# Opposition Brief — Appalachian Power Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2001
- **Citation:** 532 U.S. 903

## Text

i
Y

Nos. 00-445, 00-632 and 00-6

a
—

Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED

2 4d

dN 4 2B

In

Supreme Court o

The CLERK

f the United States

+

STATE OF MICHIGAN, et al.,

UNITED STATES

Petitioners,

ENVIRONMENTAL

PROTECTION AGENCY,

Respondent.

*

On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari
To The United States Court Of Appeals
For The District Of Columbia Circuit

*

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
OF ENVIRONMENTAL INTERVENORS

¢

Davip W. MARSHALL
(Counsel of Record)
Clean Air Task Force

P.O. Box 950
Henniker, NH-03242
(603) 428-8114

and

ANN BREWSTER WEEKS

Clean Air Task Force

c/o Grants Management
Associates

77 Summer Street, 8th Floor

Boston, MA 02110
(617) 292-0234

Counsel for Environmental
Intervenors

Davip G. HaAwkINs

JoHN D. WALKE

Natural Resources Defense
Council

1200 New York Avenue, NW
Suite 400

Washington, D.C. 20005

(202) 289-6868

Howarp A. LEARNER

JoHN N. Moore

Environmental Law &
Policy Center of the
Midwest

35 East Wacker Drive,
Suite 1300

Chicago, IL 60601

(312) 673-6500

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., (800) 225-6964

OR CALL COL

LECT (402) 342-2831

i
RESTATEMENT OF QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Whether EPA may, under Sections 110(a)(2)(D) and
110(k)(5) of the Clean Air Act, consider cost as one of
several factors in determining the amount of emis-
sions reductions that a state must make to adequately
mitigate emissions that are significantly contributing
to another state’s failure to attain a national ambient
air quality standard.

Whether EPA’s action in considering cost as a factor
under Sections 110(a)(2)(D) and 110(k)(5) represents a
constitutionally permissible exercise of the authority
delegated to EPA by Congress.

1.

ii
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

The following Parties were petitioners in the consoli-
dated proceeding before the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit, the judgment in
which review is sought.

In No. 98-1497, State of Michigan, Michigan
Department of Environmental Quality and State
of West Virginia, Division of Environmental
Protection.

In No. 98-1588, State of Ohio.

In No. 98-1596, Commonwealth of Virginia.

In No. 98-1615, State of Alabama, ex. rel. Bill Pryor,
Attorney General.

In No. 98-1617, State of Indiana and Indiana
Department of Environmental Management.

In No. 98-1619, State of North Carolina.

In No. 98-1621, State of South Carolina.

In No. 98-1499, United Mine Workers of America.

In No. 98-1500, Appalachian Power Company, et al.,
consisting of:

Appalachian Power Company;

Baltimore Gas and Electric Company (now
referred to as Constellation Power Source
Generation, Inc.);

Carolina Power & Light Company;

Central and South West Services, Inc.:

Central Power and Light Company;
Public Service Company of Oklahoma;
Southwestern Electric Power Company;
West Texas Utilities Company;

Central Illinois Light Company;

Central Illinois Public Service Company;
ClINergy;

Columbus Southern Power Company;

iii
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS - Continued

Commonwealth Edison Company;
Consumers Energy Company;
Dayton Power and Light Company, The;
Detroit Edison Company, The;
Duke Energy Company;
Florida Power Corporation;
Illinois Power Company;
Indiana Michigan Power Company;
Jacksonville Electric Authority;
Kentucky Power Company;
Kentucky Utilities Company;
Louisville Gas and Electric Company;
Madison Gas and Electric Company;
Minnesota Power Company;
Monongahela Power Company, d/b/a Allegheny
Power System, Inc.
Northern Indiana Public Service Company;
Oglethorpe Power Corporation;
Ohio Power Company;
Ohio Valley Electric Corporation;
Oklahoma Gas & Electric Company;
Otter Tail Power Company;
PacifiCorp Electric Operations;
Plains Electric Generation & Transmission
Cooperative, Inc.;
Potomac Edison Company, The, d/b/a
Allegheny Power System, Inc.;
Potomac Electric Power Company;
Public Service Company of New Mexico;
Salt River Project;
South Carolina Electric & Gas Company;
Southern Company:
Alabama Power Company;
Georgia Power Company;
Gulf Power Company;

iv

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS - Continued

Mississippi Power Company;
Savannah Electric and Power Company;
Tampa Electric Power Company;
Tucson Electric Company;
Union Electric Company;
Virginia Power;
West Penn Power Company, d/b/a Allegheny
Power System, Inc.;
Edison Electric Institute;
National Rural Electric Cooperative Association; and
American Public Power Association.

In No. 98-1500, Duquesne Light Company.

In No. 98-1501, Midwest Ozone Group.

In No. 98-1502, West Virginia Chamber of Commerce.

In No. 98-1504, National Mining Association.

In No. 98-1518, West Virginia Manufacturers
Association.

In No. 98-1556, City of Springfield, Missouri through
the Board of Public Utilities, d/b/a City Utilities
of Springfield, Missouri.

In No. 98-1567, Kansas City Power & Light
Company;

St. Joseph Light & Power Company;
The Empire District Electric Company;
Utilicorp United, Inc.;

City of Independence, Missouri; and
Associated Electric Cooperative, Inc.

In No. 98-1573, Indianapolis Power & Light
Company.

In No. 98-1585, The Alabama Forestry Association,
Inc., by and through its section The Alabama
Pulp and Paper Counsel.

In No. 98-1590, Dairyland Power Cooperative.

