# Opposition Brief — Brierly v. Alusuisse Flexible Packaging, Inc.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2000
- **Citation:** 528 U.S. 1076

## Text

No. 99- 683 OFFICE OF THE CLERK

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

JEFFREY D. BRIERLY, Administrator
of the Estate of Paul Brierly, Deceased,
Petitioner,
v.

ALUSUISSE FLEXIBLE PACKAGING,
INC., DAVID ELLISON,
Respondents.

Own Petition For Writ OF CERTIORARI
To Tue UNiteED STATES CourT OF APPEALS
For THe Sixtus Circuit

RESPONDENT ELLISON BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

ARNOLD TAYLOR *

O'Hara, RUBERG, TAYLOR,
SLOAN & SERGENT

209-C THomMas More PARK
P.O. Box 17411
CovinGTON, KY 41017-0411
(606) 331-2000

Attorneys for Respondent Ellison

* Counsel of Record

BECKER GALLAGHER LEGAL PUBLISHING, INC..
CINCINNATI, OHIO 800-890-5001

i

RESTATEMENT OF QUESTIONS PRESENTED

:

II.

Whether this Court should waste judicial resources by
reviewing the decision of the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals, where the law of the Commonwealth of
Kentucky and the facts of this case compelled
summary judgment in favor of the Respondent
Ellison?

Whether the Respondent Ellison should be prevented
from having access to the Federal Courts where he
was not served with process for 18 months and had
nothing to do with any procedural missteps by the
other Respondent.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
RESTATEMENT OF QUESTIONS PRESENTED. .... . i
TABLE OF AUTIOUREEES® 2 cc cscvscisdateasn iv
OPENACS MAIN fcc ccnw acne uahowee ran l
STATUTORY PROVESGUID oc cccccncccceuess l
STATEOGEING GE Cae CAR 2s os eich cece 2
REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION. ....... 7

I. Whether this Court should waste judicial

resources by reviewing the decision of the

Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, where the law

of the Commonwealth of Kentucky and the

facts of this case compelled summary judgment
in favor of the Respondent Ellison? ......... 7

II. Whether the respondent Ellison should be

prevented from having access to the federal

courts where he was not served with process

for 18 months and had nothing to do with any
procedural missteps by the other respondent .. . 19

oe 8). wrerrere rr ry ye ee 28

iil
APPENDIX

APPENDIX A

The Order of the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Kentucky at
Frankfort, entered October 11, 1994 ........ la

APPENDIX B
The Order of the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Kentucky at

Frankfort, entered March 21,1995 ......... 3a
APPENDIX C
ie ec ame ba hwe en Sa
APPENDIX D
OE a Ta
APPENDIX E

Portion of Petition for Writ of Certiorari in
Ritchey v. Upjohn Company, etal ......... 8a

hY
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Bradley v. Austin,
S41 F260 1206 GU Cm. ISGS) 2. cee 9

Brown v. Demco, Inc.,
Wee Ore eG, OE es wk oe wh we ees 16

Cantrell v. Great Republic Ins. Co.,
873 F.2d 1249 (9 Cir. 1989) .............005. 16

Caterpillar, Inc. v. Lewis,
519 U.S. Gi, 117 SpA. 467 (198O). ww ce 4,5,14

Com. Ex Rel. Cowan v. Wilkinson,
See ee ee, SO ee ee eeu bas 8

Commonwealth of Ky. Ex Rel. Hancock v. Ruckelshaus,

362 F.Supp. 360, Aff'd 497 F.2d 1172 (6th Cir. 1974),
Aff'd 426 U.S. 167, 96 S.Ct. 2006, 48 L. Ed.2d 555
DN ay Oe hoe an we oe ee eee Y 8,14

Fryman vy. Electric Steam Radiator Corporation,
eet oe es SS oe EE ea a eee es 12

Ford v. United States,
273 U.S. 593, 47 $2. 531, 71 L.Ed. 793 (1927)... ..... 8

George v. Com.,
eee es Oe Se Se hc is oink dee a 8

Getty Oil Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North America,
Ad Fi i ee ee kh ew wea nee 17

Louisville Water Co. v. Wells,
ee re I Oe tek ka i eee oe a 8

Vv

Manning v. Kentucky Bd. of Dentistry,
657 S.W.2d 584 (Ky. 1983). ................... 9

McCray v. Davis H. Elliott Co.,
419 S.W.2d 542 (Ky.1967)...................... 12

McKinney v. Board of Trustees of Mayland Com. Coll.,
955 F.2d 924 (4" Cir. 1992)... ............00-... 17

