# Reply Brief — Appalachian Power Co. v. Whitman

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386014_0669%3A8

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Reply Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2001
- **Citation:** 532 U.S. 903

## Text

Pie Supreme Court, U.S.

\%/ FILED
No. 99-1431 APR 2 6 2000

IN THE CLERK
Supreme Court of the Anited States

APPALACHIAN POWER COMPANY, ef ai.,
Cross-Petitione:s

¥.

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, et ai.
Cross-Respondents

On Conditional Cross-Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
For the District of Columbia Circuit

REPLY BRIEF FOR
CONDITIONAL CROSS-PETITIONERS
APPALACHIAN POWER COMPANY, et al.

DAVID E. MENOTTI HENRY V. NICKEL
WILLIAM F. PEDERSEN F. WILLIAM BROWNELL
JEFFERY A. KNIGHT (COUNSEL OF RECORD)
SHAWPITTMAN LUCINDA MINTON LANGWORTHY
2300 N Street, N.W. HUNTON & WILLIAMS
Washington, D.C. 20037 1900 K Street, N.W.
(202) 663-8675 Washington, D.C. 20006
Counsel for American (202) 955-1500
Forest & Paper Counsel for Appalachian Power
Association and American Co., et al., American Public
Tron & Steel Institute Power Association, and

National Association of
Home Builders
April 26, 2000
“ [Additional Counsel Listed Inside]

AANA EAR AIS ROE LEE I ATI TIN tI LEN IITE LES ME SETAE TEE LD LAER OLE STR MELE SEITE AIELLO EDIE TE
WILSON-EPES PRINTING CO., INC. — (202) 789-0096 -— WASHINGTON, D. C. 20001

NEWMAN R. PORTER

LEWIS AND ROCA

40 N. Central Avenue

Phoenix, AZ 85004

(602) 262-5786

Counsel for Nevada Mining
Association, Newmont Gold
Company, and Meridian
Gold Company

RUSSELL S. FRYE

COLLIER, SHANNON, RILL &
Scott, PLLC

3050 K Street, N.W., Suite 400

Washington, D.C. 20007
(202) 342-8878
and
RICHARD WASSERSTROM
AMERICAN FOREST & PAPER
ASSOCIATION, INC.
1111 19th Street, N.W.
8th Floor
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 463-2582
Counsel for American Forest
& Paper Association, Inc.

GRANT CRANDALL

General Counsel

UNITED MINE WORKERS OF
AMERICA, AFL-CIO

8315 Lee Highway

Fairfax, VA 22031

(703) 208-7200

and

EUGENE M. TRISKO

P.O. Box 596

Berkeley Springs, WV 25411

(304) 258-1977

Counsel for United Mine
Workers of America,
AFL-CIO

DavD F. ZOLL

ALEXANDRA DAPOLITO DUNN

CHEMICAL MANUFACTURERS
ASSOCIATION

1300 Wilson Boulevard

Arlington, VA 22209

(703) 741-5165

Counsel for Chemical
Manufacturers Association

G. WILLIAM FRICK
M. ELIZABETH Cox
AMERICAN PETROLEUM
INSTITUTE
1220 L Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005 %
(202) 682-8250

Counsel for American Petroleum
Institute

HAROLD P. QUINN, JR.
NATIONAL MINING
ASSOCIATION
1130 17th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 463-9793 j

Counsel for National Mining

Association

MARCELLE SHOOP

Vice President Law and
General Counsel ‘
KENNECOTT CORPORATION
8315 West 3595 South
P.O. Box 6001

Magna, Utah 84044-6001
(801) 252-3000

Counsel for Kennecott Holdings
Corporation, Kennecott
Energy and Coal Company,
and Kennecott Services
Company

PETER S. GLASER

SHOOK, HarDY & BACON

600 14th Street, N.W.

Suite 800

Wasshington, D.C. 20005

(202) 639-5627

Counsel for Western Fuels
Association, Inc.

