# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Ter Maat v. Browning-Ferris Industries of Illinois, Inc.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 2000
- **Citation:** 529 U.S. 1098

## Text

() Supren:.
99141 8 FER 2 5 2000
No. —erice oF THE cirex

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

RICHARD TER MAAT, et al.,
Petitioners,
V.

BROWNING-FERRIS INDUSTRIES
OF ILLINOIS, INC., et al.
Respondents.

On PETITION For Writ OF CERTIORARI
To Tue UNITED STATES CouRT OF APPEALS
For THe SEVENTH CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

EDWARD M. MAHER *
GUYER & ENICHEN
PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
SuITE B

2601 REID FARM Roap
ROCKFORD, ILLINOIS 61114
(815) 636-9600

Counsel for Petitioners

* Counsel of Record

BECKER GALLAGHER LEGAL PUBLISHING, INC.,
CINCINNATI, OHIO 800-890-5001

|OSpP

* ills Hat on nae

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Whether a corporate officer becomes personally liable
under CERCLA as an “operator” of a landfill when the
corporation by which he is employed has been granted an
exclusive operating permit by state regulatory authorities.

Stated differently, may a corporate officer who has
attempted to comply with environmental laws and regulations,
and for whom no evidence was produced to the contrary at
trial, be termed an “operator” for the mere performance of his
duties as an officer.

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS
Petitioners

The Petitioners are AAA Disposal Services, Inc., a
former Illinois corporation, M.I.G. Investments, Inc:, a
former Illinois corporation, and Richard Ter Maat. AAA
Disposal Services, Inc. and M.1.G. Investments, Inc. are both
dissolved corporations. Neither had any parent corporations
nor any wholly owned subsidiaries when they were in
existence.

Respondents
The Respondents are:

Browning-Ferris Industries of Illinois, Inc., a
Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in
Illinois. The parent company of Browning-Ferris Industries
of Illinois, Inc. is Browning-Ferris Industries, Inc., a publicly
traded corporation.

Apache Products Company, a South Carolina
corporation with its principal place of business in Anderson,
South Carolina. The parent company of Apache Products
Company is Jasper Corporation.

Tamms Industries, a Delaware corporation with its
principal place of business in Kirkland, Illinois.

DaimlerChrysler Corporation (f/k/a Chrysler
Corporation), a Delaware corporation with its principal place
of business in Auburn Hills, Michigan. The parent company
of DaimlerChrysler Corporation is DaimlerChrysler AG, a
publicly traded corporation.

pte ae ARK eee A Alan rin ata ene be re

The Ingersoll Milling Machine Company, an Illinois
corporation with its principal place of business in Rockford,
Illinois. The parent company of Ingersoll Milling Machine
Company is Ingersoll International, Inc.

Newell Operating Co. (f/k/a Amerock Corporation),
a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in
[llinois. The parent company of Newell Operating Company
is Newell Co., a publicly traded corporation.

Camcar Division of Textron, Inc., a Delaware
corporation with its principal place of business in Rockford,
Illinois. The parent company of Camcar Division of Textron
Inc. is Textron, Inc., a publicly traded corporation.

Twin Disc, Inc., a Wisconsin corporation with its
principal place of business in Racine, Wisconsin. Fidelity
Management & Resources Corp., a publicly traded company,
owns 10% or more of the stock of Twin Disc, Inc.

No other respondent has a parent corporation, nor
does any publicly held company own 10% or more of any
Respondent’s stock.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW .......... i
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING ...........4.. il
DAME NE GAMES 6 oe WA ei ween iv
SAG A RASTER kk ee Fa ba ee dae Vi
eR soa ee he es 1
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ........005.. ]
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED ......... l
>rAtumenees OF TRE CARE 6 ick ie cea wees 4
ARGUMENT FOR ISSUANCE OF WRIT......... 7
eres 5s each Aste es bos Re ek eee ee 18
APPENDIX

Appendix A
Seventh Circuit Opinion of

SO Ou RUE ao nw ke a ee A ee la
Appendix B

Seventh Circuit Judgment of

PUNE 3, TO on sa oe ees a we ee 18a

iV

BIR GCOS 0 Sy POAT ROS SN

Appendix C
District Court Memorandum and Order of

ily Th, TORO ka eee ee ae 20a
Appendix D

Seventh Circuit Order Denying Petition for
Rehearing of November 30, 1999 ......... 75a

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases

Browning-Ferris Industries of Illinois, Inc.
v. Ter Maat

195 F.3d 953 (7" Cir. 1999) ......... 1, 15-16
FMC Corp. v. Aero Industries, Inc.
998 F.2d 842 (10" Cir. 1993) .......... 10, 14
Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co. |
966 F.2d 837 (4" Cir. 1992) 2.2.2.0... 8,9, 10
Riverside Market Development Corp. v.
International Building Products, Inc. }
931 F.2d 327 6" Ce: TO a aa 14 i
Sidney S. Arst Co. v. Pipefitters Welfare
Education Fund
25 F.38 497 CCE: TS =. se passim
U.S. v. Bestfoods
SGN U.S. 24 CED ia wee ee 12, 16, 17 !
U.S. v. Carolina Transformer Co. |
978 F.2d 032 10" Ce. TOD on. A ee 10
U.S. v. Gurley
43 F.3d 1188 (8" Cir. 1994) 2. ......00.... LI 7
U.S. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical
& Chemical Co., Inc. ;
810 F.2d 726 (8" Cir. 1986) ............. 10

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Statutes and Other Authorities

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OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit is reported at 195 F.3d 953 (7" Cir.
1999). A copy of the opinion is included in the Appendix at
Appendix A. The Opinion of the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, Western Division, is
published at 13 F.Supp.2d 756 (N.D. Ill. 1998). A copy of
the opinion is included in the Appendix at Appendix C.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The United States-Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit issued its Final Judgment on November 1, 1999. One
of the Appellants, Browning-Ferris Industries of Illinois, Inc.,
filed a Petition for Rehearing on November 15, 1999. The
Petition for Rehearing was denied on November 30, 1999.
This Petition for Writ of Certiorari is filed within 90 days of
the denial of the Petition for Rehearing. The Court’s
jurisdiction is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§1254(1) and
2106.

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act
42 U.S.C. §9607(a)

§9607. Liability
(a) Covered persons;

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PON ee MS SOR ee Oe Ts here ne ah Gc SORT

sao Set Rtas. Aeneid Dreads aden kei 2 I ACS a Peel eR Gc Rehan RY,

Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and
subject only to the defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this
section—

(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any
hazardous substance owned or operated any
facility at which such hazardous substances
were disposed of,

shall be liable for—

(A) all costs of removal or remedial action
incurred by the United States Government or a State
or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the national
contingency plan;

(B) any other necessary costs of response
incurred by any other person consistent with the
national contingency plan;

(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or
loss of natural resources, including the reasonable
costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss
resulting from such a release; and

(D) the costs of any health assessment or health
effects study carried out under section 9604(i) of this
title.

42 U.S.C. §9601(9)
and §9601(20)(A)

§9601. Definitions
For purposes of this subchapter—

(9) The term “facility” means (A) any building,
structure, installation, equipment, pipe or pipeline (including
any pipe into a sewer or publicly owned treatment
works), well, pit, pond, lagoon, impoundment, ditch, landfill,
storage container, motor vehicle, rolling stock, or aircraft, or
(B) any site or area where a hazardous substance has been
deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or otherwise come
to be located; but does not include any consumer product in
consumer use or any vessel.

(20)(A) The term “owner or operator” means (i) in the
case of a vessel, any person owning, operating, or chartering
by demise, such vessel, (ii) in the case of an onshore facility
or an offshore facility, any person owning or operating such
facility, and (iil) in the case of any facility, title or control of
which was conveyed due to bankruptcy, foreclosure, tax
delinquency, abandonment, or similar means to a unit of State
or local government, any person who owned, operated, or
otherwise controlled activities at such facility immediately
beforehand. Such term does not include a person, who,
without participating in the management of a vessel or
facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his
security interest in the vessel or facility.

3
:
3
;
:

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The material facts for purposes of this appeal relate to
the involvement of an officer, director and shareholder in the
affairs of a corporation. The corporation, M.I.G.
Investments, Inc., (MIG) was issued a permit to operate a
sanitary landfill by the State of Illinois.

The landfill in question, known as the MIG/DeWane
Landfill, is located in north central Illinois. It was located on
a farm owned by the DeWane family. The landfill began as
a rock quarry. A small operator began limited landfilling in
the quarry in 1968 pursuant to local permits. A predecessor
of Browning-Ferris Industries of Illinois, Inc. (BFI) leased the
property in 1970 and thereafter undertook development of the
landfill. BFI ceased landfilling operations in 1975.

AAA Disposal Systems, Inc. (AAA) was an
established waste hauler in the northern Illinois area when BFI
withdrew from the MIG/DeWane Landfill. The stock of that
corporation was owned in equal shares by the Appellant
Richard Ter Maat, his father Jack Ter Maat, and a third
individual, Edward Foerster. The DeWanes offered the lease
of the landfill to the AAA shareholders following the
cessation of operations by BFI. The two Ter Maats and
Foerster incorporated MIG for the sole purpose of operating
the landfill. MIG was granted an operating permit from the
Illinois Environmental Protection Agency and began accepting
waste. Slightly before the landfill closed one of the
shareholders, Mr. Foerster, retired. His shares of AAA
stock were purchased equally by the other two shareholders.
His shares of MIG were transferred to AAA.

Philip Stephenson was hired as the controller of both
AAA and MIG. He was instructed by the shareholders, who

4

also comprised the board of directors, to maintain each
corporation as a separate entity. To that end, Stephenson kept
separate books, checking accounts, addresses, post office
boxes, annual reports, and financial statements for each
corporation. An independent accounting firm prepared the tax
returns for each corporation.

The three shareholders incorporated two other waste
hauling companies. Saturn Disposal, Inc. (Saturn) operated
in the area northwest of Chicago. Economy Disposal, Inc.
(Economy) operated in southern Wisconsin. The shareholders
and Stephenson met every Friday to review the affairs of
AAA, MIG, Saturn, and Economy. Richard Ter Maat was
the president of AAA and MIG. The other two shareholders
held other offices in the corporations. The shareholders had -
a rule that a single shareholder could not act on behalf of any
of the corporations. Any action to be taken required an
unanimous vote.

Each of the officers had a separate area of
responsibility. Stephenson had an accounting background.
He was responsible for all financial matters and for keeping
the books of the corporations.

Richard Ter Maat was primarily responsible for AAA,
the largest of the hauling companies, devoting approximately
98% of his time to that endeavor. His emphasis was on
developing new business for the hauling companies. In the
mid-1980s Richard Ter Maat devoted additional time to MIG
in his capacity as its president. MIG and the DeWanes sought
a new permit to increase the acreage and the height of the
landfill. He became MIG’s principle spokesman with the
Illinois Environmental Protection Agency in Springfield and
with local officials. Richard Ter Maat signed correspondence
on behalf of MIG as well as its tax returns. He attended to

5

other such administrative matters. He also issued general
directives that anyone working on the waste disposal routes or
at the landfill was to adhere to all environmental laws and
regulations.

Jack Ter Maat was résponsible for servicing the
municipal contracts of all three haulers. He was also closely
involved in the management of Economy and Saturn.

The third shareholder, Mr. Foerster, was responsible
for maintaining the vehicles owned by the corporations. His
principal activities, though, were at the landfill where he was
responsible for day to day operations. Mr. Foerster was a
heavy equipment operator who prepared the liner of the
landfill. He was also responsible for applying intermediate
cover throughout the landfilling process.

Philip Stephenson maintained the books so that the
profits of the business were routed through AAA. This was
done for tax purposes. The books reflected that MIG was
technically insolvent. Nevertheless, Stephenson provided for
a sufficient cash flow through MIG so that it could meet its
obligations. The landfill approached the maximum Capacity
allowed by its permit during the attempts to obtain a vertical
and horizontal expansion. The Illinois Appellate Court
ordered the Illinois Pollution Control Board to issue the
vertical expansion requested by MIG and the DeWanes. The
officers of MIG assumed that the landfill’s existence was
assured for several years. The Illinois Supreme Court,
however, precipitously reversed the appellate court. That
action came so quickly that the corporation did not have
adequate funds for closure. The remaining assets of MIG
were devoted to applying a final cover. When those funds
were exhausted, the landfill was abandoned and the
corporation was dissolved. Over the Succeeding years the

6

landfill collapsed, forming a crater which collected rainwater
and exacerbated the flow of leachate (water mixed with
contaminants from the disposed material) from the landfill.
The landfill was eventually placed on the National Priorities
List.

