# Opposition Brief — Alcan Aluminum Corp. v. Prudential Assurance Co.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2000
- **Citation:** 528 U.S. 1077

## Text

No. 99-720

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

ALCAN ALUMINUM CORPORATION
Petitioner,
v.
PRUDENTIAL ASSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED, et al.,

Respondents.

On PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
Unitrep STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION FOR RESPONDENT

CGU INSURANCE COMPANY OF CANADA,

AS SUCCESSOR TO GENERAL ACCIDENT
ASSURANCE COMPANY OF CANADA

PauL D. HERBERT
Counsel of Record
Ropers, MAJESKI, KOHN & BENTLEY
Attorneys for Respondent
CGU Insurance Company of Canada,
as successor to General Accident
Assurance Company of Canada
1001 Marshall Street
Redwood City, CA 94063
(650) 364-8200

156376 @) Counsel! Press LLC
FORMERLY LUTZ APPELLATE SERVICES
(800) 274-3321 + (800) 359-6859

i
QUESTION PRESENTED

Should an unsuccessful appellant be permitted to bring
an Erie' violation claim before this Court on petition for
certiorari merely because that losing party disagrees with
the manner in which a federal court of appeals applied the
acknowledged authority of a state’s highest court to the
particular facts of the appellant’s case, — particularly where
the facts of the case support the outcome reached by the
federal court?

1. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tomkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).

ii
LIST OF PARTIES

Prudential Assurance Company Limited (Canadian
Branch) was taken over by The Prudential Assurance
Company of England Property Casualty, later renamed
General Accident Indemnity Company which later became
General Accident Assurance Company of Canada, which
later merged with Commercial Union Assurance Company
of Canada to become CGU Insurance Company of Canada;
Continental Insurance Company; Certain Underwriters at
Lloyd’s Of London; The Home Insurance Company;
Commercial Union Assurance Company of Canada Limited,
which has since been merged with General Accident
Assurance Company of Canada to become CGU Insurance.

RULE 29.6 STATEMENT

Respondent, The Prudential Assurance Company
Limited (Canadian Branch), taken over by The Prudential
Assurance Company of England Property Casualty, later
renamed General Accident Indemnity Company, which later
became General Accident Assurance Company of Canada,
which later merged with Commercial Union Assurance
Company of Canada to become CGU Insurance Company
of Canada, is a corporation organized and existing under the
laws of Canada. No publicly held company owns 10% or
more of the stock of CGU Insurance Company of Canada.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
Question Presented 2... ww... cece cece i
I ign SE ors ll
ee ll
NN een ili
Table of Cited Authorities .................... Vi
Statement of Jurisdiction ..................... |

The Constitutional Provisions and Statutes
ENTE res on Oa ie AT ee l
pemeememt OF the Case .... wk ecw ccce ]
Reasons for Denying the Writ ................. 5

I. Contrary To Alcan’s Petition, The Ninth

Circuit Properly Applied California Law And
Did Not Violate The Erie Doctrine. ....... 5

A. The Ninth Circuit Expressly Followed

The State’s Law Permitting Allocation

To An Insured, As Set Forth In Aerojet
cae ed Bis hE RA Sk kc 0k wx 5

1. Aerojet Allows For Allocation To
An Insured For Those Triggering
Injuries That Occurred Outside Its
Period Of Insurance. ............ 6

iv

Po eee

Contents

Page |

2. The Ninth Circuit Affirmed The 7

Trial Court’s Allocation To Alcan

Based Upon Triggering Injuries |

That Occurred Beyond Alcan’s :

Period Of Insurance. ............ S ,

B. Alcan’s Dispute With The Ninth Circuit ,
Does Not Implicate The Erie Doctrine
Since It Involves, At Most,
Disagreement Over The Intended
Meaning Of Aerojet, Not Whether
Aerojet Is Controlling Precedent For

i Te rey Serr ree 10 ,
II. The Manuscript Policies Created By Alcan
In This Case Compel A Result Different
From Aerojet, Which Was Based Upon A
Review Of “Standard Comprehensive Or
Commercial General Liability Policies”

Drafted By The Insurance Carriers :

Pe 2 5S 5a o Seka Wace sideeeet es 11

A. The Plain Language Of The General
Accident Policies, Written By Alcan,
Does Not Require General Accident To
Pay For Either Indemnity Or Defense
Alleged To Have Been Suffered Beyond
its Last Policy Period. ............. 12

