# Amicus Curiae Brief — Cleveland v. United States

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2000
- **Citation:** 531 U.S. 12

## Text

SS I CTT enema wey
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= JUN 0 1 200
No. 99-804 :
In The es
Supreme Court of the United States
ae ¢
CARL W. CLEVELAND,
Petitioner,
¥.
UNITED STATES,
Respondent. .

¢

On Writ Of Certiorari To The
United States Court Of Appeals
For The Fifth Circuit

¢

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF THE CHAMBER
OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES
IN SUPPORT OF NEITHER PARTY

*
Rosin S. ConraD CarTER G. PHILLIPS
National Chamber RICHARD D. BERNSTEIN*
Litigation Center, Inc. JoserH S. MILLER
1615 H Street, N.W. SipLey & AUSTIN
Washington, D.C. 20062 1722 Eye Street, N.W.
(202) 463-5337 Washington, D.C. 20006
(202) 736-8000
Of Counsel
Counsel for Amicus Curiae
*Counsel of Record
June 1, 2000

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., (800) 225-6964
OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831

QUESTION PRESENTED

Amicus curiae will address the following question:

Whether, prior to its issuance, a standard business
license —- one without a profit-sharing arrangement
between the government and the licensee —- is the govern-
ment’s property?

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
QUESTION PRESENTED. ..............0.0c0cc0s00
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .....................0: iii
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE ...........-..605. 1
INTRODUCTION. .......ccccccccececccencseselases 2
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT...............0c00000. 5
ARGUMENT ......ce ee 6
I. AN UNISSUED STANDARD BUSINESS LICENSE
IS NOT GOVERNMENT PROPERTY............. 7

Il. TREATING UNISSUED STANDARD BUSINESS
LICENSES AS PROPERTY UNDER THE MAIL
FRAUD STATUTE WOULD BRING ABOUT
TROUBLING RESULTS IN OTHER AREAS OF
Per Se 17

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page
CASES
Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987).......... 6
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry. Co. v. Illinois ex
rel. Grimwood, 200 U.S. 561 (1906)..............6.. 11

Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889)..... 14, 15, 16
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) ...17, 18, 19
Gundling v. City of Chicago, 177 U.S. 183 (1900)...15, 16
Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898)............. 15

Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer,
a gos Re Be. re nr ere er ree 1

Jones v. United States, 68 U.S.L.W. 4422 (U.S. May
MI ik wd wna h seve sae eka nes wie sewnnesses 19

Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979)..... 19

Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S.

a eeieds Rdiwehh eee ee eee ce ewen 1
McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987) ......... 6
Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell, 222 U.S. 225 (1911)...... 11

Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S.
BE ere Pr eri rr Teer ry ree 17, 18, 19

Semiconductor Energy Laboratory Co. v. Samsung
Electronics Co., 204 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2000)...20, 21

Sheriock ¥. Alling, 93 US. 99 (1676). ..... 2... cece ene. 14

Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465 (1888)......... 13, 14, 15

iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Toulabi v. United States, 875 F.2d 122 (7th Cir. 1989) . .3, 12
United States v. Granberry, 908 F.2d 278 (8th Cir.

PR 53 for CEL RDE RS SS AR a eens 3
United States v. Kato, 878 F.2d 267 (9th Cir. 1989)..... 3
United States v. Martinez, 905 F.2d 709 (3rd Cir.

erg Peer rere a erer Ee erey re ree 3, 10
United States v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 256 U.S. 51

{| SERRE ern pes Seem gnaG LOR rep mean Mn amN Cae m ROR tor /e 10
United States v. Paccione, 949 F.2d 1183 (2d Cir.

CURR RSs nbd cue Red eee eka ts Dene eee ks 2
United States v. Salvatore, 110 F.3d 1131 (5th Cir.

SOOU Rava de deck k red eres an Sonate Fe eas ee 4
United States v. Schwartz, 924 F.2d 410 (2d Cir.

