# Opposition Brief — Virginia v. Kingdom of Spain > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386014_1195%3A3 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Opposition Brief - **Published:** January 1, 2001 - **Citation:** 531 U.S. 1144 ## Text Suprome Court, U.S. FILED ef) ‘JAN 11 200 Nos. 00-629 & 00-652 OFFICE OF THE CLERK. | IN THE Supreme Court of the Hnited States COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA Vi KINGDOM OF SPAIN SEA HUNT, INCORPORATED 7, KINGDOM OF SPAIN ON PETITIONS FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT BRIEF OF THE KINGDOM OF SPAIN IN OPPOSITION TO CERTIORARI JAMES A. GOOLD Counsel of Record Robert A. Long, Jr. KEITH A. NOREIKA COVINGTON & BURLING 1201 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W. Washington, D.C. 20004-2401 (202) 662-6000 Attorneys for Respondent January 2001 TABLE OF CONTENTS ¥ This Case Is Not An Appropriate Vehicle For Determining The Meaning Of “Abandonment” Under Admiralty FOR TN AONE COANE LO TEC ART 9 ya The Court of Appeals’ Decision Does Not Create A Circuit Conflict. .................. 13 3. The Additional Issues Raised in Sea Hunt’s Petition Merit No Further EE TGA ERO EC SEs PRC e OCR 15 4. The Foreign Policy Implications Of This Case Counsel Against Further Judicial PI i siitiiabiiniscisnithienicitereitibciswnctninta 17 | i as 19 | ike : al a TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page Bonifay v. The Steamship Paraporti, 145 F. Supp. 879 (E.D. Va. 1956) ncicessiccccsvesnnieennaeiatidads 17 California v. Deep Sea Research, Inc., 523 U.S. 491 (1996) .......0.:acusisiicieeliciasiemalenta aia 2, 10, 16 Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 305 (PR iscmanniaseibienmnmads 17 Columbus-America Discovery Group v. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co., 203 F.3d 291 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 121 3.:C4. ZFE Gages wtenennnscdiesilenns 15 Columbus-America Discovery Group v. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co., 974 F.2d 450 (4th Cir. 1992)............ Au Fairport International Exploration, Inc. v. The Shipwrecked Vessel Known as the Captain Lawrence, in rem, 177 F.36 491 Gia Cie, Fests cetendiaeens 14 Klein v. Unidentified Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 758 F.2d 1511 (11th Cir. 1985)... ccceeeseseees 17 Lathrop v. Unidentified Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel, $177 F. Sapp. 953 GOLDS. Fi. TI scssttncsareseststscssscesesee 17 Martha's Vineyard Scuba Headquarters, Inc. v. Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Steam Vessel, $33 F.2d 1059 (iat Cin. Po icciciiesae atin 15 New Harbor Protection Co. v. Steamer Charles P. Chouteau, 5 F. 463 (D. La. 1881) occ cecceeeeeeeeeees 17 Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945) .......... 18 Sea Hunt, Inc. v. Unidentified, Shipwrecked Vessel or Vessels, 221 F.3d 634 (4th Cir. 2000) .........cecssseoees Passim Sea Hunt, Inc. v. Unidentified, Shipwrecked Vessel or Vessels, 47 F. Supp. 2d 678 (E.D. Va. | SM passim Sea Hunt, Inc. v. Unidentified, Shipwrecked Vessel or Vessels, 22 F. Supp. 2d 521 (E.D. Va. ROE cheadedsbaitainn: 2 Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. vy. Avagliano, PT RA SO GIO viii tbiieie chink pesinloiy kee. 18 The Pohatcong, 77 F. 996 (S.D.N.Y. 1896) ...ccccccecccceseseeeees 17 The Yucatan, 30 F. Cas. 893 (S.D. Fla. RT Pisiisciiccekcccade 17 Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 640 F.2d 560 8 BERR eee 15 United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 RE 1] United States v. Steinmetz, 973 F.2d 212 i SERRE SSS g ec Oe aa 11 Yukon Recovery, L.L.C. v. Certain Abandoned Property, 205 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, I a 15 ~ Page FEDERAL, CONSTITUTIONAL, TREATY AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS FS. CE NS Wr ie ae cath ekcnchrhtinsishehilaepitaicantdbi iene 8,11 Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-298 (1988) (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 2101- I iitah a sinss sdehnctitinitaistnsisicatebiiaiedbicabncdacsidibganbuls 7,9 1763 Definitive Treaty of Peace Between France, Great Britain, Spain and Portugal, 42 Consol. Faas BO is CI iiiieitaacnasablthnitinaitdeionsiace 6, 17 1902 Treaty of Friendship and General Relations Between Spain and the United States, Fa UR ZA Fe I I iiteecktnssinthsskcsirssnces passim Be Utes © TB icdetitinsincctiehcinhdliitascsaiipawatibichadicaclalie 2 LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS H.R. Rep. No. 100-514 (II) (1988)...sscsscssssssessscesneeenneeeee 10 BRIEF OF THE KINGDOM OF SPAIN IN OPPOSITION TO CERTIORARI