MAURICE H. MCBRIDE

NATIONAL PETROCHEMICAL &
REFINERS ASSOCIATION

1899 L Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 457-0480

Counsel for National
Petrochemical & Refiners
Association

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'

Davi M. FLANNERY

JACKSON & KELLY

P.O. Box 553

1600 Laidley Tower

Charleston, WV 25322

(304) 340-1017

Counsel for Midwest Ozone
Group; and West Virginia
Chamber of Commerce

KURT E. BLASE

O’CONNOR & HANNAN

Suite 500

1666 K Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20006-2803

(202) 887-1400

Counsel for Kennecott Holdings
Corporation, Kennecott
Energy and Coal Company,
Kennecott Services Company
and National Stone
Association

TIMOTHY L. HARKER
THE HARKER LAW FIRM
9500 Accord Drive
Potomac, MD 20854
(301) 983-0964
and
THOMAS J. GRAVES
NATIONAL PAINT AND COATINGS
ASSOCIATION, INC.
1500 Rhode Island Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005
(202) 462-6272

Counsel for National Paint and
Coatings Association

DAVID M. FRIEDLAND

BEVERIDGE & DIAMOND

1350 I Street, N.W.

Suite 700

Washington, D.C. 20005

(202) 789-6000

Counsel for Phoenix Cement
Company

RULE 29.6 DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Pursuant to Rule 29.6, CAA Industry Cross-Petitioners
hereby amend the corporate disclosure statement filed with
the conditional cross-petition for a writ of certiorari. (Case
No. 99-1431). The page numbers of the conditional cross-
petition for a writ of certiorari on which CAA Industry
Cross-Petitioners requiring amended statements appear are
provided for convenience.

Carolina Power & Light Co (p. x)
(10% or greater owner: State Street Bank &
Trust Co. Boston)

Detroit Edison Co., The (p. xi)
(a subsidiary of DTE Energy Co.)

Meridian Gold Co. (p. xi)
(a wholly-owned subsidiary of Meridian Gold, Inc.)

Newmont Gold Co. (p. xi)
(10% or greater owner: Newmont Mining Corporation)

Otter Tail Power Co. (p. xi)
(10% or greater owner: Otter Tail Power Co. ESOP)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
RULE 29.6 DISCLOSURE STATEMENT ....-.cccccccseeeosce-..., 1
CPE GP AIT II visite a Iv
a EDI SE NBDE ot Bs Sate A |
I. THE NATURE OF EPA’S AUTHORITY UNDER
CAA §109 IS CRITICAL TO EVALUATION
OF THE NONDELEGATION ISSUE ........cccccccceecccs-..... 1
I]. THE LOWER COURT’S HOLDING THAT EPA,
IN DEFINING AN INTELLIGIBLE
PRINCIPLE, MUST IGNORE FACTORS
CRITICAL TO SOUND POLICY JUDGMENT
IS. AN ISSUE OF EXCEPTIONAL
i te ag CRETE Sie NEE 4
CI ecivensiitiiinistibanasstisauatumeba. pce ese 10

ill

1V
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES Page
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,

a A A IROD ssnicnscniciidahiniesanumubiensoniesiscimbiekincn 3
AT & T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board, 525 U.S.

PE hiiiciicassisaseanesciouanbacnpadatabtaaaaduiniadiniiniials 3
American Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 665 F.2d 1176

te MS | Rp menesnoareee ern AON? EMR IRE Re |

American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. EPA, 175
F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir.), modified 195 F.3d 4

EEE sckicicadabhasdnieekdebiasecnashibeiuleddcitesamasdichths i
Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976)............. 2
Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 51 F.3d 1053 (D.C. Cir.

Sica ciseneskinslbeeinlh cen buateteplacieda bth doin tevcascakcea Rlaatdaaaratnckuss 2
Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. American

Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980).................008 ye
J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276

Os I ies ceed ni sas adduanatumlbamalioicnpens 2
Reet V. EROS, S57 UG. VIG CBSE) vvssiscsissasnsrtsscecscsincsess 3
Lead Industries Ass’n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130

cs MTs, WII is hia ianscinies mcs Lia Cacdechaabsanccgbdeandtinni 7
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) .............. 3
National Cable Television Ass'n, Inc. v. United

SN FER ies OR ria cshsccccdinnenscinintoichesinins 3
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA,

FR ee a ls FD ei ecesssitdvciseasassscrvnes PY

Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA,
ee ee AO A Gl, CIEE Peiniaiccinscscsinpeentsinienanvans 6

Vv

South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S.