PERS 505 io abe cee deh Cok eee ase 12
United States v. Shotts, 145 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir.

PUM SA ccd eer e aces ieee ue eee eae 3

STATUTES
Be See IE hws ce wh oe eek Cone oe ead ka 9
RO teria ee he Pee ee eee Ape Neen 4,6
ee. 1g Ye reer esa, 20
Fs RR re mney erm DN ery G 20
RO Mii Kd Reh CN Aa Ee eae ee 20
ek Rees. Te rE £5 dd 1k wb SOA ne Se ees 22
SS 254 cane kha boxe hxwnsedansaucaes 22

v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page
SED a ins a ish nce iwwakn vaxkisencuaes 23
ee |) err Tre herr er rey rer rr ct 23
DC. Cote Rae Te. Se, Ws Be ok ok hes cae ta sawans 2,7
OS BAAD 6a kiki oan bes access chaiesescenan 9
G7 To sustain a conviction
for federal mail fraud, then, the Government must prove
that the defendant defrauded another of something that
qualifies as “property” under the statute. See, e.g., Car-
penter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 26 (1987) (upholding
federal mail and wire fraud convictions where “[t]he
Journal had a property right in keeping confidential and
making exclusive use, prior to publication, of the sched-
ule and contents of the ‘Heard’ column”). Indeed, as the
Court observed in McNally, the mail fraud statute “had
its origin in the desire to protect individual property
rights, and any benefit which the Government derives
from the statute must be limited to the Government's
interests as property holder.” McNally, 483 U.S. at 359 n.8
(emphasis added). Because a standard business license is”

3 The federal mail fraud statute provides, in relevant part,
that “[wJhoever, having devised or intending to devise any
scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or
property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promises, . . . for the purpose of executing
such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, places in any post
office or authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or
thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal
Service . . . shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more
than five years, or both.” 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994).

not the issuing authority’s property before an applicant
obtains it, a falsehood submitted to that licensing author-
ity through the mails is not mail fraud.

I. AN UNISSUED STANDARD BUSINESS LICENSE
IS NOT GOVERNMENT PROPERTY.

Local, state, and federal authorities have established
myriad licensing and permitting regimes. These licensing
and permitting regimes touch virtually every aspect of
contemporary American commercial life, from the licens-
ing of the professions (such as law and medicine) to
setting conditions on the marketing of basic goods and
services (such as selling and serving food). In order to
obtain one of these standard business licenses, an appli-
cant typically pays a fee that roughly approximates the
proportionate cost of the regulatory program, and pro-
vides information demonstrating that he or she (or it)
satisfies the government’s criteria for obtaining the
license.

For example, Chapter 28 of Title 47 of the District of
Columbia Code sets forth a comprehensive “General
License Law” for businesses operating in the District of
Columbia. See D.C. Code Ann., tit. 47, ch. 28 (1997 &
Supp. 2000). Under this General License Law, “[n]o per-
son shall engage in or carry on any business in the
District of Columbia without having first obtained a mas-
ter business license and any necessary endorsements,”
which vary by the specific business at issue.4 D.C. Code

4 “Business” is defined broadly under this scheme as “any
trade, profession, or activity which provides, or holds itself out

Ann. § 47-2851.2 (Supp. 2000). The licensing system is
administered by a Business License Center within the
D.C. Department of Consumer & Regulatory Affairs. See
D.C. Code Ann. §§ 47-2851.5, -2851.7 (Supp. 2000). The
Business License Center “collect[s] a fee of $25 for each
master business license it issues, plus $5 for each
endorsement added to the master business license.” D.C.
Code Ann. § 47-2851.8(a)(1) (Supp. 2000). This fee is
“deposited in the Master License Fund,” D.C. Code Ann.
§ 47-2851.8(a)(2) (Supp. 2000), which Fund pays “[t]he
entire cost of the master business licensing system,” D.C.
Code Ann. § 47-2851.13(b) (Supp. 2000).5