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS - Continued

In No. 98-1598, South Carolina Public Service
Authority, d/b/a Santee Cooper.
In No. 98-1601, American Municipal Power-Ohio.
In No. 98-1602, Fort James Operating Company;
Gilman Paper Company;
Rayonier, Inc.;
Savannah Electric & Power Company;
Southeast Paper Manufacturing Company; and
International Paper Company.
In No. 98-1608, PP&L, Inc.
In No. 98-1609, Council of Industrial Boiler Owners.
In No. 98-1611, Network for Workable Air Policies.
In No. 98-1616, Georgia Coalition for Sound
Environmental Policy, Inc.
In No. 98-1618, Interstate Natural Gas Association of
America.
In No. 99-1070, Appalachian Power Company, et al.
In No. 99-1093, Wisconsin Paper Council;
Madison Gas and Electric Company;
Northern States Power Company;
Wisconsin Public Service Corporation; and
Wisconsin Manufacturers & Commerce.

The following Party was a Respondent in the consoli-
dated proceeding before the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit, the judgment in
which review is sought.

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.

The following Parties were Intervenors in the consoli-
dated proceeding before the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit, the judgment in
which review is sought.

Natural Resources Defense Council;
Environmental Law & Policy Center of the Midwest;

vi
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS - Continued

American Lung Association of Metropolitan
Chicago;

Appalachian Mountain Club;

Citizens Action Coalition of Indiana, Inc.;

Clean Air Council;

Environmental Defense Fund (now referred to as
Environmental Defense);

Group Against Smog and Pollution;

Hoosier Environmental Council;

Illinois Environmental Council;

Izaak Walton League of America;

Legal Environmental Assistance Foundation;

Michigan Environmental Council;

National Environmental Trust;

Natural Resources Council of Maine;

New York Public Interest Research Group;

Ohio Citizen Action;

Ohio Environmental Council;

U.S. Public Interest Research Group; and

Wisconsin’s Environmental Decade Institute.

State of New York;

State of Connecticut;

State of Maine;

Commonwealth of Massachusetts
State of New Hampshire;
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania;
State of Rhode Island; and

State of Vermont.

State of Maryland.
State of Wisconsin.

Province of Ontario, Canada;
Norman W. Sterling, Minister of the Environment,
Province of Ontario;

i)

vii

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS - Continued

Charles A. Harnick, Attorney General of the
Province of Ontario; and
Christopher Carl Haromy.

Appalachian Power Company, et al.
(listed in paragraph 1. supra).

,

Dairyland Power Cooperative.
Virginia Manufacturers Association.

South Carolina Public Service Authority,
d/b/a Santee Cooper.

Detroit Public Lighting;

Grand Haven Board of Light and Power;

Holland Board of Public Works;

Lansing Board of Water and Light;

Marquette Board of Light and Power;

Michigan South Central Power Agency; and

City of Wyandotte Department of Municipal Service.

GPU Generation, Inc.

American Gas Association.

Interstate Natural Gas Association of America.
Network for Workable Air Policies.

Business Council of Alabama.

Michigan Manufacturers Association.

Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc.;
KeySpan Generation LLC;

Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation;
PECO Energy Company;

Public Service Electric and Gas Company;
Rochester Gas & Electric Corporation; and
PG&E Generating.

Viii
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS - Continued

Natural Gas Supply Association; and
Sempra Energy.

Associated Industries of Massachusetts;
New England Council; and
New Jersey State Chamber of Commerce.

PP&L, Inc.;
Atlantic City Electric Company; and
Delmarva Power & Light Company.

The following were Amici in the consolidated pro-
ceeding before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit, the judgment in which
review is sought.

Government of Canada.
North Carolina Citizens for Business and Industry.

South Carolina Chamber of Commerce;

Environmental Management Association of
South Carolina; and

South Carolina Manufacturers Alliance.

Toledo Metropolitan Area Council of Governments.

Ne

ix

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| Page
RESTATEMENT OF QUESTIONS PRESENTED...... i
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS. .............:... ii
SEs Ge Reis

5 Judge Sentelle dissented, as he had on the merits. Judges
Tatel and Garland did not participate in considering whether to
grant rehearing en banc. Order Denying Reh’g En Banc in No.
98-1497 and consolidated cases, June 22, 2000, reprinted at Ind.
Pet., App. at 64a.

REASONS FOR REJECTING THE
PETITIONS FOR REVIEW

I. THIS COURT SHOULD DENY CERTIORARI ON
THE “SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION” QUES-
TIONS.

The only question raised by the Petitions of Ohio and
Michigan, and the primary one raised by that of Industry,
is whether - or how much — EPA may consider cost as a
factor in finding that certain sources are producing NOx
emissions that “contribute significantly” to nonattain-
ment in another state within the meaning of Section
110(a)(2)(D)(i)(D of the Act. As discussed infra at Section
I.B., Congress did not define the term “contribute signifi-
cantly.” Therefore, EPA’s interpretation of the term is
entitled to considerable weight under the settled law of
this Court, and should be upheld unless it is impermissi-
ble. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842-45
(1984) (“Chevron”). In other words, this is a case that is
properly decided under “step two” of the Chevron anal-
ysis, not “step one.” The D.C. Circuit’s decision finding
permissible EPA’s inclusion of cost in the factors consid-
ered in determining the significance level of upwind state
contributions to downwind nonattainment is completely
consistent with the established case law of this Court and
the Courts of Appeals.

