# Amicus Curiae Brief — Cayetano v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386014_1713%3A5 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief - **Published:** January 1, 2001 - **Citation:** 532 U.S. 942 ## Text (5) No. 00-1198 FEB 26 200 ! | In The Supreme Court of the United States + BENJAMIN J. CAYETANO and EARL I. ANZAI, Petitioners, CHEVRON USA, INC., Respondent. ¢ On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari To The United States Court Of Appeals For The Ninth Circuit 7 BRIEF OF THE CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO AS AMICUS CURIAE SUPPORTING PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI ¢ Louise H. RENNE City Attorney City and County of San Francisco ANDREW W. ScHWARTZ * Burk E. DELVENTHAL ELLEN FoRMAN SusAN S. CLEVELAND Deputy City Attorneys City Hall, Room 234 1 Carlton B. Goodlett Place San Francisco, California 94102-4682 (415) 554-4620 *Counsel of Record Additional Counsel Continued on Inside Cover COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., (800) 225-6964 OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831 The following California cities join with the City and County of San Francisco in this brief in support of peti- tioners: Alameda Carol A. Korade, City Attorney City Hall 2263 Santa Clara Ave., Room 280 Alameda, CA 94501 Antioch William Galstan, City Attorney P.O. Box 5007 Antioch, CA 94531-5007 Avalon Pamela Albers, City Attorney P.O. Box 1676 Avalon, CA 90704 Berkeley Zachary D. Cowan, City Attorney 2180 Milvia St. Berkeley, CA 94704 Capitola Richard M. Manning, City Attorney 420 Capitola Ave. Capitola, CA 95010 Carlsbad Ronald R. Ball, City Attorney 1200 Carlsbad Village Drive Carlsbad, CA 92008 Chula Vista John M. Kaheny, City Attorney 276 Fourth Avenue Chula Vista, CA 91910 Corte Madera Jeffrey A. Walter, City Attorney Walter & Pistole 670 W. Napa, Suite F Sonoma, CA 95416 Cotati Jeffrey A. Walter, City Attorney Walter & Pistole 670 W. Napa, Suite F Sonoma, CA 95416 Culver City Carol Schwab, City Attorney 9770 Culver Blvd. Culver City, CA 90232 gre LL LOLOL OLED LTD Hawthorne Glen E. Shishido, City Attorney 4456 West 126th Street Hawthorne, CA 90250 Lafayette Charles J. Williams, City Attorney 1330 Arnold Dr., Suite 149 Martinez, CA 94553 Laguna Beach Philip D. Kohn, City Attorney Rutan & Tucker Post Office Box 1950 Costa Mesa, CA 92628-1950 Livermore Thomas R. Curry, City Attorney 1052 So. Livermore Ave. Livermore, CA 94550 Long Beach Robert E. Shannon, City Attorney City Hall 333 West Ocean Blvd., 11th Floor Long Beach, CA 90802-4664 Los Angeles James K. Hahn, City Attorney 200 N. Main St., 18th Floor Los Angeles, CA 90012 Montclair Diane E. Robbins, City Attorney 11800 Central Ave., Suite 125 Chino, CA 91710 Moreno Valley Robert L. Hansen, Asst. City Attorney P.O. Box 88005 14177 Frederick St. \ Moreno Valley, CA 92552 Morgan Hill Helene L. Leichter, City Attorney 17555 Peak Avenue Morgan Hill, CA 95037 Newark Gary T. Galliano, City Attorney 16101 East 14th St. San Leandro, CA 94578 Novato Jeffrey A. Walter, City Attorney Walter & Pistole 670 W. Napa, Suite F Sonoma, CA 95416 Oceanside Duane E. Bennett, City Attorney 300 North Coast Highway Oceanside, CA 92054 Palm Desert David J. Erwin, City Attorney 74-760 Highway 111, Suite 200 Indian Wells, CA 92210 Piedmont George S. Peyton, Jr., City Attorney 1999 Harrison St. Suite 1950 Oakland, CA 94612 Port Hueneme Don G. Kircher, City Attorney Burke, Williams & Sorensen, LLP 611 West Sixth Street, Suite 2500 Los Angeles, CA 90017 Poway Stephen M. Eckis, City Attorney P.O. Box 789 Poway, CA 92074-0789 Redlands Daniel J. McHugh, City Attorney P.O. Box 3005 Redlands, CA 92373 Roseville Mark Doane, City Attorney 2005 Hilltop Circle Roseville, CA 95747 Ross Hadden Roth, City Attorney 1050 Northgate Dr. San Rafael, CA 94903 Sacramento Samuel L. Jackson, City Attorney 980 Ninth St., Tenth Floor Sacramento, CA 95814-2736 San Anselmo Hadden Roth, City Attorney 1050 Northgate Dr. San Rafael, CA 94903 San Buenaventura Donna Landeros, City Manager 501 Poli Street Ventura, CA 93002-0099 San Diego Casey Gwinn, City Attorney 1200 Third Ave., Suite 1620 San Diego, CA 92101 San Pablo Brian M. Libow, City Attorney One Alvarado Square San Pablo, CA 94806 San Rafael Gary T. Ragghianti, City Attorney 1400 Fifth Avenue San Rafael, CA 94901 Santa Clara Michael R. Downey, City Attorney 1500 Warburton Ave. Santa Clara, CA 95050 Santa Cruz John G. Baricone, City