# Opposition Brief — Michigan v. Environmental Protection Agency

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2001
- **Citation:** 532 U.S. 970

## Text

No. 00-746

Jn the Supreme Court of the GnitesStates—

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION

»ARI . U

Act N ri
“ i PR

RUDE}

1 ) Ass }
'p rd

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the Environmental Protection Agency
has reasonably interpreted the term “reservation” in
Section 301(d)(2)(B) of the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42
U.S.C. 7601(d)(2)(B), to include trust lands validly set
apart for the use of an Indian Tribe as well as formally
designated reservations.

2. Whether Section 301(d)(2) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C.
7601(d), delegates to eligible Indian Tribes the author-
ity to administer programs for the management of air
resources in all areas within the exterior boundaries of
their reservations, including lands owned in fee by non-
Indians.

(I)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Arizona vy. EPA, 151 F.3d 1205 (1998), as amended,

NTO F 2d STO (Oths Cir. 1908) nics cccaccsccesscsscsscesssssceccssasseseces
Black v. Cutter Labs., 351 U.S. 292 (1956) .00.0...cccccccccceeee

Bugenig v. Hoopa Valley Tribe, 229 F.3d 1210

(9th Cir. 2000), reh’g en banc granted (Feb. 28, 2001) ....

California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians,

chal dcaccknathccesdnsbhaiecsinidntesmaneencacons

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council,

ON, GF CGT CIE) ances ccensesevcsnsncrtsassocnsoneves salaloniel

Department of the Interior v. South Dakota, 519

ESE SEE Ae OR

Florida Dep't of Business Regulation v. Department
of the Interior, 768 F.2d 1248 (11th Cir. 1985),

cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1011 (1986) .0.........cccccscecsessecessseseeees

McAlpine v. United States, 112 F.3d i429 (10th

Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 984 (1997) .0...000000 ccc. ae
Montana vy. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981) ................

Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawa-

tomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505 (1991) ........ccccccccceseseseeee

Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Sac & Fox Nation,

508 U.S. 114 (1993) ........... ieinmuneiinaichaaaieddaiionsote ecbatslbitalinipnind

(IIT)

IV

Cases—Continued: Page

South Dakota v. Department of the Interior, 69
Fe EI Ns I spas icciciicsislaniatiieienscctladsciiananiddnadstnani 13

United States v. Azure, 801 F.2d 336 (8th Cir.

ITD sceeiistdatistape beeaaiahigiseashitbaisaidaid bighaiimaatehaaninesdaeieensabibthnidiamanie 9
United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634 (1978) wo. 9
United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975) ........... 7, 14,15
United States v. Roberts, 185 F.3d 1125 (10th Cir.

1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1960 (2000) oo... 13
United States v. Sohappy, 770 F.2d 816 (9th Cir.

1985), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 906 (1986) oo... eee g
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S.

I siditeanithesk aia eaiadhceicactinacti lain aaiminamincidachasaubaapaalinsisiebiadsen 17

Statutes and regulations:

Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq. .........ccccccscsssssssseseseseseees 2
OR CR, FS oo ees 2 {
i ee ta MI ce teccasisctaistadsnasasnishsidesemstasotomeliaheseies 4
© Ey Ge Ree PRICED seccsccssscseicrccovesniescontisboxtaense 2
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Fe Ae NI ha cicitanisebaietinsnieniaccdescinaianisientetn 2,3, 16,17
§§ 160-169B, 42 U.S.C. 7470-7492 ..........ccccccssssscssessssssssesees 2
§§ 162-164, 42 U.S.C. 7472-7474 ou... eccccsssesesseceesseees ASSP 2
I i ie es UO cies itssicendeansatensasonciasnnnancioneascievcsinmnnaelbicintocs 2
Os ee tas I Sa niiicnias icaticcrencctidaensctssedesnianes 2,12
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Dy Fs POD eiretniceainpnierpnaccnncnsindnanchebasisenasnianii 11
$ 179(aN(4), 42 U.S.C. T509(a)(4) ............cscesscosecssesecesesesseesees 2
§ 301(d), 42 U.S.C. 7601(d) oo... 3,7, 11, 14, 15, 16
§ 301(d)(1), 42 U.S.C. T601(A)(1) ..........cececesscssessecesecscececeees 3
§ 301(d)(2), 42 U.S.C. 7601(d)(2) ceesecccsssssen 3, 4,5, 7, 14, 16, 18
§ 301(d)(2)(B), 42 U.S.C. 7601(d)(2)(B) oe 4,5,12, 14
§ 301(d)(4), 42 U.S.C. T601(A)(4) cccsessssssssssssssssssseseeeeeees 4,11,17
§ SOTA), 4B UBC. TODA) onnncasccccsscnsscsceccscsascsesscseseses 18
SD, Ge ES, FG: cena sass scctonncntnsnnnctanrnssesnciit 17

