# Appendix — Hopkins v. Saunders

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 2000
- **Citation:** 531 U.S. 873

## Text

~ FIL ED
00 4'7 APR 25 2000

Lt

DOCKET No.

In The
Supreme Court of the United States

——

TOMMY D. HOPKINS,
Petitioner,

V.

JOHN L. SAUNDERS, KYLE VICKERS, CHARLES
AUSFAHL, ROY TEMPLE AND BETH M. WHEELER,
Respondents.

—

Petition for Writ of Certiorari
To the United States Court of
Appeals For the Eighth Circuit

—~—

APPENDIX TO |
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

<_<

* TOMMY D. HOPKINS
2408 Oakview Dr.
Jefferson City, Missouri 65109-0738
(573) 636-9534

* Pro Se Petitioner

\“/GA ny
S ae ee

APPENDIX
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Order of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
denying rehearing entered on January 26, 2000 l

Opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
entered on December 16, 1999 2-21

Order of the United States District Court for the Western
District of Missouri on Rule 60(b) Motion entered on
June 16, 1998 22-23

Order of the United States District Court for the Western
District of Missouri on Rule 59 Motion entered on
April 22, 1998 24-25

Judgment of the United States District Court for the Western
District of Missouri entered on February 27, 1998 26-30

Order of the United States District Court for the Western
District of Missouri Setting Hearing Schedule entered on
November 7, 1997 31

Order of the United States District Court for the Western
District of Missouri entered on September 30, 1997__ 32-40

Order of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
denying rehearing entered on January 23, 1996 4]

Opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
entered on August 23, 1996 42-51

Order of the United States District Court for the Western
District of Missouri entered on January 9, 1996 52-78

Judgment of the Circuit Court of Cole County, Missouri

entered on May 4, 1995 __ 79-80
Order of the Personnel Advisory Board of the State of

Missouri entered on October 18, 1994 81-84
Text of First Amendment to U.S. Constitution 85
Text of Fifth Amendment to U.S. Constitution 85
Text of Eleventh Amendment to U.S. Constitution _—_—&5

Text of Fourteenth Amendment to U.S. Constitution 85

Text of 7 U.S.C. Section 74 86
Text of 7 U.S.C. Section 79 86-90
Text of 7 U.S.C. Section 84.(g) 90
Text of 7 U.S.C. Section 87.(f) 91
Text of 28 U.S.C. Section 1254 91
Text of 28 U.S.C. Section 1738 91
Text of 28 U.S.C. Section 1746 92
Text of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 92-93
Text of 42 U.S.C. Section 1988 93-94
Text of 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e 94-96
Text of 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e-2 96
Text of 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e-3(a) 97
Text of 7 CFR Section 800.0 98-101

Text of 7 CFR Section 800.1 101

Text of 7 CFR Section 800.196 101-106
Text of Article I Section 2 to Missouri Constitution 107
Text of Article I Section 8 to Missouri Constitution 107

Text of Article I Section 10 to Missouri Constitution 107

Text of Chapter 36 Section 36.030 of Missouri Revised
Statutes 108-110

Text of Chapter 36 Section 36.031 of Missouri Revised
Statutes 110-111

Text of Chapter 36 Section 36.350 of Missouri Revised
Statutes 111-112

Text of Chapter 36 Section 36.380 of Missouri Revised
Statutes 112

Text of Chapter 36 Section 36.390 of Missouri Revised
Statutes 113-114

Text of Chapter 105 Section 105.055 of Missouri Revised
Statutes 115-116

Text of Chapter 411 Section 411.145 of Missouri Revised
Statutes 116-117

Text of Rule Number VI (1)(A) of the Merit System Rules
and Regulations for the Division of Grain Inspection 118

Text of Rule Number VI (2)(A) of the Merit System Rules
and Regulations for the Division of Grain Inspection 118

ili

Text of Rule Number VIII (5)of the Merit System Rules and
Regulations for the Division of Grain Inspection 118-119

Text of Rule Number XIV (1)(D) of the Merit System
Rules and Regulations for the Division of Grain
Inspection 119-120

Executive Order of the Governor of the State of Missouri
entered February 1, 1978 121-122 .

Letter of Termination issued by John L. Saunders to
Tommy D. Hopkins on June 10, 1994 123

Tommy D. Hopkins’ Request for Jury Trial submitted to

the United States District Court for the Western District

of Missouri on October 27, 1994 and entered as District
Court Document #2 124

United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-2803 WHJC

Tommy D. Hopkins,
Appellant,

Order Denying Petition for

Rehearing and for Rehearing
En Banc

v.

John L. Saunders, et al.,

~~ we KM KK mM KM

Appellees.

The petition for rehearing en banc is denied. The
petition for rehearing by the panel is also denied.

(5128-010199)

January 26, 2000

Order Entered at the Direction of the Court:

Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
No. 98-2803
Tommy D. Hopkins, ’
Plaintiff/Appellant, :
*
V. °
Mm
John L. Saunders, Kyle Vickers, °
Charles Ausfahl, Roy Temple, °
Beth M. Wheeler, *
Defendants/Appellees. °
Appeals from
the United
No. 98-2948 States District
Court for the
Western District
of Missouri.

Tommy D. Hopkins,

*
Plaintiff/Appellee, °
*~
V. *
* 7
John L. Saunders, Kyle Vickers, as
Defendants/Appellants, °
*
Charles Ausfahl, *
Defendant, :
x

Roy Temple, Beth M. Wheeler,
Defendants/Appellants. ”

Submitted: | September 14, 1999

Filed: December 16, 1999

Before WOLLMAN, Chief Judge, HEANEY and BEAM,
Circuit Judges.

WOLLMAN, Chief Judge.

Tommy D. Hopkins appeals from the district court's
denial of his claim for reinstatement and from the court's
failure to rule on his claims that John L. Saunders and other
state officials (collectively, the officials) violated his rights
under the First Amendment and Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (Title VII). 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17.' The
officials cross-appeal, contending that the district court erred
in finding that Hopkins had a property interest in his job and
in awarding Hopkins nominal damages and attorney fees.
We affirm in part and reverse in part.

I.

This case comes before us for the second time. We
outline only those facts relevant to this appeal, referring the
reader to a more complete recitation of the facts found in our
first opinion, Hopkins v. Saunders, 93 F.3d 522, 524-25 (8th
Cir. 1996) (Hopkins I). On June 10, 1994, Hopkins was

'We grant Hopkins’ motion to supplement the record.

3

dismissed from his position as director of the Division of
Grain Inspection and Warehousing (the Division) of the
Missouri Department of Agriculture (the Department)
without receiving prior notice or a hearing. Hopkins sought
review of his dismissal by filing an appeal with the
Agriculture Personnel Review Board (APRB), an entity
formed pursuant to a merit system plan adopted by the
Department in 1978 (1978 plan). The purpose of this plan
and the APRB was to ensure that Division employees were
employed on the basis of job qualifications rather than
political affiliations. The Department responded to Hopkins'
appeal with a letter explaining that the 1978 plan was void
and that the APRB no longer existed.

Hopkins then filed an appeal with the Personnel
Advisory Board (PAB), an employment termination review
board established under Chapter 36 of the Missouri Revised
Statutes. Chapter 36 is a state merit system law that was
enacted by the Missouri legislature in 1979; the Department
formally adopted the PAB dismissal procedures in 1982.
Following a hearing, the PAB found that Missouri Revised
Statute section 36.030.1(1) expressly excludes division.
directors, such as Hopkins, from the PAB's appeal
procedures, and, furthermore, that the 1978 plan remained
applicable to those employees who were excepted from the
PAB's procedures. The PAB therefore dismissed Hopkins'
claim, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to hear his appeal
and that the proper forum for such an appeal was the APRB.

Hopkins then brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action in
federal district court against Saunders, Director of the
Department, and several other state officials, alleging that he
was dismissed in violation of his due process rights and in
violation of Missouri's whistleblower statute. The officials
moved for summary judgment on qualified immunity and
Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds. The district court
denied the motion, whereupon the officials took an

4

interlocutory appeal to this court on the question of
immunity. We reversed, finding that the officials were
entitled to both qualified and Eleventh Amendment
immunity, and remanded the case to the district court for
further proceedings regarding Hopkins’ claim for equitable
relief. See Hopkins I, 93 F.3d at 527. On remand, the
district court found by way of cross motions for summary
judgment that Hopkins had a property interest in his position
as Division director under the 1978 plan and that he had been
dismissed in violation of his procedural due process rights.
Following a hearing, the district court also found that
Hopkins would have been dismissed from his position even if
he had received due process. The court therefore awarded
Hopkins nominal damages only, along with attorney fees,
and entered a final judgment on all of Hopkins' claims.

Il.

Hopkins first argues that the district court denied him
the opportunity to pursue claims that he was discharged in
_violation of the First Amendment and Title Vil.2 He
contends that these claims were sufficiently raised in his
second amended complaint but were never properly resolved,
inasmuch as we did not dispose of them on immunity
grounds in Hopkins I and the district court failed to rule on
them on remand. Thus, Hopkins contends that the district
court, by entering a final judgement in Hopkins' action
against the officials, wrongly foreclosed his ability to pursue
these claims and that we should therefore reinstate them.

? Hopkins also contends that he was improperly foreclosed from
asserting a claim based upon the Missouri Constitution's counterpart to
the First Amendment. For the sake of brevity and clarity, the phrase
"First Amendment" as used in this opinion refers to both Hopkins' federal
and state constitutional speech claims.

3

Our determination whether to reinstate Hopkins' First
Amendment and Title VII claims rests upon three key
inquiries. First, we must determine whether Hopkins
sufficiently raised First Amendment and Title VII claims in
his complaint. The essential function of a complaint under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is to give the opposing
party "fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds for a
claim, and a general indication of the type of litigation
involved." Redland Ins. Co. v. Shelter Gen. Ins. Co., 121
F.3d 443, 446 (8th Cir. 1997) (citing Oglala Sioux Tribe of
Indians v. Andrus, 603 F.2d 707, 714 (8th Cir. 1979)). "[I]t is
the facts well pleaded, not the theory of recovery or legal
conclusions," that state a cause of action and put a party on
notice. Economy Housing Co. v. Continental Forest
Products, Inc., 757 F.2d 200, 203 (8th Cir. 1985) (quoting
Moore v. Puget Sound Plywood Inc., 332 N.W.2d 212, 215
(1983)).

We conclude that Hopkins' second amended
complaint, while not a model of clarity, alleged facts
sufficient to put the officials on notice of Hopkins' First
Amendment and Title VII claims. Hopkins' complaint does
not assert First Amendment and Title VII claims in
separately numbered counts, as it does his due process and
whistleblower claims. It does, however, list the First
Amendment as a basis for the district court's jurisdiction and,
more importantly, generally alleges in its due process count
that Hopkins was dismissed because of statements he made
regarding an employee's sexual harassment complaint and the
Department's hiring practices. These factual allegations
suggest First Amendment and Title VII claims and thus are
sufficient, albeit perhaps marginally so, to satisfy the liberal
pleading requirements of the federal rules.

Second, we must determine whether Hopkins' First
Amendment and Title VII claims were encompassed within
our qualified immunity ruling in Hopkins I. Our jurisdiction

over an interlocutory appeal challenging a district court's
denial of qualified immunity "is limited to the resolution of
the issue of qualified immunity." Mettler v. Whitledge, 165
F.3d 1197, 1202 (8th Cir. 1999). Accordingly, we have held
that where a district court's summary judgment order-
addresses qualified immunity only as it relates to some of a
plaintiff's claims and not to others, even though all such
claims are part of a single action, we have jurisdiction only
over those claims to which the district court expressly
applied the principle of qualified immunity. See Jones Vv.
Coonce, 7 F.3d 1359, 1365 (8th Cir. 1993).

The district court's summary judgment order
considered the officials’ qualified immunity only as it related
to Hopkins' due process and whistleblower claims. See
Hopkins v. Saunders, No. 94-4458, slip op. at 23-27
(W.D.Mo. Jan. 9, 1996). Our jurisdiction in Hopkins I was
therefore limited to these claims and did not extend to
Hopkins' First Amendment and Title VII claims. As a result,
Hopkins I did not dispose of Hopkins' First Amendment and
Title VII claims.

Finally, we must decide whether Hopkins waived his
right to pursue his First Amendment and Title VII claims. "It
is an axiom of trial procedure that counsel must take the
initiative in protecting the rights of his clients." McNeely v.
United States, 353 F.2d 913, 917 (8th Cir. 1965). "To obtain
appellate review of a trial court's acts or omissions a party
must have made known to the trial court the action which the
party desires the court to take... ." Porterco, Inc. v. Igloo
Products Corp., 955 F.2d 1164, 1173 (8th Cir. 1992)
(citations omitted).