The Appellants entered into an Administrative Order
on Consent to remedy the problems at the landfill. They
subsequently filed an action for contribution against AAA,
MIG, and Richard Ter Maat. Jack Ter Maat was also named
as a defendant during one portion of the proceedings in the
district court but was dismissed following his death. Edward
Foerster was not a party.

ARGUMENT FOR ISSUANCE OF
WRIT OF CERTIORARI

This Court should grant certiorari because of the
hopeless confusion existing in the District and Circuit Courts
regarding the issue of personal liability under CERCLA (42
U.S.C. §9601 et seq.). The general issue for this Court’s
consideration is a determination of when an individual will be
held responsible for pollutional activities that are attributable
to acorporation. The specific issue presented by this appeal
is whether an individual may be deemed a co-operator under
CERCLA, and therefore liable with a corporation, when only
the corporation was issued an operating permit by a state.

The resolution of this issue in the Circuit Courts falls
into three broad categories. The first approach imposes
liability on any person who had the “authority to control” the
activities of the corporation, principally activities that could
involve waste disposal. The second approach imposes
liability on an individual who exercises “actual control” over

7

such activities. A third line of cases seems to suggest that
individual liability should be imposed only if the person
engaged in wrongful conduct that directly results in
environmental damage. To compound the confusion, many
cases seem to fall into a given category but borrow language
from a case that espouses a differing analysis of liability.

A dangerous undercurrent exists in these cases that is
implicit, although not specifically articulated. The cases seem
to assume that, whenever a corporation 1s liable under
CERCLA, an individual must also be liable. Perhaps that
bias is based on hornbook law holding that a corporation can
only act through its agents and employees. Consequently, if
a corporation is an operator under CERCLA, and if the
corporation can only act through its agents and employees, it
follows that an identifiable agent or employee must also be
liable as a co-operator. If that is indeed the manner in which
CERCLA is to be interpreted, this Court should
unambiguously make that pronouncement. However,
CERCLA should not be interpreted in that manner. If this
Court agrees that the interpretation of “operator” as used in
CERCLA should not result in the automatic imposition of
personal liability, an unambiguous line should be drawn
between conduct or status that will, or will not, result in such
liability.

The Circuits adopting the “authority to control”
analysis have imposed draconian results on individuals caught
within its net. The “authority to control” analysis holds that
anyone who has the authority to control a company’s waste
disposal activities, whether or not that authority is ever
exercised, is personally liable under CERCLA as an
“operator.” Representative of this approach is Nurad, Inc. v.
William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837 (4" Cir. 1992).
In Nurad, the Fourth Circuit analyzed the potential liability of

former tenants at a site that included polluting underground
storage tanks. The decision also discussed the liability of the
(wo surviving sons of the majority stockholder and president
of the corporation that owned the site. The Fourth Circuit
agreed with the expansive test utilized by the district court:

We do not agree with Nurad that the
district court applied an improper standard.
The district court applied the correct standard
in holding that the tenant defendants need not
have exercised actual control in order to
qualify as operators under §9607(a)(2), so long
as the authority to control the facility was
present. Although the court did note that the
tenant defendants “never actively participated
in the disposal of hazardous substances” at the
site, the court’s decision quite properly turned
on the fact that they lacked “authority to
control the operations or decisions involving
the disposal of hazardous substances at the Site
or the contents of the USTs.” Indeed, the
district court's examination of the terms of the
various leases in question indicated that it
recognized that authority to control—not actual
control—was_ the appropriate — standard.
(Nurad, pg. 842).

The Nurad Court also declined to impose individual
liability on the two sons of the former majority shareholder
under the same rationale. Those defendants did not have the
authority to control the underground storage tanks because
their father had totally subordinated their role in the exercise
of his ultimate control over all aspects of the site. The
implication was clear, though, that the father would have been

9

liable, had he survived, due to his degree of control over the
affairs of the corporation.

The rationale of Nurad was again used by the Fourth
Circuit in U.S. v. Carolina Transformer Co. 978 F.2d 832 (4"
Cir. 1992). The Fourth Circuit in that case imposed liability
on two officers and shareholders of a corporation based on the
general control they exerted over it. The opinion is silent
about any specific activities in which either of them may have
engaged that contributed to the leeching of PCBs at the
processing plant.

The second approach to the issue of individual liability
under CERCLA has been referred to as the “actual control”
test. That is, liability is predicated on a showing that the
individual exerted actual control over the affairs of the
corporation rather than merely possessing the authority to do
so. Again, the emphasis is not placed on the actual
pollutional activity at issue but rather fixes on managerial
activities. A case regarded as one of the leading authorities
on the “actual control” test is U.S. v. Northeastern
Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co., Inc., 810 F.2d 726 (8" Cir.
1986) (commonly cited as “NEPACCO”). Even though
NEPACCO is routinely cited as an “actual control” case {see
FMC Corp. v. Aero Industries, Inc., 998 F.2d 842 (10" Cir.
1993)} it clearly applies the “authority to control” standard in
its analysis. The case is further evidence of the manner in
which the lines for imposing liability have become blurred.
The result is that individuals are left with no standards against
which to measure their conduct.

In NEPACCO, two individuals named Lee and Mills
concocted a plan for the surreptitious disposal of toxic
chemicals produced at a factory by dumping them on a near-
by farm. NEPACCO is cited as an “actual control” case

10

primarily because the liability of these two defendants was
predicated on their “actual control” of the wastes. The Eighth
Circuit rejected the argument that the men had to “possess”
the waste, rather than merely controlling it, for liability to
attach. Lee and Mills, however, were not the only ones found
liable for the illegal dumping. The major shareholder and
president of the company, Michaels, was also held liable.
The Eighth Circuit specifically noted that Michaels “was not
personally involved in the actual decision to transport and
dispose of the hazardous substances." (NEPACCO pg.745) To
reach that result, the Eighth Circuit implicitly invoked the
“authority to control” test to affirm Michaels’ liability:

As NEPACCO’s corporate president and as a
major NEPACCO shareholder, however,
Michaels was the individual in charge of and
directly responsible for all of NEPACCO’s
operations, including those at the Verona
plant, and he had the ultimate authority to
control the disposal of NEPACCO’s hazardous
substances. (NEPACCO pg.745)

While purporting to be a more lenient standard, the
“actual control” cases do not offer much solace to. private
individuals. In U.S. v. Gurley, 43 F.3d 1188 (8" Cir. 1994)
two employees were deemed jointly and severally liable for a
site which a corporation operated. Unfortunately, that court
offered little guidance to similarly employed individuals as to
their potential liability exposure. One of the individuals was
described as the principle shareholder and president of the
corporation. His liability was virtually assumed, and the
judgment against him was affirmed without discussion. The
Eighth Circuit's analysis instead centered on the liability of an
employee who was not a shareholder or officer. He, too, was
held jointly and severally liable with little more than a

1]

discussion of statements he had made in an unrelated
proceeding concerning his day to day activities on behalf of
the company.

The “actual control” and the “authority to control”
lests essentially develop a new legal doctrine: Reverse
respondeat superior. Under either approach there seems to be
4 presumption that an identifiable person will ultimately be
held responsible for the acts of a corporation. Unfortunately,
none of these courts appears to have recognized that this
would be the logical extension of their decisions. One cannot
overly-emphasized the impact of this problem. This is an
issue of financial survival for those employed throughout the
waste disposal industry. Virtually every Superfund site
results in a remediation plan that runs into the millions, if not
tens of millions, of dollars. To impose such devastating
_ personal liability, without clearly setting forth the proscribed
conduct, is fundamentally unfair. Nevertheless, corporate
employees have been held responsible for the waste practices
of their employer, even when the person has done nothing
which directly caused any pollution.

At one point the Seventh Circuit seemed to advance a
more equitable standard for analyzing personal liability. That
Circuit seemed to say that such secondary liability would be
predicated on a fault concept. The case announcing this
concept was Sidney S. Arst Co. v. Pipefitters Welfare
Education Fund, 25 F.3d 417 (7" Cir. 1994). The United
States Supreme Court recently decided a comparable issue on
secondary liability in U.S. v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. >i, 118 8.
Ct. 1876, 141 L.Ed.2d 43 (1998) in which Arst was cited with
approval.

The issue in Arst arose from the dismissal of a
complaint against two corporate officers. A transformer had

12

been cut open, and the PCB laden fluids within it had spilled.
The plaintiff alleged that the officers personally supervised the
activity that resulted in toxic waste entering the environment.
The Seventh Circuit expressed doubt that the company’s
president and vice president ‘had supervised such a routine
task, but accepted the pleadings as true. In discussing
whether there would be ultimate liability, however, the
Seventh Circuit seemed to advance a “fault” basis that would
be more equitable than the current collection of cases:

Yet even under these liberal pleading
standards, a complaint does not automatically
state a Claim for CERCLA “operator” liability
merely by being directed against persons
holding management or like positions.

To survive a motion to dismiss a plaintiff must
allege that persons associated with the
corporation directly and personally engaged in
conduct that led to the specific environmental
damage at issue in the case. Without such
direct, personal involvement, the corporation
and not the associated individuals must be

\ regarded as owning or operating the hazardous
waste site in question.

Thus, a plaintiff does not state a claim for
owner or operator liability if she merely
alleges that certain individuals had general
corporate authority or served generally in a
supervisory capacity. Active participation in,
or exercise of specific control of, the activities

13

in question must be shown. (Arst pgs. 421-
422, emphasis added.)

An earlier case also implied that the liability of a
corporate officer would be based on specific actions that
caused pollution rather than general actions taken on behalf of
a corporation. See Riverside Market Development C. Orp. V.
International Building Products, Inc., 931 F.2d 327 (Sth Cir.
1991). Riverside Market has been termed an “actual control” -
case. {See FMC Corp. v. Aero Industries, Inc.. id.)} The
language of the case, however, suggests that liability should
rest on wrongful conduct and not mere “actual control” of the
corporation:

Under traditional concepts of corporate
law, the principle of limited liability would
protect officers or employees like Prescott
from being held responsible for the acts of a
valid corporation. However, CERCLA ;
prevents individuals from hiding behind the
corporate shield when, as “operators,” they
themselves actually participate in the wrongful
conduct prohibited by the Act. (Riverside
Market pg. 330, emphasis added.)

As if to emphasize this apparent fault standard, the Fifth
Circuit again noted:

In determining liability in cases like the one
now before us, we must look to the extent of
the defendant’s personal participation in the
alleged wrongful conduct. (Id. at 330.
emphasis added.)

The crucial distinction of this appeal is that the Court
is asked to decide issues of secondary liability. Here, the
“operator” of the landfill was designated by law. MIG was
granted the operating permit by the Illinois Environmental
Protection Agency. MIG had the exclusive right to operate
the landfill under state law. Accordingly, MIG was found
liable by the district court and a judgment was entered against
it. The issue presented by this appeal, however, is whether
an individual must also be found liable in addition to MIG.
Unfortunately, the Seventh Circuit seems to have retreated
from the principles of Arst.

A brief review of the facts in this case is important to
an understanding of this issue. Richard Ter Maat was only
one of three investors who held an equal number of MIG’s
shares (subject to the exception noted in the Statement of the
Case following the retirement of one shareholder). His
connection with the landfill was essentially limited to dealing
with state regulators and carrying out the administrative
functions of the corporation. Another shareholder, Edward
Foerster, was responsible for constructing the landfill
consistent with the specifications of the state issued operating
permit. Mr. Foerster testified that he was responsible for the
day to day activities of the site. Yet itis Mr. Ter Maat, as the
president of the corporation, who is vulnerable to a finding of
liability. The three shareholders owned the stock of three
hauling companies: AAA, Saturn, and Economy. They also
owned the shares of the landfill company, MIG. To the
extent that Mr. Ter Maat had input into the landfill end of the
overall waste disposal business, it was to express a policy of
strict adherence to all environmental laws. Absolutely no
evidence was presented in the district court that Mr. Ter Maat
engaged in any conduct that resulted in contamination of the
environment. Nevertheless, the Court in Browning-Ferris
Industries of Illinois, Inc. v. Ter Maat, 195 F.3d 953 (7" Cir.

15

1999) imposed a standard that would virtually demand the
imposition of liability on Mr. Ter Maat:

If Ter Maat did not merely direct the general
operations of M.I.G. and AAA, as in id. at
330 (referring to Arst), or specific operations
unrelated to pollution, United States y.
Bestfoods, supra, 524 U.S. at 66-67, 118 S.Ct.
1876; United States v. Township of Brighton,
153 F.3d 307, 313-15 (6" Cir. 1998), but
supervised the day-to-day operations of the
landfill—for example, negotiating waste-
dumping contracts with the owners of the
wastes or directing where the wastes were to
be dumped or designing or directing measures
for preventing toxic substances in the wastes
from leeching into the ground and thence into
the groundwater—then he would be deemed
the operator, jointly with his companies, of the
Site itself.