The decision of the court of appeals rests on multiple, independent and settled principles of domestic and international law governing sovereign vessels and military gravesites. The court of appeals correctly applied these principles to affirm the Kingdom of Spain’s Ownership of its Royal Navy Frigates La Galga and Juno and its right to protect from commercial exploitation the final resting place of more than 425 Spanish soldiers, sailors and their dependents who died at sea in the service of their country. To create the appearance of a conflict among the courts of appeals, Petitioner Commonwealth of Virginia (“Virginia”) conflates cases applying a principle of implied abandonment where the owner of a vessel did not appear to protect its interests with cases in which the owner did appear — as the Kingdom of Spain did in this case — and proof of express abandonment was required. Virginia’s Petition also ignores controlling treaties, case law and principles of international policy on which the court of appeals grounded its decision. The court of appeals correctly held that the Royal Navy Frigates La Galga and Juno are the property of the Kingdom of Spain under at least five parallel lines of legal authority: the 1902 Treaty of Peace and General Relations Between Spain and the United States; the deference United States courts accord to understandings between other nations concerning the meaning and effect of treaties between those nations; the deference United States courts accord to military and foreign policy decisions of the Executive Branch; international law and custom conceming sovereign vessels and military gravesites; and the proper application of the Abandoned Shipwreck Act where a sovereign owner contests claimed abandonment of its vessels. No conflict among the a Be x courts of appeals is presented by the court of appeals’ application of these principles. Petitioner Sea Hunt, Incorporated (“Sea Hunt”) misreads California v. Deep Sea Research, Inc., 523 U.S. 491 (1998), as somehow precluding a sovereign from appearing in an in rem proceeding to defend its ownership of a sovereign vessel. In this case, the Kingdom of Spain appeared before a U.S. court and submitted proof of ownership that was found to be dispositive. Accordingly, Deep Sea Research has no bearing on this case. Sea Hunt also misconstrues the admiralty law of salvage. In accordance with long-settled principles, the court of appeals correctly held that Spain was entitled to protect its vessels from commercial exploitation. OPINIONS BELOW The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 1-27) is reported at 221 F.3d 634.' Opinions of the district court are reported at 47 F. Supp. 2d 678 (Pet. App. 28-59) and 22 F. Supp. 2d 521. The district court’s decision denying Sea Hunt’s request for a salvage award is unreported. See App., infra, la-9a. JURISDICTION The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on July 21, 2000. Pet. App. 2. The petitions for a writ of certiorari were filed on October 19, 2000. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1). ' References to “Pet. App.” are to the appendix to the Commonwealth of Virginia’s Petition, No. 00-629. +P COUNTERSTATEMENT OF THE CASE l. The Royal Navy Frigates La Galga and Juno are commissioned warships of Respondent the Kingdom of Spain. The frigates sank in 1750 and 1802, respectively. At the time of their sinkings, each vessel was engaged in military service. Each vessel remains to this day on the rolls of the Navy of Spain. Under Spanish law, each vessel is public dominion property of the Kingdom of Spain. (C.A. App. 235, 229-30, 238-39). a. La Galga was a fifty-gun frigate commissioned into the Spanish Navy in 1732. On her final voyage, La Galga was serving as escort to a convoy of merchant ships bound from Havana to Spain, providing protection from pirates. On board La Galga were the Second Company of the Sixth Battalion of Spanish Marines, royal property and military prisoners. On August 18, 1750, the convoy encountered a hurricane that scattered the ships and drove them westward towards Colonial America. Over the next week, La Galga lost her masts and rudder. On August 26, 1750, La Galga struck a shoal off Assateague Island, near the border between Virginia and Maryland, and sank. (C.A. App. 218-19; 423-24). Most of those on board La Galga reached land and the wreck remained accessible for a month or more. From late August into October 1750, Captain Daniel Huoni unsuccessfully sought the assistance of the Virginia authorities to protect the wreck and to prevent looting. On November 3, 1750, Governor Ogle of Maryland pledged to send