We recently applied these principles in Becker v.
University of Nebraska at Omaha, 191 F.3d 904 (8th Cir.
1999). There, Becker asserted in his trial brief to the district
court that the defendant university had expressly consented to

7

waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity to Becker's ADEA
claim. Id. at 909 n.4. The district court, however, dismissed
Becker's ADEA claim on Eleventh Amendment grounds
without ever ruling on Becker's waiver argument. Id at 907,
909 n.4. On appeal, Becker reasserted his waiver argument,
but we refused to reach the merits of this issue, finding that
Becker had failed to preserve it for appellate review. Id. at
909 n.4. We noted that although Becker had asserted this
argument in his trial brief, this alone was insufficient to
preserve it for appeal where the district court never ruled on
the issue. Id. Rather, we explained that to preserve his
waiver argument for appeal Becker “should have called the
district court's attention to its failure to decide the waiver
issue." Id. Because Becker failed to actively assert this
argument to the district court, we refused to consider it on

appeal.

As in Becker, Hopkins failed to adequately assert his
First Amendment and Title VII claims to the district court.
Although Hopkins' second amended complaint marginally set
forth these claims, the record is devoid of any evidence that
Hopkins otherwise asserted them to the district court. At oral
argument, Hopkins attempted to explain his failure to
actively assert these claims by stating that he believed that
the district court was first going to deal with his due process
claim alone and then move on to his other claims. Although
this may explain Hopkins' inactivity prior to the court's entry
of a final judgment, it does not explain why he took no
affirmative action immediately following the entry of
judgment to call the district court's attention to the fact that it
had not ruled on his First Amendment and Title VII claims.
Hopkins challenged the district court's final judgment in two
separate motions, but in neither motion did he raise his First
Amendment or Title VII claims.

Therefore, although we believe that Hopkins
sufficiently asserted First Amendment and Title VII claims in

his complaint and that these claims were not resolved by
either this court or the district court, we nevertheless
conclude that Hopkins waived his right to assert these
arguments on appeal. "A party may not stand idly by,
watching the proceedings and allowing the district court to
commit error on which the party subsequently complains."
Becker, 191 F.3d at 909 n.4 (quoting McNeely, 3 53 F.2d at
917). Accordingly, we affirm the district court's entry of a
final judgment on all of Hopkins' claims, including his First
Amendment and Title VII claims.

Il.

We turn next to issues regarding Hopkins’ section
1983 procedural due process claim. The district court found
that Hopkins had a property interest in his job under the 1978
plan and that his due process rights were violated when he
did not receive notice or a hearing prior to his dismissal. The
court also found, however, that Hopkins was dismissed for
cause and therefore refused to reinstate him, instead
awarding him only nominal damages. Both parties challenge
aspects of this ruling. Hopkins contends that the court's
failure to order reinstatement is erroneous as a matter of law,
fact, and procedure. The officials, in their cross-appeal,
contend that the court erred in finding that Hopkins
possessed a property interest in his job. The officials also
argue that, even if the court was correct in its property
interest finding, it erred in awarding Hopkins nominal
damages and attorney fees.

A.
For the sake of analytical clarity, we turn first to the

officials' claims on cross-appeal. The officials first assert that
the district court erred in finding that Hopkins possessed a

9

recognized property interest in his position as Division
director under the 1978 plan. We review this finding de
novo, made as it was on cross-motions for summary
judgment. Hossaini y. Western Mo. Med. Ctr., 140 F.3d
1140, 1142 (8th Cir.1998) (reviewing grant of summary
judgment de novo).

To establish a procedural due process violation, a
plaintiff must demonstrate that he has a protected property or
liberty interest at stake and that he was deprived of that
interest without due process of law. See Marler v. Mo. State
Bd. of Optometry, 102 F.3d 1453, 1456 (8th Cir. 1996). A
protected property interest exists where a plaintiff has a
"legitimate claim of entitlement" to a benefit that is derived
from a source such as state law. Board of Regents v. Roth,
408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). A plaintiff has a protected
property interest in his employment if he can show "that he
could have been fired only for good cause." Spitzmiller v.
Hawkins, 183 F.3d 912, 916 (8th Cir. 1999).

To determine whether Hopkins had a protected
property interest in his position as Division director, we must
answer three questions. First, we must determine whether
the 1978 plan applied to Hopkins in his capacity as Division
director. Section BII of the plan, which is entitled "Coverage
of the System," states that "the [merit] system established by
this plan shall apply to, all offices, positions and employees
of the Division of Grain Inspection, Weighing and
Warehousing." This section then sets forth in detail the
employees excluded from the coverage of the plan, listing six
divisions within the Department and the staff of the
Department's director as among those employees excepted
from the plan.

Section BII therefore lends substantial support to the
district court's conclusion that the 1978 plan was intended to
apply to Hopkins. Section BII's reference to "all offices,

10

positions and employees" is sufficiently broad to encompass
Hopkins' position as director of the Division. Furthermore,
Section BII carefully defines those positions that are not
covered by the plan, yet it fails to denote Hopkins' office as
such a position. To be sure, Section BII is not entirely
consistent with other language within the 1978 plan. Most
notably, the plan's appeal procedures require Hopkins, in his
capacity as director, to sit on the APRB to review employee
terminations, which, if followed literally, would require
Hopkins to review his own termination. While this result
may be unorthodox (and there is no indication that recusal
would not be permitted, if indeed not required, in that
situation), we do not believe that it is sufficient to overcome
the clear language of Section BII. Therefore, we find that the
1978 plan applied to Hopkins in his capacity as Division
director.

Second, we must determine whether the 1978 plan
was in effect at the time of Hopkins' dismissal. In adopting
the appeal procedures of Chapter 36, the Department made
clear that division directors and other specified Department
employees were excluded from those procedures. There is
no evidence, however, that the Department intended to
abrogate existing merit systems governing those employees
excluded from Chapter 36's coverage, nor does Chapter 36
itself suggest such an effect. Absent a clear intent to repeal
existing merit systems, such as the 1978 plan, we cannot say
that the district court erred in finding that the 1978 plan
remained in effect at the time of Hopkins' discharge. Cf.
United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439,453 (1988) ("[A] later
statute will not be held to have implicitly repealed an earlier
one unless there is a clear repugnancy between the two,");
Nichols v. Rysavy, 809 F.2d 1317, 1331 (8th Cir. 1987).

Finally, we must determine whether Hopkins had a
legitimate entitlement to continued employment under the
1979 plan. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 577. Rule Number VI(1)(A)

11

of the plan states that "dismissals from employment shall be
made for cause under rules uniformly applicable to all
positions of employment," and that "[n]Jo ... dismissal shall be
made because of favoritism, prejudice or discrimination."
Rule Number V1(2)(A) reiterates this position by stating that
management may not use "nonmerit factors" in deciding
whether to retain an employee. The clear import of these and
other provisions of the 1978 plan is that division directors
such as Hopkins are not employees-at-will but may be
dismissed only for cause, creating in the division directors a
property interest protected by the rights guaranteed by the
Due Process Clause. See Spitzmiller, 183 F.3d at 916; Pace
v. Moriarty, 83 F.3d 261, 262-63 (8th Cir. t 996).
Accordingly, the district court correctly found that Hopkins
had a protected property interest in his position as Division
director under the 1978 plan.

The officials’ second contention on cross-appeal is
that the district court erred in awarding Hopkins nominal
damages and attorney fees for the officials' violation of
Hopkins' procedural due process rights. The propriety of the
district court's nominal damage award, and derivatively its
fee award, rests upon one issue: Whether a nominal damage
award in a section 1983 action for the violation of procedural
due process rights is legal or equitable in nature. In Hopkins
I, we held that the officials were entitled to both qualified
immunity and Eleventh Amendment immunity.’ See
Hopkins I, 93 F.3d at 527. Qualified immunity insulates a

tides site!

> Despite our rulings in Hopkins I, Hopkins reasserts his
contention that the officials are not entitled to qualified or Eleventh
Amendment immunity. Because these arguments are precluded by the
law of the case doctrine, we need not reconsider them. See Kinman v.
Omaha Public School Dist., 171 F-3d 607, 610 (8th Cir 1999).

12

defendant from all claims for legal damages, but it does not
shield a defendant from claims for equitable relief. See Pace,
83 F.3d at 263. The Eleventh Amendment protects a state
official sued in his official capacity from all claims except for
certain forms of prospective equitable relief, such as
reinstatement. See Campbell v. Arkansas Dep't of
Correction, 155 F.3d 950, 962 (8th Cir. 1998). Recognizing
that our immunity rulings had foreclosed all legal remedies,
we concluded Hopkins I by instructing the district court to
rule only on Hopkins' "claim for equitable relief." Hopkins
I, 93 F.3d at 527. Thus, Hopkins I, by both its remand
instruction and its holdings, prohibited the district court from
awarding Hopkins any form of legal relief. Therefore, if the
nominal damage award is found to be legal in nature, it must
be vacated.

The fact that a remedy may require one party to pay
money to another is not a sufficient reason to characterize the
remedy as "legal relief." Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers,
Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 570 (1990); see also
Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 894 (1988).
However, because money damages was the traditional form
of relief offered in the courts of law, "federal law has
consistently held that money damages are generally
characterized as a legal remedy." Kampa v. White
Consolidated Indus., Inc., 115 F.3d 585, 586 (1997) (citing
Terry, 494 U.S. at 570). Accordingly, a monetary award will
be characterized as equitable only if it possesses one of the
two fundamental attributes of an equitable remedy. Terry,
494 U.S. at 570, see also County Music Co. v. C.H.L.R., Inc.,
88 F.3d 635, 642 (8tb Cir. 1996).

First, a monetary award may be an equitable remedy
if the award is “restitutionary" in nature, "such as in actions
for disgorgement of improper profits.” Terry, 494 U.S. at 470
(citations omitted); see also Cass County, 88 F.3d at 642.
Here, the district court's nominal damage award was not in

13

the form of restitution. By ordering the officials to pay $1.00
to Hopkins, the court was not restoring to Hopkins anything
that was rightfully his, nor was it putting him in the position
_ he would have been in had his due process rights been
observed. See Black's Law Dictionary 1313 (6th ed. 1990)
(defining restitution). Rather, the court's nominal damage
award, like all nominal damages awarded for violations of
procedural due process rights, merely signified that "the law
recognizes the importance to organized society that
[procedural due process] rights be scrupulously observed."
Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266 (1978).

Second, a monetary award may be deemed an
equitable remedy if the award is “incidental to or intertwined
with injunctive relief." Terry, 494 U.S. at 571; see also Cass
County, 88 F.3d at 643. Because the district court refused to
grant Hopkins reinstatement or any other injunctive relief,
the damage award was neither incidental to nor intertwined
with any other relief.

Under the Supreme Court's framework in Terry,
therefore, the district court's nominal damage award was
legal in nature. This conclusion is consistent with rulings
from other circuits that have expressly held that nominal
damages are inherently a legal remedy, regardless of the
context in which they are awarded. See, e.g., United States
v. Marolf, 173 F.3d 1213, 1219-20, n.5 (9th Cir, 1999);
Griffith v. Col. Div. of Youth Servs., 17 F.3d 1323, 1327

(10th Cir. 1994); Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 968 F.2d
427, 431 (Sth Cir. 1992), aff'd in part, 511 U.S. 244 (1994);

Swanson v. Elmhurst Chrysler Plymouth. Inc., 882 F.2d
1235, 1240 (7th Cir. 1989).

We have analyzed the nature of nominal damages in
two contexts. In White v. Armontrout, we affirmed the
district court's vacation of a nominal damage award on
qualified immunity grounds. 29 F.3d 357, 359, 361 (8th Cir.

14

1994); see also Hartley v. Fine, 780 F.2d 1383, 1388 (8th Cir.
1985). In doing so, we intimated that nominal damages are
legal in nature, because qualified immunity erects a barrier to
legal remedies only. See Pace, 83 F.3d at 263. Several other
circuits have also implicitly recognized the legal nature of
nominal damages by finding them to be barred by qualified
immunity. See, e.g., Ruvalcaba v. Los Angeles, 167 F.3d
514, 524 (9th Cir. 1999); Cummins v. Campbell, 44 F.3d
847, 849 (10th Cir. 1994); Fox v. Board of Trustees of State
Univ. of N.Y., 42 F.3d 135, 141 (2nd Cir. 1994), Hicks v,
Feeney, 850 F.2d 152, 155 n.4 (3rd Cir. 1988); Rheuark v.
Shaw, 628 F-2d 297, 299 (Sth Cir. 1980).