7 U.S.C. 1985(e)(1)(A)(ii) (1994 & Supp. V 1999)... 9

LF Tk, Sea aNRe cen een aCe ee 9

V

Statutes and regulations—Continued:

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BB UKs. SD ctetssicevtantiasderentinateenaainitennen
OE UF Ba Fe isentnicitinscunsocaccbiecntiniatatbialaaipnanenianaased amie
a RE Bs, Fa ictictccnivserastpcehtaacdenaestcndnsi adc dibiidinedacnadiueaitatasaditaiaeh
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WCF Bs FAD scnciliiusncervctisatonaiiouieioaeae
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Miscellaneous:

196 Comage. Bee: SEITE (RIG) esecericesisesitscsicnisinsicservasininmnntenasanni
59 Fed. Reg. (1994):

Br. ID sicacsancieasinsicsnransissinneniintaniaiibainetatecaaninatmsaiananeaetia

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Gh Frac, Tear, BT G56 CIGD certs ersiccsnsssnnsetsstsisccesnssntpensansenetosianann
S. Rep. No. 228, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. (1989) .........::cscecee
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1993) .....

In the Supreme Court of the Gnited States

No. 00-746

STATE OF MICHIGAN, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. la-49a)
is reported at 211 F.3d 1280.
JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 139a)
was entered on May 5, 2000. A petition for rehearing
was denied on July 12, 2000. Pet. App. 135a-136a. On
September 27, 2000, the Chief Justice extended the
time within which to file a petition for a writ of
certiorari to and including November 9, 2000, and the
petition was filed on that date. The jurisdiction of this
Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

STATEMENT

1. The Clean Air Act (CAA or Act), 42 U.S.C. 7401- -

et seq., establishes an intergovernmental partnership to
regulate air quality throughout the Nation. This case
involves the proper interpretation of amendments to
the Act enacted in 1990 in order to increase the role of
Indian Tribes in that partnership.

a. The CAA gives the States primary responsibility
for ensuring that ambient air meets federally estab-
lished standards. See 42 U.S.C. 7407(a). The States
discharge that responsibility by developing State
Implementation Plans (SIPs) that “provide[] for imple-
mentation, maintenance, and enforcement” of those air
quality standards. 42 U.S.C. 7410(a)(1). Once SIPs
have been approved by the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), they are federally enforceable. 42
U.S.C. 7509(a\(4).

The CAA also establishes several other programs
designed to protect and enhance the quality of the
Nation’s air resources. For example, Part C of Title I
of the CAA creates a program for the “prevention of
significant deterioration” (PSD) of air quality in areas
where the air is cleaner than required by federal stan-
dards. 42 U.S.C. 7470-7492. Areas subject to the PSD
program receive one of three classifications (Class I, II,
or III) that specify the maximum amount of air quality
deterioration allowable in the areas. 42 U.S.C. 7472-
7474. The least deterioration is permitted in Class I
areas. 42 U.S.C. 7473. Section 164(a) of the CAA
authorizes the States to redesignate areas under their
jurisdiction as Class I. 42 U.S.C. 7474(a).

Section 116 of the CAA generally preserves the
authority of the States to regulate air pollution under
their own laws. 42 U.S.C. 7416. Those state regu-

3

lations, however, must be at least as stringent as appli-
cable federal requirements. 42 U.S.C. 7416.

b. In 1990, Congress passed a compendium of
amendments to the CAA, several of which addressed
the role of Indian Tribes under the Act. Most signifi-
cant for this case, the 1990 Amendments added Section
301(d), which grants EPA the “author[ity] to treat
Indian tribes as States” under the Act, 42 U.S.C.
7601(d)(1), subject to the following requirements:

(A) the Indian tribe has a governing body carry-
ing out substantial governmental duties and
powers;

(B) the functions to be exercised by the Indian
tribe pertain to the management and protection of
air resources within the extericr houndaries of the
reservation or other areas within the tribe’s juris-
diction; and

(C) the Indian tribe is reasonably expected to be
capable, in the judgment of the Administrator, of
carrying out the functions to be exercised in a man-
ner consistent with the terms and purposes of [the
CAA\] and all applicable regulations.