ag RNEASY Pe CER OLN OCaD AT EEE EN CON 8
West v. Gilaom, S27 U.S. Z1Z CIGD) occcesccsscasccsnssescrceccases 6
ET i Ts Fee Tits FO i chitin cs nnccsntntnensnanncena 3
FEDERAL STATUTES
Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 ef seq.
(1994)
42 U.S.C. § 7401(b), CAA § 101(D) «0... ee 5
42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1), CAA § 101(b)(1)...... 9
EI. Fs He Oe i iiiincicterccesrscscrrensasnsens 6
42 U.S.C. § 7408, CAA § 1G .n...siciesceccesssccseeses passim
42 U.S.C. § 7409(b), CAA § 109(b) ...... ee 5,6
42 U.S.C. § 7409(d), CAA § 109(d) ....... eee eeeeeees 8
Ge UA. i et eB iiticaricnceccsessrcccnesnees 6-7
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

H.R. Rep. 95-294 (1977) reprinted in 4 Sen.
Comm. on Env’t and Pub. Works,
A Legislative History of the Clean Air Act

Amendments of 1977 (Comm. Print 1978)............. 2,8
FEDERAL REGULATIONS
ee isis riicicssicacnsasnvnerennnsssnenamiensinnaninse’ 6
MISCELLANEOUS
Breyer, Stephen, Breaking the Vicious Circle
ithe ed iemibnainapeniioninnniae 5

Memorandum from Alicia Munnell to Art Fraas,
OMB (December 13, 1996) (EPA-
Docket No. A-95-58, Item IV-H-1)...............ceeee 9-10

ARGUMENT

In its response, EPA describes the “fundamental question”
here as not the constitutionality of the Clean Air Act (““CAA”
or “Act’), but a much narrower issue: whether the
nondelegation doctrine constrains the Agency’s discretion as
it applies the Act. EPA’s re-framing of the issue confirms
that, in any review of the lower court’s non-delegation
holding, this Court must address the nature and scope of the
Agency’s authority to define “intelligible principles” for
making risk management decisions. That is, if certiorari is
granted, the question of whether the nondelegation doctrine
constrains the Agency’s discretion cannot be_ resolved
without this Court examining the nature of the congressional
delegation -- an inquiry that requires review of the issue as
presented by CAA Industry Cross-Petitioners.

I. THE NATURE OF EPA’S AUTHORITY UNDER
CAA § 109 IS CRITICAL TO EVALUATION OF
THE NONDELEGATION ISSUE,

This case concerns EPA’s extraordinary claim of authority
to make risk management decisions without guiding
principles. Based on Lead Industries and cases that have
relied upon it,' EPA argued to the lower court that “nothing
in the statute requires [the Administrator] to make any
specific ‘findings’ or to structure her decisionmaking in any
particular way” when she judges risk under CAA § 109, even
when her choices lie along a continuum of uncertain and
indistinguishable health risks. EPA Resp. Br. (D.C. Cir. 97-

' Lead Industries Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1980);
American Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 665 F.2d 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1981);
NRDC v. EPA, 902 F.2d 962 (D.C. Cir. 1990).

2

1441) 43. Indeed, EPA argued that when confronted with
uncertain and indistinguishable health risks, it may elect to
revise NAAQS as a policy matter even without a finding that
that action is needed to respond to “significant risk.””

It was this interpretation of CAA § 109 that led Non-State
CAA Petitioners (CAA Industry Cross-Petitioners here) to
argue that, because EPA interprets § 109 of the Act to require
no findings that a revised NAAQS will demonstrably
improve the public health, “EPA improperly reads § 109 as a
standardless delegation of authority.” Non-State CAA Pet’rs
and Intervenors Reply Br. (D.C. Cir. 97-1441) 17. And it
was this assertion by EPA of unbounded public health policy
judgment that led the lower court to hold that EPA’s
interpretation of the Act raised “nondelegation” concerns.

In its petition for certiorari, EPA claimed that the lower
court’s nondelegation ruling was worthy of certiorari because
it “conflicts with this Court’s decisions upholding
congressional enactments containing far broader grants of
authority” than the CAA and “raises questions respecting the
constitutionality of a broad range of federal statutes.” EPA
Pet. 9. In response, CAA Industry Cross-Petitioners
observed that the lower court “did not question Congress’

> EPA Resp. Br. (D.C. Cir. 97-1441) 42. While EPA argues that the
significant risk standard of /ndustrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. API, 448
U.S. 607 (1980) is not applicable, the “significant risk” standard has been
endorsed by Congress as the threshold for public health regulation under
the Clean Air Act. See H.R. Rep. 95-294, at 3, 48-49 (1977) reprinted in
4 Sen. Comm. on Env’t and Pub. Works, A Legislative History of the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, at 2470, 2515-16 (Comm. Print
1978) (“1977 Legis. Hist.”); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 51 F.3d 1053, 1063
(D.C. Cir. 1995); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 16, 31-32 (D.C. Cir.
1976).