We have implied a contrary view of nominal damages
in the context of a Title VII action. Prior to 1991, Title VII's
remedies were statutorily limited to injunctions and "such
affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include
_. . reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without
back pay, or any other equitable relief as the court deems
appropriate.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g)(1). Despite this
limitation, we held in Dean v. Civiletti that a plaintiff who
had established all the elements of a Title VII claim but was
unable to show actual damages could recover nominal
damages. 670 F.2d 99, 101 (8tb Cir. 1982) (per curiam); see
also Parton v. GTE North, Inc., 971 F.2d 150, 154 (8th Cir.
1992); Maney v. Brinkley Mun. Waterworks & Sewer Dep’t.,
802 F.2d 1073, 1076 (8th Cir, 1986). Dean thus implied that,
at least under Title VII, nominal damages are equitable in
nature.

However ambiguous our earlier holdings, we are
convinced that the court's damage award in the present case
constitutes legal relief. First, the court's damage award does
not possess either of the attributes of equitable relief set forth
by the Supreme Court in Terry. Second, the majority of
circuits have characterized nominal damages as legal in
nature, either expressly or implicitly through rulings in

15

qualified immunity cases. Finally, we believe that White and
its view of nominal damages is more apposite to the present
case than the view intimated in Dean. White involved a
section 1983 claim and the assertion of qualified immunity as
a defense to that claim, see White, 29 F.3d at 360-61,
whereas Dean involved a claim under Title VII and its
narrow pre-1991 remedial framework, see Dean, 670 F.2d at
100. Hopkins’ claim has much in common with the claim in
White: it is based on section 1983 and is being challenged, at
least in part, on qualified immunity grounds, In contrast,
Hopkins’ claim differs significantly from the claim in Dean:
it does not implicate a statutory limitation on damages, such
as that which existed under pre-1991 Title VII, or the
concerns raised by such a limitation. Thus, we believe that
White's suggestion that nominal damages are legal in nature
applies in this case; and we see no reason to expand Dean's
implicit view of nominal damages beyond the context of
Title V11.

In summary, then, we conclude that because the
award of nominal damages to Hopkins constitutes legal
rather than equitable relief, it runs counter to our remand
instructions and our immunity holdings in Hopkins I and
therefore must be reversed.

Likewise, we must also vacate the award of attorney
fees to Hopkins. Section 1988 of Title 42 provides that the
court, in its discretion, may grant "the prevailing party"
reasonable attorney fees. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). "[T]o qualify
as a prevailing party, a civil rights plaintiff must obtain at
least some relief on the merits of his claim." Farrar v.
Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111 (1992). Absent the nominal
damage award, Hopkins has obtained no relief on the merits
of his claim, Hopkins received only a declaration that his
procedural due process rights were violated. The "moral
satisfaction" of such a declaration, without more, is not

16

sufficient to confer prevailing party status on a plaintiff. See
Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 762-63 (1987).

C.

We turn next to Hopkins' challenges to the district
court's resolution of his procedural due process claim, all of
which attack the court's refusal to reinstate Hopkins to his
position as Division director. First, Hopkins argues that
Missouri law, not federal law, establishes the appropriate
remedy for the procedural due process deprivation that he
suffered and that the remedy required by Missouri law is
reinstatement. Thus, according to Hopkins, the district court
erred by refusing to look to Missouri law in fashioning a
remedy. Because the decision whether to follow state law
involves a question of law, we review the district court's
ruling de novo. See McCuskey v. Central Trailer Serv., Ltd.,
37 F.3d 1329, 1330-31 (8th Cir. 1994) (reviewing district
court's legal conclusions de novo).

The Supreme Court defined the proper remedy for the
denial of procedural due process in Carey v. Piphus, holding
that the remedy for a procedural due process violation is
defined by the extent of the injury that resulted from the
denial of constitutionally required process. ‘435 U.S. at
263-64; see also Perry v. Brakke, 826 F.2d 740, 747 (8th Cir.
1987). Thus, in the context of public employment,
reinstatement is proper only where a tenured employee would
not have been dismissed if his procedural due process rights
had been observed. See Brewer v. Chauvin, 938 F,2d 860,
864 (8th Cir. 1991). Where an employee would have been
discharged even if he had received due process, i.e. was
discharged for cause, his sole injury is the lack of process and
only nominal damages are proper. See id.

17

Carey therefore makes clear that federal law defines
the proper remedy for a procedural due process violation.
See Brewer, 938 F.2d at 863 (quoting Peery v. Brakke, 826
F.2d 740, 747 (8th Cir. 1987)). Carey looks solely to the
process to which a plaintiff is entitled, which is also defined
by federal law, see Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill
470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985), and determines the degree of
injury that occurred because of the denial of that
constitutionally mandated process. See Brewer, 938 F.2d at
863-64. State law is irrelevant to this analysis. Therefore,
the district court properly looked to federal law, rather than
Missouri law, in determining the proper remedy for Hopkins'
procedural due process deprivation.

D.

Hopkins also contends that, even if the district court
was correct in applying the Carey remedial framework, there
was insufficient evidence to support the court's finding that
Hopkins was dismissed for cause. Whether an employee
"would have been fired even if he had been accorded due
process is a finding of fact, which we may not set aside
unless clearly erroneous." Rogers v. Kelly, 866 F-2d 997,
1000 (8th Cir. 1989). We therefore must affirm the court's
finding if its "account of the evidence is plausible in light of
the record viewed in its entirety." Id. (quoting Anderson v.
City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985)).

Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court
found that Hopkins was discharged because his
confrontational and autonomous managerial style conflicted
with the cooperative, consensus-based form of management
that Saunders was attempting to create within the
Department. The court thus found that Hopkins would have
been dismissed even if he had received due process. This
finding is supported by evidence that Hopkins repeatedly

18

resisted Saunders’ attempts to coordinate matters at the
director level. For example, Hopkins refused to rely on the
central personnel office, instead maintaining his own
employee files, and disregarded Saunders' attempt to
coordinate certain functions through the Department's
Administrative Services. In addition, there was testimony
that Hopkins-managed his own division through intimidation
and fear. This dictatorial managerial style both conflicted
with Saunders’ approach and harmed employee morale within
the Division. Accordingly, we can not say that the district
court committed clear error in finding that Hopkins would
have been dismissed even if he had received due process.

E.

Finally, Hopkins argues that the district court's
evidentiary hearing regarding the cause of his dismissal was
procedurally defective in several respects. First, Hopkins
contends that he was denied procedural due process at the
hearing itself because he was never given a written notice
prior to the hearing setting forth the officials' alleged basis
for his dismissal. Although it is not clear that no such notice
was provided to Hopkins prior to the hearing, we believe that
even if he never received a formal notice, Hopkins was not
denied due process because the fundamental purposes of due
process--"notice and an opportunity to respond"--were
served. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 546; see also Heinen v.
Brewer, 171 F. 3 d 612, 614 (8th Cir. 1999). Hopkins had
the benefit of and utilized discovery and the power of
subpoena to prepare for the hearing. He was therefore able to
fully apprise himself of the officials' asserted grounds for
dismissal and could adequately present a defense at the
hearing.

Second, Hopkins contends that the district court
incorrectly denied his Rule 60(b) motion for relief, in which

19

he alleged that defense witnesses "systematically
manipulated" their testimony by conversing in the hallway
prior to testifying at the hearing. We review the district
court's ruling on this issue for abuse of discretion. See
United States v. Covington, 133 F.3d 639, 645 (8th Cir.
1998) (applying abuse of discretion review to the district
court's refusal to grant a mistrial because of communication
between witnesses). No such abuse exists here. Hopkins
supports his claim of witness misconduct with five affidavits
that assert that several defense witnesses conversed in the
hallway outside of the courtroom. However, evidence of
communication between witnesses, by itself, is insufficient to
warrant relief under Rule 60(b) for improper witness
communication. See id. In order to obtain Rule 60(b) relief,
Hopkins must also demonstrate that the contact between
witnesses "resulted in the tailoring of witness testimony . . .
or the development of less than candid testimony."
Covington, 133 F.3d at 645 (quoting United States v. Kindle,
925 F.2d 272, 276 (8th Cir. 1991). Hopkins has made no
such showing.

Third, Hopkins asserts that the district court
improperly permitted Carol Heminghaus, a defense witness,
to be present 'in the courtroom prior to her testifying. The
decision whether to exclude a witness from the courtroom is
"committed to the sound discretion of the trial court."
United States v. Wilson, 103 F.3d 1402, 1406 (8th Cir.
1997). Here, the court acted well within its discretion.
Heminghaus was a member of the APRB that would have
heard Hopkins' appeal in 1994 had a hearing been held, and
her testimony at trial concerned whether she would have
affirmed Hopkins' dismissal at that time. Thus, Heminghaus
was "a person whose presence. . . [was] essential to the
presentation of the party's cause," Fed. R. of Evid. 615,
because in order to credibly testify regarding how she would
have ruled in 1994, it was necessary that Heminghaus first
hear the evidence that she would have heard in 1994. Thus,

20

Nate re tsi 2 atic aera canine tan
ee

not only was Heminghaus's presence in the courtroom
permissible, it may have been essential.

IV.
We reverse that portion of the district court's

judgment which awards Hopkins nominal damages and
attorney fees. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.

21

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
CENTRAL DIVISION

TOMMY D. HOPKINS,
Plaintiff,

JOHN L. SAUNDERS, et al-,

)
vs. ) No. 94-4458- CV-C-SOW
)
)
Defendants. )

ORDER

Before this Court are plaintiff's Motion ior Relief
Under Rule 60(b). Defendants failed to file a response.

Plaintiff asserts that the defense violated this Court's
order that witnesses not discuss their testimony with other
witnesses. Plaintiff argues that the appropriate sanction is to
disqualify the witnesses involved in this miscarriage of
justice. Plaintiff states that this Court should either (a) reopen
the hearing and disqualify these defense witnesses from
testifying, or (b) reconsider the evidence presented at trial,
disregarding evidence of these witnesses.

This Court would have made the same findings had it
only considered the testimony of defendant John Saunders
and plaintiff Tommy Hopkins. Defendant Saunders was the
first witness to testify and, therefore, the alleged misconduct
would not have influenced his testimony,

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that plaintiff's Motion for Relief Under
Rule 60(b) (doc. #144) is denied.

/s/ Scott O. Wright
SCOTT O. WRIGHT
Senior United States District Judge

June 16", 1998.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
CENTRAL DIVISION

TOMMY D. HOPKINS, )
Plaintiff, )
Vs. ) No. 94-4458- CV-C-SOW
)
)
)

JOHN L. SAUNDERS, et al.,
Defendants.

ORDER

Before this Court is plaintiff's Rule 59 Motion to
Reconsider and Set Aside a Portion of the Order and
Judgment Entered on February 27, 1998, and defendants'

Opposition.
On February 27, 1998, this Court held that:

(1) because plaintiff's procedural due process
rights were violated, plaintiff shall be awarded
nominal damages in the amount of $1.00; and

(2) plaintiff is not entitled to reinstatement,
because he would have been fired even if he
had received due process.

Plaintiff requests a hearing regarding the mental and
emotional distress he suffered as a result of his firing and the
amount of back pay he should be awarded. Plaintiff asserts
that he should be awarded back pay from the date of his

24

firing, June 10, 1994, until the date the Court held its hearing
on December 17-18, 1997.

Plaintiff's claims for back pay and damages for
mental or emotional distress are barred by the Eleventh
Amendment. Hopkins v. Saunders, 93 F.3d 522, 526-27 (8"
Cir. 1996). Plaintiff is not requesting, and is not entitled to,
back pay for the post-order period. See Barnes v. Bosley,
828 F.2d 1258 (8" Cir. 1987). Additionally, plaintiff is
asserting that the mental and emotional distress he suffered
was a result of his firing, not lack of a hearing.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that plaintiff's Rule 59 Motion to
Reconsider and Set Aside a Portion of the Order and
Judgment Entered on February 27, 1998 (doc. #139) is
denied.

/s/ Scott O. Wright
SCOTT O. WRIGHT

Senior United States District Judge

April 22, 1998

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

CENTRAL DIVISION
TOMMY D. HOPKINS, )
Plaintiff, )
vs. ) No. 94-4458- CV-C-SOW

JOHN L. SAUNDERS, et al., )

Defendants. )

ORDER

In an order dated September 30, 1997, this Court held
the following: '

(1) the Merit System Plan and Rules and -
Regulations apply to plaintiff as the Director of
the Division;

(2) based on the Merit System Rules and
Regulations, plaintiff had a property interest, or
a legitimate claim of entitlement, in continued
employment unless dismissed for cause; and

(3) because plaintiff had a property interest in
continued employment unless dismissed for
cause and plaintiff was terminated from his
position as Director of the Division by
Department Director Saunders without receiving

26

prior notice or a hearing, plaintiff's procedural
- due process rights were violated.

