# Opposition Brief — Freeman v. City of Dallas > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386014_1846%3A2 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Opposition Brief - **Published:** January 1, 2001 - **Citation:** 534 U.S. 817 ## Text Scorome tout US n\ TELED JUL 31 2001 No. 00-1755 f CLERK In The ee Supreme Court of the United States ¢ CHARLES FREEMAN and ROSALYN BROWN, Petitioners, CITY OF DALLAS, Respondent. * On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari To The United States Court Of Appeals For The Fifth Circuit * BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT THE CITY OF DALLAS IN OPPOSITION ¢ City Attorney of the City of Dallas Peter B. Haske Assistant City Attorney Counsel of Record Orrice oF THE Dattas City ATTORNEY City Hall, 1500 Marilla, 7/b/north Dallas TX 75201 (214) 670-3519 (214) 670-0622 (Telecopier) Attorney for City of Dallas, Respondent COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., (800) 225-6964 OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831 QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1. Does the Fourth Amendment prohibition against “unreasonable . . . Seizures” of property require a sepa- rate judicial seizure warrant prior to a building demoli- tion that is accomplished pursuant to a quasi-judicial municipal board order issued after notice, the oppor- tunity to be heard, and the right to judicial appeal, regardless of the reasonableness of the administrative order? 2. Did the owners of two vacant multi-unit residen- tial apartment buildings demolished by the City of Dallas as “urban nuisances” receive adequate procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment in connection with the demolitions of their buildings under the facts of this case? i TABLE OF CONTENTS Page QUESTIONS PRESENTED . ..ccccccccccscesccessces i TABLE OF CONTENTS «2.5. sccsesscecsssncesseens ii TABLE OF AUTHRORITIES « .. se cccccacesccssccsscss Vv OPINIONS BELOW. ooi i cvic sei sweedivecedsdstesee 1 JURISDICTION . ... i cakssotsnpstepesseuenshbeevess. 2 CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, TREATIES, STAT- UTES, AND REGULATIONS. .......cccccccccsces 2 STATEMENT OF THEE CAG. scccasccesvvenccscsess 3 A. Course Of Proceedings and Disposition...... 3 - B. Statement of Pate: so. sscsscssevedesvecserss 5 1. Petitioners’ Acquisition of the Properties.. 5 2. The UE csckccosesdencsentanss liveness 6 3. 2611 Meyers Street Property and First URSB Hearing Thereon ................ 8 4. 2621 Meyers Street Property and First URSB Hearing Thereon ................ 10 5. The URSB Rehearings........cccccessee 12 6. The URSB Final Orders and Notices of Right tO AMOMAE ssccassssesssccvssesess 14 ARGUMENT . .. +4 5sasa¥eua gs bebe eneenewasies exes 14 A. Introducthat..96iica9s peaenesg saceeasadenicess 14 B. There was No Disregard of this Court’s Prece- dems... .«. 7, 1. ¢ ARGUMENT A. Introduction The Petitioners seek a radical change in Fourth Amendment law. Their Fourth Amendment argument asks for the unprecedented creation of an absolute 15 requirement for a judicial “seizure” warrant and aban- donment of this Court’s long line of precedents that assess the validity of seizures under a rule of reason. Petitioners do not now, and never have, alleged that the demolitions were factually unreasonable seizures (that the code violations did not justify demolitions of their buildings). Even though they also dispute the adequacy of the due process they received, their substantive claim is that the seizures (demolitions) were per se unreason- able, even if due process had been sufficient, solely because there were no judicial seizure warrants in addi- tion to the Board orders. Petitioners’ Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process arguments are simply misplaced; predicated on the mistaken belief that they had no right to judicial review of the URSB’s administrative orders.” The Petitioners have never, either at the administra- tive proceedings nor in this later federal court litigation, disputed that the code violations asserted by city inspec- tors existed in their buildings; that they had received the opportunity to repair those violations, that they lacked the funds, materials, and workers to complete such repairs; or that such violations rendered their buildings “urban nuisances,” and so potentially eligible for demoli- tion under the City’s minimum urban standards policies. Rather than disputing the existence of the defects that needed repair, their strategy at the URSB proceedings was simply to stall. They never asked that any of the inspectors testify. They never sought to call other wit- nesses or to adduce other evidence. They never asked to see the files from which staff read and to which Board members referred during the URSB hearings. They failed to appeal to district court. In short, they waived any 16 procedural complaints about the fair administrative hear- ings that the Board conducted. B. There was No Disregard of this Court’s Precedents 1. Opinion Below Did Not Conflict With This Court’s Fourth Amendment Precedents Contrary to Petitioners’ argument (Pet. 21-27), the Fifth Circuit scrupulously followed this Court’s holdings that the validity of seizures under the Fourth Amend- ment is to be judged by the rule of reason. See Soldal v. Cook County, IIl., 506 U.S. 56, 62 (1992); G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 351 (1977). In addition, the en banc majority carefully considered this Court’s deci- sions respecting the level of probable cause needed for non-criminal administrative code enforcement inspec- tions, and applied the rationale of those decisions to the “seizures” here. (Pet. App. 15-18). See Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967). A subsequent Fifth Circuit opinion accurately states the Freeman court’s en banc Fourth Amendment holding: “The [Freeman en banc] court held that the seizure of buildings designated ‘nui- sances’ pursuant to established and non-arbitrary police power procedures was not rendered per se unreasonable by the city’s failure to obtain a warrant to enforce a demolition order.” James v. City of Dallas, ___ F.3d ___ 2001 WL 682089, *14 n.8, Case No. 00-10556 (5th Cir. June 18, 2001). This rationale squarely follows this Court’s repeated holdings that “ ‘reasonableness is still the ulti- mate standard’ under the Fourth Amendment.” Soldal, 506 U.S. at 71, quoting Camara, 387 U.S. at 539. 17 Since no decision of this Court imposes a per se warrant requirement for seizures — particularly seizures not involving criminal investigations, the court of appeals could not have improperly disregarded any such deci- sion. The decisions of this Court upon which the Peti- tioners rely are inapposite; because they deal with warrant requirements for searches rather than seizures. Searches are fundamentally different than seizures in that an arbitrary or unlimited search involves potentially broad governmental rummaging through persons’ “houses, papers, and effects.” U.S. Const., amend. 4 (Pet. 1). It was the evil inherent in an arbitrary and unlimited search, the fishing expedition, more than the arbitrary seizure, that was the primary impetus for the Fourth Amendment, because searches often can be so much more intrusive than seizures and because pre-Independence Americans suffered more from over-broad searches than from warrantless seizures. See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69-70 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (his- torical discussion). This Court has explicitly recognized this important distinction between searches, for which warrants are presumptively required absent a recognized exception, and seizures, for which warrants are but one way that a governmental agency can satisfy the require- ment for reasonableness. See G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, supra, 429 U.S. at 351. 2. The Opinion Below Did Not Conflict With This Court’s Procedural Due Process Precedents Petitioners also attempt to use this Court’s decision in Honda Motors, Inc. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415 (1994), to 18 impose burdens on the City beyond those required by the procedural due process standards of the Fourteenth Amendment, and accuse the Fifth Circuit of disregarding Honda Motors. (Pet. 27, 30). In Honda Motors, this Court addressed the total absence of any “protection against arbitrary and inaccurate adjudication” in the State of Oregon’s procedures for determining punitive damages in civil trials. 512 U.S. at 430. The Court was struggling with the unique and vexing problem posed by calculation of punitive damages by a jury whose decision was insu- lated from effective judicial review. Id. Because Peti- tioners mistakenly believe that Texas law does not give them a right to appellate review of the URSB orders (Pet. 27-28), they treat Honda-Motors as presenting a situation analogous to their own. Honda Motors is not at all similar to the instant case because, as the en banc opinion below correctly held, the Petitioners had the absolute right to appeal to the Texas courts. (Pet. App. 3). The Petitioners had, but failed to exercise, an absolute right to plenary state court review of the URSB orders. City Code § 27-9(e) (Resp. App. 59); Cedar Crest No. 10, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 754 S.W.2d 351, 353 (Tex.App. — Eastland 1988, no writ), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1081 (1989). State court judicial review of an URSB demolition order is not a “discretionary writ of certiorari proceeding” as alleged by Petitioners. (Pet. 5). The state appellate court has no discretion to refuse to review the administrative order, and the aggrieved parties have an appeal as of right from a Board demolition order. Dallas City Code § 27-9(e) (Resp. App. 59); see also Texas Loc. Government Code §§ 54.039 (Resp. App. 8-10) and 214.0012 (Resp. App. 18-19) (statutory rights to appeal in similar municipal demolition proceedings authorized by iii 19 general state laws). Even absent any statutory appeal provision in the City Code, or even if the City Code purported to deny any right to judicial appeal from URSB orders, persons aggrieved by municipal demolition orders in Texas have an absolute right to judicial review under the “due course of law” clause in Article I, Section 13 of the Texas Constitution (Resp. App. 5). Nash v. City of Lubbock, 888 S.W.2d 557, 562 (Tex.App. - Amarillo 1994, no writ). Petitioners seize on term “certiorari” (Pet. 5) because in other contexts it is associated with discretion- ary judicial review, and use the term inappropriately here. The sole role of the “certiorari” mechanism in appeals from URSB orders is that certiorari is the writ that the state district court uses to order the URSB to produce the administrative record and the reasons for the administrative decision. See, e.g., Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code §§ 54.039(b)-(e) (Resp. App. 9), 214.0012(b)-(e) (Resp. App. 18-19); Nussbaum v. City of Dallas, 948 S.W.2d 305, 308 (Tex.App. - Dallas 1996, no writ). Moreover, Texas state court review would not have been “limited” (Pet. 5) had Petitioners appealed. Their appeal would have provided full consideration of any litigable constitutional issues that they might have raised. Under the “substantial evidence” standard of review applicable here, Texas state courts fully determine federal constitutional claims as well as the sufficiency of the evidence in appeals from administrative orders. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 2001.174 (“substantial evidence” review of state agency decisions includes substantive and pro- cedural constitutional issues); City of Sherman v. Henry, 928 S.W.2d 464 (Tex. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1156 (1997) (considering substantive due process claims in “substantial evidence” appeal from city personnel 20 action); Cedar Crest No. 10, Inc. v. City of Dallas, supra (considering substantive and procedural due process claims on “substantial evidence” appeal from Dallas demolition order). The Petitioners cite no cases identify- ing any constitutional right to de novo trial on appeal from - an adverse administrative decision and there are none. Petitioners admit that Honda Motors does not hold that administrative procedures cannot provide adequate due process (Pet. 29). Honda Motors only views as suspect changes from traditional common law procedures that deprive a party of adequate protections against depriva- tion of property or liberty. 512 U.S. at 430. Petitioners can only argue that that happened here by maintaining their mistaken belief that they had no right to judicial review. In addition, Petitioners mistakenly rely on Crossman v. City of Galveston, 247 S.W. 810 (Tex. 1923), and other Texas state court cases for the proposition that Texas common law barred city demolitions of nuisances except through court actions to abate nuisance. (Pet. 18, 19, 28). They read Crossman incorrectly, so that their attempt to use Crossman to render Honda Motors applicable to this case must fail. Crossman rejected on due process grounds the demolition of a building as a nuisance via municipal order “in the absence of any general laws either of the city or of the state.” 247 S.W. at 813. Here, by contrast, Texas’ state constitution and the general city laws con- tained in Dallas’ charter and city code all expressly authorize the Board actions here challenged. The City created the URSB and the program it administers pur- suant to the City’s powers as a Texas “home rule” city to take virtually any measures respecting local problems that do not conflict with state laws. See Texas Const. art. 11, § 5 at Resp. App. 5; City Charter ch. I, § 1 at Resp. jtmneteci es ee 21 App. 23, ch. II, § 1(16), (18), (24), (28), and (31) at Resp. App. 24-28, ch. II, § 2 at Resp. App. 34, Ch. XV, § 2 at Resp. App. 36; City Code ch. 27 passim at Resp. App. 41 et seq. The only other relevant procedural due process objec- tion that the Crossman court had to the administratively- ordered demolition there was that the Galveston City Council’s determination of nuisance was final. 