The licensing requirements vary according to the par-
ticular business at issue. “An applicant for licensure as a
certified public accountant,” for example, must “establish
to the satisfaction of the Board of Accountancy that,”
among other things, she “[i]s of good moral character”
and .“[h]as passed a written examination in accounting
and auditing and such related subjects as the Board shall

to provide, goods or services to the general public or to any
portion of the general public, for hire or compensation, and
which pays, or is subject to the payment of, taxes on earnings, or
fees in lieu of taxes, to the District of Columbia, or which
qualifies for tax-exempt status under District law.” D.C. Code
Ann. § 47-2851.1(1)(A) (Supp. 2000). Moreover, the general
requirement that all District businesses be licensed has only two
narrow exceptions, one for businesses that are affiliated with a
District-licensed business but maintain no business address in
the District, and the other for specific businesses “whose annual
gross receipts are $2,000 or less in any calendar year.” D.C. Code
Ann. § 47-2851.2(a)(1) & (2) (Supp. 2000).

5 Renewal fees are treated in like manner. See D.C. Code
Ann. §§ 47-2851.8(b), -2851.13(b) (Supp. 2000).

determine to be appropriate.”© D.C. Code Ann.
§ 47-2853.42 (Supp. 2000). Importantly, all the District’s
licensing boards are expressly empowered to discipline a
licensee who “[k]nowingly provides false or misleading
information on or in support of an application or renewal
application,” as well as one who “[f]raudulently or
deceptively obtains, or attempts to obtain, a license or
certificate, or to register, for another person.” D.C. Code
Ann. § 47-2853.17(a)(1) & (2) (Supp. 2000). Possible penal-
ties include revocation of the license, a “civil fine not to
exceed $5,000 for each violation,” and prosecution for
criminal violations.” D.C. Code Ann. § 47-2853.17(c)(2) &
(5), (d) (Supp. 2000).

As even this brief foray into District of Columbia
business licensing makes clear, conducting a business in
many localities entails applying for (and, from time to
time, renewing) a standard business license of one kind
or another. Under the Government's construction of the
mail fraud statute, making a false statement on an appli-
cation for such a license that is sent through the mails is

6 The Board of Accountancy is itself established by the
General License Law. See D.C. Code Ann. § 47-2853.6(b) (Supp.
2000).

7 Under the District’s general criminal code, it is unlawful
to “willfully make[ ] a false statement that is in fact material, in
writing, directly or indirectly, to any instrumentality of the
District of Columbia government, under circumstances in which
the statement could reasonably be expected to be relied upon as
true,” so long as “the writing indicates that the making of a false
statement is punishable by criminal penalties.” D.C. Code Ann.
§ 22-2514(a) (1996 & Supp. 2000). This is analogous to the
prohibition against making false statements to the Government
of the United States set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994).

10

federal mail fraud because the unissued license is the
issuing authority’s property. Thus, for example, in United
States v. Martinez, 905 F.2d 709 (3rd Cir. 1990), the Gov-
ernment successfully prosecuted as federal mail fraud a
scheme for obtaining a Pennsylvania state medical license
that included submitting fraudulent documents (e.g.,
transcripts, a medical degree, etc.) through the mails. See
id. at 710-11 (describing the scheme). This construction of
the mail fraud statute is fundamentally flawed, however,
because an unissued standard business license is not an
issuing authority’s “property” within the meaning of the
statute - a conclusion compelled by the very nature of
standard business licensing regimes and this Court’s
cases upholding such regimes as proper exercises of the
police power.

1. To be sure, governments both own property and
routinely exercise the power to dispose of that property.
The United States, for example, once owned large tracts
of land in what are now the Western States and, in order
to promote the growth of the railroads, granted that land
to railroad companies for them to develop. See, e.g.,
United States v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 256 U.S. 51, 52-53
(1921) (discussing one such set of grants to the Northern
Pacific Railway Company). Similarly, the United States
regularly disburses from the Treasury funds that it owns,
sending the funds to designated recipients as diverse as
taxpayers who are owed an income tax refund and gov-
ernment contractors who are owed for goods sold to the
United States. State and local governments likewise own
land and improvements (e.g., school grounds and build-
ings) and hold and disburse general revenue funds.
When governments engage in commercial or proprietary

11

activities, they exercise the powers of a property owner
and are in many respects indistinguishable from other
property owners.

