# Appendix — Meyer v. Meyer

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386014_0995%3A2

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 2000
- **Citation:** 530 U.S. 1263

## Text

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

Mrs. Tanya Meyer, Ph.D.,
Petitioner,
V.

Ronald Allen Meyer, Sr.,
Respondent,

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

~ APPENDICES A-E

Mrs. Tanya Meyer, Ph.D.
2581 Fremont Drive

Lake Havasu City, AZ 86406
(520) 505-2842

See ga

EDITOR'S NOTE
THE FOLLOWING PAGES WERE POOR HARD COPY

AT THE TIME OF FILMING. L* AND WHEN A

BETTER COPY CAN BE OBTAINED, A NEW FICHE

WILL BE ISSUED.

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3

TABLE OF CONTENTS
APPENDICES A-EF
PAGE

Appendix Au... ccc... Decision of Divison One

Court of Appeals of the State of Arizona
Appendix B...... Judgment of Mohave County

Appendix C
Decision of the Supreme Court of Arizona............. C-]
Supreme Court of Arizona Refusal to
Review Decision 0.0.0.0... cccosscss....... C-3
Appendix D.... Court Order Being Violated
Appendix E
Other Relevant Court Orders

Mohave County Minute Order - 1/24/2000............. E-]
Mohave County Minute Order - 2/7/2000............... E-3
Mohave County Minute Order - 2/24/2000............. E-5
Court of Appeals Decision - La Paz County............. E-7
SM isdisncisicicenimm te E-16
Roy v. Industrial Commission of Arizona.............. E-24
A OOM ossssicsicctaticinccsancccc E-32

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E-14

Sheri Newman
Superior Court Clerk

(520) 669-6131
TDD (520) 669-8400)
FAX (520) 669-2186

Futu re
Unlimited

1316 Kofa Avenue, Suite 607
Parker, Arizona 85344

E-15

STATE OF ARIZONA
DEPARTMENT OF REAL ESTATE 596368

REAL ESTATE SALESPERSON LICENSE

This is to certify that the person named below has fulfilled the requirements of
Arizona laws governing the licensing of
A REAL ESTATE SALESPERSON

TANYA Z MEYER ie

LAKE HAVASU CITY, AZ 86403

| License No. sa117882000

TS LICENSE MUST GE AVAILABLE FOR PUBLIC INSPECTION

_ E-16

Document 900003637 State of California

Name Change of Doc 4980007619

Commission on Teacher Credentialing
issues this document to

TANYA ZAPPE MEYER

Clear Adminsstrative Services Credential

Ks Dias credentun avthonzes the bokier to serve as & su JerWwHeNdeN, MSCOsIE aupenntenden. deputy sare mienden:. Poncipel, aise ant principal super sor
consultant, coorcinater, Of in an cyuralent of smermediate kel cominetrat ve postion m grades tweve and below. mokding orexchoot, ord 11 classes
Organised promanily for actules

Vahd: October 7, 1997 to November 1, 2002

Ro To eaew dus credential, te hoder nerds fo wort only on apebicascn form and fee to the Com nisaon within at mon-hs ser to he export On date pomed
above The onewal penal os fine year

Aa JTF tt org

E-17

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CERTIFICA 4

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TANYA Z MEYER
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E-18

198 P. 1105, 22 Ariz. 490, Horton v. Horton, (Ariz.
1921)
1105 198 P. 1105
22 Ariz. 490
Horton
Vv.
Horton
No. 1893.
Supreme Court of Arizona.
July 5, 1921

Action by L. J. Horton against Annie Horton, for
annulment of marriage. Judgment for plaintiff, and
defendant appeals.

Reversed, with directions to dismiss.
1. Divorce k 320

Marriage in foreign state to evade restrictions of
state of domicile held not invalid. Where parties
domiciled in Arizona went to New Mexico for the
purpose of evading the restrictions provided by Civ.
Code 1913, par. 3864, as amended by Laws 1917, c.
54, forbidding remarriage for one year after divorce,
and were there married, such marriage was not
thereby rendered invalid in Arizona, the statute not in
terms or by necessary implication declaring such
marriage void.

2. Marriage k 3
Marriage valid according to lex loci valid
everywhere at common law. Marriage is primarily a
contract and under the common-law rule is valid
everywhere if entered into according to lex loci.

3. Marriage k 3

Legislature may determine what marriages shall be
void, notwithstanding they are valid in state where

E-19

celebrated. It is within the power of the legislature to
enact what marriages shall be void within the state,
notwithstanding they are valid in the state where
celebrated, whether contracted between parties who
were in good faith domiciled within the state where
the ceremony was performed or between parties
who left the state for the purpose of avoiding its
statutes.

1. DIVORCE 320
134 ---
134 VII Operation and Effect of Divorce, and Rights
to Divorced Persons
134k319 Right to Marry
134k320 In general.

Ariz., 1921

Where parties domiciled in Arizona went to New
Mexico for the purpose of evading the restrictions
provided by Civ. Code 1913, par 2864, as amended
by laws 1917, c. 54 (A.R.S. section 25-320),
forbidding remarriage for one year after divorce,
and were there married, such marriage was not
thereby rendered invalid in Arizona, the statute not in
terms or by necessary implication declaring such
marriage void.

2. MARRIAGE 3
253
253k3 What law governs.

Ariz. 1921

Marriage is primarily a contract and under the
common-law rule is valid everywhere if entered into
according to the lex loci.

3. MARRIAGE 2
253 ----
253k2 Power to regulate and control.

Ariz. 1921

E-20

- | =

It is within the power of the Legislature to enact what
marriages shall be void within the state,
notwithstanding they are valid in the state where
celebrated, whether contracted between parties who
were in good faith domiciled within the state where
the ceremony was performed or between parties
who left the state for the purpose of avoiding its
statutes.

*1106 Appeal from Superior Court, Maricopa
County; F. H. Lyman, judge.

Phillips, Cox & Phillips and C. F. Ainsworth, all of
Phoenix, for appellant.

Earl Anderson of Phoenix, for appellee.
[22 Ariz. 491] Baker, J.

This action was brought by the plaintiff (the parties
will be designated in this court as they were in the
court below) to obtain a judgment annulling the
marriage between the plaintiff and the defendant,
celebrated in Deming, N. M., on the 12th day of
September, 1918, on the ground that such marriage
was void. It appears from the finding s of the lower
court that the parties both resided in the state of
Arizona at the time they contracted the marriage in
New Mexico, and that they have ever since retained
such residence. It further appears that the defendant
was formerly married to one William Crawford, but
on the Ist day of August, 1918, she was granted an
absolute divorce from her husband by the superior
court of Maricopa county, Ariz. For the purpose of
avoiding the restrictions of the laws of Arizona,
prohibiting the marriage of a divorced person until
after the expiration of one year from the time the
divorce is granted, the parties went to Demin, N. M.
and were there married. They immediately returned
to this state and lived together as husband and wife
until about the 26th day of February, 1920, when the

E-21

defendant drove plaintiff from the house, since which
time the parties have lived separate and apart.

The lower court determined that the marriage in
Deming, N. M., was void and entered a judgment
annulling it for the reason and on the ground that
such marriage was consummated prior to the
expiration of one year from the date of the divorce
granted to the defendant.

The provisions of the statutes of this state on the
subject are contained in section 3839, Revised
Statutes 1913, and section 3864, as amended by
chapter 54, Sessions Laws 1917, p. 75:

‘3839. All marriages valid by the laws of the place
where contracted, shall be valid in this state; [22
Ariz. 492] provided, that all marriages solemnized in
any other state or country by parties intending at the
time to reside in this state shall have the same legal
consequences and effect as if solemnized in this
state; parties residing in this state cannot evade any
of the provisions of its laws as to marriage by
going into another state or country for the
solemnization of the marriage ceremony.’

‘3864. A divorce from the bonds of matrimony shall
notin any wise affect the legitimacy of the children
thereof; and either party may, after the dissolution of
the marriage, marry again only after one year shall
have elapsed from the date of judgment of such
divorce; provided however, that if proceedings are
begun prior to the expiration of the said one year to
set aside said judgment of divorce, or either of them,

may not marry again until the said proceedings shall
have been determined.’

[1] It is conceded that by the laws of New Mexico the
marriage between the parties when consummated
there was lawful in that state. Does the fact that the
parties, being domiciled in this state, lett here and

E-22

went to New Mexico for the purpose of evading the
restrictions provided in section 3864 and were there
married, render such marriage invalid in this state?
We do not think so. It will be observed that the
statutes above cited do not in terms, or by necessary
implication, declare such a marriage void. The
statutes merely in general terms prohibit such a
marriage. No penalty is affixed for disobedience.

There is some conflict of authority as stated in 5
R.C.L. 1001----

‘Upon the question whether the courts of the state
which has enacted such a statute merely in general
terms prohibiting such marriage of such person
occurring out of the state while he is still domiciled
within the state. The weight of authority is that if the
marriage is valid according to lex loci, it will be
upheld even [22 Ariz. 493] by the courts of the state
which enacted the statute, and in which theparties to
the remarriage are domiciled, even though the
parties went out of the state to solemnize the second
marriage for the express purpose of evading the law
of the domicile and of the forum’

In Com. v. Lane, 113 Mass. 458, 18 Am. Rep. 509, the
Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in an opinion by
Mr. Chief Justice Gray, says:

‘A marriage which is prohibited here by statute
because contrary to policy of our laws, is yet valid if
celebrated elsewhere according to the law of the
place, even if the parties are citizens and residents of
this commonwealth, and have gone abroad for the
purpose of evading our laws, unless the Legislature
has clearly enacted that such marriages out of the
state shall have no validity here. This has been
repeatedly affirmed by well considered decisions.’

And this seems to be the overwhelming weight of
the better reasoned cases on the subject. Medway v.

E-23

Needham, 16 Mass. 157, 8 AM. Dec. 131; Van Voorhis
v. Brintnall, 86 N. Y. 18, 37, 40 Am. Rep. 505; Thorp v.
Thorp, 90 N. Y. 602, 43 Am.Rep. 189; Griswold v.
Griswold, 23 Colo. App. 365, 129 Pac. 560; Phillips v.
Madrid, 83 Me. 205, 22 Atl. 114,12 L. R. A. 862;, 23
Am. St. Rep. 770 State v. Shattuck, 69 Vt. 403, 38 Atl.
81,40 L. R. A. 428, 60 Am. St. Rep. 936, and notes;
State v. Hand, 87 Nrb. 189, 126 N. W. 1002, 28 L. R.A.
(N.S.) 753; Conn *1107 v. Conn, 2 Kan. App. 419, 42
Pac. 1006; Dudley v. Dudley, 151 Iowa, 142, 130 N. W.
785, 32 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1170; Hoagland v. Hoagland
(Wyo.) 193 Pac. 843; Hilton v. Stewart, 15 Idaho, 150,
96 Pac. 579, 128 Am. St. Rep. 48.

A number of cases take a contrary view, but an
examination of these cases will show that they were
based upon statutes expressly declaring the
marriages (1) void, or (2) declaring incapacity to
contract, [22 Ariz. 94] or (3) which by express terms
suspended the operation of decrees of divorce, or
were held to suspend it by necessary implication, or
(4) such statutes were held to be declarations of
public policy, superseding the jus gentium that a
marriage valid where performed is valid
everywhere. This distinction is pointed out in
Griswold v. Griswold, supra. The cases we refer to
are collated in 19 C. J. 183, and footnotes, the
principal ones being Lanham v. Lanham, 136 Wis.
360, 117 N. W. 787, 17 L. R. A. (N.S.) 804, 128 Am. St.
Rep. 1085; Pennegar v. State, 87 Tenn. 244, 10S. W.
305, 2L. R.A. 703, 10 Am. St. Rep. 648; McLennan v.
McLennan, 31 Or. 480, 50 Pac. 802, 38 L. R. A. 863, 65
Am. St. 835; In re Stul’s Estate, 183 Pa. 625, 39 Atl. 16,
39 L. R. A. 539, 63 Am. St. Rep. 776.

