# Opposition Brief — Local 1199J v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of United Health Care System, Inc., 120 S. Ct. 2199 (2000) (No. 99-1574)

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2000

## Text

No. 99-1574 | “APR A 7 sang

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IN THE

Supreme Court of the Anited States

LOCAL 1199J,

Petitioner,
Vv.

OFFICIAL COMMITTEE OF UNSECURED CREDITORS
OF UNITED HEALTH CARE SYSTEM, INC.
Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER

RAYMOND G. HEINEMAN
Counsel of Record
LYNCH MARTIN KROLL
Attorneys for Respondent JNESO,
District Council 1, MUOE, AFL-CIO
300 Executive Drive, Suite 010
West Orange, New Jersey 07052
(973) 243-0100

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WILSON-EPES PRINTING CO., INC. — (202) 789-0096 - WASHINGTON, D. C. 20001

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

STATEMENT ....0.00.....:cccccccccsccsceccescccccccecesersssessceesseanaars
ARGUMENT. ..........cccccccccscsccccccsscsseesessssecsssncccsnecceesaeees
CONCLUSION .......0:::ccsecscessssecceeessssssenncnenaeaceeeeseeseeens

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases: Page
Adams v. Erwin Weller Co., 87 F.3d 269 |
(Sn Che. A ectitenciiieamminaias 10
In re Hanlin Group, Inc., 176 B.R. 329
Canin. TRIG. Fae ccstseshisinascsiinnnitianien 10
Teamsters, Local 572 v. Weslock Corp., 66 F.3d
248 COR OR, Teiiicsencssacineeennns 9
Statutes:
SOOM SOTO Fe cascctsninininstiinntsonstisangnabariantoapseen 7
SD ULSAK. § DOG RGRD ciccccnsssscieniicanameaniiasaneitcntontsetoals 8
Other Authorities:
ROCHE RR. § GaP Wa viiccnctsseniciamatiaandacansieae. 7
BO FE 6 PB viineccamieninmniians 8
D4 Fad. Reg. 16,065 (I pa nccacccesescrespinsnsssenisesesesss 8
SA Fad. Ream, HG Oe Cie icninentennccactetesitnsnatinnion 8
DE Fed. Rea. BO GG Ci i incssseseinsrsriccnnrveantesensasinns 9
Appendix:

Appendix A—Opinion and Order of the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the District of
New Jersey Dated and Filed March 26, 1997.. la

IN THE
Supreme Court of the Anited States

No. 99-1574

LOCAL 1199],
Petitioner,
we

OFFICIAL COMMITTEE OF UNSECURED CREDITORS OF UNITED
HEALTH CARE SYSTEM, INC.
Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER

STATEMENT

United Health Care System, Inc., herein United, is a New
Jersey not-for-profit corporation which provided hospital and
health care services in Newark, Orange, East Orange and
Irvington, New Jersey. United employed approximately
1,300 to 1,600 employees. JNESO is the certified collective
bargaining representative for the approximately 461 regis-
tered nurses previously employed by United as Debtor and
Debtor-in-Possession.

United was experiencing financial difficulties by early
1996, including a projected loss of $25 million and had aban-
doned any effort to obtain long-term conventional financing.

2

Rather, United, thereafter, exclusively pursued a merger or
partnership with other health care institutions as a solution to
its financial difficulties. As early as August 21, 1996,
United’s Board of Trustees recognized that the Hospital
would not stand alone and needed a partner. The minutes of
United's Board of Trustees dated September 25, 1996, indi-
cate that, "the Committee came to the conclusion that United
does need a partner to survive in this environment and that
time is of the essence in coming to a conclusion as to who
that partner will be.”

By the fall of 1996, Debtor's financial position had become
so extreme that it had ceased paying its premiums for em-
ployee health insurance to Blue Cross/Blue Shield in October
and to U. S. Health Care in December. Further, commencing
in November 1996, Debtor's officers converted, for its busi-
ness purposes, the following deductions from the paychecks
of the registered nurses:

1. Health insurance co-payments which has resulted
in Blue Cross terminating the employees’ health insur-
ance on or about February 7, 1997;

2. Credit union loans which has resuited in the em-
ployees defaulting on home mortgage loans, automobile
loans, etc.;

3. Credit union savings accounts;
4 401(k) pension funds;
5. Federal savings bonds;

6 Court ordered child support and alimony pay-
ments; and

7. Union dues.

On January 15, 1997, United failed to meet its payroll tax ob-
ligation.

3

In order to maintain its business operations while it
searched for a merger partner or purchaser, United arranged
interim financing with Daiwa Health Co.-2LLC, herein
Daiwa. United was aware that the interim financing was not
sufficient to sustain the hospital's operations on an on-going
basis and that it was merely a temporary measure.

Throughout the fall and winter, United carried on discus-
sions with various health care institutions seeking a merger or
purchaser. From the vantage of maintaining the Hospital's
operations on a long-term basis, the most promising discus-
sions were with Primary Health Care, which proposed main-
taining United's operations with a reduced work force of 900
employees, a loss of 400 to 600 jobs — sufficient to trigger
the WARN Act's notice requirements. It is undisputed that
United did not advise its employees of the potential for lay-
offs or closure of its Hospital. In this regard, United had con-
cluded that notice to employees would have destroyed it's
attempt to merge with another institution or successfully seek
a third-party purchaser. Throughout this period, the registered
nurses and the Hospital's other employees continued in their
faithful service to Debtor's hospital, its patients and the com-
munity. Thus, the Debtor's employees worked to preserve the
hospital's operations and value to a potential purchaser or
merger partner, unaware of the financial exigencies, which
would destroy that which they labored to build and nurture.

On February 18, 1997, United concluded an agreement
with St. Bamabas Healthcare System, providing for a pur-
chase of assets for $13 million. The agreement specifically
required United to give notice under the WARN Act as a
condition of the agreement. Thus, the agreement, at Section
7, Representations and Warranties of Seller, Subsection (C),
Closing; Continued Employment, provided

Seller shall give written notice to all of its employees re-
specting closing of United's facilities, and shall continue
to employ its employees thereafter, as required by, and

4

shall otherwise fully comply with, all provisions of ap-
plicable state and federal law (including, without limita-
tion, the WARN Act).

