# Appendix — Mangieri v. Mangieri

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386014_1463%3A2

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 2001
- **Citation:** 531 U.S. 1080

## Text

App. 1

226 F.3d 1
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 00-1084

ROBERT W. MANGIERI,
Plaintiff, Appellant,

Vv.

PAUL MANGIERI, AS EXECUTOR OF
THE ESTATE OF JOSEPH F. MANGIERI,
Defendant, Appellee.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Robert E. Keeton, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Tortuella, Chief Judge,

Wallace, “” Senior Circui €

and Lipez, Circuit Judge.

Peter D. Prevett for appellant.
Pamela E. Terry, with whom Forman, Terry, Hickey & Garrahan

L.LP. was on brief, for appellee.

September 11, 2000

App. 2

TORRUELLA, Chief Judge. This case arises from a will
contest between plaintiff-appellant Robert W. Mangieri and
defendant-appellee Paul Mangieri, who are, respectively, the only son
and a nephew of the now deceased Joseph F. Mangieri. The case was
filed on August 31, 1999. The complaint alleges two claims: first, a
claim under Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 191 § 20, the
omitted child statute; and second, a breach of fiduciary duty claim
against appellee Paul Mangieri based on his actions as executor of the
estate of Joseph W. Mangieri. The district court granted summary
judgment for appellee on November 4, 1999. For the reasons stated
below, we affirm.

The essential facts are as follows: On November 2, 1984,
Joseph F. Mangieri executed a will in which he divided his estate
between his brothers, Robert L. and Sal Mangieri, his sister-in-law,
Josephine Mangieri, and other beneficiaries. The 1984 will contained a
clause stating that any children not provided for in the will were
intentionally omitted from the will. The 1984 will made no provision
for decedent's son, Robert W. Mangieri. On February 12, 1987, Joseph
executed a second will. The 1987 will did not make any provision for
Robert; however, in contrast to the 1984 will, it did not expressly state
that this omission was intentional. The 1987 will left the entire estate to
testator's nephew, Paul Mangieri. Paul Mangieri was also named
executor of the 1987 will. On May 28, 1997, Joseph directed his
attorney to draw up a new will, which, if executed, would have left the
bulk of his estate to his son Robert. Joseph died on June 10, 1997
without having signed the new will.

A trial ensued in the Massachusetts Probate Court. On April 12,
1999, the probate court issued detailed findings of fact and conclusions
of law. For our purposes, it is only relevant that (1) the court explicitly
found that testator-decedent had deliberately left his son Robert out of
the 1987 will, and (2) the court admitted the 1987 will to probate as the
Last Will and Testament of the Decedent. Robert Mangieri neither filed
a motion to amend the probate court's findings of fact nor appealed the
court's judgment.

On August 31, 1999, appellant filed suit against Paul Mangieri,
as executor of the estate of Joseph F. Mangieri, in the United States
District Court for the District of Massachusetts. As indicated, the

App. 3
complaint alleges (1) a claim under Massachusetts General Laws
Chapter 191 s. 20, the omitted child statute, and (2) that Paul Mangieri
committed a breach of his fiduciary duty as executor of Joseph F.
Mangieri's estate by failing to consider Robert's claim as an omitted
child and thus failing to protect Robert's interest as one of the testator's
heirs. Appellant alleges that jurisdiction is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
s. 1332, the federal diversity of citizenship statute.

At the time appellant filed his complaint in federal court, he
simultaneously filed a motion for an ex parte temporary restraining
order. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion on
September 2, 1999. After notice to opposing counsel was provided, the
court held a second hearing on September 8, 1999. At that time,
appellee filed a motion to dismiss, which the district court construed as
a motion for summary judgment. Thereafter, on September 15th,
appellant renewed his motion for a preliminary injunction. On
November 4, 1999, the district court issued an order granting appellee's
motion to dismiss, denying appellant's motion for preliminary
injunction, and entering judgment for appellee, Paul Mangieri. The
court reasoned, in part, that:

The core issues that require dismissal of this case in the view of this
court are that (1) this court lacks authority to hear and resolve this case
on the merits because this controversy is within the jurisdiction of the
Probate Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and that court
has taken jurisdiction and issued findings and conclusions that preclude
plaintiff's claim, and (2) this court either lacks jurisdiction . . . or in the
exercise of discretion should not exercise jurisdiction to make any
order that would be inconsistent with or otherwise impede completion
of proceedings in that court before it has reached a final disposition.
Mangieri v. Mangieri, No. 99-11812, slip op. at 7 (D. Mass. Nov. 4,
1999).