42 U.S.C. 7601(d)(2).

Section 301(d)(2) directs the EPA to promulgate
regulations “specifying those provisions of this chapter
for which it is appropriate to treat Indian tribes as
States.” 42 U.S.C. 7601(d)(2). “In any case in which the
[EPA] determines that the treatment of Indian tribes
as identical to States is inappropriate or administra-
tively infeasible, the [EPA] may provide, by regulation,
other means by which the Administrator will directly
administer [the applicable provisions of the Act] so

4

as to achieve the appropriate purpose.” 42 U.S.C.
7601(d)(4).

The 1990 Amendments also revised Section 110 of the
Act, which governs SIPs, to address Tribal Imple-
mentation Plans (TIPs). 42 U.S.C. 7410(0). Tribes are
not required to submit TIPs, but, if a Tribe submits a
plan, the EPA reviews the plan in accordance with the
provisions for review of state plans, except as the EPA
has otherwise provided in the regulations promulgated
under Section 301(d)(2). If the EPA approves a TIP,
“the plan shall become applicable to all areas (except as
expressly provided otherwise in the plan) located with-
in the exterior boundaries of the reservation, notwith-
standing the issuance of any patent and including
rights-of-way running through the reservation.” 42
U.S.C. 7410(0).

Finally, the 1990 Amendments left in place Section
164(c), which was enacted in 1977. That Section pro-
vides, in relevant part, that “[lJands within the exterior
boundaries of reservations of federally recognized
Indian tribes may be redesignated [pursuant to the
PSD program} only by the appropriate Indian govern-
ing body.” 42 U.S.C. 7474(c).

2. In 1998, the EPA promulgated the Tribal Author-
ity Rule (TAR), 40 C.F.R. Pt. 49, which implements the
directive in Section 301(d)(2) of the CAA that the EPA
promulgate regulations addressing how Tribes may be
treated as States under the Act. See Pet. App. 50a-
134a. Under the TAR, a Tribe may be treated in the
same manner as a State for all of the core CAA pro-
grams, including the establishment of TIPs and
redesignations under the PSD program. As provided in
Section 301(d)(2)(B), a Tribe may implement a CAA
program only “within the exterior boundaries of the
reservation” or “other areas within the tribe’s juris-

5

diction.” 40 C.F.R. 49.6(c). The EPA determined that
Section 301(d)(2), viewed in the context of the CAA as a
whole, “is a delegation of federal authority, to tribes
approved by EPA to administer CAA programs in the
same manner as states, over all air resources within the
exterior boundaries of a reservation.” Pet. App. 53a-
54a. That grant of authority, the EPA concluded,
embodies “a territorial view of tribal jurisdiction” and
does not “distinguish[{] among various categories of on-
reservation land” but allows eligible Tribes “to address
conduct relating to air quality on all lands, includ-
ing non-Indian-owned fee lands, within the exterior
boundaries of a reservation.” Jd. at 54a. The EPA
reasoned that its interpretation of the scope of tribal
authority is supported by the language and legislative
history of Section 301(d)(2)(B), id. at 54a-62a, and that
a “territorial approach to air quality regulation best
advances rational, sound air quality management” be-
cause of the “high mobility” and “areawide effects” of
air pollutants (59 Fed. Reg. 43,956, 43,959 (1994)).

The EPA also concluded that the term “reservation”
in Section 301(d)(2)(B) includes Pueblos and “trust land
that has been validly set apart for use by a tribe, even
though that land has not been formally designated as
a ‘reservation.’” Pet. App. 66a. In reaching the con-
clusion that the term “reservation” includes trustlands,
the EPA relied on the meaning given to “reservation”
in cases interpreting 18 U.S.C. 1151, the Indian country
statute, because the CAA does not define
the term. Pet. App. 66a-67a (citing Oklahoma Tax
Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498
U.S. 505, 511 (1991)).

Finally, the EPA determined that Section
301(d)(2)(B)’s reference to “other areas within the
tribe’s jurisdiction” authorizes Tribes to implement

6

CAA programs in non-reservation areas over which
they can demonstrate jurisdiction under general
principles of federal Indian law. Pet. App. 70a. The
EPA explained that disputes about a Tribe’s juris-
diction over particular non-reservation areas would be
addressed “on a case-by-case basis in the context of
particular tribal applications.” Jd. at 71a.