As the D.C. Circuit noted, in the proceeding below
neither the State nor Industry Petitioners could make up
their minds as to whether or how Congress intended EPA
to consider cost in determining what contributions to
nonattainment are “significant.” See Ind. Pet., App. at

17a-20a. Initially, the States argued that EPA could con-
sider cost, but could not make it the controlling factor in
determining significance. Id. However, “[a]t oral argu-
ment, counsel for the States abandoned this position and
decided that the statute flatly prohibits EPA from consid-
ering costs at all.” Ind. Pet., App. at 18a-19a. On the other
hand, Industry initially argued below that EPA could
consider only “air quality impacts,” not costs. Industry
presented a different position at oral argument, however,
claiming that while EPA could not consider costs under
Section 110(a)(2)(D) of the Act (in determining whether a
SIP prohibits emissions from sources that “significantly
contribute” to nonattainment), it nevertheless could con-
sider costs under Section 110(k)(5) (in determining
whether a SIP is “adequate”). Ind. Pet., App. at 20a.

Petitioners still do not agree on how Congress
intended EPA to treat costs in issuing a “SIP call” under
Sections 110(a)(2)(D) and 110(k)(5) of the Act, presenting
three inconsistent positions to this Court. Industry’s Peti-
tion argues that EPA may consider cost in determining
the proper level of emission reductions required to cor-
rect an interstate pollution transport problem, but only
under Section 110(k)(5)’s adequate mitigation language
and not under Section 110(a)(2)(D)’s significant contribu-
tion language. Ind. Pet. at 13, 18. The State Petitions now
contain two distinct variations of the cost argument. The
Michigan Petition argues that EPA cannot consider cost at
all. Michigan Pet. at 12-13, 19. On the other hand, the
Ohio Petition appears to argue that cost may be a factor
in EPA’s determination of what contributions are signifi-
cant, but only a subordinate factor. Ohio Pet. at 11, 15.
Different petitioners have the right, of course, to raise

10

different theories of their case. But in this case these
disparate interpretations raise the obvious question - if
Congressional intent here is so clear, then why can’t
Petitioners agree on what that intent was?

A. The D.C. Circuit’s Holding that EPA’s Inter-
pretation of “Significant Contribution” is Per-
missible Does Not Conflict with the Decisions
of this Court or with Other Decisions of the
D.C. Circuit.

Petitioners claim that the D.C. Circuit’s decision
upholding EPA’s consideration of cost as a factor in deter-
mining when a contribution to downwind nonattainment
is “significant” conflicts with various decisions of this
Court and other decisions of the D.C. Circuit. Petitioners
are wrong.

First, Petitioners claim that the lower court’s decision
conflicts with the decision of this Court in Union Elec. Co.
v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246 (1976) (“Union Electric”). See Michi-
gan Pet. at 14-19. However, Union Electric is not on point
here. In that case, this Court was faced with a polluter’s
challenge to EPA’s approval of a SIP on the grounds that
EPA was required to consider whether the state’s choice
of controls in the SIP were economically or technologi-
cally infeasible. This Court upheld EPA’s position® that it
was not authorized to reject a SIP on such grounds,
finding that Congress had set out minimum requirements
that a SIP must meet in order to obtain EPA approval, and

6 The Court noted that “we have previously accorded great
deference to the Administrator’s construction of the Clean Air
Act [citations omitted].” Union Elec., 427 U.S. at 256.

11

that the three-year deadline for achieving the NAAQS set
by Congress “leaves no room for claims of technological
or economic infeasibility.” Union Elec., 427 U.S. at 256-260.
The Court stated that the Act’s minimum compliance
requirements are of a “technology-forcing” nature, and
“are expressly designed to force regulated sources to
develop pollution control devices that might at the time
appear to be economically or technologically infeasible.”
Id. at 257. The Court also made clear, however, that as
long as a state plan would achieve attainment and meet
the minimum requirements of the Act, the states were
free to choose particular measures needed to accomplish
that task, and were free to consider infeasibility claims in
so doing. Id. at 260-265. Indeed, the Court stated explic-
itly that “we do not hold that claims of infeasibility are
never of relevance in the formulation of an implementa-
tion plan... .” Id. at 266.

The instant case is entirely different from Union Elec-
tric. Neither the EPA nor the Court is faced here, as the
Court was in Union Electric, with the implications of the
“technology-forcing” character of the Act’s attainment
requirements. We are not concerned here with the ques-
tion of whether all measures that are or could be con-
tained in an implementation plan will in the aggregate be
adequate to achieve timely attainment of the ozone
NAAQS,” or whether additional measures that may not

7 As the Court recognized in Union Electric, “the [Act does]
allow claims of technological and economic infeasibility to be
raised in situations where consideration of such claims will not
substantially interfere with the primary congressional purpose
of prompt attainment of the national standards.” Union Elec.,
427 US. at 266.

Ae aaa

12

be technologically or economically feasible must be
included in such a plan.

Attainment of the NAAQS in a state impacted by
emissions transported across its borders requires a combi-
nation of in-state and upwind state emission control mea-
sures. Section 110(a)(2)(D) does not place the entire
burden of downwind attainment on upwind states,
because it does not require the elimination of all upwind
emissions necessary for a downwind state to achieve
attainment.§ If it did, Union Electric might well prohibit
EPA from considering cost in determining the level of
required upwind emission reductions, at least if the effect
of such consideration would be the failure to achieve
downwind attainment. Here, however, Congress has
authorized EPA to require the elimination of some — but
not all - upwind emissions, specifically those that “con-
tribute significantly” to downwind attainment problems.
In this sense, Section 110(a)(2)(D)(i)(I) is similar to other
provisions in the Act that specifically target certain emis-
sions or emission sources that represent but a portion of
the overall reductions necessary to achieve attainment. In
the context of such specific implementation measures,
EPA has often been permitted, and in some cases,

8 EPA so stated in the NOx SIP Call Rule, noting that even
after implementation of its rulemaking reducing upwind
emissions, some downwind areas will require additional local
reductions. See, 63 Fed. Reg. 57,356, 57,374, 57,377, 57,403.

