# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Lennix v. Halter

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 2001
- **Citation:** 531 U.S. 1150

## Text

PILED

OFFICE OF JHE G&ERK
In The

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{ Supreme Court of the United States
Cecile A. Lennix

Kenneth S. Apfel, Commissioner of Social Security

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari
In The U.S. Court of Appeals
For The Fifth Circuit

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

j Cecile A. Lennix
: Pro Se
1817 Armant Ct.
LaPlace, LA 70068
(504) 652-2268

* i

Questions Presented for Review

1. May the judicial system of the State of Louisiana deny a
_ Claimant a day in court to defend himself?

2. May a claimant have the privilege to submit evidence to
the court system that was not given to the A.L.J. Adrian
Pedron when ordered in a court hearing on 12/09/1996
but never received?

3. Does a claimant have the opportunity to be examined by a
Social Security disability physician for a work related
hung injury before the courts make final decisions?

4. May an employer elect not to complete an accident report
on an employee who is injured while at work but

completed sheet as personal injury?

Parties to the Proceeding

Cheryl Chapman
Assistant Regional Counse!
1301 Young Street, Suite 430
Dallas, Texas 75202-5433
Phone# - 204-767-2921
Fax Number - 214-767-9189

(ii)

Table of Contents

Title

Citation of Opinions and Orders in the Case
Basis for Jurisdiction

Constitutional Provision
Statement of the Case

Arguments
Listing of Appendix Items
Appendix Item 1
Appendix Item 2

(iti)

Statute of the Case

Elliot L. Richardson v. Pedro Perales 402 US 389, 28 L Ed 2d
842, 91S Ct 1420

Citation of Opinions and Orders in the Case

Complaint filed August 04, 1998. Civil action 98-2296 Sect. T
Mag. 5 ‘

October 14, 1999 United States District Court Eastern District
of Louisiana Civil Action No. 98-2296 Section “LLM” (1)

Notice of Appeal Civil Action No. 98-2296 Section “LLM” (1)
on November 09, a

01/22/00 Additional Extension of Time Case #99-31244

01/24/00 Motion to Supplement Record on Appeal
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
No. 99-31244

USDC - 98-2296 Sec.”LLM” (1)

Received 10/07/98 Motion for Extension of Time wrong
name and case number

Earline Jackson for Leanna Jackson

Civil Action No. 98-2156 Section “C” (3)

Letter of April 11, 2000 from Attorney Cheryl Chapman,
Office of the General Counsel

August 04, 2000 United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit No. 99-31244

Basis for Jurisdiction

The merits of the Social Security Disability claim
have not been addressed in any lower court proceeding.

Constitutional Provision

The Constitution of the United States of America, Article
XIV, which provides in pertinent part: “Nor shall any state
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law.”

Statement of the Case

I would like to appeal the decision rendered by

Circuit Judges Higginbotham, Duhe’, and Wiener in case
#99-31244.

On Sunday, June 27, 1993, while performing duties
an an assistant operator at Big Three Industries, now Air
Liquide of America, anhydrous ammonia, 95% or better
purity, was inhaled by claimant Cecile A. Lennix. The
required Supervision Investigation of Accident form was
never signed and executed. Compensation was not paid or
ordered by the court system of the State of Louisiana. Merits
of the case were never addressed and considered.

Claimant asked to address compliance in reporting

accidents, but received judgment relative to personal injury
for compensation.

Claimant is asking this court to see if her records
have been misfiled or overlooked because claimant feels that
the accident of Sunday, June 27, 1993, has caused her mental
and medical problems.

Argument

Merits of case not heard in lower courts, therefore need
Federal relief.

On Sunday, June 27, 1993, claimant had an accident inhaling
anhydrous ammonia, 95% pure or better.

Lionel Comeaux, supervision, filled out a Supervision
Investigation of accident form, which he did not sign. Gave
copy to claimant on fax paper. Information fades. Ex. A

Monday, June 28, 1993, claimant visited the company
doctor, Christy Montegut, with a return visit on Wednesday,

July 27 and July 30, 1993, Office visits to Dr. John Theile,
Lung Specialist. Ex. C

July 30, 1993, received Dr. Montegut’s office visits and

Highland papers from Houston office. Supervision
Investigation of Accident report ommited. Ex. D

Claimant continued to work with residual medical
problems.