247 S.W. at 813. Here by contrast, as demonstrated above, Petitioners had the right to appeal to state district court. City Code § 27-9(e) (Resp. App. 59). Thus the most recent Texas state appellate opinion on point, not cited by Petitioners, upheld the City of Dallas’ URSB program against a due process challenge that asserted that the right to appeal Board demolition orders under City Code § 27-9(e) was too limited. This opinion correctly distinguished the Texas Supreme Court cases upon which Petitioners now rely (Pet. 28 n.13 and accompanying text) upon the grounds that those cases involved situations without the right to judicial review. See Cedar Crest No. 10, Inc. v. City of Dallas, supra, 754 S$.W.2d at 353. C. The Opinion Below Created No Conflict Among the Circuit Courts Petitioners point to no opinions of other circuits con- flicting with the opinion below on procedural due pro- cess issues. However, on the Fourth Amendment question, they assert that the opinion below conflicts with opinions in two other circuits: Conner v. City of Santa Ana, 897 F.2d 1487 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 816 (1990) (Pet. 15-16) and Hroch v. City of Omaha, 4 F.3d 693 (8th Cir. 1993). (Pet. 17). Contrary to Petitioners’ contentions, there is no divergence among the circuits as to whether a 22 warrant is necessary to execute an administrative order to demolish a building, where the order is issued after notice, hearing, and the opportunity for judicial appeal: The Fifth Circuit and the Eight Circuit opinions hold that no warrant is required, while the Ninth Circuit has not yet squarely addressed the question. The Fifth Circuit’s decision is the en banc opinion below. The Ninth Circuit decision, Conner, did require a judicial warrant for breaking down a fence to enter an occupied residential property within an “enclosed, fenced yard” to seize junk automobiles. 897 F.2d at 1491. Nev- ertheless, the Ninth Circuit recognized that prior pro- cedural protections, including “numerous hearings and appeals,” id. at 1490, “established . . . the validity of the seizure.” Id. at 1491. It was the entry into the private fenced residential property (the search for the cars) that the Ninth Circuit held to trigger the need for a warrant. Id. at 1491-92. Only the assertedly unlawful entry into fenced, occupied, residential property rendered the sub- sequent warrantless seizures unlawful according to the Ninth Circuit. Id. at 1492. If read as Petitioners would have it, to require a warrant to execute an administrative order to seize personal property that was not located in fenced private land, Conner would be contrary to G.M. Leasing, supra, 429 U.S. at 351 (permitting warrantless seizures of vehicles from property where the seizures “did not involve any invasion of privacy”). In Conner, the administrative order purported to authorize entry by breaking down a fence and entering into the yard of an occupied residence, whereas here, the buildings were vacant and thefe is no indication that they were fenced. Conner does not hold that the absentee owners of a vacant and dilapidated building have any right to a judicial ee ee ae ts see 23 warrant before execution of an administrative demolition warrant. The Eighth Circuit’s Hroch decision recognized most of these factors, when it distinguished Hroch from Conner on the facts. 4 F.3d at 696-97. Indeed, Hroch, although relied on by Petitioners, actually supports the City and is entirely consistent with the Fifth Circuit’s en banc opinion below. Hroch upheld an administratively-ordered seizure against a Fourth Amendment challenge on the grounds that the property owner's right to seek judicial review of the seizure order “provide[d] a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant.” 4 F.3d at 696-97, quoting Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 603 (1981). Petitioners here also had the right to judicial review. They simply chose not to appeal. As a subsequent Eight Circuit opinion explicitly recognizes, Hroch stands for the same proposition as does the en banc Fifth Circuit opinion here: administrative seizure orders, issued after procedural safeguards that are sufficient to satisfy the Fourteenth Amendment, also will normally be found reasonable, and hence sufficient, under the Fourth Amendment. See Samuels v. Meriwether, 94 F.3d 1163, 1167 (8th Cir. 1996). D. The Court of Appeals Correctly Decided This Case 1. The “Seizures” of Petitioners’ Abandoned Buildings Pursuant to Administrative Demoli- tion Orders Were Reasonable Under the Facts of this Case, and Thus Permissible under the Fourth Amendment Execution of the URSB orders in this case without a judicial warrant was reasonable for Fourth Amendment 24 purposes because this course of action struck the appro- priate balance between competing private and govern- ment interests. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14-15 (1948). Upon such considerations, in Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559 (1999), this Court approved a warrant- less seizure of a contraband automobile that was in plain view in a public place. See also, G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, supra, 429 U.S. at 351 (no warrant needed for seizures of vehicles from property where the seizures “did not involve any invasion of privacy”). Here, no plain view or other warrant exception was required, because the URSB demolition orders expressly authorized demoli- tion, the Petitioners had already received more pro- cedural rights than they would have obtained from the City’s ex parte presentation to a magistrate, the Petitioners failed to exercise the right to appeal, and the City had a strong interest in enforcing its minimum housing stan- dards in an efficient manner, and in protecting the public from hazardous buildings. By contrast, the Petitioners’ intended commercial use of the buildings provided them only with a diminished expectation of privacy compared to that of an in-residence homeowner. See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 700 (1987) (“An expectation of pri- vacy in commercial premises, however, is different from, and indeed less than, a similar expectation in an individ- ual’s home.”). Nothing could be more reasonable than implementation of a legislatively authorized administra- tive order, issued after adequate notice and hearing, as to which the aggrieved parties had, but failed to exercise, their absolute right to appeal. The Petitioners could not possibly reasonably have believed, having participated in hearings, been served with the URSB orders, and been advised of their rights to —— er 25 appeal, that their buildings would remain standing or that their properties would remain free of liens. Since any expectations to that effect were unreasonable, the imple- mentation of the URSB orders was valid under the Fourth Amendment. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984). Moreover, the URSB as a quasi-judicial body was the functional equivalent of a neutral and detached magis- trate for Fourth Amendment purposes - so that the URSB orders satisfied any requirement for a warrant here. A magistrate for the purposes of issuing arrest warrants under the Fourth Amendment need not be a judge. Shad- wick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345 (1972) (reserving the question of whether a magistrate needs to work under judicial supervision); see Ward v. Village of Monroeville, Ohio, 409 U.S. 57 (1972) (mayor’s direct interest in finances, not executive status, could disqualify him as judge); Dugan v. Ohio, 277 U.S. 61 (1928) (mayor with limited financial duties qualified to be a judge because no direct interest in collection of fines); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 534 (1927) (union of executive and judicial power does not necessarily violate due process). The URSB has no duties that would interfere with its impar- tiality. City Code, ch. 27 (Resp. App. 41 et seq.). Texas has explicitly vested municipal boards similar to the URSB with quasi-judicial powers. Subchapter C of Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code Title 2, Subtitle D, Chapter 54 (§§ 54.032-54.043, entitled” Quasi-Judicial Enforcement of Health and Safety Ordinances”) (Excerpts at Resp. App. 8-9). The Fifth Circuit recognizes the URSB as exercising “quasi-judicial” powers. (Pet. App. 24). The Petitioners enjoyed more due process rights before the URSB than 26 they ever could have obtained through an ex parte pre- sentment to a judge of a warrant application. Moreover, the Fourth Amendment clearly was not originally intended to reflect hostility to fair administrative pro- cedures - it was directed against arbitrary action. Just as the drafters of what is now codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1983 could not have predicted the modern reliance on admin- istrative remedies (“We also see no reason to suppose that Congress, in enacting the Reconstruction civil rights stat- utes, wished to foreclose the adaptation of traditional principles of preclusion to such subsequent developments as the burgeoning use of administrative adjudication in the 20th century.” University of Tennessee v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 797 (1986), accord Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 98-101 (1980)); those who drafted and ratified the Fourth Amendment more than a century before administrative adjudications became common practice, could not have intended to place limits on procedurally fair administra- tive adjudications. 2. Petitioners Received Adequate Procedural Due Process Under the Facts of This Case The reinstated majority panel opinion respecting due process (Pet. App. 65-69), properly rejected Petitioners’ claims that they did not receive an adequate opportunity to be heard (Pet. App. 66-68) and correctly ruled that they were not deprived of due process when they did not receive an additional hearing on the amount of demoli- tion expenses because their opportunity to do the demoli- tion work themselves sufficiently protected them against exorbitant demolition costs, and “[a] hearing on costs 27 before the demolition could have done no more.” (Pet. App. 69). The record supports the court of appeals’ panel and en banc conclusions that Petitioners had ample notice and opportunity to be heard. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313-15 (1950) (notice); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (opportunity to be heard). Petitioners complain that they may not have received notice of all violations for which the property was cited (Pet. 9), but notice of violations went to the then-owners of record. (R. vol. 2, p. 04-05, 035).2 Besides, Freeman was very familiar with the state of the proper- ties from working on and cleaning them. (See R. vol. 8, p. 58-59, 60-62, 81-82, 86-88). His testimony at four hearings and at the district court trial clearly demonstrates his awareness of the repairs that inspectors were requiring. Petitioners also complain about “ex parte” communica- tions between staff and Board members, and members’ visits to the properties. (Pet. 8-9). However, they allege no specific prejudice from those alleged events, and cite no 2 On February 28, 1994, Freeman falsely told the URSB that he was the lawful owner of both properties, but that he transferred one to Brown’s name. (R. vol. 6, p. 99-100). Again, on May 23, 1994, Freeman told the URSB that he was the actual owner of the two properties. (R. vol. 6, p. 64-65). In fact, he only acquired a .1% interest in the properties from Brown in August, 1994. (R. vol. 6, p. 79-80, 133-34). Any failure to serve Freeman with notices of inspection violations that were sent to the owners of record shortly after the inspections obviously was caused by the Board’s reliance on Freeman’s misrepresentations. Had Freeman not been intimately familiar with the structures, or had he desired additional copies of the notices or other documents consulted at the hearings, he simply could have asked to see them. He did not. 28 authority for the proposition that due process prohibits them. The court of appeals carefully considered these complaints and correctly determined that under the spec- ific facts here presented these occurrences did not deprive Petitioners of procedural due process. (Pet. App. 66-68). Petitioners also continue mistakenly to insist that they had no right to appeal from the URSB orders. (Pet. 5). However, as demonstrated above, Petitioners had the absolute right to judicial appeal. Petitioners also erroneously assert that Texas law prevented them from obtaining a stay pending appeal (Pet. 6), relying on Texas Local Government Code §§ 54.039(e) (Resp. App. 9) and 214.0012(e) (Resp. App. 19) for that proposition. However, those laws do not apply because the City has not implemented the relevant portions of chapters 54 or 214 of the Local Government Code. See Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code §§ 54.031 (Resp. App. 8), 214.001(a) (Resp. App. 10). Even if §§ 54.039(e) and 214.0012(e) applied here, those provisions merely state that the appeal “does not stay proceedings on the deci- sion appealed from.” (Resp. App. 9). This is similar to the procedure in many appeals. There may be no automatic stay, but nothing prevents an appellant from moving for a stay pending appeal under general equitable principles. See, e.g., S. Ct. R. 23; Fed. R. App. P. 8. In Texas, those equitable principles are codified in statutes and rules of civil procedure. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §§ 65.001 (Resp. App. 7) (application of equity principles), 65.011 (Resp. App. 7-8) (grounds for injunction); Tex. R. Civ. P. 680 (Resp. App. 20-21) (temporary restraining order). Contrary to Petitioners’ insinuations, the term “urban nuisance” as defined by City Code § 27-3(23) (Resp. App. aa. 29 17), is neither vague nor subjective, and does not permit demolition upon merely aesthetic considerations as Peti- tioners imply. (Pet. 11). The en banc majority opinion below correctly recognized that the definition was clear, concrete, specific, and objective. Freeman v. City of Dallas, n. 2 (Pet. App. 5); accord Criswell v. City of Dallas, Texas, 2001 WL 609480, *5, Civ. Case No. 3:00-CV-0687-G (N.D. Tex. May 29, 2001) (unpublished).? Under the City Code definition, before a structure can be classified as an “urban nuisance” (and thus considered for an order of repair or demolition under City Code § 27-13 (Resp. App. 67)), the structure must either be “dangerous” within the meaning of City Code § 27-3(23)(A) (Resp. App. 47) or fail to meet the standards of City Code § 27-3(23)(B) (Resp. App. 47) by reason of violating at least two of the 31 “Minimum Standards” for structural soundness, utilities, and health enumerated in City Code § 27-11 (Resp. App. 3 The Criswell court stated: Section 27-11, referenced in the definition of an urban nuisance, is comprised of no less than 31 separately delineated property, structural, utility, and health standards. Dallas, Tex. Rev. City Code, Art. III, 27-11(a)-(d). These 31 standards are extremely detailed, going se far as to specify a minimum temperature for the hot water supplied by the water heater and the size of the masonry support dowels for the foundation. Dallas, Tex. Rev. City Code, Art. III, 27-11(c)(4), 27-11(b)(2). .. . Pursuant to its own review of the detailed nuisance standards contained in Chapter 27 and in accordance with the Fifth Circuit’s findings on the same issue, this court concludes that the definition of an “urban nuisance” is not unconstitutionally vague. Criswell v. City of Dallas, Texas, 2001 WL 609480, *5. 