(Ter Maat pg. 956, emphasis added.)

The Seventh Circuit has thus advanced the proposition
that, if one seeks compliance with the law, he can be found
guilty of violating CERCLA. Incredibly, if Mr. Ter Maat is
found to have “design(ed) or direct(ed) measures for
preventing toxic” contamination, he must share in the several
millions of dollars of liability assessed against the two
corporate defendants. In no other setting can someone be
shown to have followed the law, or at least not have been
shown to have violated it, and be punished so severely.

The Seventh Circuit in Ter Maat used an analogy to
describe the circumstances under which a corporate president
would be held liable. The Seventh Circuit stated that, if one

16

is hit by.a train, only the company would be liable. If the
president was driving the train, however, or ordered the
engineer to violate the law, the president would also be liable.
The language quoted above is not so restrictive, though. If
the president of the company issued a directive on how the
train was to be operated, he would be personally liable under
the Seventh Circuit's analysis because he had involved himself
in train “operation.” Even if the president issued a directive
that the cngineer was to operate the train safely and in accord
with all applicable laws, the president would become liable
because he had “design(ed) or direct(ed) measures for
preventing” trains from striking individuals. Mr. Ter Maat,
to the extent that he even became involved in such issues, did -
nothing more than direct compliance with the law.
Unfortunately, under the Seventh Circuit's rationale, he now
faces onerous liability for taking that stance.

This Court should grant certiorari so that it can
formulate the broad principles applicable to issues of
secondary liability. Clearly there was a discernible legal
operator of this landfill. That operator was MIG, the holder
of the operating permit issued by the State of Illinois. Mr.
Ter Maat was never an “operator” under Illinois law. He
could not have dispossessed MIG of the landfill. He could
not have operated it in his own name. He could not transfer
or assign the operating permit, except to approve such a
disposition in his capacity as president, Mr. Ter Maat’s
liability, if it exists at all, comes only through his actions on
behalf of the corporation.

This Court was recently confronted with a similar
issue regarding the liability of a corporate parent. U.S. v.
Bestfoods, id. Bestfoods answered the liability question in
relation to an entity that was located above the legal operator
on the ladder of responsibility. This case presents the same

17

issue, but for an entity that is located immediately below the
legal operator. Given the disarray of the Circuit Courts in
responding to the problem, only the Supreme Court is in a
position to develop coherent, uniform, rules. Without this
Court's intervention, one’s liability exposure will continue to
be subject to the vagaries of the jurisdiction in which he
resides.

CONCLUSION

The courts below have created a tangled web of
liability that ensnares individuals unevenly and erratically.
This Court should grant ceriiorari for two reasons. First, a
response is required to the implicit holdings of the lower
courts that an individual must be iiable whenever a
corporation has been found guilty of violating CERCLA. The
Petitioner urges this Court to reject that proposition.
Secondly, assuming the Court agrees with the Petitioner on
that point, uniform rules of personal liability should be
established for all courts to follow.

In the specific context of this case, the Supreme Court
should reject the Seventh Circuit’s requirement that a
corporate officer becomes liable when he takes steps to
comply with environmental laws. Corporate managers should
not be punished for such activities. In considzring the issue
of secondary liability which is presented here, this Court
should impose liability only if the individual has committed a
knowing violation of. the law or otherwise acted in an
environmentally reckless manner. To impose liability on any
other basis will allow the current injustices to continue. This
is the only Court that can provide such clarity and uniformity
of outcome below.

18

Respectfully submitted,

/s/

Edward M. Maher
Counsel for Petitioner

Guyer & Enichen, P.C.
2601 Reid Farm Road
Rockford, IL 61114
(815)636-9600

19

APPENDIX A

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

[Filed November 1, 1999]

Nos. 98-3204 and 99-1360

BROWNING-FERRIS

INDUSTRIES OF ILLINOIS,

INC., et al.,
Plaintijfs-Appellants,

We

RICHARD TER MAAT, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.

Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, Western Division.
No. 92 C 20259--Philip G. Reinhard, Judge.

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 8, 1999
DECIDED NOVEMBER 1, 1999

Before POSNER, Chief Judge, and BAUER and
RIPPLE, Circuit Judge.

POSNER, Chief Judge. Browning-Ferris and several
other companies have brought a suit for contribution under the

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Court of Appeals Opinion - 11/1/99

Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (CERCLA-the Superfund statute). The suit is
against Richard Ter Maat and two corporations of which he

is (or was - one of the corporations has been sold) the

president and principal sharcholder; they are M.I.G.
Investments, Inc. and AAA Disposal Systems, Inc.

Back in 1971 the owners of a landfill had leased it to
a predecessor of Browning-Ferris, which operated it until the
fall of 1975. Between then and 1988 it was operated by
M.1.G. and AAA. In June of that year, after AAA was sold
and Ter Maat moved to Florida, M.I.G. abandoned the
landfill without covering it properly. For tax reasons, M.1.G.
had been operated with very little capital, and it lacked funds
for a proper cover. Two years after the abandonment, the
EPA placed the site on the National Priorities List, the list of
the toxic waste sites that the Superfund statute requires be
cleaned up, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 9605(8)(B), 9616(d), (¢), and
Shortly afterward Browning-Ferris and the other plainuffs,
which shared responsibility for some of the pollution at the
site, agreed to clean it up.

Section 113(f)(1) of the Superfund law authorizes any
person who incurs costs in cleaning up a toxic-waste site to
“seek contribution from any other person who its liable or
potentially liable under section 9607(a) of this title... . In
resolving contribution claims, the court may allocate response
costs among liable parties using such equitable factors as the
court determines are appropriate.” 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1).
Section 107(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1), a part of the
Statutory provision to which section 113(f)(1) refers, includes
in the set of potentially liable persons anyone who owned or
operated a landfill when a hazardous substance was deposited

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_ Court of Appeals Opinion - 11/1/99

in it, and this set is conceded to include both M.I.G. and
AAA. The district judge held, however, that Ter Maat was
not himself a potentially liable person, because he had done
nothing that would subject him to liability on a “piercing the
corporate veil” theory for the actions of the two corporations.
So far as corporate liability for clean-up costs was concerned,
the judge ruled that of the’ 55 percent of those costs that he
deemed allocable to transporters and operators (the other 45
percent he allocated to the owners of the landfill and the
generators of the toxic wastes dumped in it), 40 percent was
the responsibility of Browning-Ferris and the other 60 percent
the responsibility of M.I.G. and AAA. As between those
two, the judge allocated responsibility equally, holding that,
although the two corporations had operated the landfill
jointly, the statute required him to allocate liability severally
rather than jointly.

Browning-Ferris and the other companies that have
incurred clean-up costs at the site of the former landfill have
appealed. All of them join in making the following three
arguments: the corporate veil should be pierced two ways,
one to make Richard Ter Maat liable for the conduct of both
“his” corporations, AAA and M.I.G., and the other to make
AAA liable for M.I.G.’s conduct as an affiliate; in any event
Ter Maat is directly as distinct from derivatively liable for
contribution, as he was persona!ly an operator of the landfill;
the Superfund statute does permit joint liability in a
contribution suit and it would be equitable to make AAA pay
for the whole amount allocated to the two corporations, since
they were jointly liable and M.I.G. is assetless (or may be -
it has some insurance). Finally, Browning-Ferris argues that
the district court allocated too much of the liability for the
pollution at the site to it relative to M.I.G. and AAA.

3a

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Court of Appeals Opinion - 11/1/99

Two issues are relatively simple and we address them
first. One is whether an individual can shield himself from
liability for operating a hazardous-waste facility mérely by
being an officer or shareholder of a corporation that also
operates the facility. The answer is no. The principle of
limited liability shields a shareholder from liability for the
debts (including debts arising from tortious conduct) of the
corporation in which he owns shares (with the exception
discussed later for “veil piercing” situations), but not for his
personal debts, including debts arising from torts that he
commits himself. In other words, the status of being a
Shareholder does not immunize a person for liability for his,
as distinct from the corporation's, acts. E.g., Sidney S. Arst
Co. v. Pipefitters Welfare Education Fund, 25 F.3d 417, 420
(7th Cir. 1994); Spartech Corp. v. Opper, 890 F.2d 949, 953
(7th Cir. 1989); Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland
Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1503 (11th Cir. 1996); Aronson
v. Price, 644 N.E.2d 864, 867 (Ind. 1994). There is no
liability shield at all for an officer. If he commits an act that
is Outside the scope of his official duties, his employer may
not be liable; but he is whether or not the act was within that
scope. E.g., /tofca, Inc. v. Hellhake, 8 F.3d 1202, 1204 (7th
Cir. 1993); Carter-Jones Lumber Co. v. Dixie Distributing
Co., 166 F.3d 840, 846-47 (6th Cir. 1999); United States v.
Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co., 810 F.2d 726,
744 (8th Cir. 1986). Which is not to say, however, that the
officer is automatically liable for the acts of the corporation;
there is no doctrine of “superiors” liability,” comparable to
the doctrine of respondeat superior, that is, the employer's
Strict liability for torts of the employee committed within the
scope of his employment.

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Court of Appeals Opinion - 11/1/99

So if Ter Maat operated the landfill personally, rather
than merely directing the business of the corporations of
which he was the president and which either formally, or
jointly with him (as well as with each other), operated it, he
is personally liable. E.g., United States v. Bestfoods, 524
U.S. 51, 55 (1998); Sidney S. Arst Co. v. Pipefitters Welfare
Education Fund, supra, 25 F.3d at 421-22; Riverside Market
Development Corp. v. International Bidg. Products, Inc., 931
F.2d 327, 330 (Sth Cir. 1991) (per curiam). The line between
a personal act and an act that is purely an act of the
corporation (or of some other employee) and so not imputed
to the president or to other corporate officers is sometimes a
fine one, but often it is clear on which side of the line a
particular act falls. If an individual is hit by a negligently
operated train, the railroad is liable in tort to him but the
president of the railroad is not. Or rather, not usually; had
the president been driving the train when it hit the plaintiff, or
had been sitting beside the driver and ordered him to exceed
the speed limit, he would be jointly liable with the railroad.
If Ter Maat did not merely direct the general operations of
M.I.G. and AAA, as in id. at 330, or specific operations
unrelated tu pullution, United States v. Bestfoods, supra, 524
U.S. at 66-67; United States v. Township of Brighton, 153
F.3d 307, 313-15 (6th Cir. 1998), but supervised the day-to-
day operations of the landfill - for example, negotiating
waste-dumping contracts with the owners of the wastes or
directing where the wastes were to bedumped or designing or
directing measures for preventing toxic substances in the
wastes from leeching into the ground and thence into the
groundwater - then he would be deemed the operator, jointly
with his companies, of the site itself. E.g., Control Data
€orp. v. $.C.S.C. Corp., 53 F.3d 930, 937 (8th Cir. 1995);
Witco Corp. v. Beekhuis, 38 F.3d 682, 692 (3d Cir. 1994);

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Court of Appeals Opinion - 11/1/99

FMC Corp. v. Aero Industries, Inc., 998 F.2d 842, 846 (10th
Cir. 1993); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical &
Chemical Co., supra, 810 F.2d at 743. Unfortunately the
district court did not consider this possibility, although urged
to do so by the plaintiffs, and so a remand is necessary to
determine Ter Maat’s status.

It is also clear we think that CERCLA does not
preclude the imposition of joint as distinct from several
liability in a suit for contribution. This is, or at least should
be considered, a case of first impression at the appellate level.
Carter-Jones Lumber Co. v. Dixie Distributing Co., supra,
166 F.3d at 847-48, does hold that CERCLA permits joint
liability in a contribution suit, but on the unsatisfactory
ground that state law so required, when it is plain that actions
for CERCLA contribution are governed by federal law.
Section 113(f), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1), the CERCLA
contribution provision, provides expressly that actions under
it are to be governed by federal law, with the federal court to
“allocate response costs among liable parties using such
equitable factors as the court determines are appropriate.”
There is a savings provision in CERCLA, 42 U.S.C.
§ 9652(d), but the plaintiffs’ claims in this case are based
exclusively on the federal contribution provision, and not on
state law.

An earlier Sixth Circuit case had tossed off a casual
dictum that contribution liability under CERCLA is several,
not joint, Centerior Service Co. v. Acme Scrap Iron & Metal
Corp., 153 F.3d 344, 348 (6th Cir. 1998), but the dictum is
defunct after Carter-Jones. A similar dictum in Pinal Creek
Group v. Newmont Mining Corp., 118 F.3d 1298, 1303 (9th
Cir. 1997), is, when read in context, limited to cases in which

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Court of Appeals Opinion - 11/1/99

potentially responsible parties are suing under a provision of
CERCLA, § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a), that imposes —
automatic joint liability on defendants; the cases hold that the
parties’ rights are nevertheless subject to allocation under
section 113(f), which does not include that automatic feature.
See id. at 1306; Akzo Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp., 30 F.3d
761, 764 (7th Cir. 1994); Centerior Service Co. v. Acme
Scrap fron & Metal Corp:, supra, 153 F.3d at 349-53. Joint
liability thus is optional, rather than unavailable.