, i
[2] Marriage is primarily a contract. In its
constitution it is purely personal and consensual.
Considered merely as a contract, it is valid
~ everywhere if entered into according to the lex loci.
This is the common-law rule. The statute recognizes
the common-law rule, ‘all marriages valid by the laws

E-24

a

of the place where contracted shall be valid in this
state.’ The reason for this rule is clearly stated by Mr.
Justice Story in his Conflict of Laws (7th Ed.) par. 121,
where he quotes from the opinion of Sir Edward
Simpson in the historic case of Scrimshire v.
Scrimshire, 2 Hagg. Const. 395;

‘All civilized nations allow marriage contracts. They
are juris gentium, and the subjects of all nations are
equally concerned in them. Infinite mischief and
confusion must necessarily arise to the subjects of all
nations with respect to legitimacy, succession, and
other rights, if the respective laws of different
countries were only to be observed as to
marriages contracted by the subjects of those
countries abroad; and therefore all nations have
consented, or are presumed to consent, for the
common [22 Ariz. 495] benefit and advantage, that
such marriages shall be good or not according to the
laws of the country where they are celebrated. By
observing this rule few, if any, inconveniences can
arise. By disregarding it, infinite mischiefs must
ensue.’

[3] The Legislature undoubtedly had the power to
enact what marriages shall be void in this state,
notwithstanding their validity in the state where
celebrated, whether contracted between parties who
were in good faith domiciled in the state where the
ceremony was performed, or between parties who,
being domiciled in this state, left the state for the
purpose of avoiding it statutes and married. But the
Legislature has not seen fit to do so. Ifthe Legislature
in so many words had said that, if persons residing in
this state, in order to avoid the restrictions contained
in section 3864, and with the intention of returning to
reside in this state, go into another state and there
have their marriage solemnized, and after return and
reside here, their marriage shall be deemed void in
this state, and entirely different state of matters would
exist. .

E-25

The decree of divorce granted by the superior court
of Maricopa county to the defendant, Annie Horton,
was absolute. Essentially it undid the marriage, and
those who were united in it were disunited. The
prohibition contained in the statute did not render
the judgment intermediate or interlocutory, nor did it
impair its integrity. She went into another state and
there married. The prohibition contained in the
statute was without effect outside the territorial limits
of this state.

‘It is almost universally conceded that statutes
prohibiting the guilty party to a judgment of divorce
from marrying again, either for a certain period, or
while the other party to the former marriage lives,
are without effect outside the territorial limits of the
prohibiting state. Since sucha prohibition is in the
[22 Ariz. 496] nature of a penalty it does not apply to
divorces granted outside of the state, nor does it
carry any disability beyond the borders of the state

where in force.’ 5 R. C. L. 1004.

In view of all the facts and circumstances disclosed
by the record, we are of the opinion that the
marriage in New Mexico was not void. While the
defendant was forbidden to marry again in this state
until after the expiration of one year from the time the
divorce was granted, she could contract a marriage
in New Mexico which, if valid there, will be
recognized by the courts of this state. To hold
otherwise would render a number of marriages in
this state void, and possibly cast an ugly suspicion
upon the legitimacy of innocent children.

*]107_ If our views shall be found inconvenient or
repugnant to sound principles, it may be expected
that the succeeding Legislature will explicitly enact
that marriage contracted within another state by
parties who have left this state for the purpose of
avoiding its laws, and who return and lie here, shall
be of no force in this state.

E-26

The judgment of the lower court is reversed, with
instructions to dismiss the action.

ROSS, C. J., and McALISTER, J., concur.

397 P.2d 211, 97 Ariz. 98, Roy V. Industrial
Commission,
(Ariz. 1964)
*211 397 P.2d 211
97 Ariz. 98
Johnnie May ROY, Petitioner,

Vv.
The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of Arizona
and the Howard P. Foley Company and Jelco,
Inc. (Foley-Jelco), Respondents.
No. 8212.
Supreme Court of Arizona, In Division.
Dec. 10, 1964.

Certiorari proceeding to review award denying
alleged common-law wife death benefits under the
workmen’s compensation law. The Supreme Court,
Udall, C. J., held that common-law marriage was
valid under law of Texas, and where presumption
that marriage continued until decedent’s death was
not rebutted by evidence in record the presumption
that marriage continued until decedent’s death was
not rebutted by evidence in record the presumption
controlled and sufficed as basis on which predicate
award of death benefits to her.

Award set aside.
1. MARRIAGE 51
253 ----
253k51 Questions for jury.

Ariz. 1964

E-27

Under Texas law, question whether a common-law
marriage exists is a legal question.

2. MARRIAGE 13
253 ----
253K12 essentials
253K13 common-law REQUISITES.

Ariz. 1964

Under Texas law, requisites of a common-law
marriage are express or implied agreement between
parties to become husband and wife, cohabitation in
pursuance of such agreement, and holding out by
parties that they are husband and wife.

3. MARRIAGE 40(1)
253

253k40 Presumptions be
253k40(1) In general.

Ariz. 1964

When a showirg is made that a marriage has been
celebrated, every act necessary to validity of that
marriage will be presumed in absence of proof to the
contrary.

4 MARRIAGE 40(10)
253 ----
253k40 Presumptions
253k40(10) Rebuttal of presumptions.

Ariz. 1964

Evidence to rebut validity of a marriage must be
sufficiently clear and conclusive as fairly to preclude
any other result.

5 MARRIAGE 40(10)
253 ---
253K40 Presumptions
253K40(10) Rebuttal of presumptions.

E-28

Ariz. 1964

While presumption of marriage is very powerful,
evidence in opposition to presumption need not be
conclusive to overcome it.

6. WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 1474

413 ----

413XVI Proceeding to Secure Compensation

413XVI(N) Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence

413XVI(N)6 Dependency and Relationship

413K1472 Husband and Wife

413K1474 Existence and validity of marriage
relations; common-law marriages.
Ariz. 1964

Where facts gave rise to inescapable legal

conclusion that common-law marriage of alleged
common-law wife and decedent was valid under law
of Texas, and strong presumption that marriage
continued was not rebutted, presumption that
marriage continued until decedent’s death controlled
and sufficed as base on which to predicate award of
death benefits under workmen’s compensation law to
widow.

*212 Joe H. Tonahill, Jasper, Tex., Kenneth S.
Scoville and LeRoy Hofmann, Phoenix, for Johnnie
May Roy

[97 Ariz. 99] Edgar M. Delaney, Phoenix, for
respondent Industrial Commission of Arizona;
Richard J. Daniels, Frank E. Murphy, Jr., James S.
Tegart, Robert A. Slonake, Ralph E. Mahowald, Jr.,
Phoenix, of counsel.

UDALL, Chief Justice.

Petitioner, Johnnie Mae (Reeves) Roy, brings this
matter before us by means of certiorari to review an
award of the Industrial Commission denying her
death benefits under the Workmen’s Compensation
Law. Her claim arises out of the death of Harold Lee

E-29

Roy, to whom it is alleged she was married at the
time of his demise.

No issue is raised regarding the death of Harold Lee
Roy being the proximate result of an accidental
injury sustained in the course of and arising out of his
employment. Decedent was a lineman working for
Foley-Jelco Company and was killed almost
instantaneously May 9, 1962, while working on the
construction of an electrical transmission line tower.

The only dispute involved herein lies in the marital
status of decedent and petitioner. Petitioner alleges
she and decedent consummated a common law
marriage in Texas in the latter part of 1959 or early
1960, and it is admitted that such a marriage is
entirely legal in that state. A thorough interstate
investigation of this matter was conducted by the
Industrial Commission which was assisted in its
endeavors by counsel representing two children of
the deceased. The children were issue of two
previous marriages previously entered into and
dissolved in accordance with the prescribed
solemnities. Having been born under such
circumstances their rights as surviving dependents of
decedent have been recognized.

The sole question for our determination is whether
the conclusion of the Industrial Commission, that
petitioner was not the lawful wife of decedent at the
time of his death, is sustained by competent evidence
in the record.

*213 [1] [2] Although our statutes require the
solemnization of marriages contracted within our
state, A.R.S. section 25-111, they specifically provide
for recognition of the validity of marriages valid by
the laws of the place where contracted, A. R. S.
section 25-112. It therefore must be determined
whether under Texas law petitioner and the
deceased achieved the marriage status. Respondent

E-30

concluded that such a status had not been reached
and accordingly denied petitioner's claim for death
benefits.

Whether a common-law marriage exists has been
held by the Texas courts to be a legal question.
Moore b. Jordan, 328 S. W. 2.d 343 (Tex.Civ.App.).
The requisites of such a marriage are: (1) An
agreement express Or implied between the parties to
become husband and wife; (2) cohabitation [97 Ariz.
100] in pursuance of such agreement, and (3) a
holding out by the parties that they are husband and
wife. Ex Parte Threet, 160 Tex. 482, 333 S. W. 2d 361;
Shelton v. Belknap, 155 Tex. 37, 282 S. W. 2d 682

[3] [4] [5] A number of years ago this Court had
occasion to deal with the presumption of the validity
of marriage and stated:

‘Both the law and public policy favor matrimony and
when it is once shown that a marriage has been
celebrated, the contract, the parties’ capacity to
enter into it, and in fact every act necessary to it
validity will be presumed, in the absence of proof to
the contrary. The presumption that it was legal and
valid in all respects is one of the strongest known to
the law, * * *. ‘ Kolombatovich v. Magma Copper
Co., 43 Ariz. 314, 318, 30 P.2d 832, 834.

It was pointed out in the Kolombatovich decision,
supra, that the evidence to rebut the validity of the
marriage must be sufficiently clear and conclusive as
fairly to preclude any other result. A more recent
decision recognizes the presumption as being very
powerful but rejected the argument that the evidence
in opposition thereto must be conclusive to overcome
it. Hodges v. Industrial Commission, 73 Ariz. 326,

241 P.2d 431. See also Texas Employers’ Insurance
Association v. Elder, 155 Tex. 27, 282 S. W. 2d 371.

As the only issue involved herein is the question of
whether petitioner and decedent were married we
must look to the record to determine whether the
evidence before respondent was sufficient to
establish a prima facie case of such marriage,
thereby giving rise to the presumption of its validity.

[6] The record herein indicates that early in the
investigation of this matter respondent secured and
had before it for consideration a certified copy of the
death certificate which contains the information that
decedent was married at the time of his death and
petitioner’s name as spouse. It indicates that
decedent’s brother Ivey signed as informant

Upon rehearing of this matte by the respondent the
testimony of seven witnesses was taken. The
petitioner testified in essence that she and decedent
visited a Justice of the Peace in Orange, Texas,
intending to have a ceremonial marriage. Although
she was unsure of the exact date she thought it was
on or about March 18m 1960. They were informed
that a three day waiting period was necessary. Upon
further inquiry the Justice of the Peace informed them
of the legality of so-called common-law marriages
and they then agreed to be married in that manner.
Decedent on that day place on petitioner’s finger a
wedding band which she wore until Christmas of
1961 when decedent gave [97 Ariz. 101] her a set of
rings consisting of both an engagement and wedding
ring.

On the day they entered into this agreement they
had occasion to be an establishment in Buna, Texas,
owned by a friend of decedent, Anthony Scalisi. Mr
Scalisi testified that he recalled the visit and that
decedent told him they had been married that day.
He further corroborated petitioner’s claim that from
that day forward they held themselves out to the
public generally as husband and wife. He also had
occasion to visit them while they were *214. staying

E-32

at decedent’s father’s home in Livingston, Texas,
where they presented themselves as husband and
wife; and it was not until after decedent’s death that
he learned they had not been ceremonially joined in
matrimony.

The secretary of the union local in Beaumont, Texas,
of which decedent was a member during 1960 and
1961, testified that during this period the couple held
themselves as husband and wife; and, it was not until
after decedent’s death that he learned they had not
been ceremonially joined in matrimony.

The secretary of the union local in Beaumont, Texas,
of which decedent was a member during 1960 and
1961, testified that during this period the couple held
themselves out to the public generally as husband
and wife.

Decedent’s brother Emory testified that when
visiting his home in Erath, Louisiana, the couple slept
together and otherwise conducted themselves as
husband and wife. Three other witnesses testified: -
one of the decedent’s ex-wives; a former co-worker
of petitioner; and a former co-worker of decedent. In
summation it can be said that their testimony, along
with that of Emory, indicated that all was not blissful
between the parties, that decedent drank quite
heavily and on several occasions physically beat the
petitioner. She apparently threatened to leave after
these incidents and stated that she and the decedent
were not married; however, these statements could
not change the past and if in fact a valid marriage had

been entered into they could not destroy its validity.

The evidence indicates that this couple resided
together as husband and wife in approximately
twelve communities located in Texas, Louisiana,
Kansas, New Mexico, and Arizona. This is certainly
consistent with a marriage relationship.

E-33

Decedent’s brother Ivey did not testify; however, in
addition to being informant for the death certificate
he submitted two affidavits. In the first one he
reiterated the fact that they were married but in the
second he repudiates the first to some extent.