Governments also exercise a different power that
many other property owners lack — namely, the power to
regulate conduct in the interests of public safety and
welfare, or the “police power.” “[T]he police power of a
state embraces regulations designed to promote the pub-
lic convenience or the general prosperity, as well as regu-
lations designed to promote the public health, the public
morals, or the public safety.” Chicago, Burlington & Quincy
Ry. Co. v. Illinois ex rel. Grimwood, 200 U.S. 561, 591 (1906).
Indeed, “the police power is but another name for the
power of government.” Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell, 222
U.S. 225, 233 (1911).

When a government issues standard business
licenses pursuant to its own licensing regime, it clearly
exercises its police power, not the powers it has by virtue
of owning property. This fact is evident when one con-
siders that a licensing regime, no less than a correspon-
dingly framed general prohibition, serves directly to limit
and regulate private conduct. For example, a munici-
pality could decide to regulate the provision of taxi ser-
vices by making it a crime to drive a taxi without a
specified level of knowledge about the streets in the
municipality.® The regulation would be enforced by pros-
ecuting taxi drivers who were stopped because they

8 A legislature could accomplish equally its regulatory
goals through a general prohibition (e.g., “you shall not practice
accountancy without adequate skill”) or through a licensing
regime (e.g., “you shall not practice accountancy without a
license, which requires adequate skill”). No one would claim

12

appeared to be lost, or who were reported by passengers
to lack the requisite knowledge. Alternatively, the munic-
ipality could decide to achieve the same regulatory objec-
tive (i.e., limiting taxi drivers to those who are
knowledgeable about local streets) by requiring would-be
drivers to obtain a taxi driver’s license that is conditioned
on the successful completion of a local geography test.
See Toulabi v. United States, 875 F.2d 122, 123 (7th Cir.
1989) (“To be a taxi driver in Chicago, a person must pay
a fee of $50 and answer correctly 20 out of 25 questions
on a test of local geography.”).

In this hypothetical, the licensing method may be
more effective at producing knowledgeable taxi drivers
than the prohibition method. The crucial point here, how-
ever, is that in both methods the municipality acts as a
regulator, not an owner disposing of his or her property.
See id. at 125 (holding that an unissued taxi driver’s
license is not property for purposes of the federal mail
fraud statute); see also United States v. Schwartz, 924 F.2d
410, 417 (2d Cir. 1991) (“The government’s interest in
issuing its licenses ancillary to its regulatory program is
no different than its interest in propounding and enforc-
ing its other regulations with broad based applications

that a general prohibition is a form of government property. Cf.
Guido Calabresi, The Cost of Accidents 113-14 (1970)
(“[P]rohibition and restriction . . . are really the same thing on
different levels of generality. I speak of prohibiting an activity
(banning the sale of firecrackers or all driving), or alternatively
of restricting it (allowing firecrackers only in limited
circumstances or barring driving at speeds of over 80 miles per
hour). When we restrict an activity, we are simply prohibiting
one of its subcategories.”).

13

that do not include the issuance of licenses. Whether it
chooses to use licenses or blanket rules, the government's
purpose is to control the private use of private prop-

erty.”).

2. This Court has repeatedly held, in cases sustain-
ing state and local licensing regimes against various con-
stitutional attacks, that the creation of a licensing regime
is an exercise of the police power. These cases thus con-
firm that the decision whether to issue a particular
license to a given applicant is a regulatory and adminis-
trative act, not a disposition of property.

