# Amicus Curiae Brief — Allender v. United States > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386014_0586%3A11 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief - **Published:** January 1, 1999 - **Citation:** 528 U.S. 873 ## Text Supreme Court, US. FILED No. 99-1030 MAY 1.52099. IN THE Supreme Court of the Unite States CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA, AND STEPHEN GOLDSMITH, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS MAYOR OF THE CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS, Petitioners, Vv. JAMES EDMOND, ET AL., Respondents. On Writ Of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit BRIEF OF THE NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES, NATIONAL GOVERNORS’ ASSOCIATION, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF COUNTIES, COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, INTERNATIONAL CITY/COUNTY MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL MUNICIPAL LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, AND U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS AS AMICI CURIAE SUPPORTING PETITIONERS RICHARD RUDA * Chief Counsel JAMES I. CROWLEY STATE AND LOCAL LEGAL CENTER 444 North Capitol Street, N.W. Suite 345 Washington D.C. 20001 (202) 434-4850 * Counsel of Record for the Amici Curiae ; Witson - Eres Printine Co.. inc. - 789-0096 - WasHINGTON. D.C. 20001 QUESTION PRESENTED Whether checkpoints at which law enforcement officers briefly stop vehicular traffic, check motorists’ licenses and vehicle registrations, look for signs of impairment, and walk a “narcotics detection” dog around the exterior of each stopped automobile are unlawful under the Fourth Amendment. (i) TABLE OF CONTENTS ete cg an EEN REE REEE TSS SPSS Eas U8 SOAR OU SNORE INDIANAPOLIS* ROADBLOCK PROGRAM SATISFIES THE FOURTH AMENDMENT............ A. Brown v. Texas Provides The Standard For Determining The Constitutionality Of Indianapolis’ Checkpoints..............ccceccece0e. B. A Primary Purpose Of Interdicting Drug Offenders Does Not Render Indianapolis’ Program Violative Of The Fourth ey CEE LTR ON TEE IO ky ptt as cane OE IN cg ee See (ili) Page 27 iV TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases Page Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979)............ssseeeeees passim Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 1 GET Pcs ciscsiapascccipubelateuaiesianalsnianeeune mnie 21 Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997)............... 19 Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979)......... 9, 11, 16 Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983) ........ eee 25 Galbert v. United States, 590 A.2d 990 (D.C. FINED issuieshs bosisasudelonslasbissand saadadaatasudeaambannias Keiiainghaiae 26 Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990)............ 25 Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990).............. 22 Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981).......... 22 Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. SE I eich tinhchaniediccdsenbaciscaernapacess cienavaitsabints passim New. York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987)............. 24 Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977)....... 8 South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 EN iakicnnsasiearcencotabibinahs Siaamdadubaee idinedanhaiinteids 24 Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983) .........cceeeeeees 25 Ferry v. GIO, FIZUIS. 1 CUGGB) ossscisccssscssesonseas a, Ba ee Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 CIE siikcaininianicaibgaihsintained covacadslad esthiaenaaeaseecaneni 12 United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 EP iakivesshhaicnb acd ecesbcadicbbadsdapixddeniduanakiatatin oohabates 8,9 United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 FIIR spk snsiicidvanientsiicadiadedcaitanas oti abaaante passim United States v. McFayden, 865 F.2d 1306 (D.C. is SN iicciannessnnitiasnbinnaj bla cinsa taka puadciintcaneasias tea 26 United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 CP ctinckaxticsidibicarts bias tarsi hcitcapiigabdnsaniiniansiassien 1, 7, 14 United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975) .......... 10 United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983) ......... passim United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973)... 21, 22 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996)........ 5, 24 Vv TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued Statutes | Page Wane, Fume, Ce Br bh oa vccnisscctsnsastundelacaeitsonies 16 Ind. Ann. Code § 9-24-18-5 .uu.........cccccscsssccssssssseees 16 Other Authorities Brief for Petitioners, Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990)... 