Attorney 333 Church Street Santa Cruz, CA 95060 Santa Monica Marsha Jones Moutri, City Attorney 1685 Main St. P.O. Box 2200 Santa Monica, CA 90407-2200 Santa Paula Phillip H. Romney, City Attorney P.O. Box 912 Santa Paula, CA 93061 Sunnyvale Valerie J. Armento, City Attorney P.O. Box 3707 Sunnyvale, CA 94088 Mii Tiburon Ann R. Danforth, City Attorney 1505 Tiburon Blvd. Tiburon, CA 94920 Torrance John L. Fellows III, City Attorney 3031 Torrance Blvd. Torrance, CA 90503-5059 Tracy Debra E. Corbett, City Attorney 325 East Tenth St. Tracy, CA 95376 Union City Gary T. Galliano, City Attorney 16101 East 14th St. San Leandro, CA 94578 Wasco Alan J. Peak, City Attorney 1601 “F” St. Bakersfield, CA 93301 i TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF AUT ERORREEERS 6c 6cs ce cic cecacivvesscceus ii STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE..... 1 CREP RUGS 005 0c dé ctescabepuand nuns thaybaene ets 1 STATEMENT OF TEER CAB ooo icc icc cecicdvccaawsss 3 REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT OF CER- RURMUIE ons kc tadeuccindees bined pekiaseerks sate 5 I. REVIEW BY THIS COURT IS NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH A CLEAR STANDARD OF JUDI- CIAL REVIEW OF LEGISLATIVE LAND USE pe bey 8 | PTET ET yy Peres pre pre 5 Il. THE COURT SHOULD GRANT REVIEW TO PRESERVE THE POWERS OF ELECTED LEGIS- LATURES TO DECIDE THE WISDOM AND EFFICACY OF LAND USE REGULATION ..... 13 A. The Ninth Circuit Decision Conflicts with Representative Democracy................. 14 B. The Ninth Circuit Decision Will Prevent Land Use Planning and Reduce Property We, i a0 ob dnd no 4esdes io neeekeaeetes. 15 C. The Ninth Circuit Decision Will Promote Inefficiency and Chaos in Land Use Poli- CPUS ook 5h cds cee epics Kc acadcaaaevacen 16 D. The Ninth Circuit Decision Will Shift Land Use Planning to Federal Courts Unfamiliar a Baw ar a 17 ee RT 8 PICS TTERT TPC IeT ER or ore hr eee 20 Se TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page Cases Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (I9GD) 055 oc ccccnsdccendiosncsdsenuenen 17,41 @B Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, No. 99-1260 (Fed. 21, SBOE) oo cccsccscscccsncccstos 18 Bonnie Briar Syndicate, Inc. v. Town of Mamaroneck, 721 N.E.2d 971 (N.Y. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. BODE CRBGE) oo on ccnccsccscassacéseaneaveenseusiaues 12 Chevron USA, Inc. v. Cayetano, 224 F.3d 1030 (9th Che, BBGB) oc ccccscsscessstsesssnenepetyaaans 2, 3, 12 City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, 499 US. 365 (1991) ..ccccssccee PETTITT Te 6 City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, L9., T26 UG. G67 (GPP) oo cccccvsscssesecvess 2, 9, 10 Clajon Production Corp. v. Petera, 70 F.3d 1566 (10th Cle, 1956) oc cccccccccscnceuncdsensasensaeuusenes 12 Dodd v. Hood River County, 136 F.3d 1219 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 923 (1998)............. 18 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) ...2, 8, 9, 11 Eastern Enterprises, Inc. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998) ..9, 10 Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963) ............4.. 6 Keystone Bituminous Coal Assoc. v. DeBenedictis, 480 US. GO (19G7) 0 oc cccccccestenivestedosbdneuscseees 7 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)............ 6, 15 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued Page Manocherian v. Lenox Hill Hospital, 643 N.E.2d 479 (N.Y. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1109 (1995)...... 12 Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887)............-.... 6 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934)............... 6 New Port Largo, Inc. v. Monroe County, 95 F.3d 1084 (11th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1121 (1997) .... 12 Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. BES GION) occ cccsccvcsccccssnecssvciaes 2, 8, 9, 11, 12 Northern Illinois Home Builders Ass'n, Inc. v. County of Du Page, 649 N.E.2d 384 (Ill. 1995)............. 12 Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).................. 6 Parking Assn. of Georgia, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 450 CEB Bee Get. WOON i hse cn cencccsvanectecesnasiee 11 Parking Assn. of Georgia, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 515 CEG, BIOS CI i bk hdc de sbscevicdecisndsccsindscs 11 Pennell v. San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988) .............44.. 