In traditional common law, when two or more persons
inflict an indivisible injury each is fully liable for the injury.
That is, the plaintiff can if he wants sue one of the tortfeasors
for the entire damages and let the other go, and the one who
is sued has no remedy against the one who got off scot-free.
CERCLA modifies the traditional common law rule (as many
other statutes do and as many state courts have done by
modifying the common law) by allowing one liable party to
sue another for contribution. It does not follow that if, as in
this case, contribution is sought from more than one party, the
defendants cannot be held jointly liable. It is up to the district
Judge, guided only by equitable considerations - a broad and
loose standard, see Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp. v. Lefton
Iron & Metal Co., 14 F.3d 321, 326 (7th Cir. 1994):
Environmental Transportation Systems, Inc. v. ENSCO, Inc.,
969 F.2d 503, 509 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v. Colorado
& Eastern R.R., 50 F.3d 1530, 1536 (10th Cir. 1995) - to
decide, and it is easy to imagine cases, of which this may be
one, where such considerations weigh heavily in favor of joint
liability.

Suppose, to alter the facts for simplicity’s sake, that
Browning-Ferris had been made to clean up the entire site

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Court of Appeals Opinion - 11/1/99

even though it had made only a small (say, 1 percent)
contribution to its toxicity. Suppose M.I.G. and AAA were
the bad actors jointly responsible for the other 99 percent.
Suppose that for tax or other reasons M.1.G. had no assets.
Under the view of the district court, even though M.1.G. and
AAA had combined to inflict an indivisible injury (the
contamination for which they were jointly responsible as joint
operators), AAA would have to pay only 50 percent of the
contamination for which it and M.I.G. were jointly liable, or
49.5 percent of the total clean-up cost (remember that we’re
assuming that the two corporations are jointly responsible for
99 percent of the total contamination), while Browning-Ferris
would have to pay 50.5 percent of the total clean-up cost even
though it was responsible for only 1 percent of that cost. Cf.
Carter-Jones Lumber Co. v. Dixie Distributing Co., supra.
These are not our facts, but they show that a rule against ever
holding contribution defendants jointly liable would be
inconsistent with the statutory direction that the district court
allocate liability equitably among the liable parties. Cf.
Centerior Service Co. v. Acme Scrap Iron & Metal Corp.,
supra, 153 F.3d at 354 n. 12; Sun Co. v. Browning-Ferris,
Inc., 124 F.3d 1187, 1193 (10th Cir. 1997); Pinal Creek
Group v. Newmont Mining Corp., supra, 118 F.3d at 1303.
The judge did not make such an allocation, mistakenly
believing himself constrained to allocate liability equally
among joint polluters, and so this is another issue requiring
further consideration on remand.

The next issue is whether the district judge allocated
too large a share (40 percent) of responsibility for the cost of
the clean up to Browning-Ferris relative to the defendants,
who had operated the landfill for a lot longer time and had
dumped a much larger quantity of wastes in it. The judge

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Court of Appeals Opinion - 11/1/99

allocated as large a share as he did to Browning-Ferris
because he found that it had operated the landfill poorly and
had dumped particularly toxic wastes from a nearby Chrysler
plant in violation of its operating permit, and the liquid
character of the wastes had hastened their absorption into
groundwater. Browning-Ferris argues both that these findings
are erroneous and that, in any event, there is no evidence that
the wastes from the Chrysler plant increased the cost of
cleaning up the site and anyway the amount dumped in the
landfill was not as great as the district judge found. From
evidence that a considerable portion of the Chrysler wastes
were dumped elsewhere, Browning-Ferris argues that
defendants’ expert had exaggerated the amount deposited in
the landfill. Browning-Ferris may be correct on all these
factual points, but we cannot say that the district court
committed any clear errors in finding as it did, and that of
course is our criterion.

The trickier question, which returns us to the issue of
the district court’s equitable discretion in allocating liability
among polluters, is whether the court must find a causal
relation between a party’s pollution and the actual cost of
cleaning up the site. To answer this question we have to
distinguish between a necessary condition (or “but-for cause”)
and a sufficient condition. If event A is a necessary condition
of event B, this means that, without A, B will not occur. If
A is a sufficient condition of B, this means that, if A occurs,
B will occur. If A is that the murder weapon was loaded and
B is the murder, then A is a necessary condition. If A is
shooting a person through the heart and B is the death of the
shooting victim, then A is a sufficient condition of B but not
a necessary condition, because a wound to another part of the
victim's body might have been fatal as_well.

9a

Court of Appeals Opinion - 11/1/99

This distinction may sometimes be important in the
pollution context. It is easy to imagine a case in which, had
X not polluted a site, no clean-up costs would have been
incurred; X’s pollution would be a necessary condition of
those costs and it would be natural to think that he should pay
at least a part of them. But suppose that even if X had not
polluted the site, it would have to be cleaned up — and at the
same cost - because of the amount of pollution by Y. (That
would be a case, perhaps rare, in which the clean-up costs
were sensitive neither to the amount of pollution nor to any
synergistic interaction between the different pollutants.) Then
X’s pollution would not be a necessary condition of the clean
up, or of any of the costs incurred in the clean up. But that
should not necessarily let X off the hook. For suppose that if
X had not polluted the site at all, there still would have been
enough pollution from Y to require a clean up, but that if Y
had not polluted the site X’s pollution would have been
sufficient to require the clean up. In that case, the conduct of
X and the conduct of Y would each be a sufficient but not a
necessary condition of the clean up, and it would be entirely
arbitrary to let either (or, even worse, both) off the hook on
this basis. So far as appears, this is such a case; Browning-
Ferris’s pollution was serious enough (if indeed it dumped a
large quantity of Chrysler’s particularly toxic wastes) to
require that the site be cleaned up, but the other pollution at
the site was also enough. If Browning-Ferris’s conduct was
thus a sufficient though not a necessary condition of the clean
up, it is not inequitable to make it contribute substantially to
the cost.

We do not suggest that this is one of the presumably
rare cases in which the total costs of clean up are unaffected
by the number of polluters or the specific amounts or types of

10a

-Court of Appeals Opinion - 11/1/99

pollution contributed by each. Browning-Ferris’s pollution
was not, so far as appears, so serious all by itself as to have
required the incurring of ail the cleanup costs that were
incurred. Even so, no principle of law, logic, or common
sense required the court to allocate those total costs among the
polluters on the basis of the volume of wastes alone. Not only
do wastes differ in their toxicity, harm to the environment,
and costs of cleaning up, and so relative volume is not a
reliable guide to the marg:.ial costs imposed by each polluter;
but polluters differ in the blameworthiness of the decisions or
omissions that led to the pollution, and blameworthiness is
relevant to an equitable allocation of joint costs. (Presumably
it would not entitle the judge to make one polluter pay for
separable costs wholly imposed by other polluters.) The
district judge did not abuse his discretion in deciding that all
these factors warranted making Browning-Ferris bear more
than its proportional volumetric share of the pollution.

It remains to consider two issues of derivative liability.

If Ter Maat is deemed on remand to be personally liable as an

operator of the landfill, and especially if the judge allocates
100 percent of the joint liability of M.I.G. and AAA to AAA,

the solvent one of the pair (there is no suggestion that the
‘change of ownership gets AAA off the liability hook), then
Browning-Ferris and the other plaintiffs will be able to collect

the amount of contribution to which they are entitled from the

defendants. But these are big “ifs” (how big is for the district
judge to decide, in the first instance, on remand). The judge
may find that Ter Maat was not an operator and that AAA
should not bear the entirety of its joint liability with M.I.G.
In that event, it will become important whether Ter Maat and

AAA are derivatively liable for the conduct of M.I.G., and as

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Court of Appeals Opinion - 11/1/99

the issue is fully briefed we shall resolve it now and hope to
head off a further appeal.

The argument is that the corporate veil should be
pierced, and Ter Maat, as shareholder of M.I.G. and AAA,
and AAA as an affiliate of M.I.G. (both dominated by Ter
Maat, and AAA in addition a 30 percent shareholder of
M.I.G.), should be held liable for M.I.G.’s debt to the
plaintiffs. Although there is a split of authority on whether
federal or state law governs the piercing of the corporate veil
in CERCLA cases (the Supreme Court expressly left the
question open in United States v. Bestfoods, supra, 524 U.S.
at 63 n. 9), that is not a problem here because the parties have
assumed that state law (Illinois state law, specifically) governs
and so any contention that federal law should instead govern
has been waived. Lloyd v. Loeffler, 694 F.2d 489, 495 (7th
Cir. 1982).

The general rule, of course, in Illinois as elsewhere,
is that a shareholder qua shareholder, and a parent,
subsidiary, or other affiliate, qua affiliate, is not liable for a
corporation’s debts. E.g., /n re Rehabilitation of Centaur Ins.
Co., 632 N.E.2d 1015, 1017 (Ill. 1994); Jtofca, Inc. v. Hell-
hake, supra, 8 F.3d at 1204 (applying [llinois law). That is
the principle of limited liability and it serves the important
social purpose of encouraging investment by individuals who
are risk averse and therefore will not invest (or will insist on
a much higher return) in an enterprise if by doing so they
expose their entire wealth to the hazards of litigation. But in
some circumstances’ the corporate veil is pierced and the
corporation’s debtor allowed to collect his debt from the
shareholder or affiliate.

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Court of Appeals Opinion - 11/1/99

In the case of a voluntary creditor, for example
someone who had lent money to the corporation, the strongest
case for piercing the veil is presented when the corporation
had led potential creditors to believe that it was more solvent
than it really was. Holland vy. Joy Candy Mfg. Corp., 145
N.E.2d 101 (Ill. App. 1957); In re Xonics Photochemical,
Inc., 841 F.2d 198, 201 (7th Cir. 1988); In re Kaiser, 791
F.2d 73, 75 (7th Cir. 1986). For example, the nonbank
subsidiary of a bank holding company might hold itself out as
being the bank, leading creditors to believe that they were
dealing with a more substantial corporation than was in fact
the case; that would be a good case for piercing the veil.
FMC Finance Corp. v. Murphree, 632 F.2d 413, 423 (Sth
Cir. 1980); cf. Fentress y. Triple Mining, Inc., 635 N.E.2d
102, 108 (Ill. App. 1994): Hystro Products, Inc. v. MNP
Corp., 18 F.3d 1384, 1390-9] (7th Cir. 1994) (Illinois law).
Although Illinois formulates the test for piercing the veil in
more traditional terms - with much talk of “unity of interest
and ownership,” “commingling of assets,” disappearance of
the separate “personalities” of the corporation and its owner
or affiliate, and the desirability of avoiding “injustice,” e.g. ,
id. at 1388-91- it is hard to see how a voluntary creditor can
complain if he knows that his debtor lacks sufficient assets to
be certain to be able to pay the debt when it comes due.

Analysis is more difficult in the case of an involuntary
creditor, such as the plaintiffs here, who wish to be
compensated for having in effect “lent” the money to clean up
the site of the former landfill but lent under compulsion,
having been forced to clean it up by the Superfund law rather
than pursuant to a contract with the “debtors,” such as M.I.G.
See generally Secon Service System, Inc. v. St. Joseph Bank
& Trust Co., 855 F.2d 406, 413-14 (7th Cir. 1988). In such

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Court of Appeals Opinion - 11/1/99

a case there is no issue of protecting reliance induced by
misrepresentations by the debtor. The plaintiffs in dumping
toxic wastes to the landfill obviously were not relying on
M.1.G.’s appearing to have greater assets than it actually had.
In these circumstances we can think of only two arguments for
piercing the corporate veil. The first is that the owners may
. have so far neglected the legal requirements (requirements not
intended solely for the protection of creditors) for operating
in the corporate form that they should be taken to have
forfeited its protections, forfeiture thus operating to enforce
the legal requirements that the state has seen fit to impose on
investors who want the benefits of limited liability.
Moreover, if the formalities have been flouted, it becomes
hard to see how the investors could reasonably have relied on
the protections of limited liability; they would have known
they were skating on thin ice. In such a case the investment-
encouraging function of limited liability is attenuated.