30 60-65). None of those standards relate merely to cosmetic appearances or would permit demolition if a structure were merely subjectively “offensive or annoying” as alleged by Petitioners. (Pet. 11). All of these “Minimum Standards” address substantial concerns of public health, safety, fitness for residence, or structural integrity. Only if violations of these “Minimum Standards” are the cause for the structure being objectively “substantially offen- sive and annoying to persons of ordinary sensibilities, tastes, and habits living in the community.” City Code § 27-3(23)(B) (Resp. App. 47), will the “offensive or annoying” condition make the structure an “urban nui- sance.” Despite the Petitioners’ contrary argument (Pet. 11), the Board has no power to demolish a building merely because board members find it “annoying” or “offensive.” : + CONCLUSION The Petitioners’ grounds for review being without merit, and there being no additional grounds warranting review, the Petition for a writ of certiorari in this fact- ~ intensive case should-be denied. Respectfully submitted, Peter B. HaAsKEL Assistant City Attorney Counsel of Record Orrice OF THE Da.tias City ATTORNEY | 1500 Marilla, 7/b/north Dallas TX 75201 (214) 670-3519 (214) 670-0622 (FAX) Attorney for City of Dallas, Respondent ete Resp. App. 1 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION CHARLES FREEMAN and ROSALYN BROWN, Plaintiffs, Case No. 3-96-CV-1108-DES V. CITY OF DALLAS, ) ) ) ) ) ) Defendant. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER (Filed Oct. 9, 1997) This matter is before the court on plaintiff’s Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment (Doc. 60). Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) allows for motions to alter or amend judgment if filed within ten days after entry of the judgment. The purpose of Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) is “to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence.” Waltman v. International Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468, 473 (5th Cir. 1989) (quoting Keene Corp. v. International Fidelity Insurance Co., 561 F. Supp. 656, 665 (N.D. Ill. 1982), aff’d., 735 F.2d 1367 (7th Cir. 1984)). Because Fed. P.. Civ. P. 59(e) does not list specific grounds to alter or amend judgments, a district court has consid- erable discretion in deciding whether to grant the motion. 11 CHarLes ALAN Wricut & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL Practice AND Procepure: Civil 2d § 2810.1 (citing Edward H. Bohlin Co., Inc. v. Banning Co., Inc., 6 F.3d 350, 355 (5th Cir. 1993)). Factors a district court may consider include: (1) whether the judgment is based upon a manifest error Resp. App. 2 of law or fact; (2) the existence of newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence; (3) whether recon- sideration is necessary to prevent manifest injustice; or (4) an intervening change in controlling law. Id. Recon- sideration of a judgment, however, is an extraordinary remedy which should be used sparingly. Id. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) motions should not be used to relitigate old matters, raise new arguments, or present evidence that could have been raised prior to entry of the judgment. Id. Plaintiffs move the court to alter or amend its August 13, 1997 judgment in which the court disallowed prejudg- ment interest and declinéd to enjoin the City of Dallas (“City”) from maintaining a lien on plaintiffs’ property to recover the costs of demolition. Plaintiffs contend that plaintiffs’ counsel misstated the law governing the award of prejudgment interest in their motion for judgment. Plaintiffs point out that state law governs the award of prejudgment interest in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions, and argue that Texas law provides that judgments in property damage cases must include prejudgment interest. Plain- tiffs also contend that the court erred by allowing the lien to stand because it requires the plaintiffs “to pay for the unconstitutional demolition” or hold the land with a cloud on the title. ‘As an initial matter, the court notes that plaintiffs are advancing arguments that could have been raised before entry of judgment. Motions to alter or amend a judgment, however, “cannot be used to raise arguments which could, and should, have been made before the judgment issued.” Simon v. United States, 891 F.2d 1154, 1159 (5th Cir. 1990) (quoting Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 781 F.2d 1260, 1268 (7th Cir. 1986)). Accordingly, plaintiffs’ eee Resp. App. 3 arguments are not proper grounds to alter or amend a judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). On their merits, plaintiffs’ arguments are also unhelpful. As to plaintiffs’ first argument, the court dis- agrees that Texas law requires an award of prejudgment interest under the circumstances of the present case. Plaintiffs’ second argument appears to be incorrectly premised on the idea that the court determined the demo- lition itself to have been unconstitutional. The court did not question the City’s ultimate right to demolish prop- erty found to be a nuisance by the City Urban Rehabilita- tion Standards Board. The court merely found that the Fourth Amendment required the City to obtain a warrant before effectuating such demolition. IT IS THEREFORE BY THE COURT ORDERED that plaintiff’s Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment (Doc. 60) is denied. Dated this 7 day of October, 1997, at Topeka, Kansas. /s/ Dale E. Saffels DALE E. SAFFELS United States District Judge Resp. App. 4 Unritrep States Court OF APPEALS FOR THE FirrH Circurt. Locat Rute 41.3 5TH CIR. R. 41 ISSUANCE OF MANDATE; STAY OF MANDATE * * * 41.3 Effect of Granting Rehearing En Banc. Unless otherwise expressly provided, the granting of a rehearing en banc vacates the panel opinion and judgment of the court and stays the mandate. Resp. App. 5 CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF TEXAS, ArtTIcLE 1, SECTION 13, TEXAS CONSTITUTION ARTICLE 1. BILL OF RIGHTS SECTION 13. Excessive bail or fines; cruel and unusual punishment; remedy by due course of law. Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel or unusual punishment inflicted. All courts shall be open, and every person for an injury done him, in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have - remedy by due course of law. Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel or unusual punishment inflicted. All courts shall be open, and every person for an injury done him, in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law. CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF TEXAS, ArTIcLE 11, SecTION 5 TEXAS CONSTITUTION Article 11 - MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS Section 5 - Cities of more than 5,000 population; adop- tion or amendment of charters; taxes; debt restrictions Cities having more than five thousand (5000) inhabitants may, by a majority vote of the qualified voters of said city, at an election held for that purpose, adopt or amend their charters. If the number of inhabitants of cities that have adopted or amended their charters under this section is reduced to five thousand (5000) or fewer, the cities still Resp. App. 6 may amend their charters by a majority vote of the quali- fied voters of said city at an election held for that pur- pose. The adoption or amendment of charters is subject to such limitations as may be prescribed by the Legislature, and no charter or any ordinance passed under said char- ter shall contain any provision inconsistent with the Con- stitution of the State, or of the general laws enacted by the Legislature of this State. Said cities may levy, assess and collect such taxes as may be authorized by law or by their charters; but no tax for any purpose shall ever be lawful for any one year, which shall exceed two and one- half per cent of the taxable property of such city, and no debt shall ever be created by any city, unless at the same time provision be made to assess and collect annually a sufficient sum to pay the interest thereon and creating a sinking fund of at least two per cent thereon. Further- more, no city charter shall be altered, amended or repealed oftener than every two years. Resp. App. 7 Texas Crvit Pracrice & Remepies Cope, SecTion 65.001. TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE & REMEDIES CODE CHAPTER 65. INJUNCTION SUBCHAPTER A. GENERAL PROVISIONS § 65.001. Application of Equity Principles. The principles governing courts of equity govern injunction proceedings if not in conflict with this chapter or other law. Texas Crvit Practice & Remepies Cope, Section 65.011 TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE & REMEDIES CODE CHAPTER 65. INJUNCTION SUBCHAPTER B. AVAILABILITY OF REMEDY § 65.011. Grounds Generally A writ of injunction may be granted if: (1) the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded and all or part of the relief requires the restraint of some act prejudicial to the applicant; (2) a party performs or is about to perform or is procuring or allowing the performance of an act relating to the subject of pending litigation, in violation of the rights of the applicant, and the act would tend to render the judgment in that litigation ineffectual; (3) the applicant is entitled to a writ of injunction under the principles of equity and the statutes of this state relating to injunctions; Resp. App. 8 (4) a cloud would be placed on the title of real property being sold under an execution against a party having no interest in the real property subject to execu- tion at the time of sale, irrespective of any remedy at law; or (5) irreparable injury to real or personal property is threatened, irrespective of any remedy at law. Texas Locat GOVERNMENT CODE, Sections 54.031 anv 54.039 TEXAS LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE CHAPTER 54. ENFORCEMENT OF MUNICIPAL ORDI- NANCES SUBCHAPTER C. QUASI - JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF HEALTH AND SAFETY ORDINANCES § 54.031. Subchapter Applicable to Certain Munici- palities This subchapter applies to a municipality that by ordinance implements the subchapter. § 54.039. Judicial Review (a) Any owner, lienholder, or mortgagee of record jointly or severally aggrieved by any decision of a com- mission panel may present a petition to a district court, duly verified, setting forth that the decision is illegal, in whole or in part, and specifying the grounds of the ille- gality. The petition must be presented to the court within Resp. App. 9 30 calendar days after the date a copy of the final deci- sion of the commission panel is mailed by first class mail, certified return receipt requested, to all persons to whom notice is required to be sent under Section 54.035. The commission panel shall mail that copy promptly after the decision becomes final. In addition, an abbreviated copy of the order shall be published one time in a newspaper of general circulation in the municipality within 10 calen- dar days after the date of the mailing of the copy as provided by this subsection, including the street address or legal description of the property; the date of the hear- ing, a brief statement indicating the results of the order, and instructions stating where a complete copy of the order may be obtained, and a copy shall be filed in the office of the municipal secretary or clerk. (b) On presentation of the petition, the court may allow a writ of certiorari directed to the commission panel to review the decision of the commission panel and shall prescribe in the writ the time, which may not be less than 10 days, within which a return on the writ must be made and served on the relator or the relator’s attorney. (c) The commission panel may not be required to return the original papers acted on by it. It is sufficient for the commission panel to return certified or sworn copies of the papers or of parts of the papers as may be called for by the writ. (d) The return must concisely set forth other facts as may be pertinent and material to show the grounds for the decision appealed from and shall be verified. (e) The allowance of the writ does not stay proceed- ings on the decision appealed from. Resp. App. 10 (f) The district court’s review shall be limite2 to a hearing under the substantial evidence rule. The court may reverse or affirm, in whole or in part, or may modify the decision brought up for review. (g) Costs may not be allowed against the commis- sion panel. (h) If the decision of the commission panel is affirmed or not substantially reversed but only modified, the district court shall allow to the municipality all attor- ney’s fees and other costs and expenses incurred by it and shall enter a judgment for those items, which may be entered against the property owners as well as all persons found to be in occupation of the property subject to the proceedings before the commission panel. Texas Local Government Code, Sections 214.001 and 214.0012 TITLE 7. REGULATION OF LAND USE, STRUCTURES, BUSINESSES, AND RELATED ACTIVITIES CHAPTER 214. MUNICIPAL REGULATION OF STRUCTURES § 214.001. Authority Regarding Substandard Building (a) A municipality may, by ordinance, require the vacation, relocation of occupants, securing, repair, removal, or demolition of a building that is: (1) dilapidated, substandard, or unfit for human habitation and a hazard to the public health, safety, and welfare; Resp. App. 11 (2) regardless of its structural condition, unoc- cupied by its owners, lessees, or other invitees and is unsecured from unauthorized entry to the extent that it could be entered or used by vagrants or other uninvited persons as a place of harborage or could be entered or used by children; or (3) boarded up, fenced, or otherwise secured in any manner if: (A) the building constitutes a danger to the public even though secured from entry; or (B) the means used to secure the building are inade- quate to prevent unauthorized entry or use of the build- ing in the manner described by Subdivision (2). (b) The ordinance must: (1) establish minimum standards for the contin- ued use and occupancy of all buildings regardless of the date of their construction; (2) provide for giving proper notice to the owner of a building; and (3) provide for a public hearing to determine whether a building complies with the standards set out in the ordinance. (c) A notice of a hearing sent to an owner, lien- holder, or mortgagee under this section must include a statement that the owner, lienholder, or mortgagee will be ' required to submit at the hearing proof of the scope of any work that may be required to comply with the ordi- nance and the time it will take to reasonably perform the work. | Resp. App. 12 (d) After the public hearing, if a building is found in violation of standards set out in the ordinance, the municipality may order that the building be vacated, secured, repaired, removed, or demolished by the owner within a reasonable time as provided by this section. The municipality also may order that the occupants be relo- cated within a reasonable time. If the owner does not take the ordered action within the allotted time, the munici- pality shall make a diligent effort to discover each mort- gagee and