We believe that the district court's ruling in this case is amply
supported by both the record and the law and needs little analysis.
Under the probate exception to diversity jurisdiction, "a federal court
may not probate a will, administer an estate, or entertain an action that
would interfere with pending probate proceedings in a state court or
with a state court's control of property in its custody." Ashton v.

ine B ichael Paul F ..Inc., 918 F.2d 1065,
1071 (2d Cir. 1990) (citing Markham v. Allen, 326 U.S. 490, 494

App. 4

(1946)). While "[t]he precise scope of the probate exception has not
been clearly established," it is clear that "[a]s a general matter, courts
tend to view the probate exception as extending to all suits ‘ancillary’ to
the probate of a will." Georges v. Glick, 856 F.2d 971, 973 (7th Cir.
1988) (citing Dragan v. Miller, 679 F.2d 712, 715 (7th Cir. 1982)).

In this Circuit, we have previously stated:
It is obvious that insofar as the complaint requests the district court to
order the defendants to turn over to the plaintiff property which they
received in their capacity as fiduciaries, and for which they are
accountable to the probate court, the federal district court had no
jurisdiction. Kittredge v. Stevens, 126 F.2d 263, 266 (1st Cir. 1942).
Against this background, it is clear that this case falls squarely within
the probate exception to the diversity jurisdiction of the district court.
First, appellant's claim is within the jurisdiction of the Massachusetts
Probate Court. Second, as appellant concedes, the relief he requests
would require the district court to set aside the ruling of the probate
court that appellant Robert was deliberately omitted from the 1987 will
and that the 1987 will must be admitted to probate as the Last Will and
Testament of the Decedent. In fact, the complaint "demands that [the
district court] find Plaintiff is an omitted child, is entitled to an intestate
share of the testator-decedent, Joseph F. Mangieri's estate, and order
Paul Mangieri, as executor, to distribute the estate accordingly."

In our view, the district court correctly declined to do so on the
ground that this would improperly interfere with a probate proceeding
currently pending before the Massachusetts State Probate Court. @

For the reasons stated, the decision of the district court is affirmed.

(1). Of the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation.

(2). In light of our conclusion that the probate exception to federal diversity
jurisdiction applies to this case, we need not address the district court's alternative
holding that abstention is proper pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See
Mangieri, No. 99-11812, slip op. at 8 (citing

District of Columbia Court of Appeals
v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983), and Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S.
413, 416 (1923)).

App. 5

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

j

Civil Action, File Number 99-CV-11812-REK

ROBERT W. MANGIERI,
PLAINTIFF

Ve

PAUL MANGIERI, as executor of the estate
of Joseph F. Mangieri,
DEFENDANT

Ne ee ee ee we wae we SS

Memorandum and Order
November 4, 1999

I. Pending Matters

Pending before this court are the following motions:

(1) Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 9, filed
September 8, 1999) and Memorandum in Support Docket No. 16, filed
September 22, 1999) and Plaintiffs Opposition (Docket No. 13 and 15,
filed September 15, 1999):

(2) Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Docket No.
11, filed September 15, 1999) and Defendant's Opposition (Docket No.
17, filed September 22, 1999).

IL. Factual and Procedural Background

This case arises from a will contest between the only son anda
nephew of the now deceased Joseph F. Mangieri.

App. 6

On April 12, 1999, after a trial on the issue of revocation and
undue influence, the Probate Court in Barnstable, Massachusetts, of the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, issued an
Order that included findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding
the contested last will and testament of Joseph F. Mangieri. I recite the
relevant factual findings below for the purpose of context and
background for this memorandum.

On February 12, 1987, Joseph F. Mangieri (hereinafter
“Decedent") executed an instrument-as his last will and testament that
did not make any provision for his only child, Robert Mangieri
(hereinafter "Robert") because of an apparently estranged relationship
between father and son. The will left everything to the Decedent's
nephew, Paul Mangieri (hereinafter "Paul"), and also named Paul as the
executor.

In July of 1993, on the occasion of Paul's birthday, the
Decedent visited him and gave him the original 1987 will along with a
deed to a cemetery plot and a Weatherby rifle and rifle case. The
Decedent told Paul and his wife Cathy that Paul was to inherit his entire
estate. Paul testified that he put the will in his attic for safekeeping.

Between February of 1987 and May of 1997, the Decedent and
his son, Robert, reconciled their relationship and on May 28, 1997, the
Decedent instructed his attorney, Brooks Thayer at the law firm
LaTanzi, Spaulding and Landreth to prepare a will naming his son as
executor and leaving his entire estate to his son, his daughter-in-law,
and his brother.