Merger of Big Three Industries and Air Liquide of America.
Ex. E ;

Thursday, January 13, 1994, claimant walked into company
control room, which had an unusual odor, compounded by
Sup. Gaubert, who began to repeatedly flick a butane
lighter. Reported incident to Plant Manager. Ex:F

January 15 and 16, 1994, claimant's family reported
claimant's strange and unusual behavior to company doctor

(Christy Montegut).

Monday, January 17, 1994, family received order of
protective custody, and claimant was admitted to DePaul

Psychiatric Hospital. Discharged on January 25, 1994. Ex. G

Claimant received 26 weeks pay from group policy through
company. Ex. H

July 31, 1994 Air Liquide Insurance Company informed
claimant of termination. Ex. I

September 1994 started treatment with Dr. Charles Chester.
Ex. J

Claimant applied for C.O.B.R.A. and received checks from
ITT Hartford, an individual policy held and paid for by
claimant. Ex. K e

September 11, 1995 appeal ITT Hartford decision. Ex. L

Letter dated September 08, 1995 received September 13, 1995
from Don Bobo, Human Resource. Ex. M

September 1995 started medical treatment at Louisiana
Medical Center. Ex.N

1996 Started treatment with Dr. Robert Ellis, River Parish
Mental Health.

Monday, December 09, 1996 hearing Judge Adrian Pedron
(ALJ). Advocate Ison was given thirty (30) additional days
to get medical records to Judge Pedron. I was not aware of
what was sent to Judge Pedron by Advocate Ison. Claimant
is submitting attending physician's Statement of Disability
sheets from Dr. Christy Montegut. Received partial
disability from Social Security. May 19, 1997 appealed
decision. Ex. O

Complaint filed August 4, 1998. Civil Action 98-2296 Sect. T
Mag. 5. Ex. P

February 4, 1998 certified letter #Z039176419 Mr. Patrick
Verschelde. Ex. Q

Medical records of October 02, & 03, 2000. Ex. R
Affidavits of Kenneth Pelham and Ferrell Yarbrough. Ex.S

Claimant believes that just too long delayéd is justice
denied.

After doing all the leg work, paperwork, utilitizing the
public library, and asking others for help, claimant is asking
this court to please hear her case. ~

I hope, pray, and keep the faith that I would be rewarded

with any and everything that is due me, including filing
fees.

Appendix

United States District Court, Eastern District of Louisiana
Cecile A. Lennix versus Kenneth S. Apfel, Commissioner of
Social Security; Civil Action No. 98-2296, Section “LLM” (1)
Dismissed with Prejudice

United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Cecile
A. Lennix, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus Kenneth S. Apfel,
Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana USDC No. 98-CV-2296-LLM, No. 99-
31244, Summary Calendar. Affirmed

Item 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

CECILE A. LENNIX CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NO. 98-2296
KENNETH S. APFEL, SECTION “LLM” (1)
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY

ORDER AND REASONS

Plaintiff Cecile A. Lennix seeks judicial review pursuant to
Section 405(g) of the Social Security Act (the “Act”) of the
final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security
Administration (the “Commissioner” ), which denied her
claim for disability income benefits (“DIB”) and
supplemental security income benefits (“SSI”) under Title II,
§§ 216(1) and 223 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(I) and 423, and
under Title XVI , §§ 1602 and 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Act, 42
U.S.C. §1381(a).’ Plaintiff and defendant filed timely cross-
motions for summary judgment. Record Doc. Nos. 6, 7.

1. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Lennix applied for DIB on June 20, 1994, alleging disability since
January 13, 1994, because of stress and depression.” (Tr.34). The

' Plaintiff incorrectly cited ”Part A of Title XVIII of the Social Security Act,
as presently amended.” (Tr.29). She is actually seeking disability income

benefits (“DIB”) under Title II and supplemental security income benefits
(“SST”) under Title XVI.

? At the hearing before the AU, however, Lennix alleged she was also
disabled due to diabetes, a respiratory impairment, and shoulder, heart
and back pain. (Tr.315-334).

Commissioner denied her application initially and on reconsider-
ation. (Tr.33-47, 55-70). Plaintiff requested a hearing before an
administrative law judge (“ALJ”), which was held on December 9,
1996. The ALJ partially granted Lennix’s application on March 21,
1997. (Tr. 14-17). He found that she was entitled to a period of
disability insurance benefits commencing on January 13, 1994 ,
under §§ 216(I) and 223 of the SSA. However, he found that
pursuant to those same sections of the SSA, her entitlement to
disability benefits ended on September 30, 1995, “the last day of
the second month after the month of the disability cessation.” (Tr.
17). After the Appeals Council denied review on June 11, 1998
(Tr. 5-6), the ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the
Commissioner for purposes of this Court’s review.

2. STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL

Plaintiff’s request for judicial review raises the following
issue: whether the Commissioner erred in concluding that
she was no longer disabled.*

3. AU'S FINDINGS RELEVANT TO ISSUES ON
APPEAL

The Commissioner made the following findings relevant to
the issues on appeal:

A. The claimant has had a “severe” impairment or
combination of impairments consisting of depression.
Specifically, she was under a disability beginning with her
alleged onset date and ending July 11, 1995. During that
time, she suffered from a major depression that precluded
her ability to perform even simple unskilled work.

B. She has no severe physical impairments. The record
as a whole shows that her diabetes and respiratory
impairments are well controlled by medications and that
these impairments do not result in more than minimal limitations in

> Plaintiff is filing pro se in this matter.

10

hers o perform basic work vis. ee Sime edie,
752 F.2d 1099 (Sth Cir. 1985).

q As of July 11, 1995, claimant had a good mood and
fairly normal sleep and appetite. Her Zoloft was decreased
to 50 mg. On July 31, 1995, she had experienced even more
of a decrease in her daytime sleepiness, Her mood, sleep,
and appetite were within normal limits and she had no
suicidal, assaultive or psychotic illness. She was to continue
to take Zoloft at 50 mg. a day for the next six months. Dr.
Chester, her treating physician, did not think she was
disabled anymore. (Tr. 15, 231).

D. Claimant gave exaggerated testimony of symptoms
and functional limitations for the period after the time she
was actually disabled. Owing to medical improvement
related to the ability to work, the claimant, since July 11,
1995, has regained a residual functional capacity consistent
with at least an ability to perform her past relevant semi-
skilled work as an assistant operator at an air separation

plant.
4. ANALYSIS
A. Standards of Review

The function of this Court on judicial review is limited to
determining whether there is substantial evidence in the
record to support the final decision of the Commissioner as
trier of fact and whether the Commissioner applied the
appropriate legal standards in evaluating the evidence.
Spellman v. Shalala, 1 F.3d 357, 360 (5th Cir. 1993); Villa v.
Sullivan, 895 F.2d 1019, 1021 (5th Cir. 1990). Substantial
evidence is more than a scintilla but less than a prepon-
derance and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Richard-
son y, Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Spellman, 1 F.3d at
360. This Court may not reweigh the evidence, try the issues ~
de novo or substitute its judgment for the Commissioner’s.
Id; Selders v, Sullivan, 914 F.2d 614, 617 (Sth Cir. 1990).

11

The Commissioner is entitled to make any finding that is
supported by substantial evidence, regardless whether other
conclusions are also permissible. See Arkansas v, Oklahoma
503 U.S. 91 (1992). Despite this Court's limited function, it
must scrutinize the record in its entirety to determine the
reasonableness of the decision reached and whether
substantial evidence exists to support it. Villa, 895 F.2d at
1022; Johnson v, Bowen, 864 F.2d 340, 343-44 (Sth Cir. 1988).
Any findings of fact by the Commissioner that are
supported by substantial evidence are conclusive. Ripley v.
Chater, 67 F.3d 552, 555 (Sth Cir. 1995).

To be considered disabled and eligible for DIB, plaintiff
must show that she is unable “to engage in any substantial
gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable
physical or mental impairment which can be expected to
result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last
for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.” 42
US.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Commissioner
has promulgated regulations that provide procedures for
evaluating a claim and determining disability. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1501 to 404.1599 & Appendices, §§ 416.901 to 416.998
(1995). The regulations include a five-step evaluation
process for determining whether an impairment prevents a
person from engaging in any substantial gainful activity.
ID. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; Greenspan v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 232,
236 (5th Cir. 1994); Moore v. Sullivan, 895 F.2d 1065, 1068
(6th Cir. 1990). The five-step inquiry terminates if

“The five-step analysis requires consideration of the following:

First, if the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful employ-
ment, he or she is found not disabled. 20 C.F.R. $§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b).

Second, if it is determined that, although the claimant is not engaged in
substantial employment, he or she has no severe mental or physical
impairment which would limit the ability to perform basic work-related
functions, the claimant is found not disabled. ID. §§ 404.1520(c),
416.920(c).

12

the Commissioner finds at any step that the claimant is or is
not disabled. Leggett v. Chater, 67 F.3d 558, 564 (Sth Cir.
1995).