This Court held an evidentiary hearing December
17-18, 1997, to determine whether plaintiff would have been
fired even if he had received due process. This Court finds
that plaintiff was fired for cause. Specifically, plaintiff was
fired for the good of the service and because his management
style conflicted with the management style of Deputy
Director Saunders. As Division Director, plaintiff exhibited
behavior in his management style that adversely affected
employee job performance, the atmosphere in his Division
and the quality of work performed in the Department as a
whole. Plaintiff displayed a management style that indicated
he was not willing to accept suggestions or directions in
operating his division more effectively and efficiently.
Plaintiff maintained an autonomous form of management
which was directly contrary to Director Saunders' style of
management and adverse to the team approach that Director
Saunders strongly encouraged in the Department.

Because plaintiff's procedural due process rights were
violated, plaintiff is entitled to nominal damages. Brewer v.
Chauvin, 938 F.2d 860, 862-64 (8th Cir. 1991). Plaintiff is
not entitled to reinstatement, because he would have been
fired even if he had received due process. Rogers v. Kelly,
866 F.2d 997, 1000-1001 (8th Cir. 1989)

Also before this Court is plaintiff's Motion for
Attorney's Fees and Costs (doc. #132). Pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988, plaintiff is seeking attorney's fees and costs as the
prevailing party. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that "a
plaintiff who wins nominal damages is a prevailing party
under §1988.” Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 112 (1992). In
her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor enumerated three
factors that should be considered in determining whether and
how much a prevailing party should be awarded in attorney's

27

ee

fees: (1) the difference between the amount recovered and
the damages sought; (2) the significance of the legal issue on
which the plaintiff prevailed; and any public goal or purpose
the litigation might have served. Id. at 116-122; Jones v.
Lockhart, 29 F.3d 422, 423-24 (8th Cir. 1994).

Taking these factors into consideration, this Court
finds that plaintiff's counsel is entitled to attorney's fees. Not
only did plaintiff establish that his procedural due process
rights were violated, but he also furthered the public policies
that require the employees of the Division of Grain
Inspection, Weighing and Warehousing be employed based
on job qualifications rather than political affiliations.
Additionally, plaintiff's counsel represented plaintiff in an
efficient manner and requested a modest hourly rate. Based
on counsel's itemization of his fees and expenses, this Court
finds that plaintiff's counsel should be awarded $43,764.00
for attorney's fees (364.7* hours @ $120.00/hour) and
$6,236.41 for expenses.

Plaintiff's counsel has also requested leave to
withdraw as counsel for plaintiff. Local Rule 83.5(0) states
the following:

Counsel may not be relieved from further
representation of a client without obtaining leave of
Court. Such leave will ordinarily be denied unless
entry of appearance by substitute counsel is assured
or has occurred.

Accordingly, Venters' Motion to Withdraw (doc. #135) is
denied and may be refiled after substitute counsel has entered

an appearance.

* Counsel requested compensation for 393.4 hours but only provided
itemized times for 364.7 hours.

28

It is hereby

ORDERED that, pursuant to an evidentiary hearing
held December 17-18, 1997, this Court finds that plaintiff
was fired for cause. Specifically, plaintiff was fired for the
good of the service and because his management style
conflicted with the management style of Deputy Director
Saunders. As Division Director, plaintiff exhibited behavior
in his management style that adversely affected employee job
performance; the atmosphere in his Division and the quality
of work performed in the Department as a whole. Plaintiff
displayed a management style that indicated he was not
willing to accept suggestions or directions in operating his
Division more effectively and efficiently. Plaintiff
maintained an autonomous form of management which was
directly contrary to Director Saunders' style of management
and adverse to the team approach that Director Saunders
strongly encouraged in the Department. It is further

ORDERED that because plaintiff's procedural due
process rights were violated, plaintiff shall be awarded
nominal damages in the amount of $1.00. It is further

ORDERED that plaintiff is not entitled to
reinstatement, because he would have been fired even if he
had received due process. It is further

ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for attorney's fees
and costs (doc. #132) is granted. It is further

ORDERED that plaintiff's counsel shall be awarded
$43,764.00 for attorney's fees (364.7 hours @ $120.00/hour).
It is further

ORDERED that plaintiff's counsel shall be awarded
$6,236.41 for expenses. It is further

ORDERED that Venters' Motion to Withdraw (doc.
#135) is denied.

/s/ Scott O. Wright
SCOTT O. WRIGHT
Senior United States District Judge

February 27, 1998.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
CENTRAL DIVISION

TOMMY D. HOPKINS,
Plaintiff,

VS. No. 94-4458- CV-C-SOW

JOHN L. SAUNDERS, et al.,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)

ORDER

Pursuant to a telephone conference held October 31,
1997, it is hereby

ORDERED that Defendants shall file the notice
required by the Merit System Plan and Rules and Regulations
by November 19, 1997. It is further

ORDERED that witness and exhibit lists and findings
of fact and conclusions of law shall be filed by December 8,
1997. It is further

ORDERED that an evidentiary hearing on the issue
of whether Hopkins would have been fired even if procedural
due process had been observed shall be held at the U.S.
District Courthouse in Jefferson City, Missouri on December
17, 1997, at 9:00 a.m.

/s/ Scott O.Wright
SCOTT O. WRIGHT
Senior United States District Judge

November 7", 1997.

31

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
CENTRAL DIVISION

TOMMY D. HOPKINS, +)
Plaintiff, )

vs. ) No. 94-4458- CV-C-SOW.
JOHN L. SAUNDERS, et al., )

Defendants. )

ORDER

Before this Court are defendants' Second Motion for
Summary Judgment, plaintiff's Opposition and
Counter-Motion for Summary Judgment, and defendants'
Reply. For the following reasons, defendants’ Motion will be
denied and plaintiff's Motion will be granted.

I. Background

Plaintiff Tommy D. Hopkins ("plaintiff") was the
Director of the Division of Grain Inspection and
Warehousing (“the Division”) in the Missouri Department of
Agriculture ("the Department") from approximately August
1981 until June 10, 1994. On June 10, 1994, plaintiff was
terminated from his position as Division Director by
Department Director Saunders without receiving prior notice
or a hearing.

Plaintiff sought review of the decision by filing an
appeal with the Agriculture Personnel Review Board

32

("APRB"). The Department responded with a letter
explaining that the APRB did not exist.

Plaintiff filed an appeal with the Personnel Advisory
Board ("PAB"). The PAB dismissed plaintiffs appeal,
holding that the Department had adopted the PAB's appeal
procedures for most of its employees but not for its division
directors.

The Department agreed with the PAB's result, but not
its rationale, and appealed to the Circuit Court. Plaintiff
successfully moved to dismiss the appeal on the theory that
the state was the prevailing party below.

Plaintiff filed the present complaint seeking $6
million in compensatory damages, $3 million in punitive
damages and injunctive relief. The Department moved for
summary judgment on the basis of qualified and Eleventh
Amendment Immunity. This court denied the Department's
motion.

The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded, granting
defendants immunity from damages on the issue of plaintiff's
due process claim. The Eighth Circuit remanded plaintiff's
claim for equitable relief for further proceedings.

II. Standard

A motion for summary judgment should be granted if,
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party, there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (c); Rafos v. Outboard
Marine Corp., 1 F. 3d 707, 708 (8" Cir. 1993) (citing Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986)). A defendant
who moves for summary judgment has the burden of

showing that there is no genuine issue of fact for trial.
Be:

33

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986).
A plaintiff opposing a properly supported motion for
summary judgment may not rest upon the allegations of his
pleadings, ‘but must set forth specific facts showing them is a
genuine issue for trial." Id.

III. Discussion

Defendants argue that the Court of Appeals
recognized that plaintiff failed to prove he had a property
right in continued employment and the Court of Appeals'
ruling should, therefore, end this litigation. Plaintiff argues
this court previously decided plaintiff had a property interest
in his continued employment and, based on the doctrine of
the law of the case, this issue should not be relitigated.

The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that:

After a careful reading of the plan itself, we are
unable to determine whether it grants Hopkins a
property right. Although the plan states that it shall
apply to ‘all offices, positions and employees’ of the
Division, the general language in the plan indicates
that it does not apply to the division director but is to
be used by the division director in dealing with his
subordinates. . .. Clearly, there was confusion when
Hopkins was dismissed as to whether a division
director had a continued right of employment, and the
officials are thus entitled to qualified immunity on
Hopkins, due process claim.

Hopkins v. Saunders, 93 F.3d 522, 526 (8th Cir. 1996). The
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals did not determine whether
plaintiff had a continued right of employment. The Eighth
Circuit held that the officials were entitled to qualified
immunity because it was unclear when plaintiff was
dismissed whether plaintiff had a continued right of

34

employment. Whether plaintiff had a property interest in
continued employment is the issue that is now before this
Court.

Defendants argue that Hopkins did not have a
property interest in his position as a Division Director and,
therefore, he cannot state a claim under 42 U.S.C. §1983.
Plaintiff asserts that he had a property interest in continued
employment by virtue of the U.S. Grain Standards Act and
the rules and regulations promulgated pursuant to the federal
law, the February 1, 1978, Executive Order, and the Merit
System Plan and Rules and Regulations published by the
Missouri Department of Agriculture.

To have a property interest, plaintiff must have “a
legitimate claim of entitlement" in a benefit. Board of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.' 564, 577 (1972). This "legitimate
claim of entitlement" is created and defined "by existing
rules or understandings that stem from an independent source
such as state law." Id.; Perry v. Sinderman 408 U.S. 593, 601
(1972) (citing Roth, 408 U. S. at 577) ("A person’s interest in
a benefit is a ‘property’ interest for due process purposes if
there are such rules or mutually explicit understandings that
support his claim of entitlement to the benefit and that he
may invoke at a hearing."). If a property interest exists,
plaintiff would be “entitled to a hearing or some related form
of due process prior to termination.” Packett v. Stenberg,
969 F.2d 721, 725 (8" Cir. 1992) (citing Cleveland Bd. Of
Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985)).

On February 15, 1978, the Director of the Department
filed with the Secretary of State a plan to establish a system
of personnel administration based on merit principles for the
employees of the Division ("Merit System Plan") as required
by the Governor's Executive Order of February 1, 1978.
Section A of the Merit System Plan, entitled Basis for the
Plan, states that:

[t]he United States Grain Standards Act (As
Amended) requires that a state agency must
employ personnel on the basis of job
qualifications, rather than political affiliations,
in order to qualify for designation as an official
agency to perform official inspection and
weighing services or to give official supervision
of weighing functions; .. .

July18, 1978, the Department filed with the Secretary of
State Merit System Rules and Regulations for the Division.
The Merit System Plan and Rules and Regulations
established the APRB to conduct appeal hearings. Plaintiff
sought review of his termination by filing an appeal with the
APRB, but the Department responded with a letter explaining
that the APRB did not exist. The first question is whether
plaintiff, as the Director of the Division, held a position
within the classified service category and whether the Merit
System Plan and Rules and Regulations, therefore, applied to
plaintiff. Section BII, entitled Coverage of the System, states
that (emphasis added):

All employees of the Missouri Department of
Agriculture shall be divided into the following
services:

1. Classified Service. The classified services shall
consist of, and the provision of the Governor's
Executive Order and the system established by this
plan shall apply to, all offices, positions, and
employees of the Division of Grain Inspection,
Weighing and Warehousing, that are existing now
or hereafter created. “SN

2. Unclassified Service. The unclassified service
shall consist of, and the provisions of the Governor's
Executive Order and of the system established by this

36

ee ee ean neeeeeeeee

plan shall not apply to, all offices, positions and
employees of the Division of Administrative
Services, Division of Animal Health, Division of
Plant Industries, Division of Audits and Compliance,
Division of Weights and Measures, Division of Fairs,
Division of Agricultural Development, Fiscal Office,
and the office and staff of the Director and Deputy
Director of the Missouri Department of Agriculture,
that are existing now or hereafter created.

"All offices, positions and employees" is broad
language that would include the Director of the Division of
Grain Inspection, Weighing and Warehousing. Additionally,
the language clearly states when the plan shall not apply. If
the Division Director was not to be covered by the Merit
System Plan, the drafters could have listed it as one of offices
or positions the plan would not apply to.

It is true, as the Eighth Circuit noted, ‘at the general
language of the Merit System Plan indicates that the plan is
to be used by the Division Director in dealing with
subordinates. Court finds, however, that the fact the Merit
System Plan is to be used by the Division Director in dealing
with subordinates is insufficient to overcome the clear

language that makes the Merit System Plan also applicable to
the Division Director.

This Court also finds that the Merit System Plan is
still in effect as to plaintiff even though the Department
adopted the appeal procedures under Chapter 36 for most of
its employees because the Department expressly excluded
division directors from coverage. Accordingly, this Court
finds that the Merit System Plan and Rules and Regulations
apply to plaintiff as the Division Director.