The Decedent died on June 10, 1997, without having executed
the 1997 will.

Although the original 1987 will leaving everything to Paul could
not be located upon the Decedent's death (the will's envelope was in
Paul's attic, but it was empty), the probate court found that, contrary to
Robert's assertions, the Decedent had not revoked his 1987 will.

The Probate Court also found that the Decedent had
deliberately left Robert out of his 1987 will, providing a motive for
Robert to destroy the will (and thus an explanation of its
disappearance) if he had come upon it after his father's death.

On April 12, 1999, the Probate Court ordered that the
photocopy of the Decedent's will dated February 12, 1987, that was
kept in the Decedent's lawyer's office, shall be admitted to probate as

App. 7
the Last Will and Testament of the Decedent and that a decree shall
issue appointing Paul Mangieri as executor.

On August 31, 1999, Robert filed suit against Paul Mangieri, as
executor of the estate of Joseph F. Mangieri, in this United States
District Court for the District of Massachusetts alleging (1) a claim
under Massachusetts General Laws, Chapter 191, Section 20, as an
“omitted child"; and (2) that defendant committed a breach of his
fiduciary duty as executor of Joseph F. Mangieri's estate by failing to
consider the plaintiff's claim as an omitted child and thus by failing to
protect plaintiff's interest as possibly one of the testator’s heirs.

Immediately upon filing suit in this federal district court, Robert
Mangieri filed a Motion for an Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order
(Docket No. 2, filed August 31, 1999) on which the court heard
evidence and argument on September 2, 1999. On the basis of all the
oral and filed submissions then before the court, and for reasons stated
orally and summarized here, the court found: (a) that plaintiff had failed
to show a likelihood of success on the merits of his contention that the
absence of a clause in the 1987 will of Joseph F. Mangieri, that
appeared in his 1984 will, manifested that his leaving his child Robert
W. Mangieri of the 1987 will was not intentional, -- had railed to show
that he is likely to succeed on his claim as an “omitted child" under
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 191, 20; (b) that plaintiff had failed to show
irreparable harm that would warrant preliminary equitable relief: (c)
that plaintiff had failed to show a balance of hardship that would
support preliminary equitable relief, and (d) that plaintiff had failed to
show that public interest would be better served by granting than by
denying preliminary equitable relief. The court therefore denied the
Motion for Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order (Docket No. 2) and
scheduled a time for hearing the motion for a temporary restraining
order after appropriate notice.

The hearing after notice was convened on September 8, 1999.
On the basis of all the oral and filed submissions and oral argument the
court DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE the special defenses
asserted in the defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 9, filed
September 8, 1999). The court deferred ruling on other aspects of the
Motion to Dismiss and accepted the agreement of the parties to submit
the case on the merits forthwith rather than going through a two-phase
process of hearing, first on preliminary injunction and, second, at a later

App. 8
time, a trial or hearing on the merits. Defendant orally moved for
summary judgment, and the court, with consent of the parties, set a
schedule for additional submissions by the parties on or before
September 22, 1999. The additional submissions of the parties having
been filed -- e.g., Plaintiff's renewed Motion for Preliminary Injunction
(Docket No. 11, filed September 15, 1999), Plaintiffs Statement of
Material Facts As To Which There Exists A Genuine Dispute (Docket
No. 14), Plaintiff's Oppositions to Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment (Docket No. 13 and ;5), Defendant's Memorandum of Law
In Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 16) and
Defendant's Opposition to Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Docket
No. 17) -- the court now addresses the merits.

III. Defendant's Memorandum of Law in Support of
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment asserts the following
grounds for a Final Judgment dismissing this civil action:

1. To dismiss the action because the complaint
fails to state a claim against the defendant upon which
relief can be granted. The matter being res judicata on
the issue of pretermitted child.

2. To dismiss the action or in lieu thereof to
quash the return of service of the summons on the
grounds that the defendant is a citizen of New York,
was served in New York and was not and is not subject
to service ofprocess within the District of
Massachusetts.

3. To dismiss the action on the grounds that the
court lacks jurisdiction because both the Plaintiff and the
Defendant are citizens of the State of New York.

4. To dismiss the action on the grounds that the
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Probate Court in
which the Estate was probated. See Ellis v. Stevens et
al., 37 F. Supp. 488, 490-491 (D. Mass.] 1941), M.G.L.

App. 9
ch. 215, 3 and M.G.L. ch. 191 15. Memorandum of
Law in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment (Docket No. 16, filed September 22, 1999) at
2-3.