13

required, to consider issues of technological and eco-
nomic feasibility, or of cost or cost-effectiveness.?

Furthermore, unlike Union Electric, this case does not
involve a claim that a state’s choice of emission controls
in its implementation plan is technologically or economi-
cally infeasible. Indeed, this case does not deal with a
state’s choice of emission controls at all. Rather, this case
involves EPA’s interpretation of its own authority to find
that a state has failed to control interstate emissions as
mandated by Congress and to impose a remedy for that
failure.!° Finally, the present case does not deal with
claims of technical or economic infeasibility, but rather

® For cases in which the D.C. Circuit has found that EPA can
lawfully consider costs in Clean Air Act rulemaking, see, e.g.,
George E. Warren Corp. v. EPA, 159 F.3d 616 (D.C. Cir. 1998),
amended on other grounds, 164 F.3d 676 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
(examining Clean Air Act Section 211, 42 U.S.C. § 7545,
providing for the regulation of reformulated gasoline); NRDC v.
EPA, 937 F.2d 641 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (upholding EPA’s use of cost-
benefit analysis to determine that a particular polluting source ©
should not be classified as “major” under Section 165 of the Act,
42 U.S.C. § 7475).

Congress also has specifically allowed or required EPA to
consider costs in connection with a variety of specific emission
reduction measures; see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(3)(A)(i) (mobile
source standards); 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(2)(B) (fuel additive
regulation); 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1), (b)(1) (certain new stationary
source standards); 42 U.S.C. § 7547(a)(3) (nonroad vehicle
compliance deadlines); 42 U.S.C. § 7571(b) (aircraft compliance
deadlines); and 42 U.S.C. § 7511b(b)(3) and (4), (e)(1) (certain
control techniques guidelines for VOCs).

10 This Court in Union Electric explicitly did not reach the
question of whether EPA could consider factors of economic or
technical infeasibility in drafting its own implementation plan
where a state fails to do so. Union Elec., 427 U.S. at 261, n.7.

14

with issues of cost and cost-effectiveness.!! For all of the
above reasons, Union Electric does not conflict with the
lower court’s holding here.}2

The decision of the D.C. Circuit in this case further-
more does not conflict with other decisions of that
court.!3 First of all, contrary to the claims of Michigan
Petitioners, there is no conflict with American Trucking
Ass‘ns v. Browner, 175 F.3d 1027, modified on reh’g, 195 F.3d

11 In another Clean Air Act case presently before this Court,
American Trucking Ass’ns v. Browner, No. 99-1426, several
industry petitioners recently argued that Union Electric “never
mentions cost-benefit analysis,” and “could not be clearer that it
dealt only with ‘technological and economic infeasibility.’ ”
Reply Brief for Cross-Petitioners (ATA, et al.) in No. 99-1426, at
16-17 (Oct. 6, 2000) (citation omitted).

12 Several other opinions of this Court mentioned in
passing by Industry do not support its arguments here. See Ind.
Pet. at 16-17. First, Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204
(1988) was concerned with retroactive agency rulemaking under
the Medicare program, and is not relevant here because EPA’s
NOx SIP Call Rule is not retroactive rulemaking. Nor is
Industrial Union Dep’t v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607
(1980) of any assistance to Petitioners. In that case, a divided
Court struck down the Secretary of Labor’s proposed benzene
regulations, finding that “Congress was concerned, not with
absolute safety, but with the elimination of significant harm.” Id.
at 646. Indeed, the Court found that the statutory requirement
that the Secretary conduct “some cost-benefit analysis” prior to
setting a standard manifested the intention of Congress that the
Secretary must find a “significant risk of harm.” Id. at 644. The
Court clearly did not find that the Secretary could not consider
costs in setting a standard.

13 We note that there was not a close split of D.C. Circuit
judges in this case. Indeed, only a single judge would have
granted the petitions for en banc rehearing. Ind. Pet., App. at
64a-65a.

15

4 (D.C. Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S.Ct. 2003, 2193 (2000)
(Nos. 99-1426, 99-1257) (“ATA”), or Lead Indus. Ass’n v.
EPA, 647 F.2d 1130 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1042
(1980) (“Lead Industries”). Neither ATA nor Lead Industries
is relevant to the present case, as both were concerned
with the promulgation of NAAQS under Section 109 of the
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7409, not the implementation of the result-
ing standards.!4 These two cases are part of a long line of
D.C. Circuit cases that have consistently found that “[t]he
statute and its legislative history make clear that economic
considerations play no part in the promulgation of ambi-
ent air quality standards under Section 109.” Lead

14 The plain language of Section 109(b)(1) makes clear that
the NAAQS must be set “based on” “air quality criteria”
established under Section 108, 42 U.S.C. § 7408, and must be
“requisite to protect the public health.” 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1).
The air quality criteria, in turn, “shall accurately reflect the
latest scientific knowledge useful in indicating the kind and
extent of all identifiable effects on public health or welfare
which may be expected from the presence of such pollutant in
the ambient air, in varying quantities.” 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(2).
The Act’s legislative history provides clear evidence that
Congress intended EPA to be limited to public health
considerations when setting NAAQS. Thus, both the statute and
legislative history provide that the establishment of the
primary, health-based, NAAQS are confined to public health
considerations. See Brief of Cross-Respondent American Lung
Ass’n in ATA, No. 99-1426 (September 8, 2000). Further,
Congress has ratified this long-standing interpretation of EPA’s
authority to establish NAAQS through repeated legislative
proceedings over the past three decades in which it has
considered and rejected initiatives to provide for the
consideration of costs in establishing the NAAQS. See Brief of
Amici Curiae Environmental Defense, American Public Health
Association, et al. on Behalf of Cross-Respondents, in ATA No.
99-1426, at 5-15 (September 11, 2000).