The necessary funds to cover the cost of the wages and health
benefits for said employees are specifically set forth at Sec-
tion 6, DIP Loan, which states in relevant part:

The DIP Credit facility shall be drawn upon by seller in
such notice as the bankruptcy court may direct, and shall
be used exclusively for the following purposes:

(i) payroll and health benefits;

On February 19, 1997, United filed a voluntary petition for
relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, which was
effective as of 12:01 a.m. Further, on February 19, 1997,
United provided all employees with sixty (60) days’ notice of
the closure of United's operation and corresponding termina-
tion of employment ("Termination Notice"). The Termina-
tion Notice provided that employment would end on April 20,
1997, or within fourteen (14) days of that date. The Termi-
nation Notice was ostensibly provided under the WARN Act,
which requires certain employers to give at least sixty (60)
days’ advance notice of a plant closing or mass _ layoff.
JNESO, the union representing Debtor's registered nurses,
was not provided the notice until February 27, 1997. Pursuant
to Section 2102(a)(1) of the WARN Act, an employer cannot
order a plant closing or mass layoff until the end of a sixty-
day period after the employer serves written notice of such an
order to the representative of the affected employees.

Following the filing of the bankruptcy petition, United's
employees continued in their employment. For several days,
registered nurses and other employees continued to provide
direct patient care to patients at the hospital. (App. 2a).
Thereafter, employees continued to provide cleanup, inven-
tory and other services to preserve United's assets. (Id.)

5

On March 4, 1997, the Unsecured Creditor’s Committee,
herein the Committee filed an emergent application for an
Order directing United to immediately terminate all its em-
ployees, except those necessary to protect the Debtor's prop-
erty. The Committee argued, inter alia, that United, as
Debtor-in-Possession. was not an employer for purposes of
the WARN Act. |

In an opinion and order filed on March 26, 1997 (App. A),
the Honorable William F. Tuohey of the United States Bank-
ruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey denied a motion
filed by the Unsecured Creditors’ Committee, herein referred
to as “Committee,” to (i) immediately terminate all employees
of United Health Care System, Inc., herein the Debtor, except
those necessary to protect property and (ii) to provide appro-
priate written notice of such termination. Specifically, Judge
Tuohey held:

(1) that the Debtor was subject to the Worker Ad-
justment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN Act),
29 U.S.C. § 2101, et. seq.;

(2) that the statutory “faltering company” and “un-
foreseeable business circumstances" exceptions to the
WARN Act did not apply to the Debtor; and

(3) that the employees’ back-pay claim under the
WARN Act was entitled to a first priority as an admin-
istrative expense under Sections 503 and 507 of the
Bankruptcy Code.

Following the Committee's ttmely appeal to the United
States District Court for the District of New Jersey, the Hon-
orable Joseph A. Greenaway denied the Committee's Appeal
and affirmed the Opinion and Order of the Bankruptcy Court.
Judge Greenaway also recognized that Debtor continued as an
employer, subject to the WARN Act, while it continued to
employ its 1,300 employees for 16 days after the Debtor's
bankruptcy filing of February 19, 1997. In particular, the

ieee 6

District Court noted that, in its agreement to transfer its major
asset to the St. Barnabas Healthcare Center, Debtor agreed to
meet its WARN Act obligations out of the proceeds of the
transfer.

Following the Committee's timely appeal to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, the Third Cir-
cuit reversed the District Court and held that United, as
Debtor-in-Possession, was not an employer engaged in a
business operation within the meaning of the WARN Act. In
so ruling, the Third Circuit undercut employees’ protection
from economic dislocation as guaranteed by the WARN Act
and created a cynical path for businesses to evade their re-
sponsibilities to their employees.

On March 28, 2000, Petitioner Local 1199J filed a timely
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari. The issue on appeal is
whether the protections of the WARN can be simply evaded
by filing a petition for Bankruptcy and, thereafter, proceeding
to liquidate assets.

sina ARGUMENT

As noted by the Bankruptcy Court "there is no doubt that
United's plant closing and massive layoff would, absent bank-
ruptcy, trigger the notification requirements under WARN."
(App. 7a). While the Committee argued that the Debtor did
not succeed to United's obligation under the WARN Act be-
cause it was a "liquidating fiduciary," the Bankruptcy Court
concluded that the Debtor-in-Possession, as fiduciary, suc-
ceeded to the WARN Act obligations of United since
Debtor's 1,300 employees continued to work on a daily basis
for sixteen days after the Chapter 11 petition was filed. Jd.
The District Court affirmed the Bankruptcy Court's conclu-
sion noting that Debtor's 1,300 employees were requested to
continue to report to work for 16 days and that Debtor's
agreement with St. Barnabas Healthcare System stipulated

mriiiaemiieinaiiiastiiiteaeasi aii

7

that Debtor would give notice to its employees pursuant to the
WARN Act. The Circuit Court reversed, concluding that the
Debtor was not an employer since it had surrendered its Cer-
tificate of Need and was not operating the Hospital on an on-
going business enterprise.

The public policy underlying the WARN Act is extraordi-
narily strong and compelling. 20 C.F.R. § 639.1(a) states that
the purpose of the WARN Act is to provide:

protection to workers, their families and communities by
requiring employers to provide notification 60 calendar
days in advance of plant closing and mass layoffs. Ad-
vance notice provides workers and their families some
transition time to adjust to the prospective loss of em-
ployment, to seek and obtain alternative jobs and, if nec-
essary, to enter skill training or retraining that will allow
these workers to successfully compete in the job market.

The Act's- applicability to the instant case is even more
compelling than in the normal case of closing and mass lay-
offs. Commencing in November 1996 through the date of the
bankruptcy petition, United's officers unilaterally and secretly
diverted employee wages, which had been withheld from its
employees’ pay, to its own business purposes. Thus, the em-
ployees involuntarily contributed their medical benefits, life
savings, mortgage payments, child support payments and
union dues to Debtor's efforts to preserve its assets pending a
sale or merger, even though such sale or merger would still
have resulted in the mass layoff of employees. At the very
time employees should have been conserving their resources
for the devastating times ahead, Debtor was secretly draining
their ability to cope with their impending unemployment.
Debtor's mass layoff has not only left its employees jobless,
but has destroyed their credit ratings and left them mired in
debt.