lienholder having an interest in the building or in the property on which the building is located. The municipality shall send to each identified mortgagee and lienholder a notice containing: (1) an identification, which is not required to be a legal description, of the building and the property on which it is located; (2) a description of the violation of municipal standards that is present at the building; and (3) a statement that the municipality will vacate, secure, remove, or demolish the building or relocate the occupants of the building if the ordered action is not taken within a reasonable time. (e) As an alternative to the procedure prescribed by Subsection (d), the municipality may make a diligent effort to discover each mortgagee and lienholder before conducting the public hearing and may give them a notice of and an opportunity to comment at the hearing. In addition, the municipality may file notice of the hear- ing in the Official Public Records of Real Property in the county in which the property is located. The notice must contain the name and address of the owner of the affected Resp. App. 13 property if that information can be determined, a legal description of the affected property, and a description of the hearing. The filing of the notice is binding on subse- quent grantees, lienholders, or other transferees of an interest in the property who acquire such interest after the filing of the notice, and constitutes notice of the hearing on any subsequent recipient of any interest in the property who acquires such interest after the filing of the notice. If the municipality operates under this subsection, the order issued by the municipality may specify a rea- sonable time as provided by this section for the building to be vacated, secured, repaired, removed, or demolished by the owner or for the occupants to be relocated by the owner and an additional reasonable time as provided by this section for the ordered action to be taken by any of the mortgagees or lienholders in the event the owner fails to comply with the order within the time provided for action by the owner. Under this subsection, the munici- pality is not required to furnish any notice to a mortgagee or lienholder other than a copy of the order in the event the owner fails to timely take the ordered action. (f) Within 10 days after the date that the order is issued, the municipality shall: (1) file a copy of the order in the office of the municipal secretary or clerk; and (2) publish in a newspaper of general circulation in the municipality in which the building is located a notice containing: (A) the street address or legal description of the property; ili ia iii aa i Resp. App. 14 (B) the date of the hearing; (C) a brief statement indicating the results of the order; and (D) instructions stating where a complete copy of the order may be obtained. (g) After the hearing, the municipality shall promptly mail by certified mail, return receipt requested, a copy of the order to the owner of the building and to any lienholder or mortgagee of the building. The munici- pality shall use its best efforts to determine the identity and address of any owner, lienholder, or mortgagee of the building. If a notice is mailed according to this subsection and the United States Postal Service returns the notice as “refused” or “unclaimed,” the validity of the notice is not affected, and the notice shall be deemed as delivered. (h) In conducting a hearing authorized under this section, the municipality shall require the owner, lien- holder, or mortgagee of the building to within 30 days: (1) secure the building from unauthorized entry; or (2) repair, remove, or demolish the building, unless the owner or lienholder establishes at the hearing that the work cannot reasonably be performed within 30 days. (i) If the municipality allows the owner, lienholder, or mortgagee more than 30 days to repair, remove, or demolish the building, the municipality shall establish specific time schedules for the commencement and per- . formance of the work and shall require the owner, lien- holder, or mortgagee to secure the property in a Resp. App. 15 reasonable manner from unauthorized entry while the work is being performed, as determined by the hearing official. (j) A municipality may not allow the owner, lien- holder, or mortgagee more than 90 days to repair, remove, or demolish the building or fully perform all work required to comply with the order unless the owner, lienholder, or mortgagee: (1) submits a detailed plan and time schedule for the work at the hearing; and (2) establishes at the hearing that the work cannot reasonably be completed within 90 days because of the scope and complexity of the work. (k) If the municipality allows the owner, lienholder, or mortgagee more than 90 days to complete any part of the work required to repair, remove, or demolish the building, the municipality shall require the owner, lien- holder, or mortgagee to regularly submit progress reports to the municipality to demonstrate compliance with the time schedules established for commencement and per- formance of the work. The order may require that the owner, lienholder, or mortgagee appear before the hear- ing official or the hearing official’s designee to demon- strate compliance with the time schedules. If the owner, lienholder, or mortgagee owns property, including struc- tures or improvements on property, within the municipal boundaries that exceeds $100,000 in total value, the municipality may require the owner, lienholder, or mort- gagee to post a cash or surety bond in an amount ade- quate to cover the cost of repairing, removing, or demolishing a building under this subsection. In lieu of a Resp. App. 16 bond, the municipality may require the owner, lienholder, or mortgagee to provide a letter of credit from a financial institution or a guaranty from a third party approved by the municipality. The bond must be posted, or the letter of credit or third party guaranty provided, not later than the 30th day after the date the municipality issues the order. (1) In a public hearing to determine whether a building complies with the standards set out in an ordi- nance adopted under this section, the owner, lienholder, or mortgagee has the burden of proof to demonstrate the scope of any work that may be required to comply with the ordinance and the time it will take to reasonably perform the work. (m) If the building is not vacated, secured, repaired, removed, or demolished, or the occupants are not relo- cated within the allotted time, the municipality may vacate, secure, remove, or demolish the building or relo- cate the occupants at its own expense. This subsection does not limit the ability of a municipality to collect on a bond or other financial guaranty that may be required by Subsection (k). (n) If a municipality incurs expenses under Subsec- tion (m), the municipality may assess the expenses on, and the municipality has a lien against, unless it is a homestead as protected by the Texas Constitution, the property on which the building was located. The lien is extinguished if the property owner or another person having an interest in the legal title to the property reim- burses the municipality for the expenses. The lien arises and attaches to the property at the time the notice of the Resp. App. 17 lien is recorded and indexed in the office of the county clerk in the county in which the property is located. The notice must contain the name and address of the owner if that information can be determined with a reasonable effort, a legal description of the real property on which the building was located, the amount of expenses incurred by the municipality, and the balance due. (0) If the notice is given and the opportunity to © relocate the tenants of the building or to repair, remove, or demolish the building is afforded to each mortgagee and lienholder as authorized by Subsection (d), (e), or (g), the lien is a privileged lien subordinate only to tax liens. (p) A hearing under this section may be held by a civil municipal court. (q) A municipality satisfies the requirements of this section to make a diligent effort, to use its best efforts, or to make a reasonable effort to determine the identity and address of an owner, a lienholder, or a mortgagee if the municipality searches the following records: (1) county real property records of the county in which the building is located; (2) appraisal district records of the appraisal dis- trict in which the building is located; (3) records of the secretary of state; (4) assumed name records of the county in which the building is located; (5) tax records of the municipality; and (6) utility records of the municipality. Resp. App. 18 TEXAS LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE TITLE 7. REGULATION OF LAND USE, STRUCTURES, BUSINESSES, AND RELATED ACTIVITIES CHAPTER 214. MUNICIPAL REGULATION OF STRUCTURES ; § 214.0012. Judicial Review (a) Any owner, lienholder, or mortgagee of record of property jointly or severally aggrieved by an order of a municipality issued under Section 214.001 may file in district court a verified petition setting forth that the decision is illegal, in whole or in part, and specifying the grounds of the illegality. The petition must be filed by an owner, lienholder, or mortgagee within 30 calendar days after the respective dates a copy of the final decision of the municipality is mailed to them by first class mail, certified return receipt requested, or such decision shall become final as to each of them upon the expiration of each such 30 calendar day period. (b) On the filing of the petition, the court may issue a writ of certiorari directed to the municipality to review the order of the municipality and shall prescribe in the writ the time within which a return on the writ must be made, which must be longer than 10 days, and served on the relator or the relator’s attorney. (c) The municipality may not be required to return the original papers acted on by it, but it is sufficient for the municipality to return certified or sworn copies of the papers or of parts of the papers as may be called for by the writ. (d) The return must concisely set forth other facts as may be pertinent and material to show the grounds of the decision appealed from and shall be verified. Re NEN ME Ne ae Resp. App. 19 (e) The issuance of the writ does not stay proceed- ings on the decision appealed from. (f) Appeal in the district court shall be limited to a hearing under the substantial evidence rule. The court may reverse or affirm, in whole or in part, or may modify the decision brought up for review. (g) Costs may not be allowed against the munici- pality. (h) If the decision of the municipality is affirmed or not substantially reversed but only modified, the district court shall allow to the municipality all attorney’s fees and other costs and expenses incurred by it and shall enter a judgment for those items, which may be entered against the property owners, lienholders, or mortgagees as well as all persons subject to the proceedings before the municipality. Resp. App. 20 Texas Rutes or Crvit Procepure 680 PART II. RULES OF PRACTICE IN DISTRICT AND COUNTY COURTS SECTION 5. INJUNCTIONS RULE 680. TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER No temporary restraining order shall be granted without notice to the adverse party unless it clearly appears from specific facts shown by affidavit or by the verified com- plaint that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the applicant before notice can be served and a hearing had thereon. Every temporary restraining order granted without notice shall be endorsed with the date and hour of issuance; shall be filed forthwith in the clerk’s office and entered of record; shall define the injury and state Why it is irreparable and why the order was granted without notice; and shall expire by its terms within such time after signing, not to exceed fourteen days, as the court fixes, unless within the time so fixed the order, for good cause shown, is extended for a like period or unless the party against whom the order is directed consents that it may be extended for a longer period. The reasons for the exten- sion shall be entered of record. No more than one exten- sion may be granted unless subsequent extensions are unopposed. In case a temporary restraining order is granted without notice, the application for a temporary injunction shall be set down for hearing at the earliest possible date and takes precedence of all matters except older matters of the same character; and when the appli- cation comes on for hearing the party who obtained the temporary restraining order shall proceed with the appli- cation for a temporary injunction and, if he does not do Resp. App. 21 so, the court shall dissolve the temporary restraining order. On two days’ notice to the party who obtained the temporary restraining order without notice or on such shorter notice to that party as the court may prescribe, the adverse party may appear and move its dissolution or modification and in that event the court shall proceed to hear and determine such motion as expeditiously as the ends of justice require. Every restraining order shall include an order setting a certain date for hearing on the temporary or permanent injunction sought. Ch. Ch. Ch. Ch. Ch. Ch. Ch. Ch. Ch. Ch. Ch. Ch. Ch. Ch. Ch. Ch. Ch. Ch. Ch. Ch. Ch. Ch. Ch. THE CITY OF DALLAS, TEXAS RF FE S33588 x~Fxissesban- Resp. App. 22 CHARTER city of DALLAS, TEXAS [LOGO] CHARTER of Incorporation and Territory, §§ 1 - 3 Powers of the City, §§ 1 - 2 City Council, §§ 1 - 20 City Secretary, §§ 1 - 3 Elections and Referendums, §§ 1 - 11 Recall of Councilmen, §§ 1 - 2 The City Manager, §§ 1 - 2 Legal Department, §§ 1 - 3 Municipal Courts, §§ 1 - 9 City Auditor, §§ 1 - 3 Reserved Administrative Departments, §§ 1 - 4 The Budget and Financial Procedure Relating Thereto, §§ 1 - 14 Police Department, §§ 1 - 8 Fire Department, §§ 1 - 9 Franchises, §§ 1 - 11 Planning and Zoning, §§ 1 - 7 Civil Service and Personnel, §§ 1 - 17 Park and Recreation Department, §§ 1 - 10 Ordinances and Resolutions, §§ 1 - 16 Assessment and Collection of Texas, §§ 1 - 29 Public Improvement and Assessments, §§ 1 - 12 Borrowing Money, §§ 1 - 12 Resp. App. 23 Ch. XXII. Public Contracts, §§ 1 - 12 Ch. XXIII. Claims For Damages Or Injury, §§ 1 - 6 Ch. XXIV. Miscellaneous Provisions, §§ 1 - 21 [A] CHAPTER I. INCORPORATION AND TERRITORY SEC. 1. CORPORATION NAME. All inhabitants of the City of Dallas, Dallas County, Texas, as the boundaries and limits of said city are herein established or may hereafter be established, shall be a body politic, incorporated under, and to be known by, the name and style of the “City of Dallas,” with such powers, rights and duties as herein provided. SEC. 2. BOUNDARIES. The bounds and limits of the City of Dallas shall be those as established and described in ordinances duly passed by the city council of the City of Dallas in accor- dance with state law. The city secretary