The next question is whether plaintiff had a legitimate
claim of entitlement to continued employment unless

37

a

dismissed for cause because of the Merit System Plan and
Rules and Regulations. Were there rules or mutually explicit
understandings that support plaintiff's claim of continued
employment unless dismissed for cause and that plaintiff may
invoke at a hearing?

Rule Number VI (1)(A) states in part (emphasis added):

Demotions in, and dismissals from employment
shall be made for cause under rules uniformly
applicable to all positions of employment. No
appointment, promotion, demotion, or dismissal shall
be made because of favoritism, prejudice or
discrimination.

Rule Number VI (2)(A) states in part (emphasis added):

Discrimination against any person in recruitment,
examination, appointment, training, promotion,
retention, discipline, or any other aspect of personnel
administration, because of political or religious
opinions or affiliations or because of race, national
origin, or any other non-merit factors is prohibited.

Rule Number VI (2)(B) states in part:

An applicant or employee who feels himself
adversely affected in his opportunity for employment,
in his status as an employee, or in his condition of
employment because of discrimination may under this
rule appeal to the board for a review of the alledged
(sic) discriminatory action or practice.

The causes for suspension, demotion and dismissal of any
employee in the classified service are enumerated in Rule
Number VIII(2) and under Rule Number VIII(5) an

38

employee in the classified service can be dismissed when the
good of the service will be served thereby.

Based on these Merit System Rules and Regulations,
plaintiff had a property interest, or legitimate claim of
entitlement, in continued employment unless dismissed for
cause. Plaintiff's property interest in continued employment
is further reinforced by the Employee Information Handbook
for the Department and by various agreements entered
between the United States Department of Agriculture and the
Missouri Department of Agriculture. See plaintiff's exhibits
6-8, 11 and 13.

Because a property interest existed, plaintiff was
entitled to a hearing or some related form of due process
prior to termination." Packett, 969 F.2d at 725 (citing
Cleveland Bd. Of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542
(1985)). Both plaintiff and defendants agree that plaintiff was
terminated from his position as Director of the Division by
Department Director Saunders without receiving prior notice
or a hearing. Accordingly, plaintiff's procedural due process
rights were violated.

IV. Conclusion

This Court finds that the Merit System Plan and Rules
and Regulations apply to the plaintiff as the Director of the
Division. Based on the Merit System Rules and Regulations,
plaintiff had a property interest, or a legitimate claim of
entitlement, in continued employment unless dismissed for
cause. Because plaintiff had a property interest in continued
employment unless dismissed for cause and plaintiff was
terminated from his position as Director of the Division by
Department Director Saunders without receiving prior notice
or a hearing, plaintiff's procedural due process rights were
violated.

The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that
defendants are immune from damages on the issue of
plaintiff's due process claim. Both parties shall file briefs by
October 5, 1997, that address the appropriate equitable relief
plaintiff should be awarded.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that defendants’ Second Motion for
Summary Judgment (doc. #90) is denied. It is further

ORDERED that plaintiff's Counter-Motion for
Summary Judgment (doc. #98) is granted. It is further

ORDERED that both plaintiff and defendants shall
file briefs addressing the issue of equitable relief by October
5, 1997. :

/s/ Scott O. Wright
SCOTT O. WRIGHT
Senior United States District Judge

September 30, 1997.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

NO. 96-1174WMJC

Tommy D. Hopkins,
Order Denying
Petition for Rehearing
and Suggestion for
Rehearing En Banc

‘e Appellee,
v.

John L. Saunders, et al.,

a ¢ «2 2 @.e 2 6

Appellants

The suggestion for rehearing en banc is denied. The
petition for rehearing by the panel is also denied.

September 23, 1996

Order Entered at the Direction of the Court:

/s/ Michael E. Gans
Clerk, U.S. Court Of Appeals , Eighth Circuit

41

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

Roy Temple, Beth M. Wheeler,
Defendants/Appellants.

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
No. 96-1174
Tommy D. Hopkins, a
_ Plaintiff/Appellee, °
*
V. * Appeal from the United
* States District Court for
John L. Saunders, Kyle Vickers, * the Western District of
Defendants/Appellants, * Missouri.
ok
Charles Ausfahl, °
Defendant, *
ae
*
*

Submitted: — 1996

Filed: August 23, 1996

Before WOLLMAN , Circuit Judge, HENLEY, Senior Circuit
Judge, and DOTY, District Judge.

WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

After Tommy D. Hopkins was terminated from his
job as Director of the Division of Grain Inspection and

* The HONORABLE DAVID S. DOTY, United States District Judge for
the District of Minnesota, sitting by designation.

42

er ereemnrmninnnnmnideiiaiinensiatiins

Warehousing (the Division) of the Missouri Department of
Agriculture (the Department), he brought this 42 U.S.C. §
1983 action against John L. Saunders, Director of the
Department, and others, in their individual and official
capacities, (collectively, the officials), alleging that he had
been dismissed in violation of his due process rights and in
violation of Missouri's whistleblower statute. The officials
appeal the district court's denial of their motion for summary
judgment based on qualified and Eleventh Amendment
immunity. We reverse and remand.

I.

Prior to the enactment of the 1976 United States
Grain Standards Act, the Division was operating as a
patronage organization. The Grain Standards Act, and the
regulations promulgated pursuant thereto, required the
Division to instead "employ personnel on the basis of job
qualifications rather than political affiliations." 7 U.S. C. § 79
(f) (1) (A) (ix) ; see also 7 C.F.R. § 800.195(f) (2) ; 7 C.F.R.
§ 800.196(g) (3) (ii) . In response to the Grain Standards Act,
the governor of Missouri issued an executive order in 1978
requiring the Department to establish a formal merit system
for its Division employees. Pursuant to the executive order,
the Department drafted a merit system plan (the plan), which
was submitted to the United States Department of
Agriculture for approval. The plan established an Agriculture
Personnel Review Board (APRB) to conduct appeal hearings
for Division employees.

In 1979, the Missouri legislature enacted a state merit
system law, found in Chapter 36 of the Missouri Revised
Statutes. The law established a Personnel Advisory Board
(PAB) to hear appeals of merit system employee dismissals.
Some merit employees were not covered by the law. For
example, Chapter 36 expressly excluded division directors
from its coverage. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 36.030.1(1). On May

43

28, 1982, the Department adopted the PAB dismissal
procedures for most of its employees. Division directors were
among the employees the Department excluded from
coverage. In a letter adopting the PAB procedures, the
Department agreed, however, to provide "substantially
similar" appeal procedures for the excluded employees
pursuant to Missouri Revised Statute section 36.390.8 if such
procedures were legally required.”

On June 10, 1994, Hopkins was terminated from his
position as division director by the Department without
receiving prior notice or a hearing. He sought review of the
decision by filing an appeal with the APRB, the board
established pursuant to the plan. The Department responded
with a letter explaining that the plan was void and that the
APRB no longer existed.

Hopkins then filed an appeal with the PAB. The
Department moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing that
Hopkins was specifically excluded from Chapter 36 coverage
and that he failed to state a claim under Missouri's
whistleblower law. Hopkins urged the PAB to determine that
it lacked jurisdiction over his claim because the APRB still
existed and was the proper forum. He requested that the
matter be remanded to the APRB. After conducting a hearing
to determine whether it had jurisdiction, the PAB dismissed
the case, holding that the Department had adopted the PAB's
appeal procedures for its regular employees but not for its
division directors. It held that the plan's appeal procedures
still applied to dismissals of regular Division employees who
were excepted from the PAB's appeal procedures. The
Department agreed with the PAB's result but not with its
rationale and sought review in Missouri state court. Hopkins

* Section 36.390.8 provides that non-merit agencies “shall adopt
- dismissal procedures substantially similar to those provided for merit
employees.”

successfully moved to dismiss the appeal because the
Department was the prevailing party before the PAB.
Hopkins then filed the present complaint in district court,
seeking $6 million in compensatory damages, $3 million in
punitive damages, and injunctive relief in the form of
reinstatement.

Il.

We review the trial court's denial of a motion for
summary judgment de novo. Get Away Club, Inc. v.
Coleman, 969 F.2d 664, 666 (8th Cir. 1992). Summary
judgment should be granted if there is no genuine issue of
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

A. Qualified Immunity

Under the doctrine of qualified immunity,
government officials are generally immune from suit in
performing discretionary duties if "their conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). "(Qualified immunity
is more than a defense to suit; it grants government officials
the right not to be subject to the burden of trial at all."

Billingsley v. St. Louis County, 70 F.3d 61, 63 (8th Cir.
1995) (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 ( 1985)).
Whether a government official is entitied to qualified

immunity is a question of law. Engle v. Townsley, 49 F.3d
1321, 1323 (8th Cir. 1995).

To prove that a clearly established right has been
infringed upon, a plaintiff must do more than allege that an
abstract right has been violated. Runge v. Dove, 857 F.2d
469, 472 (8th Cir. 1988). Instead, a plaintiff "must make a
"particularized showing’ that a "reasonable official would

45

understand that what he is doing violated that right’ or that ‘in
the light of preexisting law the unlawfulness' of the action

was ‘apparent.’ Id. (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S.
635, 640 (1987)).

The officials argue that Hopkins did not have a
constitutionally protected right to continued employment.
They allege that even if the initial plan applied to Hopkins as
division director, Hopkins lost any entitlement to a right of
continued employment when the Department adopted the
PAB's dismissal procedures. Hopkins, on the other hand,
alleges that the Department adopted the PAB procedures for
its regular employees only -- thus, the appeal procedures
established by the plan are still in effect as to him.

In denying the officials' claim of qualified immunity,
the district court agreed with Hopkins and held that “[w]hile
the specific procedures to be followed might have been
debatable at the time of plaintiff's termination, the fact that he
was entitled to some due process was well established[.]"
The district court pointed to the Grain Standards Act and to
the plan itself, which provided that employees of the Division
be employed on the basis of qualifications rather than
political affiliations. It held that a reasonable official should
have been aware of the laws governing the dismissal of
employees_and accordingly refused to grant immunity.

Contrary to the district court's conclusion, we find no
violation of clearly established law. Hopkins clearly had no
continued right of employment under the state merit system
law. Although the Department adopted the PAB's appeal
procedures under Chapter 36 in 1982, both chapter 36 and
the Department itself expressly excluded division directors
from coverage. Moreover, in Brown v. Personnel Advisory
Bd., 879 S.W.2d 581, 584-85 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994), the
Missouri Court of Appeals rejected a part-time employee's
argument that the Grain Standards Act required the

46

j
i
:

|

Department to use the PAB procedures for all employee
dismissals.

Although the Department agreed to adopt similar
dismissal procedures for division directors if required by law
under section 36.390.8, the officials are nevertheless entitled
to qualified immunity. Missouri courts have not yet decided
whether section 36.390.8 confers a property interest in
continued employment or whether it merely gives employees
a right to receive review procedures. Thus, in Pace v.
Moriarty, 83 F.3d 261, 263 (8th Cir. 1996), we held that state
officials were entitled to qualified immunity on an
employee's claim for damages based on section 36.390.8.
Likewise the officials in the present case cannot be held to
have violated a clearly established right when it is unclear
whether section 36.390.8 bestows such a right.

Having concluded that Hopkins had no clearly
established right to continued employment under the state
merit system law, we turn to the question whether he had
such a right under the Department of Agriculture merit plan.
After a careful reading of the plan itself, we are unable to
determine whether it grants Hopkins a property right.
Although the plan states that it shall apply to "all offices,
positions and employees" of the Division,, the general
language in the plan indicates that it does not apply to the
division director but is to be used by the division director in
dealing with his subordinates. In fact, under the plan, the
division director was a member of the APRB and would thus
be entitled to hear his own appeal.

Clearly, there was confusion when Hopkins was
dismissed as to whether a division director had a continued
right of employment, and the officials are thus entitled to
qualified immunity on Hopkins' due process claim. See
Tubbesing v. Amold, 742 F.2d 401, 406-07 (8th Cir. 1984)
(commissioners entitled to qualified immunity when it was

not clear whether employee policy manual establishing a
property right in employment applied to director). Moreover,
it was unclear whether Hopkins was subject to either the
plan's dismissal procedures or those provided pursuant to
section 36.390.8. Our review of the record leads us to the
conclusion that the only thing that is clear in this case is that
the law was unsettled at the time of Hopkins' dismissal.

The officials further claim that they are entitled to
qualified immunity on Hopkins' claim that he was denied a
right to a post-termination hearing under Missouri's
whistleblower statute. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 105.055.° The
Missouri courts have not yet interpreted this statute. The
district court determined, however, that the right to such a
hearing was clearly established by section 105.055 and thus
denied the officials qualified immunity. We disagree. The
relevant issue for qualified immunity purposes is whether-the
officials violated clearly established law when they refused to
grant Hopkins a hearing on his section 105.055 claim before ~
the APRB. Because it was not clearly established that the
plan's appeal procedures applied to Hopkins as division
director at the time of-his dismissal, the officials were not
violating any clearly established right when they denied him
a hearing before the APRB. See Warmer v. Graham, 845 F.2d
179, 182 (8th Cir. 1988) ("official may not be charged with
knowledge that his conduct was unlawful unless it has been
previously identified as such"). Accordingly, the officials are
also entitled to qualified immunity on this claim.