7 Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922)....... 8 Railroad Commission v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496 (1941) .... 19 Richardson v. City and County of Honolulu, 124 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 871 CRBGED 6 i'n vinnie ccd cadavetsccosedccbnccddeudesecdate 12 San Remo Hotel v. City and County of San Francisco, 145 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 1998)...............00e eee 19 Santa Monica Beach, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 968 P.2d 993 (Cal. 1999), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1131 (1999)...... 12, 19 iv TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued Sinclair Oil Corp. v. County of Santa Barbara, 96 F.3d 401 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1059 | PRR yer erer rrr Tererrerre rie TT rr ee Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 121 S.Ct. 675 (2001) ................. Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Calvert County, 48 F.3d 810 (4th GO BUD ed ovcsccadncceocccnvendseassesebanase Texas Manufactured Hous. Ass'n v. Nederland, 101 F.3d 1095 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 521 U.S. BER CE a 650666 cb nas ckbedacscadeesenheceduhn Trimen Development Co. v. King County, 877 P.2d DOr COMI ROOD 65s one sacndenercdccnsisncareces United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 ER iain ka sieae The dissenting opinion apparently did not consider the Court’s rationale for the adjudicatory-legislative distinction expressed in Nollan and Dolan; namely, that the danger of the government's unfairly leveraging its police power is far greater in cases of individual property owners seeking approval of a single development than in instances of regulation applying across the board to an entire class of similarly situated property owners. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834-35; Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385. 12 highly deferential review to heightened scrutiny. Compare New Port Largo, Inc. v. Monroe County, 95 F.3d 1084, 1088 (11th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1121 (1997) (height- ened scrutiny not applicable to zoning regulation); Texas Manufactured Hous. Ass'n v. Nederland, 101 F.3d 1095, 1105 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1112 (1997) (rejecting application of Nollan to legislation regulating location of manufactured homes); Clajon Production Corp. v. Petera, 70 F.3d 1566, 1578 (10th Cir. 1995) (heightened scrutiny inap- plicable to hunting license scheme because regulation not a “physical taking or its equivalent”); Bonnie Briar Syndi- cate, Inc. v. Town of Mamaroneck, 721 N.E.2d 971, 974-75 (N.Y. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1094 (2000) (heightened scrutiny does not apply to downzoning); Santa Monica Beach, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 968 P.2d 993, 1001-02 (Cal. 1999), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1131 (deferential standard applies to land use regulations that are “generally appli- cable through legislative action”) with Richardson v. City and County of Honolulu, 124 F.3d 1150, 1165-66 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 871 (1998) (applying height- ened scrutiny to legislative rent control); Chevron, 224 F.3d 1030, 1033-34 (same); Northern Illinois Home Builders Ass'n, Inc. v. County of Du Page, 649 N.E.2d 384, 389 (Ill. 1995) (heightened scrutiny applicable to legislative devel- opment impact fee); Trimen Development Co. v. King County, 877 P.2d 187, 194 (Wash. 1994) (same); Man- ocherian v. Lenox Hill Hospital, 643 N.E.2d 479, 482 (N.Y. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1109 (1995) (applying height- ened scrutiny to rent control legislation). This Court has not definitively resolved the scope of the “substantially advances” prong of the Agins takings test, particularly as it applies to generally applicable land use regulation. The Court should grant review in this case to establish a uniform standard of judicial review of 13 legislative zoning and other land use regulations under the Takings Clause.