Reddick v. Commonwealth,
33 S.W. 416 My. 1895)... cc cece ee, 12

Ritchey v. Upjohn Drug Co.,
139 F.3d 1313 (9th Cir. 1998),
cert. denied 119S.Ct407 .................... 25

Russell v. Able,
931 S.W.2d 460 es WO S50 Se ee ee 11

Scialo v. Scala Packing Co., Inc.,
821 F.Supp. 1276 (N.D. Ill. 1993)................. 16

Steinfeld v. Jefferson County Fiscal Court,
312 Ky. 614, 229 S.W.2d 319 (1950) ............ 8

Stone v. Kentucky Ins. Guar. Ass’n.,
wus 5. W.2d 67S My. 1995)... .... 2... oc. ce. 8

Wade v. Commonwealth,
303 S.W.2d 905 (Ky. 1957). .................. 8

Weimer v. City of Johnstown,
NY, 931 F.Supp.985 (N.D. NY 1996).............. 18

Woods v. Simpson,
46 F.3d 21 (6th Cir. 1995)...................... 8

VI

STATUTES

Page
i ge 8 Pere er ere er re oe passim
ESD, og 60-5 4 8s ee ee passim

i fo Rk Of PPPPeePUrerererer: ore 9

l

OPINIONS BELOW

The Order of the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Kentucky at Frankfort, entered October
11, 1994, is not reported and is set forth in the Appendix to
this Brief at page la.

The Order of the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Kentucky at Frankfort, entered March 21,
1995, is not reported and is set forth in the Appendix to this
Brief at page 3a.

STATUTORY PROVISIONS
KRS 342.690 EXCLUSIVENESS OF LIABILITY

(1) If an employer secures payment of compensation
! as required by this chapter, the liability of such employer
| under this chapter shall be exclusive and in place of all other
liability of such employer to the employee, his legal
representative, husband or wife, parents, dependents, next of
kin, and anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages from
! such employer at law or in admiralty on account of such
injury or death. For purposes of this section, the term
“employer” shall include a “contractor” covered by
subsection (2) of KRS 342.610, whether or not the
subcontractor has in fact, secured the payment of
compensation. The liability of an employer to another person
who may be liable for or who has paid damages on account of
injury or death of an employee of such employer arising out
of and in the course of employment and caused by a breach of
any duty or obligation owed by such employer to such other
shall be limited to the amount of compensation and other

I ileal daaiaiasaiadiaainl

pie Maia i Rast tsi hes

2

benefits for which such employer is liable under this chapter
on account of such injury or death, unless such other and the
employer by written contract have agreed to share liability in
a different manner. The exemption from liability given an
employer by this section shall also extend to such employer’s
carrier and to all employees, officers or directors of such
employer or carrier, provided the exemption from liability
given an employee, officer or director or an employer or
carrier shall not apply in any case where the injury or death
is proximately caused by the willful and unprovoked physical
aggression of such employee, officer or director.

KRS 446.080LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION;
STATUTES NOT RETROACTIVE;
COMMON USAGE; TECHNICAL TERMS

* * *

(4) All words and phrases shall be construed according to
the common and approved usage of language, but
technical words and phrases, and such others as may
have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in
the law, shall be construed according to such meaning.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Under Kentucky Workers’ Compensation laws an
employer is generally exempt from civil claims by an
employee for injury in the workplace; co-employees, such as
the Respondent, David Ellison (“Ellison”), also enjoy an
exemption from liability. Only two exceptions are carved out
of those exemptions. The first exception is found in KRS
342.610 (4), which will be found at page 97a of the Appendix

3

to the Petition. That statute provides that a civil cause of
action will lie against the employer if injury or death results
to an employee through the deliberate intention of his
employer to produce such injury or death. No cause of action
was stated against Ellison under KRS 342.610 (4) because that
Statute does not grant a cause of action against a fellow
employee such as Ellison. The second exception is found in
KRS 342.690 (1), which will be found at page la of the
Appendix to this Brief. That statute provides that the
employer's exemption also extends to co-employees, so long
as the injury or death suffered by an employee is not caused
by the wilful and unprovoked physical aggression of the co-
employee. The Complaint never stated a cause of action
under KRS 342.690 (1) because there was no allegation that
Brierly’s injury or death was caused by the “wilful and
unprovoked physical aggression” of Ellison.