6, 24 U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Drugs, Crime and the Justice System CIDR sssinssicrssnsissectindaiaeaabndiahanaenadie | U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, DWI Offenders under Correctional DCT RIE TIRE sesisicecnnssniiuiichoisddedassnanaiaiapmeinksl 24 U.S. Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration, Table, Percentage of Adult Males Testing Positive for Any Drug at Time of Arrest . In 1998, 34.2 percent of Indianapolis’ arrestees tested positive for cocaine. 45.1 percent tested positive for marijuana, and 1.8 tested positive for opiates. See Table. Per- centage of Adult Males Testing Positive for Specific Drugs at Time of Ar- rest in 1998 (visited May 12. 2000) ). See also, e.g., Ind. Ann. Code §§ 9-24-1-1 (requiring licenses), 9-24-18- 5 (prohibiting driving while license is suspended or revoked). 17 cedure that is so limited both in the manner in which the in- formation is obtained and in the content of the information revealed by the procedure.” /d. In short, a sniff is not “a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” /d. The intrusion is no greater than that which is constitutionally permissible at either a sobriety or immigration checkpoint.* Likewise, the “ ‘subjective’ intrusion” of Indianapolis’ checkpoints — “the fear and surprise engendered in law- abiding motorists by the nature of the stop,” Sitz, 496 U.S. at 452 (citation omitted) — does not render the program constitu- tionally unreasonable. Motorists are provided with “visible signs of the officers’ authority,” id. at 453 (citations omitted), including lighted signs which identify the checkpoints as a “NARCOTICS CHECKPOINT __ MILE AHEAD, NAR- COTICS K-9 IN USE, BE PREPARED TO STOP,” Pet. App. 57a, the presence of “approximately thirty” police offi- cers including uniformed patrolmen, and police cruisers. /d. at 52a. Furthermore, motorists can see that the procedure is conducted in a regularized manner, with all cars receiving the same initial processing. See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 453. Finally, having a dog led around the exterior of one’s car does not create fear and anxiety in a “law-abiding motorist[],” id. at 452, to any greater degree than police walking around the car * In 1994-95, the State of Tennessee. with the assistance of a National Highway Traffic Safety Administration grant. conducted an extensive statewide sobriety checkpoint program, in which officers “used passive alcohol sensors in flashlights to detect the odor of alcoholic beverages.” See U.S. DOT, NHTSA, Technical Report, Evaluation of Checkpoint Tennessee: Tennessee's Statewide Sobriety Checkpoint Program, Execu- tive Summary at 4 . Such devices are functionally indistinguish- able from drug detection dogs, in that they reveal only the presence or absence of alcohol odors in a driver's breath. An affirmance of the court of appeals’ judgment would raise a serious question regarding the consti- tutionality of such non-invasive devices as passive alcohol detection sensors. 18 to check for working lights, a valid license plate and inspec- tion sticker. And it far less likely to generate fear and anxiety in a law-abiding motorist then the selective referrals to a sec- ondary inspection area for further questioning which the Court upheld in Martinez-Fuerte. See 428 U.S. at 560. As the forgoing demonstrates, Indianapolis’ program causes only an incremental interference with motorists” lib- erty, which is of insufficient magnitude to render it unconsti- tutional. The program's high degree of effectiveness demon- strates that it “advances the public interest,” Brown, 443 U.S. at 51, and is thus constitutionally reasonable. Because the program satisfies the Brown standard, the court of appeals erred in invalidating it. - B. A Primary Purpose Of Interdicting Drug Offenders Does Not Render Indianapolis’ Program Violative Of The Fourth Amendment The court of appeals acknowledged that if the reasonable- ness of Indianapolis’ program “is to be assessed at the level of the entire program . . . these roadblocks probably are legal, given the high ‘hit’ rate and the only modestly intrusive char- acter of the stops.” Pet. App. 3a. The court failed to follow controlling precedent, however, explaining that “courts do not usually assess reasonableness at the program level when they are dealing with searches related to general criminal law en- forcement rather than to primarily civil regulatory programs for the protection of health, safety, and the integrity of our borders.” /d. at 4a (citation