shall at all times keep a correct and complete description with recent annexation or disannexations. (Amend. of 6-12-73, Prop. No. 1; Amend. of 4-2-83, Prop. No. 3) SEC. 3. ADDITIONAL TERRITORY. The city may from time to time alter its boundaries by annexing any territory adjoining its present or future boundaries in any size or shape desired in any manner provided by state law. In addition thereto, the city may annex additional territory lying adjacent to the city with or without the consent of the territory and the inhabitants of the territory annexed where the same is not inconsis- tent with the state law. Such annexations shall be accom- plished by ordinance providing for the alteration and extension of the boundary limits, which ordinance shall Resp. App. 24 describe the territory to be annexed and shall be pub- lished one time in the official newspaper. Amendments reducing the area may be incorporated into the proposed ordinance without the necessity of publishing said amendments and without the necessity of republication of said ordinance as amended. The proposed ordinance shall not thereafter be finally acted upon until at least 30 days have elapsed after the publication thereof; and upon the final passage of any such ordinance, the boundaries of the city shall thereafter be as fixed in such ordinance. The additional territory annexed shall be a part of the city and the property situated therein shall bear its pro rata part of the taxes levied by the city as provided by state law. The inhabitants thereof shall be entitled to all the rights and privileges of all the citizens and shall be bound by the acts, ordinances and resolutions of the city. CHAPTER II. POWERS OF CITY SEC. 1. POWERS OF THE CITY. The City of Dallas, as such body politic and corpo- rate, shall have perpetual succession and shal] have the following powers: (1) to use a corporate seal; (2) to sue and be sued; (3) to implead and be impleaded in all courts; (4) to institute and prosecute suits without giv- ing security therefor, and to appeal from judgments of the courts without giving supersedeas or cost bonds, other bonds or security whatever; Resp. App. 25 (5S) to contract and be contracted with; (6) to acquire property within or without its boundaries or within the boundaries of other munici- palities for any public purpose, in fee simple or lesser interest or estate, by purchase, gift, devise, lease or con- demnation, and may sell, rent, lease, hold, manage and control any property now owned by it or which it hereaf- ter may acquire; construct, own, lease, operate and regu- late public utilities; (7) to assess, levy and collect taxes for general and special purposes on all lawful subjects of taxation; (8) to borrow money on the faith and credit of the city by the issue or sale of bonds, warrants or notes of the city; (9) to appropriate the money of the city for all lawful purposes; (10) to create, provide for, construct, regulate and maintain public works and public improvements of any nature; (11) to levy and collect assessments for local improvements; (12) to levy an occupation tax on any person, occupation, calling or business where permitted under the laws of this state; (13) to license and regulate vehicles operated for hire and fix and regulate the rates to be charged therefor; Resp. App. 26 (14) to license and regulate persons, corpora- tions, and associations engaged in any business, eccupa- tion, profession or trade; (15) to license and regulate all places of public amusement; (16) to define nuisances and prohibit the main- tenance of any nuisance within the corporate limits of the city to within 5,000 feet of the corporate lines, outside of the city limits, and abate such nuisances by summary proceedings and provide for the punishment of the authors thereof; (17) to regulate the use of automobiles, motor- cycles and other motor-driven vehicles, and the speed thereof and prescribe the proper lighting of the same when used at night; (18) to provide for the inspection of buildings and all works of construction and prescribe and enforce proper regulations in regard thereto; (19) to regulate and locate or prohibit the erec- tion of all poles in the city and cause the same to be removed or changed at any time; (20) to provide for the inspection of weights and measures and fix standards of weights and measures; (21) to provide for the regulation of bakeries and prescribe the weight and quality of bread manufac- tured or sold in the city; (22) to provide for the inspection and regula- tion of dairies located inside the city limits or at any other place from which milk or other products are sold within Resp. App. 27 the city, and for the inspection of all cows and facilities from which milk is sold in the city, and prescribe fees to be charged in connection with such inspection, and estab- lish and maintain a standard of quality of all dairy prod- ucts sold in the city; (23) to regulate, restrain or prohibit the running at large of all animals in the city, and to license same; (24) to adopt any ordinance or regulation hav- ing for its purpose the prevention of fires or the removal of fire hazards; (25) to regulate burial grounds, cemeteries and crematories and condemn and close same in the thickly settled portions of the city when public interest and pub- lic health may demand, and regulate the burial of the dead; (26) to provide for a system of vital statistics; (27) to define, prohibit, abate, suppress and prevent all things detrimental to the health, morals, com- fort, safety, convenience and welfare of the inhabitants of the city; (28) to regulate the construction and height of, and materials used in, all buildings and structures, and the maintenance and occupancy thereof; (29) to regulate and control the use, for what- ever purpose, of the streets and all other public places; (30) to create, establish, abolish and organize offices and fix the salaries, working conditions, and com- pensation of all officers and employees, except those set out in the Charter; Resp. App. 28 (31) to make and enforce all police, health, sani- tary and other regulations, and pass such ordinances as may be expedient for maintaining and promoting the peace, good government and welfare of the city, for the performance of the functions thereof, for the order and security of its inhabitants and to protect the peace, lives, health and property of such inhabitants, and to provide suitable penalties for the violation of any ordinance enacted by the city; (32) to open, extend, straighten, widen or alter any street, alley, avenue, boulevard, sidewalk, parkway or public way, and to close or vacate and abandon the same; (33) to expend public funds for purposes of advertising and public information; (34) to have the exclusive right to erect, own, maintain and operate a waterworks and sanitary sewer system, or any part thereof, for the use of said city and its inhabitants, and to regulate the same, but shall not have the power or right to sell said waterworks system; to prescribe rates for water and sanitary sewer services fur- nished to the inhabitants, and to make such rules and regulations as the council may deem expedient, including the power to extend water and sanitary sewer lines and assesses a portion or all of cost therefor and affix a lien against the property and the owner thereof; to do any- thing whatsoever necessary to operate and maintain said waterworks, and to compel the owners of all property and the agents of such owners to pay all charges for water and sanitary sewer services furnished upon such Resp. App. 29 property; excess property in the waterworks system may be sold as other property; (35) to make provision for care and sustenance of policemen, firemen and fire alarm operators who have been disabled while in the service of the city, or who, after long and continued service, shall become by reason of old age and informities incapacitated to discharge their duties, or because of longevity of service alone, and to make provision for the aid and relief of the widows, minor children and dependents of deceased policemen, firemen, and fire alarm operators and may provide for the creation of a fund or funds for such purposes, from the general revenue of the city or from such other sources as may be prescribed by the council under such rules and regulations as the council may adopt, and said city may exercise all of the powers as may be conferred upon the city council by acts of the legislature of the State of Texas; (36) to make provision for the care and suste- nance of all of the officers and employees of the city who have been disabled while in the service of the city, or who after long and continued service, shall become by reason of old age and infirmities incapacitated to discharge their duties, or because of longevity of service alone, to pro- vide for the aid and relief of the widows, minor children and dependents of deceased officers and employees; to provide for the creation of a fund or funds for such purposes, from the general revenue of the city or from such other sources as may be prescribed by the council under such rules and regulations as the council may adopt; ee — Resp. App. 30 (37) by ordinance or resolution, to provide for and construct a general storm sewer and drainage system in the city which may be divided into public and private sewers and drains and be built, maintained and con- ducted in such manner, as the city council may provide. For the purpose of establishing a general storm sewer and drainage system, the city council shall have full power to change any river, creek, bayou or other drain, or any part thereof, so as to divert the drainage thereof in accordance with a general drainage plan or any special plan providing therefor; (38) to adopt rules and regulations for the civil service system; (39) to fix and regulate the rates of gas, water, electricity and other utilities, and to regulate and fix the fares, tolls and charges of local telephones and exchanges; of public carriers and motor vehicles, where they are transporting passengers, freight or baggage, and generally to fix and regulate the rates, tolls or charges and the kind of service of all public utilities of every kind, unless otherwise required by state law; (Amend. of 4-3-76, Prop. No. 10) (40) to regulate the speed of engines, locomo- | tives, electric railways, or other power-driven equipment | operating upon tracks, rails, or defined routes, either at ground level, overhead or underground within the limits of the city, and to regulate the operation of the same so as to prohibit the blocking of intersections, streets, alleys, avenues or impeding the free flow of vehicular traffic or pedestrians; Resp. App. 31 (41) to contract with public service carriers, common carriers, or private carriers or with transporta- tion authorities for the furnishing of transportation facili- ties within the city limits of Dallas and connecting the adjoining areas; including the joint use of publicly owned and privately owned or joint publicly owned facilities to provide an interregional transportation network, both within and without the city limits of Dallas; (42) to require any and all railroad companies operating any track upon or across any public street of the city, to reduce any such track below the level of the streets intersected or occupied by any such track, or to elevate any such track above the level of the streets intersected or occupied by any such track, and to require the company or companies owning or operating any such track to provide necessary and proper crossing for the public travel at intersecting streets; all such work to be done in the manner required by the city; (43) to require any holder of a franchise from the city to allow the use of its tracks, poles, underground conduits and wires by any other holder to which the city shall grant a franchise upon payment of a reasonable rental therefor to be fixed by the city council; (44) to exercise any of its powers or perform any of its functions and may participate in the financing thereof, jointly or in cooperation, by contract or other- wise, with the State of Texas, any count of this state or any of the civil agencies thereof which have any of the municipal powers, or the United States or any agency thereof; Resp. App. 32 (45) to acquire, construct, or own, within or without the city, either wholly or in cooperation with any other city, county or political subdivision of the state, an airport or airports, either by purchase, donation, bequest, eminent domain or otherwise; to provide for the opera- tion, maintenance, control and financing thereof, the same as though wholly owned by the city within its city limits; (46) to acquire, by purchase, gift or devise, or by the exercise of the right of eminent domain by and through condemnation proceedings, and own, in fee sim- ple or otherwise, either public or private property located inside or outside of the corporate limits of the city or within any county in the state, for the extension, improvement and enlargement of its waterworks system, including riparian rights, water supply reservoirs, stand- pipes, watersheds, dams, the laying, building, mainte- nance and construction of water mains, rights-of-way in connection therewith, and the laying, erection, establish- ment or maintenance of any necessary appurtenances or facilities which will furnish to the inhabitants of the city an abundant supply of wholesome water; for sewerage plants and systems; rights-of-way for water and sewer lines; parks, playgrounds, fire stations, police stations, airports and landing fields, burial grounds and ceme- teries, incinerators or other garbage disposal plants, elec- tric light and power plants and rights-of-way for lines in connection therewith, gas plants and rights-of-way for gas lines in connection therewith; streets, boulevards and alleys or other public ways; city jails, prison farms, city halls and other municipal buildings, municipal garages, and parking facilities, or any rights-of-way needed in —_ Resp. App. 33 connection with any property used for any purpose here- inabove named; for the straightening or improving of the channel of any stream, branch or drain and for any other municipal purpose. The procedure to be followed in any condemnation proceedings hereunder and authorized herein shall be in accordance with the provisions of the state law with reference to eminent domain. The provi- sions of Title 52 of the Revised Civil Statutes of Texas (1925), as amended, or as may hereafter be amended, shall apply to such proceedings, or such proceedings may be under any other state law now in existence or that hereafter may be passed governing and relating to the condemnation of land for public purposes by the city; (47) to exercise all the powers conferred upon water improvement districts or water control and preser- vation districts under the state law as the same now exists or may hereafter be amended, providing for the exercise of the rights of eminent domain by and through condemnation