Ellison was the Safety Director at the facility of the
Respondent, Alusuisse Flexible Packaging, Inc. (“Alusuisse”)
He was advised that welding was to be done on a machine
known as a parts washer, which used solvents to clean ink off
parts. He went to the parts washer room and observed that:

(1) the electricity to the machine was locked
out and tagged out; (2) the washing machine
and solvent supply reservoir were drained of
solvent; (3) the pit below the washer was
ventilated with a compressed air hose over the
course of the entire weekend to purge any
accumulated fumes from underneath the
machine; (4) the washing machine door was
left open Friday evening so-that the interior of
the machine could be aired out over the
weekend; (5) and a special floor-level
ventilation system was left running during the

4

weekend to help purge the room of fumes.

He smelled no solvent odors in the room. He
suggested wrapping portions of the machine with fire
retardant blankets and putting water in the bottom of a pit in
which the washer sat, in order to prevent residual materials on
the floor of the pit from catching fire. There was an apparent
misunderstanding between Ellison and other gentlemen about
whether an LEL (“Lower Explosive Limit”) monitor had been
used.

When Ellison was told by another employee of
concerns about the possibility of fire during the welding, he
and that employee returned to the parts washer room and
discussed the precautions that had been taken. Ellison left the
room for a period of time and was returning to it when the
welding began and the explosion occurred. A spark from the
welding torch ignited solvent vapors within the parts washer,
blowing a steel door off the washer. The door struck the
Petitioner’s decedent. When the decedent was killed, he was
standing in what was considered to be the safest position in
the room.

At the time of the accident, Ellison was a Kentucky
resident. On or before May 9, 1994 Ellison left Alusuisse’s
employ and became a citizen of Wisconsin, so there was
complete diversity at the time this action was originally filed
on May 12, 1994. A Summons was issued for Ellison on
May 12, 1994 and on May 13, 1994 the Shelby County
Sheriff made a return indicating that Ellison was no longer a
Kentucky resident. On August 11, 1994 one of the attorneys
for Alusuisse advised Petitioner’s counsel of Ellison’s new
address and employment. However, Ellison was not-served
with Summons or pleadings until November 13, 1995. That
was in part due to an Order issued by the District Court on

pe te, mee “

nar icticar iteiiie Ghatesa tite ne AS A wt dn ca Be lt) tA TBR OA ce tncend

5

October 11, 1994 in Alusuisse’s earlier removal effort and
continued by Order dated March 21, 1995. (Appendix to this
Brief, pages la and 3a, respectively.) However, Brierly
never objected to the Order and made no further efforts to
serve Ellison until November of 1995. No substantive steps
occurred in Shelby Circuit Court, but considerable substantive
discovery occurred in the federal action.

The District Court determined that Ellison properly
removed the case and that Alusuisse could consent to that
removal. Ultimately the District Court granted Ellison’s
Motion for Summary Judgment and the Sixth Circuit
affirmed. |

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION

I. WHETHER THIS COURT SHOULD WASTE
JUDICIAL RESOURCES BY REVIEWING THE
DECISION OF THE SIXTH CIRCUIT COURT OF
APPEALS, WHERE THE LAW OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY AND THE
FACTS OF THIS CASE COMPELLED SUMMARY
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE RESPONDENT
ELLISON?

Even if the issues framed by Petitioner were worthy of
consideration, this is not the case in which to review them.
The Court stated in Caterpillar, Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61,
117 Sup.Ct. 467 (1996), at 477:

To wipe out the adjudication post-judgment
and return to state court a case now satisfying
all federal jurisdictional requirements would

6

impose an exorbitant cost on our dual court
system, a cost incompatible with the fair and
unprotracted administration of justice.

In this case, all federal jurisdictional requirements
were met. No discovery was conducted in the State court
case, while extensive discovery was conducted in the Federal
action before the Summary Judgment was granted. The
holdings of the courts below were well-founded and returning
this case to Shelby Circuit Court would “impose an exorbitant
cost on our dual court system, a cost incompatible with the
fair and unprotracted administration of justice.”

The Petitioner would have the Court believe that the
lower courts imposed upon him a burden of proof in a civil
action greater than that required to support a criminal
conviction, but the arguments about “inferred” intent have no
relevance to Ellison. In fact, no cause of action was stated
against Ellison, because there was no allegation of the single
basis on which such a cause of action may be founded.
There are two instances in which an injured employee may
avoid the exclusive remedies of the Kentucky Workers’
Compensation system and file a civil action for damages,
neither of which provided the Petitioner any relief against
Ellison.