Respondent’s investigation disclosed that on August
22, 1960, decedent applied for credit in Erath,
Louisiana, listing petitioner as his wife, and again,
February 9, 1962, he obtained a loan for the purchase
of an automobile in Mesa, Arizona, listing petitioner
as his spouse. It is also unrefuted in the record that
petitioner was paid as surviving spouse on a life
insurance policy taken through the labor union.

It is our opinion that the above facts give rise to the
inescapable legal conclusion that under the law of
Texas a valid common-law [97 Ariz. 102] marriage
between petitioner and decedent was consummated.
Once established there is a strong presumption that
the marriage continued, and this record does not
contain sufficient evidence to rebut it. Therefore, the
presumption is controlling and sufficient upon which
to predicate an award. Respondent was bound
thereby, and must give it effect. See Martin v.
Industrial Commission, 73 Ariz. 401, 242 P.2d 286.

Award set aside.
LOCKWOOD, V. C. J., SCRUGGS, J., concurring.

418 F. Supp. 1061
(Cite as: 418 F.Supp.1061)
Roger G. Redhail et al., Plaintiffs,
Vv.
Thomas E. ZABLOCKI et al., Defendants.
Civ. A. No. 74-C-624.
United States District Court, E. D. Wisconsin
Aug. 31, 1976

E-34

Aclass action was brought, under federal civil rights
statute proscribing the deprivatior. of rights, and
against defendant class of county clerks, challenging
constitutionality of statute which requires residents,
who have minor issue not in their custody whom they
are under an obligation to support by a court order
or judgment, to obtain a court order granting them
permission to marry in order to obtain a marriage
license. A declaratory judgment and an injunction ©
were sought. The three-judge District Court,
Reynold, J., held that action was entitled to be
maintained as a class action against class of
defendants consisting of 72 county clerks; that no pre
judgment notice to class members was required; and
that statute is invalid as violative of equal protection.

Order accordingly.

[1] DECLARATORY JUDGMENT 123

118Ak123

In the absence of a pending state criminal
prosecution, both declaratory judgments and
injunctions may be issued by federal court with
respect to constitutionality of state statute.

[1] INJUNCTION 105(2)

212k105(2)

In the absence of a pending state criminal
prosecution, both declaratory judgments and
injunctions may be issued by federal court with
respect to constitutionality of state statute.

[2] CIVIL RIGHTS 209 i"
78k209

Formerly 78k13.9

Exhaustion of state remedies is not a prerequisite to
commencing an action under federal civil rights
statute proscribing the deprivation of rights. 42
U.S.C.A. section 1983.

[3] FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE 181

E-35

170 Ak181

Action, brought under federal civil rights statute,
challenging constitutionality of state statute requiring
certain residents to obtain court permission before
they can marry was entitled to be maintained as a
class action against class of defendants consisting of
72 county clerks. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. rule 23 (a),
(a)(1, 3, 4), (b), , (b)(2), 28 U.S.C.A.; W.S.A.
245.10(1).

[4] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 309(1.5)
92k309(1.5)

Formerly 92k309(1)

Due process does not require notice to absent
members of a class within rule 23(b)(2).
Fed.RulesCiv.Proc. rules 23(d)(2), 28 U.S.C.A.

[5] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 48(4.1)

92k48(4.1)

Formerly 92k48(4)

The discretionary notice provisions of class action
rule 23(d)(2) are at least presumptively valid as
complying with due process. Fed.Rules
Civ.Proc.rule 23(d)(2), 28 U.S.C.A.

[6] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 309(1)

92k309(1)

Due Process requires only that “interested parties”
be given notice.

[7] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 309(1.5)

92k309(1.5)

Formerly 92k309(1)

In class action, brought under federal civil rights
statute, challenging constitutionality of state statute
which requires certain residents to obtain court
permission before they can marry, brought against
defendant class of county clerks, all of whom were
required by state statute to refuse to issue marriage
licenses to members of class of plaintiffs without

E-36

: ‘as —

court order, no pre judgment notice to members of
either class was required by either rule 23 or due
process; however, notice of judgment would be
provided to members of defendant class.
Fed.Rules.Civ.Proc. rule 23(d)(2), 28 U.S.C.A.; W.S.A.
245.10(1, 4, 5).

[7] FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE 177.1

170Ak177.1

Formerly 170Ak177, 170 Ak161

In class action, brought under federal civil right
statute, challenging constitutionality of state statute
which requires certain residents to obtain court
permission before they can marry, brought against
defendant class of county clerks, all of whom were
required by state statute to refuse to issue marriage
licenses to members of class of plaintiffs without
court order, no pre judgment notice to members of
either class was required by either rule 23 or due
process; however, notice of judgment would be
provided to members of defendant class.
Fed.RulesCiv.Proc. rule 23(d)(2), 28 U.S.C.A.; W.S.A.
245.10(1, 4, 5).

[8] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 208(1)

92k208(1)

Statutory classifications are generally measured
against the rational relationship test and are upheld if
they are rationally related to some legitimate
government interest. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.

[9] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 208(1)

92K208(1)

If statutory classification impinges upon fundamental
rights or constitutes a suspect classification, it is
subjected to strict scrutiny and can be upheld only if
it is necessary to promote compelling governmental
interests and is narrowly drawn to express only such
interests. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 14.

[10] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 82(10)

E-37

92k82
Individual interests involved in marriage are within
the constitutional right of privacy.

[11] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 82(10)

92k82(10)

Formerly 92k82

There is a constitutionally protected right to marry
which occupies status of a fundamental right.

[12] DIVORCE 34

134k34

Classification created by statute placed substantial
burdens on ability of class members to marry and

’ thus affected their fundamental rights and was
required to be subjected to strict scrutiny. W.S.A.
245.10(1,4,5).

[13] DIVORCE 34

134k34

Wealth discrimination inherent in statute requiring
certain residents to obtain permission before they
can marry provided additional justification for
applying strict scrutiny test.

[14] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 225.1
92k225.1

A sliding scale equal protection analysis was not
appropriate in case involving validity of state statute
which requires certain residents to obtain court
permission before they can marry. W.S.A.
245.10(1,4,5); U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14

[15] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 208(1)

92k208(1)

Where a statutory classification is tested against
requirements of strict scrutiny test, state bears
burden of showing how compelling its interest may
be.

E-38

[16] DIVORCE 321

134k321

State’s interest in counseling persons who had failed
to fulfill support obligations arising from a previous
marriage was insufficient to justify restriction on such
persons’ marital rights under statute which prohibits
remarriage without court permission. W.S.A.
245.10(1,4,5).

[17] DIVORCE 321

134k321

Interest in state in safeguarding welfare of children
could not justify restriction on rights of persons under
statute which prohibits marriage without court
permission, since statute was not necessary to
achievement of such interest. W.S.A. 245.10(1,4,5)

[18 DIVORCE 321

134k321 -

State has legitimate and substantial interests in
regulating the domestic relations of its residents.

[19] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 225.1

92k225.1

Formerly 92k225.2

Statute which requires residents, who have minor
issue not in their custody whom they are under an
obligation to support by a court order or judgment,
to obtain a court order granting them permission to
marry in order to obtain a marriage license is invalid
as violative of equal protection. W.S.A. 245.10(1,4,5);
U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 14.

[19] DIVORCE 4

134k4

Statute which requires residents, who have minor
issue not in their custody whom they are under an
obligation to support by a court order or judgment,
to obtain a court order granting them permission to
marry in order to obtain a marriage license is invalid

E-39

as violative of equal protection. W.S.A. 245.10(1,4,5); -
U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 14.

*1062 Georgia Lutze, Paticia Nelson and Robert H.
Blondis, Milwaukee Legal services, Inc., Milwaukee,
Wis., for plaintiffs.

Robert P. Russel, Corp. Counsel, and David J. Siler,
Asst. Corp. Counsel, Milwaukee, Wis., for
defendants.

Before TONE, Circuit Judge, and REYNOLDS and
Warren, District Judges.

REYNOLDS, District Judge.

This is a class action challenging the constitutionality
of a Wisconsin statute, s 245.10(1), (4), and (5) (1973),
[FN1] which requires certain residents to obtain court
permission before they can marry. The action is
brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. s 1983, and *1063
jurisdiction is conferred by 28 U.S.C. s 1343(3).
Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 92
S.Ct. 1113, 31 L.Ed.2d 822 (1972). The statute is
attacked on the grounds that it conflicts with rights
secured by the First, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution. The
relief sought includes a declaratory judgment that the
statute is unconstitutional as well as an injunction
restraining it enforcement. We hold that the statute
violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal

_ protection clause and that the relief requested should
be granted.

FN 1. ‘245.10 Permission of court required for
certain marriages (1) No Wisconsin resident having
minor issue not in his custody and which he is under
obligation to support by any court order or
judgment, may marry in this state or elsewhere,
without the order of either the court of this state
which granted such judgment or support order, or
the court having divorce jurisdiction in the county of

E-40

this state where such minor issue resides or where
the marriage license application is made. No
marriage license shall be issued to any such person
except upon court order. The court, within 5 days
after such permission is sought by verified petition in
a special proceeding, shall direct a court hearing to
be held in the matter to allow said person to submit
proof of his compliance with such prior court
obligation. No such order shall be granted, or
hearing held, unless both parties to the intended
marriage appear, and unless the person, agency,
institution, welfare department or other entity

having the legal or actual custody of such minor issue
is given notice of such proceeding by personal
service of a copy of the petition at least 5 days prior
to the hearing, except that such appearance or
notice may be waived by the court upon good cause
shown, and, if the minor issue were of a prior
marriage, unless a 5-day notice thereof is given to
the family court commissioner of the county where
such permission is sought, who shall attend such
hearing, except that such appearance or notice may
be waived by the court upon good cause shown, an if
the minor issue were of a prior marriage, unless a 5
day notice thereof is given to the family court
commissioner of the county where such permission is
sought, who shall attend such hearing, and to the
family court commissioner of the court which granted
such divorce judgment. If the divorce judgment was
granted in a foreign court, service shall be made on
the clerk of that court. Upon the hearing, if said
person submits such proff and makes a showing that
such children are not then and are not likely
thereafter to become public charges, the court shall
grant such order, a copy of which shall be filed in any
prior proceeding under s. 52.37 or divorce action of
such person in this state affected thereby;otherwise
permission for a license shall be withheld until such
proof is submitted and such showing is made, but
any court order withholding such permission is an
appealable order. Any hearing under this section

E-41

may be waived by the court if the court is satisfied
from an examination of the court records in the case 7
and the family support records in the office of the
clerk of court as well as from disclosure by said
person of his financial resources that the latter has
complied with prior court orders or judgments
affecting his minor children, an also has shown that
such children are not then and are not likely
thereafter to become public charges. No county
clerk in this state shall issue such license to any
person required to comply with this section unless a
certified copy of a court order permitting such
marriage is filed with said county clerk.‘‘(4) Ifa
Wisconsin resident having such support obligations
of a minor, as stated in sub. (1), wishes to marry in
another state, he must, prior to such marriage, obtain
permission of the court under sub. (1), except that in
a hearing ordered or held by the court, the other
party to the proposed marriage, if domiciled in
another state, need not be present at the hearing, the
judge shall within 5 days, send a copy of the order of
permission to marry, stating the obligations of
support, to such part not present. (5) This section
shall have extraterritorial effect outside the state;
and s. 245.04(1) and (2) are applicable hereto. Any
marriage contracted without compliance with this
section, where such compliance is required, shall be
void, whether entered into in this state or elsewhere.

I.

In January of 1972, a paternity action was
commenced in the County Court, Civil Division, of
Milwaukee County, Wisconsin, against plaintiff
Roger G. Redhail in which it was alleged that he was
the father of a baby girl born out of wedlock on July
5, 1971. On February 23, 1972, Redhail appeared
and admitted that he was the father of the child. On
May 12, 1972, Redhail was adjudged the father of the
child born on July 5,1971, and was ordered to pay
$109 per month as support for the child until she

E-42

|

reached eighteen years of age, and was also ordered
to pay court costs.

At the time of his admission of paternity, Redhail was
a minor and a high school student. From May of 1972
until August of 1974, he was unemployed, indigent,
and.unable to pay any support obligation. No
payments were, therefore, made, and as of
December 24, 1974, there was an arrearage in
excess of $3,732.

Redhail’s child has been a public charge since her
birth and is currently receiving benefits under the
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (“AFDC”)
program in excess of $109 per month. Thus, the child
would be a public charge even if Redhail were
current! the payment of support in the paternity
action.