proceedings. It shall also have all the powers authorized by Article 7880-126, Revised Civil Statutes of the State of Texas, as the same presently exists or may hereafter be amended, and all other powers con- ferred upon cities and towns in the State of Texas acting individually or jointly, in the furnishing of an adequate supply of wholesome water. It shall have authority to sell any surplus water not needed by the City of Dallas; (48) to erect and establish work houses, houses of correction, or rehabilitation facilities within or without the city limits; to make all necessary rules and regulations therefor; to employ personnel necessary to manage and control the same; to assign persons confined to the city jail to any such facility so established; Resp. App. 34 (49) to provide a code of ethics by ordinance which shall be binding on all officers, employees, and elective and appointive officials as provided herein, set- tling out the acts, conduct and financial interest which shall be considered to be in conflict with the position they hold and providing the procedure for enforcing the same. This may be either in addition to, or incorporated into personnel rules and regulations as pertain to various employees. SEC. 2. GENERAL POWERS ADOPTED. The enumeration of particular powers in the Charter shall not be held or deemed to be exclusive, but in addition to the powers enumerated herein, implied thereby or appropriate to the exercise thereof, the city shall have and may exercise all other powers which under the Constitution and laws of the State of Texas, it would be competent for the Charter specifically to eru- merate. The city shall have and exercise all the powers conferred upon cities by what is known as the Home Rule Amendment to the Constitution of the State of Texas and the Enabling Act relative thereto, passed by the Thirty- Third Legislature of the State of Texas, found in the published laws of said legislature, Regular Session, pages 307 to 317, and effective July 7, 1913, and all other laws passed by the legislature of the State of Texas, relating thereto, or which may hereafter be passed by said legisla- ture in relation to such matters. Resp. App. 35 CHAPTER XV. PLANNING AND ZONING (Renamed and Renumbered by Amend. of 6-12-73, Prop. No. 43) SEC. 1. COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING. (1) CONTENT. The council may adopt, and may from time to time modify, a comprehensive plan setting forth in graphic and textual form, policies to govern the future physical development of the city. Such plan may cover the entire city and all of its functions and services or may consist of a combination of plans governing speci- fic functions and services or specific geographic areas . which together cover the entire city and all of its func- tions and services. (2) ADOPTION. Upon receipt from the city man- ager of a proposed comprehensive plan or proposed modification of the existing plan, the council shall hold a public hearing on the proposed comprehensive plan or modification thereof and shall thereafter adopt it by reso- lution with or without amendment, or reject the same. (3) EFFECT. The comprehensive plan shall serve as a guide to all future council action concerning land use and development regulations, urban conservation and rehabilitation programs and expenditures for capital improvements. (Renumbered by Amend. of 6-12-73, Prop. No. 43) Resp. App. 36 SEC. 2. URBAN CONSERVATION AND REHA- BILITATION AND REDEVELOPMENT. The council may by ordinance provide for urban redevelopment, rehabilitation and conservation programs for: (1) the alleviation or prevention of slums, obsoles- cence, blight or other conditions of urban deterioration; and (2) the achievement of the most appropriate use of land. (Renumbered by Amend. of 6-12-73, Prop. No. 43) SEC. 3. ZONING COMMISSION. The city council shall appoint 15 qualified voters of the City of Dallas who shall constitute the zoning com- mission of the City of Dallas, and shall be the city plan commission as the same is referred to by state statute for the approval of plats and subdivisions. The members shall possess the same qualifications and be subject to the same disqualifications as provided by the Charter for members of the city council, or general laws of the State of Texas. The city council shall name one of the members to be the chairman and one to be the vice chairman. (Renumbered by Amend. of 6-12-73, Prop. No. 43) SEC. 4. DUTIES OF ZONING COMMISSION. The zoning commission shall: (1) Adopt, subject to approval of the city council, such rules and regulations as they deem best to govern Resp. App. 37 their actions, proceedings and deliberations, including the time and place of meeting. (2) Upon application made, advertise and hold pub- lic hearings on zoning or changes in zoning, and make recommendations thereon to the city council. (3) Act as an advisory body to the city council in relation to any changes in the boundaries of the various original districts and any changes in the zoning ordi- nances and regulations to be enforced therein. Such rec- ommendation shall be made after advertisement of and a public hearing held thereon. Notice of such public hear- ing shall be published at least one time in a newspaper of general circulation in the city at least 10 days prior to the date of said hearing, or as otherwise provided by state law or this charter. (4) Administer provisions of state law regarding the platting and recording of subdivisions and additions, and in connection therewith, to require the owners and devel- opers of land who desire to subdivide, plat or replat land for urban development, to provide for building setback lines, to dedicate streets, alleys, parks, easements or other public places of adequate width an size; to coordinate street layouts and street planning with the city and with other municipalities, and to coordinate the same with the county, state and federally designated highways, as they may deem best in the interest of the general public. In connection with the planning and the platting of prop- erty, the zoning commission shall have the power to consider the character of development or land use con- templated by the proposed platting and the zoning of the Resp. App. 38 property, and require off-street parking, streets and alleys of adequate width to be provided for that purpose. (5) Make recommendations to the city manager and the city council on matters affecting the physical develop- ment of the city. (6) Advise and make recommendations on the com- prehensive plan and the implementation thereof as may be requested by the city manager and the city council. (7) Exercise all other responsibilities as may be pro- vided by law. (Renumbered by Amend. of 6-12-73, Prop. No. 43; Amend. of 8-12-89, Prop. No. 9) SEC. 5. DEDICATION OF STREETS, ALLEYS AND PUBLIC PROPERTIES. The action of the zoning commission in requiring the dedication of streets, alleys and public places shall not amount to an acceptance of said dedication, nor estop the city council to deny the same. Acceptance of all dedica- tions shall be by action of the city council, or when the city council shall have made actual appropriation of the same by entry, use or improvement. (Renumbered by Amend. of 6-12-73, Prop. No. 43) SEC. 6. CITY URBAN DEVELOPMENT COMMIS- SION. In addition to the zoning commission, the city coun- cil may have by ordinance provide for an urban develop- ment commission. The ordinance creating the same shall state how the body shall be constituted, the qualifications ea ey a ee ae f- Resp. App. 39 ~ of the members and the duties of the same. (Renumbered by Amend. of 6-12-73, Prop. No. 43) SEC. 7. ALTERNATE MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT. In addition to the membership provided by state law to serve on the board of adjustment, the city council may, if it so desires, appoint six additional members who shall be designated as alternate members. the alternate mem- bers shall serve on the board at the designation of the board chair in any case where any regular member of the board of adjustment is either absent or unable to serve in any particular case for any reason so that all cases to be heard by the board of adjustment will always be heard by the minimum number of members required by state law. These alternate members, when appointed, shall serve for the same period as the regular members, and any vacan- cies shall be filled in the same manner. (Amend. of 6-12-73, Prop. No. 28; Amend. of 5-3-97, Prop. No. 11) SEC. 8. THOROUGHFARE PLAN. The city council shall by ordinance adopt a thorough- fare plan. A thoroughfare plan now in existence or here- after adopted by the city council shall not be changed except by an ordinance duly adopted after a public hear- ing as herein provided. Prior to any change in a thoroughfare plan, the city council shall hold a public hearing. Written notice of all public hearings before the city council on proposed changes in the thoroughfare plan shall be sent to owners Resp. App. 40 of real property lying within 200 feet of the area of the proposed change, such notice to be given, not less than 10 days before the date set for hearing, to all such owners who have rendered their said property for city taxes as the ownership appears on the last approved city tax roll. Such notice may be served by depositing the same, prop- erly addressed and postage paid, in the United States mail. (amend. of 1-17-81, Prop. No. 3) Sec. Sec. Sec. Sec. Sec. Sec. Sec. Sec. Sec. Sec. Sec. Sec. Sec. Sec. Sec. Resp. App. 41 CHAPTER 27 MINIMUM URBAN REHABILITATION STANDARDS ARTICLE I. GENERAL PROVISIONS. 27-1. _—_ Legislative findings of fact. 27-2. Purpose of chapter. 27-3. Definitions. 27-3.1. Code enforcement official. ARTICLE II. ADMINISTRATION. 27-4. _—_ Violations; penalty. 27-5. Inspection. 27-5.1. Donation of noncomplying property to a nonprofit corporation. 27-5.2. Retaliation against tenants prohibited. 27-6. Urban rehabilitation standards board. 27-7. Hearing panels. 27-8. Powers and duties of a hearing panel; advi- sory responsibilities of the board. 27-9. Procedure. 27-10. Failure to comply with board order. ARTICLE III. MINIMUM STANDARDS. 27-11. Minimum standards; responsibilities of owner. 27-12. Responsibilities of occupant. Sec. Sec. Sec. Sec. Sec. Sec. Sec. Sec. Sec. Sec. Sec. Sec. Sec. Sec. Sec. Sec. Sec. Resp. App. 42 ARTICLE IV. REPAIR, DEMOLITION, RECEIVERSHIP, VACATION, RELOCATION, CLOSURE, AND CIVIL PENALTIES. 27-13. 27-14. 27-14.1. 17-14.2. 27-14.3. 27-15. 27-16. 27-17. 27-18. 27-19. 27-20. 27-20.1. 27-21. 27-22. 27-23. Urban nuisance; repair, demolition, receivership, and civil penalties; notice. Rehearing of repair and demolition orders and civil penalty assessments. Treatment for insects and rodents. Rehearing review requirements. Rehearing review. Reduction of occupancy load; vacation of structure; relocation of occupants; placing of placard on structure. Closure of a structure. ARTICLE V. RESIDENTIAL HOTELS Occupancy record cards. Fee; renewal. Maximum number of occupants; posting card; altering card. Designation of guest rooms; posting notices. On-site hotel manager; notice to occupants. Inspections; maintenance of records. Required facilities. Cooking food prohibited. ARTICLE VI. MASTER METERED UTILITIES. 27-24. 27-25. Definitions. Records of ownership and management maintained by utility companies. Sec. Sec. Sec. Sec. Sec. Sec. Sec. Sec. Sec. Sec. Sec. Sec. Sec. Sec. Sec. Sec. Sec. Sec. SEC. 27-1. There exists in the city of Dallas, Texas, structures 27-26. 27-27. 27-28. Resp. App. 43 Notice to tenants. Notice of utility interruption. Nonpayment of utility bills - Essential util- ity service. ARTICLE VII. LICENSING OF APARTMENT COMPLEXES. 27-29. 27-30. 27-31. 27-32. 27-33. 27-34. 27-35. 27-36. 27-37. 27-38. 27-39. 27-40. 27-41. 27-42. 27-43. Definitions. Authority of director. License required; defenses. License application. License fees. Issuance, denial, and display of license. Revocation of license. Appeals. Amendments to license. Expiration and renewal of license. Nontransferability. Licensee’s records. Failure to pay ad valorem taxes. Notification of change of information. Inspections; reinspection fees. ARTICLE I. GENERAL PROVISIONS. LEGISLATIVE FINDINGS OF FACT. used for human habitation and nonresidential purposes that are substandard in structure and maintenance. Fur- thermore, inadequate provision for light and air, insuffi- cient protection against fire, lack of proper heating, insanitary conditions, and overcrowding constitute a Resp. App. 44 menace to the health, safety, morals, welfare, and reason- able comfort of the citizens of the city of Dallas. The existence of such conditions will create slum and blighted areas requiring large scale clearance, if not remedied. Furthermore, in the absence of corrective measures, such areas will experience a deterioration of social values, a curtailment of investment and tax revenue, and an impairment of economic values. The establishment and maintenance of minimum structural and environmental standards are essential to the prevention of blight and decay and the safeguarding of public health, safety, morals, and welfare. (Ord. Nos. 15198; 19234) SEC. 27-2. PURPOSE OF CHAPTER. (a) The purpose of this chapter is to protect the health, safety, morals, and welfare of the citizens of the city of Dallas by establishing minimum standards appli- cable to residential and nonresidential structures. Mini- mum standards are established with respect to utilities, facilities, and other physical components essential to make structures safe, sanitary, and fit for human use and habitation. Demolition of structures is provided for as a last resort when compliance with standards cannot rea- sonably be achieved. (b) This chapter is found to be remedial and essen- tial to the public interest, and it is intended that this chapter be liberally construed to effect its purpose. All structures within the city on the effective date of this chapter, or constructed thereafter, must comply with the provisions of this chapter. (Ord. Nos. 15198; 19234) / Resp. App. 45 SEC. 27-3. DEFINITIONS. In this chapter: (1) BASEMENT means the portion of a struc- ture that is partly underground and has more than one- half its height, measured from clear floor to ceiling, above the average finished grade of the ground adjoining a structure. (2) BATHROOM means an enclosed space con- taining one or more bathtubs, showers, or both, and which may also include toilets, lavatories, or fixtures serving similar purposes. | (3) BOARD means the urban rehabilitation standards board. (4) CELLAR means the lowermost portion of a structure partly or totally underground having one-half or more of its height, measured from clear floor to ceiling, below the average finished grade of the adjoining ground. (5) DEPARTMENT means the department des- ignated by the city manager to enforce and administer this chapter. (6) DIRECTOR means the director of the department designated by the city manager to enforce and administer this chapter and