A. The Petitioner has no cause of action under
the first exception to the Workers’ Compensation laws.

The first exception is found in KRS 342.610 (4),
which provides:

If injury or death results to an employee
through the deliberate intention of his
employer to produce such injury or death, the

7

| employee or his dependent as herein defined
| shall receive the amount provided in this
chapter in a lump sum to be used, if desired, to

prosecute the employer. The dependents may
. bring suit against the employer for any amount

they desire. If injury or death results to an
employee through the deliberate intention of
his employer to produce such injury or death,
the employee or his dependents may take
under this chapter, or in lieu thereof, have a
cause of action at law against the employer as
if this chapter had not passed, for such damage
SO sustained by the employee, his dependents
or personal representatives as is recoverable at
law. Ifa suit is brought under this subsection,
all right to compensation under this chapter
shall thereby be waived as to all persons. If a
. Claim is made for the payment of compensation
or any other benefit provided by this chapter,
| all rights to sue the employer for damages on
; account of such injury or death shall be waived
: as to all persons. (Emphasis added.)

Even if the decedent’s injuries and death were
considered to have resulted from the deliberate intention of
Alusuisse (which Ellison denies), KRS 342.610 (4) grants the
Petitioner a cause of action only against Alusuisse, not a
fellow employee such as Ellison.

A A Ci ee ls

Under any rule of statutory construction, KRS 342.610
(4) must be construed as excluding Ellison from any potential
liability to the Plaintiff. Under the rule of ejusdem generis,
where general words follow or precede a designation of
particular subjects or classes of persons, the meaning of the
general words ordinarily will be presumed to be restricted by

8

the particular designation, and to include only things or
persons of the same kind, class or nature as those specifically
enumerated. Woods v. Simpson, 46 F.3d 21 (6th Cir. 1995);
Steinfeld v. Jefferson County Fiscal Court, 312 Ky. 614, 229
S.W.2d 319 (1950). Here the use of the word “employer”
does not admit the inclusion of the word “employee” into
KRS 342.610 (4).

Likewise, under the maxim, Expressio unius est
exclusio alterius, the express mention of one thing in a statute
implies the exclusion of another different thing. Steinfeld,
supra. The maxim applies where that which is expressed is
in such great contrast to that which is omitted that the contrast
enforces the affirmative inference that which is omitted must
be intended to have opposite and contrary treatment. Ford v.
United States, 273 U.S. 593, 47 S.Ct. 531, 71 L.Ed. 793
(1927); Wade v. Commonwealth, 303 S.W.2d 905 (Ky.
1957); George v. Com., 885 S.W.2d 938 (Ky. 1994);
Louisville Water Co. v. Wells, 664 S.W.2d 525 (Ky. 1984).
The Kentucky legislature could have easily included the word
“employee” in KRS 342.610 (4) but did not, whereas
“employer” is mentioned multiple times.

Where there is no exception to the positive terms of a
statute the presumption is that the legislature intended none.
Com. Ex Rel. Cowan v. Wilkinson, 828 S.W.2d 610 (Ky.
1992); Stone v. Kentucky Ins. Guar. Ass’n., 908 S.W.2d 675
(Ky. 1995). Where a particular provision appears in a statute,
the failure to include that same requirement in another section
of the statute will not be deemed to have been inadvertent.
Commonwealth of Ky. Ex Rel. Hancock v. Ruckelshaus, 362
F.Supp. 360, Aff’d 497 F.2d 1172 (6th Cir. 1974), Aff'd 426
U.S. 167, 96 S.Ct. 2006, 48 L. Ed.2d 555 (1976).

9

In determining the meaning of legislation, the Court
must first look to the plain language of the statute itself: if no
ambiguity in the statutory ianguage is found, that language is
regarded as conclusive unless there is a clearly expressed
legislative intent to the contrary. Bradley v. Austin, 841 F.2d
1288 (6th Cir. 1988). That same philosophy and approach
applies to any Kentucky statute. In Manning v. Kentucky Bad.
of Dentistry, 657 S.W.2d 584 (Ky. 1983), the court stated, at
587:

we

The Court’s function in the interpretation of
. Statutes is to construe the language so as to
give effect to the intent of the legislature.
i [citations omitted] Where words in a statute
are clear and unambiguous and express the
legislative intent, there is no room for
construction and the statute must be accepted
as it is written. [citations omitted] It is
presumed that the legislature is acquainted
with the law on the subjects on which it
legislates and is informed of previous
legislation and construction that it has
previously received. Where it has made no
exception to the positive terms of the statute,
the presumption is that it intended to make
none, and it is not the province of a court to
introduce an exception by construction.
[citations omitted]

KRS 446.080 (4) provides:

All words and phrases shall be construed
according to the common and approved usage
of language, but technical words and phrases,
and such others as may have acquired a
peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law,

10
shall be construed according to such meaning.

