# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Haney v. United States

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 2001
- **Citation:** 531 U.S. 1149

## Text

PILED —

(\) 20 988 oc 1 2 2000

OFFICE OF THE CLERK
No.

IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States

CHARLES M. HANEY, JR., Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

PATIENCE E. SCHERMER
Captain, United States Air Force
Appellate Defense Counsel
Counsel of Record

STEPHEN P. KELLY

Major, United States Air Force
Appellate Defense Counsel
Counsel for Petitioner

Appellate Defense Division
(AFLSA/J AJA)

Air Force Legal Services Agency
112 Luke Avenue, Suite 343
Bolling AFB, DC 20332-8000 ~
(202) 767-1562

KEVIN J. BARRY
Counsel for Petitioner
13406 Sand Rock Court
Chantilly, VA 22021
December 2000 (703) 968-7247

4

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the Sixth Amendment right to conflict-free
counsel guaranteed in all twelve federal circuits has been
violated in a prosecution under the Uniform Code of Military
Justice where the senior government prosecuting attorney
who actively moved the case toward trial (1) switched sides
during the pendency of the prosecution, (2) was appointed as
one of petitioner’s two defense counsel, (3) conspired with
petitioner’s co-defense counsel to conceal from the trial judge
both the conflict and his status as an appointed defense
counsel, and (4) testified against his client’s interest at trial.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........ccccccccccccces iv
GPINIOUEBELIOW ... 6. 6 iiidinicnmsie RE. 1
toi dire vesihr eth stant diate nted bose uk 2
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
PROVISIONS INVOLVED .......ccccccccccvcccecs 2
STATEMENT OF THECASE ...................:. 3
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT .......... 11
REE ACE SSSA AE eae ene Mer Seems 22
APPENDIX A

United States v. Haney, No. 93-0157/AF

ee WN ECON. «5c cckacescecccccscc la
APPENDIX B

United States v. Haney, No. 93-0157/AF

EK a 2a
APPENDIX C

United States v. Haney, ACM 29000 (f rev)

(AF Ct. Crim App Nov. 4, 1999) ............... 3a
APPENDIX D

United States v. Haney, 45 M.J. 447

ae k da ch ae Bibs pees aot 33a
APPENDIX E

United States v. Haney, ACM 29000 (f rev)
FR pen & Bo) | eee 47a

iv

APPENDIX F

APPENDIXG

United States v. Haney, 38 M.J. 229

Ces SE chee codsnneussdaniesnsuanan ewe 54a

United States v. Haney, ACM 29000

(A.F.C.MLR. Aug. 26,1992) ..........eeeeeeees 55a
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Constitutional Provisions:

U.S. Constitutional Amendment VI ....... passim

Supreme Court Cases:

Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) ...... 14

Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980) ..... passim

Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60

CREED ib s'vnéa save cnsensdhakcees ccneanean passim

Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475

(ROSE vkhdpedwnsdewcbakdaneadsecacaeeees passim

Middendorf v. Henry, 425.U.S. 25 (1976) ........ 11

Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261 (1981) ....... passim
Federal Circuit Cases:

Atley v. Ault, 191 F.3d 865 (8th Cir. 1999) ....... 15

Brien v. United States, 625 F.2d 10

(Ist Cir, 1982) 2... ..... cece cece e cece eee eeee 16

Ciak v. United States, 59 F.3d 296

GR GAY BUN 6 6 iad s Sdgkeeassecarascaeoneeas 15

Dawan v. Lockhart, 31 F.3d 718 (8th Cir. 1994)... 15

Familia-Consoro v. United States, 160 F.3d 761
(Rae Ce EME so aces csacctuncesscsnuabacenas es 16

Vv

Federal Circuit Cases:—Continued
Freund v. Butterworth, 165 F.3d 839
(Tite Cor, 1908). onc ccciccctecclitin es.
Perillo v. Johnson, 205 F.3d 775
(Sts Chr. BOGO) ooo cc ccccvsveveneeri Baa:
Riggs v. United States, 209 F.3d 828
Gt Che, BORD. i cictecvccvcecitvenl ei
Spreitzer v. Peters, 114 F.3d 1485
CU Cae BOD ok vv envnccdcnecsue tae oe
United States v. Burney, 756 F.2d 787
(SRR CBE: SOU vos cc ceccccddsac iii.
United States v. Cirrincione, 780 F.2d 620
CRU A FO ocd vie dee SS eedecedee
United States v. Crespo de Llano, 838 F.2d 1006
GRRE as chasis
United States v. Levy, 25 F.3d 146
BEER IT COT ge Oe nite
United States v. Morelli, 169 F.3d 798
kt PRP Sept ee oe aka Bean ee
United States v. Tatum, 943 F.2d 370
i | RM irene eat Scien ity emai 9
United States v. Taylor, 139 F.3d 924
CR I 54 isles dle bald ecient a Ve
Military Cases:
United States v. Breese, 11 M.J. 17
AMMA SUMED bh tics boncbeer sik es ae
United States v. Devitt, 20 M.J. 240
CR TIED ono nkic des ctetvnisx ein.

United States v. DuBay, 17 U.S.C.M.A.
BOC, Se Co. SEE URED ovine vo seivvicecdeckcc.

vi
Military Cases:—Continued

United States v. McClain, 50 M.J. 488
(CA.A.F. 1GBB) 20 cccccccccccccvcccccccesscess

United States v. Murphy, 50 MJ. 4
CCAM. BEG. cccccdcascccccccttsccsedetua

United States v. Scott, 24 M.J. 186
ot ere ay oe

United States v. Smith, 44 M.J. 459
COA RBe BEGG cccccccccccescscccsccsecssen

United States v. Sparks, 29 M.J. 52
oe eee

United States v. Whidbee, 28 M.J. 823
(CLC ELE. GED cccccccccccsisivdctéedcdstes

State Cases: .

Armstrong v. People, 701 P.2d 17
(Wake. 1GGED oo ccccidceddawniccddvassbie decetebs

Lettley v. State, 746 A.2d 392 (Md. 2000) ........
People v. Bonin, 765 P.2d 460 (Cal. 1998) ........

Shongutsie v. State, 827 P.2d 361
CWO. BEBE ccccccccccccccccesedpagecncoenens

State v. Atley, 564 N.W.2d 817 (Iowa 1997) ......

State v. Crespo, 718 A.2d 925 (Conn. 1998) .......

State v. Mountjoy, 708 A.2d 682 (N.H. 1998) .....

State v. Wallace, 908 P.2d 1267 (Kan. 1995) ......

State v. Wille, 595 So.2d 1149 (La. 1992).........
Federal Statutes:

Art. 22 U.C.M.J. (2000), 10 U.S.C. § 822
CRBGED xc cccccccccccschsmdedede dt sdeasbecbae<

Federal Statutes:—Continued
Art. 23, U.C.M.J. (2000), 10 U.S.C. § 823
GHEE) cccccsncecedscvtetacutbeeniaeen 4
Art. 24, U.C.M.J. (2000), 10 U.S.C. § 824
GEUGED cvccencccedscnkanacinnscvdehaieaaeue 4
Art. 27(a)(2), U.C.M.J. (2000), 10 U.S.C. §
GUGODNSED cccccvdcduccetuccsstaleset passim
Art. 38, U.C.M.J. (2000), 10 U.S.C. § 838
GUE 0.0.0.404000k4000dsebivandbembaataeeerel 14
Art, 3%a), U.C.M.J. (2000), 10 U.S.C. § 839(a)
GE Bosco kecccadedodbusetctvdasdicédeceiial 7
Art. 60, U.C.M.J. (2000), 10 U.S.C. § 860
Gee bi Woe pene dbddusd bcedcdsndes bedbtidee )
Art. 60 (d), U.C.M.J. (2000), 10 1J.S.C. § 860
I ih died ind hdd pein od hide bes os 9
Art. 112a, U.C.M.J. (2000), 10 U.S.C. § 912a
GU bh.ccbducaeUsadeetheedaac Ue cvoticectece 3
Military Rules for Courts Martial:
PAA SUID s dncaccciccdocecccscssce 6

—_— ea, ree ze

IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 2000

No.

CHARLES M. HANEY, JR., Petitioner,

V.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

The Petitioner, Charles M. Haney, Jr., respectfully
prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the order and
judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Armed Forces entered in his case on September 12, 2000.

OPINIONS BELOW

The order of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Armed Forces denying reconsideration is reprinted as
Appendix A. United States v. Haney, No. 93-0157/AF
(C.A.A.F. Sep. 12, 2000). The grant of review and summary
affirmance order issued by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Armed Forces is reprinted as Appendix B.
United States v. Haney, No. 93-0157/AF (C.A.A.F. Aug. 17,
2000). The unpublished opinion of the United States Air
Force Court of Criminal Appeals is reprinted as Appendix C.
United States v. Haney, ACM 29000 (f rev)(AF Ct. Crim App
Nov. 4, 1999). 3

. 2

Previous opinions and orders, in reverse chronological
order, are as follows: United States v. Haney, 45 M.J. 447
(C.A.A.F. 1996) at Appendix D; United States v. Haney, ACM
29000 (f rev)(A.F.C.M.R. May 26, 1994) at Appendix E;
United States v. Haney, 38 M.J. 229 (C.M.A. 1993) at
Appendix F; and, United States v. Haney, ACM 29000
(A.F.C.M.R. Aug. 26, 1992) at Appendix G.

JURISDICTION

The final judgment of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Armed Forces was entered on September 12,
2000. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28
U.S.C. § 1259(3) (2000) and 10 U.S.C. § 867(a)(3) (2000).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States provides, in relevant part:

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right... to have the Assistance of Counsel for
his defence.

Article 27(a)(2) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice
provides:

No person who has acted as investigating officer,
military judge, or court member in any case may
later act as trial counsel, assistant trial counsel, or,
unless expressly requested by the accused, as
defense counsel or assistant or associate defense
counsel in the same case. No person who has acted
for the prosecution may act later in the same case
for the defense, nor may any person who has acted
for the defense act later in the same case for the
prosecution.

Art. 27(a)(2), UCMJ (M.C.M. 2000 ed.), 10 U.S.C. § 827
(a)(2)(2000).

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case raises the question whether conflict free defense
counsel is in fact guaranteed in the military justice system, and
whether the standards applied by military appellate courts in
reviewing counsel conflict of interest issues meet constitutional-
norms.

In this general court-martial tried in 1990, the chief
prosecuting attorney spent months personally preparing the
case for trial. Shortly before trial, he switched sides and became
one of two appointed defense counsel. While representing the
government, he had played a substantial role, including drafting
the charges and inducing petitioner’s commander (an official
who had the right to dismiss the charges and who believed
petitioner to be innocent) to commence the formal judicial
process by “preferring” (swearing to) the charges.

After switching to the defense side, the same attorney
played an equally active defense role (including evaluating and
rejecting crucially important defense evidence), although he
never appeared as petitioner’s counsel in court. The conflicted
counsel conspired with his co-counsel to conceal from the trial
judge not only the conflict but even his status as a defense
counsel, first by not entering an appearance or being present
with petitioner and co-counsel at trial, and second by influencing
his co-counsel to. affirmatively misstate the composition of the
defense to the judge, all in direct violation of mandatory court
rules. When the issue as to his role in inducing petitioner’s
commander to prefer the charges arose at trial, he even testified
on behalf of the government and against his client’s interests
without anyone disclosing to the trial judge the former
prosecutor’s current status as an appointed defense counsel.

Statement of Facts

After trial, petitioner was found guilty in 1990 of one
specification of wrongful use of marijuana and one specification
of wrongful use of cocaine in violation of Article 112a, Uniform
Code of Military Justice (“U.C.M.J.”) (10 U.S.C. § 912a (2000)).
He was sentenced to a dismissal, 7 months confinement and
substantial monetary forfeitures.

4

At the time of his trial, Major Haney was an officer
with over 19 years of exemplary, unblemished service in
both the enlisted and officer ranks of the United States Air
Force. His work at the Air Force Space Command at
Peterson Air Force Base, CO, in missile test & evaluation
was extremely challenging, and required the highest levels
of security clearances, including access to several
“compartmentalized” sets of top secret information, and at
the time of the charged offenses he was performing
flawlessly on an extremely complex and demanding mission.
The prosecution was initiated solely on the basis of a
disputed laboratory report of a 1989 random urinalysis test.
There was substantial evidence questioning the validity and
reliability of the report, and substantial evidence of
petitioner’s good military character and character for non-
drug abuse.