® Il. THE COURT SHOULD GRANT REVIEW TO PRE- SERVE THE POWERS OF ELECTED LEGISLA- TURES TO DECIDE THE WISDOM AND EFFICACY OF LAND USE REGULATION. Immediate review of the Ninth Circuit’s decision is imperative for amici cities. The cities have enacted scores of laws regulating land use to promote the general health, safety, and welfare and continue to enact such regulations daily. The Ninth Circuit decision invites legal challenges to every one of these regulations as a “taking.” The Ninth Circuit’s decision allows aggrieved land- owners to avoid the political process entirely. If the deci- sion stands, courts could be permitted to assume the role of legislatures, and the public would be denied a voice in matters that have direct and immediate impact on their safety, property values, economic welfare, and quality of life. The framers of the Constitution could not possibly have intended this result.7 This Court should therefore © On January 29, 2001, Greenspring Racquet Club filed a petition for certiorari requesting that the Court adjudicate the same issue presented here; namely, the proper standard of judicial review of a generally applicable zoning ordinance under the “substantially advances” prong of the Agins test. Greenspring Racquet Club, Inc. v. Baltimore County, Maryland, No. 00-1012. In that case, in upholding a zoning ordinance limiting the height and floor-area ratio of buildings against a takings challenge, the Fourth Circuit deferred to the legislature. The filing of the petition in Greenspring is further evidence that the scope of the “substantially advances” standard is an important and unsettled issue warranting immediate review by this Court. 7 The Chevron majority noted that its decision should be narrowly applied and that it “save[s] for another day the 14 grant the petition and establish a uniform standard of review of the efficacy of land use regulation that pre- serves traditional deference to the policy decisions of legislative bodies. A. The Ninth Circuit Decision Conflicts with Rep- resentative Democracy. Whether a price control such as that at issue in Chev- ron will have its intended effect in a complex industry is usually the subject of lengthy legislative committee hear- ings, in which economists, consumer advocates, dealers, and oil companies would present divergent views on the question. Following the gathering of evidence, demo- cratically elected legislators would weigh the opinions of their constituents affected by the proposed regulation and their respective experts to fashion a policy that will promote the general health, safety, and welfare. Predicting the impact of a price control in a complex business such as the motor fuel industry is quintessen- tially a legislative policy function. The courts have no greater right to legislate this policy than they have in dictating zoning decisions, safety requirements for autos, or the proper procedure for pasteurizing milk. Chevron raises the potential for abuse of judicial power with regard to all government regulation, not merely land use regulation. The deferential rational basis question of whether the ‘substantially advances’ test applies outside the context of rent contro] statutes that permit the capture of a premium.” App. 12 n. 4. However, the court’s reasoning that legislatures cannot be entrusted to make policy with respect to the economic relations between commercial landlords and tenants is easily expanded to apply to all social and economic regulation that affects the value of assets, including all land use regulation. 15 test, historically applicable to social and economic legisla- tion, would become obsolete. The Ninth Circuit's pro- posal that the federal courts would conduct their own evidentiary hearing to predict the effects of legislation, see App. 15-17, takes a page directly from Lochner. B. The Ninth Circuit Decision Will Prevent Land Use Planning and Reduce Property Values. The prospect of defending every land use policy in court will inevitably have a chilling effect on the entire planning process. Governments will be less apt to experi- ment with new initiatives to respond to rapidly changing conditions. More social and economic problems will be unaddressed. All communities will become more haphaz- ard, congested, and unsafe. Ultimately, the quality of life for all would suffer. What may promote the short-term economic interest of a few property owners will cause immeasurable injury to a public that relies on local gov- ernment to create well-planned communities.8 For example, San Francisco and amici cities enact regulations designed to reduce traffic congestion and pre- serve open space. The cities have instituted programs