# Opposition Brief — Slinger Drainage v. Environmental Protection Agency

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386014_2120%3A2

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2001
- **Citation:** 534 U.S. 972

## Text

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— sep 14 200!
No. 01-86 ¢
Jn the Supreme Court of the United States _ me

SLINGER DRAINAGE, PETITIONER
Vv.

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION

THEODORE B. OLSON
Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
JOHN C. CRUDEN

Acting Assistant Attorney
General

ScoTT J. JORDAN
Attorney
Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
(202) 514-2217

jO@e

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Whether petitioner timely appealed a decision of the
Environmental Appeals Board of the Environmental
Protection Agency within the 30-day appeal period
prescribed by 33 U.S.C. 1319(g¢)(8)(B).

(I)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
American Fed. of Gov’t Empl. v. FLRA, 802 F.2d
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Burnet v. Willingham Loan & Trust Co., 282 U.S.
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Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386 (1995) ........ccsccccsssssssssseeseees

Tribue v. United States, 826 F.2d 638 (7th Cir.

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United Mine Workers of Aniavies v. Dole, 870 F.2d
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United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop.,

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Statutes and rule:
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.-1251 et seq::

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§ 309(g)(8)(B), 33 U.S.C. 1819(g)(8)(B) s.ssscscssccoe

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(IIT)

IV

Rule—Continued:

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In the Supreme Court of the Anited States

No. 01-86
SLINGER DRAINAGE, PETITIONER

Vv.

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION

OPINION BELOW

___ The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 1a-5a)
is reported at 237 F.3d 681.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on
January 30, 2001. A petition for rehearing was denied
on April 13, 2001 (Pet. App. 66a-7la). The petition for a
writ of certiorari was filed on July 12, 2001. The juris-
diction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

STATEMENT

1. Petitioner is in the business of installing field
drainage tile. Petitioner was hired by a landowner who
wanted to drain a wetland portion of his property in

(1)

2

southeastern Wisconsin to make it suitable for farming.
In completing that project, Slinger installed 26,000
linear feet (almost five miles) of drainage tile in a 50-
acre area of wetlands. Pet. App. 2a, 48a. Following an
evidentiary hearing, an administrative law judge (ALJ)
determined that petitioner had violated Section 301(a)
of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1311(a), by redeposit-
ing dredged material into waters of the United States
without obtaining the permit required under Section
404 of the Act, 33 U.S.C. 1844. The ALJ assessed a
Class II civil penalty of $90,000. Pet. App. 2a.

2. On September 29, 1999, the Environmental Ap-
peals Board (EAB) of the Environmental Protection
Agency affirmed the ALJ’s decision. On November 1,
1999, petitioner appealed the EAB’s decision to the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit. Pet. App. 2a-3a.

3. The court of appeals dismissed petitioner’s appeal
for lack of jurisdiction. Pet. App. la-5a. The court ob-
served that the Clean Water Act provides that a party
may obtain judicial review of an assessment of a Class
II penalty “by filing a notice of appeal * * * * within
the 30-day period beginning on the date the civil
penalty order is issued.” Jd. at 2a (quoting 33 U.S.C.
1319(g)(8)(B)). The court assumed, without deciding,
that the EAB issued its decision on September 30, 1999,
the day the EAB mailed its decision to petitioner and
posted the decision on its website. The court none-
theless held that petitioner’s appeal was untimely,
because the 30-day period under 33 U.S.C. 1319(g)(8)(B)
ended on October 29, 1999, and the notice of appeal was
not filed until November 1, 1999. The court explained
that it would not apply Federal Rule of Appellate Pro-
cedure 26(a), which provides that a computation of a
time period under the Rules or an “applicable statute”

3

should “[e}]xclude the day of the act, event, or default
that begins the period.” The court reasoned that the
Clean Water Act itself specifies that the 30-day period
begins on the date the civil penalty order is issued and
thus the date of September 30 must be included in
computing the 30-day period. Pet. App. 4a-5a.

ARGUMENT

Petitioner asks this Court to hold that his appeal was
timely because the 30-day appeal period under 33
U.S.C. 1319(g)(8)(B) began on the day after the civil
penalty order was issued, and that the date of issuance
was the day on which the order was mailed to the
parties and posted on EPA’s website rather than the
day that the order was signed and dated. Petitioner’s
contention, however, lacks merit and, in any event, does
not warrant this Court’s review.

1. The court of appeals correctly held that 33 U.S.C.
1319(g)(8)(B) directs that the 30-day appeal period
begins on the date of issuance of a civil penalty order.
Pet. App. 4a-5a. The text of that provision provides
that a person seeking review of an EPA administrative
civil penalty order under the Clean Water Act must file
a notice of appeal “within the 30-day period beginning
on the date the civil penalty order is issued.” 33 U.S.C.
1319(g)(8)(B) (emphasis added). “Judicial review provi-
sions * * * are jurisdictional in nature and must be
construed with strict fidelity to their terms. * * *
This is all the more true of statutory provisions specify-
ing the timing of review, for those time limits are, as we
have often stated, ‘mandatory and jurisdictional.’”
Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 405 (1995) (quoting Mis-
souri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 45 (1990)). The court of
appeals properly applied that principle in concluding
that 33 U.S.C. 1319(g)(8)(B) dictates that the 30-day

4

period begins on, not after, the date of an order’s
issuance. Pet. App. 2a.