The word “employer” has a common and distinct
meaning both in law and ordinary usage; an employer is an
entity quite distinct from an employee. It must be presumed
that the legislature meant to allow a civil cause of action,
under the specified circumstances, only against employers.
There are no ambiguities in the statute; KRS 342.610 (4)
allows a cause of action at law only against an employer.

B. The Petitioner stated no cause of action under
the second exception to the Workers’ Compensation laws and
Ellison's right to Judgment was compelling.

KRS 342.690 (1) provides, in part:

The exemption from liability given an
employer by this section shall also extend to
such employer's . . . employees .. . ,
provided the exemption from liability given an
employee shall not apply in any case where the
injury or death is proximately caused by the
wilful and unprovoked physical aggression of
such employee . . . . (emphasis added).

The Complaint stated no cause of action under KRS
342.690 (1) because there was no allegation that the
decedent's injury or death was “proximately caused by the
wilful and unprovoked physical aggression” of Ellison. The
Complaint alleged that Ellison “knew immediately prior to the
explosion that [his] intended course of action created a known
unsafe and hazardous work environment which could or
would result in serious bodily injury or death to... Paul
Brierly, yet deliberately placed [Brierly] in a position of
imminent peril.” The Complaint alleged that Ellison “failed
and refused to take even the minimum safety precautions

| 1

required by local, state and/or federal law, and took
affirmative and intentional actions in violation of such laws,
all of which caused and brought about the death of [Brierly].”

It was alleged that the death “resulted from the
deliberate, wilful and unprovoked intention of . . . Ellison .
: . . o produce serious injury or death as contemplated by KRS
342.610 (4), and/or KRS 342.690 (1) such that the
prosecution of this action is without the restrictions of KRS
Chapter 342" and that Ellison’s “intentional conduct was
undertaken with a deliberate and flagrant indifference to the
rights of [Brierly] and with a subjective awareness that such
intentional conduct would result in bodily harm or death to
[Brierly].”

If those allegations were an attempt to meet the
“physical aggression” requirements of KRS 342.690 (1) it
was a failed Procrustean effort. There was no physical
aggression by Ellison and there is no allegation of such
physical aggression.

The Kentucky legislature meant to remove the
exclusivity protection from an employee who intentionally and
physically attacks another empioyee without provocation. For
example, in Russell v. Able, 931 S.W.2d 460 (Ky. 1996),
Able approached Russell from behind and intentionally placed
her knee to the back of Russell’s knee, Causing Russell to fall
to the floor. Russell was allowed to sue Able, despite the fact
i that she had recovered compensation benefits. The case
makes it apparent that “physical aggression” means exactly
what it says; there is no exception for anything less.

Even if the allegations of the Complaint are stretched
to encompass “physical aggression”, Ellison was entitled to
summary judgment because he never committed any act of

O°EESS AT TT

12
physical aggression. It is apparent that even if “deliberate
intention” were a criterion applicable to Ellison, he committed
no such act. Fryman v. Electric Steam Radiator Corporation,
277 S.W.2d 25 (Ky. 1955); McCray v. Davis H. Elliott Co.,
419 S.W.2d 542 (Ky. 1967). The record is clear that no
Alusuisse employee ever contemplated the possibility of an

explosion.

. No inference of intent operates against Ellison.

The argument Petitioner makes at pages 25 et seq. of
the Petition should be read carefully. There the Petitioner
argues that the deliberate intention required by KRS 342.610
(4) may be inferred from circumstances. Whether this is true
or not, KRS 342.610 (4) does not apply to employees such as
Ellison, but only to employers. The Petitioner carefully fails
to mention that distinction in his argument and it is a critical
omission.

Moreover, Ellison’s acts or inactions would not
furnish the basis for such an inference in any event. In
Reddick _v. Commonwealth, 33 S.W. 416 (Ky. 1895), the
Court held that a person who caused a hotel to burn, in which
fire a person died, could be convicted of murder even though
he might deny intent to have caused a death. The Court held,
at 417, that this felony of arson:

. . Clearly belonged to the cases “malum in
se” and not merely “malum prohibitum.”