sheriffs to stop the looting, but a second storm scattered the wreck and ended all salvage efforts. The remains of La Galga were driven by storms and wave action into the seabed and became unrecoverable by then-existing salvage technology. (C.A. App. 147-53; 424-25; 429). ~ e b. Juno was a thirty-four gun frigate built for the Royal Navy of Spain in 1789, at the outbreak of the Napoleonic Wars. Juno was assigned to Spain’s Caribbean Fleet and spent the remainder of her military service on convoy escort duty. Juno’s final voyage began as escort to a convoy from Vera Cruz to Cadiz, but she suffered storm damage en route and put in to Puerto Rico for repairs, while the other ships continued on to Spain. After repairs were completed, Juno was assigned in October 1802 to serve as a troopship taking the soldiers of the Third Battalion of the Regiment of Africa and their families home to Spain from combat duty. East of Norfolk, Virginia, Juno encountered a fierce storm and disappeared at sea with more than 425 soldiers, sailors and military dependents on board. Over the next year, Spain’s Consul General in Boston unsuccessfully canvassed United States ports for any reports of Juno survivors or sightings of wreckage. (C.A. App. 216-17). 2. Petitioner Sea Hunt is a commercial salvage firm that secured a permit from Virginia to take artifacts from Juno and La Galga, in return for granting Virginia a share of the proceeds. Through historical research, Sea Hunt was aware that both ships were Spanish Royal Navy vessels believed to have sunk in the vicinity of Assateague Island, Virginia. (C.A. App. 417-22; 423-30). On learning of Sea Hunt’s proposed activities, the Kingdom of Spain advised that it objected to disturbance of La Galga and Juno and expressed its desire that their remains be left undisturbed as military gravesites. (C.A. App. 103, 104). Sea Hunt initiated - this in rem action because it anticipated that Spain would claim ownership of La Galga and Juno and object to salvage. (C.A. App. 66, 73, 80, 82). In March 1998, Sea Hunt initiated an in rem admiralty action seeking a declaratory judgment that Juno and La Galga had been abandoned and ceased to be sovereign vessels of Spain, and that they had become the property of Virginia or Sea Hunt under the Abandoned wie _ Shipwreck Act or the law of finds. Pet. App. 33. In the alternative, Sea Hunt sought a salvage award giving it exclusive rights as salvor-in-possession to the vessels and their contents. After filing its in rem claim, Sea Hunt conducted limited salvage operations. At a September 15, 1998 hearing concerning those operations, unrebutted expert testimony was presented by a National Park Service underwater archaeologist that Sea Hunt was using inappropriate and potentially destructive techniques to scour the seabed for artifacts that were endangering the remains of the vessels. (C.A. App. 181-97). At the request of the district court, Sea Hunt agreed to cease operations until ownership of Juno and La Galga had been adjudicated. 3. In response to the Sea Hunt and Virginia claims, Spain appeared in the district court and filed a verified claim that it is the owner of Juno and La Galga. In support of a motion for summary judgment and in opposition to a Sea Hunt and Virginia cross-motion, Spain provided the district court with documentary history of the vessels demonstrating that both had been commissioned naval vessels on active duty and had never been abandoned or stricken from the rolls of the Spanish Navy. Spain also demonstrated that under Spanish law Juno and La Galga are public dominion property of Spain that can only be ceded or abandoned by an express act authorized by Parliament. Spain also objected to commercial exploitation of the gravesites of its personnel. (C.A. App. 104; 105-26; 198- 204; 214-34; 235, 238). 4. Central to this case and to the decision of the court of appeals are two treaties entered into by the Kingdom of Spain. Article X of the 1902 Treaty of Friendship and General Relations (33 Stat. 2105, 2110-11, 11 Bevans 628, 632) obligates each nation “in cases of shipwreck” to provide the vessels of the other nation with “the same assistance and it. protection and the same immunities which would have been granted to its own vessels in similar cases.” The understanding of the United States and Spain, affirmed by the court of appeals, is that this article obligates the United States to provide a Spanish sovereign vessel shipwrecked in United States waters with the same rights and immunities that the United States provides to its own sovereign vessels. The earlier treaty is the 1763 Definitive Treaty of Peace, 42 