3. Petitioners and others sought review of the TAR
in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit. As relevant to the claims before this
Court, the court of appeals denied the petitions for
review. Pet. App. la-49a.’

The court of appeals first upheld the EPA’s con-
clusion that the CAA delegates authority to eligible
Tribes to regulate air resources on all land within
reservations, including fee land owned by non-Indians.
Pet. App. lla-2la. The court noted that the “EPA sug-
gests, not implausibly,” thet Tribes might have “in-
herent sovereign power” to regulate air pollution on
non-Indian-owned fee lands within reservation bounda-
ries under the principle, recognized in Montana v.
United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981), that Tribes may
exercise authority over non-Indians on fee lands if their
behavior “has some direct effect on * * * the health or
welfare of the tribe.” Pet. App. lla-12a. The court did
not address that question, however, because it upheld
the EPA’s conclusion that the CAA contains a delega-
tion of authority. The court explained that the
“statute’s clear distinction between areas ‘within the
exterior boundaries of the reservation’ and ‘other areas
within the tribe’s jurisdiction’ carries with it the
implication that Congress considered the areas within

! The court of appeals also dismissed other challenges on other
grounds, but petitioners do not renew those claims in this Court.

7

the exterior boundaries of a tribe’s reservation to be
per se within the tribe’s jurisdiction.” Jd. at 13a. The
court noted that this appreach furthers the CAA’s
purpose “to ensure effective enforcement of clean air
standards” by avoiding a “‘checkerboard’ pattern of
regulation within a reservation’s boundaries,” which
would be problematic because of the high mobility and
area-wide effects of air pollutants. Jd. at 13a-14a. The
court also found support for the EPA’s conclusion in the
drafting history of Section 301(d), because the phrase
“within the exterior boundaries of the reservation” was
substituted for the language in the bill as originally
introdueceed—“within the area of the tribal government’s
jurisdiction.” Jd. at 14a-15a. Finally, the court noted
that the EPA’s conclusion is consistent with cases in
which this Court has found congressional delegations of
authority to Tribes over non-Indian lands within reser-
vation boundaries. Jd. at 17a-19a (citing United States
v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975), and Rice v. Rehner, 463
U.S. 713 (1988)).”

The court of appeals also upheld as reasonable the
EPA’s construction of “reservation” to include trust
lands and Pueblos as well as formally designated
reservations. Pet. App. 2la-26a. The court explained
that “the Act nowhere defines ‘reservation.’” Jd. at

2 Judge Ginsburg dissented from this portion of the court’s
opinion. Pet. App. 38a-49a. He concluded that Section 301(d)(2) is
not an express delegation of authority for Indian Tribes to regulate
the conduct of non-Indians on fee land within reservation boun-
daries. /d. at 49a. He further concluded, however, that Section
110(0) is such an express delegation, although the authority it
provides extends only to the promulgation of TIPs and not to other
powers under the CAA. /d. at 42a. He also explained that Tribes
might, under Montana, have inherent authority to exercise those
other powers. /d. at 49a.

8

22a. The court concluded that the interpretation given
the term by the EPA is consistent with its dictionary
definition, its use in various federal statutes, the legis-
lative history, and judicial precedent. Jd. at 23a-25a.
Finally, the court of appeals held that the EPA reason-
ably concluded that Tribes may propose TIPs and make
redesignations under the PSD program with respect to
non-reservation lands over which the Tribes demon-
strate that they possess authority under ordinary
principles of federal Indian law. /d. at 26a-28a.

ARGUMENT

The decision of the court of appeals is correct and
does not conflict with the decision of any other court of
appeals. This Court’s review is therefore not war-
ranted.

1. a. Contrary to petitioner’s contention (Pet. 14-
21), the court of appeals correctly concluded that the
EPA reasonably interpreted “reservation” to include
trust lands “validly set apart for use by a tribe, even
though that land has not been formally designated as a
‘reservation’” (Pet. App. 66a). See id. at 22a-26a
(applying Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)).