The claimant has the burden of proof under the first four
parts of the inquiry. Id. If she successfully carries this
burden, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that
other substantial gainful employment is available in the
national economy, which the claimant is capable of

performing. Greenspan, 38 F.3d at 236; Kraemer v. Sullivan,
885 F.2d 206, 208 (5th Cir. 1989). When the Commissioner
shows that the claimant is capable of engaging in alternative

“the ultimate burden of persuasion shifts back
to the claimant.” I[d.; accord Selders, 914 F.2d at 618.

The Court “weigh{s} four elements of proof when
determining whether there is substantial evidence of

Third, if an individual’s impairment has lasted or can be expected to last
patchy sear) cteap ibsnar emma pheno 0-8 eat

serious impairments in the regulations or is medically equivalent to a
listed impairment, he or she is considered disabled without consideration
of vocational evidence. Id. 8§ 404.1520(d), 4 16.920(d).

Fourth, if a determination of disabled or not disabled cannot be made by
these steps and the claimant has a severe impairment, the claimants
residual functional capacity and its effect on the claimant's past relevant
work are evaluated. If the impairment does not prohibit the claimant from
returning to his or her former employment, the claimant is not disabled.
Id. $8 404.1520(e), 416.920(e).

Fifth, if it is determined that the claimant cannot return to his or her
former employment, then the claimant's age, education and work
experience are considered to see whether he or she can meet the physical
and mental demands of a significant number of jobs in the national
economy. If the claimant cannot meet the demands, he or she will be
found disabled. [d. $$ 404.1520(f)(1), 416.920(f)(1). To assist the
Commissioner at this stage, the regulations provide certain tables that
reflect major functional and vocational patterns. When the findings made
with respect to claimant's vocational factors and residual functional
capacity coincide, the rules direct a determination of disabled or not
disabled. Id. § 404, Subpt. P, App. 2, $8 200.00-204.00, 416.969 (1994)
(“Medical-Vocational Guidelines”).

13

disability: (1) objective medical facts; (2) diagnoses and
opinions of treating and examining physicians; (3) the
claimant’s subjective evidence of pain and disability; and (4)

_ {her] age, education, and work history.” Martinez v. Chater, 64
F.3d 172, 174 (Sth Cir. 1995). “The Commissioner, rather than the
courts, must resolve conflicts in the evidence.” Id.

B. Factual Background

Plaintiff Cede A. Lennix and her daughter were the only
witnesses testifying at the hearing on December 9, 1996,
before the ALJ. (Tr. 315-355). It is clear from a review of the
entire transcript that plaintiff was no longer basing her claim
for disability on depression and stress, but mainly on
respiratory problems she was experiencing. She alleged that
the problems began after she “inhaled pure ammonia from a
tank. A relieve valve went off on me and it was pure
ammonia that got into my system.” (Tr.319). This occurred
on June 27, 1993. (See Plaintiff's Mem. in Support, p.1.)
Since that time, she alleges that she suffers from exposure to
any sort of chemical, including those in household cleaners
like bleach, chlorine and aerosol spray, sulfur, dust and
tobacco. She is taking medication for her “airways,” called
Proventil, an inhalant, which she has to use approximately
twice a day. She stated that Proventil did relieve her
condition, “because it relieves the water” and it takes the
pain away from around her heart. (Tr.336). She described
suffering from pain, mostly around her heart area, which
she attributes to the buildup of fluids due to her inability to
properly release moisture through her “airways.” (Tr.320-
329). She also testified that she is being treated for diabetes,
for which she is taking pills, not insulin, and vaginitis, a
recurring bacterial infection, at Charity Hospital. (Tr. 332-
334).

C. Medical Evidence
This Court has reviewed the medical records in evidence

and the ALJ’s summary of the medical evidence (Tr. 19-21),
and finds the ALJ’s thorough summary of the evidence was

14

substantially correct and incorporates it herein by reference.
In her Motion for Summary Judgment and Incorporated
Statement of Material Facts, Lennix makes very little
reference to her mental or psychological condition. She
concentrates mainly on her physical symptoms, although
she does mention her stay in DePaul Hospital in January of
1994; she also mentions that she was placed in an area with
Alcoholic and Drug Dependency patients, “was very afraid
and asked my daughter to bring my Prevential Inhaler
pump.” (Plaintiff's Mem. pp. 3-4). She also states that the
accident on June 27, 1993 “has and is causing me physical
and emotional stress “ Id. p.6.