includes representatives, . agents, or department employees designated by the direc- tor. (7) DWELLING means a structure or building occupied as a residence. Resp. App. 46 (8) FLOOR SPACE means the total area of all habitable space. (9) GRADE means the natural surface of the ground, or surface ground after completion of any change in contour. (10) HABITABLE SPACE means the space occu- pied by one or more persons while living, sleeping, eat- ing, and cooking; excluding kitchenettes, bathrooms, toilet rooms, laundries, pantries, dressing rooms, closets, storage spaces, foyers, hallways, utility rooms, heater rooms, boiler rooms, and basement or cellar recreation rooms. (11) KITCHEN means a space, 60 square feet or more in floor area with a minimum width of five feet, used for cooking or preparation of food. (12) KITCHENETTE means a space, less than 60 square feet in floor area, used for cooking or preparation of food. (13) OPERATING CONDITION means free of leaks, safe, sanitary, and in good working order. (14) OWNER means a person claiming, or in whom is vested, the ownership, dominion, or title of real property, including, but not limited to: (A) the holder of fee simple title; (B) the holder of a life estate; ; (C) the holder of a leasehold estate for an initial term of five years or more; (D) the buyer in a contract for deed; and Resp. App. 47 (E) a mortgagee, receiver, executor, or trustee in control of real property; but not including the holder of a leasehold estate or tenancy for an initial term of less than five years. (15) PERSON means any individual, corpora- tion, organization, partnership, association, or any other legal entity. (16) PLUMBING FIXTURES means gas pipes, water pipes, toilets, lavatories, sinks, laundry tubs, dish- washers, garbage disposal units, clothes-washing machines, catch basins, wash basins, bathtubs, shower baths, sewer pipes, sewage system, septic tanks, drains, vents, traps, and other fuel-burning or water-using fix- tures and appliances, together with all connections to pipes. (17) PREMISES or PROPERTY means a lot, plot, parcel of land, including any structures on the land. (18) PROPERTY MANAGER means a person who for compensation has managing control of real prop- erty. (19) PUBLIC SEWER means a sewer operated by a public authority or public utility and available for public use. (20) RESIDENTIAL HOTEL means a structure that receives more than 50 percent of its rental income from occupancies of 30 consecutive days or more and contains: Resp. App. 48 (A) more than five guest rooms with living and sleeping accommodations, but no kitchen or kitch- enette; (B) more than five guest rooms with living, sleeping, and kitchen or kitchenette facilities that are offered for rental on a daily basis; or (C) more than five guest rooms with living and sleeping accommodations, each of which is individu- ally secured and rented separately to one or more indi- viduals who have access to bathroom, kitchen, or dining facilities outside the guest room on a common basis with other occupants of the structure. (21) SANITARY means any condition of good order and cleanliness that precludes the probability of disease transmission. (22) STRUCTURE means that which is built or constructed, an edifice or building of any kind, or any piece of work artificially built up or composed of parts joined together in some definite manner. (23) URBAN NUISANCE means a premises or structure that: (A) is reasonably dangerous to the physical health or safety of an occupant or other person; or (B) because of violations of Section 27-11, its state of disrepair is such that it could reasonably cause injury, damage, harm, or inconvenience to a considerable portion of the community in the use and enjoyment of property, materially interfering with the proper use or comfort and enjoyment of surrounding property, taking into consideration the nature and use of the properties in Resp. App. 49 the area and the character of the community in which they are situated, which condition would be substantially offensive and annoying to persons of ordinary sensi- bilities, tastes, and habits living in the community. (Ord. Nos. 15198; 15919; 16473; 17226; 19234; 19896; 22154) SEC. 27-3.1. CODE ENFORCEMENT OFFICIAL. The director, or a designated representative, shall serve as the code enforcement official of the city. The code enforcement official shall have the power to obtain search warrants allowing the inspection of any specified premises to determine the presence of a health hazard or unsafe building condition, including but not limited to any structural, property, or utility hazard, or a violation of any health or building regulation, statute, or ordi- nance. (Ord. 20433) ARTICLE II. ADMINISTRATION. SEC. 27-4. VIOLATIONS; PENALTY. (a) A person who violates a provision of this chap- ter, or who fails to perform an act required of him by this chapter, commits an offense. A person commits a separate offense each day or portion of a day during which a violation is committed, permitted, or continued. (b) Criminal penalties. (1) An offense under this chapter is punishable by a fine not to exceed $2,000; except, that an offense under Section 27-5.2 and 27-25 of this chapter is punish- able by a fine not to exceed $500. Resp. App. 50 (2) An offense under this chapter is punishable by a fine of not less than: (A) $200 for a first conviction of a violation of Section 27-11(a)(1), (3), or (4) or 27-11(b)(1), (2), (3), (4), (6), (7), (8), (9), or (10); (B) $500 for a first conviction of a violation of section 27-11(a)(2), (5), or (6), 27-11(b)(5), 27-11(c), or 27-11(d); and (C) $2,000 for a first conviction of a viola- tion of Section 27-31. (3) The minimum fines established in Subsec- tion (b)(2) will be doubled for the second conviction of the same offense within any 24-month period and trebled for the third and subsequent convictions of the same offense within any 24-month period. At no time may the minimum fine exceed the maximum fine established in subsection (b)(1). (c) Except where otherwise specified, a culpable mental state is not required for the commission of an offense under this chapter. (d) In addition to imposing the criminal penalty prescribed in Subsection (b), the city may, in accordance with Chapter 54, Subchapter B of the Texas Local Govern- ment Code, bring a civil action against a person violating a provision of this chapter. The civil action may include, but is not limited to, a suit to recover a civil penalty not to exceed $1,000 for each day or portion of a day during which the violation is committed, continued, or permit- ted. Resp. App. 51 (e) The penalties provided for in Subsections (b) and (d) are in addition to any other enforcement remedies that the city may have under city ordinances and state law. (f) The director has the authority to enforce provi- sions of Chapter 7A and Article II, Chapter 18 of this code. (Ord. Nos. 19234; 19896; 20017; 20599; 22695) SEC. 27-5. INSPECTION. For the purpose of ascertaining whether violations of this chapter exist, the director is authorized at a reason- able time to inspect: (1) the exterior of a structure and premises which contain no structure; and (2) the interior of a structure, if the permission of the owner, occupant, or person in control is given. (Ord. Nos. 15198; 19234) SEC. 27-5.1. DONATION OF NONCOMPLYING PROPERTY TO A NONPROFIT COR- PORATION. (a) a judge of the municipal court may dismiss one or more citations of a property owner who is charged with violating this chapter, if the property owner donates the property, for which the citations have been issued, to a nonprofit corporation selected by the city. (b) The urban rehabilitation standards board may waive a civil penalty or part of a civil penalty assessed against a property owner pursuant to Section 27-13 of this Resp. App. 52 chapter if the property owner donates the property, for which the civil penalty has been assessed, to a nonprofit corporation selected by the city. (c) The city is authorized to contract with a non- profit corporation for the acceptance of property donated pursuant to Subsection (a) or (b) of this section. The terms of the contract must provide that the nonprofit corporation will: (1) within 90 days from the date of acceptance of the donated property, bring the property into compli- ance with this chapter, including, but not limited to, providing all necessary cleanup, maintenance, repairs, and alterations; and (2) within 120 days from the date of acceptance of the donated property, sell the property directly to an occupant owner or rent the property directly to an occu- pant tenant. (Ord. Nos. 19234; 19896; 21973) SEC. 27-5.2. RETALIATION AGAINST TENANTS PROHIBITED. (a) A landlord commits an offense if he raises a tenant’s rent, diminishes services to a tenant, or attempts eviction of a tenant within six months after: (1) the tenant files a valid complaint with the director complaining of a violation of this chapter on property occupied by the tenant; a complaint is consid- ered valid if it results in an action described in Paragraph (2), (3}, or (4) of this subsection; alld Resp. App. 53 (2) the director issues to the landlord or his agent a written notice or citation listing any violation of this chapter that exists on property occupied by the ten- ant; (3) the director issues to the landlord or his agent written notice of a hearing before the urban reha- bilitation standards board concerning any violation of this chapter that exists on property occupied by the ten- ant; (4) the tenant, after filing a complaint with the director and the landlord or his agent, files a written complaint with the city attorney complaining of a viola- tion of this chapter on property occupied by the tenant, unless the complaint is later withdrawn by the tenant or dismissed on the merits; or (5) repairs are completed on property occupied by the tenant in compliance with either a written notice or citation issued by the director or a written order issued by the urban rehabilitation standards board. (b) It is a defense to prosecution under Subsection (a) that: (1) rent was increased pursuant to an escalation clause in a written lease which provided for changes in costs of utilities, taxes and insurance; (2) rent was increased, services were reduced, or notices to vacate were issued as part of a pattern of rent increases, service reductions, or evictions for an entire multidwelling project; (3) the tenant was delinquent in rent when the landlord gave notice to vacate or filed an eviction action; Resp. App. 54 (4) the tenant was responsible for or caused a violation of this chapter that existed on property occu- pied by the tenant; (5) the tenant’s written lease fixing the rent, services, or term of occupancy had expired, unless, at the time an action described in Subsection (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4) occurred, a violation of this chapter that was reason- ably dangerous to the physical health or safety of the tenant or another person existed on property occupied by the tenant; (6) the tenant holds over after giving notice of termination or intent to vacate; . (7) the tenant holds over after the landlord gives notice of termination at the end of the rental term and, at the time the notice of termination was given, the landlord or his agent had not received actual notice that a valid complaint had been filed with the city complaining of violations of this chapter on property occupied by the tenant; (8) before filing a complaint with the city com- plaining of a violation of this chapter on property occu- pied by the tenant, other than a violation that is reasonably dangerous to the physical health or safety of the tenant or another person, the tenant fails to comply with a written lease provision requiring the tenant to: (A) notify the landlord or his agent, in writing, of the violation; and (B) allow the landlord 15 days to correct the violation; or oo nah (woke Bian oe ete, Resp. App. 55 (9) the landlord proves that the rent increase, service reduction, or attempted eviction was- for good cause and not for purposes of retaliation against the tenant. i (c) An offense under this section may be prosecuted upon the filing of a written complaint by the tenant with the city attorney. (Ord. 20017) SEC. 27-6. URBAN REHABILITATION STANDARDS BOARD. (a) There is created the urban rehabilitation stan- dards board, which is composed of 30 members and eight alternate members. The 30 members must be appointed by the city council, with each city council member mak- ing two appointments, and the eight alternate members must be appointed by the city council as a whole. The mayor shall appoint the chair. The board shall consist of: (1) aregistered architect who has had at least 10 years experience in the construction of buildings and housing; (2) a mortgage loan banker who has been engaged in mortgage loan banking for at least 10 years; (3) a home builder who has at least 10 years experience in the construction of homes; (4) a licensed real estate broker who has at least 10 years experience in the appraisal of real estate; (5) a person who is engaged in social or welfare work and having at least 10 years experience in public or private case work; Resp. App. 56 (6) a structural engineer who has at least 10 years experience in the construction of commercial build- ings; and (7) twenty-four members and eight alternate members chosen on the basis of their interest in commu- nity affairs. (b) Members and alternate members must be resi- dents ‘of the city. Their appointment will be made in August of each odd-numbered year for a two-year term beginning on September 1. All members and alternate members shall serve until their successors are appointed and qualified. ; (c) Alternate members must meet the same require- ments and qualifications as regular board members, except that an alternate member has voting privileges only when sitting in for an absent member. (d) The director of environmental and health ser- vices, the fire marshal, the building official, and the direc- tor of housing shall serve in an advisory capacity as ex officio members of the board with no voting privileges. (Ord. Nos. 15198; 19234; 19673; 21153; 21200; 21515; 21854; 22026) SEC. 27-7. HEARING PANELS. (a) The chair of the board shall divide the board into four hearing panels for the purpose of performing the duties of the board. Three panels will be composed of seven members, two alternate members, and the chair, and one panel will be composed of eight members, two Resp. App. 57 alternate members, and the chair. Five members consti- tute a quorum. Decisions of a hearing panel are made by a majority vote of those present. (b) The chair is responsible for obtaining a quorum for each meeting of a panel. In the absence of a regular member, the chair may assign a member from another panel or an alternate member to serve. Each board mem- ber, including the chair, has full voting privileges on any panel and is free to attend any panel meeting. (c) For the purpose of fulfilling