* Section 105.055(5) states, in relevant part:

Any employee may file an administrative appeal whenever the
employee alleges that disciplinary action was taken against the employee
in violation of this section. The appeal shall be filed with the state
personnel advisory board; the provided that the appeal shall be filed with
the appropriate agency review board or body of nonmerit agency
employers which have established appeal procedures substantially similar
to those provided for merit employees . . .

48

B. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

Because they were sued in their official capacities, the
officials also seek Eleventh Amendment immunity from
Hopkins' request for money damages. The Eleventh
Amendment prohibits a citizen from suing a state for money
damages in federal court. Welch v. Texas Dep't of Hwys. &
Public Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 472 (1987). Even when a state
is not named as a party to the act on, the suit may still be
barred by the Eleventh Amendment. A state official is
entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity if immunity will
"protect the state treasury from liability that would have had
essentially the same practical consequences as a judgement
against the State itself." Hadley v. North Ark. Community
Technical College, 76 F.3d 1437, 1438 (8th Cir. 1996),
petition for cert filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3001 (U.S. June 24, 1996)
(No. 95-2060) (citations omitted); see also Ford Motor Co. v.
Dep't of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945) ("when the
action is in essence one for the recovery of money from the
State, the state . . . is entitled to invoke is sovereign immunity
from suit even though individual officials are nominal
defendants").

In considering whether the officials were entitled to
Eleventh Amendment immunity, the district court noted that
a critical factor was whether any judgment "would ultimately
come out of state funds or whether a judgment could be paid
out of non-state funds under the agency's discretionary
control." The district court then refused to grant immunity,
holding that Hopkins had raised a valid claim as to whether
any money damages could be paid from non-state funds.

Hopkins suggested that any monetary award could
be paid out of the grain inspection fee fund, which is separate
from the state's general revenue fund. It is true that Missouri
law requires grain inspection fees to be kept in a separate
account. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 411.151. However, under

section 411.151.1 the account is considered part of the state
treasury. In fact, section 411.1,31.2 authorizes the legislature
to transfer money from the general revenue fund to the grain
inspection fee fund as needed "to enable the director to
continue operations[.]" Furthermore, no expenditures could
be made from the grain inspection fee fund until after the
money was appropriated by the legislature. § 411.151.1.

The grain inspection fee fund is also subject to
several restrictions under state and federal law. Under
section 411.151.1, the money in the fund is restricted “for the
payment of salaries and expenses . . . necessary for carrying
out the provisions consistent with the grain inspection and
weighing services of [the Grain Warehouse Law.]” The
Grain Standards Act further forbids the Division from using
“any moneys collected pursuant to the charging of fees for
any purpose other than the maintenance of the official
inspection operation or other agricultural programs operated
by the state or local governmental agency.” 7 U.S.C. §

79(f(1(A)(vi).

In summary, section 411.151 makes clear that
money in the grain inspection fee fund is part of the state
treasury. They money in the fund is restricted by both state
and federal law and cannot be expended without
appropriation by the state legislature. See Dover Elevator
Co. v. Arkansas State Univ., 64 F.3d 442, 447 (8° Cir. 1995)
(university which could not spend money unless appropriated
by state assembly was entitled to Eleventh Amendment
immunity); Hadley, 76 F.3d at 1441 (Eleventh Amendment
immunity extended to college when its daily operations were
dependent upon state treasury). Because any judgment
would ultimately come out of state funds, the officials are
entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.

III. Conclusion

We reverse the denial of immunity for the officials ©
in their individual and official capacities, and remand
Hopkins’ claim for equitable relief for further proceeding.
See Treleven v. Univ. of Minnesota, 73 F.3d 816, 819 (8"
Cir. 1996) (state official may be sued in official capacity for
prospective injunctive relief); Grantham v. Trickey, 21 F.3d
289, 295 (8"" Cir. 1°994) (qualified immunity does not bar
plaintiff's equitable claim for reinstatement).

A true copy.
Attest: /s/ Michael E. Gans

CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS,
EIGHTH CIRCUIT.

51

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

-~ CENTRAL DIVISION
TOMMY D. HOPKINS, )
Plaintiff, '
vs : No. 94-4458-CV-C-5
JOHN L. SAUNDERS, et al., :
Defendants.
Order

Before this Court are defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
or, in the alternative, for Summary Judgment and plaintiff's
response. For the following reasons defendants' motion is
granted in part and denied in part.

Background

Plaintiff, Tommy D. Hopkins, brings the above cause
against John L. Saunders, Kyle Vickers, Charles Ausfahl,
Roy Temple, and Beth M. Wheeler in their individual and
official capacities alleging violations of due process and
Missouri's whistleblower statute. On June 10, 1994, Hopkins
was fired as Director of the Division of Grain Inspection and
Warehousing (Division) of the Missouri Department of
Agriculture (Department), a position he had held for thirteen
years. Hopkins received no notice or hearing prior to
termination. Hopkins filed a Notice of Appeal with the
Agriculture Personnel Review Board (APRB) on June 30,
1994. This board was created pursuant to a 1978 Executive

52

order by the governor of Missouri calling for the
establishment of a personnel administration system based on
merit for the Division.

In response, the Department informed Hopkins that
the APRB no longer existed and that the merit system plan
was "void and inoperative." Hopkins next filed a Petition for
Review in the Circuit Court of Cole County seeking review
of the Department's response. That petition for review was
later dismissed at Hopkins' suggestion. Additionally, in an
attempt to preserve any appeal rights, Hopkins filed a Notice
of Appeal with the state Personnel Advisory Board (PAB), a
board that hears appeals of merit system employee
dismissals. Defendants challenged the PAB's jurisdiction by
filing a motion to dismiss which was denied. As a result,

~~ Defendants filed a Petition for Writ of Prohibition in the Cole

County Circuit Court seeking to prohibit the PAB from
proceeding with an evidentiary hearing. A hearing, however,
was conducted solely to determine what personnel provisions
applied to Hopkins. Both Hopkins and the Department then
asked for the PAB to dismiss the case on different grounds.
Hopkins maintained that the PAB had no jurisdiction over
the case because he was covered by the plan created in
compliance with the Executive Order, and therefore, the
APRB had proper jurisdiction. The Department claimed that
the PAB was the right forum but that the Missouri Merit
System Law removed division directors from protection.

The PAB dismissed the case on the grounds set forth
by Hopkins. They found that the Department had adopted the
PAB's procedures for its regular employees but not for
directors. In addition, the PAB found that the Department
had established appeal procedures similar to those afforded
merit employees pursuant to the Executive Order and that
any appeal was to be presented to the APRB. ~

53

The Department appealed the PAB's findings by
filing suit in the Circuit Court of Cole County. The Circuit
Court dismissed the Department's petition for review as moot
because the Department had received a dismissal as it had
requested.

This Court originally granted Defendants' motion to
dismiss on abstention grounds, choosing to "permit state
courts to try state cases free from interference by federal
courts.” Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 36, 43, 91 S.Ct. 746,
750, L.Ed.2d 669 (1971). However, since the state courts
have refused to hear this case, the cause must be dealt with
by this Court.

Standard

A motion for summary judgment should be granted if,
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party, there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (c) ; Rafos v. Outboard
Marine Corp., 1 F. 3d 707, 708 (8th Cir. 1993) (citing
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct.
2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). A defendant who
moves for summary judgment has the burden of showing that
there is no genuine issue of fact for trial. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby. Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2514, 91
L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A plaintiff opposing a properly
supported motion for summary judgment, however, may not
rest upon the allegations of his pleadings, "but must set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."

Id.

Analysis

; Statutes

In bringing this motion, Defendants first assert that
Hopkins is not entitled to remedy as a matter of Missouri
law. Defendants maintain that the Executive Order system,
the APRB, was superseded either by the enactment of the
State Merit System Law or by the subsequent adoption by the
Department of its appeals process. Under the Merit System
Law, for agencies covered by the statute, Division Directors
of merit agencies are expressly excluded from the merit
system. Mo. Ann. Stat. § 36.030 (Vernon 1994). This Court
holds that Hopkins is not subject to the Merit System Law

because of both collateral estoppel and the supremacy of the
federal Grain Standards Act.

A. The Enactment of Chapter 36

After examining Chapter 36, Missouri's Merit System
Law, this Court cannot Say as a matter of law that Chapter 36
was meant to include the Division at the time of its
amendment in 1979. When a federal court is faced with a
lack of controlling state judicial authority, it must determine
the law as the state court would determine it, guided by
reason and sound judicial analysis. Morton v. Texas Welding
And Manufacturing Co., 408 F -Supp. 7, 10 (S.D.Tex. 1976):
The primary rule of Statutory construction is to ascertain the
intent of the legislature from the language used and to give
effect to that intent if possible. Wolff Shoe Co. v. Director of
Revenxie, 762 S.W.2d 29, 31 (Mo. banc 1988). Words must
be accorded their plain and ordinary meaning, id,, and, if the
wording of a statute is plain, simple, and straightforward, it is
appropriate to assume that the ordinary meaning of those
words accurately expresses the legislative purpose. United
States v. Jones, 811 F.2d 444, 447 (8th Cir. 1987). While the
first source in determining legislative intent is to examine the

55

words used in the statute, a proper analysis also considers the
context in which the words are used. Fowler v. Director of
Revenue, 823 S.W.2d 134, 135 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).

Section 36.030 of the Merit System Law, which lists
those governmental units included in the act's coverage, fails
to explicitly name the Division or the Department while
specifically naming many other governmental units at the
division level or smaller.’ The fact that the Executive Order
was issued in order to comply with federal standards shows
that the government was well aware that Division needed to
have a merit system. This court finds that had the legislature
intended for Division to be included under the State
Personnel Law, it would have specifically named it.

Defendants contend that the Division was included
through the catch-all provision at the end of the section, “.. .
and such other agencies as may be required to maintain
personnel standards on a merit basis by federal law or
regulation for grant-in-aid programs.” Mo. Ann. Stat. §
36.030(1). However, the Division received no grant money
and cannot be considered a “grant-in-aid program” within the
plain meaning of the statute.

' A system of personnel administration based on merit principles and
designed to secure efficient administration is established for all offices,
positions and employees, except attorneys, of the department of social
services, the department of corrections, the department ofhealth , the
department of natural resources, the department of mental health, the
personne] division and other divisions and units of the office of
administration, the division of employment security of the department of
labor and industrial relations, the division of industrial inspection, the
tourism commission, environmental improvement authority, Missouri
housing development commission, the Missouri state water patrol, the
Missouri veterans commission, such other agencies as may be designated
by law, and such other agencies as may be required to maintain personnel
standards on a merit basis by federal law or regulation for grant-in-aid
programs.” Mo. Ann. Stat. §36.030 (1994)

56

Furthermore, both the executive and judicial branches >
of Missouri have interpreted the statute as not including the
Division as a merit agency under its coverage. On November
13, 1979, the director of the Department signed a cooperative
agreement with the United States Department of Agriculture
stating that personnel in the Division were covered by the
Executive Order plan rather than Chapter 36; this was over
three months after Chapter 36 had taken effect. This
agreement had also been approved by the Missouri Attorney
General.

Moreover, the Missouri Court of Appeals ruled in
Brown v. Personnel Advisory Bd. of State of Mo., 879
S.W.2d 581 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994), that the Department was a
non-merit agency that had adopted the appeals procedure of
Chapter 36 for at least some of the personnel of the Division
on April 22, 1981. If the Department had this option at that ~
time, it necessarily follows that the Division was not included
in the original act,

B. Collateral Estoppel

Since this Court cannot rule as a matter of law that
the Division was included as a merit agency within Chapter
36, the issue of which procedures the state of Missouri meant
to apply to the Division turns on a factual determination of
whether the Department later adopted Chapter 36 and to
which personnel that adoption would apply. That issue has
already been adjudicated before the PAB, and relitigation by
this court is barred by collateral estoppel.