Lennix refers in her memorandum to having two liver tests
performed. She claims she is diabetic and is receiving
treatment for that as well as for her respiratory problems.
(See Tr.264 showing abnormal liver profile results, dated
7/31/95; see also Plaintiff's Mem.pp.5-6 and Ex.I/1 attached
[exhibit appears to be copy of same test taken on 7/31/95,
with added notation “Dr. Charles Chester ordered this test.
7/31/95 - Return to work.”}).

The ALJ found that the plaintiffs testimony of subjective
severe breathing problems, were not supported by the
evidence as a whole in the disabling degree alleged, and
therefore lacked credibility. (Tr. 15). He thoroughly
reviewed the medical evidence presented at the hearing,
along with additional medical evidence which he ordered
submitted after the hearing. (Tr. 353).

Whether pain is disabling is an issue for the ALJ, who has
the primary responsibility for resolving conflicts in the
evidence. Carrier v. Sullivan, 944 F.2d 243, 247 (5th Cir.
1991). It is within the ALJ’s discretion to determine the
disabling nature of a claimant’s pain, and the AL]’s
determination is entitled to considerable deference. Wren v.

Sullivan, 925 F.2d 123, 128 (Sth Cir. 1991); James v. Bowen,
793 F.2d 702 (5th Cir. 1986). The determination whether an

15

applicant is able to work despite some pain is within the
province of the administrative agency and should be upheld
if supported by substantial evidence. Jones v. Heckler, 702
F.2d 616 (Sth Cir. 1983); Epps v. Harris, 624 F.2d 1267 (Sth
Cir. 1980).

Subjective complaints must be corroborated by objective
medical evidence. Houston v. Sullivan, 895 F.2d 1012, 1016
(5th Cir. 1989). When the medical signs or laboratory
findings show that the claimant has medically determinable
impairments that could reasonably be expected to produce
the alleged symptoms, the Commissioner must evaluate the
intensity and persistence of the symptoms, so that he can
determine how the symptoms limit the claimant’s capacity
for work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c).

The Commissioner found, and his conclusion is substantially
supported by the medical records, that although plaintiff
testified she had crying spells daily, she also stated that she
was handling them. (Tr. 17). Additionally, as noted above,
he found that her testimony regarding symptoms and
functional limitations since July 11, 1995, the date he found
her disability had ended, was exaggerated. (Tr. 15). This
Court finds there was substantial evidence in the record to
support the ALJ's findings that Lennix’s disability, as such is
defined by the Act, ended on July 11, 1995.

Although the plaintiff did not specifically argue that her
combined impairments prohibited her from performing any
type of work, the Commissioner nevertheless properly
considered plaintiff's combined impairments. An
individual's combined impairments can prohibit substantial
gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1523, 416.923; Owens v.
Heckler, 770 F.2d 1276, 1282 (Sth Cir. 1985). It is well settled
that “the Commissioner must analyze both the disabling
effect of each of the claimant's ailments and the combined
effect of all of these impairments.” Fraga vy, Bowen, 810 F.2d
1296, 1305 (Sth Cir. 1987) (quotations omitted). However, an
ALJ's finding that multiple impairments do not render a

plaintiff disabled will be upheld unless the Commissioner
“so fragmentized [plaintiff's] several ailments” that he failed
properly to evaluate their combined effect upon plaintiff. Jd.

In the instant case, the ALJ properly found that since July 11,
1995, the plaintiff had no disorder or combination of
disorders meeting or equaling in severity any of the
disorders described in the Listing of Impairments, Subpart
P, Appendix 1, Social Security Regulations No. 4. Since at
least July 11, 1995, she had not met or equaled Listing
Section 12.04,° dealing with depression. (Tr. 15) With regard
to her respiratory problems and her diabetes, there was

* Under Listing 12.04, an affective disorder is “[cJharacterized by a
disturbance of mood, accompanied by a full or partial manic or depressive
syndrome. Mood refers to a prolonged emotion that colors the whole
psychic life; it generally involves either depression or elation.” 20 C.F.R.
Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 12.04 (1995). To satisfy the listing, plaintiff
must show that she meets the requirements of both subparagraphs A and
B of the listing.

To meet subparagraph A of Listing 12.04 for depression, Lennix
must prove: [mjedically documented persistence, either
continuous or intermittent, of...[djepressive syndrome
characterized by at least four of the following:

a. Anhedonia or pervasive loss of interest in almost all
activities; or

b. Appetite disturbance with change in weight; or

c. Sleep disturbance; or

17

substantial evidence that these problems were controlled
with medication, and that they did not produce, either alone
or in combination with any remaining emotional symptoms,
any disability that would render her incapable of perform-
ing at least her past relevant semi-skilled work. In other

= words, the Court finds that substantial evidence supports
the ALJ's conclusion.