16

Indus., 647 F.2d at 1148. 5ee also, e.g., American Petroleum
Inst. v. Costle, 665 F.2d 1176, 1185 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 1034 (19&2); NRDC v. EPA, 902 F.2d 962,
973 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1082 (1991); and
American Lung Ass’n v. EPA, 134 F.3d 388, 389 (D.C. Cir.
1998). Because Congress has often - both explicitly and
implicitly - authorized EPA to consider cost-related fac-
tors in implementing the NAAQS, cases such as ATA and
Lead Industries dealing with the use of such factors in
promulgating the NAAQS are simply not relevant to the
issues raised by Petitioners here.'5 The various D.C. Cir-
cuit opinions addressing when EPA may take cost into
consideration under different Clean Air Act provisions
hardly constitute the “hodge-podge” alleged by Industry.
See Ind. Pet. at 6. Rather, these cases divide along clear
lines - EPA cannot consicer costs when promulgating an
air quality standard, but may, and in some cases, must, do
so in implementing such a standard.'¢

15 See examples cited at footnote 9, supra. We also note that
Michigan, et al., argue that “EPA’s consideration of costs under
§ 110(a)(2)(D) is wholly incensistent with the position the EPA
adopted before this Court in the EPA’s petition for a writ of
certiorari in ATA.” Michigan Pet. at 8. But, in fact, EPA’s
positions in ATA and in this case are perfectly compatible: ATA
deals with the promulgation of the NAAQS under Section 109,
where consideration of costs has long and properly been
excluded, while the instant case deals with the implementation
of the NAAQS, where EPA’: consideration of costs have often
been upheld.

16 The D.C. Circuit’s opition in NRDC v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146,
1157 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en anc), referenced in the Industry
Petition at 7, was concerned with EPA’s establishment of limits
on source emissions of hazardous air pollutants under an earlier
version of Section 112 of the Act, not with the promulgation of
ambient air quality standards under Section 109.

17

The D.C. Circuit’s ruling here also does not conflict
with its decision in Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 51 F.3d 1053 (D.C.
Cir. 1995) (“Ethyl”), as argued by Industry. Ind. Pet. at
17-18. Ethyl dealt with Section 211(f)(4) of the Act, 42
U.S.C. § 7545(f)(4), authorizing EPA to grant a waiver
from the prohibition on the use of certain fuel additives if
the manufacturer could show that the additive “will not
cause or contribute to a failure of any emission device or
control system . . . to achieve compliance by the vehicle
with the emission standards.” EPA decided that Ethyl
Corporation had made the above showings, but neverthe-
less denied the waiver on the grounds that EPA could
consider other factors such as whether the waiver was
consistent with the public interest and the effects of the
additive on public health. Ethyl, 51 F.3d at 1054-55. Not-
ing that EPA had specifically determined that Ethyl Cor-
poration met the explicit statutory criteria, that EPA’s
waiver denial was inconsistent with its published guid-
ance and indeed that this was the first waiver case where
EPA had considered factors other than those set forth in
Section 211(f)(4), the D.C. Circuit held that given the
plain meaning of the statute, EPA erred in considering
those other factors. Ethyl, 51 F.3d at 1056, 1058. In this
case, Section 110(a)(2)(D) does not provide a set of exclu-
sive criteria that controls EPA’s determination of the level
of emissions that “significantly contribute” to downwind
nonattainment and must be “adequately mitigated”
under Section 110(k)(5). The use by Congress of these
undefined terms permits EPA discretion in interpreting
them, unlike the very explicit language in Section
211(f)(4) that the court in Ethyl determined provided EPA
with very little discretion.

18

B. EPA’s Consideration of Costs Under Sections
110(a)(2)(D) and 110(k)(5) Is Permissible Under
Established Case Law.

This is not a case where the lower court has commit-
ted a clear error of law on an important or novel legal
question. Rather, the “significant contribution” issue is
easily resolved under the well-established rules of statu-
tory construction set out in Chevron and its progeny. Since
Chevron, federal courts have used a two-part test to
review an agency’s construction of a statute that it
administers. This test is described in Chevron as follows:

If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end
of the matter; for the court, as well as the
agency, must give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the
court determines that Congress has not directly
addressed the precise question at issue, the
court does not simply impose its own construc-
tion on the statute. . . . Rather, if the statute is
silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific
issue, the question for the court is whether the
agency’s answer is based on a permissible con-
struction of the statute. [footnotes omitted].

Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. Furthermore, in examining
this second question, Chevron provides that the Court has
“long recognized that considerable weight should be
accorded to an executive department’s construction of a
statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer. . . . Id. at
844.