Petitioner errs in relying (Pet. 13) on Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 26(a)(1), which provides for the
exclusion of the date of an order to be appealed with
respect to the computation of time for an appeal under
any “applicable statute.” The court of appeals correctly
concluded that Rule 26(a) has no application to 33
U.S.C. 1319(g)(8)(B) because “Congress has specified a
particular method of counting in the statute itself and
there is no indication of a contrary congressional inten-
tion.” Pet. App. 4a. Contrary to petitioner’s assertion
(Pet. 17), Rule 26(a) and the statute cannot be read
together. Rule 26(a) provides for counting to begin
after the date an order is issued, while 33 U.S.C.
1319(g)(8)(B) specifies that the counting must begin on
the date that the order is issued.

Petitioner further argues (Pet. 14-25) that the court
of appeals’ decision is inconsistent with the decisions of
other courts. Petitioner cites no other decision, how-
ever, interpreting 33 U.S.C. 1319(g)(8)(B), the statute
at issue in this case. Indeed, many of the decisions that
petitioner cites involve statutes that provide that the
running of the appeal period begins “after” the action
sought to be appealed,’ or address the application of
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 26(a)(3), which

1 See, e.g., Burnet v. Willingham Loan & Trust Co., 282 U.S.
437 (1931) (claim must be filed “within five years after” tax return
was due or was filed); United Mine Workers of America v. Dole,
870 F.2d 662, 663 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (a challenge to a new safety stan-
dard under 30 U.S.C. 811(d) must be filed before the 60th day
“after” such standard was promulgated); Tribue v. United States,
826 F.2d 633 (7th Cir. 1987) (claim under Federal Tort Claims Act
must be filed within six months after final denial of claim by

agency).

5

extends the time to file when the last day falls on a
weekend or holiday.”

Petitioner also relies (Pet. 20-21) on American Fed-
eration of Government Employees v. FLRA, 802 F.2d
47 (2d Cir. 1986). That decision interpreted 5 U.S.C. -
7123(a), which provides for review of a final agency
order “during the 60-day period beginning on the date
on which the order was issued.” The court concluded
that the clock under 5 U.S.C. 7123(a) begins after the
date that the order was issued. 802 F.2d at 48-49. The
court reasoned that counting the date of issuance as one
of the 60 days leaves a petitioner with only 59 days plus
some portion of the date of issuance, depending on the
time of day on which the order is issued. Jd. at 48. The
result reached by the court, however, expands the 60-
day period to 60 days plus some portion of the date of
_ issuance, because theoretically a petitioner could file its
appeal on the date of issuance.

In any event, American Federation does not present
a square conflict with the decision below because the
decisions interpret different statutes. Moreover, the
existence of a single decision decided 15 years ago

suggests that even if there is a tension in the circuits, it __

is not sufficiently developed or widespread to warrant
review by this Court at this time.

2 We do not dispute that Rule 26(a)(3) would apply if the final
day of petitioner’s appeal period had fallen on a weekend or holi-
day, because Section 1319(g)(8)(B) itself does not address computa-
tion in the event that the 30th day falls on a weekend or holiday.

6

2. This Court’s review is also not warranted because
petitioner’s appeal was untimely in any event unless
petitioner is also correct in its contention that the date
of issuance of the civil penalty was September 30, 1999
(the date the decision was sent to petitioner) and not
September 29 (the date of the decision). Pet. App. 3a;
see also Pet. 8-9, 25-27. The court of appeals, however,
did not decide that question or consider the general
question of when a civil penalty order is “issued” for
purposes of 33 U.S.C. 1319(g)(8)(B). See Pet. App. 3a
(“For the purpose of assessing our jurisdiction, we
assume, without deciding, that [petitioner] is correct
that the order issued on Thursday, September 30,
1999.”). Nor does petitioner cite a decision of any other
court that addresses that question under 33 U.S.C.
1319(g)(8)(B). Accordingly, this Court should decline
petitioner’s request that it address the issue in the first
instance. See, e.g., United States v. Oakland Cannabis
Buyers’ Coop., 121 S. Ct. 1711, 1719 (2001); National
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Smith, 525 U.S. 459, 470
(1999).

CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted.

THEODORE B. OLSON
Solicitor General

JOHN C. CRUDEN
Acting Assistant Attorney
General

ScoTT J. JORDAN
Attorney

SEPTEMBER 2001

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386014_2120%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