As the court of appeals explained (Pet. App. 22a-25a),
the CAA does not define “reservation,” and that term is
ambiguous. Although “reservation” is sometimes used
to refer to formally-designated reservations, it is also
frequently used in the broader sense adopted by the
EPA. In still other instances, the term “reservation”
refers to even broader classes of Indian lands. See, e.g.,
25 U.S.C. 3202 (includes lands held by Alaska Native
Corporations under the Alaska Native Claims Settle-
ment Act). As the court further noted, the dictionary
definition of the term and its use in various federal

9

statutes comports with the EPA’s interpretation. See
Pet. App. 23a-24a (citing inter alia Webster’s Third
New International Dictionary 1930 (1993); 7 U.S.C.
1985(e)(1)(A)(ii) (1994 & Supp. V 1999); 7 U.S.C. 2012();
25 U.S.C. 1452(d); 25 U.S.C. 1903(10)). Statements in
the Senate Committee report referring to tribal author-
ity to administer and enforce the CAA “in Indian lands”
and in “Indian country” also support EPA’s interpreta-
tion. See S. Rep. No. 228, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. 79, 80
(1989); 18 U.S.C. 1151 (defining “Indian country” to
include more than just formally designated reserva-
tions). As the court of appeals concluded (Pet. App.
25a), given the ambiguity of the term “reservation,” the
EPA reasonably interpreted that term, as this Court
and the courts of appeals have interpreted it in related
contexts, to include both formal and informal reserva-
tions, the latter including trust lands outside of formal
reservations. See ibid. (citing Oklahoma Tax Comm’n,
498 U.S. at 511; United States v. John, 487 U.S. 634, 649
(1978); United States v. Azure, 801 F.2d 336, 339 (8th
Cir. 1986); United States v. Sohappy, 770 F.2d 816, 822-
823 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 906 (1986)).
See also Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Sac & Fox Nation,
508 U.S. 114, 123 (1993).

Petitioners err in contending (Pet. 16) that the court
of appeals relied solely on the absence of an express
definition in the Act and the dictionary to determine
the scope of the term “reservation.” As we have de-
scribed, the court of appeals concluded that the EPA
reasonably interpreted the term “reservation” only
after reviewing the use of the term in a variety of other
federal statutes, as well as the text of the Act and the
term’s “ordinary or natural meaning,” Smith v. United
States, 508 U.S. 228, 228 (1993). See Pet. App. 22a-24a.
The court correctly concluded that the varying defini-

10

tions of “reservation” in the U.S. Code “lay to waste
petitioners’ argument” that the term is susceptible of
only one meaning. /d. at 24a. Further, noting the many
statutory provisions in whick Congress has expressly
defined the term “reservation,” the court of appeals
properly reasoned that Congress could have limited the
term as petitioners suggest, but did not do so. /bid.

Petitioners’ argument (Pet. 17) that “reservation”
must be given the meaning that the EPA had pre-
viously given the term under the PSD program is also
off the mark. Petitioners argue that Congress was
presumably aware of the definition used under that
program and implicitly adopted that definition by not
expressly rejecting it. That argument stands Con-
gress’s decision not to define “reservation” on its head.
If Congress had wanted to mandate a particular de-
finition of reservation, it could have done so; instead,
Congress chose to entrust the EPA with that task.
Moreover, to the extent Congress should be presumed
to have been aware of the definition that the EPA had
given “reservation” under the PSD program, Congress
also should be presumed to have been aware of the
broader definition that Congress and the courts had
given the term in a variety of contexts, see pp. 8-9,
supra. There is no reason to assume that Congress by
its silence intended to adopt the narrower definition
rather than the broader one.

Petitioners are also mistaken in asserting (Pet. 17-18)
that the court of appeals’ holding regarding the mean-
ing of “reservation” must be rejected because it is
“tantamount” to a conclusion that Congress gave the
EPA discretion to decide what lands Tribes could re-
designate. Congress, not the EPA, endowed both
States and Tribes with the redesignation power, which
Tribes can exercise for reservations and for other areas

1]

over which they can show jurisdiction. See, e.g., 42
U.S.C. 7474(c), 7601(d). To the extent that petitioners
quarrel with the “authority that the CAA grants to
states and tribes to redesignate clean air areas within
their respective jurisdictions” (Pet. 14-15), their quarrel
is not with the EPA but with Congress.*