The issue raised by Petitioners in this case is whether
EPA may consider costs in carrying out its obligations to
ensure that SIPs adequately address interstate emissions

19

under Sections 110(a)(2)(D) and 110(k)(5) of the Act. Con-
gress has not defined the phrase “contribute signifi-
cantly” in Section 110(a)(2)(D). It has not defined when a
SIP is “substantially inadequate” or when a plan will
“mitigate adequately” interstate pollution transport
within the meaning of Section 110(k)(5). Nor has Con-
gress enumerated the factors that EPA must consider
when determining whether a state’s emissions contribute
significantly to downwind nonattainment or how much
emissions reduction is needed to mitigate adequately
such contributions. Congress clearly has not prohibited
EPA from considering cost factors in making either of
these determinations. As mentioned earlier, Petitioners’
inability to agree on whether and to what extent Con-
gress did intend EPA to consider costs in requiring
interstate emissions reductions pursuant to Sections
110(a)(2)(D) and 110(k)(5) of the Act speaks volumes to
the lack of any clear Congressional direction on this
issue. As the D.C. Circuit observed, “[a]gainst this back-
drop, it would be at the very least ironic for us to say that
there is ‘clear congressional intent to preclude consider-
ation of cost’ under § 110(a)(2)(D)” Ind. Pet., App. at 20a
(quoting NRDC v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146, 1163 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (en banc)). Because Congress has not directly
addressed the precise question of whether costs may be
considered under Sections 110(a)(2)(D) and 110(k)(5),
EPA’s resolution of that question is properly reviewed
under step two of Chevron.

While EPA’s interpretation of Sections 110(a)(2)(D)
and 110(k)(5) may not be the only possible one, it is a
reasonable one and therefore is permissible under Chev-
ron’s second step. 467 U.S. at 837. EPA considered a

20

variety of air-quality related factors,!” based on the most
sophisticated modeling available, in addition to the avail-
ability of cost-effective controls, in its multi-factor
approach to “significant contribution.” See 63 Fed. Reg.
57,356, 57,376-379. Cost was not the sole factor consid-
ered.

Furthermore, no one disputes that the failure of
many areas in the Eastern United States to attain the
ozone standard almost 30 years after it was first promul-
gated is due to contributions from both local (in-state)
and upwind (out-of-state) emissions sources.'* The basic
structure of Section 110(a)(2)(D) requires EPA to include
an assessment of the relative level of control efforts in the
upwind and downwind states as part of its determination
of whether a state’s contribution is significant. Unless
EPA were to interpret Section 110(a)(2)(D)(i)(I) as prohib-
iting all upwind emissions that impacted downwind non-
attainment in any way (an interpretation that no party
thus far has advocated in this case), EPA had to interpret
the Congressional prohibition of significantly contribut-
ing emissions in such a way that, among other things,
reasonably allocated responsibility between upwind and

17 EPA considered the following air quality factors:
“[t}he overall nature of the ozone problem .. . ;”

“the extent of the downwind nonattainment problems to
which the upwind State’s emissions are linked, including the
ambient impact of controls required under the CAA or
otherwise implemented in downwind areas;” and

“the ambient impact of the emissions from the upwind
State’s sources on the downwind nonattainment problems.” 63
Fed. Reg. 57,356, 57,376. See also 62 Fed. Reg. 60,318, 60,325.

18 See Ind. Pet. at 8-9; Ohio Pet. at 8.

ee

21

downwind states, and among different upwind states
themselves. EPA’s consideration of cost in this context
was a perfectly reasonable means to equitably allocate the
burden of emissions reductions among the numerous
states contributing to the problem.

If EPA did not consider costs and instead adopted a
“bright-line” emissions contribution test as urged by
some Petitioners,19 the economic burden of compliance
throughout the eastern United States could be quite dis-
parate. Such a test could mean that a downwind state that
had already adopted stringent controls would be forced
to adopt even more stringent controls while upwind
states could escape even basic - and much more cost-
effective — controls.2” On the other hand, if the “bright
line” emissions contribution level were set low enough,
the reverse could occur - that is, upwind states would
bear a disproportionate share of the emissions reductions
burden while downwind states would incur no respon-
sibility. Of course, the same disparities could occur
between different upwind states as well. In addressing
the implications of Petitioners’ arguments below, the D.C.
Circuit noted that “counsel eventually went so far as to
claim that if faced with two states, one of which could
eliminate all relevant emissions at a trivial cost, while the
other could eliminate none at a cost of less than $5000 a

19 See Ohio Pet. at 9.

20 Indeed, EPA found that additional downwind controls
would cost about $4300 per ton of NOx removed, while the
regional reductions required by EPA’s rule would cost only
approximately $1500 per ton removed. 63 Fed. Reg. 57,356,
57,379.

22

ton, EPA must mandate the same cutback for each.” Ind.
Pet., App. at 19a.

Petitioners provide absolutely no evidence that Con-
gress intended that EPA adopt such an approach to
addressing the problem of interstate transport under Sec-
tions 110(a)(2)(D) and 110(k)(5). Rather, Congress
intended quite the opposite. For example, when Congress
added one predecessor to Section 110(a)(2)(D), Senate
commenters noted that the new provisions were
“intended to equalize the positions of the States with
respect to interstate pollution,” and to ameliorate previ-
ously existing “distinct economic and competitive disad-
vantage[s].” S. Rep. No. 95-127 at 41-42, reprinted in 3
1977 Leg. Hist. 1415-16. Thus, factoring cost-effectiveness
into the assessment of significance allowed EPA to
respond to dual directives presented it by Congress: pro-
hibit all significant contribution, and take the equities of
the situation into account in allocating responsibility for
the ozone problem among different states in a region.