8

The Third Circuit concluded that the Debtor is not a "busi-
ness enterprise that employs ... 100 or more employees" un-
der 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a) because it is a liquidating fiduciary.
The Third Circuit did not rely on the Department of Labor's
Final WARN Rule, 20 CFR § 639, in which the Department
refused to address the status of fiduciaries in bankruptcy.
Rather, the Third Circuit relied on the Department's supple-
mentary information providing guidance with respect to the
Final Rule. Thus, in refusing to change the Final Rule to ad-
dress fiduciaries, the Department stated:

Another commenter suggested that "fiduciaries" in
bankruptcy proceedings should be excluded from the
definition of employer. Since adequate protections for
fiduciaries are available through the bankmuptcy courts,
the Department does not think it appropriate to change
the regulations to address this situation. Further, DOL
agrees that a fiduciary whose sole function in the bank-
ruptcy process is to liquidate a failed business for the
benefit of creditors does not succeed to the notice obli-
gations of the former employer because the fiduciary is
not operating a "business enterprise" in the normal
commercial sense. In other situations, where the fiduci-
ary may continue to operate the business for the benefit
of creditors, the fiduciary would succeed to the WARN
obligations of the employer precisely because the fiduci-
ary continues the business in operation.

54 Fed. Reg. 16,045 (1989). .

The Third Circuit's reliance on the Department of Labor's
foregoing advice is misplaced and undercuts the employees’
WARN Act protections. The Department's advice was pro-
vided for guidance only and was not to be interpreted as im-
posing any new or additional standards beyond those in the
Final WARN Rule. 54 Fed. Reg. 16,042 (1989)(R7). Further,
the Department, in the context of a discussion of the effects of
collective bargaining agreements on WARN Act obligations,

9

advised that where the provisions of an agreement are con-
sistent with and not inferior to WARN requirements, applica-
tion of those provisions to further define or clarify WARN in
terms of a specific context would satisfy WARN. 54 Fed.
Reg. 16,044 (1989). The Third Circuit failed to recognize
that, the agreement between Debtor and St. Barnabas clarified
the Debtor's WARN Act obligations.

In the instant case, the sole remaining cash asset within the
Debtor's estate at the time of the Committee's application was
approximately $2 million, which represented the balance of
the deposit from the sale of Debtor's "good will" to St. Barn-
abas. (App. 17a). This remaining cash asset was, thus, the
product of the agreement negotiated between the Debtor and
St. Barnabas and which was contingent on Debtor giving no-
tice to and continuing to employ its employees. That agree-
ment was the product of a lengthy series of bidding processes
and negotiations between the debtor, various health care in-
stitutions and the Commissioner of Health. The agreement is
consistent with the WARN Act and clearly clarifies and de-
fines the application of the WARN Act in the instant context.
St. Barnabas and the Commissioner of Health acted, in part,
based on the agreement that the WARN Act requirement
would apply to the Debtor. In the absence of that agreement,
the Committee would not have proceeded in the instant mat-
ter because there would have been no available cash assets at
that time.

Any reliance by the Third Circuit on Teamsters, Local 572
v. Weslock Corp., 66 F.3d 241 (9th Cir. 1995) is misplaced.
The Ninth Circuit's consideration of the definition of "a busi-
ness enterprise" was limited to the context of a secured
creditor which, through the provision of financing, monitored,
and eventually brought to a halt, the production operation of
the employer. Significantly, the secured creditor never em-
ployed any of the laid-off employees. Rather, the secured
creditor ceased the employer's production operation at the

10

time it took possession of the employer's assets and subcon-
tracted the security of those assets to a third party. Similarly,
in Adams v. Erwin Weller Co., 87 F.3d 269 (8th Cir. 1996),
the Eighth Circuit concluded that a secured commercial
lender was not an employer under the WARN Act merely be-
cause it cut off further capital to protect its investment.

In the instant case, the Debtor continued the employment
relationship. For several days, the employees continued to
provide direct patient care to Debtor's remaining patients.
The employees’ services were necessary to carry out the pur-
chase agreement with St. Barnabas and to prevent malpractice
and other claims by patients which would lead to the dissipa-
tion of Debtor’s remaining assets. Thereafter, the employees
continued to provide valuable services to the Debtor in reli-
ance on Debtor’s promise to comply with the WARN Act's
sixty-day notice requirement.

It is obvious that the employees need their wages in order
to survive. As noted by the Court in Jn re Hanlin Group,
Inc., 176 B.R. 329 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1995):

WARN gives the employer a choice—it may provide 60
days' notice of closing or layoff to its employees, keep-
ing the business open and incurring operating expenses
during that period; or it may shut down its operations
with little or no notice to its employees, saving operating
expenses, but providing back pay to its employees, in
compensation for the lack of notice, in accordance with a
Statutory formula. Thus, the purpose of the WARN is to
provide a statutory form of severance pay.

In the circumstances of this case, the employees were not
given a choice as the Debtor's finances deteriorated. Rather,
their sole opportunity for a choice was when they were con-
fronted with the opportunity to abandon Debtor's patients in
the Hospital's waning hours. For two months, both the hos-
pital administration and New Jersey state officials beseeched

11

JNESO representatives and its members, the registered
nurses, not to abandon the United Hospital patients. They
honored their nursing commitment to said patients, most of
whom were children. Now the nurses ask that the commit-
ment made in the Agreement between Debtor and Saint Barn-
abas be honored.

CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

RAYMOND G. HEINEMAN
. Counsel of Record

LYNCH MARTIN KROLL

Attorneys for Respondent JNESO,

District Council 1, IUOE, AFL-CIO

300 Executive Drive, Suite 010

West Orange, New Jersey 07052
DATED: April 17, 2000 (973) 243-0100

APPENDIX

la

APPENDIX
[Filed Mar. 26, 1997]

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

Case No. 87-21785
Chapter 11
Hearings: March 7, 21, 1997

In Re: UNITED HEALTHCARE SYSTEM, INC.
Debtor-on-Possession

OPINION
TUOHEY, WILLIAM F.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

United Healthcare System, Inc. (“United” or “debtor”)
filed a Chapter !1 bankruptcy petition on February 19, 1997.
The debtor formally operated a full service hospital within the
City of Newark, New Jersey as well as certain clinic facilities.