Title 28 U.S.C. § 1738 "requires federal courts to give
the same preclusive effect to state court judgments that those
judgments would be given in the courts of the state from
which the judgments emerged." Kremer v. Chemical Const.
Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 467, 102 S.Ct. 1883, 1889, 72 L.Ed.2d
262 (1982). Accordingly, federal courts have consistently

57

applied res judicata and collateral estoppel to causes of action
and issues decided by state courts. Id. Under collateral
estoppel, once a court decides an issue of fact or law
necessary to its judgment, that decision precludes relitigation
of the same issue on a different cause of action between the
same parties. Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153,
99 S.Ct. 970, 973, 59 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979). So long as
opposing parties had an adequate opportunity to litigate
disputed issues of fact, res judicata is properly applied to
decisions of an administrative agency acting in a "judicial
capacity." United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384
U.S. 394, 422, 86 S.Ct. 1545, 1559, 16 L.Ed.2d 642 (1966)
(citations omitted). When a federal court is bound by the
statutory directive of §1738, state proceedings need do no
more than satisfy the minimum requirements of the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause in order to
qualify for full faith and credit. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 482, 102
S.Ct. at 1897.

This Court then must first decide whether the courts
of Missouri would give preclusive effect to the judgment of
the PAB. Section 36.390(9) requires that a decision by the
PAB be final and binding subject to appeal. Mo. Ann. Stat.
§36.390(9). Further, collateral estoppel has been "applied by
Missouri courts in situations where the fact issue was raised
and decided in an administrative proceeding and relitigation
later attempted in a circuit court action." Bresnahan v. May
Dept. Stores Co., 726 S.W.2d 327, 329 (Mo. banc 1987). In
Bresnahan, the Missouri Supreme Court held that a decision

by an appeals referee with the Appeals Tribunal of the
Division of Employment Security determining that the

? See Butcher v. Ramsey, 628 S.W.2d 912, 914 (Mo.Ct.App. 1982), “the
unappealed final administrative determination in a workman’s
compensation proceeding upon a fact issue within the jurisdiction of the
administrative body is not subject to collateral attack and constitutes a bar
to relitigation of the same fact issue in a subsequent common law action.”

(see also Scannell v. Fulton Iron Works Co., 289 S.W.2d 122 (1956).

58

a

plaintiff had tried to steal from her employer precluded the
plaintiff from relitigating that fact in a civil trial in circuit
court. 726 S.W.2d at 330. The court said that parties may not
relitigate the issues raised and decided adversely to them in
an administrative proceeding if those proceedings met a
four-pronged test: 1) the issue decided was identical to the
issue presented in the present action; 2) the prior adjudication”
resulted in a judgment on the merits; 3) the party against
whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party to the prior
adjudication; 4) the party against whom collateral estoppel is
asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in
the prior suit. Id.,. at 330 (citing Oates v. Safeco Ins. Co. of
Am., 583 S.W.2d 713, 719 (Mo. banc 1979)).

In the current cause, the parties are identical, and the
issue is the same. The prior adjudication was held solely to
determine the factual issue of what procedure had been
adopted by the Department. That hearing resulted in a
judgment for the plaintiff on the merits. This Court further
finds that Defendants had a "full and fair opportunity" to
litigate the issue. Both sides were afforded a chance to be
heard and present evidence at a hearing. The hearing was
held in front of a three person board and treated as a
contested case. Section 36.390 required the PAB to use the
official procedures and rules set out in Chapter 536 allowing
parties to call and examine witnesses, to introduce exhibits,
to cross-examine and impeach opposing witnesses, and rebut
the evidence against them. Mo. Ann. Stat. § 536.070(2).
Section 36.390(9) provides for judicial review for a party
aggrieved by a final decision.

Since all four prongs of the test are met, Missouri
courts would recognize the preclusive effect of the PAB's
decision. That being the case, this court must next determine
whether the PAB proceedings met the minimum
requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause. No single model of procedural fairness, let alone a

59

particular form of procedure, is dictated by the Due Process
Clause. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 610, 94
S.Ct. 1895, 1901, 40 L.Ed.2d 406 (1974). The procedures
afforded in the PAB appeals process are virtually identical to
those held to be sufficient in Kremer. 456 U.S. at 484, 102
S.Ct. at 1898. The state was allowed to submit all exhibits
and the testimony of any witnesses, to rebut the evidence
submitted by Hopkins, and allowed to be represented by
counsel. Judicial review was allowed to extend to a
determination of whether the action of the PAB:

(1) Is in violation of constitutional provisions;

(2) Is in excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction
of the agency;

(3) Is unsupported by competent and substantial evidence
upon the whole record;

(4) Is, for any reason, unauthorized by law;

(5) Is made upon unlawful procedure or without fair trial;

(6) Is arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable;

(7) Involves an abuse of discretion.

Mo. Ann. Stat. § 536.140(2).° The procedures provided
certainly satisfied the requirements of the Due Process
Clause. As Defendants have been afforded a full and fair
opportunity to litigate this factual issue of whether the
Department adopted the PAB procedure for Division, its
relitigation is barred by collateral estoppel.

> This Court has no appellate jurisdiction over the decision by the
Missouri circuit court to dismiss the state’s appeal. Federal courts, with
the exception of the United States Supreme Court, do not possess
appellate jurisdiction over state court proceedings.

RR. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng’rs, 398 U.S. 281, 296, 90 S.Ct.
1739, 1747, 26 L.Ed. 362 (1923) (district courts may not exercise
appellate jurisdiction over state courts); Williams v. McKenzie, 834 F.2d
152, 153 (8 Cir. 1987) (federal courts are not empowered to review state
court proceedings even if a federal claim has been asserted therein).

60

The Supremacy Clause and the Grain Standards Act

Defendants' position that Hopkins was removed from
the merit system as a matter of Missouri law is further flawed
because such an action would be counter to the Grain
Standards Act and void under the Supremacy Clause.
Defendants stated that following the passage of the 1976
Grain Standards Act the "Division was required to maintain a
merit personnel system." (Defs. Supp. at 20). This Court
agrees with the parties on this point. Congress may, pursuant
to its power to regulate Commerce, U. S. Const. Art. 1 §8,
prohibit state regulation in the same area. United States v.
City of St. Louis, 452 F. Supp. 1147, 1150 (1978). State laws
can be preempted by federal regulations as well as federal
statutes. Hillsborough County, Fla. v. Auto. Med. Labs.. 47]
U.S. 707, 714, 105 S.Ct. 2371, 2375, 85 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985).
"State law is preempted where the state law ‘stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress.’”” English v. Gen. Elec.
Co., 496 U.S. 72, 80, 110 S.Ct. 2270, 2275, 110 L.Ed.2d 65
(1990) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz. 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61
S.Ct. 399, 404, 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941)).

It is axiomatic that congressional intent is the
guidepost to judicial interpretation of federal statutes.
Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 82 S.Ct. 1328, 8
L.Ed.2d 440 (1962); Kansas City.Mo. v. Fed. Pac. Elec. Co.,
310 F.2d 271 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 912, 83 S.Ct.
256, 9 L.Ed.2d 171 (1962). The issue turns on the language
of the statute and, where the language is not dispositive, on
the intent of Congress as revealed in the history and purposes
of the statutory scheme. See, Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n
v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108, 100 S.Ct. 2051,
2056, 64 L.Ed.2d 766 (1980) ("the starting point for
interpreting a statute is the language of the statute itself");
Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 95, 103 S.Ct.
2890, 2898, 77 L.Ed.2d 490 (1983) ("in deciding whether a

61

federal law pre-empts a state statute, our task is to ascertain
Congress’ intention in enacting the federal statute at issue").

As a general rule of statutory construction, where the
terms of a statute are unambiguous, judicial inquiry is
complete. Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430, 101
S.Ct. 698, 701, 66 L.Ed.2d 633 (1981). The language of the
Grain Standards Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 71-87, and of the
regulations promulgated thereunder are straight-forward and
unambiguous with regard to "official personnel" of
designated state agencies. The Act provides that state
agencies are required to employ personnel on the basis of job
qualification rather than political affiliation in order to be
designated an "official agency” under the act. 7 U.S. C. §79
(f) (1) (A) (ix). Section 84(g) provides that the "the
Secretary shall develop and effectuate standards for the
recruiting, training, and supervising of official inspection
personnel and appropriate work production standards for
such personnel, which shall be applicable to . . . all state
agencies under delegation of authority pursuant to this
section." 7 U.S.C. § 84(g). These regulations promulgated by
the Secretary of Agriculture clearly state that "state agencies
shall employ official personnel on the basis of job
qualification rather than political affiliation." 7 C.F.R.

§800.196(g)(3)(ii).

"Official inspection personnel" means persons

- licensed or otherwise authorized by the Secretary pursuant to

section 84 to perform all or specified functions involved in
official inspection, official weighing, or supervision of
weighing or supervision of official inspection. 7 U. S. C. §75
(j). The regulations define "official personnel" in the same
way. 7 C.F.R. § 800.0(b)(70). Since Plaintiff was licensed by
the Secretary of Agriculture to perform the above functions
at the time of his dismissal, he qualifies as inspection
personnel under the Act and the regulations, both of which

62

require the state to employ him based on personal
qualifications rather than political affiliation.

Pre-emption "is compelled whether Congress’
command is explicitly stated in the statute's language or
implicitly contained in its structure and purpose." Jones v.
Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525, 97 S.Ct. 1305, 1309,
51 L.Ed.2d 604 (1977). One of the stated purposes of
Congress in adopting the Grain Standards Act of 1976 was to
"provide for the establishment of official United States
standards for grain [and] to promote the uniform application
thereof by inspection personnel." 7 U.S.C. §74. Legislative
history almost solely reflects the concern that corruption and
incompetence had permeated the grain grading system as it
existed prior to 1976. S. Rep. No. 747, 94TH Cong., 2ND.
Sess. 1976, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6522, 1976 WL 14076
(Leg.Hist.), H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1722, 94TH Cong., 2ND
Sess. 1976, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6522, 1976 WL 14076
(Leg.Hist.). Obviously, one of Congress' objectives in
requiring that "official personnel" be employed based on job
qualification rather than political affiliation was to avoid the
corruption and incompetence in the application of its grain
standards which might arise if state agencies were allowed to
operate in a patronage fashion. This Court cannot interpret
this statute as allowing states to exclude from these standards
the highest ranking manager in the officially designated state
agency.

The Supremacy Clause dictates that any provision
made by Missouri which allowed any "official personnel" to
be employed on the basis of political affiliation would be
void.

D. ___ Missouri Statute § 105.055

Defendants next ask this court to dismiss Hopkins'
claims under §105.055, Missouri's "Whistleblower” Statute,

63

for failure to state a case under which relief may be granted.
As this statute has not yet been interpreted by Missouri case
law, this Court must again determine the meaning of a
Missouri statute. Once again, when a federal court is faced
with a lack of controlling state judicial authority, it must
determine the law as the state court would determine it,
guided by reason and sound judicial analysis. Morton, 408 F.
Supp. at 10. The primary rule of statutory construction is to
ascertain the intent of the legislature from the language used
and to give effect to that intent if possible. Wolff Shoe, 762
S.W.2d at 3. Words must be accorded their plain and
ordinary meaning, Id., and, if the wording of a statute is
plain, simple, and straightforward, it is appropriate to assume
that the ordinary meaning of those words accurately
expresses the legislative purpose. Jones, 811 F.2d at 447.

Section 105.055 is a “whistleblower” statute whose
clear purpose is to encourage the reporting of wrong-doing
and prohibit supervisors from firing underlings for making
such reports. The Statute plainly states that “[n]o supervisor
or appointing authority shall . . . take any disciplinary action
whatsoever against a state employee . . . for the disclosure of
information which the employee reasonably believes
evidences a violation of any law, rule or regulation.” Mo.
Ann. Stat. § 105.055(2)(1).

Defendants claim that since § 105.055(1) applies only
to disclosures to the state legislature or state auditor and since
§ 105.055(3) in part addresses issues relating to legislative
requests, the entire statute applies only to reports made to the
legislature or auditor. This Court cannot accept that
interpretation. The language of subsection (1) protects
employees discussing any aspect of agency operation with
the state legislature or state auditor. Mo. Ann. Stat. §
105.055(1). Under Defendants’ interpretation, subsection (2)
would serve no purpose because violations of law and
regulations certainly are already included within discussions

64

of the operations of the agency addressed in subsection (1).
The legislature must be presumed not to enact meaningless
provisions. Wollard v. City of Kansas City, 831 S.W.2d 200,
203 (Mo. banc 1992) (citing City of Willow Springs v.
Missouri State Librarian, 596 S.W.2d 441,446 (Mo. banc
1980). Further, had the legislature intended to limit
subsection (2) to disclosures made to the state legislature or
state auditor it would have so specified, as it did in
subsection (1). While the legislature and auditor might
occasionally be appropriate forums for disclosure of
violations of law and regulations, they certainly are not
always the most appropriate or the most obvious to an
employee wanting to report such activity. This Court cannot
accept that the Missouri state legislature intended this
legislation to be so neutered by such a limitation.