Captain Robert Watson, the chief prosecuting attorney
for Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado, personally oversaw
the investigation and processing of petitioner’s case from
December 1989 until approximately May 1990. As the base
legal office’s “Chief of Military Justice,”! Captain Watson
was personally and substantialiy involved in investigating

1 The “Chief of Military Justice” is the attorney who has supervisory
responsibility for all military justice matters within the office of the staff
judge advocate (“SJA”), a senior attorney who serves as principal legal
advisor to the “convening authority” (“CA”). The SJA has overall
responsibility for conducting the military justice prosecution function
within that command. Convening authorities are military commanders,
and generally are not lawyers. CAs play a number of critical roles under
the U.C.M.J., the most important of which is to exercise prosecutorial
discretion (similar to that exercised by the United States Attorney).
CAs thus determine, with the advice of their SJAs, whether a matter will
be handled administratively or criminally through trial by court-martial,
who will be prosecuted, for what charges, and at what level of court-mar-
tial. See, e.g., Art. 22-24, U.C.M.J. Normally, the actual in-court
prosecutions are conducted by junior attorneys in the SJA’s office. Thus,
while it is the CA who exercises prosecutorial discretion, the case prepa-
ration is actually done, and the trials are conducted, by more junior
attorneys on the SJA’s staff. Captain Watson was the most senior of
these prosecuting attorneys.

5

and processing the case against the petitioner, including
gathering evidence, coordinating further investigation,
obtaining authorization to prosecute from higher
headquarters, and representing the government in
negotiations with petitioner’s original counsel, about
alternate dispositions of the case other than by general
court-martial. Captain Watson personally drafted the
charges against the petitioner, and he formed a personal
belief that the charges were true and that petitioner was
guilty. He convinced petitioner’s commander, Colonel
Smith, to initiate the judicial processing of the case under
the U.C.M.J. (to swear to and “prefer” the charges), even
though Colonel Smith specifically told Captain Watson that
he did not believe the charges were true and that he
actually believed Major Haney was innocent.

At the time he was initially accused, petitioner was
represented by the only defense counsel at Peterson Air
Force Base, the “Area Defense Counsel,” Captain Brian
Koza, who thus became petitioner’s appointed (or “detailed”)
defense counsel. In April, 1990, aware that he was scheduled
for transfer overseas, Captain Koza arranged for Captain
Israel B. Willner, a “circuit” defense counsel from another
base, to be appointed as a defense co-counsel. In June, 1990,
when Captain Koza departed for a new military assignment
- overseas, Captain Watson was transferred from his position
as Chief of Military Justice into the Area Defense Counsel
position being vacated by Captain Koza, thus becoming the
sole defense counsel on the base.

Upon becoming the area defense counsel, Captain
Watson recognized that there was a conflict of interest issue
if he were to represent petitioner, and he approached his
former supervisor, the base staff judge advocate (“SJA”),
about it. The SJA is the officer with authority to waive any
conflict objections on the part of the government. Based on
Captain Watson’s (erroneous) statements to the SJA that he
had only “minimal” involvement with petitioner’s case, and
had never “acted for the prosecution,” the SJA orally granted
the requested government waiver.

6

After Captain Watson became area defense counsel, he
became an active member of the defense team along with
Captain Willner. He participated in preparation of the
defense case, including taking client confidences,
interviewing potential defense witnesses, investigating and
collecting (and most importantly rejecting) potential defense
evidence, and discussing strategy and tactics with Captain
Willner and petitioner.

In particular, the two defense counsel discussed the
anticipated issue concerning the defective “preferral” of
charges by Colonel Smith. They discussed the fact that
Captain Watson would almost certainly be called as a
witness for the prosecution regarding his role in convincing
Colonel Smith to swear to the charges. They knew this
subject would arise, for they planned to call Colonel Smith
as a defense witness on the merits to testify about
petitioner’s good military character, and about the fact that
he believed petitioner would never abuse drugs. (In the
military justice system, “good military character,” and
“specific trait” character evidence (e.g., for non-drug abuse)
are not only admissible, but may alone be sufficient to raise
a reasonable doubt.) Captain Willner and Captain Watson
decided that it “would look extremely poor to have
somebody called from the defense counsel’s table to the
witness stand to testify for the prosecution.” Their solution
to this “problem” was to agree to a plan under which no one
would learn that Captain Watson was then serving as a
defense counsel. To accomplish this end, they agreed that
Captain Watson would not sit at the defense table at trial
(but would sit in the gallery when he was in court), and they
agreed not to identify him as a defense counsel to the
military judge (at the point in the trial when the defense
was required by Rule for Court-Martial 901(d)(2) to identify
all members of the defense.)

As planned, Captain Watson did not sit at the defense
counsel table at trial. He was never introduced to the
military judge and was never announced on the record or
otherwise identified as a member of the trial defense team.

7

There was absolutely no judicial inquiry into any conflict of
interest at trial, and petitioner never waived any conflict at
trial.

Also as planned, Colonel Smith testified at trial for the
defense that, despite swearing to and preferring the charges,
he always believed petitioner was innocent. In light of this
testimony, the military judge excused the court members
(military jury) and held an Art. 39(a), U.C.MJ., hearing to
inquire into what he and counsel for both sides agreed was a
question of improper preferral of charges. Colonel Smith was
recalled and testified he only signed the charge sheet because
Captain Watson explained to him that it was merely an
administrative command responsibility and guilt or innocence
would be ruled upon in court.

Captain Watson then was called to testify for the
prosecution (against petitioner’s interests) about Colonel
Smith’s swearing to and preferral of the charges. Just before
Captain Watson was called to take the stand, Captain Willner
and the military judge had the following exchange:

Captain Willner: Your Honor, before we do that, I
wanted to point out to the court that since the time
that these charges were preferred, Captain Watson
has been reassigned to the Area Defense Counsel
Office. As the Area Defense Counsel, he has
worked with me in preparing for this case. He has
also taken confidences from Major Haney.

Military Judge: Well, fine. We won't get into his
confidential relationship with the accused. We’ll
discuss only matters pertaining to the advice given
to Colonel Smith at the time of preferral. Captain
Watson?

App. C at 30a.

This is the only information that was given to the
military judge that Captain Watson had worked both sides of
this case. The military judge gave no indication he saw any
issue of conflict or was aware of any requirement for a
judicial inquiry. Despite Captain Watson’s testimony for the

8

government in support of the legality of the preferral, the
military judge found the preferral in this case to be fatally
defective because Colonel Smith did not believe the charges
to be true at the time he signed them. The military judge
found the preferral so flawed that, unless waived by the
defense, a mistrial would be necessary. Thereafter, both
defense counsel (including Captain Watson, but not including
any independent outside counsel), urged petitioner to waive
the defective preferral and proceed with trial, which he did.

Defense counsel were unsuccessful in challenging the
government’s laboratory report, and called few witnesses at
trial, none of whom effectively raised the issue of petitioner's
extraordinary good character, including particularly his
reputation—and the opinions of virtually all who knew him—
that he would never use illegal drugs. The most important of
the potential witnesses for this character trait were never even
interviewed. Petitioner was found guilty. At the sentencing
hearing which followed, counsel called no witnesses, other than
petitioner who read a sworn statement. Petitioner was
sentenced to an unusually severe sentence including monetary
forfeitures amounting to $7000.00, seven months confinement (a
substantial portion of which he served in isolation at the
military’s Disciplinary Barracks at Fort Leavenworth), and a
dismissal from the service which will, if his conviction becomes
final, terminate all military benefits including his retirement
benefits.

Facts Relative to the Post-trial DuBay
Hearing and Appellate Review

Petitioner three times appealed his case to the Air ~
Force Court of Criminal Appeals (“A.F.C.C.A.”),? and each
time that court affirmed the conviction. Each time he filed a
petition for review by the Court of Appeals for the Armed
Forces (“C.A.A.F.”),? and each time that court granted

; 2The A.F.C.C.A. was formerly named the Air Force Court of Military
Review.

3 The C.A.A.F. was formerly named the Court of Military Appeals.

9

review. The first time, the C.A.A.F. remanded the case to the
A.F.C.C.A. to consider the conflict of counsel and other.
ineffectiveness of counsel issues that had not been considered
on that court’s first review. The Air Force Court reviewed
the issues and again affirmed the conviction. The second
time the C.A.A.F. considered the case it not only set aside the
decision of the A.F.C.C.A., but also set aside the “action” of
the convening authority approving petitioner’s conviction and
sentence,‘ and remanded the case for submission to a
different convening authority for a new staff judge advocate
recommendation® and a new convening authority action. In
so doing, the court authorized a post-trial evidentiary
hearing, pursuant to United States v. DuBay, 17 U.S.C.M.A.
147, 37 C.M.R. 411 (1967), to resolve the issues related to
defense counsel conflict of interest, “and other
ineffectiveness-of-counsel issues.” See United States v.
Haney, 45 M.J. 447, 452 (C.A.A.F. 1996), App. D. The new
convening authority authorized a DuBay hearing, which was
conducted in October 1997. None of these earlier decisions
(Apps. D, E, F, or G) are at issue in this petition. It is only
the post-trial DuBay hearing and the subsequent decisions
which raise the issues addressed in this petition.

At the 1997 DuBay Hearing, evidence was received on
both conflict of counsel and ineffective assistance of counsel
issues.© Among the specific questions that the military judge
was directed to answer was “[d]id the accused know of

4 At the conclusion of trial, after receiving submissions from the defense,
and receiving the Recommendation of his SJA, the CA is required to take
“action” on the findings and sentence, and has complete discretion to
approve, disapprove or modify the findings or sentence. See Art. 60,
UCMJ.

5 Prior to taking action on the findings and sentence, the CA is required to
receive the recommendation of his staff judge advocate. See Art. 60(d),
U.C.M.J. The SJA is an (usually senior) attorney, and is the CA’s principal
legal advisor.

6 The ineffectiveness of counsel issues raised on the record included the
rejection of crucial character evidence, the failure to interview key wit-
nesses, the failure to call available witnesses on findings, and the failure to
call any witnesses other than petitioner on sentencing.

10

Captain Watson’s prior representation of the government in
his case and did he waive this conflict of interest?” See App.
C at 6a (emphasis added). The DuBay hearing judge actually
found very few facts, the majority of his “findings” being no
more than a recitation of portions of the various testimony he
had heard.

At the DuBay hearing, Captain Watson testified he did
not believe there really was a conflict, and that he never
obtained any written waiver from petitioner. Despite this,
both Captain Watson and Captain Willner testified they
“fully informed” petitioner about the conflict. Captain
Willner also testified that, but for the “appearance” issue
related to the defective preferral of charges, and Captain
Watson potentially being a prosecution witness against
petitioner, Captain Watson would have sat at the defense
counsel table and been properly announced to the trial judge
as defense counsel. ;

Petitioner testified at the DuBay hearing that he was
never told any specifics about Captain Watson’s prior
government representation by either Captain Willner or
Captain Watson, and that Captain Watson told him there was
really no conflict because it was just a normal change of duty
assignment within the military system and he had not really
acted in petitioner’s case.

The DuBay judge found there was no judicial inquiry into
whether petitioner waived any potential conflict of interest
with Captain Watson, or into whether petitioner waived
Captain Watson’s presence at trial, because “the court was
never aware that Captain Watson was a detailed counsel” and
“{njo one informed the military judge that Captain Watson was
also detailed as Major Haney’s defense counsel.” App. C at 10a,
12a. Among the facts the DuBay judge did find was that, after
a meeting between Captain Willner, Captain Watson and
petitioner in early June 1990, just prior to Captain Watson
being detailed to the defense, “[n]o one saw a conflict of
interest.” App. C at 9a. At two separate points in his findings,
the DuBay judge also asked the right legal question: “The issue
appears to be whether a waiver requires a judicial inquiry to be

11

valid.” Id. at 10a, 12a. Yet, having specifically asked the
question, the military judge did not answer it.

The A.F.C.C.A. “adopted” the DuBay judge’s findings of
fact as its own (App. C at 6a), incorporated them into its
opinion, and relied on them to resolve the conflict of interest
and ineffectiveness of counsel issue. In its very brief (one
page) section discussing the conflict issue, the A.F.C.C.A.
found that petitioner “was aware of Captain Watson’s prior
participation on the government side and knowingly waived
that participation. ...” App. C at 30a emphasis added). The
court gave no analysis or justification in support of its naked
“knowingly waived” conclusion.

Significantly, the A.F.C.C.A. also found that the military
“trial judge should have made an inquiry into a possible
conflict of interest” (App. C at 30a. (emphasis added)) after the
exchange between Captain Willner and the trial judge prior to
Captain Watson’s testimony. The A.F.C.C.A. then declared
that the DuBay hearing judge “found [that petitioner] clearly
understood Captain Watson’s potential conflict and waived it,”
(App. C at 30a), but gave no citation to the record for this
conclusion. The court finally decided that petitioner had “failed
to meet his burden to show how Captain Watson’s performance
was adversely affected by the perceived conflict of interest, or
how it adversely affected the outcome of the trial,” (App. C at
30a-31a), found no error, and affirmed the conviction.

The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, without
comment, summarily affirmed the A.F.C.C.A. decision (App. B),
and thereafter denied reconsideration of its decision. App. A.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

Although this Court has never determined whether the
Sixth Amendment of the Constitution applies to trials
conducted pursuant to the Uniform Code of Military Justice,’

7 The “question of whether an accused in a court-martial has a constitu-
tional right to counsel has been much debated and never squarely
resolved.” Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 33 (1976) (footnote omitted).