Simultaneously with the filing of the bankruptcy petition
on February 19, 1997, the debtor sent all of its employees a
notice advising that all employees would be terminated ap-
proximately sixty (60) days from the filing of the bankruptcy.
(Letter to employees dated February 19, 1997 attached as
Exh. B to Unsecured Creditior’s Motion). On March 4, 1997,
the Unsecured Creditor’s Committee (“Committee”), repre-
sented by Riker, Danzig, Scherer, Hyland and Perretti, with
Dennis O'Grady appearing, filed an Order Shortening Time
with the Bankruptcy Court seeking to have the Court direct
the debtor to immediately terminate all employees except

2a

those necessary to protect the debtor's estate. The matter was
heard before the Court on short notice on March 7, 1997 and
said hearing was continued on Friday, March 21, 1997. At the
conclusion of the hearing, the Court reserved decision. The
issue presented by the applicatiori of the Unsecured Creditor’ s
Committee goes to the allowance or disallowance of claims
against the estate and is thus a “core” proceeding as defined
by 28 U.S.C. § 157.

FINDINGS OF FACT

The debtor is a New Jersey not for profit corporation which
provided hospital and healthcare services to Newark, Orange,
East Orange, and Irvington, New Jersey. As of the filing date,
the debtor employed approximately 1,300 employees. The
debtor in its answering papers filed March 7, 1997 to the ap-
plication of the Committee to terminate employees states:

“On February 19, 1997, the debtor provided all employ-
ees with sixty days’ notice of the closure of United's op-
erations and corresponding termination of employment.
The termination notice provided that employment would
end on April 20, 1997 or within fourteen days of that
date. The termination notice was provided under the
WARN Act, 29 U.S.C. ¢ 2101-2109, which requires cer-
tain employers to give at least sixty days advance notice
of a plant closing or mass layoff.” (Debtor's objection to
Committee Application, at p. 2).

After the bankruptcy petition was filed on February 19,
1997, debtor continued having all of its 1,300 employees re-
port to work each day. Within 48 hours after the filing of the
bankruptcy, all of the debtor's patients had been discharged
either to home or transferred to other healthcare facilities.
Nonetheless, debtor's 1,300 employees continued to work at
the hospital on a daily basis after the Chapter 11 petition was
filed. The employees were engaged in cleaning, the taking of
inventory of debtor's supplies, and the readying of debtor's

rr $$ —$——<—_—__——

3a

assets for a liquidation sale. This procedure of having all em-
ployees report to work and to continue with the cleanup and
securing of debtor's physical plant continued for a sixteen
_ day period after the filing of the Chapter 11 petition. Ulti-
mately, on March 6, 1997, debtor issues a furlough notice to
all of its employees advising them that they were not to report
to duty with the exception of a small contingent of approxi-
mately 100 employees who continued to work down to the
present time securing debtor's plant and maintaining neces-
sary equipment through maintenance. (Furlough Notice Exh.
C-1 in evidence).

At the hearing held on March 7, 1997 on page 18, the
Committee and the debtor stipulated that the projected payroll
pursuant to the terms of the debtor's February 19, 1997 letter
to its employees agreeing to pay the employees until April
20, 1997 created a $7.3 million payroll obligation. (TR.
March 7, 1997, at p. 18, 1, 14 and following).

That number of $7.3 million included the projected payroll
to be paid on March 13, 1997 which covered the pay period
February 23 through March 8, 1997. The Court has taken into
evidence as Exh. D-2 an analysis prepared by debtor setting
forth its projected warn Act liability. The second page of
Exh. D-2 notes the pay period that ended February 22, 1997
included wages earned pre- and post-bankruptcy. Thus, three
days’ wages for February 20, 21 and 22, 1997 post-filing are
included in the payroll period that closed on February 22,
1997. The gross payroll for said three-day period after the
filing is $639,665. Said pay period was actually paid to the
employees by Court-approved checks that were submitted to
the employees on Thursday, February 27, 1997. The Court
notes the debtor pays its employees every two weeks and that
the paychecks are issued on a Thursday. Thus, on February
27, 1997, the employees were paid their wages for the two-
week period prior to Saturday, February 22, 1997. The next
check after February 27, 1997 was issued to the employees on

4a

Thursday, March 13, 1997. The March 13, 1997 check repre-
sented payment for the two-week pay period that terminated
on Saturday, March 8, 1997. As has been noted, with the ex-
ception of 100 employees, effective March 6, 1997 all em-
ployees were furloughed and told not to report to duty. Thus,
approximately 1,200 of debtor's employees have not reported
to work since the close of the pay period on Saturday, March
8, 1997 pursuant to the Furlough Notice. The one exception
to this is the 100 employees that have been maintained for
security and other purposes.

All sides agree that an employee who finds employment
elsewhere during the sixty-day WARN Act windows relieves
debtor of an obligation to pay that employee. In this regard,
when analyzing Exh. D-2, p. 2 in connection with the March
8, payroll set forth in Column 2 of the Exhibit, debtor has re-
flected a credit of $538,174 representing employees formally
with debtor who have found employment with St. Barnabus
and in addition, debtor has taken a credit for $32,291 repre-
senting wages due for employees who have taken employ-
ment elsewhere other than at St. Barnabus. Thus, debtor did
project a March 8, 1997 payroll of $1,688,348 (Exh. D-2).

With the consent of the parties at the hearing on March 7,
1997, debtor was authorized to pay the employees for the pay
period for the two-week period to March 8. This payroll es-
timated by debtor to be $1,688,348 was pursuant to the stipu-
lation of the parties paid to the employees on March 13, 1997.
Having done that, the projected going-forward payroll as-
serted by debtor to be a WARN Act liability for the period of
time after March 8, 1997 is $5,078,929 as set forth in Exh. D-
2 at p. 2. Column 3. It is further noted that based on the
checks issued on March 13, 1997 covering the pay period
through March 8, 1997, debtor has thus paid seventeen (17)
days of post-petition wages to the employees and forty-three
(43) days' wages remain of the sixty-days' WARN Act.