Defendants also claim that the termination of Hopkins
was not a "disciplinary action" within the statute. The statute
clearly defines "disciplinary action" as "any dismissal,
demotion, transfer, reassignment, suspension, reprimand,
warning of possible dismissal or withholding of work." Mo.
Ann. Stat. § 105.055(4). Defendants contend that this
definition only includes low level merit employees and that a
"failure to reappoint" is not a dismissal or withholding of
work. Once again this Court cannot agree with the
defendant's interpretation. Viewing the evidence and
inferences that can be drawn from it in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, a reasonable jury could conclude
that Hopkins was terminated in retribution for reporting
violations of reguiations and the law within Division. This is
exactly the type of retaliation that § 105.055 was enacted to
prevent and is clearly a disciplinary action within the statute.
Subsection (5) provides that "any employee" may file an
appeal under the act. Mo. Ann. Stat. § 105.055(5). Even were
Hopkins not required to be employed based on qualifications,
this Court could not view his termination under these
circumstances as falling outside the coverage of this statute.

65

The statute by its plain language applies to employees at all _
levels. To deny coverage to management personnel within
the state government would be te deny coverage to those
most likely to recognize when a law or regulation was being
violated. This Court is not persuaded that that was the intent
of the Missouri legislature.

Section 105.055(5) provides that appeals under the
act be filed with the appropriate agency review board. As
discussed above, collateral estoppel afforded the decision of
the PAB dictates that the appropriate agency review board
would be the APRB.* Defendants have claimed that this
board does not exist, and thus barred the plaintiff from the
hearing allowed him under §105.055. Viewing the evidence
in the manner most favorable to the plaintiff, Defendants'
refusal to allow Hopkins a hearing before the APRB could
constitute a denial of Due Process and therefore be actionable
under 42 U.S.C. S 1983. Defendants are not entitled to
summary judgment as a matter of law on this issue.

I. 11th Amendment Immunity

Defendants have claimed that because they have been
sued in their official capacity, they are entitled to Eleventh
Amendment immunity’ from the monetary awards requested
by Hopkins.° In the absence of consent, a suit in which the

* Even were the APRB not the appropriate forum and the PAB was,
Hopkins might be entitled to a hearing under §105.055 because
subsection (5) only adopts the appeals provisions of §36.390 which does
not expressly exclude division directors. See, Laws v. Secretary of State,
895 S.W.2d 43 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995).
* Defendants have not claimed, and would clearly not be entitled to,
sovereign immunity. Under Missouri law, a public entity is deprived of
sovereign immunity when it performs a proprietary function. Johnson v.
i- Vv 793 S.W.2d 864, 866 (Mo. Banc 1990).
Defendant does not challenge the authority of this Court to grant
injunctive relief. It is well-settled that “a federal court, consistent with
the Eleventh Amendment, may enjoin state officials to conform their

66

BPE cmon i Ne th Re raceme tia
aa a ore Birra ranivresnmme ——* gansient ran weeps gail

State or one of its agencies or departments is named as the
defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment.’ See,
e.g., Florida Dept, of Health v. Florida Nursing Home Assn.,
450 U.S. 147, 101 S.Ct. 1032, 67 L.Ed.2d 132 (1981) (per
curiam); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 98 S.Ct. 3057, 57
L.Ed.2d 1114 (1978) (per curiam). Certain well-established
exceptions to Eleventh Amendment immunity have been
established. A state may waive its sovereign immunity and
consent to suit in federal court, or Congress may, by
legislation, abrogate immunity without the state's consent in
order to effectuate the provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S.
234, 238, 105 S.Ct. 3142, 3145, 87 L.Ed.2d 17] (1985).
This Court agrees with Defendants that neither of these
exceptions is met in this case. Congress did not abrogate

- constitutional sovereign immunity when enacting § 1983 or
the Grain Standards Act. See, Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332,
342, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 1146, 59 L.Ed.2d 358 (1979). As for
waiver by the state, waiver can only be found where stated
"by the most express language or by such overwhelming
implications from the text as [will] leave no room for any
other reasonable construction." Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S.
651, 673, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 1361, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974)
(quoting Murray v. Wilson Distillin Co., 213 U.S. 151, 171,
29 S.Ct. 458, 464, 53 L.Ed. 742 (1909)). The Supreme Court
added in Edelman that the "mere fact that a State participates
in a program through which the F ederal Government
provides assistance for the operation by the State of a system

future conduct to the requirements of federal law, even though such an
injunction may have an ancillary effect on the state treasury.” Quern v.
Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 337, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 1143, 59 L.Ed.2d 358 (1979)
(citations omitted).

’ The eleventh amendment provides, “The Judicial power of the United
States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State. U.S. Const.
amend. XI].

67

of public aid is not sufficient to establish consent on the part
of the State to be sued in the federal courts." Id., 415 U.S. at
673, 94 S.Ct. at 1361. This Court cannot find that Missouri
intended to waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity. The
fact that the Department agreed explicitly to obey federal law
in administering the program can hardly be deemed an
express waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity. Florida

Dept. of Health and Rehabilitative Serv., 450 U.S. 147, 149,
101 S.Ct. 1032, 1034, 67 L.Ed.2d 132 (1981).

However, when a suit is brought only against state
officials, as is the case here, the court must decide whether
the suit is actually one against the state. "When the action is
in essence one for the recovery of money from the state, the
state is the real, substantial party in interest and is entitled to
invoke its sovereign immunity from suit even though
individual officials are nominal defendants." Ford Motor
Corp. v. Dept. of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464, 65 S.Ct. 347,
350, 89 L.Ed. 389 (1945).

While the Eleventh Amendment bars private parties
from suing a state in federal court, state-connected entities or
subdivisions do not always share in their state's immunity.
See, Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429
U.S. 274, 280, 97 S.Ct. 568,,572, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977).
Courts considering an entity's claim of Eleventh Amendment
immunity must determine "whether the suit is in reality a suit
against the state." Sherman v, Curators of Univ, of Mo., 16
F.3d 860, 864 (8th Cir. 1994). (quoting Greenwood v. Ross,
778 F.2d 448, 453 (8th Cir. 1985)). In making this
determination courts consider as a critical factor whether any
judgment rendered against the entity would ultimately come
out of state funds or whether a judgment could be paid out of
non-state funds under the agency's discretionary control. Id,
(citing Edelman V. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 668, 94 S.Ct. 1347,
1358, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974)).

68

eteeserereerernesreesemmmeenmnnniteteesiiiaiinasieii dilate io

Cases in other Circuits have examined this challenge
to the Eleventh Amendment defense in Bowen and Schiff.
Bowen v. Hackett, 387 F. Supp. 1212 (D.R.1. 1975), Schiff v.
Williams, 519 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1975). Bowen is an :
example of the careful scrutiny required to determine
Eleventh Amendment issues. That case involved the question
whether an order directing payments to be made from a
state's Employment Security Fund and Temporary Disability
Insurance Fund was barred by the Eleventh Amendment. In
denying immunity, the District Court noted that the money in
the funds was not a product of legislative appropriations but
was revenue collected from a limited class of persons
through an-administrative process and segregated from the
general revenues of the state. Id. at 1220. Schiff involved the
question whether a judgment against a state university for
back pay to the plaintiffs who were wrongfully discharged
from their positions as editors of the student paper was barred
by the Eleventh Amendment. In that case, the Fifth Circuit
found that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar recovery
where the judgment could be paid from a fund generated by
student activities fees which were collected for the purposes
of operating the newspaper, including paying the salaries of
the editors. Id. at 262. Hopkins claims that any award he

received could be paid from a fund similar to those in Bowen
and Schiff.

Hopkins has therefore called into dispute whether or
not a monetary award would necessarily have to be paid from
State funds. Sherman, 16 F.3d at 864. He has submitted
evidence that Division is run in a corporate fashion and
generates a profit. Indeed, the majority of grading and
weighing conducted under the Grain Standards Act across the
country is done by corporations rather than state agencies.
The Division is clearly involved in interstate commerce and
is authorized by the Missouri Legislature to operate outside
the state of Missouri. Defendants have produced no evidence
as to how much control the state actually exerts over

69

Division, which is largely controlled by federal regulation.
Division receives no tax monies for its operations and
generates a profit through fees charged to grain shippers and
producers. Plaintiff claims that the monies generated through
fees are held separately from the state treasury and that
restrictions have been placed on their use. This Court holds
that there is a dispute as to a material fact as to whether a
damage award "must inevitably come from the general
revenues of the State." Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. at 665,
94 S.Ct. at 1357. Thus, it would be pre-mature to grant
Eleventh Amendment immunity to Defendants at this time.

Il. Qualified Immunity

Defendants have also claimed that they are entitled to
qualified immunity. The standard for determining whether
defendants are entitled to qualified immunity is well
established. "[G]overnment officials performing
discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability
for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which
a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73
L.Ed.2d 39 (1982). The Supreme Court has made it clear that
a plaintiff cannot defeat an official's claim of qualified
immunity "simply by alleging violation of extremely abstract
rights." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639, 107 S.Ct.
3034, 3039, 97 L.Ed. 523 (1987). There must be a
"particularized” showing that "a reasonable official would
understand that what he is doing violates that right." Id. A
court must first determine whether a violation of a
constitutional right has been alleged; second, whether the
alleged violation was clearly established; and third, whether
given the facts most favorable to the plaintiff, there are no
genuine issues of material fact as to whether a reasonable
official would have known that the alleged actions violated

70

ieee

that right. Foulks v. Cole County, Mo., 991 F.2d 454, 456
(8th Cir. 1993).

Hopkins claims that Defendants denied him due
process rights granted him by statutes and regulations. In
order to avoid qualified immunity on the due process claims,
a plaintiff must first show that he was deprived of a liberty or
property interest within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The United States Supreme Court has
recognized that “[t]o have a property interest in employment,
a person must have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it."
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 -
L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). Typically, this property interest arises
from regulatory or contractual limitations on the employer's
ability to terminate an employee. Blankenbaker v. McCook
Pub. Power Dist., 940 F.2d 384, 385 (8th Cir. 1991). When
such a property interest exists, the employee is entitled to a
hearing or some related form of due process prior to
termination. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S.
532, 542, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 1493, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 ( 1985).

As discussed in Part I of this Order, both the Grain
Standards Act and the regulations complying with the
governor’s executive order provide that employees of the
Division be employed on the basis of qualifications rather
than political affiliation. The Division regulations
promulgated under the Executive order provided for a pre-
termination hearing. These regulations created a property
interest for Hopkins in his employment. See, Bishop v.
Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 345 n. 8, 96 S.Ct. 2074 n. 8, 48 L.Ed.2d
684 (1976) (because a [federal] employee could only be
discharged for cause, he had a property interest which was
entitled to constitutional protection) (citing Arnett, 416 U.S.
at 151-152, 94 S.Ct. at 1642-1643).

That Hopkins was terminated is undisputed. That
Hopkins received no process prior to or subsequent to his

71

termination is also conceded. Therefore, this Court holds
that Hopkins has alleged a violation of an established right by
the Defendants.

The only remaining issue that must be addressed then
is whether “the contours of this right [are] sufficiently clear
that a reasonable official would understand that what his is
doing violates that right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S.
635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3039, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). The
official is presumed to know the preexisting law governing
his conduct, (see, Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818-
19, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738-39, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)), and his
conduct is to be evaluated under the Harlow standard of
“ “objective legal reasonableness’ of the action . . .” assessed
in light of the legal rules that were ‘clearly established’ at the
time it was taken . . .” Anderson, 107 S.Ct. at 3038 [citations
omitted]. The law is well established that employees with a
property interest in their job are entitled to some due process.
See, Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 542, 105 S.Ct. at 1493
(well-established law declares that a public employee with a
constitutionally protected property interest in that
employment is entitled to a pre-termination hearing
consisting of notice and an opportunity to respond). While
the specific procedures to be followed might have been
debatable at the time of plaintiff's termination, the fact that he
was entitled to some due process was well established under
case law and the Grain Standards Act, both of which a
reasonable official would have been aware. A reasonably
competent director of a state department should be aware of
federal laws governing the actions of his department. Jackson
V. Rapp, 746 F. Supp. 934, 945 (W.D.Mo. 1990). This Court
need not analyze the amount of process that should have been
afforded in deciding this motion because it is undisputed that
absolutely no process was afforded Hopkins, and some was
certainly required. Accordingly, qualified immunity cannot
be granted on this issue.

72

As established earlier in this order, Plaintiff was also
entitled to a post-termination hearing under § 105.055. This
right was clearly established by statute. That statute requires
that "each state agency shall prominently post a copy of this
section in locations where it can reasonably be expected to
come to the attention of all employees of the agency." Mo.
Ann. Stat. §1057055(6). This Court holds that the meaning of
that statute is clear and that any reasonable official would be
aware of the rights it afforded to state employees.
Accordingly, qualified immunity cannot be granted with
respect to any of the defendants on this issue.

IV. Official Immunity

De

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386014_1149%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