On September 27, 1974, Redhail filed an application
for a marriage license with defendant *1064 Thomas
E. Zablocki. Zablocki is the County Clerk of
Milwaukee County and is responsible for the
issuance of marriage licenses in Milwaukee County
pursuant to s 245.05, Wis.Stat. On September 30,
1974, an agent of Zablocki denied Redhail’s
application for a marriage license and refused to
issue a marriage license solely because Redhail
failed to comply with s 245.10(1), Wis.Stats., in that he
did not have a court order granting him permission
to marry.

This complaint in this action was filed on December
24, 1974. Since a permanent injunction restraining
the enforcement of a state statute was requested the
action was one requiring a three-judge district court,
28 U.S.C. s 2281. Designation of a three-judge court
was requested, and on January 6, 1975, the Chief
Judge of the Seventh Circuit entered an order
designating this three-judge court pursuant to 28
U.S.C. s 2284. Defendant subsequently filed his

E-43

answer. Notice was given to the governor and the
attorney general pursuant to 28 U.S.C. s 2284 (2).

On February 18, 1975, plaintiff filed a motion for a
class action. The motion sought to have the action
maintained as a class action on behalf of all
Wisconsin residents subject to the provisions of s
245.10(1) and against a class consisting of all the
county clerks within Wisconsin. By order dated
February 20, 1975, Judge Reynolds ordered that the
action proceed as a class action pursuant to Rule
23(b)(2), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on behalf
of a class of plaintiffs defined as follows:

‘All Wisconsin residents who have minor issue not in
their-custody and who are under an obligation to
support such minor issue by any court order or
judgment and to whom the county clerk has refused
to issue a marriage license without a court order,
pursuant to s 245.01(1), Wis.Stats.(1971).”

The order also established a briefing schedule in the
event plaintiffs desired to maintain the action against
a class consisting of all the county clerks. While
plaintiffs filed a briefin support of the motion,
defendant Zablocki has never filed a brief in
opposition.

Following the filing of a stipulation of facts and
briefs, oral argument was held on June 23, 1975, in
which a representative from the Wisconsin attorney
general’s office participated. The Court requested
the parties to discuss the applicability of Huffman v
Pursue, Lt.., 420 U.S. 592, 95S. Ct. 1200, 43 L. Ed.2d
482 (1975), and plaintiffs later filed a memorandum
on this issue.

II.
Before reaching the merits, it is necessary to discuss

_ the Huffman issue as well as to decide whether the
action should be maintained against a class of

E-44

OO

defendants consisting of all the county clerks in the
State of Wisconsin.

A.

In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27
L.Ed. ed 669 (1971), the Court held that federal
courts must refrain from granting injunctions which
would interfere with pending state criminal
proceedings in the absence of extraordinary
circumstances such as when there is a showing of
“bad faith” or harassment” by the state officials
responsible for the prosecution, supra at 54, 91S. Ct,
746, or where the state law to be applied is “
‘flagrantly and patently violative of express
constitutional prohibitions,’” supra at 53, 91 S.Ct. at
755, In a companion case, Samuels v. Mackell, 40]
U.S. 66, 91S. Ct. 764, 27 L. Ed.2d 688 (1971), the
same abstention doctrine was held to apply to
granting declaratory judgments. [FN2] .

FN2. Companion cases to Younger and
Samuels were: Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77, 91 S. Ct.
758, 27 L.Ed.2d 696 (1971); Perez v. Ledesma, 401
U.S. 82, 91 S.Ct. 674, 27 L.Ed.2d 701 (1971); Dyson v.
Stein, 401 U.S. 200, 91 S.Ct. 769, 27 L.Ed.2d 781
(1971); Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216, 91 S. Ct. 777,
27 L. Ed.2d 792 (1971).

Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., supra, extended Younger to
a situation where the state court action, although
nominally civil rather *1065 than criminal, was “in
important respects *** more akin to a criminal
prosecution than are most civil cases. The State is a
party *** and the proceeding is both in aid of an
closely related to criminal statutes which prohibit the
dissemination of obscene materials. ***”Supra 420
U.S. at 604, 95 S. Ct at 1208. Huffman also held that
the federal plaintiff who has lost at the state court trial
“must exhaust his state appellate remedies before
seeking relief in the District Court, unless he can

E-45

bring himself within one of the exceptions specified
in Younger.” Supra 420 U.S. at 608, 95S. Ct. at 1210.
The Court did not, however, decide whether Younger
applies to any type of state court proceeding. Supra
at 607, 95S. Ct. at 1200.

[1] In the circumstances of this action, it is
unnecessary to decide whether Younger should be
further extended. Plaintiff Redhail did not petition a
state court for permission to marry under the
provisions of s 245.10(1) after he was denied a
marriage license. There is, therefore no pending
state proceeding which would be frustrated by
granting the relief requested. In the absence of
pending state criminal prosecution, both declaratory
judgments and injunctions may be issued. Steffel v.
Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 945. Ct. 1209, 49 L.Ed.2d
505 (1974); Doran Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 95S.
Ct. 2561, 45 L.Ed.2d 648 (1975). Thus, even assuming
that Younger should be held to apply to any type of
state court proceeding, since plaintiff Redhail never
initiated a proceeding under s 245.10(1), there is no
threat to the principle underlying Younger and
Samuels *** that state courts are fully competent to
adjudicate constitutional-claims ***.” Doran v. Salem
Inn, Inc., supra, at 930, 95 S. Ct. at 2567.

[2] Nor is there any requirements that a federal
plaintiff in an action under 42 U.S.C. s 1983, such as
Redhail, first apply to state courts for relief. Monroe
v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81S. Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492
(1961), established the principle that exhaustion of
state remedies is not a prerequisite to commencing a
s 1983 action. See also, Wilwording v. Swenson, 404
U.S. 249, 92S. Ct 407, 30 L.Ed.2d 418 (1971);
McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 668, 83 S.
Ct. 1433, 10 L.Ed.2d 622 (1961).

There is, therefore, no barrier to consideration of
plaintiffs’ claims on the merits even if the principles

E-46

of Younger and Huffman are held to apply to any
state court proceeding. [FN3]

FN3. There may be members of the plaintiff
class who have applied to state courts for permission
to marry and whose petitions may be said to be
“pending” in those courts. But since the relief
requested is prospective in nature and operates
against county clerks rather than judges, granting the
plaintiff class relief will not occasion “interference”
with state court proceedings.

B.

Plaintiffs seek to have this action maintained as a
class action as to defendants under Rule 23(b)(2) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The defenant
class is defined in the complaint as “all county clerks
of counties within the State of Wisconsin, all of whom
are required by s 245.10(1) Wis.Stats. (1971) to
refuse to issue marriage licenses to members of the
class of plaintiffs without a court order.” As stated
above, defendant Zablocki has not filed a brief
indicating why this action should not be allowed to
proceed against a class of defendants.

Rule 23(a) prescribes the essential prerequisites that
must be satisfied for any class action. They are
satisfied here. First, the class of defendants,
consisting of the seventy-two county clerks in
Wisconsin, is “so numerous that joinder of all
members is impracticable.” Rule 23(a)(1). Next,
there is a question of law common to all the members
of the class the constitutionality of the challenged
statute. Thirdly, the claims and defenses of the
representative party, defendant Zablocki, are
“typical of the claims or defenses of the class,” Rule
23(a)(3), since Zablocki’s contention that his action in
refusing a marriage license to Redhail was justified
by the statute would undoubtedly be asserted by the
other county clerks. Finally, defendant Zablocki is a

E-47

*1066 representative party who “will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class.” Rule
23(a)(4). Not only is defendant Zablocki’s interest
identical to that of the other county clerks, but the
attorney representing him is from the Milwaukee
County Corporation Counsel’s office which is
experienced in conducting federal litigation.
Furthermore, the Attorney General of Wisconsin has
taken an active part in this action, urging that the
challenged statute be upheld.

Besides fulfilling the prerequisites of Rule 23(a), a
class action must fit within one of the three types of
class actions established by Rule 23(b). Plaintiffs
seek to have the action proceed under Rule 23(b)(2):

“(T)he party opposing the class has acted or refiised
toact onthe ground generally applicable to the
class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive
relief or corresponding declaratory relief with
respect to the class as a whole; ***.”

[3] A Rule 23(b)(2) class action is particularly
appropriate in civil rights cases, although the rule is
not so limited. 3B Moore’s Federal Practice P 23.40,
at 23-654 (2d ed. 1974); C. Wright, Law of Federal
Courts, s 72, at 312 (2d ed. 1970); Advisory
Committee’s Note to 1966 Amendment, 39 F.R.D. 102
(1966). While the language of Rule 23(b)(2) does not
expressly provide for its use where declaratory or
injunctive relief is sought against a class, such class
actions have been ordered. Danforth v. Christian,
351 F.Supp. 287 (W.D.Mo. 1972); Rakes v. Coleman,
318 F.Supp. 181 (E.D.Va. 1970); Washington v. Lee,
263 F. Supp. 327 (M.D.Ala.1966), aff'd sub nom. Lee
v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 88S. Ct. 994, 19 L.Ed.2d
1212 (1968). See, 3B Moore’s Federal Practice P
23.40, 1974 Supplement, at 86. Where as here, a
statute with statewide application is challenged on
the ground of its unconstitutionality allowing the
action to proceed against the class of officials
charged with its enforcement is in accordance with

E-48

the interest of judicial administration and justice
which Rule 23 is meant to further.

At oral argument, it was pointed out that the
members of the defendant class of county clerks
have never been given notice of the pendency of this
action. Indeed, no notice, either individual or
otherwise, has been directed at the members of the
plaintiff class. Rule 23 itself does not require notice to
the members of a (b)(2) class, since the mandatory
notice provisions of Rule 23 (c)(2) are by their terms
applicable, Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S.
156, 177 n. 14, 9458. Ct. 2140, 40 L.Ed.2d 732 (1974),
and the notice provision of Rule 23(d)(2) is
discretionary with the Court. Advisory Committee’s
Note to 1966 Amendment, 39 F.R.D. 106. The
question thus presented is whether due process
requires notice to the absent members of a (b)(2)
class.

On this question there exists a split of authority,
Some courts have ruled that due process requires
notice to the members of a (b)(2) class if the
judgment is to be binding on the. See, e.g., Zeilstra
v. Tarr, 466 F. 2d 11] (6th Cir. 1972); Schrader v.
Selective Service System Local Board No. 76
Wisconsin, 470 F.2d 73 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1085, 93 S. Ct. 689, 34 L.Ed.2d 672 (1972); [FN3a]
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir.
1968), on remand, 52 F.R.D. 253 (S.D.N.1971); 54
F.R.D. 565 (S.D.N.Y.1972); reversed, 479 F.2d 1005
(2nd Cir. 1973); vacated and remanded, 417 U.S. 156,
94S. Ct. 2140, 40 L.Ed.2d 732 (1974); Pasquier v.
Tarr, 318 F. Supp. 1350 (E.D.La. 1970), aff'd, 444 F.2d
116 (Sth Cir. 1971). Other courts have heldthatno
notice need be given to the class members because
due process is satisfied when the class is adequately
represented by counsel. See, e.g., Hammond v.
Powell, 462 F.2d 1053 (4th Cir. 1972); Yaffe v. Powrs,
454 F. 2d 1362 (lst Cir. 1972); Lund v. Affleck, 388
F.Supp. 137

E-49

(D.R.I.1975); White v. Local No.207 of Laborer’s Intl.
Union, 387 F.Supp. 53(W.D.La. 1974); Mazer v.
Weinberger, 385 *1067 F. Supp. 1321 (E.D.Pa.1974);
Souza v. Scalone, 64 F.R.D. 654 (N.D. Calif. 1974);
American Finance System, Inc. v. Harlow, 65 F.R.D.
94 (D.Md.1972); Watson v. Harlow, 65 F.R.D. 94
(D.Md. 1972); Watson v. Branch County Bank, 380 F.
Supp. 945 (W.D.Mich.1974); Lynch v. Household
Finance Corp., 360 F. Supp. 720 (D. Conn. 1973);
Hooks v. Wainwright, 352 F.Supp. 163
(M.D.Fla.1972). The commentators have been critical
of the line of cases requiring notice to (b)(2) class
members. 3B Moore’s Federal Practice P 23.55, at
23-1132 23-1153; 7A Wright and Miller, Federal
Practice and Procedure, s 1786, 1793, at 142-144,
203-205; Miller, “Problems of Giving Notice in Class
Actions.” 1973, 58 F.R.D. 313, 313-316.

FN3a. The Seventh Circuit has stated that in
light of n. 14 in Eisen, 417 U.S. at 177, 94S.Ct. 2140,
the holding in Schrade “will presumably have to be
reexamined at an appropriate time.” Bijeol v.
Benson, 513 F.2d 965, 968 n.3 (7th Cir. 1975).