3

authority to legislate in broad terms,” “[nJor did the court
hold that § 109 is unconstitutional.” CAA Ind. Resp. 13.

EPA now agrees that the lower court did not attack the
constitutionality of the CAA. EPA therefore re-frames the
question as follows:

The fundamental question here’ remains
whether the nondelegation doctrine provides
constitutional limitations on an agency’s
action.

EPA Resp. 20; see also EPA Reply 3-4. The cases cited by
CAA Industry Respondents show that it clearly does.’

In clarifying the issue on which it seeks certiorari, EPA
demonstrates why certiorari, if it is granted, must address the
nondelegation issue as presented by CAA Industry Cross-
Petitioners. As this Court has explained, there is nothing
wrong with broad delegations so long as the agency
articulates the principles by which it exercises its authority.

3 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 374 n.7 (1989)
(nondelegation doctrine requires narrow construction of statutes that
might otherwise be unconstitutional); /ndustrial Union Dep't, 448 US. at
646 (plurality opinion) (agency should be allowed to characterize statute
in a way to avoid unconstitutional delegation); National Cable Television
Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 342 (1974) (“the hurdles
revealed in [A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S.
495 (1935) and J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394
(1928)] lead us to read the [Independent Offices Appropriation Act] to
avoid constitutional problems”); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1965)
(construing statute so as to avoid an invalid delegation); Kent v. Dulles,
357 U.S. 116, 129 (1958) (the act in question does “not delegate to the
Secretary the kind of authority exercised”); AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils.
Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 388-89, 119 S.Ct. 721, 734-35 (1999); see generally
CAA Ind. Resp. 14-16 (and accompanying notes).

4

And the Agency cannot get those principles right unless it
follows the guidance Congress gave it in making the
delegation. If, as EPA now agrees, the question is whether
nondelegation constrains the Agency’s discretion as it applies
the statute, then the issue can be resolved only by examining
the terms of Congress’ delegation, requiring this Court to
address precisely what those terms are.*

Il. THE LOWER COURT’S HOLDING THAT EPA,
IN DEFINING AN INTELLIGIBLE PRINCIPLE,
MUST IGNORE FACTORS CRITICAL TO
SOUND POLICY JUDGMENT IS AN ISSUE OF
EXCEPTIONAL IMPORTANCE,

In attempting to explain why the issue presented by Cross-
Petitioners is, in its view, not worthy of certiorarl, EPA
mischaracterizes it. EPA argues strenuously that the cost or
technological feasibility of pollution controls should not be
allowed to override protection of public health. See, e.g.,
EPA Resp. 6, 9. But this is not the issue; no one in this case
is arguing that public health protection is not the primary
purpose of NAAQS.

Rather, EPA’s own science advisers have found that
uncertainties in the scientific data related to both particulate
matter and ozone are so large that it is not clear that revising
the NAAQS will improve public health. See CAA Ind.

* For this reason, Massachusetts and New Jersey are incorrect in asserting
that the question presented in our conditional Cross-Petition “is not
properly presented at this time.” See Mass. & NJ Resp. 9-10 n.5. For the
same reason, while EPA acknowledges that the D.C. Circuit would be
required to engage in arbitrary and capricious review on remand, see
EPA Resp. 19, such review is not possible until EPA defines the legal
standard (or “intelligible principle”) governing Agency action. See CAA
Ind. Cross-Pet. 17.

5

Cross-Pet. 11-12. Against this background, Cross-Petitioners
have asked this Court to address whether EPA is constrained
to exercise its discretion in a manner that promotes the
“public health” generally and effectuates the broad
congressional purposes of the Act as enunciated in CAA
§ 101(b), CAA ICP App. la. See CAA Ind. Cross-Pet. 6, 21-
23.