Sa

As outlined above, pursuant to prior orders of the Bank-
ruptcy Court on March 13, 1997, debtor paid its normal pay-
roll to the 1,300 employees. The checks issued by debtor on
Thursday, March 13, 1997 covered the pay period running
through Saturday, March 8, 1997. The issue before the Court
today is whether the approximately 1,200 employees who
were furloughed on March 7, 1997 continue to receive a pay-
check. The next effective paycheck is to be issued by the
debtor on Thursday, March 27, 1997 which would cover the
two-week period commencing on or about March 8, 1997.

DISCUSSION

In determining an answer to the question posed above, the
Court must address the following issues: (i) whether the
WARN Act is triggered in this case; (ii) assuming it is,
whether the exceptions to WARN set forth in 29 U.S.C. §
2102(b) apply, and (iii) should the Court find in favor of the
debtor with respect to the above, whether the "back pay" un-
der WARN to which the furloughed employees are entitled,
constitutes a first priority administrative expanse of the
United States pursuant to § 503(b)(1)(A)-and 507(a)(1) of the
Bankruptcy Code.

Upon a detailed review of the relevant provisions of the
WARN Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2102, the Bankruptcy Code, 11
U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A) and § 507(a)(1) and the caselaw cited
by the parties and independently researched by the Court in
this case, as applied to the record before-it; this Court con-
cludes as follows: (i) United is an employer subject to the
provisions of the WARN Act, (ii) neither the "unforesee-
able business circumstances" exception of 29 U.S.C.
§ 2102(b)(2)(A) nor the "faltering company" exception of 29
U.S.C. § 2102(b)(1) apply, and (iii) the employees’ WARN
Act claims constitute first priority administrative expenses for
wages pursuant to § 503(b)(1)(A) and 507 § (a)(1) of the
Bankruptcy Code as "the actual, necessary cost and expense
of preserving the United States.

6a
I. TRIGGERING OF THE WARN ACT

The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act
("WARN" or the "Act"), 29 U.S.C. § 2101 (West Supp.
1996), provides that employees with one hundred or more
workers must give at least (60) days’ advance notice to af-
fected workers or their representatives of a plant closing or
mass layoff. Specifically, an employer is subject to the
WARN Act's advance Notification requirement if the busi-
ness enterprise employs either one hundred or more employ-.
ees, excluding part-time employees, or one hundred or more
employees who, in the aggregate, work at least four thousand
hours per week, excluding overtime. See 29 U.S.C. §
2102(a)(1)(west Supp. 1996). Section 2102(a) of the WARN
Act provides in pertinent part:

"An employer shall not order a plant closing or mass
layoff until the end of a 60-day period after the employer
serves written notice of such an order." 29 U.S.C. §
2102(a).

The employer will only be subject to the notice requirements
if the company maintains the requisite one hundred employ-
ees sixty days prior to the closing or layoff. Jd.

The WARN Act notification requirements are triggered
only by a "plant Closing" or "mass layoff.” A plant closing is
defined as a "temporary or permanent shutdown of a single
site of employment or one or more facilities or operating units
at that site, that results in an "employment loss" for at least
fifty full-time employees during a thirty-day period." /d. at
§ 2102(a)(2). The employer must render the Final decision to
close the plant before employees can claim that the Act has
been violated. In re Parke Imperial Canton, Ltd., 1994 WL
842777 (Bankr.N.D. Ohio 1994).

A mass layoff is defined as a reduction-in-force other than
by reason of a plant closing, which results as employment
loss during any thirty-day period for either (i) at least 50 full-

7a

time employees who comprise at least 33% of the active full-
time employees at that site, or (ii) at least 500 full-time em-
ployees, regardless of how many employees work at that site.
29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(3)(A) and (B)(1)(ii). See also, 20 C.F.R.
§ 639.3(c). For an employee to bring an action against an
employer for violation the Act's notice requirementrs, the
plant closing or mass layoff must result in the employee's (i)
_ termination (other than for cause); (ii) voluntary departure or
retirement; (iii) layoff exceeding six months, or (iv) reduction
in hours of more than 50% during each month of any six-
month period. /d. at § 2101(b)(1).

There are a limited number of cases interpreting the Act's
application in a bankruptcy content. However, the Depart-
ment of Labor's Comments on the Act's regulations make ex-
plicit reference to a company in bankruptcy suggesting:

"[A] fiduciary whose sole function in the bankruptcy
process is to liquidate a failed business for the benefit of
creditors does not succeed to the notice obligations of
the former employer because the fiduciary is not operat-
ing a ‘business enterprise’ in the normal commercial
sense. In other situations, where the fiduciary may con-
tinue to operate the business for the benefit of creditors,
the fiduciary would succeed to the WARN obligations of
the employers precisely because the fiduciary continues
the business in operation." 54 Fed. Reg. 16042 (1989)
(emphasis added) See also, In re Hanlin Group, Inc.,
176 BR 329 (Bankr.D.N.J. 1995) and Hotel Employees
Restaurant Employees Int'l Union Local 54 v. Elstmore
Shore Associates, 724 F.Supp. 333 (D.N.J. 1989).

In this case, there is no doubt that United's plant closing
and massive layoff of employees would, absent bankruptcy,
trigger the notification requirements under WARN. In the
Chapter 11 context, however, the debtor-in-possession
("DIP") as fiduciary succeeded to the WARN obligations of
United under the second scenario outlined by the Department

8a

of Labor Comment emphasized since debtor's 1,300 employ-
ees continued to work on a daily basis for sixteen days after
the chapter 11 petition was filed. Thus, this Court concludes
United, the debtor-in possession, is an employer subject to the
provisions of WARN. In re Hanlin, 176 B.R. at 332.

Il. DEBTOR IS NOT ENTITLED TO
WARN ACT EXCEPTIONS

A. The “faltering company” exceptions pursuant to 29
U.S.C. § 2102(b)(6) and the “unforeseeable busi-
ness circumstances” exception pursuant to 29
U.S.C. § 2102(b)(2)(B) do not apply.