In determining whether a fact finder may infer intent
in a civil case, Kentucky focuses on the nature of the actions
causing the injury. Is the crime malum in se? Is itaheinous
act? Is it an act that is certain to cause a harm? Did the
effort to perpetrate the act go beyond the casual? Kentucky

13

does not hold that deliberate intent to injure may be inferred
in cases of ordinary claims of negligence. Do the facts of this
case come anywhere near meeting the criteria for allowing an
inference of intent? Not at all. As the District Court pointed

out:

Surely these gentlemen would have been out of
the plant long before the welding started had
they planned or even anticipated the possibility
of an explosion.

Ellison was manifestly entitled to judgment, and to

remand this case to State court would not only be an
unwarranted burden on him, it would be a waste of judicial
resources.

II.

WHETHER THE RESPONDENT ELLISON
SHOULD BE PREVENTED FROM HAVING
ACCESS TO THE FEDERAL COURTS WHERE HE
WAS NOT SERVED WITH PROCESS FOR 18
MONTHS AND HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH
ANY PROCEDURAL MISSTEPS BY THE OTHER
RESPONDENT.

A. The one year bar does not apply.

28 U.S.C. § 1446 (b) provides, in pertinent part:

The notice of removal of a civil action or
proceeding shall be filed within thirty days after
receipt by the defendant, through service or
otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading
setting forth the claim for relief upon which
such action or proceeding is based. . . .

14

If the case stated by the initial pleading is not
removable, a notice of removal may be filed
within thirty days after receipt by the defendant,
through service or otherwise, of a copy of an
amended pleading, motion, order or other paper
from which it may first be ascertained that the
case is one which is or has become removable,
except that a case may not be removed on the
basis of jurisdiction conferred by section 1332
of this title more than one year after
commencement of the action.

This case was removable as originally filed and Ellison
complied with the first paragraph of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). The
second paragraph deals with cases not removable upon initial
filing. It is important to note that the only reference to the one
year bar is found within the second paragraph, so the modifying
clause applies only to the second paragraph. If Congress
intended the one year bar to apply to the entirety of 28 U.S.C.
§$1446(b), a third sub-paragraph could have easily been
inserted, stating that the one year bar applied to all cases.
Where a particular provision appears in a statute, the failure to
include that same requirement in another section of the statute
will not be deemed to have been inadvertent. Commonwealth
of Kentucky, Ex Rel. Hancock v. Ruckelshaus, supra.

Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, supra, does not impose the
one year bar on this case. The Petitioner claims that the
Supreme Court’s statement, that no case may be removed
beyond one year, is a ruling by the Supreme Court that the
one year bar applies to actions originally removable. That is
not correct. Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis was a case which was
not originally removable and became removable only after the
deletion of other defendants. Thus, the Supreme Court only
had before it the question of the one year bar as it applied to

ee Oe

15

cases which later became removable; whether the one year
bar applied to cases removable as Originally filed was not a
question necessary for resolution.

After the Shelby County Sheriff’s return on May 12,
1994 the Petitioner never even attempted to serve Ellison until
November of 1995, even though a Wisconsin address was
known to the Petitioner’s attorney in August of 1994. The
Petitioner did not object to the Stay Order of October 11,
1994 or the Order of March 21, 1995 continuing the Stay
Order. Moreover, the District Court’s Memorandum Opinion
and Order of March 30, 1995 (Appendix to Petition at page
83a) points out that the stay was on the merits and did not
preclude the Court from rendering its opinion regarding
jurisdictional issues; the issue of Ellison’s citizenship was a
jurisdictional issue, resolution of which was delayed by the
Petitioner’s failure to effect service until November of 1995.

Petitioner acknowledges that the Fifth and Ninth
Circuits have also ruled that the one year limitation applies
only to cases not initially removable. Even more significant
is this Court’s denial of certiorari in Ritchey v. Upjohn Drug
Co., 139 F.3d 1313 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied 119 S.Ct
407 (1998). There the Petitioner framed one of his issues as
follows:

I. Does the one year limitation on diversity

removal under the 1988 amendments to 28

U.S.C. § 1446 (b) absolutely preclude removal

in all diversity cases after the limitation period

expires, and if not, does the one year

limitation period on removal only begin to run

from the date when the action stated by the

initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief

filed in state court was served on the diverse

State court defendant, who then filed notice of

16

removal more than two years beyond the filing
of the original action in state court? (Appendix
to this Brief, page 9a)

Thus, the Court has already rejected a Petition to visit
this issue, and Ellison respectfully submits that the Court
should reject the instant petition.

B. To construe Alusuisse’s vigorous attempts at
removal as a waiver would unfairly deprive Ellison of his
rights under 28 USC § 1446 (b).