omitted). According to the court, “[b]ecause it is infeasible to quantify the benefits and costs of most law enforcement programs, the program approach might well permit deep inroads into privacy.” Id. Evidently concluding that Indianapolis’ program amounts to a “dragnet search” — a term which neither the court of ap- peals nor this Court have ever defined — the court further rea- soned that “[a]lthough there is nothing in the text of the rn 19 Fourth Amendment to prevent dragnet searches . . . the Su- preme Court has insisted that ‘to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, a search ordinarily must be based on in- dividualized suspicion of wrongdoing,” save in cases of ‘spe- cial need” based on ‘concerns other than crime detection.” Id. at 5a (quoting Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 313-14 (1997) (emphasis added by court of appeals)). In the court of appeals’ view, “[p]rogram-level justifications for searches in support of specific regulatory programs do not carry over to general criminal law enforcement.” /d. Because Indianapolis acknowledged that the primary purpose of the roadblocks was to interdict drug offenders, the court held the program uncon- stitutional. 1. The court of appeals’ reasoning finds scant support in this Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. The court's first contention — that it is improper to assess the reasonable- ness of Indianapolis’ roadblocks “at the program level” by a balancing analysis because courts do not do so “when they are dealing with searches related to general criminal law en- forcement rather than to primarily civil regulatory programs,” Pet. App. 4a — simply ignores numerous cases in which this Court has done precisely that, including the most relevant au- thority of Martinez-Fuerte and Sitz.” In Martinez-Fuerte, each of the non-governmental parties was a person who had been indicted on multiple counts of ” Implicit in the court of appeals’ statement is the suggestion that Indi- anapolis’ roadblock stops are searches for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. Both Sitz and Martinez-Fuerte characterized the initial stop and questioning as a “seizure.” See Sitz, 496 U.S. 450-51; Martine:- Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 556. Moreover, in Place, the Court held that a dog sniff is not “a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment” - because it is “limited both in the manner in which the information is ob- tained and in the content of the information revealed by the procedure.” 462 U.S. at 707. To the extent the court of appeals analyzed Indianapolis” program as a search, it was mistaken. 20 illegally transporting aliens in violation of the former 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2); several of the defendants had also been charged with other felony offenses. See 428 U.S. at 547-49. While Sitz did not involve the appeal of a criminal prosecu- tion, the Court was obviously cognizant that the consequence for those found to have been “driving under the influence” was their arrest. See 496 U.S. at 448. Notwithstanding the serious criminal consequences facing those apprehended in Martinez-Fuerte and Sitz, in both cases the Court analyzed the reasonableness of the police conduct at the program level by weighing, in the aggregate, the bene- fits to the public interest against the costs to the motoring public. In Martinez-Fuerte, the Court expressly noted that “[rJoutine checkpoint inquiries apprehend many smugglers and illegal aliens,” that the government's “need to make rou- tine checkpoint stops is great,” and that “[rJoutine checkpoint stops do not intrude [unreasonably] on the motoring public.” 428 U.S. at 557-58. In Sitz, the Court explicitly rejected the argument “that there must be a showing of some special gov- ernmental need ‘beyond the normal need’ for criminal law enforcement before a balancing analysis is appropriate.” 496 U.S. at 450. The Court thereupon observed that “ *[d]runk drivers cause an annual death toll of over 25,000 and in the same time span cause nearly one million personal injuries and more than five billion dollars in property damage.” and that “the weight bearing on the other scale — the measure of the intrusion On motorists stopped briefly at sobriety checkpoints — is slight.” 