Consol. T.S. 279 (Feb. 10, 1763) (C.A. App. 521- 34) by which Spain, Great Britain, France and Portugal ended the Seven Years’ War. To resolve the conflict between Spain and Great Britain, Great Britain agreed to withdraw its forces from Cuba (Article XIX) in exchange for the cession by Spain of claims to territory east of the Mississippi River “on the continent of North America.” (Article XX). The 1763 Treaty expressly preserved Spain’s ownership of moveable Royal Property in North America, providing that “[H]is Catholick Majesty shall have the power to cause all the effects that may belong to him, to be brought away, whether it be artillery or other things.” (Article XX). In the district court, Diplomatic Notes of Great Britain and Spain documented each nation’s common understanding that the Treaty was not a cession of La Galga from Spain to Great Britain. App., infra, 27a, 29a. 3 In support of Spain’s ownership rights in Juno and La Galga and its right to refuse salvage, the United States submitted Statements of Interest on behalf of the Departments of State and Defense. The Department of Defense statement declares the policy of the United States that more than 16,000 sunken U.S. military vessels and aircraft sunk around the world, including uncounted military gravesites, remain United States property absent an authorized express declaration of abandonment. App., infra, 21la-22a. It also articulates the United States’ policy to secure protection for its sunken sovereign vessels and aircraft from unauthorized disturbance by providing reciprocal = treatment to other nations: “The Department of Defense has a strong interest in ensuring that the Juno and La Galga are treated in the same way that we would want U.S. Navy, U.S. Army, U.S. Air Force and other submerged sovereign non- commercial United States wrecks in foreign waters to be treated.” App., infra, 24a. | The Declaration of Interest of the Department of State States that Article X of the 1902 Treaty of Friendship and General Relations is “unique” among the many United States treaties of friendship, commerce and navigation with other nations and, in the view of the Department of State, “imposes on the United States the responsibility to afford to these ... vessels [La Galga and Juno] the same assistance and protection and the same immunities which would be granted to sunken United States warships in the same location.” App., infra, 13a, 14a. 6. The district court upheld Spain’s ownership of Juno and its right to reject salvage, but ruled that La Galga had been expressly abazidoned by Spain under the district court’s interpretation of the 1763 Definitive Treaty of Peace. Accordingly, the district court ruled that La Galga had become the property of Virginia under the Abandoned Shipwreck Act. Pet. App. 50-53. : The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s rulings upholding Spain’s ownership of Juno and denying Sea Hunt salvage rights. The court of appeals reversed the district court’s ruling that the 1763 Treaty abandoned La Galga. The court of appeals held that Petitioners had been required to show express abandonment under long-settled admiralty law principles reflected in Columbus-America Discovery Group v. Atlantic Mutual Ins. Co., 974 F.2d 450 (4th Cir. 1992), Pet. App. 11, and under the Abandoned Shipwreck Act’s definition of “abandoned shipwrecks” as those “to which the owner has relinquished ownership rights with no retention.” (43 U.S.C. § 2101(b)) sie (emphasis added). The court of appeals further held that, while an implied abandonment standard may be applied to privately owned vessels, an express abandonment standard is required “where, as here, a nation has stepped forward to assert ownership over its sovereign shipwrecks.” Pet. App. 10-11. Express abandonment is also required under Article X of the 1902 Treaty, which confers on Spanish vessels “the same immunities” conferred upon similarly situated vessels of the United States. The immunities extended to Spain’s vessels by the 1902 Treaty include the preclusion of implied abandonment of United States property under the Property Clause of the Constitution (U.S. Const. art. IV § 3). Additionally, the court of appeals held that application of an express abandonment standard to La Galga and Juno is required by the legitimate interests of the executive branch in respecting “the customary international law rule that title to sunken warships may be abandoned only by an express act of abandonment.” Pet. App. 16 (quoting Statement of Interest, U.S. Dept. of State J 15 (App., infra, 14a)). Applying these principles, the court of appeals ruled that no express abandonment