Plaintiffs Motion in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for .
Summary Judgment (Docket No. 13, filed September 15, 1999) asserts
that issues of fact that are material to the outcome of this case are
genuinely in dispute. Plaintiffs Concise Statement of Material Facts As
to Which There Exists a Genuine Dispute for Trial (Docket No. 14,
filed September 15, 1999), filed to comply with Local Rule 56.1, lists
the following allegedly disputed and material facts:

1. Whether the Plaintiff's Complaint alleges a
viable cause of action against the Defendant on which
relief can be granted.

2. Whether the doctrine of res judicata applies to
the Plaintiff's current claims due to the Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law set forth by the Barnstable
County Probate Court.

3. Whether the service on the Defendant in New
York state was insufficient ac a matter of law.

4 Whether the Defendant is subject to in
personam jurisdiction in the District of Massachusetts
due to his status as executor of the testator-decedent's
Will.

5. Whether complete diversity of citizenship
exists between the Plaintiff and Defendant so as to
confer subject matter jurisdiction upon this Honorable
Court.

6. Whether this Honorable Court is precluded
from subject matter jurisdiction due to the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Barnstable County Probate Court.

7. Whether the District Court should "abstain"
from hearing the matter under the "domestic relations
exception" to diversity or the "Burford Abstention
Doctrine."

App. 10
_8. Whether the case of Ellis v. Stevens. et al., 37
F.Supp. 488 (D. Mass. 1941) precludes the Plaintiff
from recovering. Docket No. 14 at 1-2.

The core issues that require dismissal of this case in the view of
this court are that this court lacks authority to hear and resolve this
case on the merits because this controversy is within the jurisdiction of
the Probate Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and that
court has taken jurisdiction and issued findings and conclusions that
preclude plaintiff's claim, and e this court either lacks jurisdiction (as
the point is sometimes expressed) or in the exercise of discretion should
not exercise jurisdiction to make any order that would be inconsistent
with or otherwise impede completion of proceedings in that court
before it has reached a final disposition.

In other words, in so far as plaintiff is asking this court to
consider the merits of his claim as an “omitted child" under Mass. Gen.
Laws ch. 191, 20, with regard to the probating of the will of Joseph F.
Mangieri, that is a claim that is properly heard in the Probate Court of
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. See Mass. Gen. Laws 215, 3.
See also Markham v. Allen, 326 U.S. 490, 494 (1946) (stating the by
now axiomatic proposition that "the probate exception to federal
diversity jurisdiction is a common law limitation which holds simply
that a federal court has no jurisdiction to probate a will or administer an
estate"); Kittredge v. Stevens, 126 F.2d 263, 266 (Ist Cir.) cert. denied,
317 U.S. 642 (1942) (holding that, according to the Princess Lida —
Doctrine, a federal district court has no jurisdiction over a case which
would involve the examination of the general administration of an
estate by a state probate court).

And, if plaintiff is asking this court to review the Probate
Court's decision for error in its finding that Robert was deliberately
omitted from the 1987 will, that review must be by the Massachusetts
Court of Appeals or by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in
accordance with Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 215, 9. See also Rooker v.
Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 483 & n. 16 (1923) (announcing the
now-called "Rooker-Feldman" doctrine that a federal district court
lacks appellate jurisdiction to review a state court judgment); District

App. 11
f Columbi Vv 460 U.S. 462, 482-86 & n.
16 (1983) (reiterating the viability of the "Rooker-Feldman" doctrine

State court judgment"). The two claims presented here -- alleging a
right of inheritance as an "omitted child" and a breach of fiduciary duty
by the executor of the estate for a failure to consider the "omitted
child" claim -- are sufficiently "intertwined" with the probate court
proceedings so as to require state court appellate jurisdiction, not
federal court jurisdiction. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483.

ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED:

(1) Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 9, filed September 8,
1999) is ALLOWED;

(2) Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Docket No. 1 1, filed
September 15, 1999) is DENIED:

(3) The Clerk is directed to enter forthwith on a separate document a
Final Judgment as follows:

For the reasons stated with the Memorandum of this date, it is Ordered:

Judgment for the defendant, Paul Mangieri.

App. 12

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

Civil Action, File Number 99-CV-11812-REK

)
)
ROBERT W. MANGIERI, )
PLAINTIFF )
)
V. )
)
PAUL MANGIERI, as executor of the estate )
of Joseph F. Mangieri, )
DEFENDANT )
)
Final Judgment

November 4, 1999

For the reasons stated with the Memorandum of this date, it is
Ordered:

Judgment for the defendant, Paul Mangieri.