496 U.S. at 451 (citation omitted). While the court of appeals erroneously viewed the pro- grams at issue in Martinez-Fuerte and Sitz as being “primar- ily civil regulatory programs,” this Court's Fourth Amend- ment jurisprudence contains numerous cases relying on pro- grammatic justifications to uphold police procedures “related to general criminal law enforcement.” Pet. App. 4a. For ex- ample, in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the Court held 21 that a police officer has the authority to conduct a pat down search for weapons on less than probable cause. The Court relied on FBI statistics which detailed the number of police officers killed or wounded in the line of duty nationwide, not- ing that “American criminals have a long tradition of armed violence, and every year in this country many law enforce- ment officers are killed in the line of duty, and thousands more are wounded.” /d. at 23, 24 n.21. The Court also acknowledged that “a limited search of the outer clothing for weapons constitutes a severe, though brief, intrusion upon cherished personal security, and it must surely be an annoying, frightening, and perhaps humiliating experi- ence.” /d. at 24-25. In holding that a police officer could conduct a pat down search on the basis of an articulable rea- sonable suspicion, the Court did exactly what the court of ap- peals asserted that courts do not do — “assess reasonableness at the program level” of a search “related to general criminal law enforcement.” Pet. App. 4a. See also 392 US. at 21 (“there is ‘no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search [or seize] against the in- vasion which the search [or seizure] entails’) (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967)). The Court took the same approach in United States v. Rob- inson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), upholding a police officer's au- thority to conduct a search incident to arrest notwithstanding the absence of probable cause to believe the arrestee was car- rying a weapon or evidence. The Court refused to limit “the breadth of the general authority to search incident to a lawful custodial arrest on an assumption that persons arrested for the offense of driving while their licenses have been revoked are less likely to possess dangerous weapons than are those ar- rested for other crimes.” /d. at 234. In the Court's view, this assumption rested on “a rather speculative judgment,” which was refuted by FBI statistical data “indicat[ing] that a signifi- cant percentage of murders of police officers occurs when the > officers are making traffic stops.” Jd. at 234 & n.5 (citations omitted). As the Court explained, “[t]he danger to the police officer flows from the fact of the arrest, and its attendant proximity, stress, and uncertainty, and not from the grounds for arrest.” Id. Recognizing the necessarily “ad hoc judgment” involved in a search incident to arrest, the Court held: The authority to search the person incident to a lawful custodial arrest, while based upon the need to disarm and to discover evidence, does not depend on what a court may later decide was the probability in a particular arrest Situation that weapons or evidence would in fact be found upon the person of the suspect. A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable in- trusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion be- ing lawful. a search incident to the arrest requires no ad- ditional justification. Id. at 235. See also Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 332-34 (1990) (determining reasonableness of protective sweep of premises where arrest occurs by balancing governmental in- terest in police safety against arrestee’s Fourth Amendment interests); Place, 462 U.S. at 703-04 (rejecting argument that “absent some special law enforcement interest such as officer safety, a generalized interest in law enforcement cannot jus- tify an intrusion on an individual's Fourth Amendment inter- ests in the absence of probable cause’); Michigan v. Sum- mers, 452 U.S. 692, 702-03 (1981) (upholding detention of occupant of house being searched on less than probable cause, reasoning that “[a]lthough no special danger to the po- lice is suggested by the evidence in this record, the execution of a warrant to search for narcotics is the kind of transaction that may give rise to sudden violence or frantic efforts to con- ceal or destroy evidence’’). As the foregoing demonstraies, the Court routinely ana- lyzes the reasonableness of police procedures “related to gen- 23 eral criminal law enforcement” by conducting “program level” assessments and balancing. Pet. App. 4a. Contrary to the view of the court of appeals, this approach does not “per- mit deep inroads into privacy,” id., as numerous cases dem- onstrate. See, ¢.g., Place, 462 U.S. at 703-10 (conducting bal- ancing but holding unreasonable a ninety-minute seizure of a suspect's luggage to arrange a drug sniff that was supported by a reasonable suspicion but not probable cause), Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. at 