The earliest of these decisions, Smith v. Alabama, 124
U.S. 465 (1888), involved a Commerce Clause challenge to
a then-new Alabama train engineer licensing law. The
statute made it “unlawful for the engineer of any railroad
train in [Alabama] to drive or operate or engineer any
train of cars .. . without first undergoing an examination
and obtaining a license.” Id. at 468. Operating a train
without a license was made a misdemeanor. Id. at 470.
The license fee was $5. Id. at 469. Smith, an engineer
arrested for operating a train without a license, id. at 466,
attacked the statute as a vidlation of the Commerce
Clause, id. at 473. This Court rejected Smith’s theory,
concluding that the licensing law was “within the scope
of the admitted power reserved to the State to regulate the
relative rights and duties of persons being and acting
within its territorial jurisdiction.” Id. at 482 (emphasis
added).

Importantly, in turning aside Smith’s challenge, the
Court emphasized that the licensing law was the same

14

sort of state regulatory action as the Indiana state wrong-
ful death statute it upheld against a Commerce Clause
attack in Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U.S. 99, 103 (1876) (conclud-
ing that Indiana’s wrongful death statute “only declares a
general principle respecting the liability of all persons
within the jurisdiction of the State for torts resulting in
the death of parties injured”). See Smith, 124 U.S. at
474-77 (analogizing licensing law to wrongful death stat-
ute at issue in Sherlock). According to the Court, “[t]he
power to punish for the offence after it is committed
certainly includes the power to provide penalties
directed, as are those in the statute in question, against
those acts of omission which, if performed, would pre-
vent the commission of the larger offence.” Id. at 481. The
licensing provisions were thus upheld as “parts of that
body of the local law which, as we have already seen,
properly governs the relation between carriers of pas-
sengers and merchandise and the public who employ
them.” Id. at 480.

A year later, in Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114
(1889), the Court rejected a Due Process challenge to West
Virginia’s medical licensing law. The challenged statute
“require[d] every practitioner of medicine in [West Vir-
ginia] to obtain a certificate from the State Board of
Health” permitting him to practice. Id. at 115. Practicing
medicine without this certificate was made a misde-
meanor. Id. at 117. Dent, who was fined for practicing
without a license, attacked the statute as a deprivation of
“his vested right in relation to the practice of medicine”
without due process. Id. at 118, 121-22. This Court upheld
the constitutionality of the medical licensing law as a

15

routine and valid exercise of the police power. According
to the Court in Dent,

[t]he power of the State to provide for the gen-
eral welfare of its people authorizes it to pre-
scribe all such regulations as, in its judgment,
will secure or tend to secure them against the
consequences of ignorance and incapacity as
well as of deception and fraud. As one means to
this end it has been the practice of different
States, from time immemorial, to exact in many
pursuits a certain degree of skill and learning
upon which the community may confidently
rely, their possession being generally ascer-
tained upon an examination of parties by com-
petent persons, or inferred from a certificate to
them in the form of a diploma or license from an
institution established for instruction on the
subjects, scientific and otherwise, with which -
such pursuits have to deal. The nature and
extent of the qualifications required must
depend primarily upon the judgment of the
States as to their necessity.

Id. at 122; see also Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189,
192-93 (1898) (“No precise limits have been placed upon
the police power of a State, and yet it is clear that legisla-
tion which simply defines the qualifications of one who
attempts to practise medicine is a proper exercise of that
power.”). In Dent, as in Smith, the Court recognized that
when a government issues a standard business license, it
engages in a fundamentally regulatory act.