of La Galga had been shown. As to the Treaty of 1763, the court agreed with Spain and Great Britain that the cession in the Treaty of territory “on the continent of North America” “was not intended to include movable property located in coastal waters,” an understanding which is consistent with this Court’s rulings in the Submerged Lands cases that 18th Century North America territory did not include coastal waters. Pet. App. 24. Moreover, the court recognized that the closing proviso of Article XX of the Treaty includes an express reservation of Spain’s rights to its movable property in North America. Pet. App. 22. Finally, the court of appeals observed that, if implied abandonment were the applicable standard, “even a finding of implied abandonment would be improper” in this case. Pet. App. 25. x's REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT ) # This Case Is Not An Appropriate Vehicle For Determining The Meaning Of “Abandonment” Under Admiralty Law. Virginia urges the Court to grant review in this case to determine the meaning of “abandonment” under the Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-298 (1988) (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 2101-2106 (1994)), and general admiralty law. See Pet. 8-25. In particular, Virginia urges the Court to grant review in order to decide whether abandonment may be implied from inaction over a period of time, or instead requires an express act by the owner of the sunken vessel. Pet. 10-15. There are multiple reasons why this case is not an appropriate vehicle for deciding that issue. First, this case involves sunken warships of a sovereign nation, which may be abandoned only by express act of the sovereign even if privately-owned shipwrecks are subject to an implied abandonment standard. Second, the 1902 Treaty between the United States and Spain requires the application of an express abandonment standard in this case. And third, the choice of a legal standard does not ultimately matter in this case, because the vessels at issue were not abandoned even under an implied abandonment standard. a. This Case Involves Sovereign Vessels. The Juno and La Galga were frigates in the Spanish Navy. Indeed, both ships remain on the Spanish Naval Registry to this day. Even if sunken private vessels may be subject to a standard of implied abandonment, there are strong arguments that vessels owned by a sovereign nation — and, especially, warships of a sovereign nation — should -10- remain property of the sovereign absent an express act of abandonment.” The United States Government takes the position that warships of a sovereign nation remain the property of the sovereign absent an express act of abandonment. The United States, in addition to appearing as an amicus curiae in support of Spain, has submitted formal statements of the foreign and military policy of the United States. App., infra, 10a, 20a. The Statement by the Department of Defense, signed by the Judge Advocate General of the Navy, sets forth the interest of the United States in honoring the principle that a nation’s sunken naval vessels are sovereign property that may not be disturbed without express authorization from the sovereign. App., infra, 23a. The declaration observes that more than 1,500 sunken U.S. naval vessels and countless sunken aircraft are located around the world, and that it is important that “the United States and its constituent States [grant] reciprocal recognition of the sovereign title and ownership interests of other sovereign governments in their wrecks in United States waters.” Jd. The State Department submission, signed by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans, Fisheries and Space, declares that it is “the policy of the United States Department of State to recognize claims by foreign governments . . . to ownership of foreign . The legislative history of the Abandoned Shipwreck Act indicates that sovereign vessels are treated differently from other vessels. See Pet. App. 10 (quoting H.R. Rep..No. 100-514(II), at 13 (1988)) (“{T]Jhe U.S. only abandons its sovereignty over, and title to, sunken U.S. warships by affirmative act; mere passage of time or lack of positive assertions of right are insufficient to establish such abandonment... . The same presumption against abandonment will be accorded vessels within the U.S. territorial sea that, at the time of their sinking, were on the non-commercial service of another State.”). See also Brief of the United States, at 35 & n.25, California v. Deep Sea Research, Inc., 523 U.S. 491 (1998) (No. 96-1400). « warships sunk in waters of the United States.” App., infra, 12a. The