As set forth above, WARN is designed to provide employ-
ees with sixty (60) days’ advance notice of any plant closing
in order to provide them and their respective communities
adequate time to prepare for the ultimate loss of employment
and to minimize the harmful financial and social impact of
the termination

Under WARN, an employer may order a plant closing or
mass layoff before the conclusion of sixty days without vio-
lating the Act’s notice requirement if the closing or layoff is
made pursuant to one of the Act’s three limited exceptions.
An employer is permitted to close a plant or lay off employ-
ees with less than sixty day’s notice when (i) the business is
faltering (29 USC. § 2102(b)(1) ~~ (ii) _ there
are unforeseeable business circumstances (29 U.S.C.
§ 102(b)(2)(A)) or (iii) there is a natural disaster (29 U.S.C.
§ 2102(b)(2)(B)).

The first exception referred to as the “faltering company”
exception states that an employer may order the shutdown of
a facility before the conclusion of the sixty-day period if:

“As of the time that notice would have been required,
‘the employer was actively seeking capital or business
which, if obtained, would have enable the employer to

9a

avoid or postpone the shutdown and the employer rea-
sonably and in good faith believed that giving the notice
required would have precluded the employer from ob-
taining the needed capital or business.” 29 U.S.C.
§ 2102(b)(1)

For the “faltering company” exception to apply, there must
be (i) a realistic opportunity to obtain such financing or busi-
ness, which (ii) if achieved would have avoided closure, and
(ili) the employer reasonably and in good faith believed that
such financing or business would be unavailable if notice
were given. 20 C.F.R. § 639.9(a0(4). To satisfy condition
(iii), the burden here is on United to show that its financial
services with whom it was dealing would no longer transact
business with its troubled company. Id.

The second, so-called “unforeseeable business circum-
stance” exception to the Act provides that “an employer may
order a plant closing or mass layoff before the conclusion of
the sixty-day period if the layoff or closing is caused by a
business circumstance that was not reasonably foreaeeable as
of the time that the notice would have or should have been
given.” 29 U.S.C. § 2102(b)(2)(A).

Under this exception, an employer is only acquired to give
as much notice as is practical and, at tha time, give a brief
statement explaining the basis for reducing the notification
period 29 U.S.C. § 2102(b)(3). “The test for determining
when business circumstances are not reasonably un-
foreseeable focuses on the employer's business judgment.” 30
C.F.R. § 939.9(b)(2). A business circumstance is not reasona-
bly foreseeable if it is caused by some “sudden, dramatic and
unexplained action or condition outside of the employer's
control.” Jd. supra at (b)(1).

To the extent that an employer fails to give the required no-
tice, the Act provides that the employer will be liable to its
employees and civil authorities. The employer will be liable

10a

tu each employee for back pay and benefits, including medi-
cal expenses, for the period that the employer failed to give
the required notice. This period may not exceed sixty days. 29
U.S.C. §2104(a)(1)(2). The sixty days’ back pay and lost
benefits remedies for employees and the civil penalties are
the exclusive remedies that may be sought against an em-
ployer violating the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 2104(b).

B. Application of WARN Act exceptions to the
history of debtor prior to filing.

Both of these exceptions to the WARN Act mandate a de-
tailed examination of the history of debtor prior to the filing
of the bankruptcy. The sixty-day period prior to the bank-
ruptcy would have commenced approximately December 19,
1996. As early as September 25, 1996, the minutes of the
Board of Trustees (“Board”) of the Hospital disclose that a
committee had been formed to discuss possible affiliations of
the institution with other medical facilities, The Committee
report of the “affiliation Committee” is part of the Board
minutes of September 25, 1996 and reads in part:

“The Committee came to the conclusion that United
does need a partner to survive in this environment and
time is of the essence in coming to a conclusion as to
who that partner will be.” (Exh. D-3)

For the “unforeseeable business circumstance” exception
of the Act to apply, this Court would have to conclude that
debtor's financial collapse was the result of a sudden, dra-
matic and unexpected action or condition outside of the man-
agement’s control. The record which ws established before
the Court in connection with four days of testimony on Feb-
ruary 27, 28, March 4 and 5, 1997 dealing with the sale of
debtor's “good will” to St. Barnabas Hospital for approxi-
mately $13 million demonstrated to the Court a picture of the
economic chaos which faced debtor prior to the bankruptcy.
The four-day record in the St. Barnabas transaction was sup-

lla

plemented with testimony taken on March 21, 1997 before
this Court in connection with the WARN Act issue. On
March 21, 1997, Mr. Thomas Barry, Vice President of Cain
Brothers who had previously testified in connection with the
St. Barnabas transaction resumed the stand. He reiterated that
he had been retained by debtor’s Board in early February and
that he observed United in dire financial condition, One of the
first actions that Mr. Barry did was to recommend that the
Board retian a management company to attempt to organize
debtor's books and records and to regain control of what was
a chaotic financial situation. Mr. Barry expressly testified on
March 21, 1997 that he was not retained to find long-term
financing for debtor by way of possible stock or bond offer-
ings nor was he retained for conventional mortgage financing.
Mr. Barry testified that he was retained to put together a re-
quest for proposals on an emergency basis that would attempt
to salvage in a quick transaction as much of debtor's assets as
was possible. As noted previously, throughout the end of
1996 the task force committee of the Board has been focusing
on a merger with another medical institution as the way out of
United's financial problems. As noted, the Board had focused
its efforts on a possible merger with St. Barnabas. However,
by January 15, 1997, St. Barnabas had advised United that it
was no longer interested in merger discussions. (Exh. C-3,
Tab 3,—Board Minute).