to retain affordable housing for low-income households, the elderly, and the disabled. They limit the location of liquor stores and pornography shops to protect children and reduce crime. The cities regulate the size and design of ® At the same time that land use regulations deny property owners unfettered prerogatives to do what they will with their property, these regulations enhance the quality of communities and make all property more valuable. See, e.g., C. Ford Runge, The Congressional Budget Office's Regulatory Takings and Proposals for Change: One Sided and Uninformed, 7 Envtl. L. & Prac. 5 (1999) (documenting the “givings” from broadly applied land use regulation that enhance property values). \ : : 16 buildings and billboards to preserve neighborhood char- acter. These zoning regulations preserve property values and create livable communities in which to work and raise families. All of these programs would be at risk under the Ninth Circuit’s nondeferential approach to judicial review of land use legislation. C. The Ninth Circuit Decision Will Promote Inef- | ficiency and Chaos in Land Use Policymaking. If courts are to be the final arbiter of land use policy, the enactment of a land use policy by a legislature will mark only the beginning of the decision-making process. The validity of any policy could remain unsettled for years as challenges to the legislation wind their way through the courts. Removing certainty as to the validity of land use regulation will chill investment in projects involving real property. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit’s nondeferential stan- dard of judicial review will flood the courts with lawsuits by property owners, as virtually any zoning regulation would be subject to challenge as a taking. The govern- ment could be compelled to defend thousands of land use laws in evidentiary proceedings, at monumental cost to the taxpayers. Nor do the courts have the institutional competence to study and mediate between competing interests in land use - a function that is the essence of law making. A court confronted with a complex issue of land use plan- ning is no substitute for a local legislative agency that can see the larger picture in the jurisdiction or region. Land uses are interdependent. Effective land use planning requires a broader perspective than one isolated case at one point in time. Indeed, land use regulation is no different than other exercises of the police power that mediate private economic interests and other socially 17 important goals. Decisions as to the most effective land use policies are best made by legislatures taking~the initiative to identify problems, receive evidence from affected parties, debate the advantages of alternative pol- icies, and compromise in order to reach a majority deci- sion. A court with hundreds of cases on its docket is not the proper forum to make land use policy. D. The Ninth Circuit Decision Will Shift Land Use Planning to Federal Courts Unfamiliar with Local Conditions. The Ninth Circuit decision will break down the Sep- aration of Powers at both the federal and state levels, but this problem would be particularly acute where federal courts are involved. Federal courts are not equipped to assume the planning function now performed by state and local legislative agencies. Zoning and planning requires the careful weighing of individual property rights against public values within a local context. Fed- eral judges rarely come from the communities in which land use disputes before them arise. Thus, federal courts cannot be expected to-develop the thorough appreciation of local conditions and interests necessary to engage in effective land use planning. For example, there is no comparison between condi- tions prevailing in urbanized cities like San Francisco and the patterns of development in Silicon Valley or the rural communities of California’s Central Valley. Yet, the Ninth Circuit would have federal judges unfamiliar with local conditions dictating land use rules to each of these div- erse communities. Federal judicial policymaking simply does not work in the realm of land use. Not surprisingly, with the exception of the Ninth Circuit, federal courts 18 have wisely declined to usurp the roles of local zoning boards and state courts.9 Indeed, the Ninth Circuit decision runs counter to the pronounced trend away from federal preemption of state and local regulation. In a series