Approved: By the Court,

/s/ Robert Keeton /s/ Craig Nicewicz
United States District Judge Craig Nicewicz, Deputy Clerk

App. 13
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

U.S. Const., art. Il
Section 1.

The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior
Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at
stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall
not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.

Section 2.

The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;--to all Cases
affecting Ambassadors, other public ministers and Consuls;--to all
Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;--to Controversies to
which the United States shall be a Party;--to Controversies between
two or more States;--between a State and Citizens of another
State;--between Citizens of different States;--between Citizens of the
same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and
between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or
Subjects.

In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls,
and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have
original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the
supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and
Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the
Congress shall make.

The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by
Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes
shall have been committed; but when not committed within any State,
the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law
have directed.

App. 14

28 U.S.C. Section 1254. Courts of appeals; certiorari; certified
questions

Cases in the courts of appeals may be reviewed by the Supreme
Court by the following methods:

(1) By writ of certiorari granted upon the petition of any party to
any civil or criminal case, before or after rendition of judgment or
decree;

(2) By certification at any time by a court of appeals of any
question of law in any civil or criminal case as to which instructions are
desired, and upon such certification the Supreme Court may give
binding instructions or require the entire record to be sent up for
decision of the entire matter in controversy.

28 U.S.C. Section 1332. Diversity of citizenship; amount in
controversy; costs

(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil
actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of
$75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between -

(1) citizens of different States;

(2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state;

(3) citizens of different States and in which citizens or subjects of
a foreign state are additional parties; and

(4) a foreign state, defined in section 1603(a) of this title, as
plaintiff and citizens of a State or of different States.

For the purposes of this section, section 1335, and section 1441, an
alien admitted to the United States for permanent residence shall be
deemed a citizen of the State in which such alien is domiciled.

(b) Except when express provision therefor is otherwise made in a
statute of the United States, where the plaintiff who files the case
originally in the Federal courts is finally adjudged to be entitled to
recover less than the sum or value of $75,000, computed without -
regard to any setoff or counterclaim to which the defendant may be

App. 15
adjudged to be entitled, and exclusive of interest and costs, the district
court may deny costs to the plaintiff and, in addition, may impose costs
on the plaintiff.

(c) For the purposes of this section and section 1441 of this title -
(1) a corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen of any State
by which it has been incorporated and of the State where it has its
principal place of business, except that in any direct action against the
insurer of a policy or contract of liability insurance, whether
incorporated or unincorporated, to which action the insured is not
joined as a party-defendant, such insurer shall be deemed a citizen of
the State of which the insured is a citizen, as well as of any State by
which the insurer has been incorporated and of the State where it has
its principal place of business; and
(2) the legal representative of the estate of a decedent shall be
deemed to be a citizen only of the same State as the decedent, and the
legal representative of an infant or incompetent shall be
deemed to be a citizen only of the same State as the infant or
incompetent.
(d) The word "States", as used in this section, includes the
Territories, the District of Columbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico.

Mass. Gen. Laws Chapter 191: Section 20. Omitted children.

If a testator omits to provide in his will for any of his children, whether
born before or after the testator's death, or for the issue of a deceased
child, whether born before or after the testator's death, they shall take
the same share of his estate which they would have taken if he had died
intestate, unless they have been provided for by the testator in his
lifetime or unless it appears that the omission was intentional and not
occasioned by accident or mistake; provided, however, that no such
child or issue shall take any share in any real property in the testator's
estate unless a claim is filed in the registry of probate by or in behalf of
such child or any of such issue within one year after the date of the
approval of the bond of the executor.

App. 16

Mass. Gen. Laws Chapter 215: Section 3. General provisions.

Probate courts shall have jurisdiction of probate of wills, of granting
administration on the estates of persons who at the time of their
decease were inhabitants of or residents in their respective counties and
of persons who die out of the commonwealth leaving estate to be
administered within their respective counties; of the appointment of
guardians and conservators; of all matters relative to the estates of such
deceased persons and wards; of petitions for the adoption of children,
and for change of names; or proceedings transferred to it under the
provisions of section four A of chapter two hundred and eleven; and of
such other matters as have been or may be placed within their

_ jurisdiction. Whenever service of any notice, summons, citation, order
or other process in any of the foregoing proceedings is ordered to be
made by publication the names of the estates or parties to such
proceedings shall be printed in bold type.

Probate courts have exclusive original jurisdiction of actions for
divorce or for affirming or annulling marriage.

Probate courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction of all actions
concerning the execution and validity of health care proxies created
pursuant to chapter two hundred and one D or disputes arising
thereunder.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386014_1463%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.