[4][5][6] The most extensive treatment of the
problem is by Chief Judge Fox in Watson v. Branch
County Bank, supra, at 956-960. We are in general
agreement with the conclusions stated therein. An
ironclad rule requiring individual notice to members
of a (b)(2) class would significantly frustrate use of
(b)(2) class actions. It has been pointed out that
when members of a (b)(2) class are in the role of
plaintiffs, notice would not serve a useful purpose
since members of such a class may not “opt out” and
thereby prevent an adjudication of their legal
interests. Air Line Stewards and Stewardesses Assn.,
Local 550 v. American Airline, Inc., 490 F.2d 636, 642
(7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993, 94 S.Ct.
2406, 40 L.Ed.2d 773(1974). Furthermore, where the
(b)(2) class includes a large number of persons
whose identities and whereabouts are unknown,

E-50

individually mailed notices may well be impossible
and notice by publication similarly futile. While we
are mindful of the Court’s statement in Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacquelin. 417 U.S. 156, 176, 94S. Ct. 2140,
2152, 40 L.Ed.2d 732 (1974), that “(t)here is noting in
Rule 23 to suggest that the notice requirements can
be tailored to fit the pocketbooks of particular
plaintiffs, “imposition of a notice requirement can be
tailored to fit the pocketbook of particular plaintiffs,”
imposition of a notice requirement on )b)(2) class
actions as a matter of due process should be avoided
since “the named plaintiffs in class actions raising
broad constitutional or statutory questions simply
cannot afford to pay for notice to absent class
members, and (such) a requirement *** prevents the
suit from being maintained as a class action.” Watson
v. Branch County Bank, 380 F.Supp. 945, 959
(W.D.Mich.1974). We agree with Chief Judge Fox that
the discretionary notice provisions of Rule 23 (d)(2)
are at least presumptively valid as complying with
due process, which must be tailored to the
“character of the proceedings and the nature of the
interests *** involved***.” Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank and Trust Co., Trustee, 339 U. S. 306,
317, 70S. Ct. 652, 659, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950), [FN3b]

FN3b. Due process requires only that
“interested parties” be given notice. Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., Trustee, supra,
339 U.S. at 314, 70S.Ct.652. We doubt that the
members of the defendant class are interested
persons in any realistic sense. While the state cannot
involuntarily be made a party because of it sovereign
immunity, and the plaintiff’s rights can be asserted
only against the agents of the state under the
authority of Ex parteYoung, 209 U.S. 123, 28S. Ct.
441, 52 L.Ed 714 (1908), it is the state’s interest, not
that of the county clerks, that is in reality involved.
The state’s interest is represented and protected by
it chief legal officer, the Attorney General of
Wisconsin, who represents the named defendant and

E-51

who would also be representing the other members
of the defendant class whether or not notice is given.
If the suit had been brought against the state
(following a valid Eleventh Amendment waiver), only
notice to the state itself would have been required,
yet the injunction could still have run against the
individual county clerks as agents of the state. See
Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(d); Harrington v. Colquitt Country
Board of Education, 449 F.2d 161 (Sth Cir. 1971)
(per curiam). Their interest I the suit is not greater in
the instant case, and their due process rights should
also be no greater.

[7] The remaining question is, therefore, whether
there are special circumstances in this action which
require notice to the members of either the plaintiff
or defendant class. Rule 23(d)(2) sets forth a list of the

‘special circumstances which might require notice:

“In the conduct of actions to which this rule applies,
the court may make appropriate orders: *** (2)
requiring, for the protection of the members of the
*1068 class or otherwise for the fair conduct of the
action, that notice be given in such manner as the
court may direct tosome orall ofthe members of
any step in the action, or of the proposed extent of
the judgment, or of the opportunity of members to
signify whether they consider the representation fair
and adequate, to intervene and present claims or
defense, or otherwise to come into the action; ***.”

*1069 The effects of the statute on plaintiff Redhail
should be carefully noted. He is unable to marry
anywhere without a court order so long as he
maintains his Wisconsin residency. Were he to
petition a court for permission to marry, the court
would have to deny the petition since Redhail’s
indigency has made it impossible for him to satisfy
the support obligation ordered in the paternity
action. Furthermore, even if he could somehow pay
the arrearage, because his child receives AFDC

E-52

benefits in excess of the $109 per month support
obligation, the child would still be a public charge.

In determining whether the classification created by
the statute complies with the requirements of equal
protection, it is necessary to first decide what
intensity of scrutiny it must be subjected to and then
to examine the interests arguably furthered by the
statute.

B.

[8][9] Under the equal protection approach currently
utilized by the Court, statutory classifications utilized
by the Court, statutory classifications are generally
measured against the rational relationship test and
are upheld if they are rationally related to some
legitmate governmental interest. United States
Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528,
93 S. Ct. 2821, 37 L.Ed.2d 782 (1973); San Antonio
School District v. Rodriques, 411 U.S. 1, 92 S.Ct. 1278,
36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973). If, however, the classification
impinges upon the fundamental rights or constitutes
a suspect classification, it is subjected to strict
scrutiny and can be upheld only if it is necessary to
promote compelling governmental interests and is
narrowly drawn to express only such interests. Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155, 93S. Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d
147 (173); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634, 89
S. Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969).

[10][11] In our society, marriage has long been
regarded as one of the most basic social institutions,
and the corresponding individual interest involved
have been recognized as within the constitutional
rights of privacy as enunciated in Roe v. Wade,
supra, 410 U.S. at 152-153, 93S. Ct. 705. As Mr.
Justice Douglas, writing for the majority in Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 1682,
14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965), stated:

E-53

“We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of
Rights older than our political parties, older than our
school system. Marriage is a coming together for
better or worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to
the degree of being sacred. It is an association that
promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in
living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not
commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association
for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior
decision.”

A long line of decisions make it evident that although
not explicitly set forth in the constitution, there is a
constitutionally protected right to marry which
occupies the status of being a fundamental right. Roe
v. Wade, supra 410 U.S. at 152, 93 S.Ct. 705; United
States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 444, 93S. Ct 631, 34
L.Ed.ed 626 (1973); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S.
371, 376, 91S. Ct. 780, 28 L.Ed.2d 113 (1971) Loving
v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12, 87 S.Ct. 1817, 18 L.Ed.2d

1010 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, supra, 381 U.S.
at 486, 495, 85 S.Ct. 1678; Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535, 541, 62 S.Ct. 1110, 86 L.Ed. 1655, (1942);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67
L.Ed. 1042 (1923). Lower federal courts have also
recognized the importance of the interests associated
with marriage and have afforded them constitutional
protection. See, e.g., O’Neil v. Dent, 364 F.Supp. 565,
568-569 (E.D.N.Y.1973); Holt v. Shelton, 341 F.Supp.
821, 822-823 (M.D.Tenn.1972); Wymelenberg v.
Syman, 328 F.Supp. 1353, 1354 (E.D.Wis.1971).

[12] It is apparent that the challenged statute
infringes upon plaintiff Redhail’s ability to marry. In
contrast to all other Wisconsin residents, he, and all
the members of the class he represents, must obtain
court permission before any county clerk in
Wisconsin will issue a marriage license.

Furthermore, other provisions of the statute give it
extraterritorial effect, making *1070 it impossible for
Redhail, or anyone in the plaintiff class, to enter into a.
valid marriage anywhere without a court order. The

E-54

. sia

oe ee

PE ATONE ATOR ELAN RS A Wi aE Urnith SPA oa hor g

ah Se ROR

statute's requirement that all members of the plaintiff
class obtain court permission to marry does, in a very
concrete way, limit their right to marry in a manner
not visited upon all other residents of Wisconsin.
Since the classification created by the statute places
substantial burdens on the ability of the class
members to marry, it affects their fundamental rights
and must be subjected to strict scrutiny. ~

Additionally, the statute places a special burden on
some members of the plaintiff class. In Redhail’s
case, because of his poverty he has been unable to
satisfy the support obligation ordered in the
paternity action, and, hence, a state court could not
grant him permission to marry. Other members of
the plaintiff class are barred from obtaining court
permission because although they have fulfilled their
support obligations, their minor issue are public
charges or likely to become such. [FN5] These
members of the plaintiff class would not usually have
the financial resources to voluntarily obviate any
necessity for governmental aid to their children and
to further assure that such aid would not be
necessary in the future.

FNS. Vernon T. Leipzig, Jr. the plaintiff in the
companion case entitled Leipzig v. Pallamolla, D.C.,
418 F. Supp 1073, had fully satisfied his child support
obligations at the time he petitioned for permission
to remarry. Nevertheless, Branch 2 of the County
Court, Kenosha County, Wisconsin, denied
permission because the four minor children of
Leipzig’s first marriage were then receiving
AFDC benefits.

While wealth discrimination alone has not been held
by the Court to be an adequate basis for involving
strict scrutiny, San Antonio School District v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 36 L.Ed.2d 16
(1973), classifications based on wealth have been
overturned in the area of voting, see, e.g., Bullock v.

E-55

Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 92 S.Ct.849, 31 L.Ed.2d 92
(1972) (primary filing fee requirement); Harper v.
Virginia State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 86
S.Ct. 1079, 16 L.Ed.2d 169 (1966) (poll tax); criminal
procedure, see, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S.
353, 83 S. Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d 811 (1963) (counsel on
direct appeal); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S.Ct.
585, 100 L.Ed. 891 (1956) (transcripts); and
incarceration, Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 91 S. ct.
668, 28 L.Ed.2d 130 (1971); William v. Illinois, 399
U.S. 235, 90 S.Ct. 2018, 26 L.Ed.2d 586 (1970). The
Court in Rodriguez noted at 411 U.S. at page 20, 93
S.Ct. at page 1290:

‘“*** The individuals, or groups of individuals, who
constituted the class discriminated against in our
prior cases shared two distinguishing characteristics:

because of their impecunity they were completely
unable to pay for some desired benefit, and as a
consequence, they sustained an absolute
deprivation of a meaningful opportunity to enjoy
that benefit. ***”

[13] The characteristics identified by the Court in
Rodriguez are present here with respect to some
members of the plaintiff class. Because they lack
sufficient financial resources, some of them are
unable to fulfill support obligations, while others who
have satisfied their support obligations lack the
additional wealth required to insure threat their
minor issue are not public charges nor likely to
become such. In both instances, these class
members cannot obtain permission to marry. The
wealth discrimination inherent in the statute thus
provides an additional justification for applying the
strict scrutiny test.

Defendant Zablocki and the state have urged that
instead of the strict scrutiny test, a more flexible
“sliding scale” equal protection approach should be
utilized here. See, Rodriguez, supra, at 98-110, 93
S.Ct. at 1278 (Marshall, Jr., dissenting); Borass v.

= E-56

Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1973),
reversed, sub nom. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,
416 US. 1,945S.Ct. 1536, 39 L.Ed.2d 797 (1974);
Women’s Liberation Union of Rhode Island, Inc. v.
Israel, 379 F.Supp. 44, 49-50 (D.R.1.1974), aff'd, 512
F.2d 106 (lst Cir. 1975); Timberlake v. Kenkel. 369
F.Supp. 456 (E.D.Wis.1974) (Reynold, J.), vacated and
remanded, 510 *1071 F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1975). See
generally, Gunther, The Supreme Court 197] Term,
Foreword, In Search of Evolving Doctrine ona
Changing Court: A Model for a New Equal Protection,
86 Harv.L.Rev. 1(1972).

[14] There are several reasons, however, why a
sliding scale equal protection analysis is not
appropriate in this case. First, it is not apparent
which contexts require application of the more
flexible equal protection approach. Contrast, San
Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, supra, 411 U.S.
at 30-31, 93 S.Ct. at 1278, and Village of Belle Terre v.
Boraas, supra, with Jimenz v. Weinberger, 417 U.S.
628, 94S. Ct. 2496, 41 L.Ed.2d 363 (1974); United
States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S.
528, 93 S.Ct. 2821, 37 L.Ed.2d 782 (1973); Weber v.
Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 92 S.Ct.
1400, 31 L.Ed.2d 768 (1972); Reed v Reed, 404 U.S.
71, 928.Ct. 251, 30 L.Ed.2d 225 (1971). Moreover,
despite the concern voiced by Mr. Justice Marshall in
his dissent in Sosno v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 418-419, 95
S.Ct. 553, 42 L.Ed.2d 532 (1975), the opinion of the
Court in that case is devoid of language indicating
that strict scrutiny is no longer to be applied to
classifications which infringe upon fundamental
rights, such as marriage, and the result in Sosna does
not vitiate earlier decisions mandating use of the
strict scrutiny test. [FN6] Additionally, it is very
questionable whether the statue could be upheld by
using a sliding scale analysis, since less restrictive
means exist by which the governmental interests
may be furthered. See, United States Department of
Agriculture v. Moreno, supra, 413 U.S. at 536-537, 93

E-57

S.Ct. at 2821 (1973); Timberlake v. Kenkel, supra at
466-468. The classification created by the
challenged statute must, therefore, be measured
against the requirements of the strict scrutiny test.