Mr. Dandridge, Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) of
United, took the stand on March 21, 1997 and testified that he
joined United as CEO in January of 1993 and that when he
came on board he knew that United was “‘a troubled institu-
tion.” He further testified that by April of 1996, United
started knowing substantial operating losses. When asked by
the Court as to when United had trouble maintaining supplies
such as blood and other such necessities, Mr. Dandridge testi-
fied that supply problems were a chronic situation going back
to March of 1996. He further testified that by January 1997
United commenced diverting payments of certain withholding

12a

and other tax obligations and using the funds for general op-
erating expenses. Asked as to the nature of the health insur-
ance coverage maintained by United for the benefit of its em-
ployees, Mr. Dandridge testified that in February of 1997
when he took his daughter to have her treated for medical
services, he was advised that the Blue Cross/Blue Shield pol-
icy for the benefit of the employees maintained by United had
been canceled for the non-payment of the October-November
premium.

On October 21, 1996, United had entered into a receivables
purchases and transfer agreement with DAIWA Securities
America, Inc. (“DAIWA”). Mr. Dandridge testified that he
reported to the Board at its December 18, 1996 meeting (Exh.
C-3, Tab 1) that he, Mr. Dandridge, had had a dinner meeting
with representatives of DAIWA and that they were very upset
with the quality of financial information being provided to
DAIWA by United. The deteriorating financial condition of
United throughout January 1997 results in the Department of
Human Services, Division of Medical Assistance and Health
Services of the State of New Jersey taking steps to advance
future payments to United (Exh. C-3, Tab 6). By January 28,
1997, Mr. Dandridge testified the Board minutes reflect that
bankruptcy counsel have been invited by United to sit in on
Board meetings. (Exh. C-3, Tab 5).

The Court notes, based on the record before it throughout
the St. Barnabas hearing as well as the two days of testimony
taken on the WARN Act aspect of this case, that the Board of
United labored long and hard in its efforts to keep United's
doors open. While this Court had previously questioned the
business judgment of the Board in the pre-bankruptcy offer it
accepted, it is nonetheless apparent from the sum total of the
record that the Board at all times tried to do what it felt was in
the best interests of the patients, the employees, and United in
general. There came a point in time by the Board meeting of
February 16, 1997 that for all intents and purposes United

I3a

ended as an operating hospital. Within hours of said Board
meeting, United is requesting the Commissioner of Health to
revoke its certificate of need to operate as a hospital and is
moving forward with a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition and in
the context of that bankruptcy petition is moving to dispose of

much of its assets. ;

This Court must now evaluate whether that history entitles
debtor-in-possession as is asserted by the Unsecured Cred-
itors’ Committee to exception from the provisions of the
WARN Act. This Court concludes from the aforesaid history
that the unforeseeable business circumstances exception does
not apply to United. There were months of warning signals to
the Board that placed them on notice that United was in fi-
nancial extremis and that the facts leading to United filing
bankruptcy on February 19, 1997 were far from an un-
foreseeable business circumstance so as to justify an excep-
tion to the WARN Act.

The second relevant exception to the WARN Act is the so-
called “faltering business” exception. This portion of the stat-
ute would allow United to avoid WARN Act exposure if at
the time the WARN Act's notices should have been given
debtor was seeking capital with the intention of continuing to
operate and if the management felt that the giving of the no-
tice would have hurt or precluded the efforts of the estate to
recapitalize. Debtor's problems were deep, long-term and
critical in nature. This is not a typical Chapter 11 situation
where a company or business simply needs a new bank or
benefactor and honestly believes a refinancing agreement or
the bringing on board of a new lender within a short time
frame will turn a business around. Quite the contrary, United
for many months was heading towards being absorbed by an-
other hospital or closure. While the Board and particularly,
Mr. Dandridge, held out the hope that one of the possible
Scenarios would allow United to continue to exist in some
format, nonetheless this hope or expectancy cannot defeat the

l4a

employees of their statutorily imposed right to be warned
sixty days before their employment is terminated. Debtor's
continuing problems in obtaining essential supplies which
date back to mid-1996, debtor's failure to pay the October-
November 1996 Blue Cross/Blue Shield health insurance
premiums which ultimately results in a cancellation of em-
ployees benefits, coupled with the diversion of fiduciary tax
obligations in January of 1997, make it imminently clear that
no matter what the good intentions of certain members of the
Board may have been, United was withering on the vine and
the employees were entitled to their sixty-day WARN Act
notice. It is, in fact, in recognition of this point that the Board
ultimately, upon the filing of the bankruptcy on February 19,
1997, does issue a WARN Act notice and does state to the
employees that in recognition of the application of the statute
and the entitlement to the benefit, it is the intention of United
to pay the employees wages for a sixty-day period following
the filing of the Chapter | | petition.

In sum, the Court concludes that there was a closing of a
shutdown of the debtor so as to trigger the application of the
WARN Act statute. The debtor is not entitled to either the
“faltering business” or “unforeseeable business circumstance”
exceptions and the employees for their part are entitled to
their full EARN Act protection. The immediate issue before
the Court is can debtor continue with its policy of paying the
furloughed employees their paychecks so as to satisfy
debtor's WARN Act liabilities. The next paycheck due to the
employees is March 27, 1997 and would be for a two-week
pay period ending March 22, 1997. As noted above, through-
out the pay period at issue, relevant employees of the debtor
have been on furlough and have not been reporting to duty at
United.

15a

fl. ADMINISTRATIVE STATUS IS GRANTED TO
WARN ACT CLAIMS.

The question of whether or not the debtor may continue
with its policy of paying the furloughed employees their pay-
checks so as to satisfy the debtor's WARN Act liabilities,
must be answered in the context of the priority of distribution
of claims as set forth under section 507 of the Bankruptcy
Code.

As discussed by Judge Stripp in the Hanlin case, first prior-
ity distribution rights are accorded to “the actual, necessary
costs and expenses of preserving the estate, including wages,
salaries or commissions for services rendered after the com-
mencement of the case. . .” 176 B.R. at 329 (citing 11 U.S.C.
§ 503(b)(1)A) and § 507(a)(1)). As has been recognized,
such expenses arise from transactions with a debtor-in- -
possession, where the consideration, supporting the transac-
tion is beneficial to operation of the debtor's business. 176
B.R. at 332 (citing Jn re Jartran, Inc., 732 F.2d 584, 587 (7th
Cir. 1984)). The burden of proving that the WARN Act
claims are entitled to administrative priority is on the party
asserting such status, in this case; the debtor and employees.
Id. at 333.