He tin

12

virtually every military case considering the conflict of counsel
issue has taken it as a “given” that the Sixth Amendment is
fully applicable in this system. In law, Sixth Amendment
rights are interwoven into the fabric of military justice at all
levels, and have been recognized since the inception of the
Uniform Code in 1950 when the principle of a conflict-free
defense counsel was written into the public law in Art. 27(a)(2)
of the U.C.M.J. Regarding conflict-free counsel, there is thus
no justification for considering military defendants in any way
different from other defendants in federal criminal cases. In
fact, because of the hierarchical nature of the military
personnel system, where transfers between prosecution and
defense are routine, and other relational conflicts occur,’ the
appellate courts should be particularly diligent in enforcing
this Court’s clear constitutional norms. However, here the
contrary has occurred.

In recent years, the decisions of the C.A.A.F. have
slowly modified the application of this Court’s conflict rules to
the point where the Sixth Amendment guarantee has been
effectively eviscerated. Here the accused had appointed
counsel, but that counsel had an actual conflict which
adversely affected his performance and the outcome of the
trial, and both the post-trial DuBay hearing judge and the
appellate tribunals utterly failed to apply proper norms to
remedy a fundamental constitutional deprivation.

The A.F.C.C.A. specifically recited the information that
Captain Willner gave to the trial judge about Captain Watson
working both sides of the case, and found that the judge
“should have made an inquiry.” In every other federal
(regional) circuit court.of appeals applying the Sixth
Amendment, under these facts, the conviction would be
reversed (in most reversal would be “automatic”) and a new
trial ordered. Only in this “military cireuit” is such a reversal

5 See, e.g., United States v. Whidbee, 28 MJ. (C.G.C.M.R. 1989)(for all
non-military justice duties, the defense counsel was supervised by and
received performance evaluations from the “trial counsel” (in court prose-
cuting attorney)).

13

seemingly not required. Notwithstanding that the C.A.A.F.
has uniformly stated that the Sixth Amendment applies in
this circuit, and that it is Sixth Amendment law it applies in
resolving conflicts issues, C.A.A.F. here affirmed without
comment a lower court decision which completely ignored
this Court’s jurisprudential requirements for evaluating and
deciding Sixth Amendment issues.

The conflict here is compounded by the conduct of the
two appointed defense counsel in conspiring to deceive a trial
judge and in facilitating the testimony by one of those
counsel on behalf of the government and against his client’s
interest, raising a question whether in the military justice
system an utterly different standard now exists both as to
ineffective assistance of counsel and as to adequacy of judicial
review.

The result is that “a United States court of appeals has
entered a decision in conflict with the decision of [every
other] United States court of appeals on the same important
matter,” and has “so far departed from the accepted and
usual course of judicial proceedings, or sanctioned such a
departure by a lower court, as to call for an exercise of this
Court’s supervisory power.” U.S. Sup. Ct. Rule 10(a). The
deprivation of such a fundamental constitutional right in
conflict with the jurisprudence of every regional circuit
warrants this Court’s intervention.

Background Principles

The Sixth Amendment of the Constitution expressly
provides that “in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right. . . to be have the Assistance of Counsel for
his defense.” The right to effective assistance of counsel
“means the right to counsel who is conflict free.” United
States v. McClain, 50 M.J. 483, 487 (C.A.A.F. 1999), citing
Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 345 (1980). The right to
effective assistance of counsel has consistently been held to
apply to military members facing trial by court-martial. See,
e.g., Art. 27(a)(2), U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 827(a)(2) (2000); Art.

14

38, U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 888; United States v. Scott, 24 MW.
186 (C.M.A. 1987).

Conflict of interest claims present mixed questions of
law and fact to be reviewed de novo. Sullivan, 446 U.S. at
342. Ineffective assistance of counsel based on a conflict of
interest is also “among those ‘constitutional rights so basic to
a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as harm-
less error” and “nice calculations as to the amount of
prejudice attributable to the conflict” are not to be indulged
in by the court. Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 489
(1978)(quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23
(1967)); Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 350 (quoting Glasser v. United
States, 315 U.S. 60, 76 (1942)).

This Court squarely addressed the issue of conflict of
interest in Holloway and Sullivan. In Holloway, the Court
held that if the defendant or his attorney raises the issue of-
conflict of interest, or the trial judge otherwise knows or
reasonably should know of the alleged conflict of interest,
the trial judge must inquire into the potential conflict.
Holloway, 435 U.S. at 484-491. Sullivan addressed the con-
flict question where there was no issue raised at trial. The
Court held, “In order to establish a violation of the Sixth
Amendment, a defendant who raised no objection at trial
must demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest
adversely affected his lawyer's performance.” Sullivan, 446
U.S. at 348. In such a case, however, once a defendant shows
his counsel had an actual conflict of interest, the conflict
itself demonstrates the denial of the right to have the effec-
tive assistance of counsel and prejudice is presumed.
Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 349.

The following year, the Court clarified Sullivan by not-
ing “Sullivan mandates a reversal when the trial court has
failed to make an inquiry even though it “knows or reason-
ably should know that a particular conflict exists.”” Wood v.
Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 272 n. 18. (1981) (emphasis in original).
If the possibility of a conflict of interest is sufficiently appar-
ent from the record of the trial, a duty to recognize and
inquire into the conflict is imposed upon the trial judge.

15

Wood, 450 U.S. at 272 (emphasis in original). To prevail under
Wood, a petitioner must show (1) that the trial court failed to
inquire into the conflict even though it knew or reasonably
should have known about an apparent conflict, (2) that there
was no valid waiver of the right to independent counsel, and
(3) that counsel had an actual conflict of interest. Wood, 450
U.S. at 272-273. In examining the conflict claim, the court
must “indulge every reasonable presumption against the
waiver” of the fundamental right of effective and unimpaired
assistance of counsel. Glasser, 315 U.S. at 70. Once a defen-
dant makes this showing under Wood, prejudice is presumed,
and he is entitled to reversal and a new proceeding with con-
flict-free counsel. Wood, 450 U.S. at 273-274.

Decisions of the Regional Courts of Appeals

The United States (regional) Circuit Courts of Appeals
currently diverge somewhat in their legal tests related to the
Holloway/Sullivan/Wood standard.

One group of seven Circuit Courts of Appeals employs a
Holloway/Sullivan/Wood “automatic reversal rule” to all
conflict of interest cases, even where there is no objection at
trial, if the trial judge knew or reasonably should have known
of the conflict and either failed to inquire or ignored the conflict.
See United States v. Levy, 25 F.3d 146, 153 (2nd Cir. 1994); Ciak
v. United States, 59 F.3d 296, 302 (2nd Cir. 1995); United States
v. Tatum, 943 F.2d 370, 379-380 (4th Cir. 1991); Riggs v. United
States, 209 F.3d 828, 832 n. 1 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v.
Cirrincione, 780 F.2d 620, 625 (7th Cir 1985); See also Spreitzer
v. Peters, 114 F.3d 1435, 1450-1452 (7th Cir. 1997); See Dawan v.
Lockhart, 31 F.3d 718, 721 (8th Cir 1994); See also Atley v. Ault,
191 F.3d 865, 869-870 (8th Cir 1999); See United States v. Crespo
de Llano, 838 F.2d 1006, 1012 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v.
Burney, 756 F.2d 787, 791 (10th Cir. 1985).

In like manner, the highest courts in four states also
employ an “automatic reversal rule” to conflict of interest
cases even where there is no objection at trial, if the trial
judge knew or reasonably should have known of the conflict
and either failed to inquire or ignored the conflict. State v.

16

Wallace, 908 P.2d 1267, 1273 (Kan. 1995)(citing Holloway);
State v. Wille, 595 So.2d 1149, 11538 (La. 1992)(citing
Holloway); Lettley v. State, 746 A.2d 392, 399-400 (Md.
2000)(citing Holloway and Sullivan); Shongutsie v. State, 827
P.2d 361, 365 (Wyo. 1992)(citing Holloway and Sullivan).

Thus, all of these courts view a trial judge’s failure in his
affirmative duty to inquire into a conflict of interest to be
dispositive. These courts automatically reverse and remand
for a new trial with unconflicted counsel to cure this
fundamental error, as they refuse to indulge in nice
calculations into prejudice or adverse effect, and do indulge
every reasonable presumption against the waiver of the
fundamental right to conflict free counsel.

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals implies that it would
use the “automatic reversal rule” of Sullivan/Wood if given
the opportunity, but has not yet decided such a case. United
States v. Morelli, 169 F.3d 798, 812 (3'4 Cir. 1999). The
Supreme Court of Connecticut also indicates it would
probably use the “automatic reversal rule” if the facts
warranted, but has not expressly adopted such a rule. State
v. Crespo, 718 A.2d 925, 941 n. 27 (Conn. 1998).

The remaining circuits take a slightly different
approach. They resolve conflict of interest questions by
applying Sullivan’s actual conflict/adverse effect test to all
cases where there is no objection at trial (minimizing or
ignoring the Wood clarification of Sullivan which required
automatic reversal where the judge knew or should have
known of the conflict and either failed to inquire or ignored
the conflict). See Brien v.. United States, 695 F.2d 10, 15 n.10
(1st Cir. 1982); Familia-Consoro v. United States, 160 F.3d
761, 764 (1st Cir. 1998); Perillo v. Johnson, 205 F.3d 775 (5th
Cir. 2000); Freund v. Butterworth, 165 F.3d 839, 858-862 (11th
Cir. 1999); United States v. Taylor, 139 F.3d 924 (D.C. Cir.
1998). These courts look at every case to ascertain whether
the Sullivan standard of actual conflict/adverse effect has
been met. At least four state high courts follow suit: People
v. Bonin, 765 P.2d 460, 476 (Cal. 1989); Armstrong v. People,
701 P.2d 17, 20 (Colo. 1985); State v. Atley, 564 N.W.2d 817

17

(Iowa 1997); State v. Mountjoy, 708 A.2d 682, 684 (N.H. 1998).
Thus, this latter group of courts always examines every
conflict of interest case where the judge knew or should have
known and failed to inquire under the more difficult (for the
defendant) actual conflict/adverse effect standard of
Sullivan. In any of the twelve regional circuits, petitioner
would prevail and be granted a new trial.

Decisions of the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces

In vivid contrast to the two regional circuit approaches
stands the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed
Forces, where there is currently no recognizable standard in
regard to Holloway/Sullivan/Wood either when the trial
judge knew or reasonably should have known of the possible
conflict (and either failed to inquire or ignored the conflict) or
in cases where the trial judge was not so informed. The court
currently applies an inconsistent mix of incorrect legal tests
in conflict of interest cases that fail to meet and uphold
constitutional standards. In effect, the C.A.A.F. seems to
apply a harmiess error analysis.

The Court of Military Appeals (now C.A.A.F.) originally
embraced a version of the Sullivan test in all conflict of
interest cases where there was no objection at trial and the
trial judge knew or reasonably should have known of the
possible conflict and either failed to inquire or ignored the
conflict. See United States v. Breese, 11 M.J. 17, 19-22
(C.M.A. 1981). In such cases, the court imposed an
affirmative duty of inquiry on the trial judge and implied that
a failure to inquire would require reversal. Breese, 11 M.J. at
20, 22-23. The court also established a rebuttable
presumption “that the activity of defense counsel exhibits a
conflict of interest in any case of multiple representation
wherein the military judge has not conducted a suitable
inquiry into a possible conflict.” Breese, 11 M.J. at 23.

Four years later, in United States v. Devitt, the Court
of Military Appeals explained what the Breese test meant in
a case where the trial judge knew of the multiple
representation and failed to inquire. United States v.

18

Devitt, 20 M.J. 240 (C.M.A. 1985). The court said that
Breese established a “rebuttable presumption that an
“actual conflict of interest” exists.” Devitt, 20 M.J. at 244.
The court commented that the Government could rebut the
presumption by demonstrating “either that no actual
conflict of interest existed under the circumstances of the
case, or else that, although a conflict existed, the parties
nonetheless knowingly and voluntarily chose” to waive the
conflict. Devitt, 20 M.J. 243. The court interpreted Wood,
Holloway, Glasser and Sullivan as establishing that “no
way exists for the Government to carry its burden of
disproving prejudice if an ‘actual conflict of interest’
existed.” Jd. The court saw the real question as “whether
the Government can carry its burden of rebutting the
presumption that there was an ‘actual conflict of interest’.” -
Devitt, 20 M.J. at 243-244.

Four years after Devitt, the Court of Military Appeals
addressed another conflict of interest issue in United States
v. Sparks, 29 M.J. 52 (C.M.A. 1989), a case raising not a
multiple representation type conflict, but a switching sides
scenario virtually identical to that presented in the case at
bar. In Sparks, the court again mandated a “bright-line” rule:
whenever a statutorily disqualified/conflicted defense
attorney represents a military accused, without informed
consent by the accused via full disclosure and inquiry by a
military trial judge, the prejudice is automatic, and reversal
is automatic. Sparks, 29 M.J. at 58.