FN6. In Sosna v. Iowa, supra a one-year
durational residency requirement for divorce was
upheld against attacks based on the rights to
interstate travel and to due process. The substance
of the court’s approach defies simple
characterization, although it did state that the
residency requirement “may reasonable be justified
on ground other than purely budgetary
considerations or administrative convenience,”
supra, at 406, 95 S.Ct. at 561, and that the plaintiff
therein “was not irretrievable foreclosed from
obtaining some part of what she sought.” Id., at 406,
95 S.Ct. at 561. Whether Sosna foreshadows a new
approach to statutes restricting “fundamental rights”
remains uncertain.

C.

[15] Where a statutory classification is tested against
the requirements of the strict scrutiny test “***the
state bears the burden of showing how compelling its
interest may be; depending upon how compelling its
interest may be, showing that the specific measure is
necessary to its achievement; and showing that the
specific measure is sufficiently narrowly drawn to
achieve the state's interest. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 155, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973); Shapiro
v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22
L.Ed.2d 600(1969); Aptheker v. Secretary of State,
378 U.S. 500, 508, 84 S.Ct.1659, 12 L.Ed.2d 992
(1964).” Baird v.Lynch, 390 F.Supp. 740, 749
(W.D.Wis.1974).

Defendant Zablocki and the state have urged that
there are two interests furthered by the statute: (1)
providing counseling to the prospective marriage
partners emphasizing the necessity of fulfilling

E-58

preexisting child support obligations, and (2)
protecting the welfare of the children whom
members of the plaintiff class are under a court
determined obligation to support. [FN7]

FN7. While in Beberfall v. Beberfall, 54 Wis.2d
329, 195 N.W.2d 625 (1972), the Wisconsin court
stated that the policy behind s 245.10(1) “is to make
certain that the children of the first marriage are not
to become public charges,” supra at 335, 195 N.W.2d
at 629, the state's interest in saving welfare costs is
not a compelling one, Shapiro v. Thompson, supra,
394 U.S. at 633, 89 S.Ct. at 1322, and both defendant
Zablocki and the state have conceded this.
Additionally, there are other statutory tools which
they state may use to enforce child welfare support
obligations and avoid increased welfare expenses.

*1072 [16] There is some evidence that one of the
chief purposes of s 245.10(1) was to insure that
persons who had failed to fulfill support obligations
arising from a previous marriage be counseled
before they incurred new obligations. See, 28 W.S.A
s 245.10 Legislative Council Notes, 1959, 1975 pocket
part, at 36; Wisconsin Legislative Council General
Report, Vol.5, at 68 (1959). The state’s interest in
such counseling is not, however, of sufficient
importance to justify s 245.10(1). The statute doe not
simply provide for mandatory counseling before a
second marriage, but prohibits remarriage without
court permission which can be granted only if the
license applicant has fulfilled support obligations and
if the minor children are not public charges or likely
to become such. The state’s interest in counseling is
not, therefore, sufficient to justify the restriction on
plaintiff's marital rights because it is not a sufficiently
“compelling” state interest and the statute is also not
“narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state
interests at stake.” Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155,
93 S.Ct. 705, 728, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973).

E-59

[17] The second state interest assertedly furthered
by the state statute safeguarding the welfare of
children might conceivable be termed both a
legitimate and “compelling” governmental interest.
It does not, however, justify the restriction on the
rights of plaintiff class imposed by s 245.10(1), since
the statute is not necessary to the achievement of this
interest.

Wisconsin law already has several statutory means
whereby support obligations may be enforced
without restricting the right to marry. If the children
are issue of a previous marriage, s 247.232 and s
247.265 give the judge and family court
commissioner power to order the parent to make a
wage assignment, and under s 295.03 disobedience
of a court order to pay child support may be
punished as civil contempt without proof of personal
demand for payment and refusal to pay. If the
support obligation arises through a paternity action,
the court can order the parent to execute a wage
assignment, s 52.21(2), order commitment to the
county jail, s 52.39, or subject the parent to civil
contempt proceedings, s 52.40. Besides these civil
remedies, the state may charge a nonsupporting
parent with the felony of abandonment of a minor
child, s 52.05, or the misdemeanor offense of failure
to support a minor child under s 52.055. By adroit
use of probation and the Huber law, s 56.08, it can be
assured that parents found guilty of these criminal
penalties will comply with their support obligations.
These statutory provisions give the state alternative
means of enforcing the child support obligations of
the plaintiff class members which do not abridge
their rights to marry.

Furthermore, for those members of the plaintiff class
who children are public charges, allowing their
marriage will have not effect on the children’s
welfare, since AFDC and other welfare programs will
continue to provide support for the children. It is

E-60

eel

also reasonable to believe that at least some
members of the plaintiff class will better their
financial circumstances by marriage due to the
likelihood of a working spouse. [FN8]

FN8. As the Court noted in Taylor v. Louisiana,
419 US. 522, 535 n. 17, 95S. Ct. 692, 42 L.Ed.2d 690
(1975), Department of Labor statistics indicate that as
of October 1974, 54.2% of all women between ages
18 and 64 were in the labor force.

[18][19] Application of the strict scrutiny test thus
leads inexorably to the conclusion that the
challenged statute cannot stand. While it is true that
the state has legitimate and substantial interests in
regulating the domestic relations of its residents,
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404, 95 S.Ct. 553, 42
L.Ed.2d 532 (1975), the statute at issue here does not
deal with areas such as the age, health, and
competency which may be required by legislation of
persons desirous of contracting marriage. The
interference with the constitutionally protected right
to marry caused by the challenged statute cannot
withstand close scrutiny, and it therefore runs afoul of
the equal protection clause.

For the foregoing reason,

*1073 IT IS ORDERED that the clerk of court enter
judgment in favor of the plaintiff Roger G. Redhail
and the class he represents, and against defendant
Thomas E. Zablocki and the class he represents
declaring s 245.10(1), (4), and (5), Wis.Stats. (1973),
unconstitutional under the equal protection clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and invalid, void, and of no effect.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant Thomas E.
Zablocki, the class he represents, and their officers,
agents, servants, employees, and their successors
and those persons in active concert or participation
with them who receive actual notice of the judgment

E-61

be permanently enjoined from denying applications
for marriage licenses on the ground that the
applicant has failed to comply with the class he
represents.

END OF DOCUMENT

E-62

U.S. Supreme Court
BODDIE v. CONNECTICUT,
401 U.S. 371 (1971)
401 US. 37]
BODDIE ET AL. v. CONNECTICUT ET AL. ,
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
No. 27.
Argued December 8, 1969
Reargued November 17, 1970
Decided March 2, 1971

In view of the basic position of the marriage
relationship in our society and the state
monopolization of the means for dissolving that
relationship, due process of law prohibits a State
from denying, solely because of inability to pay court
fees and costs, access to its courts to indigents who,
in good faith, seek judicial dissolution of their
marriage. Pp. 374-383.286 F. Supp. 968, reversed.

HARLAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Ceurt, in
which BURGER, C. J., and STEWART, WHITE,
MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined. DOUGLAS,
J., filed an opinion concurring in the result, post, p.
383. BRENNAN, J., filed an opinion concurring in part,
Post, p. 386. BLACK, J., filed a dissenting opinion,
post, p. 389.

Arthur B. LaFrance reargued the cause and filed
briefs for appellants.Raymond J. Cannon, Assistant
Attorney General of Connecticut, reargued the cause
for appellees. With him on the brief were Robert K.
Killian, Attorney General, and William S. Kaplan.
Allan Ashman filed a brief for the National Legal Aid
and Defender Association as amicus curiae urging
reversal.

Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by
Francis B. Burch, Attorney General of Maryland, and
J. Michael McWilliams, Assistant Attorney General,

E-63

joined by George F. Kugler, Jr., Attorney General of
New Jersey, and Stephen Skillman, Assistant Attorney

General, and by the following Attorneys General:
David P. [401 U.S. 371, 372] Buckson of Delaware,
Jack P. F. Gremillion of Louisiana, Clarence A. H.
Meyer of Nebraska, Harvey Dickerson of Nevada,
Helgi Johanneson of North Dakota, and Lee Johnson
of Oregon.

MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the
Court.

Appellants, welfare recipients residing in the State of
Connecticut, brought this action in the Federal
District Court for the District of Connecticut on behalf
of themselves and others similarly situated,
challenging, as applied to them, certain state
procedures for the commencement of litigation,
including requirements for payment of court fees and
costs for service of process, that restrict their access
to the courts in their effort to bring an action for
divorce.

It appears from the briefs and oral argument that the
average cost to a litigant for bringing an action for
divorce is $60. Section 52-259 of the Connecticut
General Statutes provides:

"There shall be paid to the clerks of the supreme
court or the superior court, for entering each civil
cause, forty-five dollars... ."

An additional $15 is usually required for the service
of process by the sheriff, although as much as $40 or
$50 may be necessary where notice must be
accomplished by publication. 1
There is no dispute as to the inability of the named
appellants in the present case to pay either the court
fees required by statute or the cost incurred for
the service of process. The affidavits in the record
establish that appellants' welfare income in each
instance barely suffices [401 U.S. 371, 373] to meet
the costs of the daily essentials of life and includes no

E-64 ,

allotment that could be budgeted for the expense to
gain access to the courts in order to obtain a divorce.
Also undisputed is appellants’ "good faith" in seeking
a divorce.Assuming, as we must on this motion to
dismiss the complaint, the truth of the undisputed
allegations made by the appellants, it appears that
they were unsuccessful in their attempt to bring their
divorce actions in the Connecticut courts, simply by
reason of their indigency. The clerk of the Superior
Court returned their papers "on the ground that he
could not accept them until an entry fee had been
paid." App. 8-9. Subsequent efforts to obtain a
judicial waiver of the fee requirement and to have the
court effect service of process were to no avail. Id., at
9.Appellants thereafter commenced this action in the
Federal District Court seeking a judgment declaring
that Connecticut's statute and service of process
provisions, "requiring payment of court fees and
expenses as a condition precedent to obtaining court
relief [are] unconstitutional [as] applied to these
indigent [appellants] and all other members of the
class which they represent."
As further relief, appellants requested the entry of an
injunction ordering the appropriate officials to permit
them "to proceed with their divorce actions without
payment of fees and costs." A three-judge court was
convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2281, and on July 16,
1968, that court concluded that "a state [may]
limit access to its civil courts and particularly in this
instance, to its divorce courts, by the requirement of
a filing fee or other fees which effectively bar
persons on relief from commencing actions therein."
286 F. Supp. 968, 972.
We noted probable jurisdiction, 395 U.S. 974 (1969).
The case was heard at the 1969 Term and thereafter
was [401 U.S. 371, 374] set for reargument at the
present Term. 399 U.S. 922 (1970). We now reverse.2
Our conclusion is that, given the basic position of the

E-65

marriage relationship in this society's hierarchy of
values and the concomitant state monopolization of
the means for legally dissolving this relationship, due
process does prohibit a State from denying, solely
because of inability to pay, access to its courts to
individuals who seek judicial dissolution of their
marriages.