In the instant case, this Court’s review of the record reveals
the ALJ did “not simply [make] a rote statement” that he
had evaluated plaintiff's impairments in combination.
Fraga, 810 F.2d at 1305; accord Tamez v, Sullivan, 888 F.2d
334, 336 (5th Cir. 1989). The ALJ clearly evaluated the
medical evidence carefully. See Fraga, 810 F.2d at 1305; see
Harrell v. Bowen, 862 F.2d 471, 482 (5th Cir. 1988). He
differentiated her condition between January 14, 1995 and
July 11, 1995, during which time he found she was disabled
due to severe depression, and her condition after July 11,
1995, from which time he found that she no longer suffered
from a disability, as that term is defined under the Act.

In addition, plaintiff must also meet the identical paragraph B require-
ments of either Listing 12.04 or 12.06 by showing that her disorder results
in at least two of the following:
1. Marked restriction of activities-of daily living; or
2. Marked ditficulties in maintaining social functioning; or
3. Deficiencies of concentration, persistence or pace resulting in
frequent failure to complete tasks in a timely manner (in work
settings or elsewhere); or
4. Repeated episodes of deterioration or decompensation in
work or work-like settings which cause the individual to
withdraw from that situation or to experience exacerbation of
signs and symptoms (which may include deterioration of
adaptive behaviors).

Id. $§ 12.04(B), 12.06(B). “Marked” means “more than moderate, but
less than extreme.”

ee a eee

18

“The Commissioner, rather than the courts, must resolve
conflicts in the evidence.” Martinez v. Chater, 64 F.3d 172,
174 (Sth Cir. 1995). As stated earlier, the Commissioner is
entitled to make any finding that is supported by substantial
evidence, regardless whether other conclusions are also
permissible. See Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 US. 91 (1992).
Despite this Court’s limited function, it must scrutinize the
record in its entirety to determine the reasonableness of the
decision reached and whether substantial evidence exists to
support it. Villa, 895 F.2d at 1022; Johnson v. Bowen, 864
F.2d 340, 343-44 (Sth Cir. 1988). Any findings of fact by the
Commissioner that are supported by substantial evidence
are conclusive. Ripley v. Chater, 67 F.3d 552, 555 (5th Cir.
1995). Actually, this Court does not find any signifi
conflicts in the evidence in this case. After scrutinizing the
record in its entirety, the Court finds the ALJ’s decision to be
entirely reasonable, and finds his finding of facts to be
substantially supported by the evidence of record.

CONCLUSION

Substantial evidence in the record supports the AL]’s
decision that plaintiff Lennix was entitled to a period of
disability insurance benefits commencing on January 13,
1994, and ending on September 30, 1995, “the last day of the
second month after the month of the disability cessation.”
Supra, p.2. In addition, substantial evidence in the record
supports the ALJ’ s decision that Lennix has regained a
residual functional capacity consistent with at least an ability
to perform her past relevant semi-skilled work.

Accordingly, FF IS ORDERED that plaintiff's complaint be
and is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 14th day of October, 1999.

Lansing L. Mitchell”
UNITED STATES SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE

19

Item Z

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 99-31244
Summary Calendar

CECILE A. LENNIX,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus

KENNETH S. APFEL, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,

Defendant-A ppellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
USDC No. 98-CV-2296-LLM

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DUHE, and WIENER, Circuit
Judges. PER CURIAM:’

Cecile A. Lennix appeals from the grant of summarv judgment f or
the Commissioner of Social Se urity in her action for judicial
review of the Commissioner’s decision denying her application for
disability benefits for the period after July 11, 1995. Lennix
contends that the Commissioner’s decision was not supported by
substantial evidence; that the Administrative Law Judge (AU)
ignored evidence she submitted; and that she was deprived of due
process.

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion
should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.R.47.5.4.

20

The Commissioner's decision was supported by substantial
evidence. Richardson v. Pe.rales, 402 US. 389, 390 (1971).
Lennix’s depression (the basis for an award of benefits for
the period ending July 11, 1995) had been treated success-
fully by July 11, 1995, and her medication ultimately was

complains. That document added no support to Lennix’s
disability claim. Finally, the Due Process Clause does not
require that each and every claim receive a full hearing
before a judge at each step of review.

AFFIRMED.

21

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386014_1558%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.