Notwithstanding this early jurisprudence in conformity
with the regional circuits, in the years since Breese, Devitt
and Sparks, the Holloway/Sullivan constitutional standards
have virtually disappeared from the military lexicon. In
United States v. Smith, 44 M.J. 459 (C.A.A.F. 1996), in a 4-1
decision, the court held there was multiple representation
rising to the level of an actual conflict of interest where the
defense counsel had previously represented the witness who
provided the pivotal evidence against the accused. Smith, 44
M.J. at 460-462. The court, however, found that appellant
“knowingly and intelligently waived his right to conflict-free

19

counsel” even when the trial judge had held what the
appellate court described as only a “superficial” inquiry on
the record, because there was “no evidence that the conflict
adversely affected counsel’s representation of appellant,”
despite the fact that defense counsel failed to fully cross-
examine and impeach his previous client about his motive to
lie. Smith, 44 M.J. at 462, 463.

In a dissenting opinion, Judge Gierke argued that the
trial judge’s inquiry was inadequate under constitutional
norms and that appellant’s waiver was not knowing and
intelligent because it was based on inadequate/incompetent
legal advice from his defense counsel, who said he did not
see an actual conflict but perceived only “a possible
appearance.” Smith, 44 M.J. at 462-463. Judge Gierke also
focused on an underlying theme in these types of cases
which is overwhelmingly evident in the case at bar: “[a]
defense counsel who does not understand the problem
cannot competently advise his client regarding it.” Jd.

In the most recent published opinion in this area, the
Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces has completely
eliminated any requirement for a Holloway/Sullivan/Wood
inquiry and a- knowing waiver at trial. In United States v.
Murphy, 50 M.J. 4 (C.A.A.F. 1998), in a 3-2 decision, the
court found it “arguable” that the military judge knew or
should have known of the potential conflict of interest
between the defense counsel and his client, and found that
the counsel with a conflict (for formerly representing a key
witness for the government) “should have and could have”
facilitated that judicial inquiry by merely informing the
military judge of the prior representation. Murphy, 50
M.J. at 10. Assuming, arguendo, that there had been an
actual conflict, the court nevertheless held that the conflict
had no impact on the merits portion of the trial. Murphy,
50 M.J. at 11 (emphasis added). The court found the
witness’ testimony “mostly cumulative,” that defense
counsel did not object to the “additional facts,” and that
there was overwhelming evidence of guilt which meant
that the witness’ testimony “could not have prejudiced

20

appellant as to the findings of guilt.” Jd. The court even
went so far as to announce it was “convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt that appellant was not prejudiced by the
unresolved conflict of interest because of the admission of
his multiple confessions and the corroborating physical
evidence.” Jd.

Amazingly, the court reached this finding on the merits
even though it found that the testimony in question, which
was allowed in evidence “without objection” by the conflicted
defense counsel, “sealed appellant’s motive for killing his own
son,” and “provided helpful testimony that might show why
appellant would falsely confess to the killings.” Jd. By .
applying what seems to be a “harmless error” analysis, the
C.A.A.F. has totally rejected the rationale of this Court that
“nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice attributable
to the conflict” are not to be indulged in by the court and that
this type of infraction can never be treated as harmless.
Holloway, 435 U.S. at 489. Notwithstanding this finding on
the merits, C.A.A.F. found this very same conflict of counsel
required reversal as to the sentencing portion of the trial,
since it found questions of actual conflict and adverse effect
still unanswered.

In Murphy, the C.A.A.F. effectively did away with this
Court’s entire jurisprudence regarding the analysis of conflict
of interest. There is no Glasser standard, no Holloway
standard, no Sullivan standard, and no Wood standard.
There is only C.A.A.F.’s evaluation of whether the conflict
error was not prejudicial “beyond a reasonable doubt” and an
illogical and constitutionally infirm remedy of requiring a
rehearing on sentence due to the outstanding issue of a
conflict of counsel, but not requiring any remedy as to guilt
based on that same conflict.

The Current Conflict

The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces no longer
espouses and enforces any discernable conflict of interest test
which meets constitutional standards as enumerated by this

21

Court and every regional court of appeals. As demonstrated
by the case at bar, the standard is so far in demise that it is
now permissible for an accused to “knowingly waive” an
actual, statutory, conflict of interest with no trial level waiver,
and no trial level judicial inquiry even though the military
judge knew or should have known of the conflict. This is true
even where defense counsel testified against his client, where
neither defense counsel really thought there was a conflict
(though one counsel obtained an oral waiver from his former
client, the government), and where both defense counsel
actively misled the trial judge about the status of the
accused’s representation. This case is even more aggravated
than a typical conflict case as it involves not just joint
representation of a co-accused or representation of a witness;
this case involves an active prosecutor switching sides in the
middle of the prosecution to become an active defense
attorney on the very same case.

In at least seven United States Circuit Courts of Appeal
and four state high courts, this case would be automatically
reversed as constitutionally infirm. In the remaining Circuit
Courts of Appeal and at least four other state high courts,
this case would be examined for actual conflict and for a
determination of adverse effect pursuant to the Sullivan
test, and would then be reversed. In stark contrast, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces found
no conflict of interest problem in this case and affirmed it
with neither comment nor analysis.

The decision of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Armed Forces represents a complete departure from this
Court’s Sixth Amendment assistance of counsel/conflict of
interest jurisprudence. The decision of the court below is in
direct violation of Wood v. Georgia, Cuyler v. Sullivan, and
Holloway v. Arkansas, and all the principles for which they
stand. Not only does the decision of the court below fail to
pass constitutional muster, but it highlights the conflict
between the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces and all
the other United States Circuit Courts of Appeal on the same
important matter.

December 2000

CONCLUSION

Wherefore, the petitioner respectfully requests that this
Honorable Court grant the petition for a writ of certiorari to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces.

22

Respectfully submitted,

PATIENCE E. SCHERMER
Captain, United States Air Force
Appellate Defense Counsel
Counsel of Record

STEPHEN P. KELLY

Major, United States Air Force
Appellate Defense Counsel
Counsel for Petitioner

Appellate Defense Division
(AFLSA/J AJA)

Air Force Legal Services Agency

112 Luke Avenue, Suite 343

Bolling AFB, DC 20332-8000

(202) 767-1562

KEVIN J. BARRY
Counsel for Petitioner
13406 Sand Rock Court
Chantilly, VA 22021
(703) 968-7247

la

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ARMED FORCES
Washington, D.C. 20442-0001

USCA Misc. Dkt. No. 93-0157/AF
Crim. App. Dkt. No. 29000

UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
Charles M. HANEY, Jr. (265-04-8987), Appellant
ORDER

On consideration of appellant’s petition for reconsid-
eration of the order of this Court issued on August 17, 2000,
it is, by the Court, this, 12th day of September, 2000,

ORDERED:

That said petition for reconsideration is hereby denied.

For the Court,

/s/ Thomas F. Granahan
Clerk of the Court

cc: The Judge Advocate General of the Air Force
Counsel for Appellant (BARRY, Esq.)
Counsel for Appellee (HINDEL)

2a
APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ARMED FORCES
Washington, D.C. 20442-0001

USCA Misc. Dkt. No. 93-0157/AF
Crim. App. Dkt. No. 29000

UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
Charles M. Haney, Jr. (265-04-8987), Appellant
ORDER

On consideration of the petition for grant of review of
the decision of the United States Air Force Court of Criminal
Appeals on further review, it is, by the Court, this 17th day of
August, 2000,

ORDERED:

That said petition is hereby granted; and,

That the decision of the United States Air Force Court
of Criminal Appeals on further review is affirmed.

For the Court,

/s/ Thomas F. Granahan
Clerk of the Court

cece: The Judge Advocate General of the Air Force
Appellate Defense Counsel (BARRY, Esq.)
Appellate Government Counsel (HINDE L)

3a

APPENDIX C

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE COURT
OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

UNITED STATES
V.

Major CHARLES M. HANE Y, JR.
United States Air Force

ACM 29000 (f rev)
4 November 1999

Sentence adjudged 19 July 1990 by GCM at Peterson
Air Force Base. Colorado. Military Judge: Robert N.
Spencer.

Approved sentence: Dismissal, confinement for 8
months, and forfeiture of $750.00 pay per month for
12 months.

Appellate Counsel for Appellant: Mr. Kevin J. Barry,
Colonel Jeanne M. Rueth, Colonel Douglas H. Kohrt,
Lieutenant Colonel Ray T. Blank, Jr, Major Carol L.
Hubbard, and Captain Patience E. Schermer.

Appellate Counsel for the United States: Colonel
Anthony P. Dattilo, Colonel Michael J. Breslin,
Lieutenant Colonel Ronald A. Rodgers, and Major
Bryan T. Wheeler.

‘Before

SENANDER, YOUNG and SPISAK
Appellate Military Judges

OPINION OF THE COURT
UPON FURTHER REVIEW

SENANDER, Senior Judge

The appellant was convicted, contrary to his pleas, by a
general court-martial, of wrongful use of marijuana and
cocaine. Article 112a, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 912a. His approved

4a

sentence is a dismissal, confinement for 8 months, and
forfeiture of $750.00 pay per month for 12 months. We are
reviewing this case for the third time. The appellant now assets
six errors. We find no error and affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

On 15 November 1989, the appellant was randomly
selected to provide a urine sample for drug testing. During
the test procedures the appellant told the drug test monitor he
believed his sample would come back positive because of the
prescribed drugs he was taking. Subsequently, his urinalysis
test report was positive for both marijuana and cocaine. The
appellant has consistently denied the use of illegal drugs. He
has provided different theories as to how his test results could
be positive. He first speculated that the combination of
prescription drugs that he took for pain resulting from a
motorcycle accident might be the cause. When that theory
didn’t find support, he investigated his use of herbal teas, but
could find no evidence to support his theory that the teas he
purchased at local shops contained marijuana or cocaine.

Following his conviction by court-martial, we resolved his
first appeal, alleging 10 errors, adversely to the appellant in an
unpublished opinion on 26 August 1992. United States v.
Haney, ACM 29000 (A.F.C.M.R. Aug. 26, 1992) (unpub. op.).
On 6 April 1993, the substitute appellate defense counsel, in an
Addendum to the Supplement to Petition for Grant of Review
to the Court of Military Appeals (now United States Court of
Appeals for the Armed Forces) asserted five additional errors plus
an allegation of inadequacy of appellate representation. Because the
Court of Military Appeals viewed the issues raised by substitute
appellate defense counsel as matters that were not raised before this
Court, the Court of Military Appeals set aside our prior affirmance
and remanded the case to us for further review. United States v.
Haney, 38 M.J. 229 (C.M.A. 1993). On 26 May 1994, we
considered the following assignment of errors: (1) ineffective

~assistance of trial defense counsel; (2) an assistant to the defense
team had a conflict of interest; (3) the military judge erred during
instructions; (4) comments by the convening authority constituted

5a

unlawful command influence; (5) the military judge erred in his
finding a court member was not asleep during a portion of the trial;
(6) the military judge was appointed in violation of the
Appointments Clause; and (7) the trial and appellate judges were not
appointed for fixed terms. In an unpublished opinion we found
adversely to the appellant and again affirmed the findings and
sentence. United States v. Haney, ACM 29000 (f rev) (A.F.C.M.R.
May 26, 1994) (unpub. op.).

Because our superior court found that the staff judge advocate
failed to serve substitute defense counsel with the first or second
addenda to the staff judge advocate recommendation (SJAR), both of
which raised new matter, it set aside our opinion and returned the
case to the convening authority for a new SJAR and convening
authority action. United States v. Haney, 45 M.J. 447 (1996). Our
superior court also suggested that the convening authority consider
an evidentiary hearing concerning Captain Watson’s involvement in
the trial and other ineffectiveness of counsel issues.

Il. EVIDENTIARY HEARING

The 14th Air Force Commander, the new designated
convening authority, ordered the evidentiary hearing and
directed that it be conducted in the manner contemplated by
United States v. DuBay, 37 C.M.R. 411 (C.M.A. 1967). He
limited the scope of the hearing to resolving Captain Watson’s
alleged conflict and other ineffectiveness of counsel issues.
Captain (now Lieutenant Colonel) Willner, Circuit Defense
Counsel, served as the detailed military counsel and Captain
Watson, then Peterson Air Force Base Area Defense Counsel,
acted as part of the defense team at the trial. The military
judge for this post-trial Article 39(a) hearing was tasked to
resolve the following questions.

a) When did Captains Willner and Watson become aware
of any complaints concerning allegations of
ineffectiveness-of-counsel and what were their responses?

b) What was Captain Watson’s professional relationship
with the accused and what services did he provide in
defending the accused?

6a

c) Who developed the initial trial strategy in defending
the accused, and why was certain evidence not produced
and witnesses not called? How was the accused involved
in this strategy and did he consent to the defense
strategy?

d) If Captain Watson was a member of the defense team,
why was he not present at the initial trial? Did the
accused waive Captain Watson’s presence at the initial
trial? Did the accused know of Captain Watson’s prior
representation of the government in-his case and did he
waive this conflict of interest?