The Petitioner’s cited cases are distinguishable. For
example, in Scialo v. Scala Packing Co., Inc., 821 F.Supp.
1276 (N.D. Ill. 1993), the original attempts at removal were
woefully inadequate, and a reading of the case makes it
apparent that the original defendants attempted to justify their
lack of proper removal with spurious reasoning, as detailed by
the court at 1277, footnote 3.

In Brown v. Demco, Inc., 792 F.2d 478 (5" Cir. 1986)
the original Defendants did not remove the case, but defended
it in State court for about four years. Thereafter, new
Defendants were named and they proceeded to remove the
case; the original Defendants gave their consent to that
removal. The Fifth Circuit merely decided that the original
Defendants had waived their right to consent, precluding their
later consent.

Petitioner misreads Cantrell v. Great Republic Ins.
Co., 873 F.2d 1249 (9" Cir. 1989). There the Plaintiffs sued
Great Republic Insurance Company (GRIC) but the Complaint
was answered by Great Republic Life Insurance Company
(GRLIC), which even counterclaimed against Cantrell. There
was no removal. The Plaintiff then filed an Amended

17

Complaint, specifically naming GRLIC as a Defendant. The
Ninth Circuit held that the original failure to remove was a
waiver because GRLIC was acting as a party long before the
technical amendment of the Complaint.

In this case, it can hardly be said that Alusuisse
waived its right to remove; it may have made procedural
missteps, but its actions were all in the course of a vigorous
attempt to remove the case.

e. The Sixth Circuit properly decided that a later
served Defendant has 30 days from service in which to remove
a case to federal district court.

Getty Oil Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North America,
841 F.2d 1254 (5" Cir. 1988) did in fact apply a rule of
unanimity. However, even that case must be viewed in the
context of its facts. There Getty sued three defendants,
serving them on September 3", September 5" and September
24", 1986 respectively. The first served Defendant removed
timely, with the second served Defendant consenting. The
third served Defendant consented, but beyond thirty days
from service on the first served Defendant. The court held
that all served Defendants must join in the Petition no later
than thirty days from service on the first Defendant. Of
course, Getty Oil deals with a situation in which all of the
named Defendants were served within a relatively close time
period. Getty Oil was criticized in McKinney v. Board of
Trustees of Mayland Com. Coll., 955 F.2d 924 (4" Cir.
1992).

The McKinney court pointed out that §1446 (b) does
not address the issue of multiple defendants and does not Say
that the time will run from service on the “first served”
defendant. The court rejected Getty Oil by saying it was not

18

logical and promoted inequity, not unanimity. To the
argument that a Plaintiff should know at the earliest possible
date what court he will be in, the court answered that the
Plaintiff should get ail of the Defendants served at about the
same time. Moreover, the court rejected the notion that
choosing the forum was “bad” or a “defeat” of the Plaintiff's
choice of forum. The court did not believe that Congress
meant a Plaintiff's right to choose a forum was of any greater
value than a Defendant’s right to remove.

Weimer v. City of Johnstown, NY, 931 F.Supp.985
(N.D. NY 1996) points out many reasons why the last served
rule was not applied in that particular case. Even in Weimer,
however, the Court specifically stated, at 993, that “...the
Court does not wish to close the door to this line of argument
in future cases displaying the characteristics...warranting
application of the minority, last-served rule.”

The Sixth Circuit was correct. Ellison and Alusuisse
have separate counsel. Petitioner’s counsel was aware of
Ellison’s Wisconsin address in August of 1994 but made no
effort to serve him for eighteen months. Removals to federal
district court are subject to Rule 11 of the federal rules of
civil procedure and a later served defendant should be given
time to properly analyze the Complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 1446
(b) does not adequately deal with the issue of multiple
defendants and it never makes reference to a “first served”
defendant. The Sixth Circuit properly decided that to refuse
Ellison a right of removal granted him by Congress would be
inequitable. The Petitioner’s parade of horribles should not
persuade this court. The Sixth Circuit has not created a
situation where parties wishing to be in state court will be
subjected to frequent journeys to federal court and back and
the Sixth Circuit certainly did not shift to a Plaintiff the
burden of proving nondiversity.

HO er A ela sit

19

CONCLUSION

Thereare no compelling reasons why certiorari should
be granted in this case. The law and the facts in favor of
Ellison are so compelling that it would be a waste of judicial
resources for this Court to grant certiorari.

For those reasons, Ellison respectfully submits that the
Court should deny the Petition for Writ of Certiorari now
pending before this Court.