II. THERE ARE NO GROUNDS FOR A GRANT OF
CERTIORARI ON THE NON-DELEGATION DOC-
TRINE QUESTION

Industry Petitioners’ argument that this Court should
grant certiorari to review the D.C. Circuit’s decision on
the State Petitioners’ non-delegation doctrine challenge is
meritless. Industry Petitioners fail to identify any conflict
between the D.C. Circuit’s ultimate decision in Michigan
and the non-delegation jurisprudence of this Court, nor

siciasttasiaamiidaiiliiiliiiiciiial

23

do they identify any conflict within the D.C. Circuit’s
jurisprudence.?! |

A. There is No Conflict Between the D.C. Circuit's
Holding and This Court’s Non-Delegation Doc-
trine Jurisprudence.

Industry Petitioners, for the first time in this case,”
raise their claim that EPA’s analysis of significant contri-
bution is a constitutionally-impermissible exercise by the
Agency of the authority delegated to it by Congress. The
D.C. Circuit determined that EPA’s significant contribu-
tion analysis did not represent a constitutionally imper-
missible exercise of Agency discretion, and therefore did
not run afoul of the nondelegation doctrine, because the
Agency’s assessment of significance was confined by sev-
eral technical threshold determinations, and because the
resulting rule was limited in its scope. Ind. Pet., App. at
27a-28a.

While Industry baldly claims that the D.C. Circuit
has “turned upside-down the principle of unconstitu-
tional delegation,” they completely fail to describe any
conflict between the D.C. Circuit’s ultimate decision on
this point and this Court’s nondelegation jurisprudence.
Indeed, it is Industry Petitioners (and the State Peti-
tioners in the case below) who attempt to “turn the

21 Petitioners do not assert that any conflict exists between
the D.C. Circuit’s Michigan holding and decisions of any other
Circuit Courts of Appeals.

22 Industry Petitioners did not raise their nondelegation
argument before the D.C. Circuit; State Petitioners did raise the
issue below, but do not seek certiorari on that point.

24

nondelegation doctrine on its head” by using it to analyze
Agency actions under delegated authority, rather than to
examine the Congressional delegation of authority itself.
The nondelegation doctrine consistently has been used by
this Court as a constraint on Congressional, not adminis-
trative action.2? Moreover, the Court is currently review-
ing the D.C. Circuit’s application of the non-delegation
doctrine in the context of the Clean Air Act. ATA, No.
99-1257.

Assuming, arguendo, that it was appropriate for the
D.C. Circuit to apply the nondelegation doctrine to
analyze the Agency’s action in issuing the NOx SIP Call,
it is clear that the D.C. Circuit’s Michigan holding is
consistent with this Court’s jurisprudence. This Court’s
nondelegation cases recognize that “in our increasingly
complex society, replete with ever changing and more
technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job
absent an ability to delegate power under broad general
directives.” Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372
(1989). The interstate transport of ozone pollution and its
NOx precursor absolutely is the kind of complex techni-
cal problem for which the delegation to an agency with
substantial technical and scientific expertise is appropri-
ate.

23 See e.g., Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 771 (1996);
Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 165 (1991); Mistretta v. United
States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989); J.W. Hampton & Co. v. United
States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) (the purpose of the nondelegation
doctrine is to ensure that important policy choices are made by
Congress, and that Congress has provided “intelligible
principles” to guide agency action).

25

Furthermore, this Court’s analysis has never ended at
the question whether the delegation of authority to an
agency is broad or limited — the Court looks to the overall
scope of the delegated authority and the statutory context
in which the rules under it are developed. Indeed, agency
actions under statutes including broad delegations of
authority have consistently been upheld. Loving v. United
States, 517 U.S. 748, 771 (1996) (citing National Broad. Co. v.
United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216-217, 225-26 (1943)). There
have been only two instances in the history of the non-
delegation doctrine in which this Court has struck down
a Congressional delegation of authority, and in each of
those cases the concern was with completely standardless
or limitless delegation, not simply the grant of broad
authority.24 But EPA’s decisionmaking in the NOx SIP
Call was neither standardless nor limitless - the D.C.
Circuit found the Agency had constrained its discretion
both by the factors it used to bound its significance
analysis, and by the limited geographic scope of the Rule.

24 See Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 418, 420, 431-32
(1935); A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495,
537-542 & 553 (1935) (Cardozo, J. concurring and noting
particular concern where the delegated authority extends “as
wide as the field of industrial regulation.”). And even in Panama
and Schecter, the Court recognized that “legislation must often
be adapted to complex conditions involving a host of details
with which the national legislature cannot deal directly.”
Panama, 293 U.S. at 248; Schecter, 295 U.S. 495, 529-530. That is
precisely the situation presented here — EPA has been delegated
a complex problem to solve - a problem involving a host of
technical details that Congress could not have efficiently or
expertly addressed itself.

‘

26

Moreover, the delegation of authority to EPA under
Sections 110(a)(2)(D)(i)(I) and 110(k)(5) was specifically
limited by Congress. Clear boundaries confine EPA’s
exercise of its discretion in the NOx SIP Call Rule, includ-
ing the following recognized by the D.C. Circuit: “EPA
must find (1) emissions activity within a state; (2) show
with modeling or other evidence that such emissions are
migrating into other states; and (3) show that the emis-
sions are contributing to nonattainment.” Ind. Pet., App.
at 28a.

The court also found that because the resulting NOx
SIP Call Rule did not “affect the whole economy,” a more
precise set of standards confining the Agency’s action
was unnecessary. Id. Whatever else one may think of this
analysis, it is completely consistent with this Court’s
nondelegation jurisprudence, which examines not only
the standards governing agency action, but the scope of
the delegated power. See, e.g., Synar v. United States, 626
F. Supp. 1374, 1386 (D.D.C.), aff'd sub nom. Bowsher v.
Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (constitutionality of a delega-
tion must be assessed both on the basis of the specificity
of the standards governing its exercise and the overall
scope of the power granted).

B. The D.C. Circuit’s Holding Does Not Represent
an Intra-Circuit Conflict.

Industry Petitioners paint a picture of the D.C. Cir-
cuit in conflict with itself that is simply incorrect. They
allege that the Michigan decision is somehow at odds with
the D.C. Circuit’s previous decisions, particularly ATA.