I
At its core, the right to due process reflects a
fundamental value in our American constitutional
system. Our understanding of that value is the basis
upon which we have resolved this case.Perhaps no
characteristic of an organized and cohesive society is
more fundamental than its erection and enforcement
of a system of rules defining the various rights and
duties of its members, enabling them to govern their
affairs and definitively settle their differences in an
orderly, predictable manner.
Without such a "legal system," social organization
and cohesion are virtuallyimpossible; with the ability
to seek regularized resolution of conflicts individuals
are capable of interdependent action that enables
them to strive for achievements without the anxieties
that would beset them in a disorganized society. Put
more succinctly, it is this injection of the rule of law
that allows society to reap the benefits of rejecting
what political theorists call the "state of nature." [401
U.S. 371, 375]

American society, of course, bottoms its systematic
definition of individual rights and duties, as well as its
machinery for dispute settlement, not on custom or
the will of strategically placed individuals, but on the
common-law model. It is to courts, or other
quasi-judicial official bodies, that we ultimately look
for the implementation of a regularized, orderly
process of dispute settlement. Within this framework,
those who wrote our original Constitution, in the Fifth
Amendment, and later those who drafted the

E-66

Fourteenth Amendment, recognized the centrality of
the concept of due process in the operation of this
system. Without this guarantee that one may not be
deprived of his rights, neither liberty nor property,
without due process of law, the State's monopoly over
techniques for binding conflict resolution could
hardly be said to be acceptable under our scheme of
things. Only by providing that the social enforcement
mechanism must function strictly within these bounds
can we hope to maintain an ordered society that is
also just. It is upon this premise that this Court has
through years of adjudication put flesh upon the due
process principle. Such litigation has, however,
typically involved rights of defendants - not, as here,
persons seeking access to the judicial process in the
first instance. This is because our society has been so
structured that resort to the courts is not usually the
only available, legitimate means of resolving private
disputes. Indeed, private structuring of individual
relationships and repair of their breach is largely
encouraged in American life, subject only to the
-caveat that the formal judicial process, if resorted to,
is paramount. Thus, this Court has seldom been
asked to view access to the courts as an element of
due process. The legitimacy of the State's monopoly
over techniques of final dispute settlement, even
where [401 U.S. 371, 376] some are denied access to
its use, stands unimpaired where recognized,
effective alternatives for the adjustment of
differences remain. But the successful invocation of
this governmental power by plaintiffs has often
created serious problems for defendants' rights. For
at that point, the judicial proceeding becomes the
only effective means of resolving the dispute at hand
and denial of a defendant's full access to that
process raises grave problems for its legitimacy.
Recognition of this theoretical framework illuminates
the precise issue presented in this case. As this Court

E-67

on more than one occasion has recognized, marriage
involves interests of basic importance in our society.
See, e. g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967);
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). It is not surprising,
then, that the States have seen fit to oversee many
aspects of that institution. Without a prior judicial
imprimatur, individuals may freely enter into and
rescind commercial contracts, for example, but we
are unaware of any jurisdiction where private citizens
may covenant for or dissolve marriages without state
approval.
Even where all substantive requirements are
concededly met, we know of no instance where two
consenting adults may divorce and mutually liberate
themselves from the constraints of legal obligations
that go with marriage, and more fundamentally the
prohibition against remarriage, without invoking the
State's judicial machinery.
Thus, although they assert here due process rights
as would-be plaintiffs, we think appellants’ plight,
because resort to the state courts is the only avenue
to dissolution of their marriages, is akin to that of
defendants faced with exclusion from the only forum
effectively empowered to settle their disputes. Resort
to the judicial process by these plaintiffs is no more
voluntary in a realistic sense than that of the
defendant called upon to [401 U.S. 371, 377] defend
his interests in court. For both groups this process is
not only the paramount dispute-settlement technique,
but, in fact, the only available one. In this posture we
think that this appeal is properly to be resolved in
light of the principles enunciated in our due process
decisions that delimit rights of defendants compelled
to litigate their differences in the judicial forum.

II
These due process decisions, representing over a
hundred years of effort by this Court to give concrete

E-68

embodiment to this concept, provide, we think,
complete vindication for appellants’ contentions. In
particular, precedent has firmly embedded in our
due process jurisprudence two important principles
upon whose application we rest our decision in the
case before us.

A
Prior cases establish, first, that due process requires,
at a minimum, that absent a countervailing state
interest of overriding significance, persons forced to
settle their claims of right and duty through the
judicial process must be given a meaningful
opportunity to be heard. Early in our jurisprudence,
this Court voiced the doctrine that " [w]herever one is
assailed in his person or his property, there he may
defend," Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274, 277

(1876). See Baldwin v. Hale, 1 Wall. 223 (1864);
Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409 (1897).

The theme that "due process of law signifies a right to
be heard in one's defense," Hovey v. Elliott, supra, at
417, has continually recurred in the years since
Baldwin, Windsor, and Hovey. 3 Although "[mJany
controversies [401 U.S. 371, 378] have raged about
the cryptic and abstract words of the Due Process
Clause," as Mr. Justice Jackson wrote for the Court in
Mullane v. Central Hanover Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306

(1950), "there can be no doubt that at a minimum
they require that deprivation of life, liberty or
property by adjudication be preceded by notice and
opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of
the case." Id., at 313.

Due process does not, of course, require that the
defendant in every civil case actually have a hearing
on the merits. A State, can, for example, enter a
default judgment against a defendant who, after
adequate notice, fails to make a timely appearance,
see Windsor, supra, at 278, or who, without justifiable
excuse, violates a procedural rule requiring the

E-69

J

production of evidence necessary for orderly
adjudication, Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212
U.S. 322, 351 (1909). What the Constitution does
require is "an opportunity . . . granted ata
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner,"
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)
(emphasis added), "for [a] hearing appropriate to the
nature of the case," Mullane v. Central Hanover Tr.
Co., supra, at 313. The formality and procedural
requisites for the hearing can vary, depending upon
the importance of the interests involved and the
nature of the subsequent proceedings. 4 That the
hearing required by due process [401 U.S. 371, 379]
is subject to waiver, and is not fixed in form does not
affect its root requirement that an individual be given
an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of
any significant property interest, 5 except for
extraordinary situations where some valid
governmental interest is at stake that justifies
postponing the hearing until after the event.6 In
short, "within the limits of practicability," id., at 318, a
State must afford to all individuals a meaningful
opportunity to be heard if it is to fulfill the promise of
the Due Process Clause.

B
Our cases further establish that a statute or a rule
may be held constitutionally invalid as applied when
it operates to deprive an individual of a protected
right although its general validity as a measure
enacted in the legitimate exercise of state power is
beyond question. Thus, in cases involving religious
freedom, free speech or assembly, this Court has
often held that a valid statute was unconstitutionally
applied in particular circumstances because it
interfered with an individual's exercise of those
rights. 7 No less than these rights, the right to a
meaningful opportunity to be heard within the limits
of practicality, must be protected against denial by

E-70

particular laws [401 U.S. 371, 380] that operate to
jeopardize it for particular individuals. See Mullane
v. Central Hanover Tr. Co., supra; Covey v. Town of
Somers, 351 U.S. 141 (1956). In Mullane this Court
held that the statutory provision for notice by
publication in a local newspaper, although sufficient
as to beneficiaries of a trust whose interests or
addresses were unknown to the trustee, was not
sufficient notice under the Due Process Clause for
known beneficiaries. Similarly, Covey held that
notice by publication in a foreclosure action, even
though sufficient to provide a normal person with an
opportunity for a hearing, was not sufficient where
the defendant was a known iacompetent. The Court
expressly rejected an argument that "the Fourteenth
Amendment does not require the State to take
measures in giving notice to an incompetent beyond
those deemed sufficient in the case of the ordinary
taxpayer." Id., at 146. Just as a generally valid notice
procedure may fail to satisfy due process because of
the circumstances of the defendant, so too a cost
requirement, valid on its face, may offend due
process because it operates to foreclose a particular
party's opportunity to be heard. The State's
obligations under the Fourteenth Amendment are not
simply generalized ones; rather, the State owes to
each individual that process which, in light of the
values of a free society, can be characterized as due.
Il
Drawing upon the principles established by the
cases just canvassed, we conclude that the State's
refusal to admit these appellants to its courts, the sole
means in Connecticut for obtaining a divorce, must
be regarded as the equivalent of denying them an
opportunity to be heard upon their claimed right to a
dissolution of their marriages, and, in the absence of
a sufficient countervailing [401 U.S. 371, 381]
justification for the State's action, a denial of due

E-7]

process. 8 The arguments for this kind of fee and cost
requirement are that the State's interest in the
prevention of frivolous litigation is substantial, its use
of court fees and process costs to allocate scarce
resources is rational, and its balance between the
defendant's right to notice and the plaintiff's right to
access is reasonable.In our opinion, none of these
considerations is sufficient to override the interest of
these plaintiff-appellants in having access to the only
avenue open for dissolving their allegedly untenable
marriages. Not only is there no necessary connection
between a litigant's assets and the seriousness of his
motives in bringing suit,9 but it is here beyond
present dispute that appellants bring these actions in
good faith. Moreover, other alternatives exist to fees
and cost requirements as a means for conserving the
time of courts and protecting parties from frivolous
litigation, [401 U.S. 371, 382] such as penalties for
false pleadings or affidavits, and actions for malicious
prosecution or abuse of process, to mention only a
few. In the same vein we think that reliable
alternatives exist to service of process by a state-paid
sheriff if the State is unwilling to assume the cost of
official service. This is perforce true of service by
publication which is the method of notice least
calculated to bring to a potential defendant's
attention the pendency of judicial proceedings. See
Mullane v. Central Hanover Tr. Co., supra. We think
in this case service at defendant's last known address
by mail and posted notice is equally effective as
publication in a newspaper. We are thus left to
evaluate the State's asserted interest in its fee and
cost requirements as a mechanism of resource
allocation or cost recoupment. Such a justification
was offered and rejected in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S.
12 (1956). In Griffin it was the requirement of a
transcript beyond the means of the indigent that
blocked access to the judicial process. While in

E-72

Griffin the transcript could be waived as a convenient
but not necessary predicate to court access, here the
State invariably imposes the costs as a measure of
allocating its judicial resources. Surely, then, the
rationale of Griffin covers this case.
IV

In concluding that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment requires that these
appellants be afforded an opportunity to go into
court to obtain a divorce, we wish to re-emphasize
that we go no further than necessary to dispose of the
case before us, a case where the bona fides of both
appellants’ indigency and desire for divorce are here
beyond dispute. We do not decide that access for all
individuals to the courts is a right that is, in all
circumstances, guaranteed by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment so that its
exercise may not be placed beyond the reach of any
individual, [401 U.S. 371, 383] for, as we have already
noted, in the case before us this right is the
exclusive precondition to the adjustment of a
fundamental human relationship. The requirement
that these appellants resort to the judicial process is
entirely a state-created matter. Thus we hold only
that a State may not, consistent with the obligations
imposed on it by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, pre-empt the right to
dissolve this legal relationship without affording all
citizens access to the means it has prescribed for
doing so.

Reversed.
Footnotes
[Footnote 1] App. 9. The dollar figures are averages
taken from the undisputed allegations of the
complaint. The particular fee the sheriff receives
from the plaintiff for service of process in any one
case depends on the distance he must travel to

E-73

effectuate service of process. Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev.
52-261 (1968).

[Footnote 2] Following colloquy at the oral

reargument as to the possible availability of public or
private funds to enable plaintiffs-appellants to defray

the expense requirements at issue in this case, the
parties submitted further papers on this score.

Nothing in these materials would justify our declining

- to adjudicate the constitutional question squarely
presented by this record.

[Footnote 3] See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254

(1970); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S.

337 (1969); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965);
Schroeder v. New York, 371 U.S. 208, 212 (1962); Best

v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 371 U.S. 334, 338

[401 U.S. 371, 378] (1963); Covey v. Town of Somers,

351 U.S. 141 (1956); Mullane v. Central Hanover Tr.

Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950);Anderson Nat. Bank v.

Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 246 (1944); Opp Cotton Mills v.
Administrator, 312 U.S. 126, 152-153 (1941); Morgan

v. United States, 304 U.S. 1 (1938); United States v.

Illinois Central R. Co., 291 U.S. 457, 463 (1934);
Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S.

673 (1930); Coe v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 237 U.S.

413, 423 (1915); Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S.

373, 385-386 (1908); Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v.
Schmidt, 177 U.S. 230, 236 (1900).

[Footnote 4] Compare Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, with

In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). See also Bowles v.
Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 520-521 (1944).

[Footnote 5] Goldberg v. Kelly, supra; Sniadach v.
Family Finance Corp., supra; Opp Cotton Mills v.
Administrator, supra, at 152-153; United States v.

Illinois Central R. Co., supra, at 463; Coe v. Armour
Fertilizer Works, supra.
[Footnote 6] Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. |
McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961); Ewing v. Mytinger &
Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950); Fahey v.

E-74

Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947); Bowles v. Willingham,
supra; Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
[Footnote 7] E. g., Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147
(1939); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940);
Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 527 (1960); Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).

[Footnote 8] At least one court has already
recognized the special nature of the divorce action.
Justice Sobel in a case like that before us took note of
the State's involvement in the marital relationship:
"Marriage is clearly marked with the public interest.
In this State, a marriage cannot be dissolved except
by ‘due judicial proceedings... .' We have erected
by statute a money hurdle to such dissolution by
requiring in many circumstances the service of a
summons by publication... . This hurdle is an
effective barrier to [plaintiffs] access to the courts.
The loss of access to the courts in an action for
divorce is a right of substantial magnitude when only
through the courts may redress or relief be
obtained." Jeffreys v. Jeffreys, 58 Misc. 2d 1045, 1056,
296 N. Y.S. 2d 74, 87 (1968). See also Brown v.
Chastain, 416 F.2d 1012, 1014 (CAS 1969)

(Rives, J., dissenting).