Second, it could be argued that enterprises engaged in
potentially hazardous activities should be prevented from
externalizing the costs of those activities, by being required to
maintain or at least endeavor to maintain a sufficient capital
cushion to be answerable in a tort suit should its activities
cause harm for which liability would attach, on pain of its
shareholders’ and affiliates’ losing their limited liability
should the corporation fail to do this. This argument has not
carried the day in any jurisdiction that we are aware of,
presumably because of the risks that it would impose on
shareholders and because the potential victims of the
corporation’s hazardous activities can be protected without
making inroads into limited liability by requiring enterprises
engaged in such activities to post a bond large enough to
assure that any judgment against the corporation will be

l4a

—
——
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Court of Appeals Opinion - 11/1/99

collectible. Courts do, it is true, frequently mention
“undercapitalization” as a separate ground from neglect of
corporate formalities for piercing the corporate veil. Hystro
Products, Inc. v. MNP Corp., supra, 18 F.3d at 1389-91;
Sea-Land Services, Inc. y. Pepper Source, 941 F.2d 289, $22
(7th Cir. 1991): People v. V& M Industries, Inc., 700
N.E.2d 746, 751 (Ill. App. 1998); Jacobson y. Buffalo Rock
Shooters Supply Inc., 664 N -E.2d 328, 332 (Ill. App. 1996):
Fentress v. Triple Mining, Inc., supra, 635 N.E.2d at 107:
McCracken v. Olson Cos., 500 N -E.2d 487, 492 (II. App.
1986). They do not do so on the basis of unusual risks to
potential tort victims or other involuntary creditors, however,
though conceivably such concerns are in the background of
their thinking.

There is no evidence that either M.I.G. or AAA failed
to comply with the legal requirements for Operating in the
corporate form, except with regard to keeping minutes of their
corporate meetings - not a failure Significant enough to
warrant forfeiture of limited liability, given that penalties
should be proportioned to the gravity of the misconduct being
penalized. The plaintiffs further argue, however, that M.I.G.
was undercapitalized. The Clearest case -- here merging,
though, with neglect of corporate formalities - for forfeiture
of limited liability on this ground is where the corporation has
failed to maintain the minimum Capitalization required by law.
But such cases are few (the only Illinois case we can find is
Gallagher v. Reconco Builders, Inc., 415 N.E.2d 560, 564
(Ill. App. 1980)), and do not bear on the “pierceability” of
the corporate veil of M.1.G., which is not accused of ever
having maintained a lower Capitalization than the law
required. The fact that its motivation in operating with little
capital was to reduce taxes does not argue for piercing the

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corporate veil, since taking advantage of lawful opportunities
for avoiding taxes is not wrongful activity.

There is of course a difference between assets
available to pay a judgment and taxable income; the former
might be ample while the latter was slight. But our point is
only that the fact that M.I.G. might have been “under-
capitalized” for tax reasons is not a reason for piercing the
corporate veil. The cases in which undercapitalization has
figured in the decision to pierce the corporate veil are ones in
which the corporation had so little money that it could not and
did not actually operate its nominal business on its own. An
example is the corporation in the Fentress case, which had no
Capital at all that the court could find, and no bank account.
Even there the court did not pierce the veil on the basis of
undercapitalization alone, but cited also a persistent neglect of
corporate formalities. Undercapitalization is rarely if ever the
sole factor in a decision to pierce the corporate veil, William
_ P. Hackney & Tracey G. Benson, “Shareholder Liability for

Inadequate Capital,” 43 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 837, 885-87 (1982),
and we think is best regarded simply as a factor helpful in
identifying a corporation as a pure shell, which M.I.G. was
not.

So on remand, to summarize, there will be no issues
of veil piercing to consider but the court will have to decide
Ter Maat’s personal liability and whether AAA should pay
more than 50 percent of the two corporations’ liability to the
plaintiffs.

AFFIRMED IN PART,
REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.

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A true Copy:

Teste:

/s/

Clerk of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

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APPENDIX B.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

[Dated November 1, 1999]

Nos. 98-3204 and 99-1360

BROWNING-FERRIS
INDUSTRIES OF ILLINOIS,
INCORPORATED, APACHE
PRODUCTS COMPANY,
TAMMS INDUSTRIES, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

V.

RICHARD TER MAAT, MIG
INVESTMENTS,
INCORPORATED, AAA
DISPOSAL SYSTEMS,
INCORPORATED, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.

Ne ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee”

JUDGMENT - WITH ORAL ARGUMENT
BEFORE: Honorable RICHARD A. POSNER, Chief Judge
Honorable WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

18a

Honorable KENNETH F. RIPPLE, Circuit Judge

Appeals from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Western Division

No. 92 C 20259, Philip G. Reinhard, Judge

The judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED in
part, REVERSED in part, and this cause is REMANDED, in

accordance with the decision of this court entered on this date.
No costs shall be awarded.

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APPENDIX C

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
WESTERN DIVISION
[Filed July 29, 1998]

No. 92 C 20259

BROWNING-FERRIS
INDUSTRIES OF ILLINOIS,
INC., et al.

Plaintiffs,

¥.

Richard TER MAAT, et al.,
Defendants,

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

REINHARD, District Judge.
INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs filed this action for contribution and
declaratory relief pursuant to the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
(CERCLA), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607 and 9613 and
under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and

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District Court Memorandum Opinion & Order - 7/29/98

2202, seeking monetary damages against defendants for the
past and future costs incurred to respond to environmental
contamination at the MIG/DeWane Landfill Superfund Site
located in Boone County, Illinois. The Court conducted a
two-week bench trial in January 1998 and set a briefing
schedule for the parties to submit post-trial briefs setting forth
the issues and citing the trial evidence relevant thereto.' This
order will decide the legal issues, make the necessary factual
findings, allocate liability among the parties and assess
damages against defendants where appropriate.

BACKGROUND

The site (also termed a facility as defined in CERCLA)
at issue is an approximately forty-seven acre landfill located
near Belvidere in Boone County, Illinois. The property
during the entire relevant time period was owned by Raymond
DeWane, Jean A. Farina and L.A.E., Inc. who leased it for
operation of a landfill. It was operated as a landfill from
February 1969 to June 1988. During that time, a variety of
residential, commercial and industrial waste was placed in the
landfill.

The landfill initially consisted of an excavated area
which was lined with five feet of clay as required by the state
landfill permit. About 45,000 cubic yards of waste were
placed in the excavation between February 1969 and March
1971. The operator of the landfill during that time left it in

' The court compliments the attorneys from both sides for
the exemplary manner in which they tried this case and their
extensive efforts in Preparing the post-trial briefs.

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poor condition and there was suspected contamination of the
groundwater by leachate.’

In early 1971, the owners leased the landfill to
Browning-Ferris Industries of Illinois, Inc. (BFI).2 BFI
| sought and obtained a new landfill permit from the Illinois
Environmental Protection Agency (IEPA) in May 1972 to
operate the site. The landfill began receiving waste in April
1973, although on a limited basis. In September 1973, when
a nearby landfill closed, the landfill began receiving waste on
an unlimited basis. BFI operated the landfill until October
1975.

BFI’s permit required a five-foot, compacted clay liner
and a gravity-powered leachate collection system which fed
into a surface impoundment. Additionally, daily, intermediate
and final earthen cover was required.* There is no evidence
to show that BFI did not comply with these requirements.
During its operating period, BFI admittedly placed about
375,000 cubic yards of waste into the landfill. At the end of

? Leachate may be described as the end result of water

leaching through a substance and collecting soluble compounds in.
the process.

> The original lease was to Rockford Disposal Service,

Inc., the predecessor to BFI. The court will simply refer to the
entities as BFI.

* Cover is a prescribed level of soil to be placed over the
waste to prevent its movement by the wind and to retard the amount

of rainwater reaching the waste.

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District Court Memorandum Opinion & Order - 7/29/98

BFI’s operation, it closed and placed a final cover over the
area it had landfilled.

Beginning in October 1975, the owners leased the
landfill to defendants.° Defendants operated the landfill from
October 1975 to June 1988. During that time, they deposited
approximately 3.5 million cubic yards of waste. MIG was the
Operator per the lease and AAA was a transporter to the
landfill. Richard Ter Maat served as an officer of both
corporations.

After filing a site closure plan with the IEPA, which
was rejected because the owners refused to sign it, defendants
left the landfill without properly closing it, including no final
cover. MIG lacked the funds to effectuate a proper closure.
AAA was sold, and Richard Ter Maat moved to Florida.
Defendants took no Part in operating or Closing the landfill
after June 30, 1988.

In August 1990, the United States Environmental
Protection Agency (USEPA) placed the landfill on the
national Priorities List (NPL) for clean-up under CERCLA.
In October 1990 and again in March 1991, the USEPA and
IEPA issued administrative orders on consent (AOC) to clean-
up the landfill. Pursuant to these AOCs, plaintiffs were to:
(1) conduct immediate waste Stabilization measures, such as
pump leachate from the surface impoundment, repair the
impoundment berm and construct an interim cap on the
landfill, (2) conduct a remedial investigation and feasibility

> When the court refers to defendants, it means MIG,

Inc,, AAA Disposal, Inc. and Richard Ter Maat.

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study (RI/FS) pursuant to the NPL®; and (3) to pay past
response costs and oversight costs incurred by USEPA and
IEPA.

Plaintiffs filed this action in an effort to recover
contribution for these costs, applicable interest and a
declaration of liability as to future costs.’ The future costs
will depend on the Record of Decision (ROD) to be issued by
USEPA which will set forth the needed measures to complete
the clean- up and management of the landfill.*

Following the bench trial, the parties submitted post-
trial briefs in which they set forth thirty-five issues to be
decided by the court. The court will decide each of the issues
in this order. The facts and evidence relevant to a particular
issue will be discussed when the court decides that issue.

The purpose of an RI/FS is to collect data, evaluate |
releases of hazardous substances and to conduct engineering
evaluations sufficient to allow federal and state agencies to select
remedies.

; Defendants have never been involved with, or
contributed to, the clean-up of the landfill despite their notification
of potential liability by the USEPA and IEPA.

5 As of the time of trial, plaintiffs suggested the ROD
would be issued in February or March 1998. As of the date of this
order, plaintiffs have not advised the court of the ROD’s issuance.

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District Court Memorandum Opinion & Order - 7/29/98

Operator Liability

Plaintiffs assert liability against AAA and Richard Ter
Maat as operators through theories of direct liability and
derivative liability under state corporate veil-piercing law.°
The court will first address the issue of direct liability.

3. AAA

The United States Supreme Court has recently spoken
on the issue of when a party can be held directly liable as an
operator under CERCLA. See United States v. Bestfoods,
524 U.S. 51, 118 S.Ct. 1876, 141 L.Ed.2d 43 (1998).'° At
issue in Bestfoods was to what extent, if any, a parent can be
held liable as either an owner or an Operator of a hazardous
waste site owned or operated by its subsidiary. The court
answered that the parent can be found derivatively liable as an
Owner or operator only if the corporate veil may be pierced in
light of the applicable state law. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at ----,
118 S.Ct. at 1880-81. On the other hand, the parent can also
be found directly liable as an Operator, independent of any
State veil-piercing law, if a plaintiff can show the parent
actively participated in, and exercised control over, the

” All Parties stipulate that MIG was an operator at the site.

This case was decided after the Parties submitted their
post-trial briefs. Plaintiff filed a motion to supplement its authority,
citing Bestfoods, which defendants opposed. The court being aware
of the Bestfoods decision independent of plaintiffs’ motion, denied
the motion as moot. Also, because of the Bestfoods decision,
several of the joint issues need not be directly addressed.

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operations of the site.'' /d. at 1881. Any person or
corporation who operates a site is directly liable for the costs
of clean-up regardless of whether that person is the site’s
owner, the owner’s parent corporation or business partner, or
someone who sneaks in at night to discharge toxic waste at the
site. Id. at 1885.

The difficulty comes in defining actions sufficient to
constitute direct operation. Bestfoods, at 1885. Because the
statute fails to adequately define the term “operator,” the
Supreme Court looked to its ordinary or natural meaning. In
the organizational sense, which was the intent of CERCLA,
operate means to conduct the affairs, manage, or operate a
business. Jd. (citing American Heritage Dictionary 1268 (3d
ed. 1992)). Therefore, under CERCLA, an operator is
simply someone who directs the workings of, manages, or
conducts the affairs of a site. /d. To sharpen this definition
for purposes of CERCLA’s concern with environmental
contamination, an operator must manage, direct, or conduct
operations specifically related to pollution, that is, operations
having to do with the leakage or disposal of hazardous waste,
or decisions about compliance with environmental regulations.
Id.

If the issue of direct liability as an operator is to be
kept distinct from derivative liability, there must be no fusion

'! The court recognizes that the two corporate defendants

here, MIG and AAA, did not have a parent-subsidiary relationship.
Nonetheless, because of their common ownership and directorship,
they are sufficiently analogous to a parent-subsidiary (sister
corporations seems an appropriate description) to make applicable
the tenets of Bestfoods.