27

While we disagree strongly with the D. C. Circuit’s deci-
sion in ATA, it certainly is not in conflict with the decision
in Michigan on the grounds asserted by Industry Peti-
tioners.25

The Michigan court upheld the Agency’s exercise of
its authority under a broad delegation not only because
the Agency’s action was confined by articulated stan-
dards,* Ind. Pet., App. at 28a, but also because the

25 In earlier D.C. Circuit decisions upholding previous EPA
significant contribution determinations under the Act, the
nondelegation doctrine was not even at issue. New York v. EPA,
852 F.2d 574 (D.C. Cir. 1988); National Asphalt Pavement Ass'n v.
Train, 539 F.2d 775 (D.C. Cir. 1976).

26 This point is ignored by Industry Petitioners, who simply
seize the court’s dicta (namely the statement that the selection
by EPA of the $2000/ton cost-effectiveness cutoff as one element
of the significance analysis “is a radically incomplete line-
drawing device”) to allege an exercise of standardless
discretion. Ind. Pet. at 20. But Industry Petitioners significantly
fail to note that the court went on to find that EPA had properly
limited its action under the statute through three threshold
determinations. Ind. Pet., App. at 28a.

Furthermore, while we agree with the D.C. Circuit that
EPA’s NOx SIP Call Rule was a valid exercise of delegated
Agency authority, we do not agree with the court’s dictum that
EPA “understood that its selection of the [cost] cut-off point was
essentially unbounded.” Ind. Pet., App. at 27a. EPA did not
simply pick the $2000/ton figure out of thin air. Rather, it
evaluated the cost of NOx emission control options, and found
that most “emissions controls that are available and of
comparable cost to other recently undertaken or planned NOx
[controls] . . . fall below $2000/ton.” 63 Fed. Reg: 57,356, 57,400.
EPA further explained that “the cost-effectiveness of measures
that EPA or States have adopted, or proposed to adopt, forms a
good reference point for determining which of the available
additional NOx control measures can most easily be

28

resulting Rule is limited in scope both geographically and
because it does not affect all American enterprise. Id. at
27a-28a. Industry Petitioners erroneously suggest that
this represents a new or different approach taken by the
D.C. Circuit to its analysis of agency action under the
nondelegation doctrine. Ind. Pet. at 20. It is notable that
they provide no citations illustrating the conflict they
suggest.

In fact, the court’s Michigan analysis is completely
consistent with previous cases in which the D.C. Circuit
(wrongly, we believe) has used the nondelegation doc-
trine to analyze agency actions under Congressionally-
delegated authority. In ATA, the court noted its view that
where the Agency “standards in question affect the whole
economy,” a more precise delegation (or more accurately
to the situation, a decisional principle more clearly articu-
lated by the Agency) is required. ATA, 175 F.3d at 1037
(citing Schecter, 295 U.S. 495, 553 (1935)). Similarly, in
Lockout/Tagout I, 938 F.2d at 1317 (D.C. Cir. 1991), the
court remanded a rule precisely because the scope of the
agency’s claimed power to roam was “immense, encom-
passing all American enterprise,” and, the D.C. Circuit
believed, this ran afoul of the nondelegation doctrine.
The Michigan court, distinguishing those earlier holdings,

implemented by upwind states whose emissions impact
downwind nonattainment problems.” Id. This approach is
analogous to various provisions in the Act requiring sources to ~
install emission control technology that is “reasonably
available.” See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7502(c)(1) (requiring major
sources in ozone nonattainment areas to install “reasonably
available control technology”).

ST ee nee ey

29

held not only that the Agency had constrained its deci-
sionmaking,?” but that the resulting rule does not affect
the whole economy. Ind. Pet., App. 28a. Michigan there-
fore does not represent a new approach by the D.C.
Circuit, nor is it in conflict with its earlier decisions, and
therefore is not worthy of a grant of certiorari by this
Court.

More importantly, as noted supra, this Court cur-
rently is reviewing an important Clean Air Act case in
which both the ultimate results of the D.C. Circuit’s non-
delegation doctrine analysis and its reasoning were
inconsistent with this Court’s non-delegation jurispru-
dence. ATA, No. 99-1257. That case provides this Court
ample opportunity to evaluate how the D.C. Circuit is
applying the non-delegation doctrine, making review of
the instant case unnecessary.

4
v

27 In fact, the court’s concern in Lockout/Tagout I, that the
agency’s asserted power to make a rule so stringent as to risk
taking industry to the verge of economic ruin, see Lockout/Tagout
I, 938 F.2d at 1317, is clearly not at issue here, where EPA has
included the availability of cost-effective NOx controls as one
limiting element in its significance determination.

30

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should deny
certiorari on the questions presented in the State and

Industry Petitions.

Respectfully submitted,

Davip W. MARSHALL
(Counsel of Record)
Clean Air Task Force

P.O. Box 950
Henniker, NH 03242
(603) 428-8114

and

ANN BREWSTER WEEKS

Clean Air Task Force

c/o Grants Management Associates
77 Summer Street, 8th Floor
Boston, MA 02110

(617) 292-0234

Counsel for Environmental Intervenors

Davip G. HaAwkKINs
Joun D. WALKE
Natural Resources Defense Council
1200 New York Avenue, NW
Suite 400
Washington, D.C. 20005
(202) 289-6868

Howarp A. LEARNER

JouN N. Moore

Environmental Law & Policy
Center of the Midwest

35 East Wacker Drive, Suite 1300

Chicago, IL 60601

(312) 673-6500

Dated: January 4, 2001

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386014_1199%3A4. Public record. Not legal advice.