EPA fails to address the real issue here -- that it chose
among alternative standards any of which would protect
against small and uncertain health risks with no discernible
principle for choosing. The only thing EPA can tell us
precisely is what principle it did not apply, and that is
consideration of “costs.” Indeed, so devoted is EPA to the
“no cost” principle that it prefers to ignore health “costs”
(i.e., cancer and cataracts) from increased UVB radiation
exposure, hardly a process that promotes the “public” health.
See also EPA App. 15a, n.4.

EPA asserts that it is precluded from considering factors
that one would normally associate with sound risk
management judgment’ by the language of § 109(b), which
requires that NAAQS be “requisite to protect the public
health.” EPA App. 1lla. But EPA completely ignores

> See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle 22-23 (1993).

° EPA now apparently agrees with CAA Industry Respondents, however,
that the “requisite to protect” language of § 109 requires EPA to a
determine that NAAQS revision is “necessary to protect” public health
and welfare. See EPA Resp. at 9. This is not the position EPA took
before the lower court. Compare Ozone Non-State CAA Pet’rs and
Intervenors Pet. (D.C. Cir. 97-1441) 37-38 (“[T]he plain meaning of the
word ‘requisite’ is ‘indispensable’ or ‘necessary,’ suggesting that the
Administrator must establish a need for the revised standard to avoid
unacceptable health risk.”), with EPA Resp. Br. (D.C. Cir. 97-1441) 42
(Petitioners argue that EPA must “demonstrate that the revised standard

6

other language of § 109 addressed by CAA Industry Cross-
Petitioners, directing that EPA allow an “adequate margin of
safety” in setting NAAQS and that NAAQS be revised only
as the Administrator determines “may be appropriate” in
light of § 109(b) and § 108. EPA App. 11 1la-112a; CAA ICP
App. la-2a.

In accordance with other decisions addressing language
similar to that used in the NAAQS provision, terms such as
“adequate” and “appropriate” on their face do not preclude
consideration of costs; they must be interpreted.’ Interpreting
them, however, is precisely what EPA (with the lower court’s
blessing) has refused to do." Moreover, EPA never explains
why “the ample margin of safety” language of § 112 does not

is ‘needed to improve demonstrably the overall public health’....
Petitioners’ ‘test’ has no basis in the statute.”’).

” NRDC vy. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en banc) (“Vinyl
Chloride”) (interpreting the word “ample”); cf West v. Gibson, 527 U.S.
212, --, 119 S.Ct. 1906, 1910 (1999) (addressing the term “appropriate”’).

* See. eg, EPA App. 19a (The nature of EPA’s risk management
authority is resolved under “Chevron step one” because the “statute on its
face does not allow consideration of technological or economic
feasibility” (emphasis added).). Curiously, EPA takes a very different
position regarding what it characterizes as the “detailed statutory
scheme” in CAA Subpart 2, arguing that it must be given discretion to
reach a result different from the result Congress reached in Subpart 2.
See EPA Reply 6. EPA has it backwards — broad delegations must be
interpreted; detailed statutory schemes must be implemented. In this
regard, CAA Industry Cross-Petitioners also note that, contrary to EPA’s
claim, see EPA Reply 8, their petition for review below challenged the
entire ozone NAAQS rule, including 40 C.F.R. § 50.9(b).

7

on its face preclude consideration of costs, yet the “adequate
margin of safety” language of § 109 does.’

Furthermore, the nature of EPA’s authority to make risk
management decisions when confronted with a continuum of
uncertain and indistinguishable health risks has not been
addressed by over 20 years of judicial decisions, as EPA
suggests. See EPA Resp. 7-8. Lead Industries addressed, for
a threshold pollutant, the issue whether EPA was required to
consider the cost and technological feasibility of pollution
controls in setting NAAQS. The D.C. Circuit, the only court
besides this one with authority to review decisions on
NAAQS, has expanded upon that decision since that time
without pausing to reflect upon its applicability to non-
threshold pollutants that call for the exercise of risk
management judgment. See, e.g., NRDC, 902 F.2d 962.

Nor is the issue resolved in EPA’s favor by legislative
history. EPA emphasizes that the CAA is a “technology
forcing” statute. See EPA Resp. 12. But this proves little,
because the CAA would still be technology forcing if
NAAQS were set to reflect sound risk management
principles. Similarly, EPA cites legislative history for the
proposition that sources may have to shut down if they
cannot meet the NAAQS. /d. at 13. But sources would still
have to shut down if they could not meet NAAQS that reflect
sound risk management principles. _

EPA also points to legislative history from the 1977
Amendments to the CAA suggesting that the requirement
that EPA obtain the advice of an independent committee on
adverse health, welfare, social, economic, and energy effects

° Compare EPA Resp. 9 n.6, 17, with CAA Ind. Cross-Pet. 9-11 and
Midwest States Br. 13.