Petitioners’ contention that the EPA’s interpretation
of “reservation” has “stripped from the states the
authority they previously possessed to redesignate
[trust] lands” (Pet. 13) is also incorrect. As the court of
appeals recognized (Pet. App. 25a), trust lands are
Indian country, and federal law generally prohibits
States from exercising regulatory authority in Indian
country unless Congress has specifically authorized
such action, California v. Cabazon Band of Mission
Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 207, 216 & n.18 (1987). Thus,
even if Tribes could not redesignate trust lands, States
generally would not have the authority to do so.* See
42 U.S.C. 7601(d)(4) (EPA may directly administer
provisions of the Act for which it determines that
Indian Tribes should not be treated as identical to

° Petitioners’ related assertion (Pet. 15) that the EPA’s inter-
pretation gives “tribal governments unbridled ability to impose
Class I standards affecting vast areas of a sovereign state” is like-
wise misdirected. Air pollution regulation necessarily has extra-
territorial effects. Just as actions by Tribes may affect adjacent
States, actions by States may affect both adjacent tribal lands and
other States. Congress recognized those facts and expressly
provided a process under which the EPA would resolve dis-
putes between Tribes and States over proposed redesignatiens. 42
U.S.C, 7474(e).

4 Indeed, petitioners acknowledge that “the Act has never been
understood as granting to states regulatory authority over sources
within their boundaries that states could not otherwise regulate
under state law.” Pet. 23.

12

States). Moreover, because trust lands ordinarily are
subject to tribal jurisdiction under general principles of
federal Indian law, they would be “other areas within
the tribe’s jurisdiction” under Section 301(d)(2)(B) if
they were not “reservation[s].” Consequently, eligible
Tribes would have authority to administer the Act in
trust lands even if petitioners were correct that trust
lands are not properly considered “reservation{s].’”
Finally, petitioners erroneously argue (Pet. 18-19)
that the court of appeals should not have accorded
Chevron deference to the EPA’s interpretation of
“reservation” because the interpretation raises consti-
tutional problems. That argument is based on peti-
tioners’ mistaken assertion that the Secretary of the
Interior has “unreviewable discretion” to take lands
into trust. As an initial matter, any constitutional pro-
blem that might be raised by the Secretary’s authority
to take land into trust has no bearing on the wholly
separate question whether the EPA has properly
interpreted “reservation” in the CAA. In any event,
there is no constitutional problem, because the Secre-
tary does not have “unreviewable discretion” to take

° Petitioners label as “inexplicable” (Pet. 18 n.13) the court
of appeals’ conclusion that Tribes are authorized by Section
301(d)(2)(B) to administer the Act with respect to lands under
their jurisdiction that are located outside reservation boundaries.
Section 301(d)(2)(B), however, plainly provides that Tribes may be
treated as States with respect to both lands “within the exterior
boundaries of the reservation” and “other areas within the tribe’s
jurisdiction.” 42 U.S.C. 7601(d)(2)(B). As the court of appeals
explained (Pet. App. 26a-28a), and petitioners now appear to
acknowledge (Pet. 18 n.13), Section 164(c), 42 U.S.C. 7474(c), does
not provide otherwise. Petitioners’ current argument, which relies
on Section 164(a), 42 U.S.C. 7474(a), is also misplaced, because it
rests on the incorrect premise that States have general authority
over Indian lands.

13

land into trust. The Secretary’s discretion is con-
strained by constitutionally adequate standards. See
United States v. Roberts, 185 F.3d 1125, 1136-1137 (10th
Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1960 (2000). And
Interior Department regulations expressly “permit[]
judicial review [of the Secretary’s decision] before
transfer of title to the United States.” 61 Fed. Reg.
18,082 (1996); see 25 C.F.R. 151.12. See also McAlpine
v. United States, 112 F.3d 1429, 1482-1435 (10th Cir.)
(Secretary’s decision to take land into trust is subject to
judicial review under the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA) because the standards set out in 25 C.F.R.
151.10 provide adequate law to apply), cert. denied, 522
U.S. 984 (1997)."

b. Petitioners also err in contending (Pet. 21-22) that
the holding of the court of appeals conflicts with the

6 Petitioners rely (Pet. 16) on South Dakota v. Department of
the Interior, 69 F.3d 878 (8th Cir. 1995), which held Section 5 of the
Indian Reorganization Act unconstitutional under the nondelega-
tion doctrine. That decision, however, was vacated by this Court
and remanded to the Secretary in light of the regulations cited in
the text following this note. See Department of the Interior v.
South Dakota, 519 U.S. 919 (1996).