Contents

Page

B. Any Perceived Ambiguity In The

Language Must Be Interpreted Against

Alcan, As Drafter Of The Manuscript
er rey eee mer 14

III. This Decision Has No Importance

Whatsoever Beyond Alcan’s Monetary Self-
| PPT EET eS IS EL ee eee 14

CI 6o. kc cack bc eee ee 15

vi

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES

Page
Cases:
Aerojet-General Corp. v. Transport Indemnity Corp.,
948 P.2d 909, 17 Cal. 4" 38 (1997) .......... passim
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tomkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) ....
ses es cue eee 84 0a ee ee i, 5, 6, 10, 11
Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552 (1941) ....... 10
Mendoza Vv. Gime, 27 F.2G1SSt 1.4 6vsc ckasavnes 10
Newman v. Stringfellow Riverside County,
NO. 1GGPRG- OEE a ose cas sasensawangeeraee 2,4, 9
United States v. Stringfellow, CV 83-2501, JMI
WTTTTTeT Tere ee ie ee
Statutes:
yi BOR A ome ee | rrr oe rr rein ry |
Cok, Ce Oe vein a die ibe eke eee 14
Cal. Civil Code § 3287(a) ......... 20... cece ees
United States Constitution:
U.S. Om GR: Fe 66a abe ee eee es ]

Rule:

supeoune Cost Rete 80... 6.00 senccéuceutacues 14

I
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
entered its judgment on March 31, 1999 and Alcan’s Petition
for Rehearing En Banc was denied on June 24, 1999. On
September 13, 1999, the Honorable Justice O’Conner
extended Alcan’s time to file a petition for writ of certiorari
up to and including October 22, 1999. Alcan filed its petition
for writ of certiorari on October 22, 1999, and the matter
was placed on the docket on October 27, 1999. Alcan asserts
jurisdiction in this Court based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a).

THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
AND STATUTES INVOLVED

U.S. Const. Art. X
Cal. Civil Code § 3287(a)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

- Petitioner, Alcan Aluminum Corporation (“Alcan”)
brought the present action to recover defense costs and
indemnity expenses arising in connection with two
underlying proceedings involving injury allegedly caused by
hazardous materials deposited by Alcan at the Stringfellow
Acid Pits in Riverside County, California. From 1965 to
1972, the Stringellow Hazardous Waste Disposal Site (“the
Site”) in Riverside County, was an area used for treatment
and disposal of hazardous substances. (JR-83; CR-227 at
2:2.”) During this period, Alcan disposed of waste at the Site.
(JR-84; CR-227 at 3:5.)

2. All cites to “JR” and “CR” are to the appellate record that
was before the Ninth Circuit.

2

On January 17, 1995, Alcan filed its First Amended
Complaint against certain of its insurers, including General
Accident, alleging breach of contract, breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and breach of
fiduciary duty. (JR-99; CR-227, at 18:39.) Thereafter General
Accident was permitted to amend its answer to assert
counterclaims against Alcan and cross-claims against
Commercial Union’ for declaratory relief, and equitable
contribution and apportionment. (CR- 90 and CR-95.)

In July and August 1996, the parties filed motions for
summary judgment/adjudication. (CR-158-159, 167-168,
172, 180, 184, and 190.) On September 23, 1996, the District
Court issued a series of separate Orders in this case. In its
Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendant
General Accident Indemnity’s Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment (“Order No. 1”), the District Court ordered that
Alcan should bear a portion of indemnity and defense costs
allocable to its self-insured period incurred by Alcan in
United States v. Stringfellow, a CERCLA action
(“Stringellow”), and in Newman vy. Stringfellow, a toxic tort
action (“Newman”) (See generally, JR-147-165; CR-232.)
(JR-160; CR-232, at 14.)*

3. Notably, Alcan had refrained from suing Commercial Union
and, instead, entered into a pre-litigation settlement with Commercial
Union for $750,000 (Can.). It was undisputed below that $500,000
(Can.) of that amount was then reimbursed to Commercial Union
by Alcan Limited pursuant to its obligations as the reinsurer for the
years from 1975-1979 when Commercial Union merely acted as a
“fronting insurer” for the entire Alcan family of companies.
(See pp.7-8, infra.) Thus, in practical effect, Alcan has been self-
insured at a primary level for the first $1 million of exposure since
August 1975.