8

of a NAAQS revision should not be used to reject state
implementation plans, and that this information “may be of
interest” to Congress in fashioning future legislation. But the
requirement of § 109(d) that this information be developed in
conjunction with decisions on NAAQS revisions suggests
that it is to be considered by EPA, and nothing in the statute
or the legislative history cited by EPA suggests otherwise."°
In light of its understanding that certain pollutants might
present no threshold for health effects, Congress in 1977
ultimately rejected an approach suggested by some that
NAAQS “are to protect against all known or anticipated
effects .. . [since] this no risk philosophy ignores all social
and economic consequences and is impractical.”'' EPA does
not even address this legislative history, which suggests that

'0 See CAA Ind. Cross-Pet. 5, 22. Indeed, the Government and CBT’s
citation to Committee Reports, and to provisions of the 1990
Amendments to the Clean Air Act that are separate from § 109, see EPA
Resp. 15; CBT Resp. 2, in order to explicate the intent of the 1970 and
1977 Congresses in enacting the provision at issue here, stretches the
claim that Congress was clear in narrowly prescribing the Agency’s
discretion in setting NAAQS. South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522
U.S. 329, 355 (1998) (“[w]e have often observed... that ‘the views of a
subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an
earlier one.’”’) (citation omitted).

'' See H.R. Rep. No. 95-294, at 127, reprinted in 1977 Legis. Hist., at
2594; CAA Ind. Cross-Pet. 5-6, 9, n.30; see also H.R. Rep. No. 95-294,
at 110, reprinted in 1977 Legis. Hist., at 2577 (recognizing unavailability
of thresholds on which to base NAAQS); id. at 106, reprinted in 1977
Legis. Hist., at 2573 (noting that NAAQS are to reduce, but not
eliminate, risk and that the combination of the “Prevention of Significant
Deterioration” and NAAQS programs would serve to provide for
“maximum feasible protection”) (emphasis added).

9

risk management authority should be exercised in light of the
broader purposes of the Act.’

EPA is left with little else except to assert that CAA
Industry Cross-Petitioners’ view of “wise social policy”
differs from that of Congress, EPA Resp. 13, without ever
explaining why Congress’ statement of policy must be
ignored in construing that statute. EPA’s view of “wise
social policy,” of course, precludes consideration of both
direct and indirect public health risks associated with
NAAQS revision (e.g., risks associated with increased UVB
radiation exposure and disruption to the congressional ozone
reduction program). But Congress wrote § 109 to focus on
the “public” health, and these considerations are clearly
relevant to the public health.

Moreover, Congress explained that the purpose of the Act
is to promote health and welfare and the productive capacity
of the population. CAA § 101(b)(1), CAA ICP App. la. If
anything, this statutory language and legislative history
indicate that Congress knew that a profligate commitment of
money and resources to address one set of uncertain risks
could increase, or limit the means to cope with, other more
serious risks."

'? ALA’s extended discussion of legislative history, see ALA Resp. 14-
24, is similarly off the mark because it does not address congressional
intent regarding the exercise of risk management judgment for non-
threshold pollutants.

'? In this regard, EPA does not dispute that its estimate of the costs of
attaining the ozone standard outweighs the benefits, and that the costs of
attaining the PM standards are an extraordinarily-high $37 billion
annually. And while EPA suggests that it has “historically overestimated
the actual cost” of NAAQS implementation, we know in this case that the
Council of Economic Advisers concluded that EPA may well have
substantially underestimated those costs. See Memorandum from Alicia

CONCLUSION

The issue of EPA’s discretion to consider “costs” when
confronted with a continuum of uncertain health risks is one
of great importance. Because EPA’s NAAQS decisions have
such extraordinary impacts on society and the national
economy, and because this Court can evaluate whether the
nondelegation doctrine constrains the Agency’s action here
only by addressing the nature and scope of EPA’s authority
to define “intelligible principles” on remand, CAA Industry
Cross-Petitioners request that the Conditional Cross-Petition

in No. 99-1431 be granted.