Judge Howard R. Altschwager was detailed to preside
over the hearing. He made specific findings of fact and
answered the convening authority’s questions in the
chronological order of the events of the trial. We adopt those
findings as our own. They are:

WHAT WAS CAPTAIN WATSON’S PRO-
FESSIONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE
ACCUSED AND WHAT SERVICES DID HE
PROVIDE IN DEFENDING THE ACCUSED?
DID THE ACCUSED KNOW OF CAPTAIN
WATSON’S PRIOR REPRESENTATION OF THE
GOVERNMENT IN HIS CASE AND DID HE
WAIVE THIS CONFLICT OF INTEREST?

Captain Watson was assigned to Peterson Air Force
Base, Colorado in March 1989, and became the Chief
of Military Justice in July 1989. He became involved
with the [appellant]’s case when he was notified by
the base laboratory of the positive urinalysis results.
Captain Watson described everything he did in this
case for the government as “ministerial” in nature.
Major Haney had security clearances that required
the government to obtain permission before they
could court-martial him. Captain Watson processed
this request. He called the Armstrong Laboratory at
Brooks Air Force Base and requested a litigation
package. He asked AFOSI to check Major Haney’s

Ta

records, and follow-up an old allegation that he had
distributed drugs while at Hanscom Air Force Base.
Massachusetts. Major Haney’s defense counsel,
Captain Koza. approached Captain Watson asking
him to investigate a theory or thesis of Major
Haney’s, which Major Haney had already presented
to the government. Major Haney used a TENS unit,
a small device which created an electrical current to
stimulate his muscles. Major Haney also took
numerous prescription and over-the-counter drugs
for pain, high blood pressure and other ailments. The
thesis was the electric current from the, TENS unit
caused his prescription and over[-]the[-]eounter
drugs to test positive for the marijuana and cocaine
metabolites. Captain Watson said he thought the
thesis was “laughable,” but agreed to ask the
laboratory to review thé theory. The Armstrong
Laboratory would not test the theory because they
viewed it as being baseless.

Captain Watson testified that after he drafted the
charges, he went to Major Haney’s commander,
Colonel Smith, and explained to him the judge
advocate’s recommendation that he prefer the
charges. Colonel Smith was reluctant to prefer them,
because he was not convinced Major Haney was
guilty. Captain Watson explained to Colonel Smith
that in order for him to swear to the charges, Colonel
Smith had to have probable cause to believe that the
offenses were committed by the accused. The
question for Colonel Smith as explained by Captain
Watson was whether he believed the urinalysis
testing program was valid. Captain Watson then
explained to Colonel Smith what he needed to do
when he informed Major Haney of the charges. He
told Colonel Smith that he needed to read the
charges to Major Haney and then give him a copy.

Captain Watson testified that he was present at the
time Colonel Smith read the charges to Major Haney.

8a

Captain Watson said Colonel Smith introduced him to
Major Haney at that time. Major Haney testified
that only Colonel Smith was present when he was
served with the charges. The charge sheet indicates
that Colonel Smith, the accuser, preferred the
charges and informed the accused of them the same
day. The original record of trial is silent on the
circumstances surrounding the service of charges.

I find that Major Haney was aware of Captain
Watson’s prior representation of the government no
later than the first meeting between Captain Watson,
Captain Willner and Major Haney Captain Watson’s
name is on the charge sheet and Major Haney admits
to receiving a copy on 2 April 1990. Major Haney
admits he first met with Captain Willner before
meeting with both of them together, he was informed
Captain Watson had just transferred from the
prosecution team, and Captain Watson described his
involvement with the prosecution, describing it as
minimal. It is more probable that Captain Watson
gave Major Haney a summary of his prior
involvement with the prosecution, rather than a
detailed explanation of everything he did while Chief
of Military Justice. Major Haney early on viewed
having a former member of the prosecution on his
defense team as a distinct tactical advantage.
Captain Watson told Major Haney they would have
to wait and see if he could represent him.

Captain Watson researched conflict of interest cases
and spoke to the base staff judge advocate about
whether they would be willing to waive any potential
conflict in him serving as Major Haney’s defense
counsel. The SJA advised Captain Watson to stay
away from the case because of Major Haney’s
personality, but stated they would have no objections
to him serving as defense counsel. Therefore, the
government was aware that Captain Watson would
be representing Major Haney.

9a

Major Haney testified that Captain Watson was not
present at the time Colonel Smith served a copy of
the charges upon him. He said Colonel Smith did not
read the charges to him, but merely handed him a
copy and said he was sorry. Major Haney said the
first time he met Captain Watson was in early June
1990. He said he was made aware at that time that
Captain Watson had served in some role for the
prosecution in his case, and he asked Captain Watson
at that time if he would be a member of his defense
team. He said he was not aware that the Captain
Watson who swore Colonel Smith to the charges was
the same Captain Watson who was now the new
Area Defense Counsel (ADC). He said he first
became aware of this when the military judge
questioned him about a possible improper preferral
at trial. I do not find Major Haney’s testimony
credible on this issue.

Shortly after the meeting, between Major Haney.
Captain Koza, and Captain Watson. Captain Willner
traveled to Peterson Air Force Base to work on
Major Haney’s case. Captain Willner was aware that
Captain Watson had been the Chief of Military
Justice and had drafted the charges, and knew from
talking with Colonel Smith that Captain Watson had
sworn Colonel Smith to the charges. Captain
Willner recalls being told by the Chief Circuit
Defense Counsel, Lt Col Woodring, to speak with
Captain Watson about his involvement in the case.
After doing this, Captain Willner spoke with Major
Haney alone and told him about Captain Watson’s
involvement with the prosecution on his case.
Captain Willner does not recall the specifics of what
he told Major Haney. All three witnesses testified
that they had a discussion about Captain Watson
formerly being a member of the prosecution. No one
saw a conflict of interest, and Major Haney testified
he concurred.

10a

Captain Willner spoke with the Chief Circuit Defense
Counsel about what he had learned about Captain
Watson’s prior involvement in the case. It was both
Captain Watson’s and Captain Willner’s
understanding that Captain Watson was “detailed” to
the defense team. The “detailing” was not done in
writing, and it was not directly communicated to
Captain Watson by Lt Col Woodring. It was clearly
understood by all of the parties, including Major
Haney, that Captain Willner as the Circuit Defense
Counsel and more experienced counsel would be the
lead counsel. Captain Watson had never prosecuted
or defended a urinalysis case before, so it was not
expected that he would have any active role at the
defense table during the trial.

There was no judicial inquiry into whether Major Haney
waived any potential conflict with Captain Watson,
because the court was never aware that Captain Watson
was a detailed counsel. The record discloses that
Captain Koza was reported as the original detailed coun-
sel, and Major Haney waived any further participation
by him. I find that there is sufficient evidence to show
Major Haney was fully informed of his right to conflict
free counsel by his trial defense counsel. The issue
appears to be whether a waiver requires a judicial
inquiry to be valid.

Captain Watson’s role was to be a local contact point
for Major Haney, Captain Willner, and local
witnesses. Prior to trial, Captain Watson solicited
and collected written witness statements. He
interviewed witnesses with Captain Willner, but does
not recall interviewing any witnesses by himself. He
discussed trial strategies with Captain Willner and
Major Haney, Captain Watson, Captain Willner and
Major Haney all testified that they had numerous
discussions about the trial tactics and strategy.

One of the defense theories investigated before trial
was whether different teas that Major Haney drank

lla

contained ingredients that would result in positive
urinalysis test results for marijuana and/or cocaine.
Captain Watson was primarily responsible for
investigating this theory. Captain Watson told Major
Haney to bring him any teas he had left over, but
Major Haney told him he had already disposed of
them. Major Haney testified he threw them away in
December at the suggestion of a superior officer.
They both went to the stores where he had
purchased the teas. Two of the stores were now
closed. Major Haney could not remember the names
of the teas and they could not find them on the store
shelves. Major Haney told him he also bought tea in
bulk. Captain Watson spoke to the store owners to
see if he could identify the supplier. He contacted
two of the companies and was told they have
botanists on their staffs who do quality control
testing to ensure the teas do not contain any illegal
substances. Major Haney’s recollection was that they
spent several days trying to find the teas, but was
told that the suppliers and source of the tea change
constantly.

WHY WAS CAPTAIN WATSON NOT PRESENT
AT THE INITIAL TRIAL, AND DID THE
ACCUSED WAIVE CAPTAIN WATSON’S
PRESENCE AT THE INITIAL TRIAL?

Major Haney testified that the first he knew that
Captain Watson would not be present at the defense
table as a member of the defense team during the trial
was the morning of trial. He said both defense counsel
told him it would be better if Captain Watson was not
present in court. He said they said it would be easier
for Captain Watson to retrieve documents, and there
was no plan for Captain Watson to question any of the
witnesses. Major Haney concurred with the advice
not to have Captain Watson in the court room.

Both Captain Watson and Captain Willner have a
very different memory of when the question of

12a

whether Captain Watson should be present in court
was discussed with Major Haney. Both say this
discussion first occurred early, shortly after Captain
Watson joined the defense team, and well before the
first day of trial. They explained to Major Haney
that because Captain Watson had no experience in
urinalysis cases, he could not question any witnesses.
Captain Willner had already interviewed Colonel
Smith, and knew he would be a strong witness for the
defense. Captain Willner believed that the trial
counsel would attack Colonel Smith’s strong opinion
of Major Haney by asking him why he preferred the
charges, and the defense counsel were afraid he
would point to Captain Watson and say he did it upon
the advice of Captain Watson. The effect of the court
members wondering about a defense counsel advising
a commander that there was probable cause to
believe the accused committed the offenses would
greatly undermine the impact of his testimony.
Defense counsel say they explained all of this to
Major Haney well before trial, and he concurred in
the strategy. The more credible evidence supports a
knowing waiver of Captain Watson’s presence by
Major Haney, however, the question remains
whether a judicial inquiry was also required. Captain
Willner at the beginning of the trial told the military
judge that Captain Koza was “the original detailed
defense counsel.” No one informed the military judge
that Captain Watson was also detailed as Major
Haney’s defense counsel.

Captain Watson consulted with Captain Willner and
Major Haney during the recesses and discussed trial
strategy issues with them. When the military judge
raised the issue of the possibility of a defective
preferral, both attorneys were involved in discussing
Major Haney’s options with him during the recess.
Major Haney testified that this discussion was the
first time they had informed him about the possibility

13a

of a defective preferral. Major Haney said he did not
know until then that Captain Watson, his defense
counsel, was the same Captain Watson who had
sworn Colonel Smith to the charges. He said his
attorneys told him they were fortunate that Colonei
Smith had blurted out that he did not believe Major
Haney was guilty. He said they told him there was
no way he would now be convicted, even though the
military judge had instructed the members to
disregard the statement. Major Haney said if the
military judge had asked him whether he wanted to
proceed at that time and waive the issue, he would
have said yes. Major Haney was asked this question
by the military judge at pages 264-266 of the record
of trial, he stated he discussed the issue with his
counsel, and waived any issue related to a defective
preferral of charges.

Captain Willner said he recognized defective
preferral as a potential issue after he interviewed
Colonel Smith prior to trial. He recalls discussing
this issue with Major Haney, both before the trial and
during the recess after the issue was raised at trial
by the military judge. Captain Watson was present
during the discussion at trial, and Major Haney also
discussed the issue with Captain Hedgepeth during
the same recess. Captain Hedgepeth was an Air Force
Judge Advocate who testified as a character witness
for Major Haney. Both Captain Willner and Captain
Watson recall telling Major Haney the result of
asserting that the preferral was defective was that he
would gain a short delay in the trial. The charges
would be preferred and referred to trial again, but
would be tried before a different court panel. The
disadvantages discussed were that the government
would now have a better insight into the defense case.
The defense would also lose the effect of the members
hearing Major Haney’s commander state he did not
believe he was guilty, even though he preferred the

l4a

charges. The government would most likely have
someone else prefer the charges, and would move
ahead of time to limit Colonel Smith or any other
witness expressing an opinion as to guilt or innocence
of Major Haney. Both counsel testified that after
discussing the issue with Major Haney, he agreed to
waive the issue and pursue this strategy.

WHO DEVELOPED THE INITIAL TRIAL
STRATEGY IN DEFENDING THE ACCUSED,
AND WHY WAS CERTAIN EVIDENCE NOT
PRODUCED AND WITNESSES CALLED? HOW
WAS THE ACCUSED INVOLVED IN THIS
STRATEGY AND DID HE CONSENT TO THE
DEFENSE STRATEGY?

Captain Willner as the lead defense counsel was
primarily responsible for developing the trial
strategy. Captain Willner discussed all of the
strategies with Major Haney and Captain Watson
both before and during the trial. Both defense
counsel described Major Haney as the most active
client either of them ever had in discussing strategies
to be used in his defense.