4. In a separate Order, the District Court also granted

Commercial Union’s Motion for Summary Judgment on the cross-
(Cont'd)

~ Boe ON a NS aire at Hate La Tas) La bane tet

3

Notably, the district court’s summary judgment ruling
to permit allocation to Alcan did not impose any specific
allocation scheme or formula for the Stringfellow and
Newman actions. Indeed, the district court denied that portion
of General Accidents Motion for Summary Judgment, finding
potential triable issues of fact with regard to how the
allocation should be done. (See Order Granting in Part and
Denying in Part General Accident’s Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment, filed 9/23/96, at JR-162: 8-16.) The
district court deferred that issue for trial.

To enable the Court to enter a final judgment in this
case, Alcan and the Insurer Defendants subsequently entered
into a series of stipulations (“Additional Stipulations”) which
resolved various factual disputes, including the appropriate
allocation formula and the amounts of indemnity and defense
costs. (CR-243, 244-245; JR-82, 105, and 119.) The
additional Stipulations were considered and accepted by the
District Court and were specifically incorporated into its
Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
(CR-276; JR-68.)

With regard to the allocation formula, the parties
stipulated amongst themselves that allocation to self-insured
periods “shall be calculated based on the proportionate
amount of time Alcan was self-insured.” (See Second
Statement of Stipulated Facts, at 910, JR-112:27-113:5.) The
only caveat to this agreement was the insurers’ having

(Cont'd
claims brought by General Accident based upon the pollution

exclusion contained in Commercial Union’s policy and the
settlement agreement entered into between Commercial Union and
Alcan. Commercial Union therefore was not a party to the subsequent
trial proceedings. (CR-235.)

4

reserved the right to argue at trial that they should be
completely excluded from having to pay any defense costs
or indemnity expenses associated with Newman plaintiffs
who had never lived in the vicinity of the Stringfellow site
until after their respective policy periods had expired.
(/d. at J 12, JR-113:20-114:18.)

Because of the parties’ stipulation, the district court
never was called upon to decide on the appropriateness of
any particular formula for allocation, except as respects the
Newman plaintiff “move-on dates.” Likewise, the parties’
stipulation eliminated the need for any party to put on
evidence regarding how any allocations should be made.

Instead, the Stipulations presented three issues of law
for resolution by the district court which also formed the
principal issues in the appeal and cross-appeals to the Ninth
Circuit. These issues were tried by the court on May 5, 1997.
Following extended oral argument, the District Court issued
oral rulings from the bench which were memorialized in the
reporter’s transcript of the proceedings (See Supplemental
Excerpt of Record (hereinafter “SER”) SER-159-237;
CR-280), in the Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law (CR-276; JR-66), and in the Amended Judgment
(CR-278; JR-46). Cross-appeals followed.

Even before cross-appeals were fully briefed, the
California Supreme Court rendered its decision in Aerojet-
General Corporation v. Transport Indemnity Company,
17 Cal.4" 38 (1997). Accordingly, the parties had a full
opportunity to brief and argue the case to the Ninth Circuit
court. Contrary to Alcan’s expectation, Aerojet held that
allocation to an insured can be permissible.

5

Acting with the benefit of Aerojet, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled on the cross-
appeals on March 31, 1999. Alcan was unhappy with the
outcome and therefore sought Petition for Rehearing
En Banc, which was denied on June 24, 1999. On September
13, 1999, the Honorable Justice O’ Conner extended Alcan’s
time to file a petition for writ of certiorari up to and including
October 22, 1999. Alcan filed its petition for writ of certiorari
on October 22, 1999, and the matter was placed on the docket
on October 27, 1999.

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

I. CONTRARY TO ALCAN’S PETITION, THE NINTH
CIRCUIT PROPERLY APPLIED CALIFORNIA LAW
AND DID NOT VIOLATE THE ERIE’ DOCTRINE.

A. The Ninth Circuit Expressly Followed The State’s
Law Permitting Allocation To An Insured, As Set
Forth In Aerojef®

Alcan’s entire Petition for Writ of Certiorari is based
upon the false premise that the Ninth Circuit was ignoring
the California Supreme Court’s precedent, set forth in
Aerojet-General Corporation v. Transport Indemnity
Company, 17 Cal.4" 38 (1997), when the Ninth Circuit ruled
against Alcan’s appeal. On the contrary, the Ninth Circuit’s
opinion makes clear that it was applying Aerojet to the
particular facts in this case when it ruled against Alcan. Alcan
is simply unwilling to recognize that the facts in this case

5. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tomkins, supra, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).