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District Court Memorandum Opinion & Order - 7/29/98

of direct and indirect liability concepts. Bestfoods, at 1885.
The question for direct liability is not whether the one
corporation operates the other, but rather, whether it operates
the site. Jd. at 1886. Such Operation is evidenced by
Participation in the activities of the site and not the subsidiary.
Id. Control of the operating corporation, if extensive enough,
gives rise to indirect liability under state law piercing
doctrine, not direct liability under the statute, /d.

Having said that, the Court cautioned that it is entirely
appropriate for directors of a parent Corporation to serve as
directors of its subsidiary and that fact alone may not serve to
expose the parent to liability for the acts of the subsidiary.
Bestfoods, at 1886. This recognizes the well-established
principle that directors and officers holding positions with a
Parent and its subsidiary can and do change hats to represent
the two corporations separately despite their common
ownership. /d. Therefore, it is not enough to establish direct
liability as an operator that dual officers and directors made
policy decisions and Supervised activities at the site. Jd.
Rather, it must be shown that, despite the general presumption
to the contrary, the officers and directors were acting in their
Capacities as officers and directors of the parent and not as
officers and directors of the subsidiary.'* /d.

The court went on to discuss various possible
scenarios where a parent corporation could be found directly

- Again, while the corporations in this case are not

parent-subsidiary, they do share officers and directors. As such,
the court finds the language of Bestfoods equally applicable here.

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District Court Memorandum Opinion & Order - 7/29/98

liable as an operator. The first is where the parent operates
the site in the stead of its subsidiary or alongside the
subsidiary in some sort of joint venture. Bestfoods, at 1887.
The second possibility is where a dual officer or director
might depart so far from the norms of parental influence
exercised through dual office-holding as to serve the parent,
even when ostensibly acting on behalf of the subsidiary in
operating the site. /d. The third scenario is that an agent of
the parent, with no hat to wear but that of the parent, might
manage or direct activities at the site. /d. Norms of
corporate behavior, undisturbed by any CERCLA provision,
are crucial reference points. /d. The critical question is
whether, in degree and detail, actions directed to the site by
an agent of the parent alone are eccentric under accepted
norms of parental oversight of a subsidiary’s site. /d.

In the present case, the evidence shows that Richard
Ter Maat, as an officer and director of AAA and MIG, was
involved in the operational decision-making at the site. The
dispositive question is whether his conduct and that of AAA
was done outside the norms of corporate conduct so as to be
considered done on behalf of AAA rather than MIG.”

The pertinent evidence establishés that MIG paid AAA
a management fee to reimburse AAA, in part, for its
performing certain administrative functions for MIG related

3 , . : ——
'° In considering the evidence on this issue, the court

disregards the evidence related to AAA's control of MIG. Such
evidence is clearly not pertinent to an analysis of direct liability as
an operator under CERCLA. See Bestfoods, at 1886 (“The
question is not whether the parent operates the subsidiary, but
rather whether it operates the site. . . .”).

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District Court Memorandum Opinion & Order - 7/29/98

to the site. Numerous outside Parties who were involved with
the site, including the IEPA and waste haulers, considered
AAA to be the operator. Some venders sent Correspondence
and invoices to AAA for services related to site operations.
Additionally, Richard Ter Maat sent several letters to the
IEPA pertaining to operational matters at the site which he
Signed as president of AAA. He also sent a letter to the
[llinois Division of Land/Noise Pollution Control pertaining
{0 an Operating permit for the site which was also signed by
him as president of AAA. While defendants attempted to
explain these letters away as aberrations, the letters speak for
themselves. Furthermore, there are several letters from
AAA's environmental consultant, M. Rapps Associates Inc.,
addressed to Richard Ter Maat and AAA which discuss
pollution and clean-up issues at the site.

On the other hand, as defendants point out, there is
also Correspondence between Rapps and MIG and the IEPA
and MIG which also pertains to Operations at the site. All this
shows, however, at best is that AAA and MIG both were
involved as operators at the site. Nothing in CERCLA, or the
case law interpreting it, prohibits a finding of more than one
operator liable for a site.

The court finds that there is sufficient evidence,
irrespective of the evidence related to AAA’s control of MIG,
to conclude that AAA was, at the very least, a joint operator
of the site. As such, AAA bears direct liability under
CERCLA for the clean-up costs. The court will determine
AAA's share in a separate section of this order. Having
found AAA directly liable as an operator under CERCLA, the
court need not address the issue of whether AAA is liable
indirectly under a veil-piercing theory.

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District Court Memorandum Opinion & Order - 7/29/98

a Richard Ter Maat

While the Bestfoods decision offers significant
guidance on the meaning of an operator for purposes of direct
liability under CERCLA, the Court was careful to point out
that CERCLA does not impinge on established corporate
principles under state law. See Bestfoods, at 1880. Prior to
Bestfoods , however, the Seventh Circuit held that a corporate
officer could be held directly liable as an operator under
CERCLA irrespective of state veil-piercing law. Sidney S.
Arst Co. v. Pipefitters Welfare Educ. Fund, 25 F.3d 417, 420-
21 (7th Cir. 1994). This court respectfully believes that the
Bestfoods case directly applies to, and therefore trumps, the
Sidney S. Arst decision. Consequently, the only way plaintiffs
can attribute individual liability as an operator to Richard Ter
Maat, as an officer of both MIG and AAA, is derivatively
under state veil-piercing law.

Efforts to pierce the corporate veil are governed by the
law of the state of incorporation, Stromberg Metal Works,
Inc. v. Press Mechanical, Inc., 77 F.3d 928, 933 (7" Cir.
1996), which in this case is Illinois. In Ilkinois, a
corporation’s veil of limited liability may be pierced only if
there is such unity of interest and ownership that the separate
personalities of the corporation and the individual no longer
exist and if the circumstances are such that adherence to the
fiction of separate corporate existence would sanction a fraud
Or promote injustice. Hystro Prod., Inc. v. MNP Corp., 18
F.3d 1384, 1388-89 (7th Cir. 1994). In determining whether
to disregard a corporate entity, the court will consider a
number of factors, including: (1) inadequate capitalization;
(2) failure to issue stock; (3) failure to observe corporate
formalities; (4) nonpayment of dividends; (5) insolvency of

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District Court Memorandum Opinion & Order - 7/29/98

the debtor corporation at the time; (6) nonfunctioning of other
officers or directors: (7) absence of corporate records; and (8)
whether the corporation is a mere facade for the operation of
dominant stockholders. Ted Harrison Oil Co., Inc. v. Dokka,
247 Ill. App.3d 791, 187 Ill. Dec. 441, 617 N.E.2d 898, 901
(4th Dist. 1993). The court may also consider whether the
dominant individuals commingled corporate funds with
personal funds or preferred themselves as creditors. /d.
When such factors are coupled with some element of injustice
or fundamental unfairness, the corporation will be considered
aS an aggregate of persons both in equity and law and its
officers, directors and shareholders wil] be held liable for the
corporation’s obligations. /d. That being said, a court should
reluctantly pierce the corporate veil. /d. The party seeking
to have the corporate entity disregarded must come forward
with a substantial showing that the corporation is really a
dummy or a sham for a dominating personality. /d.

The present case is unique as the officers, directors
and shareholders, of which Richard Ter Maat is more than
one, chose to set up two corporations, one to operate the site
(MIG) and another to haul garbage to the site (AAA). At first
glance, one might be suspicious that two corporations were
formed where one could do the job. But that is the nature of
corporate law, and there are many legitimate benefits, not the
least of which is related to taxes, that might motivate such an
organizational move. Moreover, nothing in CERCLA
purports to reject the bedrock common-law principle
respecting corporate structure. Bestfoods at 1883. The
particular structure and functions of the corporation alone do
not justify attributing liability to Richard Ter Maat
individually.

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Plaintiffs contend that Richard Ter Maat is liable as
the alter ego of MIG and AAA.“ The court will assess this
contention in light of the various factors recognized under
Illinois law, keeping in mind plaintiffs’ burden of a substantial
showing.

First, there is no evidence of undercapitalization.
While MIG did not have tremendous resources, it was able to
function financially on its own for many years. Second, stock
was issued by both corporations. Third, corporate formalities
were in fact observed. The evidence shows that while
Richard Ter Maat was president of each corporation,
decisions were made collectively. Simply because Richard
Ter Maat demonstrated a leadership role does not reflect
dominance. Additionally, regular meetings were held and
books were kept for both corporations. Both corporations
also filed corporate tax returns. Similarly, each corporation
employed a controller, Phil Stevens, to maintain corporate
accounting functions. Fourth, the evidence shows that the
other officers and directors performed specific, identifiable
functions for each corporation. While Richard Ter Maat may
have been the leader, it was not a one-man show. Fifth,
although plaintiffs point to some questionable corporate
minutes, the overall evidence demonstrates that corporate
records were maintained for both MIG and AAA. Sixth,
there is no evidence sufficient to show that either corporation
was a mere facade for the operation of Richard Ter Maat.

'* Of course, plaintiffs need only pierce the corporate veil

of either MIG or AAA to achieve their goal of attributing liability
to Richard Ter Maat.

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District Court Memorandum Opinion & Order - 7/29/98

These foregoing factors do not justify piercing the corporate
veil.

The remaining factors, while arguably supporting
piercing the corporate veil of MIG, are insufficient to do so
in light of the factors pointing the other way and plaintiffs’
burden of a substantial Showing. There was no evidence of
any payment of dividends, although that is not entirely
unusual in small corporations. As for the insolvency of MIG,
it only became insolvent once the CERCLA obligations were
imposed on it. Prior to that time, it maintained its own °
financial vitality. The fact that AAA prospered comparatively
does not show MIG’s insolvency. Lastly, there is some
Suggestion that AAA and Richard Ter Maat preferred
themselves as creditors. Given the unusually low tipping
rates charged AAA by MIG (irrespective of AAA’s volume),
the lease arrangement for heavy equipment and the
management fees paid by MIG to AAA, it is evident that
AAA prospered at MIG’s expense. Such an arrangement is
not entirely unusual as between two corporations. Ultimately,
of course, Richard Ter Maat received the benefit of AAA’s
prosperity through the sale of AAA. Whether that was part
of some grand fraudulent scheme or only last minute
manipulations by a shrewd business person, the evidence
simply does not answer. Hinting at or suggesting such
matters is not enough in light of state corporate law. The
court finds that plaintiffs have failed to prove a basis to pierce
the corporate veil as to either AAA or MIG.

Admissibility of Parnello Affidavit

On June 24, 1988, BFI submitted, via its legal
counsel, the affidavit of one of its employees, Joseph E.

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District Court Memorandum Opinion & Order - 7/29/98

Parnello, to the United States Environmental Protection
Agency (USEPA). The letter accompanying the Parnello
affidavit states, in pertinent part, that the affidavit is submitted
in response to the USEPA’s contention that BFI “has a
continuing obligation to supply information relevant to
Belvidere Municipal Landfill No. 1.” The letter further states
that the Parnello affidavit “attests to the types and volumes of
waste hauled from the Chrysler plant . . . to the Belvidere
Municipal Landfill No. 1 from 1967 to 1973.” It further
asserts that Parnello “started hauling Chrysler’s waste in 1967
and continues to haul this waste to this day.” The letter also
includes a list of the types and approximate amounts of waste
hauled from Chrysler for the seven-year period.

Parnello’s affidavit itself states, in relevant part, that
Parnello was hauling Chrysler waste to a BFI landfill in Davis
Junction, Illinois and that he had hauled Chrysler waste to the
Belvidere Municipal Landfill No. 1 from 1967 to 1973.
Parnello also states that “[a]ll of the waste [he] hauled from
Chrysler was taken to the Belvidere Municipal Landfill No.
1 until the landfill closed in 1973.” The Parnello affidavit
further states that during the seven-year period he hauled:
approximately 15,000 gallons of infilco sludge every two
months, approximately three to five 20 cubic yard loads per
week of paint sludge, approximately three to five loads of fly
ash per week depending on the season, approximately two to
five 30 yard loads of metal debris and scrap per week and
approximately two 15 yard loads per day of industrial
wastewater sludge. According to Parnello, Chrysler also
disposed of about sixty drums of waste per week, with some
of the drums containing solvents, tar or metal scraps.

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District Court Memorandum Opinion & Order - 7/29/98

Defendants seek to admit the Parnello affidavit as
circumstantial evidence of what type and volume of Chrysler
waste was hauled by Parnello during the period of 1973 to
1975. Plaintiffs contend the affidavit is inadmissible hearsay.

Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2) governs the
admissibility of the Parnello affidavit. Rule 801(d)(2)
provides that an admission by a party opponent is not hearsay,
and therefore admissible, if it “is offered against a party and
is (A) the party’s own Statement, in either an individual or a
representative capacity or (B) a statement of which the party
has manifested an adoption or belief in its truth, or (C) a
Statement by a person authorized by the party to make a
statement concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by the
party’s agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope
of the agency or employment, made during the existence of
the relationship. . . .” Parnello’s affidavit, while arguably
admissible under subsection (A), qualifies as'an admission by
BFI under subsection (B), (C) and (D). The cover letter by
BFI’s attorney reflects that BFI had adopted a belief in its
truth as it was submitted to the USEPA and also that BFI
authorized Parnello to make the Statement. Additionally, as
to subsection (D), Parnello was an employee of BFI at the
time he made the affidavit and it concerned a matter within
Parnello’s employment. Accordingly, the court admits the
Parnello affidavit as an admission by BFI.

Chrysler Waste

The parties have presented the twin issues of whether
an adverse inference can be drawn based on Chrysler’s
alleged failure to produce all documents relevant to disposal
of its wastes for the period 1973 to 1975 and whether such an

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District Court Memorandum Opinion & Order - 7/29/98

inference can be attributed to BFI for its similar failure. A
related issue is whether section 103(d) of CERCLA, 42
U.S.C. § 9603(d), required BFI to retain all records of its
operation at the site. The court finds it unnecessary to decide
these issues as there is sufficient evidence to infer that
Chrysler waste did in fact go to the site during the period
1973 to 1975.

The undisputed evidence shows that Parnello, a BFI
employee, exclusively hauled the Chrysler waste from at least
1967 to 1973. Additionally, the undisputed evidence
demonstrates he exclusively hauled Chrysler waste after 1975.
Other evidence strongly suggests that he also hauled the
Chrysler waste from 1973 to 1975.

The big mystery, of course, is where did he haul it
during the 1973-75 period. In that regard, the evidence shows
that from 1967 to 1973 Parnello hauled all of the Chrysler
waste to BFI’s site at Belvidere Municipal Landfill No. 1 and
that from 1975 forward he hauled it to BFI’s new site at Davis
Junction.'? David Boque, a management level employee of
Chrysler, testified by deposition that he was aware of Parnello
hauling Chrysler waste to Belvidere Municipal Landfill No.
1 before 1973 and to Davis Junction from sometime in 1975
thereafter. Curiously, Boque had no knowledge of where
Pamello hauled Chrysler waste from 1973 to 1975.
Furthermore, BFI applied for a permit in early 1973 from

'S The evidence shows that for a short time in 1975 he

hauled Chrysler waste to the Pagel Pit in Rockford, Illinois. That
was between the time BFI relinquished control over the site and
when it opened its new operation at Davis Junction.

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Illinois Environmental Protection Agency to deposit liquid
wastes from Chrysler in the site.

Additionally, an employee of BFI at the site, Kenneth
Bodey, testified at trial that while he worked there Parnello
hauled Chrysler waste to the Site. According to Bodey, once
or twice a week Parnello would bring in a twenty-yard
container containing two different Sludges. One sludge Bodey
described as purple in color with a stiff consistency which he
referred to as number five Sludge and described as paint
Sludge. The second Sludge, referred to as number seven
Sludge, was gray in color with a soft, but not liquid,
consistency. Bodey described this as Sewage sludge. Neither
Sludge smelled like solvents. Bodey also testified he saw
Parnello bring infilco waste into the site ina twenty-yard box.
According to Bodey, he also saw fly ash and cinders hauled
into the site by Parnello, at a rate in the winter of two to three
loads per day. To Bodey’s knowledge, BFI’s trucks went
Only to-the site and no other landfill while BF] operated the
site. While Bodey saw Parnello haul drums into Belvidere
Municipal Landfill No. 1, he never saw him haul drums to the
Site.

Cleatos Atkinson, the former general manager of BFI,
testified, and the documentary evidence Shows, that in mid-
1975 BFI sought and received Significant hauling and disposal
rate charges for liquid waste in the agreement covering 1973
to 1976. This was at about the same time BFI began hauling
Chrysler waste to Pagel Pit and then Davis Junction.

When the court views this evidence in its entirety, the

inescapable conclusion is that BFI hauled Chrysler waste,
including sludges and infilco waste, to the site during the

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period of 1973 to 1975. The more difficult questions are how
much was deposited and to what extent did these wastes
contain solvents.

In that regard, the court finds persuasive the expert
opinion of defendants’ witness, Paul R. Ammann. According
to Ammann, BFI contributed approximately 3,430,000 pounds
of solvents to the site between April 1973 and June 1975."°
This amount is based on the number of vehicles manufactured
by Chrysler during this time period and the approximate
amount of solvent-bearing waste generated therefrom.
According to Ammann, the 3.4 million pounds of solvents
deposited by BFI at the site represents about 91 percent of the
total solvent content at the site.'’ The question of the impact
of solvents at the site will be addressed when the court decides
the allocation issue.

Appropriateness of Damages Under the NCP
Defendants contend that plaintiffs have failed to carry

their burden of proving that the response costs they seek to -
recover were both necessary and consistent with the National

'© This conclusion is based on the assumption that BFI

dumped all the Chrysler waste during the relevant period at the site.
In its prior discussion, the court has already found such assumption
to be supported by the evidence. The court, therefore, finds that
about 3,430,000 pounds of solvents are attributable to BFI’s
hauling of Chrysler waste to the site.

'7 Ammann attributed the remaining nine percent to MIG
based on the amount and nature of municipal and industrial trash
hauled by MIG during its operating period as per records.

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Contingency Plan. Peppers counsel for defendants'® further
identifies 13 examples which he contends are not recoverable
special damages.

Section 107(a)(4)(B) of CERCLA imposes liability on
potentially responsible Parties (PRPs) for “any other
necessary costs of response incurred by any other person
consistent with the National Contingency Plan.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a)(4)(B). Proof that a private Party’s response costs
were Consistent with the NCP is an element of a private cost
recovery action under CERCLA. Bancamerica Commercial
Corp. v. Trinity Indus., Inc., 900 F.Supp. 1427, 145]
(D.Kan. 1995). The 19909 NCP, which applies to this action,
specifies that any response action “carried out in compliance
with the terms of an order issued by EPA pursuant to section
106 of CERCLA, or a consent decree entered into pursuant to
section 122 of CERCLA will be considered ‘consistent with
the NCP.’” 40 C.E.R. § 300.700(c)(3)(ii). Private party
response actions not made pursuant to an EPA order or decree
require substantial compliance with a list of requirements in
order for the response action to be considered consistent with
the NCP. 40 C.F.R. § 300.700(c)(5)-(6). Response actions
taken pursuant to an EPA order or decree will be found
consistent with the NCP if the actions were in compliance
with the order or decree. Trinity Indus., 900 F.Supp. at
1452; United States y. Colorado & Eastern R.R. Co., Inc.,
No. 89-C-1786, 1993 WL 350171 (D.Colo. 1993), afl’d, 50
F.3d 1530 (10" Cir. 1995); Central Maine Power Co. v. FJ.

5 See Maryland Casualty Co. v. Peppers, 64 Ill.2d 187,
355 N.E.2d 24 (1976) (Insured entitled to independent counsel]
where potential conflict of interest exists under insurance policy.)

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O’Connor Co., 838 F.Supp. 641, 647 (D.Me. 1993). In fact,
there is an irrebuttable presumption that actions taken
pursuant to the terms of an EPA consent decree are consistent
with the plan. Central Maine Power, 838 F.Supp. at 647.

In this case, the undisputed evidence shows that the
response costs sought by plaintiffs were for actions taken
pursuant to two administrative orders on consent executed
after April 9, 1990. Therefore, the court finds the costs are
consistent with the NCP.

Defendants contend that the oversight costs sought by
plaintiffs related to the emergency removal and RI/FS
activities are not recoverable, relying on United States v.
Rohm and Haas Co., 2 F.3d 1265 (3d Cir. 1993). The
Seventh Circuit has not addressed the issue. Two other
circuit courts of appeals have, in addressing the issue, rejected
the conclusion and reasoning of the Rohm case. See United
States v. Lowe, 118 F.3d 399 (Sth Cir. 1997); see also
Atlantic Richfield Co. v. American Airlines, Inc., 98 F.3d 564
(10" Cir. 1996) (limiting Rohm to the narrower circumstance
of removal actions).

After carefully reading all three cases and the
applicable statutory provisions under CERCLA, the court
respectfully disagrees with the Third Circuit and follows the
decisions of the Fifth and Tenth Circuits. It appears that
allowing oversight costs to be recovered best serves the broad
remedial purpose of CERCLA and promotes the effective
clean-up of environmental hazards. Accordingly, the court

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finds that plaintiffs are entitled to recover all of the Oversight
costs of the USEPA and IEPA.'?

Defendants, alternatively, contend that certain costs
are not recoverable and present an enumerated laundry list of
contentions and commentary as support for their position.
The court finds that the evidence supports plaintiffs’ claims
for costs as to all these matters. Only two warrant further
discussion.

First, defendants contend plaintiffs’ additional
expenses of $392,055.89 in PRP search costs were duplicative
and done ip anticipation of litigation. Patrick McGrath, vice-
president of Peterson Consulting, testified that $378,450 was
expended to identify PRPs through the identification of
generators and transporters and the specific volumes of waste
they hauled or sent to the site. According to McGrath, this
function was necessary to facilitate the de minimis settlement
process. Furthermore, McGrath’s expert report shows a
delineation of the various tasks conducted by Peterson
Consulting as part of the PRP search process. The court
agrees thai PRP search costs are not limited to the name of the
PRP alone. Information related to who brought what and how
much is particularly relevant to the de minimis settlement
process. McGrath’s testimony and report sufficiently support
the claim for the costs related to the PRP search process.
Therefore, the court finds plaintiffs are entitled to the full
amount sought.

? Even if the court were to follow the Rohm decision, the
Oversight costs related to the RI/FS activities would still be
recoverable.

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Second, defendants contend that plaintiffs’ claims for
attorney fees are not recoverable because such claims are
vague and plaintiffs have not shown they are “closely tied” to
the actual clean-up. Plaintiffs respond that they are not
seeking recovery for items related to litigation support in
Golden & Associates’ bills, that the bills from the law firms
of McDermott, Will & Emery and Kirkland & Ellis are for
administrative services provided to the MLTF and not legal
services and that the computerized legal research charge from
Lathrop & Norquist was for locating PRP addresses.

While plaintiffs’ claims include some work performed
by attorneys, they have shown it is “closely tied” to the actual
clean-up activities. Defendants’ objections do not specify
particular costs that are attributable to litigation matters versus
clean-up matters. Defendant agreed to do so where they
believed there were discrepancies, and the court will not comb
the record in search of such problems. Plaintiffs have
sufficiently shown that their costs of $8,036,608.87 are
necessary and consistent with the NCP.

Allocation of response costs associated with the emergency
removal actions and the interim remedial measures (IRM)

Plaintiffs’ expert, Edwin Raymond, testified in his trial
affidavit that the costs associated with the emergency removal
actions and the IRMs were $2,305, 183.44 as of December 31,
1997. Plaintiffs contend that defendants” should be

20 The court has already decided that Richard Ter Maat
has no individual liability as an operator under either CERCLA or

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responsible for this entire amount because of their failure to
Properly close the site when they abandoned it in 1988.
Plaintiffs further maintain that there will be future operation
and maintenance costs associated with the IRMs and that the
court should enter a declaratory judgment attributing all of the
future costs to defendants.

Defendants respond that they should not be held liable
for the full amount of the emergency removal and IRM costs
because the presence of solvents, which were introduced by
BFI, caused the emergency and interim remedial response.
Defendants further contend that a portion of the costs should
be attributed to the owners of the site because they had a legal
obligation to participate in the proper closure of the site which
was not eradicated by the agreement between the owners and
defendants.

As will be seen in more detail later in this order,
allocation of response costs is far from an exact science. This
is equally true in the context of Who should pay what for the
emergency removal and IRM costs. Here, there are three
potential parties: plaintiffs, defendants and the owners. The
court will discuss each.

As for BFI, there is simply no evidence, expert or
otherwise, to show that anything they did attributed to the
need to take emergency removal and IRM action. There has
been no showing that the toxicity contributed by BFI via the
Chrysler waste stream caused these actions to be taken.
While such toxicity will have an impact on the court’s

State veil-piercing law.

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allocation for the other clean-up costs, it has no effect in this
context. There is also no showing that anything else BFI did
years before contributed in any way to the emergency nature
of the initial response and the interim measures taken. There
is also no evidence that BFI’s closure of the site in 1975
contributed to these costs. Nor did the law impose any
obligation on them to effect closure in 1988. Therefore, the
court attributes zero percentage of the emergency removal and
IRM costs to plaintiffs.