7 In Florida Department of Business Regulation v. Depart-
ment of the Interior, 768 F.2d 1248 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S.
1011 (1986), the Eleventh Circuit held that the Secretary’s decision
to take land into trust was not reviewable under the APA, but that
decision predates the current regulatory scheme, which (as we
have explained above) provides additional standards to guide the
Secretary’s discretion and expressly notes that there is judicial
review of the Secretary’s decision. The regulatory framework is
currently in the process of further refinement: The Department of
the Interior has issued a proposed rule to revise 25 C.F.R. Part 151
to clarify further the process and standards that the Secretary
applies in implementing her authority to accept title to land in
trust. See 64 Fed. Reg. 17,574 (1999).

14

decision of the Ninth Circuit in Arizona v. EPA, 151
F.3d 1205 (1998), as amended, 170 F.3d 870 (1999). The
Arizona case did not address either the validity of the
TAR or the proper interpretation of Section 301(d).
Nor did the court of appeals in Arizona hold that
tribal trust lands could not constitute “reservation(s]”
under the CAA. The court held only that there
was insufficient evidence in the record to determine
whether certain parcels of land had been “declared to
be reservations by Act of Congress or that these par-
cels ha{d] been added to the Middle Verde reservation
by proclamation of the Secretary of the Interior pur-
suant to the Indian Reorganization Act.” 151 F.3d at
1210-1211. The court said nothing about whether those
parcels might otherwise be reservations and, indeed,
“remand[ed] to EPA, without prejudice to the parties,
to determine whether the parcels are reservations for
purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 7474(c).” 170 F.3d at 870.

2. a. Contrary to petitioners’ further contention
(Pet. 22-26), the court of appeals correctly determined
that Section 301(d)(2) delegates authority to eligible
Tribes to administer the CAA on fee lands within reser-
vation boundaries.

This Court has made clear that Congress may, by
statute, delegate federal authority to a Tribe. Mazurie,
419 U.S. at 554. The first clause of the second sentence
of Section 301(d)(2) (which authorizes the EPA to treat
eligible Tribes as States), together with Section
301(d)(2)(B) (which establishes Tribai authority over air
resources on all lands within the exterior boundaries of
a reservation), make clear the meaning of Section
301(d)(2): The EPA is authorized to treat an otherwise
eligible Indian Tribe as a State for programs governing
any air resources within the exterior boundaries of a
reservation, without the need for further inquiry by

15

EPA into the Tribe’s inherent authority over those re-
sources. See 42 U.S.C. 7601(d). As the court of appeals
explained (Pet. App. 13a), the “statute’s clear distinc-
tion between areas ‘within the exterior boundaries of
the reservation’ and ‘other areas within the tribe’s
jurisdiction’ carries with it the implication that Con-
gress considered the areas within the exterior boun-
daries of a tribe’s reservation to be per se within the
tribe’s jurisdiction.”

As the court of appeals also noted (Pet. App. 13a-
14a), this interpretation furthers the CAA’s purpose “to
ensure effective enforcement of clean air standards” by
avoiding a “‘checkerboard’ pattern of regulation within
a reservation’s boundaries,” which would be proble-
matic because of the high mobility and area-wide effects
of air pollutants. See also 59 Fed. Reg. at 43,959. The
court of appeals’ conclusion is further supported by the
drafting history of Section 301(d), because the phrase
“within the exterior boundaries of the reservation” was
substituted for the language in the bill as originally
introduced—“within the area of the tribal government’s
jurisdiction.” See Pet. App. 14a-15a.

In reaching its conclusion, the court of appeals cor-
rectly relied on this Court’s decisions in Mazurie, 419
U.S. at 556-557, and Rehner, 463 U.S. at 728-729, in
which this Court “found an express delegation despite
the absence of any ‘we hereby delegate’ language in the
statute.” Pet. App. 18a. In Mazurie and Rehner, this
Court “did not find any precise language of delegation
in the disputed statute, but, rather, rested on the impli-
cation inherent in recognizing the power of tribes to
adopt an ordinance pertinent to liquor transactions on
Indian country.” Jbid. Similarly, in reliance on those
cases, the court of appeals here properly found in the
CAA “an express congressivnal delegation from the