6. Aerojet-General Corporation v. Transport Indemnity
Company, supra, 17 Cal.4" 38 (1997).

6

(as well as the stipulations that Alcan agreed to in this case)
are different from those present in Aerojet. The result reached
by the Ninth Circuit was fully appropriate and consistent
with the precedent created by Aerojet. Thus, this case does
not implicate the Erie Doctrine at all since, at most, it is a
dispute between Alcan and the Ninth Circuit over the
intended meanings of Aerojet, rather than whether the Aerojet
decision represents controlling precedent for California.

1. Aerojet Allows For Allocation To An Insured For
Those Triggering Injuries That Occurred Outside
Its Period Of Insurance.

In Aerojet, the California Supreme Court plainly has held
that defense costs can be allocated to the insured for a claim
or a part of a claim that is not even potentially covered by an
insurer’s policy of insurance. (Aerojet-General Corp. v.
Transport Indemnity Corp. 948 P.2d 909; 928; 17 Cal.4"
38, 69.) There the court noted that for a “mixed” claim, in
which at least one of the parts is potentially covered and at
least one of the parts is not, the insurer does not have a
contractual duty to defend the claim in its entirety, and
therefore may be entitled to seek an appropriate reallocation
to the insured for some of those costs. (Aerojet-General Corp.
v. Transport Indemnity Corp. 948 P.2d 909, 921.)

It follows that, pursuant to quasi-contract,
defense costs that can be allocated solely to a
claim, or a part of a claim, that is not even
potentially covered can be allocated to the insured.

(Aerojet-General Corp. v. Transport Indemnity Corp. 948
P.2d 909; 928.)

7

The court then decided that on the issue of allocation of
defense costs to the insured, the insurer must carry the burden
of proof and it must do so by the preponderance of the
evidence. (Ibid.)

[I]f [the insurer] carries the burden of proof
by a preponderance of the evidence, each insurer
may allocate defense costs to Aerojet for any part
of the single broad “mixed” claim presented in
the governmental and private actions that was not
even potentially covered because it did not even
possibly embrace any triggering harm of the
specified sort within its policy period or
periods. ...

(Aerojet-General Corp. v. Transport Indemnity Corp. 948
P.2d 909, 929.)

In the instant case, the evidence supported partial
allocation of the Stringfellow defense and indemnity expense
to Alcan. Furthermore, as set forth infra, Alcan is ignoring
its own stipulated agreement that any allocation for the
Stringfellow federal clean up action should be “calculated
based on the proportionate amount of time Alcan was self-
insured... .”’

7. See Second Statement of Stipulated Facts, ¥ 10:2-5 at
JR-113.

8

2. The Ninth Circuit Affirmed The Trial Court's
Allocation To Alcan Based Upon Triggering
Injuries That Occurred Beyond Alcan’s Period Of
Insurance.

The Ninth Circuit opinion acknowledged that, under
Aerojet, an insurer may allocate to the insured any defense
costs for triggering injuries that occurred beyond an insurer’s
policy period. The insurer whose policy is triggered “may
still allocate costs to the insured that are attributable to
triggering injuries occurring before or after the effective dates
of the insured’s policies.” (See opinion at A-5: citing Aerojet-
General, supra, 17 Cal 4" 38, 71.)

The Ninth Circuit then concluded that the district court
had not erred when it concluded that a share of the defense
and indemnity costs arising from the Stringfellow and
Newman actions must be allocated to Alcan. The Ninth
Circuit found that allocation to Alcan was appropriate for
those triggering injuries that occurred after the insurers’
policies had expired for which they could not be held liable.
(See opinion at A-6.)

The district court did not err when it concluded
that Alcan would be responsible for those costs
arising out of the Stringfellow and Newman
actions attributable to injuries occurring during
Alcan’s period of self-insurance.

([bid.)