The first defense theory was one created by Major
Haney before Captain Willner or Watson ever
became involved in the case. Major Haney had put
together what he called a thesis and had given it to
the government. It is unclear whether this was done
with the knowledge and consent of his first defense
counsel Captain Koza. Captain Watson had been
asked by Captain Koza to explore this thesis for the
defense in January 1990. Captain Watson forwarded
the request to the Armstrong Laboratory, but they
refused to explore the theory, saving it was not
scientifically possible. When Captain Willner was
assigned to the case, he asked Major Haney who
would support this thesis. Major Haney gave him
some names, but when Captain Willner talked with
them they either were not competent to testify about

15a

the theory, or if competent, did not believe the theory
to be true. Major Haney gave him the name of
Hauser Labs who were associated with the
University of Colorado in Boulder, Colorado. Major
Haney had already hired them to explore his theory,
and told Captain Willner that they supported his
theory. Captain Willner reviewed the written report
and discovered the lab did not support Major Haney’s
thesis. Captain Willner spoke to the chemist who had
performed the tests. He told him the electrical
current from the TENS unit would not coalesce into
the metabolites for marijuana and cocaine. He also
told Captain Willner that he had told Major Haney
the lab could not support his theory. Captain Willner
contacted experts in forensic toxicology that he was
familiar with, and could find no one to support the
theory. Captain Willner made a motion at trial to
prevent the government from making any reference
to this thesis of Major Haney’s, but lost the motion.
A variation of this theory was an unknowing and
innocent ingestion defense. The theory was the teas
used by Major Haney contained substances which
unknown to him caused him to test positive for
cocaine and/or marijuana. The steps taken to explore
this theory have been previously discussed.

A second strategy that was explored was to attack
the accuracy of the Armstrong Laboratory results by
comparing them to the toxicology screen results from
Major Haney’s blood. Major Haney had had surgery
on 20 November 1989, five days after submitting his
urine specimen, which tested positive for cocaine and
marijuana. Captain Willner spoke with Major
Haney’s physician who told him the blood toxicology
screen used before surgery does not have the same
sensitivity as the Armstrong Laboratory test. He
told Captain Willner he would not expect to see
evidence of marijuana or cocaine in the blood
toxicology screen unless the patient had used the
drugs between 15 and 20 November 1989. Captain

16a

Willner determined that this had no evidentiary
value to the defense. He does not recall if he
reviewed the medical records or asked to see them
once he found out that they would be of no value.

A third strategy that was explored was the theory
that Major Haney could not have used cocaine and
marijuana during the changed time period because he
was always being observed by other people, none of
whom saw him under the influence of any drug.
During the charged time period, Major Haney was
involved with others in testing the capabilities of the
Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) network. He was
working long hours and was called in at irregular
times. He was required to perform complex tasks at
work. The defense explored this theory and
presented evidence to support it. They called Major
Martel at trial to testify about Major Haney’s busy
schedule, irregular hours, and complex tasks
required to be performed by him. The defense has
criticized the trial defense counsel for not calling
witnesses who also observed Major Haney during his
off-duty time, specifically Lt Col Roe and Major
Haney’s wife. Lt Col Roe submitted a statement
before trial to trial defense counsel telling them he
and his wife had dinner and spent most of the day
with Major Haney and his wife on 7 November 1989.
Lt Col Roe testified at the DuBay hearing that he
just recently has recognized that the date he spent
with Major Haney and his wife was not 7 November
1989, but 12 November 1989. This change in the date
is significant given the testimony of the forensic
toxicologist at trial about the retention time for
cocaine in the urine. The date given to trial defense
counsel was well beyond the time period where
observation of Major Haney in a social setting had
any evidentiary value to rebut the charge of use of
cocaine. Additionally, the error in reporting the date
of the dinner party was never noticed by Lt Col Roe

en ane SER SE

17a

until recently, and the error in the date was never
reported to trial defense counsel.

A corollary to this strategy was to have Major Haney
testify in his defense and deny his use of marijuana
and cocaine, as well as outline his activities during
the charged time period. Major Haney alleges that
his trial defense counsel did not prepare him for his
testimony until the morning before trial, and their
preparation was cursory. Captain Willner testified
that he prepared Major Haney for testifying well
before trial. He discussed the line of questioning he
would pursue. He told him some of the specific
questions he would ask, and elicited Major Haney’s
responses. He also told him other areas he would
cover in his questioning, without telling him the
specific questions he would ask. He told him how he
should conduct himself in court, his demeanor, and to
address his responses to the court members. He told
Major Haney to unconditionally deny his use of
drugs. He did not tell him to qualify his denial by
saying “I did not use them at that time.”

Captain Willner and Captain Watson spoke with Mrs.
Haney a number of times before trial, as well as after
trial. Mrs. Haney testified the first time they spoke
to her was just two days before trial, a statement
both counsel deny as being true. Mrs. Haney said
trial defense counsel told her two days before trial
that her husband was going to be convicted and go to
jail for 7 years. Trial defense counsel deny they said
this, however, they did discuss with her the
possibilities of what could occur. Captain Willner did
not call her as a witness because the disadvantages of
calling her as a witness outweighed any advantage in
calling her. Mrs. Haney had medical problems that
were beginning to be resolved just before trial. Mrs.
Haney was also very emotional. Major Haney told
Captain Willner that he was not able to be honest
with his wife concerning aspects of the trial. Captain

18a

Willner was concerned that if she testified she would
antagonize the court members because she appeared
to have a big chip on her shoulder about the Air
Force. Major Haney and Mrs. Haney had met and
married while both were Air Force enlisted
members. When Major Haney was commissioned,
she believed that she had been forced to get out of
the Air Force after serving over eight years, thus
giving up her right to her own retirement. Mrs.
Haney appeared to be very bitter about this, and
Captain Willner was concerned she would come
across this way. What Mrs. Haney could testify
about during findings was that they had been very
busy the two weeks before 15 November 1989,
because they both had busy jobs and were also
meeting with realtors to try and sell their house.
Captain Willner also felt that court members gave
less weight to the testimony of a spouse than other
witnesses, because next to an accused, she had more
to lose than anyone else. Captain Willner talked
about these issues with Major Haney and he agreed
to this strategy.

A fourth strategy explored by the trial defense
counsel, and one they intended on using until two
weeks before trial, was the theory that the urine
specimen that tested positive either was not Major
Haney’s or the specimen had been adulterated.
Major Haney had a long history of taking
prescription pain medications. If the urine specimen
which tested positive for cocaine and marijuana
metabolities was his, or was not adulterated, the
metabolities for the prescription drugs should be
found in the correct ratio to when he would take
these drugs. If the urine specimen was not his, none
of his prescription drugs would be found in the
specimen, or if found in lower than expected ratios,
would show that the urine had been diluted or
adulterated. The trial defense counsel got the name

19a

of Dr. Levisky from either Major Haney or someone
Captain Willner had spoken to about the TENS
thesis. Dr. Levisky was a toxicologist for the El Paso
County medical examiners office and was an officer in
the Air Force Reserves. Dr. Levisky agreed to help
the defense for free on his own time. This meant that
the defense did not have to notify the government of
Dr. Levisky until they decided they were going to
call him as a witness, and did not have to request
funding for the testing from the convening authority.
However, to test this theory, they had to request an
aliquot of the urine.

Dr. Levisky tested the aliquot for the cocaine and
marijuana metabolities and found them in the same
ratios as the Armstrong Laboratory and Northwest
Toxicology Laboratory. He then tested for the
presence of one or two of the medications being taken
by Major Haney. He found both of them present, but
at levels lower than expected. This supported the
defense theory that Major Haney’s sample had been
adulterated by someone pouring into his specimen
some person[’]s urine which contained the
metabolities for cocaine and marijuana. Two weeks
before trial, Dr. Levisky on his own initiative,
examined the aliquot for the presence of Theopholine,
another drug commonly taken by Major Haney. He
~ found the Theopholine in the ratio he expected. The
most likely explanation that Dr. Levisky had was
that this was Major Haney’s urine, but he had not
taken his prescription medications at either the time
or in the quantity required by the prescription.
Captain Willner explained the damage that would be
caused to the defense case by presenting evidence
that conclusively identified this as Major Haney’s
urine. Major Haney wanted to present this defense,
but in the end, agreed that it made no sense to
positively identify this as his urine. Captain Willner
and Dr. Levisky thought as a corollary to this theory,

20a

they would have a physician review Major Haney’s
medical records to see if there was any medical
reason why he would secrete lower levels of the
other drugs. Dr. Bowerman with the medical
examiners office in E] Paso County reviewed the
records and found no reason why Major Haney would
secrete lower levels. He also told Captain Willner
that Major Haney fit the profile of a drug user and he
thought Major Haney used the marijuana and
cocaine.

A fifth strategy explored and used by the trial
defense counsel was the good military character of
Major Haney. Both trial defense counsel requested
Major Haney to contact potential character witnesses
and ask them to draft character statements. Captain
Willner does not recall whether he gave Major Haney
or potential character witnesses any specific
guidance, either orally or in writing, about what to
include in the character statements. Captain Watson
identified certain parameters, such as not to say “he
did not do it” or “he passed a polygraph,” because
neither was admissible and the second was not true.
The character statements came to Captain Watson
either directly or through Major Haney to review
and edit. Captain Watson edited the witness
statements as they came in, but not all came back in
time to be re-submitted after they had been edited.
Captain Watson believed it was important that the
character statements admitted into evidence not
have any obvious editing gaps. Trial defense counsel
do not remember if everyone who submitted a
statement was interviewed as a potential witness.
Captain Willner interviewed potential witnesses, and
often times Captain Watson was present. Captain
Watson does not recall interviewing any witnesses by
himself. Trial defense counsel talked about which
witnesses to call both among themselves and with
Major Haney. They wanted to present those they

ee i

2la

thought would be most credible and who covered
different time periods. Trial defense counsel knew
that the military judge would place a limit on the
number of witnesses they could call on this issue.
They decided after a certain point, it would be
counter-productive to have repetitive testimony. The
court members would begin to resent it, and the
weaker witnesses would dilute the testimony of the
stronger witnesses. The trial defense counsel
discussed with Major Haney the witnesses they
proposed on calling and the reasons for their decision.
Neither recalls any objections to Captain Willner’s
choices by Major Haney.

Hearing exhibits 30 and 31 look like the lists of
potential witnesses provided by Major Haney to
Captain Willner. Captain Willner has no recollection
as to who or how many of the witnesses he
interviewed, but believes he interviewed most. Some
of the interviews were by phone, but most were in
person. Major Haney did not tell him the number
next to the name on exhibits 30 and 31 were the
desired order in which witnesses be called. Captain
Willner met and spoke with each person that he
called as a defense witness before trial. He does not
remember how long he spoke with each one. He did
not rehearse specific questions and answers with
them, but instead discussed the topic areas he would
ask questions about on direct examination, and what
questions they could anticipate on cross-examination.

Captain Willner testified that he attempted to help
Major Haney prepare an unsworn statement prior to
trial. Major Haney refused to prepare it, and told
Captain Willner it was inconceivable that he would be
convicted. After he was convicted, he once again told
Major Haney to prepare the statement. The next
morning they reviewed the statement before trial. The
defense did not call any witnesses in sentencing
because all of the good character evidence had already

22a

been introduced during findings. The defense did
introduce defense exhibits CC and DD. The problem
for the defense was the members by convicting Major
Haney showed they did not believe his testimony
during findings. The defense had multiple character
statements and testimony already before the members
and it could be used by the members in sentencing as
well. They chose not to call witnesses from his unit to
testify about his rehabilitative potential because they
had already presented their strongest witnesses and
the members would view this as more of the same
evidence they had already heard in findings. The
defense was also concerned about the cross-
examination they would experience about the
rehabilitative potential of a major convicted of drug
offenses. The defense did present to the members
information about Major Haney’s medical problems
and support for his mother through his unsworn
statement. They did not present independent medical
evidence because Major Haney’s doctors did not view
his medical problems as being as serious as Major
Haney did.

After the trial, both trial defense counsel were
involved in preparing clemency matters. They had
read all of the letters submitted before trial, and
chose to use some and not others. Some were not
used at trial because they contained potentially
objectionable material and the edited statements
were not returned in time for use at trial. Other
statements were used only during clemency because
they contained either potentially negative
information, did not add anything, or the court
members could become irritated by their contents.

WHEN DID CAPTAINS WILLNER AND WATSON
BECOME AWARE OF ANY COMPLAINTS
CONCERNING ALLEGATIONS OF INEFFEC-
TIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AND WHAT
WERE THEIR RESPONSES?

23a

Major Haney’s first post-trial complaint is that he
was not prepared to immediately go into confinement
once he was sentenced to confinement. He said he
was unaware that he would not be able to go back
and gather his things together. Captain Watson said
this was a detail he would have his defense paralegal
instruct the client on, including giving them a
handout of what to pack for confinement. In my
opinion, there is a probability that this information
was not passed on to Major Haney. Major Haney was
Captain Watson’s first defense client, his first officer
client, and one of his first courts-martial as a defense
counsel. Major Haney did not believe he would be
convicted. There is a low likelihood that he would
have been receptive to any information about
sentencing or post-trial matters from the defense
paralegal, let alone his own attorneys.