DAVID E. MENOTTI

WILLIAM F. PEDERSEN

JEFFERY A. KNIGHT

SHAWPITTMAN

2300 N Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20037

(202) 663-8675

Counsel for American Forest
& Paper Association and
American Iron & Steel
Institute

Respectfully submitted,

HENRY V. NICKEL

F. WILLIAM BROWNELL
(Counsel of Record)

LUCINDA M. LANGWORTHY

HUNTON & WILLIAMS

1900 K Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20006

(202) 955-1500

Counsel for Appalachian
Power Co., et al., American
Public Power Association,
and National Association of
Home Builders

Munnell to Art Fraas, OMB (Dec. 13, 1996) (EPA Docket No. A-95-58,
Item IV-H-1).

NEWMAN R. PORTER
LEWIS AND ROCA

_ 40N. Central Avenue
Phoenix, AZ 85004
(602) 262-5786

Counsel for Nevada Mining

Association, Newmont Gold
Company, and Meridian Gold

Company

MAURICE H. MCBRIDE

NATIONAL PETROCHEMICAL

REFINERS ASSOCIATION
1899 L Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 457-0480
Counsel for National

Petrochemical & Refiners

Association

DAVID M. FLANNERY

JACKSON & KELLY

P.O. Box 553

1600 Laidley Tower

Charleston, WV 25322

(304) 340-1017

Counsel for Midwest Ozone
Group; and West Virginia
Chamber of Commerce

DAVID F. ZOLL
ALEXANDP *. DAPOLITO DUNN

CHEMICAL MANUFACTURERS

ASSOCIATION
1300 Wilson Boulevard
Arlington, VA 22209
(703) 741-5165
Counsel for Chemical
Manufacturers Association

G. WILLIAM FRICK

M. ELIZABETH COX

AMERICAN PETROLEUM
INSTITUTE

1220 L Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20005

(202) 682-8250

Counsel for American Petroleum

Institute

HAROLD P. QUINN, JR.

NATIONAL MINING
ASSOCIATION

1130 17" Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 463-9793

Counsel for National Mining
Association

KURT BLASE

O’CONNOR & HANNAN

Suite 500

1666 K Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20006-2803

(202) 887-1400

Counsel for Kennecott
Holdings Corporation,
Kennecott Energy and
Coal Company, Kennecott
Services Company, and
National Stone Association

RUSSELL S. FRYE
COLLIER, SHANNON, RILL &
Scott, PLLC
3050 K Street, N.W., Ste. 400
Washington, D.C. 20007
(202) 342-8878
and
RICHARD WASSERSTROM
AMERICAN FOREST & PAPER
ASSOCIATION, INC.
1111 19" Street, N.W., 8" Flr.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 463-2582
Counsel for American Forest
& Paper Association, Inc.

MARCELLE SHOOP

Vice President Law and

General Counsel

KENNECOTT CORPORATION

8315 West 3595 South

P.O. Box 6001

Magna, Utah 84044-6001

(801) 252-3000

Counsel for Kennecott Holdings
Corporation, Kennecott
Energy and Coal Company,
and Kennecott Services Co.

TIMOTHY L. HARKER
THE HARKER LAW FIRM
9500 Accord Drive
Potomac, MD 20854
(301) 983-0964
and
THOMAS J. GRAVES
NATIONAL PAINT AND
COATINGS ASSOCIATION,
INC.
1500 Rhode Island Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005
(202) 462-6272
Counsel for National Paint and
Coatings Association

GRANT CRANDALL

General Counsel

UNITED MINE WORKERS OF
AMERICA, AFL-CIO

8315 Lee Highway

Fairfax, VA 22031

(703) 208-7200

and

EUGENE M. TRISKO

P.O. Box 596

Berkeley Springs, WV 25411

(304) 258-1977

Counsel for United Mine
Workers of America, AFL-CIO

April 26, 2000

PETER S. GLASER

SHOOK, HARDY & BACON

600 14" Street, N.W., Ste. 800

Washington, D.C. 20005

(202) 639-5627

Counsel for Western Fuels
Association, Inc.

DAVID M. FRIEDLAND
BEVERIDGE & DIAMOND
1350 I Street, N.W., Ste. 700
Washington, D.C. 20005
(202) 789-6000

Counsel for Phoenix Cement Co.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386014_0669%3A8. Public record. Not legal advice.