Finally, in Gundling v. City of Chicago, 177 U.S. 183
(1900), this Court upheld a conviction under a Chicago
city ordinance “forbidding the sale of cigarettes by any
person without a license.” Id. Like the unlicensed doctor

16

in Dent, the unlicensed cigarette seller in Gundling chal-
lenged the ordinance as, among other things, an uncon-
stitutional deprivation of his property rights without due
process. Id. at 185-86. This Court upheld the licensing
scheme for cigarette sales. According to the Court,
“(whether dealing in and selling cigarettes is that kind of
a business which ought to be licensed is, we think, con-
sidering the character of the article to be sold, a question
for the state, and through it, for the city, to determine for
itself.” Id. at 187. Indeed, such a licensing scheme for
regulating product sales was an unexceptional exercise of
the police power:

ee

Regulations respecting the pursuit of a law-
ful trade or business are of very frequent occur-
rence in the various cities of the country, and
what such regulations shall be and to what par-
ticular trade, business, or occupation they shall
apply are questions for the state to determine,
and their determination comes within the
proper exercise of the police power by the
state. ...

Id. at 188; see also id. at 189 (licensing cigarette sales
served a “regulating . . . function”).

The governmental business licensing requirements
that were already “very frequent” a century ago are,
today, virtually universal. And, just as they were a cen-
tury ago, governmental decisions whether to issue a stan-
dard business license to a given applicant are regulatory
acts, not dispositions of government property.

17

Il. TREATING UNISSUED STANDARD BUSINESS
LICENSES AS PROPERTY UNDER THE MAIL
FRAUD STATUTE WOULD BRING ABOUT
TROUBLING RESULTS IN OTHER AREAS OF
LAW.

The question whether the United States can pros-
ecute for federal mail fraud one who sends a falsehood
through the mail to obtain a standard business license (be
it local, state, or federal) might initially be viewed strictly
as a matter affecting federal criminal law. But the effects
of answering that question affirmatively - i.e., by ruling
that unissued licenses are government property — could
extend far beyond the confines of the criminal law. Three
illustrations drawn from diverse areas of law - one
involving this Court’s Takings Clause jurisprudence, the
others involving powerful civil remedies — will suffice to
demonstrate the havoc that could well result from con-
cluding that unissued licenses are the government's prop-
erty.

1. Treating an as-yet-unissued license as if it were
the issuing authority’s property would draw key features
of this Court’s regulatory takings jurisprudence into
serious doubt. To see that this is so, one need only con-
sider the Court’s decisions in Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), and Dolan v. City of
Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994), from the state permitting
authority’s new vantage as the property owner of the
unissued real estate development permit.

In both Nollan and Dolan, the government authority
that was charged with issuing the relevant real estate
development permit had decided to condition the grant

18

of the permit on the would-be permittee’s agreement to
an easement. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 828 (permit would be
granted “subject to the condition that they allow the
public an easement to pass across a portion of their
property”); Dolan, 512 U.S. at 380 (“the Commission
required that petitioner dedicate . . . an additional 15-foot
strip of land adjacent to the floodplain as a pedestrian/
bicycle pathway”). In both cases, this Court concluded
that the government, by extracting these easements, had
taken the permittee’s property. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at
841-42; Dolan, 512 U.S. at 396. This conclusion cannot be
squared, however, with the Government’s current posi-
tion that unissued permits and licenses are government

property.

According to the Government’s approach, the unis-
sued permits at issue in Nollan and Dolan would be the
property of the governmental authorities that had the
power to issue them. If unissued permits or licenses are
the government’s property, however, it should be able to
charge the would-be permittees whatever price it deems
fit under the circumstances — including the price of grant-
ing the general public an easement over private realty.
Indeed, the power to name one’s selling price - any
selling price at all — is the very essence of a property
interest: “An entitlement is protected by a property rule
to the extent that someone who wishes to remove the
entitlement from its holder must buy it from him in a
voluntary transaction in which the value of the entitle-
ment is agreed upon by the seller.” Guido Calabresi &
Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev.
1089, 1092 (1972) (emphasis added). In more traditional

ae Se ess oe _————

19

parlance, the power to set one’s selling price is one aspect
of the owner’s right to exclude others, “one of the most
essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly
characterized as property.” Kaiser Aetna v. United States,
444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979). Under the Government’s reason-
ing in this case, the permitting authorities in Nollan and
Dolan did not take anything; rather, they simply priced
the unissued permits that they owned at a level which
included the surrender of a public easement.