attendance require- ments, a member or alternate member who is absent from an assigned panel meeting but attends the meeting of one of the other panels immediately preceding or imme- diately following the missed panel meeting, will not, upon approval of the chair, be credited with an absence. A member or alternate member, however, must attend one meeting of another panel for each meeting of the assigned panel from which the member or alternate mem- ber is absent in order to avoid being credited with an absence. For the purpose of fulfilling attendance require- ments, the chair is only required to attend the regular meetings of two of the hearing panels. (d) Each hearing panel shall select a vice-chair to preside over its proceedings in the absence of the chair. (e) The director shall assign cases other than rehear- ings to the hearing panels on a rotation basis. A rehearing must be assigned to the same hearing panel that origi- nally heard the case. (f) Each hearing panel has the same authority as the full board. Resp. App. 58 (g) A decision by a hearing panel constitutes a deci- sion of the board. (Ord. Nos. 15198; 15919; 19234; 21200; 21854) SEC. 27-8. POWERS AND DUTIES OF A HEARING PANEL; ADVISORY RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE BOARD. (a) A hearing panel has the following powers and duties: (1) To require the reduction in occupancy load of an overcrowded structure or vacation of a structure that is reasonably dangerous to the health, safety, or welfare of the occupants. (2) To require, as an alternative to demolition of a structure found to be an urban nuisance, the repair of the structure by the owner or by the city. (3) To require the demolition of a structure found to be an urban nuisance. (4) To require the removal of personality from a structure ordered vacated or demolished. Removal may be accomplished by use of city forces or a private transfer company if the owner of the personalty is not known, or the whereabouts of the owner cannot be ascertained, or the owner fails to remove the personalty. A hearing panel may cause any personalty removed to be stored in the care and custody of a bonded warehouse facility. Costs of removal and storage are the responsibility of the owner of the personalty. Resp. App. 59 (5) To require that a vacant structure or vacant portion of a structure constituting a dangerous condition or nuisance be securely closed and made safe. (6) To require or cause the correction of a dan- gerous condition on the land. Correction of a dangerous condition may be accomplished by city forces or private contractor. Costs of correction are the responsibility of the owner. (7) To grant a variance when, in the opinion of a hearing panel, a literal interpretation of this chapter would result in the imposition of an unnecessary or unreasonable hardship. (8) To assess a civil penalty, not to exceed $2,000 a day, against a property owner for each day or part of a day that he fails to repair or demolish a struc- ture in compliance with a board order issued under Sec- tion 27-13 of this chapter. (9) To cause an action to be brought in district court in accordance with Section 214.003 of the Texas Local Government Code for the appointment of a receiver for property found to be an urban nuisance. (10) To require relocation of the occupants of a structure found to be an urban nuisance. (b) In addition to the powers and duties of the hearing panels, the board shall periodically meet as a whole for the purpose of planning and advising the city council on matters concerning substandard housing and enforcement of this chapter. (Ord. Nos. 15198; 16473; 19234; 19896; 20470) Resp. App. 60 SEC. 27-9. PROCEDURE. (a) The board may adopt rules not inconsistent with this chapter or Chapter 8 of this code. Meetings of the board or a hearing panel will be held at the call of the chairman, or in his absence the vice-chairman, or an acting chairman designated by the chairman, or as the board may determine. The chairman, acting chairman, or the vice-chairman may administer oaths and compel the attendance of witnesses. (b) The director or his designated representative shall act as secretary to the board and the hearing panels. (c) At each hearing of a hearing panel, an owner, lessor, occupant, or lienholder may present witnesses in his own behalf and is entitled to cross-examine any wit- ness appearing against him. (d) After a public hearing the decision of a hearing panel is final as to administrative remedies and a rehear- ing may not be granted except as provided by Sections 27-14 and 27-14.3. (e) Once the decision of a hearing panel has become final under this section, Section 27-14, or 27-14.3, the person affected by an order may appeal the decision to the state district court. Appeal to the district court must be filed within 20 days from the date of receipt of notice of a final board order. Appeal in the district court shall be limited to a hearing under the substantial evidence rule. (Ord. Nos. 15198; 15919; 19234) Resp. App. 61 SEC. 27-10. FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH BOARD ORDER. (a) A person commits an offense if he fails to correct a violation of this chapter in compliance with a board order that has become final under Section 27-9, 27-14, or 27-14.3. (b) It is a defense to prosecution under Subsection (a) that the board order has been appealed to the state district court. (Ord. Nos. 15198; 16473; 18001; 19234) ARTICLE III. MINIMUM STANDARDS. SEC. 27-11. MINIMUM STANDARDS; RESPON- SIBILITIES OF OWNER. (a) Property standards. An owner shall: (1) eliminate a hole, excavation, sharp protru- sion, and any other object or condition that exists on the land and is reasonably capable of causing injury to a person; (2) securely cover or close a well, cesspool, or cistern; (3) provide solid waste receptacles or con- tainers when required by Chapter 18 of this code; (4) provide drainage to prevent standing water and flooding on the land; (5) remove dead trees and tree limbs that are reasonably capable of causing injury to a person; and Resp. App. 62 (67 keep the doors and windows of a vacant structure or vacant portion of a structure securely closed to prevent unauthorized entry. (b) Structural standards. An owner shall: (1) protect the exterior surfaces of a structure which are subject to decay by application of paint or other coating; (2) fill hollow, masonry supporting piers, if used, with concrete and anchor the piers to concrete footings with a °/s inch steel dowel; (3) provide and maintain railings for stairs, steps, balconies, porches, and elsewhere as specified in the Dallas Building Code; (4) repair holes, cracks, and other defects rea- sonably capable of causing injury to a person in stairs, porches, steps, and balconies; (5) maintain a structure intended for human occupancy and a structure used as an accessory to a structure intended for human occupancy in a weather- tight and water-tight condition; (6) maintain floors, walls, ceilings, and all sup- porting structural members in a sound condition, capable of bearing imposed loads safely; (7) provide cross-ventilation of not less than 11/2 square feet for each 25 lineal feet of wall in each basement, cellar, and crawl space; (8) repair or replace chimney flue and vent attachments that do not function properly; Resp. App. 63 (9) repair holes, cracks, breaks, and loose sur- face materials that are health or safety hazards in or on floors, walls, and ceilings; and (10) provide and maintain a moisture-resistant finish or material for the flooring or subflooring of each bathroom, shower room, and toilet room. (c) Utility standards. An owner shall: (1) provide and maintain in operating condition connections to discharge sewage from a structure of land into a public sewer system where available; (2) provide and maintain in operating condition a toilet connected to a water source and to a public sewer, where available, in each structure intended for human habitation; (3) provide and maintain in operating condition connections and pipes to supply potable water at ade- quate pressure to a structure intended for human occu- pancy; (4) provide and maintain in operating condition a device to supply hot water of a minimum temperature of 120° F. within each structure intended for human habi- tation; (5) provide and connect a kitchen sink, bathtub or shower, and lavatory to a cold and hot water source in each structure intended for human habitation; (6) connect plumbing fixtures and heating equipment that the owner supplies in accordance with the Dallas Plumbing Code and Dallas Mechanical Code; Resp. App. 64 (7) provide and maintain heating equipment in operating condition so that it is capable of maintaining a minimum inside temperature of 68° F. from November 1 through April 15 in each room of a structure intended for human occupancy; (8) if screens are not provided as required in Subsection (d)(2), provide and maintain in operating con- dition, from May 1 through October 15, refrigerated air equipment capable of maintaining a maximum inside temperature that is 20 degrees lower than the outside temperature of 85° F., whichever is warmer, in each room of a structure intended for human occupancy; (9) provide and maintain in operating condition supply lines for electrical service to each structure intended for human occupancy if electrical service is available within 300 feet; (10) connect each heating and cooking device that burns solid fuel to a chimney or flue; and (11). provide and maintain in operating condi- tion electrical circuits and outlets sufficient to safely carry a load imposed by normal use of appliances and fixtures. (d) Health standards. An owner shall: (1) eliminate rodents and vermin in or on the land; (2) provide a structure intended for human habitation with a screen for keeping out insects at each opening of the structure if the structure is not cooled with refrigerated air; Resp. App. 65 (3) maintain the interior of a vacant structure or vacant portion of a structure free from rubbish and gar- bage; (4) keep the interior of a structure free from insects, rodents, and vermin, except as specified in Sec- tion 27-12(b). (e) It is a defense to prosecution under Subsection (a) of this section that the premises concerned is the site of new construction and reasonable and continuous pro- gress is being made to complete the construction. (f) It is a defense to a prosecution under Subsection (d)(4) of this section that the structure was treated to eliminate insects, rodents, and vermin by a person licensed under the Texas Structural Pest Control Act once within the preceding six months. (g) An owner shall provide a tenant with alternative housing that meets the minimum standards required by this section when: (1) after being issued a notice or citation for violation of Subsection (c)(7) of this section, the owner fails to repair heating equipment within 72 hours after receiving such notice or citation and the overnight low temperature, as measured by the National Weather Ser- vice at Dallas Love Field, is below 40° F. for three consec- utive days after receiving such notice or citation; or (2) after being issued a notice or citation for violation of Subsection (c)(8) of this section, the owner fails to repair refrigerated air equipment within 72 hours after receiving such notice or citation and the daytime high temperature, as measured by the National Weather Resp. App. 66 Service at Dallas Love Field, is 95° F. or above for three consecutive days after receiving such notice or citation. (h) It is a defense to prosecution under Subsections (c)(7) and (c)(8) of this section and to the alternative housing requirements of Subsection (g) of this section that: (1) failure to maintain heating and refrigerated air equipment in compliance with those subsections was the direct result of an act of nature or other cause beyond the reasonable control of the owner; or (2) the owner is making diligent efforts to repair the heating and refrigerated air equipment in com- pliance with those subsections; if the owner demonstrates to the director that diligent efforts to repair are being made; the director will not issue a notice or citation for a violation of Subsection (c)(7) or (c)(8) of this section. (i) It is a defense to prosecution under Subsection (c)(7) of this section and to the alternative housing requirements of Subsection (g)(1) of this section that a written contract is in effect requiring the tenant to pro- vide and maintain heating equipment and the owner has provided utility connections for heating equipment in compliance with the Dallas Mechanical Code, as amended, in each room of the structure intended for human occupancy. (j) It is a defense to prosecution under Subsection (c)(8) of this section and to the alternative housing requirement of Subsection (g)(2) of this section that the structure is provided with exterior windows and doors that are easily openable to provide air ventilation and Resp. App. 67 covered with screens in compliance with Subsection (d)(2) of this section. (Ord. Nos. 15198; 15372; 15919; 16473; 19234; 20578) SEC. 27-12. RESPONSIBILITIES OF OCCUPANT. (a) An occupant shall: (1) maintain those portions of the interior of a structure under his control free from rubbish, garbage, and other conditions that would encourage infestation of insects, rodents, or vermin; (2) remove an animal or animals from a struc- ture if the presence of the animal or animals is a health hazard to an occupant; (3) connect plumbing fixtures and heating equipment that the occupant supplies in accordance with the Dallas Plumbing Code and the Dallas Mechanical Code. (4) provide solid waste receptacles or con- tainers when required by Chapter 18 of this code; and (5) not alter a structure or its facilities so as to create a nonconformity with Section 27-11 or this section. (b) The tenant occupant of a single-family residen- tial structure shall keep the interior of the structure free from insects, rodents, and vermin if the owner can show that the structure was treated to eliminate insects, rodents, and vermin by a person licensed under the Texas Structural Pest Control Act: Resp. App. 68 (1) within two weeks before the date the tenant took occupancy; or (2) once within the preceding six months if there has been more than one tenant during the preced- ing six months. (Ord. Nos. 15198; 15372; 19234) ARTICLE IV. REPAIR, DEMOLITION, RECEIVERSHIP, VACATION, RELOCATION, CLOSURE, AND CIVIL PENALTIES. (Ord. 20470, title) SEC. 27-13. URBAN NUISANCE; REPAIR, DEMOLI- TION, RECEIVERSHIP, AND CIVIL PEN- ALTIES; NOTICE. (a) The director shall give notice of a hearing to consider repair, demolition, or receivership of a structure, or the assessment of a civil penalty against the owner, to the owner or owners, lessor, and occupant of the struc- ture, and any mortgagee or lienholder of reco [Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.] --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386014_1846%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.