50-53 (holding unreasonable a discretion- ary seizure to require a person to identify himself which was not supported by “a reasonable suspicion” of criminal activ- ity). ’ 2. The Court's cases likewise refute the court of appeals’ contention that inquiry into the program's purpose “is critical to its legality,” and because “[t]he program has no regulatory purpose,” it is constitutionally unreasonable. Pet. App. 10a. The first flaw in this reasoning is that the district court found that “a secondary purpose of the checkpoints is to check driver's licenses and vehicle registrations.” Jd. at 44a. _ In- deed, out of the program's 109 arrests and citations, 49 were for driving-related offenses. See id. at 55a. The court of ap- peals was clearly mistaken in asserting that the program “has no regulatory purpose.” /d. at 10a.'° '’ Even if not intended. it is clear that the use of a drug-sniffing dog advances the substantial state interest in promoting highway safety. Ac- cording to NHTSA, “[aJlcohol and other drugs create a serious highway safety problem among the general driving population.” See US. Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Drug Impaired Driving (visited May 11, 2000) . NHTSA “estimates that drugs are used by approximately 10 to 22 percent of drivers involved in crashes, often in combination with alcohol.” Jd. A 1992 NHTSA study of the deaths of 1.882 drivers indicated that “alcohol was found in 51.5 percent of the drivers, and other drugs were found in 17.8 percent of the drivers.” /d. A NHTSA study of “non-fatally injured drivers” found that “!2 percent of all drivers tested positive for drugs 24 The second flaw is that while some of the Court's cases suggest that inquiry into purpose is sometimes relevant in as- sessing the validity of certain intrusions, almost every case has involved police conduct amounting to a search. See, e.g., New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 713-16 (1987) (upholding warrantless inspections of closely regulated businesses); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 376 (1976) (ob- serving in dictum that “there is no suggestion” that an inven- tory search of a car “was a pretext concealing an investigatory police motive”). The Court has, however, “never held, out- side the context of inventory search or administrative inspec- tion . . . that an officer's motive invalidates objectively justi- fiable behavior under the Fourth Amendment.” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812 (1996). In any event, there can be no claim of pretext here, where Indianapolis openly other than alcohol . . . and 23.5 percent of drivers less than 21 years old tested positive for drugs other than alcohol.” /d. NHTSA further states that “[s]tudies of drug incidence among drivers arrested for motor vehicle offenses have found drugs in 15 to 50 percent of drivers. The higher rates typically are more prevalent among drivers who have been arrested for impaired or reckless driving but who were not impaired by alcohol. as shown by low blood alcohol concentration (BAC) levels.” /d. NHTSA also suggests a high degree of marijuana use by teenagers while driving. /d. According to NHTSA, twenty percent of high school seniors “reported that they smoke marijuana in a car.” /d. This figure is greater than the percentage of students who acknowledge drinking alco- holic beverages in cars. /d. A recent Department of Justice survey which conducted personal interviews with DWI offenders indicates that 9.5 per- cent of jailed DWI offenders reported using drugs at the time of their ar- rest. U.S. Department of Justice. Bureau of Justice Statistics. DW/ Of- fenders under Correctional Supervision 11 (Table 16) (1999). Drug checkpoints are thus an important adjunct to alcohol sobriety checkpoints: indeed, the procedures upheld in Sitz checked for drivers who were under the influence of both alcohol and drugs. See Brief for Petitioners at 6, Sitz: see also Pet. App. 7a. 25 acknowledged that one of the purposes of the program was to conduct a “narcotics checkpoint.” Pet. App. 57a.! To the extent the court of appeals engaged in an objective inquiry into the City’s purpose, the Court's cases support the view that a purpose of general criminal law enforcement does not preclude application of the Brown test in assessing the reasonableness of a seizure. In Sitz, the Court expressly re- jected the contention that “there must be a showing of some special governmental need ‘beyond the normal need’ for criminal law enforcement before a balancing analysis is ap- propriate,” and held that the Brown standard controlled. 