of recent decisions, this Court has restricted the federal role in economic and social regulation, indicating that such matters are within the purview of the state and local governments. For example, in holding that the Army Corps of Engineers has no regulatory authority to protect migratory birds using non-navigable bodies of water, the Court stated: [T]he States’ [retain] traditional and primary power over land and water use. (“[RJegulation of land use [is] a function traditionally per- formed by local governments”). . . . Congress chose to “recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States ... to plan the development and use... of land and water resources. . Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of Engi- neers, 121 S.Ct. 675, 684 (2001) (citations omitted). In areas such as disability rights, gender discrimination, and gun control, this Court has returned control of functions pre- viously centralized in the federal government to the states.1° 9 See, e.g., Dodd v. Hood River County, 136 F.3d 1219, 1230 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 923 (1998) (“The Courts of Appeals were not created to be ‘the Grand Mufti of local zoning _ boards’ ”); Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Calvert County, 48 F.3d 810, 828-29 (4th Cir. 1995) (“Resolving the routine land-use disputes that inevitably and constantly arise among developers, local residents, and municipal officials is simply not the business of the federal courts.”) 10 See, e.g., Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, No. 99-1240 (Feb. 21, 2001) (barring recovery by state employees 19 The ripeness and abstention doctrines constitute additional grounds for reserving land use disputes for resolution by the state courts. These sound policies are designed to preserve the discretion of local legislative agencies and local courts to regulate the use of land. See Williamson County Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 192-95 (1985) (takings claimant must seek compensation in state court under state procedures before a federal takings claim arises); Railroad Commission v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496, 498 (1941) (land use planning is sensitive area of social policy that federal courts should leave to state courts). These doctrines insure that land use disputes involving state and local governments are heard and determined in the state courts under state law in part because local agencies and courts, not federal courts, have the greatest familiarity with local conditions.1! based on state’s failure to comply with federal ADA); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (federal law proscribing violence against women inapplicable to state claim of sexual harassment); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (striking down federal regulation of guns in schools). 1) Although it is settled law in California that heightened scrutiny does not apply to land use legislation, see Santa Monica Beach, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 968 P.2d at 1001-02 (deferential standard applies to land use regulations that are “generally applicable through legislative action”), the Ninth Circuit decision nevertheless could have an immediate impact on California government agencies. The Ninth Circuit has flouted Williamson's state compensation requirement by allowing takings cases to circumvent the state courts. In Sinclair Oil Corp. v. County of Santa Barbara, 96 F.3d 401, 407 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1059 (1996) and San Remo Hotel v. City and County of San Francisco, 145 F.3d 1095, 1102 (9th Cir. 1998), the Ninth Circuit held that a facial challenge to regulation on the ground that it does not “substantially advance legitimate state 20 Here, rent control is a quintessential state and local issue. By adjudicating Chevron’s takings claim, the Ninth Circuit has improperly federalized this issue. , ~~ CONCLUSION The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted. Dated: February 23, 2001 Respectfully submitted, Louise H. RENNE City Attorney ANDREW W. SCHWARTZ Deputy City Attorney Counsel of Record By ANDREW W. SCHWARTZ Attorneys for Amicus Curiae City County of San Francisco interests” is ripe in federal court even though the claimant has not sought compensation in state court. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386014_1713%3A5. Public record. Not legal advice.