statement further declares that “i]t is in the foreign policy interest of the United States to honor the request of the Government of Spain” in this case that its sunken warships not be disturbed. Jd. at 14a. Because this case involves a special kind of shipwreck — warships of a sovereign nation — there is no occasion for the Court to consider whether shipwrecks of all kinds are subject to a rule of implied abandonment. b. An Express Abandonment Standard Is Required Under The 1902 Treaty Between the United States and Spain. The court of appeals held that “express abandonment . is required [under the terms] of the 1902 Treaty of Friendship and General Relations between the United States and Spain.” Pet. App. 13. The 1902 Treaty provides that “[iJn cases of shipwreck, . . . each party shall afford to the vessels of the other . . . the same immunities which would have been granted to its own vessels in similar cases.” 33 Stat. 2105, 2110-11, 11 Bevans 628, 632. The USS. Department of State informed the courts below “‘that this provision is unique’ in that no other ‘friendship, commerce and navigation (FCN) treaty of the United States contains such a broadly worded provision applying to State ships.’” Pet. App. 13-14 (quoting U.S. Department of State, Statement of Interest § 13 (App., infra, 13a)). Both the United States and Spain agree that the Treaty provides that Spanish ships sunk in U.S. territorial waters are accorded the same immunity as U.S. ships sunk in U.S. waters. As the court of appeals noted, U.S. vessels “may only be abandoned by an express, unambiguous, and affirmative act.” Pet. App. 14 (citing U.S. Const. art. IV § 3; United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 39-40 (1947); United States v. Steinmetz, 973 F.2d 212, 222 (3d Cir. 1992)). The court of appeals appropriately concluded: “We ae. cannot therefore adopt an implied abandonment standard in the face of treaties and mutual understandings requiring express abandonment. Such a standard would supplant the textual framework of negotiated treaties with an unpredictable judicial exercise in weighing equities.” Pet. App. 15. The court of appeals’ interpretation of the 1902 Treaty is plainly correct. In any event, the lower court’s resolution of this narrow issue, on which there is no circuit conflict, warrants no further review. ¢. Spain Would Retain Ownership Of The Vessels At Issue In This Case Even Under An Implied Abandonment Standard. The court of appeals concluded that “even a finding of implied abandonment would be improper” in the circumstances of this case. Pet. App. 25. As the court of appeals noted, the Kingdom of Spain strove to protect La Galga after she sank, maintained the ship on its Naval Registry, and “vigorously asserted” a claim of ownership when Sea Hunt commenced its in rem admiralty action. Jd. The court of appeals also noted that the technology needed to find and recover the wreck only recently became available. Id. The court of appeals’ resolution of this fact-bound issue is correct and warrants no further review. Because the result in this case ultimately does not depend on whether the court applies a standard of express abandonment or implied abandonment, there is no reason for this Court to address that issue in this case. * * ¥ In sum, before reaching the question whether sunken vessels may be abandoned by implication, the Court would have to (1)overturn the court of appeals’ fact-bound determination that there has been no abandonment of the 34% vessels at issue in this case under an implied abandonment standard; (2) overturn the court of appeals’ interpretation of the 1902 Treaty between the United States and Spain (a narrow issue on which the parties to the treaty are in agreement) and (3) consider whether warships of a sovereign nation are subject to an express abandonment standard even if privately-owned shipwrecks are subject to a less- demanding implied abandonment standard. Not one of these issues merits review. And there is no reason to think that this Court would disagree with the court of appeals’ weil- reasoned resolution of any of these issues, let alone all of them. 2. The Court of Appeals’ Decision Does Not Create A Circuit Conflict. Virginia asserts (Pet. 10-15) that the courts of appeals are in conflict over the question whether abandonment of shipwrecks may be implied rather than express. The court of appeals’ decision in this case does not conflict with any decision of another court of appeals. Moreover, any disagreement among the circuits is less sharply defined, and less significant, than is suggested by Virginia’s Petition. As the court of appeals explained, the