As for defendants, they clearly had an obligation under
applicable regulations to properly close the site. It is also
undeniable that they failed in this undertaking. Further, the
experts, both plaintiffs’ and defendants’, agree that failure to
properly close the site contributed to the need for emergency
removal and IRM activities. Defendants left the site without
proper slope and without a proper cap which resulted in
excessive ponding of water and runoff of water, both of which
contributed significantly to the extensive leachate problem.
There is no doubt that had the site been properly closed the
need for emergency and interim actions would have been
minimized. Defendants must share significantly in the costs
for the emergency removal and IRMs.

That leaves the owners. Plaintiffs contend the owners
should escape responsibility because they had an agreement
with defendants that gave defendants the obligation to close
the site. Nevertheless, the law places the responsibility for
closure on both the owners and defendants. This obligation
could not be bargained away. The evidence shows that, not
only did the owners fail to take any action to close the site,
they interfered with defendants proposal to do so by refusing
to sign off on the closure plan submitted to the IEPA. While

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the court does not €Xpress an opinion on defendants’ proposed
closure plan, the key at this point is that the Owners’ refusal
to become involved reflects a hands-off approach contrary to
their legal obligations. As will be discussed more thoroughly
later in this order in the allocation issue, the owners could not
sit back and reap great financial rewards from their land while
the very use of the land for which they benefitted
contaminated the environment. Equity, which is the
underpinning of the allocation process, will not allow it.

Having determined that defendants and the owners
Share the responsibility for the costs associated with the
emergency removal and IRM activities, the court must decide
what share each will bear. Of course, there can be no
exactitude in this process.

That being said, and having carefully considered the
evidence, including the expert reports and testimony, the
court finds that defendants are eighty-five percent responsible
and the owners are fifteen percent responsible. This division
of responsibility is based on the fact that the operators were
in the besi position to effectuate a closure but refused to do
so. While the owners foiled defendants’ attempt to seek
approval from the IEPA for defendants Proposed closure, that
did not prevent defendants from closing the site anyway. It
was a poor exercise of judgment by defendants to throw up
their hands and walk away simply because of the lack of
Cooperation by the owners.2! A Proper closure would have

*! While the parties could not bargain away their legal

obligations, the fact that defendants had the sole responsibility for
closure under the agreement further reflects their poor judgment in

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made a significant impact on the cleanup and response costs.
On the other hand, the owners are not squeaky Clean in all of
this. Their persistent inclination to stick their heads in the
sand is an irresponsible approach that cannot be overlooked.
Had they and defendants worked together to close the site,
which the law contemplated them doing, much environmental
harm could have been avoided. As for future costs related to
the IRMs, the court enters a declaratory judgment against
defendants and the owners based on these percentages.

Whether MIG and AAA ~* should be considered a single party
tor purposes of allocating response costs

Plaintiffs contend that section 2(a)(2) of the Uniform
Comparative Fault Act should apply and that MIG and AAA
should be treated as a single party for allocation purposes.
The court disagrees. In a contribution action such as this one
under section 113 of CERCLA, defendants are severally liable
and plaintiffs have the burden of allocating the harm to each
defendant. See Ninth Ave. Remedial Group v. Allis Chalmers
Corp., 974 F.Supp. 684, 688 (N.D.Ind. 1997). While it is
true that MIG and AAA share the role of operator, they
cannot share the liability. Any allocation of liability will take
into consideration their dual role as operators of the site

abandoning the site without effective closure.

*2 Plaintiffs contend all three parties, MIG, AAA and
Richard Ter Maat should be treated as one. This court has held in
a separate part of this order, however, that Richard Ter Maat
cannot be held individually liable as operator either directly or
derivatively.

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during their period of operation. In all likelihood each will
bear an equal share of their joint allocation which will be
decided in the allocation portion of this order. Such a result
would not be inconsistent with several liability under section
113.

Whether defendants can be declared liable for future response
costs pursuant to section ] 13(g)(2) of CERCLA

Defendants object to the entry of a declaratory
judgment against them for future response costs in the form
of final remedial action. Defendants contend such costs are
too speculative to base a declaratory judgment on.
Defendants also argue that because the baseline risk
assessment’s focus shifted from solvents to metals after the
Close of discovery that they will be denied due process if they
are not allowed to explore the bases for the metals-division
remedy for future clean-up.

Section 113(g)(2) of CERCLA provides that “[i]n any
such action described in this subsection, the court shall enter
a declaratory judgment on liability for response costs or
damages that will be binding on any subsequent action or
actions to recover further response costs or damages.” This
language reflects Congress’s intent to insure that a responsible
party’s liability, once established, will not have to be
relitigated. American Nat’l Bank and Trust Co. of Chicago v.
Harcros Chem., Inc., No. 95 C 3750, 1997 WL 281295, at
*12 (N.D.IIl. May 20, 1997). The entry of a declaratory
judgment as to liability is, therefore, mandatory under
CERCLA. Jd. (citing United States v. USX Corp., 68 F.3d
811, 819 (3d Cir. 1995)). Moreover, the fact that future costs

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District Court Memorandum Opinion & Order - 7/29/98

are speculative is no bar to a present declaration of liability.
Id. Additionally, defendants do not cite, and the court cannot
find, any authority recognizing a due process claim in this
context. Defendants have had the same opportunity as
plaintiffs to consider and respond to the USEPA’s approach
to this case. Allocation responsibility can be assessed at this
point and applied to future response costs.

Whether plaintiffs are entitled to interest from defendants on
plaintiffs’ costs related to the site

Plaintiffs seek interest at the rate of 5.6% for a period
from January 31, 1995, the date they served a demand letter
upon defendants, to the date of judgment. Defendants only
objection is to reiterate their contention that plaintiffs are not
entitled to recover certain underlying clean-up costs as argued
in other sections of their post-trial brief. Defendants do not
raise any argument directly in opposition to the imposition of
interest for the period or the rate sought.

Because section 107(a) allows for interest, and
defendants have not directly objected to its imposition, the
court will award interest for the time period and rate sought.
Such an award will only apply, however, to the percentage of
costs awarded to plaintiffs and against defendants as set forth
in other sections of this order.

Whether solvents caused the listing of the site on the National
Priorities List (NPL) or caused any element of the remedy

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As plaintiffs correctly point out in their reply brief, the
issue of what caused the site to be placed on the NPL is of no
consequence as to what remedies are ultimately necessary to
clean up the site. On the other hand, while plaintiffs’ experts
point to the remedies as being driven by the presence of
metals, there is also evidence that volatile organic compounds
(VOCs) are also present in significant levels. Furthermore,
VOCs, while present in solvents, are also found in ordinary
municipal and industrial waste.

It cannot be said that the remedies in this case are
entirely independent of solvents. The court has already found
that Chrysler waste, which included solvents, was placed in
the site during the BF] period. It may prove impossible to
Separate the solvent from the non-solvent VOCs. That,
however, supports the court’s conclusion that the remedies are
likewise indivisible. Accordingly, the court finds that
solvents are, in part, Causing some elements of the remedy.
The court will apportion this causation in its allocation
discussion.

Whether defendants Closed the site on June 30, 1988

Plaintiffs contend that under the State environmental
regulations applicable at the time, see Ill.Admin. Code tit. 35,
§§ 807.101 ef seq. (807 regulations), defendants failed to
properly close the site but instead abandoned it. Defendants
make a half-hearted response, essentially blaming the owners
and the IEPA for preventing them from properly closing the
Site.

District Court Memorandum Opinion & Order - 7/29/98

The court will take little time addressing this issue.
While several aspects of this case are murky, it is crystal clear
that defendants walked away from the site without properly
closing it. No legitimate argument can be made that
defendants did not abandon the site within the meaning of the
807 regulations. Therefore, the court finds that the site was
not closed by defendants on June 30, 1988 or anytime
thereafter.”

Whether defendants should bear any of the orphan share

An orphan share in the context of CERCLA
contemplates an inability to account for all hazardous waste
streams or to assign a measure of monetary responsibility to
an otherwise responsible party. United States v. Kramer, 953
F.Supp. 592, 595 (D.N.J.1997). The parties here do not take
issue with this definition. Rather, they disagree as to whether
defendants should bear any of the orphan share in this case.

In a contribution action such as this one, the court
enjoys broad discretion to consider and apply such equitable
factors as it deems appropriate to achieve a just and fair
allocation among liable parties. Kramer, 953 F.Supp. at 597.
Section 113(f) permits the court to allocate response costs to
all liable parties. /d. at 598. Thus, nothing in CERCLA or
its legislative history prohibits the court from allocating
orphan shares to all liable parties. /d.; see also Charter

3 Such facts as the owners’ recalcitrance and defendants’
legitimate attempts to close, if any, will be considered in allocating
costs.

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Township of Oshtemo y. American Cyanamid Co., 898
F.Supp. 506, 508 (W.D. Mich. 1995) (in a section 113(f)
contribution claim, the Orphan shares must be equitably
apportioned among all solvent PRPs). Furthermore, the
Orphan shares should be apportioned to the PRPs (both
plaintiffs and defendants) according to their relative equitable
Share. Kramer, 953 F .Supp. at 598: Charter Township, 898
F.Supp. at 509.

The court agrees with the analysis in Kramer and
Charter T, ownship and rejects the contentions of defendants.
To allocate Orphan shares to all liable Parties is not
inconsistent with several liability under section 113.
Additionally, such an approach is entirely consistent with
equitable considerations applicable to an allocation scheme
under section 113. To Properly effectuate the purposes of
CERCLA, all liable and solvent parties must share the cost in
Proportion to their relative fault.

In this case, plaintiffs’ expert, William Hengeminhle,
testified that approximately 34,615 cubic yards of waste are
attributable to orphan Operators and about 510,580 cubic
yards to orphan transporters. According to Hengemihle, the
total orphan share is 1,58 percent to be distributed on a pro
rata basis to all parties. Defendants have not countered this
allocation. Accordingly, the court accepts Hengemihle’s
apportionment of the Orphan share to the respective parties,
including defendants.

Whether BFI violated its landfill permit by failing to remove
the waste deposited in the Kennedy-Mollendorf area prior to
May 5, 1972

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It is undisputed that BFI’s landfill operating permit,
issued by the IEPA, contained a special condition, among
others, requiring BFI to remove the waste from the Kennedy-
Mollendorf area and to seal the area according to design
specifications. It is further undisputed that BFI never met that
condition. What is in dispute is whether the IEPA modified
BFI’s permit by allowing BFI to leave the waste but requiring
it to take Certain actions, including covering the waste with
clay.

It is not clear whether BFI actually complied with the
substitute conditions, even if they were approved by IEPA.
Contrary to BFI’s assertion in its post-trial brief, Raymond
De Wane did not testify that BFI complied with the special
conditions. Rather, De Wane testified that cover was placed
on the Kennedy-Mollendorf area during its use prior to BFI
becoming the operator. There is some indication that BFI
covered the Kennedy-Mullendort area and that they placed no
additional waste there, as reflected by the site characterization
memorandum. There is no evidence however, to show that
the other conditions were met.

Nonetheless, the court cannot conclude that the IEPA
ever formally approved the substitute conditions. Clearly,
several letters from the IEPA to BFI during the early to mid-
part of 1973 reflect the IEPA’s insistence that the original
condition be met and that BFI remove the waste from the
Kennedy-Mollendorf area. The memorandum from the
July 23, 1973, meeting between BFI, Wallace Koster and the
IEPA is nothing more than that, a memorandum. It is far
from an official authorization from the IEPA. In fact, one
would expect a supplemental permit to have issued had the
IEPA formally approved the change. The fact that the IEPA

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records after July 23, 1973, do not indicate a continued belief
by the IEPA that BFI was Violating its permit is not
Particularly persuasive.

Therefore, the court finds that the original condition
of the permit regarding the Kennedy-Mollendorf area was not
modified or substituted for by the IEPA, Having reached that
conclusion, the court finds that BF] did not comply as it never
removed the waste. The significance of this finding, if any,
will be addressed in the allocation section of this order.

Whether Richard Ter Maat’s deposition testimony can be
considered substantively as admissions of a Party where he
also testified at trial

Richard Ter Maat’s deposition testimony contains
admissions by a party and is, therefore, admissible as
Substantive evidence. Fed.R. Evid. 801(d)(2). It may be used
as substantive evidence at trial even if Ter Maat testifies
(which he did here). Fed.R.Civ. P. 32(a); Aircraft Gear
Corp. v. Kaman Aerospace Corp., No. 93 C 1220, 1996
WL 65990, at *] (N.D.IIl. Feb. 12, 1996); W.R. Grace &
Co. v. Viskase Corp., No. 90 C 5383, 199] WL 211647, at
*2 (N.D.III. Oct. 15, 1991).

Having said that, the court also finds the submitted
evidence from Ter Maat’s deposition to be Vague and of little
evidentiary value. Much of what Ter Maat testified to
regarding his activities related to the site could apply equally
to his role as an officer of MIG. Absent an Opportunity for
further explanation, such Statements have little evidentiary
weight.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386014_0657%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