In short, the Government’s approach means that
Nollan and Dolan were wrongly decided. Indeed, if one
adopts the Government’s conclusion that an unissued
permit or license is the issuing authority’s property, the
government's refusal to issue a permit or license would
always be an exercise of its right to refuse to transfer
ownership of its own property and thus could never be a
taking.

2. Treating an as-yet unissued license as if it were
the issuing authority’s property would also nullify exis-
ting locally-crafted, specifically-limited remedies (such as
those discussed in connection with the District of Colum-
bia’s General License Law, supra at 7-8), in favor of not
only much harsher federal criminal penalties,? but also in

° This Court has, of course, “cautioned . . . that ‘unless
Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it will not be deemed to
have significantly changed the federal-state balance’ in the
prosecution of crimes.” Jones v. United Stctes, 68 U.S.L.W. 4422,
4425 (U.S. May 22, 2000) (quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U.S.
336, 349 (1971)), see also id. (Stevens & Thomas, JJ., concurring)
(same). The mail fraud statute contains no such clear statement
of purpose to up-end the existing federal-state balance
regarding local prosecution for violations of local standard
business licensing regimes.

20

favor of broad federal and state civil anti-racketeering
and qui tam remedies designed for problems far removed
from arguable misstatements in applications for standard
business licenses. Congress surely did not intend to
expose business license applicants to these types of civil
lawsuits.

Consider, first, RICO. The federal RICO statutes
criminalize, among other things, engaging in “a pattern
of racketeering activity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1994). The
RICO regime also provides private parties a cause of
action against racketeers: “Any person injured in his
business or property by reason of a violation of section
1962 of this chapter may sue therefor . . . and shall
recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of
the suit.” 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1994). A ” ‘pattern of rack-
eteering activity’ requires at least two acts of racketeering
activity,” and an act of federal mai! fraud is within the
definition of “racketeering activity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) &
(5) (1994). As a result, a party who is injured in his
business or property by another party’s two acts of mail
fraud could seek to sue in federal court for treble dam-
ages. Assuming, for example, that obtaining two
renewals of a standard business license by submitting
false information through the mails constitutes federal
mail fraud, that licensee is thus also liable under federal
RICO to those he injures in their business or property.
Many states have their own parallel RICO laws.

The foregoing scenario is not mere sport. In Semicon-
ductor Energy Laboratory Co. v. Samsung Electronics Co., 204
F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2000), decided just three months ago,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

21

confronted just such a claim for RICO liability. In Sam-
sung, the accused infringer successfully defended against
patent infringement liability by proving that the patent
was unenforceable due to the patentee’s inequitable con-
duct before the United States Patent & Trademark Office
(“PTO”) during the patent prosecution process. Id. at
1373-78 (affirming district court’s conclusion that patent
was unenforceable due to inequitable conduct). The
accused infringer had also, however, brought counter-
claims under the federal and state RICO statutes. Id. at
1378. The accused infringer’s theory of RICO liability was
that the patentee had committed two or more acts of mail
fraud, and thus racketeering activity, by submitting false
information to the PTO through the mails. Id. at 1379. The
unissued patent was, according to the accused infringer,
property for purposes of the mail fraud statute. Id. at
1380. The Federal Circuit rejected the federal and state
RICO claims, concluding “that inequitable conduct before
the PTO cannot qualify as an act of mail fraud or wire
fraud for purposes of the predicate act requirement.” Id.
Central to this conclusion was the Federal Circuit's rejec-
tion of the notion that an unissued patent is property:

[T]he PTO has not been defrauded of property.
Although that ‘a patent is property, protected
against appropriation both by individuals and
by government, has long been settled,’ an appli-
cation that has not yet matured into a patent
cannot properly be deemed government prop-

erty.

Id. (quoting Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S.
386, 415 (1945)). Of course, under the Government's the-
ory of the mail fraud statute in this case, Samsung was

22

apparently wrongly decided, and RICO liability for ineq-
uitable conduct before the PTO should obtain.