16

implication inherent in the distinction between areas
‘within the exterior boundaries of the reservation’ and
‘other areas within the tribe’s jurisdiction.’” Jbid. The
contrary reading advanced by petitioners would render
this careful formulation superfluous. Had Congress
intended that Tribes have jurisdiction only where they
could demonstrate inherent jurisdiction, Congress could
easily have so provided, without resort to the more
complex either/or formulation employed in Section
301(d). Indeed, as we have noted, that formulation was
substituted for one based on “the tribal government’s
jurisdiction” that was in an earlier version of the bill.
Petitioners incorrectly contend (Pet. 22-23, 26) that
CAA Section 116, 42 U.S.C. 7416, precludes Section
301(d)(2) from constituting a delegation to eligible
Tribes of authority over fee lands within reservation
boundaries.* Section 116 preserves the ability of States
to adopt and enforce under state law air pollution
standards that are more stringent than those required
under the CAA. Section 116 thus serves the dual
purpose of preserving state police power to protect
public health and welfare and ensuring that state
exercise of that power is consistent with otherwise

8 42 U.S.C. 7416 provides, in relevant part, that “nothing
in this chapter shall preclude or deny the right of any State
* * * to adopt or enforce (1) any standard or limitation respecting
emissions of air pollutants or (2) any requirement respecting
control or abatement of air pollution; except that if an emission
standard or limitation is in effect under an applicable imple-
mentation plan or under section 7411 or section 7412 of this title,
such State * * * may not adopt or enforce any emission standard
or limitation which is less stringent than the standard or limitation
under such plan or section.”

17

applicable federal law.’ Section 116, however, does not
grant States authority to regulate air pollution activity
in Indian country, which includes fee lands within re-
servation boundaries.

Section 116 is silent on the question of geographical
jurisdiction. Thus, Section 116 assumes and is subject
to the same geographic jurisdictional limitations on
state authority that apply to other provisions of the
Act. Nothing in the Act gives States authority over
lands within Indian country. And, as we have ex-
plained, absent delegation by Congress, States do not
generally have comprehensive authority over such
lands. See Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 207, 216 n.18; White
Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980);
p. 11, supra. In situations in which a Tribe does not
have EPA approval to implement the Act, the
KPA—not the State—generally implements the CAA
in Indian country. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. 7601(d)(4).”

b. Finally, petitioners argue (Pet. 24) that the Ninth
Circuit has, in their view, “embraced an approach” to
delegation questions that “conflicts with the approach”
taken by the court of appeals in this case. Petitioners
assert (Pet. 25) that, if the Ninth Circuit were faced

9 See 136 Cong. Rec. 36,077 (1990) (“Consistent with the
general provisions of section 116 of the Clean Air Act, the con-
ferees understand that a State may establish additional more
stringent permitting requirements, but a State may not establish
permit requirements that are inconsistent with the national per-
mitting requirements of this act, including this title.”) (discussing
Section 506(a), an analogous provision within the Title V operating
permit program added by the 1990 Amendments).

10 We recognize that, in some situations, States may exercise
regulatory authority in Indian country under state law. If a State
has such authority, Section 116 preserves the State’s ability to
implement more stringent air pollution controls.

18

with the question whether Section 301(d)(2) constitutes
a delegation to Tribes, the Ninth Circuit “would dis-
agree” with the conclusion by the D.C. Circuit that it
does.

The Ninth Circuit, however, has granted rehearing
en banc in the case on which petitioners rely, Bugenig
v. Hoopa Valley Tribe, 229 F.3d 1210 (2000), rehearing
en banc granted (Feb. 28, 2001). In any event, that
case concerns the question whether the Hoopa-Yurok
Settlement Act of 1988 granted the Hoopa Valley Tribe
authority over a particular parcel of reservation land
that was owned in fee by a non-Indian. The question
whether CAA Section 301(d)(2) constitutes a delegation
to Tribes is not before the Ninth Circuit. Indeed, as
petitioners themselves point out (Pet. 12 n.9), the
Section 301(d)(2) question could not come before the
Ninth Circuit. See 42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1). Thus, there is
no present conflict of decisions, and the Ninth Circuit’s
resolution of Bugenig, whatever its result, will not
create a conflict that warrants this Court’s review. See
Black v. Cutter Labs., 351 U.S. 292, 297 (1956) (Court |
“reviews judgments, not statements in opinions”).

CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted.
BARBARA D. UNDERWOOD
Acting Solicitor General

JOHN CRUDEN
Acting Assistant Attorney
General

CYNTHIA A. DREW
Attorney

MARCH 2001

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386014_1310%3A4. Public record. Not legal advice.