Here, the record before the Ninth Circuit amply
supported this conclusion. First, the parties had stipulated
prior to the district court’s ruling on allocation that the

9

injuries alleged in the Stringfellow and Newman actions had
been continuous through Alcan’s period of “self-insurance.”
(See Pre-Trial Conference Order, filed 9/18/95, at 45E,
Supplemental Excerpts of Record (SER) pp. 000020:28-
21:2.) Second, the district court’s summary judgment ruling
to permit allocation to Alcan did not impose any specific
allocation scheme or formula for the Stringfellow and
Newman actions. Indeed, the district court denied that portion
of General Accidents Motion for Summary Judgment, finding
that potential triable issues of fact existed with regard to
how the allocation should be done. (See Order Granting in
Part and Denying in Part General Accident’s Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment, filed 9/23/96, at JR-162: 8-16.)
The district court deferred that issue for trial. Third, before
the issue could be adjudicated at trial, the parties stipulated
amongst themselves that allocation to self-insured periods
“shall be calculated based on the proportionate amount
of time Alcan was self-insured.” (See Second Statement of
Stipulated Facts, at 410, JR-112:27-113:5.) The only caveat
to this agreement was the insurers’ having reserved the right
to argue at trial that they should be completely excluded from
having to pay any defense costs or indemnity expenses
associated with Newman plaintiffs who had never lived in
the vicinity of the Stringfellow site until after their respective
policy periods had expired. (/d. at § 12, JR-113:20-114:18.)

Because of the parties’ stipulation, the district court
never was called upon to decide on the appropriateness of
any particular formula for allocation for the Stringfellow
costs. Likewise, the parties’ stipulation eliminated the need
for any party to put on evidence regarding how the allocation
should be made.

Faced with this record, the Ninth Circuit had no basis to
overturn this aspect the district court’s judgment. The issue,

10

as framed by the parties for determination by the Ninth
Circuit, was whether allocation to an insured of such costs
could ever be permissible. Here, the Ninth Circuit court
simply followed Aerojet’s holding that there could be
allocation. As for the formula to be used for allocation, that
issue had already been agreed to by the parties and was
therefore not subject to appellate review.

The rules of appellate review do not permit a party like
Alcan to first stipulate to the appropriateness of a formula at
trial and later claim error because the court accepted the
stipulation. (See Mendoza v. Black, 27 F.3d 1357, 1360.)
Likewise, the rules of appellate review do not permit a party
to claim error on matters that the lower court was never called
upon to decide. (Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 556
(1941).) Once the California Supreme Court had decided the
legal issue in Aerojet of whether allocation to an insured for
defense costs was ever permissible, Alcan’s stipulation that
injuries had occurred during its period of “self-insurance”
and its stipulation to permit allocation based upon the time
on the risk, eliminated its right to raise these claims of error
on appeal.

B. Alcan’s Dispute With The Ninth Circuit Does Not
Implicate The Erie Doctrine Since It Involves, At
Most, Disagreement Over The Intended Meaning Of
Aerojet, Not Whether Aerojet Is Controlling
Precedent For California.

The Ninth Circuit’s opinion in this case was expressly
based on its application of the California Supreme Court’s
decision in Aerojet to the facts in the present case.
Nevertheless, because Alcan is dissatisfied with the outcome,
Alcan is attempting to manufacture an issue of constitutional

11

dimension, where none truly exists, in a “last ditch” attempt
to get the outcome overturned. In reality, there is no Erie
Doctrine aspect to this case. This is nothing more than a
case where Alcan disagrees with the Ninth Circuit’s
interpretation of the Aerojet decision and is literally now
trying to make a federal case out of that disagreement. In
like manner Alcan challenges the Ninth Circuit’s
interpretation of California Civil Code section 3287,
governing the circumstances in which a party may recover
prejudgment interest. The Erie doctrine has never been
intended for such circumstances where the federal court is,
in fact, applying the law of the state where the diversity action
originates, rather than federal law. For this reason also,
Alcan’s petition should be rejected.

Il. THE MANUSCRIPT POLICIES CREATED BY
ALCAN IN THIS CASE COMPEL A RESULT
DIFFERENT FROM AEROJET, WHICH WAS BASED
UPON A REVIEW OF “STANDARD COMPRE-
HENSIVE OR COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY
POLICIES” DRAFTED BY THE INSURANCE
CARRIERS THEMSELVES.

The Aerojet decision is further distinguishable on its
facts because the instant case involves manuscript policies,
drafted by Alcan, rather than the standard comprehensive
general liability policy forms which were the subject of the
Supreme Court’s discussion in Aerojet. Here, the language
of the General Accident policies drafted by Alcan do not
require General Accident to pay for defense or indemnity
suffered beyond its policy periods.

12

A. The Plain Language Of The General Accident
Policies, Written By Alcan, Does Not Require General
Accident To Pay For Either Indemnity Or Defense
Alleged To Have Been Suffered Beyond Its Last
Policy Period.