Fourth Circuit has not ruled out implied abandonment of a shipwreck in all circumstances. The Fourth Circuit has held that “a court may infer an abandonment” when the property is “an ancient and long-lost shipwreck.” Columbus-America, 974 F.2d at 464- 65 (emphasis added). The Fourth Circuit has declined to draw an inference of abandonment, however, when the owner appears in the in rem action and asserts a claim of ownership. Id. In reaching this conclusion, the Fourth Circuit has relied on the established rule that when an owner asserts a claim to property that was involuntarily taken from his control, “the law is hesitant to find an abandonment.” Pet. App. 12 (quoting Columbus-America, 974 F.2d at 467-68). ‘th. As the Fourth Circuit observed, no other court of appeals has employed an implied abandonment standard against an owner that has appeared in an in rem action and asserted a claim to its property. Pet. App. 12. For that reason, the decision in this case does not conflict with any decision of any other court of appeals.’ In addition, as noted above, this case involves warships of a sovereign nation rather than privately-owned vessels. Because sovereign vessels are subject to an express abandonment standard even if privately-owned vessels may be subject to an implied abandonment standard, decisions holding that private vessels have been impliedly abandoned do not conflict with decisions, such as this one, applying an express abandonment standard to a sovereign warship. Even as to privately-owned vessels, the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Columbus-America does not represent a sharp departure from prior admiralty law or the decisions of other circuits. The Sixth Circuit has observed that “the apparent divergence of authority” between its decisions and those of the Fourth Circuit “masks a degree of underlying agreement.” Fairport International Exploration, Inc. v. The Shipwrecked Vessel Known as the Captain Lawrence, in rem, 177 F.3d 491, 499 (6th Cir. 1999). The Sixth Circuit’s standard, like the Fourth Circuit’s, “reveals a uniform concern that courts impose a high burden on those who argue that an owner abandoned property that sank against his will” . Petitioners and their amici repeatedly cite decisions in which the owner of the vessel did not come forward to contest the claim of abandonment. See Sea Hunt Pet. 16-17; Virginia Pet. 17; Professional Shipwreck Explorers Ass’n Amici at 13-14. In those cases, the courts may infer abandonment from the owner’s failure to appear and therefore need not address whether express abandonment has been shown. These decisions have no bearing on whether express or implied abandonment is appropriate when, as here, the owner has appeared. « £55 and requires parties alleging abandonment to meet “the exacting burden of proof admiralty law imposes on those who allege abandonment.” Jd at 499-500. Similarly, the First, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits have inferred abandonment only in cases in which the original owner failed to appear and assert a claim of ownership. See Martha’s Vineyard Scuba Headquarters, Inc. v. Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Steam Vessel, 833 F.2d 1059, 1065 (1st Cir. 1987) (“no person or firm appeared to assert any overall claim of ownership”); Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 640 F.2d 560, 567 (5th Cir. 1981) (original owner does not lose title “except in extraordinary cases”); see also Yukon Recovery, L.L.C. v. Certain Abandoned Property, 205 F.3d 1189, 1194 (9th Cir.) (upholding original owner’s claim to cargo), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 62 (2000) (No. 99-1958).4 In sum, this case differs from other decisions of courts of appeals in that the Kingdom of Spain, a sovereign nation, appeared in the admiralty court and asserted a claim to its sovereign vessels. No court of appeals’ decision has applied a standard of implied abandonment in similar circumstances, and therefore the Fourth Circuit’s decision in this case does not create a circuit conflict. 3. The Additional Issues Raised in Sea Hunt’s Petition Merit No Further Review. Sea Hunt raises two additional issues that plainly do not warrant this Court’s attention. First, Sea Hunt asserts 4 The petition for a writ of certiorari in Columbus-America Discovery Group v. Atlantic Mutual Ins. Co., 203 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2000), urged the Court to grant review to resolve an asserted circuit conflict over whether abandonment may be implied as well as express. This Court recently denied the petition. 121 S. Ct. 277 (2000) (No. 99- 1935).