis

Despite notice and demand, LaBombard has refused
to pay in full the amount due and, as a result, there
remains due $138,857.75 as of October 19, 1998. In
addition to that amount, LaBombard is liable for
statutory interest and additional penalties accruing after
that date.

In this case, the government made assessments against
LaBombard for the tax years 1983 through 1989. A

presumption of correctness attaches to a tax assessment —
26

made by the IRS. Geiselman v. United States, 961 F.2d
1, 6 (1% Cir. 1992). “It is settled law that taxpayers bear
the burden of proving that a tax deficiency assessment is
erroneous.” Delaney v. Commissioner of Internal

Revenue, 99 F.3d 20, 23 (1* Cir. 1996) (citing United

States v. Rexach, 482 F.2d 10, 16 (1% Cir. 1973).

LaBombard presents no evidence overcoming the
presumption that accompanies a tax assessment. Instead
he argues that the government failed to respond to his
letters which “created a default action” under the Uniform
Commercial Code and that the assessments have “no legal
basis” because the IRS had “resolved” the 1988 tax year
deficiency and returned back taxes to him.

The Court has already examined the circumstances of
the 1988 tax year and has concluded that the IRS’
assessment for that year was valid. LaBombard does not

address the validity of the other tax assessments in any

27

way and, therefore, does not challenge the presumption

of correctness that they carry. The motion of the United
States for summary judgment will, therefore, be allowed.
The government requests that the Court enter
judgment against LaBombard in the amount of
$138,857.75, plus statutory interest and additional
penalties accrued to date, and that it grant costs and other
eqprotiate vellel The Court will enter judgment for the
government in the anneal plus interest and
penalties accrued since October 19, 1998. It will not,
however, award costs, primarily because the government

cites no authority that would render such an award

appropriate.

28

ORDER
For the reasons set forth in the Memorandum above:
1) the motion of the defendant, Richard LaBombard,
to dismiss (Docket No. 5) is DENIED;
2) the motion of the plaintiff, the United States, for
summary judgment (Docket No. 5) is
ALLOWED.

So ordered.

s/ Nathaniel M. Gorton
Nathaniel M. Gorton
United States District Judge

Dated: March 31, 2000

29

APPENDIX “E” UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT DOCKET SHEET

30

APPEAL
U.S. District Court
U.S. District Court — Massachusetts (Worcester)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 99-CV-40019

USA v. LaBombard Filed: 02/03/99
Assigned to: Judge Nathaniel M Gorton

Demand: $139,000 Nature of Suit: 870
Lead Docket: None Jurisdiction: US Plaintiff

Dkt# in other court: None
Cause: 26:7401 IRS: Tax Liability

USA ‘ Henry J. Riordan
Plaintiff (COR LD NTC)

US Departinent of
Justice
Tax Division

a” Post Office Box 55
Ben Franklin Station
Washington, DC 20044
202-307-1120

Susan M. Poswistillo
617-748-3267

(COR LD NTC)

United States Attorney’s
Office

1 Courthouse Way
Boston, MA 02210
617-748-3183

RICHARD LABOMBARD __ Richard LaBombard
Defendant (COR LD NTC)
(PRO SE)
12 Peters Drive
Leominster, MA 01453

Docket as of May 25, 2000 11:31 am Page 1

32

Proceedings include all events.
4:99cv40019 USA v. LaBombard APPEAL

2/3/99 1 Complaint filed. Case assigned to Judge:
Gorton. . (dfs)
(Entry date 02/11/99)

2/3/99 -- Summons, MCF, LR4.1, etc. issued for
Richard LaBombard (dfs)
(Entry date 2/11/99)

4/9/99 2 Response by USA in Opposition to motion to
dismiss or, alternatively, for summary

judgment, filed. c/s (jb)
(Entry date 4/12/99)

4/9/99 2 Cross-motion by USA for
judgment, filed. c/s (jb)
(Entry date 04/12/99)

4/9/99 3 Return of service executed as to Richard
LaBombard with service on 3/10/99 filed.
Answer due on 3/30/99 for Richard
LaBombard. (jb) (Entry date 04/ 12/99)

4/21/99 4 Response by Richard LaBombard in
Opposition to (2-1) cross-motion for summary
judgment, filed. c/s (jb)

(Entry date 04/22/99)

4/22/99 5 Motion by Richard LaBombard to dismiss,
filed. c/s (jb)

Docket as of May 25, 2000 11:31 am Page 2

33

Proceedings include all events.
4:99cv40019 USA v. LaBombard APPEAL

2/15/00 6 Judge Nathaniel M. Gorton. Memorandum

3/14/00 7

3/30/00 8

3/31/00 9

and Order entered. “...The briefs
submitted by the parties do not contain an
adequate exposition of certain pertinent
issues. The government is, therefore,
directed to submit, within twenty-one 21
days, a brief... The defendant may respond
to the government’s submission within
fourteen (14) days after such filing...”

See Order #6 of 2/15/00 for entire text.
(EOD Date 2/16/00) (cc/cl) (jb) (Entry
date 2/16/00)

Supplemental Brief to (6-1) memorandum
order by USA, filed, c/s. (dfs) (Entry date
3/16/00)

Response by Richard LaBombard to (2-1)
opposition (5-1) motion to dismiss, filed.
c/s (jb) (Entry date 3/31/00)

Judge Nathaniel M. Gorton.

Memorandum and Order entered denying
(5-1) motion to dismiss and granting (2-1)
motion for summary judgment See Order
#9 of 3/31/00 for entire text. (EOD Date
4/03/00) (cc/cl) (jb) (Entry date 04/03/00)

Docket as of May 25, 2000 11:31 am Page 3

34

Proceedings include all events.
4:99cv40019 USA v. LaBombard APPEAL

5/2/00 10 Notice of appeal by Richard LaBombard
filed. Appeal record due on 5/17/00. (jb)
(Entry date 05/05/00)

5/5/00. 11 Judge Nathaniel M Gorton. Judgment
entered for USA against Richard

r LaBombard. Principal: $138,857.75.
(EOD Date 5/10/00) (ce/cl) (Entry date
05/10/00)
5/18/00 -- Certified copy of docket and record on

appeal forwarded to U.S. Court of
Appeals re: (10-1) appeal. (ghh)

5/25/00 -- US Court of Appeals Case Number
assigned to (0-0) recommendations
appeal : USCA NUMBER: 00-1651.
(ghh)

Docket as of May 25, 2000 11:31 am Page 4

35

APPENDIX “F” LETTER FROM IRS
DATED OCTOBER 1, 1990

36

Department of the Treasury
Internal Revenue Service

Andover, MA 05501

In reply refer to: 9999999999
Oct. 01,1990 LTR 2358C

003-22-4474 8812 30 000
Input Op: 9999999999 02738

RICHARD LABOMBARD
3 PRISCILLA LANE
BILLERICA, MA 01821-1124

Taxpayer Identification Number: 003-22-4474

Tax Form: 1040
Tax Period: Dec. 31, 1988
Correspondence Received Date: Sept. 25, 1990

Dear Taxpayer:

Sincerely yours,
s/Katherine D (illegible)

F/ Daniel J.Nally
Chief, Collection Branch

37

APPENDIX “G”: CERTIFICATE OF ASSESSMENT
SHOWING RETURN OF MILITARY PENSION 04/02/90
TO 09/30/96

38

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386014_2257%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.