Consider, as well, qui tam suits under the False
Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (1994), and state anal-
ogs thereof.!° In a qui tam suit, a private party brings an
action on behalf of the government to redress an injury to
the government, e.g., a fraudulent claim for government
property. See generally John T. Boese, Civil False Claims
and Qui Tam Actions § 1.01[A], 1-6 - 1-11 (2c ed. 2000)
(reviewing early history of federal qui tam statute). Speci-
fically, under the False Claims Act, one who “knowingly
presents, or causes to be presented, to an officer or
employee of the United States Government .. . a false or
fraudulent claim” is “liable to the United States Govern-
ment for a civil penalty,” as well as “3 times the amount
of damages which the Government sustains because of
the” false claim.!! 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (1994). A “claim” is
defined broadly under this statute as “includ[ing] any
request or demand, whether under a contract or other-
wise, for money or property,” so long as “the United
States Government provides any portion of the money or
property which is requested or demanded.” 31 U.S.C.
§ 3729(c) (1994).

10 A number of States have False Claims Act-like statutes
that create qui tam causes of action. See, e.g., John T. Boese, Civil
False Claims and Qui Tam Actions § 6.01[A], [B] & [D], -at 6-4 -
6-14, 6-25 — 6-26 (2d ed. 2000) (reviewing details of California,
Florida, and Illinois analogs to the False Claims Act).

11 In addition to seeking penalties (and damages, if they
exist), a clever plaintiff might also try to concoct a common law
claim for restitution of alleged ill-gotten gains, e.g., all profits
earned by a business with a wrongly obtained license or permit.

23

Given the expansive definition of a “claim” in the
False Claims Act, a falsified application for a standard
business license from the United States could - if that
unissued standard business license constitutes govern-
ment property - give rise to False Claims Act liability.
Moreover, under the gui tam provision in the False Claims
Act, “[a] person may bring a civil action for a violation of
section 3729 for the person and for the United States
Government.” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1) (1994). Such private
party suits are made attractive by the False Claims Act’s
bounty provisions, according to which the private party
who initiates the suit receives anywhere from 10% to 30%
of the proceeds of the action, as well as expenses, fees,
and costs. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d) (1994). Federal and state qui
tam statutes, no less so than federal and state RICO
statutes, would no doubt become powerful weapons of
civil liability should unissued standard business licenses
come to be viewed as the issuing authority’s property.

The point is that Congress surely did not intend to
launch the mail fraud, wire fraud, RICO, and qui tam
statutes as weapons to be used in disputes about the
issuance of standard business licenses. Nor is it any
answer to say that only those who deliberately falsify
license applications need fear such an expansion of lia-
bility. Even honest parties who apply for standard busi-
ness licenses will be faced with, at a minimum, the costs
of defending nuisance suits brought by private plaintiffs
clever enough to frame RICO and qui tam complaints that,
although meritless, can withstand a motion to dismiss
and serve as a basis for burdensome discovery. The fact
that the Government's treating unissued business licenses
as government property for purposes of the federal mail

24

fraud statute entails exposing licensees to massive RICO
and qui tam lawsuits demonstrates the absurdity of such a
construction of the mail fraud statute.

¢

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, in deciding this case the
Court should make clear that an unissued standard busi-
ness license does not constitute government property for
purposes of the federal mail fraud statute, or expressly
refrain from addressing that question.

Respectfully submitted,

Rosin S. CONRAD Carter G. PHILLIPS

National Chamber RicHARD D. BERNSTEIN*
Litigation Center, Inc. JoserpH S. MILLER

1615 H Street, N.W. Sipcey & AUSTIN

Washington, D.C. 20062 1722 Eye Street, N.W.

(202) 463-5337 Washington, D.C. 20006

(202) 736-8000

Of Counsel
Counsel for Amicus Curiae

“Counsel of Record

June 1, 2000

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386014_0372%3A08. Public record. Not legal advice.