[Footnote 9] We think Cohen v. Beneficial Loan
Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949), has no bearing on this
case. Differences between divorce actions and
derivative actions aside, unlike Cohen, where we
considered merely a statute on its face, the
application of this statute here operates to cut off
entirely access to the courts.

MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, concurring in the result.

I believe this case should be decided upon the
principles developed in the line of cases marked by
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12. There we considered a
state law which denied persons convicted of a crime
full appellate review if they were unable to pay fora
transcript of the trial. MR. JUSTICE BLACK's opinion

E-75

announcing the judgment of the Court stated:

"Such a denial is a misfit in a country dedicated to
affording equal justiceto all and special privileges
to none in the administration of its criminal law.
There can be no equal justice where the kind ofa

trial a man gets depends on the amount of money
he has. Destitute defendants must be afforded as
adequate appellate review as defendants who have
money enough to buy transcripts.” Id., at 19.

Griffin has had a sturdy growth. "Our decisions for 4
more than a decade now have made clear that
differences in access to the instruments needed to
vindicate legal rights, when based upon the financial
situation of the defendant, are repugnant to the
Constitution." Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40, 42.
See also Williams v. Oklahoma City, 395 U.S. 458;
Long v. District Court of lowa, 385 U.S. 192; Draper v.
Washington, 372 U.S. 487. But [401 U.S. 371, 384] :
Griffin has not been limited to securing a record for
indigents who appeal their convictions. If the more
affluent have counsel on appeal, then counsel for :
indigents must be provided on appeal of a criminal Ei
conviction. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353. The ;
tie to Griffin was explicit. "In either case [Griffin or :
Douglas] the evil is the same: discrimination against
the indigent.” Id., at 355.

In Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, we invalidated a
procedure whereby cases within the jurisdiction of
the state supreme court would not be considered if a
person could not pay the filing fee. In Smith v.
Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, we held that requiring .
indigents to pay filing fees before a writ of habeas
corpus could be considered in state court was invalid
under the Equal Protection Clause. Here Connecticut
has provided requirements for married couples to
obtain divorces and because of filing fees and
service of process one of the requirements is having

the necessary money. The more affluent can obtain a

E-76

divorce; the indigent cannot. This situation is
comparable to Burns v. Ohio, and Smith v. Bennett.
The Due Process Clause on which the Court relies
has proven very elastic in the hands of judges. "The
doctrine that prevailed in Lochner [v. New York, 198
U.S. 45], Coppage [v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1], Adkins [v.
Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525], [Jay] Burns [Baking
Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504], and like cases - that due
process authorizes courts to hold laws
unconstitutional when they believe the legislature
has acted unwisely - has long since been discarded."
Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730. I would not
invite its revival.

Whatever residual element of substantive law the
Due Process Clause may still have (Thompson v.
Louisville, 362 U.S. 199), it essentially regulates
procedure.

Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337;
Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433. The Court
today puts [401 U.S. 371, 385] "flesh" upon the Due
Process Clause by concluding that marriage and its
dissolution are so important that an unhappy couple
who are indigent should have access to the divorce
courts free of charge. Fishing may be equally
important to some communities. May an indigent be
excused if he does not obtain a license which
requires payment of money that he does not have?
How about a requirement of an onerous bond to
prevent summary eviction from rented property? The
affluent can put up the bond, though the indigent may
not be able to do so. See Williams v. Shaffer, 385 U.S.
1037. Is housing less important to the mucilage
holding society together than marriage?

The examples could be multiplied. I do not see the
length of the road we must follow if we accept my
Brother HARLAN'S invitation. The question
historically

E-77

has been whether the right claimed is "of the very
essence of a scheme of ordered liberty." Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325. That makes the test
highly subjective and dependent on the
idiosyncrasies of individual judges as Lochner,
Coppage, and Adkins illustrate.

The reach of the Equal Protection Clause is not
definable with mathematical precision. But in spite of
doubts by some,* as it has been construed, rather
definite guidelines have been developed: race is one
(Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303; McLaughlin
v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184); alienage is another
(Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410);
religion is another (Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398);
poverty is still another (Griffin v. Illinois, supra); and
class or caste yet another (Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535).

The power of the States over marriage and divorce
is, of course, complete except as limited by specific
~ constitutional provisions. But could a State deny
divorces to domiciliaries who were Negroes and
grant them to whites? [401 U.S. 371, 386] Deny them
to resident aliens and grant them to citizens? Deny
them to Catholics and grant them to Protestants?
Deny them to those convicted of larceny and grant
them to those convicted of embezzlement?

Here the invidious discrimination is based on one of
the guidelines: poverty. An invidious discrimination
based on poverty is adequate for this case. While
Connecticut has provided a procedure for severing
the bonds of marriage, a person can meet every
requirement save court fees or the cost of service of
process and be denied a divorce. Connecticut says in
its brief that this is justified because "the State does
not favor divorces; and only permits a divorce to be
granted when those conditions are found to exist, in
respect to one or the other of the named parties,
which seem to the legislature to make it probable

E-78

that the interests of society will be better served and
that parties will be happier, and so the better
citizens, separate, than if compelled to remain
together."

Thus, under Connecticut law divorces may be
denied or granted solely on the basis of wealth. Just
as denying further judicial review in Burns and Smith,
appellate counsel in Douglas, and a transcript in
Griffin created an invidious distinction based on
wealth, so, too, does making the grant or denial of a
divorce to turn on the wealth of the parties. Affluence
does not pass muster under the Equal Protection
Clause for determining who must remain married
and who shall be a!lowed to separate.

[Footnote *] See Karst, Invidious Discrimination, 16 U.
C.L. A. L. Rev. 716 (1969).

MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, concurring in part.

I join the Court's opinion to the extent that it holds
that Connecticut denies procedural due process in
denying the indigent appellants access to its courts
for the sole reason that they cannot pay a required
fee.

"[C]onsideration of what procedures due process
may require under any given set of circumstances
must begin with [401 U.S. 371, 387] a
determination of the precise nature of the
government function involved as well as of the
private interest that has been affected by
governmental action." Cafeteria & Restaurant
Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895
(1961); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263
(1970).

When a State's interest in imposing a fee
requirement on an indigent is compared to the
indigent's interest in being heard, it is clear that the
latter is the weightier. It is an unjustifiable denial of a
hearing, and therefore a denial of due process, to

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\

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close the courts to an indigent on the ground of
nonpayment of a fee.
But I cannot join the Court's opinion insofar as today's
holding is made to depend upon the factor that only
the State can grant a divorce and that an indigent
would be locked into a marriage if unable to pay the
fees required to obtain a divorce. A State has an
ultimate monopoly of all judicial process and
attendant enforcement machinery. As a practical
matter, if disputes cannot be successfully settled
between the parties, the court system is usually

"the only forum effectively empowered to settle
their disputes. Resort to the judicial process by these
plaintiffs is no more voluntary in a realistic sense than
that of the defendant called upon to defend his
interests in court." Ante, at 376-377.

In this case, the Court holds that Connecticut's
unyielding fee requirement violates the Due Process
Clause by denying appellants "an opportunity to be
heard upon their claimed right to a dissolution of
their marriages" without a sufficient countervailing
justification. Ante, at 380. I see no constitutional
distinction between appellants' attempt to enforce
this state statutory right and an attempt to vindicate
any other right arising under federal or state law. If
fee requirements close the courts to an indigent he
can no more invoke the aid of the courts for other
forms of relief than he can escape the legal incidents
of a marriage. The right to be heard in some way at
some time extends [401 U.S. 371, 388] to all
proceedings entertained by courts.

The possible distinctions suggested by the Court
today will not withstand analysis. In addition, this
case presents a classic problem of equal protection
of the laws. The question that the Court treats
exclusively as one of due process inevitably
implicates considerations of both due process and
equal protection. Certainly, there is at issue the

E-80

denial of a hearing, a matter for analysis under the
Due Process Clause. But Connecticut does not deny a
hearing to everyone in these circumstances; it denies
it only to people who fail to pay certain fees. The
validity of this partial denial, or differentiation in
treatment, can be tested as well under the Equal
Protection Clause.

In Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), we held
under the Equal Protection Clause as well as the Due
Process Clause that a State may not deny a free
transcript to an indigent, where the transcript is
necessary for a direct appeal from his conviction.
Subsequently, we have applied and extended that
principle in numerous criminal cases. See, e. g.,
Eskridge v. Washington State Board of Prison Terms
& Paroles, 357 U.S. 214 (1958); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S.
252 (1959); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961);
Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438 (1962); Lane
v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963); Draper v. Washington,
372 U.S. 487 (1963); Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305
(1966); Long v. District Court of lowa, 385 U.S. 192
(1966); Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40 (1967);
Gardner v. California, 393 U.S. 367 (1969). The
rationale of Griffin covers the present case. Courts
are the central dispute-settling institutions in our
society. They are bound to do equal justice under
law, to rich and poor alike. They fail to perform their
function in accordance with the Equal Protection
Clause if they shut their doors to indigent [401 U.S.
371, 389] plaintiffs altogether. Where money
determines not merely "the kind of trial a man gets,"
Griffin v. Illinois, supra, at 19, but whether he gets
into court at all, the great principle of equal
protection becomes a mockery. A State may not
make its judicial processes available to some but
deny them to others simply because they cannot pay
a fee. Cf. Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383
U.S. 663 (1966). In my view, Connecticut's fee

E-81

requirement, as applied to an indigent, is a denial of
equal protection.

MR. JUSTICE BLACK, dissenting.

This is a strange case and a strange holding. Absent
some specific federal constitutional or statutory
provision, marriage in this country is completely
under state control, and so is divorce. When the first
settlers arrived here the power to grant divorces in
Great Britain was not vested in that country's courts
but in its Parliament. And as recently as 1888 this
Court in Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, upheld a
divorce granted by the Legislature of the Territory of
Oregon. Since that time the power of state
legislatures to grant divorces or vest that power in
their courts seems not to have been questioned. It is
not by accident that marriage and divorce have
always been considered to be under state control.
The institution of marriage is of peculiar importance
to the people of the States. It is within the States that
they live and vote and rear their children under laws
passed by their elected representatives. The States
provide for the stability of their social order, for the
good morals of all their citizens, and for the needs of
children from broken homes. The States, therefore,
have particular interests in the kinds of laws
regulating their citizens when they enter into,
maintain, and dissolve marriages. The power of the
States over marriage and [401 U.S. 371, 390] divorce
is complete except as limited by specific
constitutional provisions. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S.
1, 7-12 (1967).

The Court here holds, however, that the State of
Connecticut has so little control over marriages and
divorces of its own citizens that it is without power
to charge them practically nominal initial court costs
when they are without ready money to put up those
costs. The Court holds that the state law requiring

ieaneemel E-82

payment of costs is barred by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal
Constitution. Two members of the majority believe
that the Equal Protection Clause also applies. I think
the Connecticut court costs law is barred by neither
of those clauses.

It is true, as the majority points out, that the Court did
hold in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), that
indigent defendants in criminal cases must be
afforded the same right to appeal their convictions as
is afforded to a defendant who has ample funds to
pay his own costs. But in Griffin the Court studiously
and carefully refrained from saying one word or one
sentence suggesting that the rule there announced to
control rights of criminal defendants would control in
the quite different field of civil cases. And there

are strong reasons for eee between the
two types of cases.

Criminal defendants are brought into court by the
State or Federal Government to defend themselves
against charges of crime. They go into court knowing
that they may be convicted, and condemned to lose
their lives, their liberty, or their property, as a
penalty for their crimes. Because of this great
governmental power the United States Constitution
has provided special protections for people charged
with crime. They cannot be convicted under bills of
attainder or ex post facto laws. And numerous
provisions of the Bill of Rights - the right to counsel,
the right to be free from coerced [401 U.S. 371, 391]
confessions, and other rights - shield defendants in
state courts as well as federal courts. See, e. g.,
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969); Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S.145 (1968); Malloy v. Hogan, 378
U.S. 1 (1964); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963). With all of these protections safeguarding
defendants charged by government with crime, we
quite naturally and quite properly held in Griffin that

E-83

the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses both
barred any discrimination in criminal trials against
poor defendants who are unable to defend
themselves against the State. Had we not so held we
would have been unfaithful to the explicit commands
of the Bi

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386014_0995%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