Captain Willner as the defense counsel of record was
responsible for all post-trial duties. Captain Watson
assisted him by being a contact point for Major and
Mrs. Haney, and received all matters to be submitted
in clemency. Major Haney said he tried contacting
Captain Watson 20 to 30 times between the time he
was convicted and the time he let anyone officially
know he was dissatisfied with his defense counsel.
He said he was only successful in contacting him
about a dozen times. He said he wanted Captain
Watson to give him more information about his prior
role for the government in his case, his post-trial
rights, and assistance to his wife to explain to her
what was going on. Captain Willner was much
harder to contact. Captain Watson was very active in
gathering clemency matters for Major Haney.

Captain Willner was first aware of Major Haney
having potential concerns about the performance of
military trial defense counsel before the trial.
Captain Willner was aware that Major Haney’s wife
and friends were advising him to obtain civilian

24a

counsel. Captain Willner spoke with Bob Warren, a
civilian attorney contacted by Major Haney before
trial, and answered his questions about the case.
Captain Willner was contacted by two other civilian
defense counsel after the trial sometime before
Captain Willner submitted his R.C.M. 1105 and 1106
materials. Captain Willner had also heard that Major
Haney was making complaints to the jail staff about
his attorneys. Captain Willner spoke to the Chief
Circuit Defense Counsel about this, and he was
advised to talk to Major Haney about any
dissatisfaction he had with them. Captain Willner
spoke with Major Haney and told him he had to feel
completely comfortable with his defense counsel, and
if he was unhappy he needed to release them and get
new counsel. Major Haney denied the allegations
from the jail staff that he was unhappy with his trial
defense counsel, and he said he was satisfied with
their performance. This conversation took place
before Captain Willner submitted his R.C.M. 1105
and 1106 materials.

Captain Willner submitted the defense clemency
matters to the convening authority on 4 October
1990. Captain Willner submitted his R.C.M. 1105 and
1106 matters to the convening authority on 23
October 1990. Major Haney’s undated request for
clemency, which is Hearing Exhibit 34, was
submitted with Captain Willner’s clemency materials
on 4 October 1990. Hearing Exhibit 35, dated
November 16, 1990, says in paragraph 2a that both of
his trial defense counsel quit on 23 October 1990.
However, the testimony of both trial defense counsel
and Major Haney is that Hearing Exhibit 33, dated
25 October 1990, is the first notice either the
convening authority or either trial defense counsel
had that Major Haney was dissatisfied with his trial
defense counsel or that he was alleging ineffective
assistance [of] counsel. Major and Mrs. Haney

——

25a

testified that they had been working on a draft of
Hearing Exhibit 33 for several weeks, but they had
not shared their concerns or a draft with anyone else,
including their trial defense counsel. Major Haney
gave Mrs. Haney what is now Hearing Exhibit 33 on
25 October 1990 to hand deliver to the convening
authority, which she did on the same date. Captain
Watson had never been identified in the record as an
attorney of record, so there never was any formal
release of him by Major Haney or the court. Captain
Willner was formally released by the court at the
post-trial Article 39(a) on 31 October 1990.

III. ERRORS BY THE MILITARY JUDGE DURING
EVIDENTIARY HEARING

The appellant in his first assignment of error asserts the
military judge erred by (1) failing to evaluate the credibility of
the witnesses and evidence; (2) failing to make findings of fact
and conclusions of law; and (8) failing to reopen the hearing to
allow defense cross-examination of a prosecution witness after
discovery of new evidence during the hearing. He asserts
these errors substantially prejudiced him and rendered the
DuBay hearing incomplete, fundamentally unfair, and fatally
flawed.

A military judge in a post-trial hearing has the burden of
providing a record on which the convening authority and
appellate courts can reach a decision on the merits of an
appellant’s claims. We expect the military judge, when necessary,
to subject witnesses to penetrating questioning so that he can
determine their credibility, reconcile inconsistencies in the
testimony, and find facts. United States v. Calamita, 48 M.J. 917
(A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1998). That is precisely what Judge
Altschwager did in this case. He conducted a thorough hearing
and analysis of the credibility of the witness testimony. His
comprehensive findings of fact both answered the questions
posed by the convening authority and created a thorough record
on which we can rely to resolve conflict of interest and
ineffectiveness of counsel issues.

26a

The appellant further asserted that he was prejudiced by
the military judge’s decision not to reopen the hearing for
cross-examination of Lieutenant Colonel (Lt Coil) Willner.
Prior to the hearing the assistant trial counsel asked Lt Co!
Willner to provide the government and defense counsel any
notes he made during his representation Jf the appellant.
However, Lt Col Willner had recently moved and did not have
the notes available. He brought them with him to the hearing.
The appellant’s counsel was mistakenly told there were no
notes because that is what the assistant trial counsel
understood. The parties became aware of the notes during
cross-examination of Lt Col Willner. After assuring that the
appellant waived any privilege he may have had concerning his
defense counsel’s notes, the hearing officer granted a recess to
enable counsel to review the notes. The hearing officer
announced, after the 37 minute recess, that he had been
informed that the defense was prepared to continue their
cross-examination, but wanted some time to review the trial
defense counsel’s notes to determine if it would be necessary to
reconvene at a later date or if they could emphasize the points
they wished to make by written brief. The cross-examination
of Lt Col Willner continued and the hearing was concluded
subject to the defense requesting it be reopened.

Three weeks later the appellant requested the hearing be
reopened to continue cross-examination of Lt Col Willner
based on a review of his file. The hearing officer denied the
request to reopen after determining that all of the areas that
the defense requested to reexamine were covered during Lt
Col Willner’s testimony. The hearing officer’s report discussed
this matter as follows:

Specifically, Lt Col Willner testified with his case file
on his lap so that it was available to jog his memory.
Lt Col Willner testified on each of the areas
requested by defense counsel and said even though
he had reviewed the file, he had no further
recollection of each of these areas of inquiry. Further
inquiry by the defense counsel, with specific

27a

references to his notes, was highly unlikely to result
in more detailed answers.

We review a military judge’s denial of a defense request to
produce a witness under an abuse of discretion standard.
United States v. Miller, 47 M.J. 352, 359 (1997). Testimony of a
witness is necessary when it is not cumulative and when it
would contribute to a party’s presentation of the case in some
positive way on a matter in issue. The appellant conducted
extensive cross-examination of Lt Col Willner and the military
judge did not abuse his discretion when he determined that
reconvening the hearing for further cross-examination would
not be productive. Mil. R. Evid. 611 (b). ‘The appellant’s
assertion that the DuBay hearing was incomplete,
fundamentally unfair, and fatally flawed is without merit.

IV. DEFECTIVE STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE
RECOMMENDATION AND CONVENING
AUTHORITY ACTION

The appellant asserts the new SJAR and addendum are
defective and void because they (1) are based on conclusions drawn
from a fatally flawed DuBay hearing which failed to adequately
address crucial issues in the case, including the questions set forth
in the convening order, and (2) are made in a vacuum, without the
benefit of any counsel by the staff judge advocate.

The appellant concludes the DuBay hearing was fatally
flawed because he believes the military judge did not answer
two questions: (1) whether the appellant waived Captain
Watson’s presence at the trial, and (2) whether the appellant
knew of Captain Watson’s prior participation on the
government side and waived any conflict. We disagree. The
hearing officer’s findings of fact, which are set out above, fully
answer each of these questions. Based on all of the testimony
it is clear that Major Haney wanted the benefit of having
Captain Watson assisting in his defense. Captain Watson was
careful to ensure there was no conflict of interest. The DuBay
hearing brought out all of the essential facts and is not fatally
flawed as claimed by the appellant.

28a

The appellant next complains because the staff judge
advocate did not include legal arguments, justifications, or
other discussion of the issues in the new SJAR or addendum.
However, the staff judge advocate is only required to state
whether corrective action on the findings or sentence should be
taken when an allegation of legal error is raised in matters
submitted under Rule for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 1106(d)(4).
The response may consist of a statement of agreement or
disagreement with the matters raised by the accused. An
analysis or rationale for the staff judge advocate’s statement, if
any, concerning legal errors is not required. R.C.M. 1106(d)(4).
The SJAR and the convening authority action are not
defective. The convening authority had all of the evidence and
legal advice necessary to take action. R.C.M. 1107(b)(3). This
issue has no merit.

V. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

The appellant has again asserted ineffective assistance of
counsel. Although this Court has twice ruled on this issue, we
will once again examine it in light of the evidence obtained
during the DuBay hearing. Appellant apparently has now
narrowed his assertion of ineffective assistance of counsel to
trial defense counsel’s presentation of evidence on good
military character.

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
an appellant must overcome the presumption that, under the
circumstances, the challenged action might be considered
sound trial strategy. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
689 (1984) (citing Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)).
Strategic or tactical decisions made by a trial defense counsel
will not be second-guessed on appeal unless there was no
reasonable or plausible basis for the defense counsel’s actions.
United States v. Garries, 19 M.J. 845 (A.F.C.M.R. 1985), aff'd,
22 M.J. 288 (C.M.A. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 985 (1986). See
United States v. Mansfield, 24 M.J. 611 (A.F.C.M.R. 1987). A
strategic decision by defense counsel may constitute ineffective
assistance of counsel only if it was so patently unreasonable
that no competent attorney would have made the same

29a

decision. Adams v. Wainwright, 709 F.2d 1448, 1445 (11th Cir.
1983). The reasonableness of a counsel’s tactical decisions is
determined by examining the facts at trial and the
circumstances under which counsel’s decision was made.
Mansfield, 24 M.J. at 617.

Lt Col Willner explained that he limited the number of
witnesses to call on good military character and presented the
remaining evidence in statement form. He was aware that the
military judge would not allow an unlimited number of
witnesses and he consulted with the appellant and called those
he believed would be most credible and who would cover
different time periods. Lt Col Willner believed it would be
counter-productive to have repetitive testimony and the
members would resent it. The character statements that were
presented were edited so as to show the appellant’s good
military character. The trial defense counsel had the
statements redone to avoid having obvious editing gaps
because many of the witnesses referred to never seeing the
appellant use drugs. Evidence that witnesses had never seen
or known the accused to use drugs was not admissible as
evidence of a character trait. United States v. Schelkle, 47 M.J.
110 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1078 (1998). Trial defense
counsel had a sound tactical reason for editing the statements
and we will not second-guess the editing or presentation of
these statements. Trial defense counsel’s performance was not
deficient. This claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is
without merit.

VI. CONFLICT OF INTEREST

Once again the appellant asserts he was denied due
process of law and the effective assistance of counsel when
Captain Watson swore his commander to the charges during
the preferral process and then switched sides becoming the
area defense counsel and eventually assisting appellant in the
preparation of his case.

When an alleged conflict of interest is at issue, “a
defendant who raised no objection at trial must demonstrate

30a

‘that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his
laywer’s performance.” Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348
(1980), quoted in United States v. Breese, 11 M.J. 17, 20 (C.M.A.
1981). The burden of proof is on the defense. United States v.
Hicks. M.J.____ No. 97-0432/AR (Sep. 30, 1999); United
States v. Calhoun, 49 M.J. 485, 489 (1998) (citing Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)).

We find that the appellant was aware of Captain Watson’s
prior participation on the government side and knowingly
waived that participation because he believed there would be
an advantage to having Captain Watson on his defense team.
Captain Watson took all appropriate steps to be released by
the staff judge advocate. The facts developed during the
DuBay hearing demonstrate that he was equally careful to
properly inform the appellant so he could make a knowing
waiver of any conflict of interest based on Captain Watson’s
prior participation on the prosecution team.

During the course of the trial an issue arose as to proper
preferral of charges by Colonel Smith. An Article 39(a),
UCMJ, session was held and Captain Watson was called to
testify. Captain Willner stated to the court:

IMC: Your Honor, before we do that, I wanted to
point out to the court that since the time that these
charges were preferred, Captain Watson has been
reassigned to the Area Defense Counsel Office. As
the Area Defense Counsel, he has worked with me in
preparing for this case. He has also taken
confidences from Major Haney.

MJ: Well, fine. We won’t get into his confidential
relationship with the accused. We'll discuss only
matters pertaining to the advice given to Colonel
Smith at the time of preferral. Captain Watson?

Under these circumstances the trial judge should have
made inquiry into a possible conflict of interest. Regardless, as
Judge Altschwager found after the post-trial evidentiary
hearing, the appellant clearly understood Captain Watson’s
potential conflict and waived it. Furthermore, the appellant

3la

failed to meet his burden to show how Captain Watson’s
performance was adversely affected by the perceived conflict
of interest, or how it adversely affected the outcome of his trial.
This asserted error is without merit.

VII. INATTENTIVE COURT MEMBER

The appellant asserts that he was denied his right to
counsel, due process, and a fair trial during the post-trial
Article 39(a) session conducted by the military judge to
resolve allegations that a court member was inattentive or
asleep.

At the post-trial Article 39(a) session the military judge
asked Captain Willner, who no longer was counsel for the
appellant, what he had observed during the trial. Captain
Willner had a duty to truthfully answer questions concerning
his observations in the courtroom. His answers neither
constitute a conflict of interest nor a violation of the attorney-
client privilege. The military judge was not precluded from
conducting this post-trial session any more than he would have
been precluded from making inquiry concerning an inattentive
court member during the trial. We find no basis for changing
our previous opinion that the asserted error is without merit.