496 U.S. at 450. See also Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498-99 (1983) (noting that in Brignoni-Ponce the government's pur- pose of enforcing immigration laws “was sufficient to warrant temporary detention for limited questioning” and declining to suggest “that a similar rationale would not warrant temporary detention for questioning on less than probable cause where the public interest involved is the suppression of illegal trans- actions in drugs or of any other serious crime”). That the government's purpose is to enforce the criminal law as op- posed to a regulatory program is not probative as to whether '' The court of appeals” reliance on dictum from the plurality opinion in Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983). is misplaced. See Pet. App. 7a (“the amendment would be violated if ‘the roadblock was a pretext whereby evidence of narcotics violation might be uncovered in “plain view” in the course of a check for driver's licenses”) (quoting 460 U.S. at 743). The referenced language did not address the validity of the initial stop but rather whether the police properly seized evidence in plain view. the discovery of which was then required to be “inadvertent.” At the time. a showing of pretext would have defeated a police claim that evidence had been discovered inadvertently. That requirement has since been over- ruled. See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 137-42 (1990). The objec- live inquiry established by Horton and Whren demonstrates that where the police have a constitutionally valid basis for a stop, it cannot be chal- lenged as being pretextual. 26 police conduct that does not amount to a search is constitu- tionally reasonable. 3. This Court should reject the court of appeals” approach because it is unworkable and “injects too large an element of uncertainty into the interpretation” of the Fourth Amendment. Pet. App. Ila. Indeed, the court of appeals suggested that the result might be different “if the primary purpose were to de- tect drunken drivers” because “the dog could be added to the roadblock scenario on the theory that since a sniff is not a search, the incremental invasion of privacy would be negligi- ble.” /d. Just how a court would determine whether a road- block program's primary purpose was detecting drunk drivers (or reducing traffic congestion) as opposed to catching drug offenders is unclear.'~ The Fourth Amendment does not an- swer the question, just as it says nothing that suggests why police practices which are undertaken for the purpose of en- forcing the criminal law are more objectionable than those undertaken to enforce regulatory programs. Contrary to the view of the court of appeals, “the alterna- tive” is not “to rule that either all roadblocks are illegal or none are.” /d. at lla. Rather, consistent with Brown, Marti- nez-Fuerte, and Sitz, a court should examine the intrusiveness of the procedures used in conducting a roadblock to deter- mine whether “the interference with individual liberty” is so severe as to render it constitutionally unreasonable. Brown, 443 U.S. at 51. Thus, a roadblock, at which police order — '- Compare United States v. McFayden, 865 F.2d 1306. 1307-08 (D.C. Cir . 1989) (upholding checkpoint whose “principal purpose was to allow police to check for a driver's license and vehicle registration” even though it “facilitated a narcotics enforcement effort” and police testified “that they were hopeful that the roadblocks would also have a ‘halo’ or ‘spin- off effect of deterring drug trafficking” ), with Galbert v. United States, 590 A.2d 990. 999 (D.C. 1991) (asserting that a roadblock “addressed to problems of general law enforcement . . . is antithetical to the Fourth Amendment’). 27 without some articulable basis — every driver and passenger out of their car to conduct a more thorough plain view exami- nation of a car's interior, might well be so intrusive as to ren- der it unconstitutional. But where, as here, police discretion has been properly circumscribed, a roadblock that results in a brief delay to motorists and uses a non-intrusive measure that “discloses only the presence or absence of narcotics, a con- traband item,” Place, 462 U.S. at 707, is clearly within the range of constitutionally reasonable practices under the Fourth Amendment. CONCLUSION The judgment of the court of appeals should be reversed. Respectfully submitted, RICHARD RUDA* Chief Counsel JAMES I. CROWLEY STATE AND LOCAL LEGAL CENTER 444 North Capitol Street, N.W. Suite 345 Washington, D.C. 20001 (202) 434-4850 “Counsel of Record for the May 15, 2000 Amici Curiae --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386014_0586%3A11. Public record. Not legal advice.