The Supreme Court in Aerojet makes clear that its
decision is based upon interpretation of the “standard
comprehensive or commercial general liability insurance
policies” created by the insurance industry itself. The Aerojet
decision makes such references no less than seven different
times throughout its decision. (See Aerojet at pp. 45, 46, 55,
56, 57, 69 and 74, fn. 24.) Indeed, the Court framed the issues
to be resolved in the decision as follows:

Whether, under standard comprehensive or
commercial general liability insurance policies,
site investigation expenses may constitute defense
costs that the insurer must incur in fulfilling its
duty to defend, and whether, under such policies,
defense costs may be allocated to the insured.

(/d. at pp. 55-56.) Furthermore, at fn. 24 of the Aerojet
decision, the Court noted that its result might be different if
it had not been reviewing the “standard comprehensive or
commercial general liability policy . . .” (/d. at p. 74, fn. 24)

The California Supreme Court’s holdings on the
allocation issue were premised upon application of a
“contractual/quasi contractual analysis” of the standard
comprehensive or commercial liability policy. (/d. at p. 73.)
Applying that same “contractual/quasi contractual analysis”
to the policies manuscripted by Alcan compels finding in
favor of General Accident. Here, the language of the policies

13

written by Alcan does not require General Accident to pay
for indemnity or defense alleged to have been suffered
beyond its last policy period. Instead, the contract only
requires General Accident to pay all sums which the insured
shall become legally obligated to pay by reason of the
insured’s legal liability for damages on account of bodily
injury or damage to or destruction of property “suffered or
alleged to have been suffered within the policy period or
any renewal thereof...” (SER-97; SER-139.)

On its face, this language limits General Accident’s
potential for coverage to damages “suffered or alleged to
have been suffered within the policy period or any renewal
thereof.” If the manuscript language is interpreted according
to its plain and ordinary meaning, General Accident is not
be required to pay indemnity for any damages suffered or
alleged to have been suffered beyond its last policy period.

Likewise, with regard to the duty to defend, the policy
manuscripted by Alcan only requires General Accident to
“defend in the name of and on behalf of the Insured any
civil action which at any time may be brought against the
Insured for injuries or damages or alleged injury or damages
covered under this policy.” (SER-97; SER-139.) (Emphasis
added.) Thus, here too, interpreting the manuscript contract
according to its plain and ordinary meaning, General
Accident should not be required to pay for defense costs for
damages suffered beyond its policy period since the contract
does not require indemnification for any damages beyond
General Accident’s last policy period.

l-

B. Any Perceived Ambiguity In The Language Must Be
Interpreted Against Alcan, As Drafter Of The
Manuscript Policies.

Furthermore, to the extent the Court believed any of the
language used in the manuscript policies is ambiguous, the
language must be interpieted against Alcan in its capacity
as drafter of the manuscript policies. (California Civ. Code
§ 154.)

Accordingly, allocation by the District Court to Alcan’s
self-insured periods was appropriate under the particular
language of the General Accident policies written by Alcan
Since the Aerojet decision involved standard adhesion policy
forms written by the insurance industry, this is yet another
reason why a different result is appropriate in our case.

Ill. THIS DECISION HAS NO IMPORTANCE
WHATSOEVER BEYOND ALCAN’S MONETARY
SELF-INTEREST.

Can there be any doubt that this case fails to meet every
threshold of significance for cases accepted by this Court?
The Ninth Circuit’s decision breaks no new ground and
involves no true questions of constitutional dimension.
(Supreme Court Rule 10.) Furthermore, the decision has no
impact whatsoever as precedent on anyone other than the
parties to this case because the Ninth Circuit recognized that
this case was appropriate for routine disposition, and did
not certify the opinion for publication. This petition is being
brought to serve Alcan’s monetary self-interest, nothing
more. Taking this case would be an utter waste of this Court’s
precious time and resources, and for that reason alone, the
petition should be denied.

15

CONCLUSION

For all the above reasons, respondent respectfully
requests that Alcan’s Petition for Certiorari be denied in all
respects.

Respectfully submitted,

PauL D. HERBERT

Counsel of Record

Ropers, MAJESKI, KOHN & BENTLEY
Attorneys for Respondent

CGU Insurance Company of Canada,
as successor to General Accident
Assurance Company of Canada

1001 Marshall Street

Redwood City, CA 94063

(650) 364-8200

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386014_0290%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