VIII. APPELLATE REVIEW UNDER ARTICLE
66(c), UCMJ

The appellant requests that we perform a plenary review
of his case and not limit our review to the specific issues.
Typically, action can only be taken that conforms to the
limitations of the remand. United States v. Smith, 41 M.J. 385,
386 (1995). However, an appellate court may consider closely
related issues(s) where the record is adequately developed.
United States v. Jordan, 38 M.J. 346, 353 (C.M.A. 1993) (Wiss,
J., dissenting). In this case, we disagree with the appellant
that a complete review of this case was required.
Nevertheless, we have considered the entire record, including
the post trial Article 39(a), UCMJ, session record and the
record of the post-trial evidentiary hearing.

32a

IX. CONCLUSION

We conclude the findings and sentence are correct in law
and fact, the sentence is appropriate, and no error prejudicial
to the substantial rights of the appellant was committed.
Accordingly, the findings and sentence are

AFFIRMED.

Senior Judge YOUNG and Judge SPISAK concur.

LAURA L. GREEN
Clerk of Court

33a

APPENDIX D

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ARMED FORCES

United States, Appellant
v.

Charles M. HANEY, Jr., Major,
U.S. Air Force, Appellee

No. 93-0157
45 M.J. 447; 1996 CAAF LEXIS 118
November 1, 1995, Argued
December 17, 1996, Decided

PRIOR HISTORY: CMR No. 29000. Military Judge: Robert
N. Spencer.

CORE TERMS: defense counsel, addendum, convening, post-
trial, recommendation, new matter, sleeping, military, clemency,
staff, confidence, sub-issue, defense team, session, salted,
ineffective assistance of counsel, attachments, substitute counsel,
failure to serve, new issue, court-martial, sentence, new trial,
own work, involvement, prosecutor, invalidate, appearance,
questioned, profferal

COUNSEL: For Appellant: Kevin J. Barry (argued);
Lieutenant Colonel Joseph L. Heimann (on brief).

For Appellee: Major LeEllen Coacher (argued); Colonel J oseph
L. Heimann and Lieutenant Colonel Michael J. Breslin (on brief).
Amicus Curiae: Captain Norman R. Zamboni; Colonel Stephen
D. Smith, Lieutenant Colonel John T. Rucker, and Major Roy
H. Hewitt (on brief).

JUDGES: EVERETT, Senior Judge. Judge SULLIVAN
concurs. COX, Chief Judge (concurring). GIERKE, Judge
(concurring in part and in the result). CRAWFORD, Judge
(dissenting).

OPINION BY: EVERETT

OPINION:

Opinion of the Court
EVERETT, Senior Judge:

Appellant was tried by a general court-martial composed of officer
members at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado, on July 19, 1990.
Contrary to his pleas, the members found appellant guilty of one
specification each of use of marijuana and cocaine, in violation of
Article 112a, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 USC § 912a.
He was sentenced to dismissal, confinement for 8 months, and
forfeiture of $ 750.00 per month for 12 months. After a post-trial
session under Article 39(a), UCMJ, 10 USC § 839(a), had
addressed—and found no merit in—allegations that a member
was sleeping during the trial, the convening authority approved
the sentence. In August 1992, the Court of Military Review!
affirmed the findings and sentence in an unpublished decision.

In our initial review of this case, we set aside the decision
below and remanded it for consideration of new issues raised
initially before this Court. 38 M.J. 229 (1993). In May 1994, the
court below, in another unpublished opinion, reaffirmed the
findings and sentence. Appellant again petitioned this Court,
and we granted review of this issue:

WHETHER THE CONVENING AUTHORITY ACTION
WAS DEFECTIVE AND VOID, WHERE THE CONVENING
AUTHORITY WAS ON NOTICE THAT APPELLANT WAS
NOT REPRESENTED BY CONFLICT-FREE COUNSEL,
DURING MUCH OF THE POST-TRIAL PHASES OF THE
TRIAL, AND WHERE THE STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE
RECOMMENDATION AND SUBSEQUENT ADDENDA
WERE NEVER SERVED ON APPELLANT'S (CONFLICT
FREE) SUBSTITUTE DETAILED DEFENSE COUNSEL
WHO HAD BEEN APPOINTED TO REPRESENT
APPELLANT AT THE POST-TRIAL 3%a) SESSION.

This granted issue involves questions regarding the
satisfactory service of the initial staff judge advocate’s (SJA)
recommendation on the original defense counsel and the
service of two addenda to this recommendation on the

'See 41 M.J. 213, 229 n.* (1994).

35a

substitute defense counsel. Resolution of these matters
requires this Court to address two sub-issues:

1. WHETHER THE ORIGINAL TRIAL DEFENSE
COUNSEL HAD PRIOR KNOWLEDGE OF AN
ALLEGATION OF INEFFECTIVENESS OF COUNSEL, SO
THAT AN ATTORNEY-CLIENT CONFLICT PRECLUDED
COUNSEL FROM RESPONDING TO THE INITIAL SJA’S
RECOMMENDATION AND THEREBY REQUIRED
SERVICE OF THIS RECOMMENDATION ON SUBS.
TITUTE DEFENSE COUNSEL.

2. WHETHER EITHER OF THE TWO ADDENDA TO THE
SJA’S RECOMMENDATION RAISE “NEW MATTER”
THAT REQUIRED SERVICE ON THE SUBSTITUTE
DEFENSE COUNSEL.

Unfortunately, because of a factual gap in the record,
we are unable to resolve the first sub-issue. Senator
Sam Ervin, while serving as a Justice on the North
Carolina Supreme Court, addressed in this manner
an appellate court’s problem in dealing with a
factually deficient record:

The unfortunate turn taken by this case in the court
below calls to mind a bit of advice received by the
writer of this opinion from his father, who was a
member of the North Carolina bar for sixty-five
years. When the writer embarked on the practice of
law, his father gave him this admonition: ‘Always salt
down the facts first; the law will keep.’ The trial
bench and bar would do well to heed this counsel.

In the very nature of things, it is impossible for a
court to enter a valid judgment declaring the rights
of parties to litigation until the facts on which those
rights depend have been ‘salted down’ in a manner
sanctioned by law.

Erickson v. Starling, 235 N.C. 643, 71 8.E.2d 384, 395-96 (1952).

* In the television series of yesteryear, Dragnet, Sgt. Joe Friday used to put
it this way, “Just the facts, ma’am, just the facts!”

36a

Because important facts regarding the first sub-issue are
not “salted down,” a remand to establish a factual record
normally would be required. See United States v. Cornelious,
41 M.J. 397 (1995). However, here this action to resolve the
first sub-issue is unnecessary. Our resolution of the second
sub-issue requires a new SJA recommendation and convening
authority action to remedy the errors in failing to serve the
substitute defense counsel with the first addendum to the
SJA’s recommendation, which raised “new matter,” and in
failing to serve this same counsel with the second addendum,
which discussed a new issue decided in the post-trial hearing.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On November 15, 1989, appellant, an officer with over 19
years of unblemished officer/enlisted service, randomly was
selected to provide a urine sample for drug testing. During
the test procedures, appellant told the drug test monitor that
he believed his sample would come back positive because of
the prescribed drugs he was taking. Subsequently, his
urinalysis test report was positive for marijuana and cocaine.

Before and during trial appellant denied knowing use of
illegal drugs. He asserted that a combination of innocent
circumstances might explain his positive test result.
According to appellant, he took prescription and non-
prescription drugs, including opiates and barbiturates, for the
continuing treatment of effects of injuries he had received in
an accident years earlier, and also he used exotic herbal teas.
The members rejected appellant’s explanation, however, and
convicted him of the alleged drug use. The granted issue
arises primarily from questions about the effectiveness of the
assistance of counsel in light of the possible conflicts of
interest on the part of two lawyers involved in appellant’s
defense.

A

The second Court of Military Review opinion concluded
that “there is some confusion as to whether Captain Watson

37a

was detailed as defense counsel... .” Unpub. op. at 3. This
confusion is quite understandable.

According to the record of trial, Captain Koza alone was
detailed as appellant’s counsel. As Captain Koza had been
transferred prior to trial, the military judge properly informed
appellant of his right to have his detailed counsel present, and
appellant waived Koza’s presence. Captain Willner, the
individual military counsel, appeared alone in court to
represent appellant.

Captain Watson, as the base area defense counsel,
consulted and assisted the defense in trial preparation, took
confidence from appellant, and collected clemency material.
However, he never entered an appearance in court as a
detailed counsel. Nonetheless, Major Willner, who was
promoted to this rank after the trial, states in his affidavit that
“Capt Watson was detailed to the case... .” In his affidavit,
Major Willner also explains that the decision not to have
Captain Watson sit at counsel table during the trial was based
on “our recognition that trial counsel or a court member might
ask Col Smith why he was willing to testify as a character
witness considering that he had preferred the charges. His
answer would have been that one of the defense counsel
[Captain Watson] had advised him to sign the charges.”
(Emphasis added.)

When the prosecution called Captain Watson as a witness
regarding a proper profferal, Captain Willner informed the
judge that Captain Watson “has worked with me in preparing
for this case. He has also taken confidences from Major
Haney.”

In a post-trial letter to the convening authority, appellant
expressly challenged “the trial strategy [Captain Watson]
helped develop or the assistance he provided. . . .” He further
asserted that Captain Watson “was reluctant to invalidate his
own work, since he was the prosecutor in April.”
Notwithstanding this confusion as to Captain Watson’s
professional relationship with appellant, the court below found
that (a) appellant was fully aware of Captain Watson’s prior
involvement as the base chief of military justice and as the

38a

officer before whom appellant’s commander had sworn to the
charges and (b) appellant had expressly requested Captain
Watson to assist his individual military counsel. Accordingly,
the court below ruled that no actual conflict of interest existed
regarding Captain Watson’s performance. Unpub. op. at 4.

B

The events concerning the role of Captain (later Major)
Willner are equally confusing. On September 24, 1990, the SJA
completed his initial recommendation and served appellant. On
September 25, 1990, the SJA served Major Willner.

On October 26, 1990, the SJA prepared and forwarded to
the convening authority the first addendum to his initial
recommendation. Without indicating the date of their receipt in
the SJA’s office, the addendum included these documents that _
the defense had submitted:

1) -Captain Willner’s defense request for clemency, which
included 34 attachments (approximately 59 pages) and
addressed appellant’s claim of innocence, 19 years of
exceptional service, medical problems, and family
stresses. The clemency request is dated October 4.

However, on October 4 and October 12, the defense had
requested extensions to file clemency matters; and the
convening authority had granted the defense until
October 25 for this purpose. Thus, the actual date of
receipt is uncertain.

2) Appellant’s request for release and/or a new trial, dated
October 25, 1990, which included 6 attachments
(approximately 63 pages.) This document questioned the
advice of counsel that Haney waive a proper profferal of
the charges. It asserted that there “were many problems
with the evidence that was presented by my attorney and
the manner in which he presented what was submitted and
what was withheld.” Appellant implied that Watson might
have intentionally failed to present appellant’s evidence of
good character because Captain Watson “was responsible
for bringing charges against me [and] was reluctant to

39a

invalidate his own work since he was the prosecutor in
April. I cannot, now, accept that the trial strategy he
helped develop or the assistance he provided were in good
faith.” Appellant argued that a new trial was required
because of “the possible ineffective counsel provided to
me.” Appellant also referred specifically to a letter, dated
October 24, from his wife to the convening authority,
regarding evidence that had not been used at trial.

3) Appellant’s wife’s letter to the convening authority
(with two attachments, approximately 4 pages), which had
been submitted directly and not through the area defense
counsel. Mrs. Haney alleged that she and appellant had
difficulty in working both with Captain Willner and with
Captain Watson. She asserted that “our defense lawyers
seem to be working harder for the prosecution than for us,
their clients.” She explained that counsel had failed to
introduce evidence and call defense witnesses.

4) Captain Willner’s submission of RCM 1105/1106,
Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1984, matters,
dated October 23, 1990, with three attachments
(approximately 9 pages.) (This is not a quotation.)

In his first addendum, the SJA explained that defense
counsel and appellant had asserted errors, including that
appellant “received ineffective assistance of counsel” and that
“a juror was asleep during a portion of the trial.” As to the
_ former, that addendum concludes, “I find from the record that
Major Haney received a vigorous defense and was competently
represented by Captain Willner, his trial defense counsel.
Captain Watson was not a counsel in the case... .” (Emphasis
added.) Reasoning that the assertion—supported by two
affidavits—that a member of the court-martial had been
sleeping during a portion of the trial “presents a significant
problem,” the SJA recommended that a post-trial session be
convened to address this issue. However, the SJA did not
serve defense counsel with a copy of this addendum to the
recommendation.

On October 29, 1990, the convening authority, in line with
the SJA’s suggestion, ordered a post-trial hearing as to

40a

whether any court member had been sleeping du

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386014_1518%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