In examining the issue of whether “back pay” under
WARN is entitled to priority as an administrative claim for
“wages” under the Bankruptcy Code, Judge Stripp, in Hanlin,
reasined that while the term “wages” is not defined under §
503, its meaning therein is the same as under § 507, which
section defines “wages” to include “vacation, severance, and '
sick leave pay.” Jd. at 11 U.S.C. § 503(a)(3). Judge Stripp
then reviewed the holdings of several of the only courts to
have addressed the issue and concluded that “given the com-
pensatory nature of back pay, it must be in the nature of
wages under the Code.” /d. (citing In re Riker Industries, Inc.,
151 B.R. 823 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1993); In re Cargo, 138
B.R. 923 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1992), and United Steelworkers.

l6a

of America, AFL-CIO-CLC v. North Star Steel Co., 5 F.3d 39
42 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. Denied, 510 U.S. 1114, 114 S.Ct.
1060, 127 L.Ed.2d 380 (1994). This Court's review of Cargo,
Riker and North Star finds in accord with the review of those
cases in Hanlin insofar as both Riker and Cargo concludes
that given the compensatory nature as statutory severance
pay, back pay under WARN constitutes wages for the pur-
poses of the Bankruptcy Code Quoting Cargo, the Hanlin
court stated that the cases are In agreement that:

"The "back pay” liability of the employer is comparable
to privately negotiated severance pay. It is severance
pay in lieu of notice, imposed by statute. It is a "quasi-
contractual" obligation. As a statutorily imposed form
of severance pay, it is "wages" within the meaning of
§ 507(a)(3) of the Code.” 176 B.R. at 333 (citing Cargo,
138 B.R. at 927).

Having determined that WARN Act "back pay” constitutes
wages under the Code and is therefore subject to the adminis-
trative priority provisions of § 503 and § 507, the court must
finally determine whether the WARN Act claims in this par-
ticular case constitute first priority administrative claims un-
der § 597(a)(1) and § 503(b)(1)(A).

In recognizing that not all wage claims are entitled to prior-
ity as administrative claims under the Bankruptcy Code, this
Court notes the "three-tier" system of priorities discussed in
Hanlin. First, the actual necessary costs and expenses of pre-
serving the estate, including wages for services rendered after
the commencement of the case are entitled to first priority as
administrative claims, 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1), 503(b)(1)(A).
Wages earned within ninety (90) days before the date of filing
of the petition or the date of the cessation of business, which-
ever comes first, are entitled to third priority, but only to the
extent of $4,000 per person, i} U.S.C.
§ 507(a)(3). All other wage claims are entitled to the same
priority as other general unsecured claims. !76 B.R. at 334.

17a

As applied to the facts of this case, the Court finds that
debtor had 1,300 of its employees report to work for 16 days
post-petition entitles the employees’ WARN Act claim to tre-
arment as a Chapter 11 first priority administrative expense in
accord with Hanlin. In so holding, the Court specifically
finds that the debtor used these employees to perform valu-
able services to the estate. In so doing, the WARN Act obli-
gation of United transferred to the DIP. The management of
the debtor recognized this essential contribution of the em-
ployees and the fact that it benefited the estate during the 16-
day wind-down by stating in the March 6, 1997 Furlough No-
tice:

"Since the transfer of the patients from United, you have
accomplished much in the way of the inventory, clean-
up, and securing of the physical plant and equipment.
Your efforts are greatly appreciated, especially during
this personally trying time for us all." (Exh. C-1).

In sum, the work the 1,300 employees did in the 16-day pe-
riod highlighted in Exh. C-1, wherein the DIP thanks the em-
ployees for inventory services and the securing and clean-up
of its equipment and plant, clearly benefited the Chapter 11
estate. Thus, the contributions of the employees were within
the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A) as wages for ser-
vices rendered which constitute the "actual, necessary costs
and expenses” of preserving the United estate.

The Committee's motion seeking to terminate all employ-
ees immediately is denied. The employees are awarded a
WARN Act administrative claim in accordance with the
terms of this Opinion. However, the sole remaining cash as-
set within the estate at this time is approximately $2 million
which represents the balance of the deposit from the sale of
debtor's "good will" to St. Bamabas. DAIWA, a secured
creditor, has asserted a lien on said funds. Said lien has been
contested by debtor and the Committee in separate proceed-
ings before this Court. Payment of the WARN Act claim

18a

cannot be paid at this time out of debtor's cash assets pending
a resolution of this lien. Therefore, debtor is not authorized
to issue paychecks to its employees in connection with the
WARN Act claim pending further order of this Court. The
salary of the approximately 100 employees currently
performing services may be paid in the normal course.

DATED; March 26, 1997

/S/ William F. Tuohey
WILLIAM F. TUOHEY
U.S. Bankruptcy Judge

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7

19a

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

Case No. 97-21785
Chapter 11 ;
Hearings: March 7, 21, 1997

In Re: UNITED HEALTHCARE SYSTEM, INC.
Debtor-in-Possession

ORDER

This matter having come before the Court on an Order
Shortening Time by the Unsecured Creditors’ Committee
seeking to have the Court direct debtor to immediately termi-
nate all employees except those necessary to protect debtor's
estate; and

The Court having considered the arguments of counsel on
March 7, and 21, 1997, as well as the submission of the par-
ties; and

The Court having rendered a written Opinion this date, the
terms of which are incorporated herein by reference,

IT IS on this 26th day of March, 1997
ORDERED that:

1. United is an employer for the purpose of ihe Worker's
Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act ("WARN")
29 U.S.C. § 2101;

ta

. The exceptions to WARN pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §
2102(b) do not apply;

20a

3. The "back pay" due under WARN constitutes an admin-
istrative first priority expanse of United's estate pursuant
to § 503 and § 507 of the Bankruptcy Code,

4. United is free to continue paying the 100 actual working
employees, and

5. The furloughed employees as noted are granted an ad-
ministrative priority WARN Act claim, the payment of
which will abide further Order of the Court.

/s/ William F. Touhey
WILLIAM F. TUOHEY
U.S. Bankruptcy Judge

i i, A A a a

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386014_0802%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