Respectfully submitted this thea November, 1999.

209-C Thomas More Park

P. O. Box 17411

Covington, KY 41017-0411

(606) 331-2000

Attorneys for Respondent David Ellison

la

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
FRANKFORT

[Filed October 11, 1994]

CIVIL ACTION NO. 94-55

JEFFREY D. BRIERLY, Administrator
of the Estate of Paul Brierly, deceased
PLAINTIFF,

v. ORDER

ALUSUISSE FLEXIBLE PACKAGING, INC.,
and

DAVID ELLISON,
DEFENDANTS.

This matter is before the Court upon the motion of the
defendant, Alusuisse Flexible Packaging, Inc. [Alusuisse] to
Stay further proceedings in this action until the resolution of
separate actions stemming from the explosion in question
including: pending action before Kentucky Workers’
Compensation Board; the pendency of criminal charges

2a

against Alusuisse; and the pendency of three separate actions
against Alusuisse other than the instant action. [Record No.
4). The plaintiff has failed to respond.

Having considered the record and being otherwise
advised,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

(1) That the motion of the defendant to stay
further proceedings [Record No. 4] be, and the
same hereby is, GRANTED.

(2) That all further proceedings in this matter
SHALL BE STAYED pending further Orders
from this Court.

(3) That the parties shall file a joint status report
within the earlier of 120 days from the date of
entry of this Order or when the case
proceeding before the Kentucky Workers’
Compensation Board has been resolved.

This the 4" day of October, 1994.

/s/ Joseph M. Hood
JOSEPH M. HOOD, JUDGE

Date of Entry and Service:

3a

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
FRANKFORT

[Filed March 21, 1995]

CIVIL ACTION NO. 94-55

JEFFREY D. BRIERLY, Administrator of
the Estate of Paul Brierly, deceased,
PLAINTIFF,

V. ORDER

ALUSUISSE FLEXIBLE PACKAGING,
INC.,
DEFENDANT.

The Court having considered the parties’ status reports
[Record Nos. 11 & 12], and being duly advised, accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that the STAY in the above-
captioned matter entered by this Court on October 11, 1995,
shall continue in full force and effect pending further orders.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties file a
joint status report within the earlier of 180 days from the date
of entry of this Order or when the case proceeding before the

4a

Kentucky Workers’ Compensation Board has been resolved.

This the 21" day of March, 1995.

/s/__ Joseph M. Hood
JOSEPH M. HOOD, JUDGE

Date of Entry and Service:

Sa

APPENDIX C

KRS 342.690 (1)

KRS 342.690 EXCLUSIVENESS OF LIABILITY

(1) If an employer secures payment of compensation
as required by this chapter, the liability of such employer
under this chapter shall be exclusive and in place of all other
liability of such employer to the employee, his legal
representative, husband or wife, parents, dependents, next of
kin, and anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages from
such employer at law or in admiralty on account of such
injury or death. For purposes of this section, the term
“employer” shall include a “contractor” covered by
subsection (2) of KRS 342.610, whether or not the
subcontractor has in fact, secured the payment of
compensation. The liability of an employer to another person
who may be liable for or who has paid damages on account of
injury or death of an employee of such employer arising out
of and in the course of employment and caused by a breach of
any duty or obligation owed by such employer to such other
shall be limited to the amount of compensation and other
benefits for which such employer is liable under this chapter
on account of such injury or death, unless such other and the
employer by written contract have agreed to share liability in
a different manner. The exemption from liability given an
employer by this section shall also extend to such employer’s
carrier and to all employees, officers or directors of such
employer or carrier, provided the exemption from liability
given an employee, officer or director or an employer or

6a

carrier shall not apply in any case where the injury or death
is proximately caused by the willful and unprovoked physical
aggression of such employee, officer or director.

Ta

APPENDIX D

KRS 446.080 (4)

KRS 446.080LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION;
STATUTESNOT RETROACTIVE;
COMMON USAGE; TECHNICAL TERMS

* *

(4) All words and phrases shall be construed
according to the common and approved usage of language, but
technical words and phrases, and such others as may have
acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law, shall
be construed according to such meaning.

8a

APPENDIX E

No.
In The
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1997

JOE B. RITCHEY,

Petitioner,
V.

UPJOHN COMPANY and WILLIAM DEMENT,

Respondents.

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari
To The United States Court Of Appeals
For The Ninth Circuit

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

MICHAEL D. MOSHER
ROBERT S. CATZ
Counsel of Record

50 North Main Street
Paris, Texas 75460-4250
(903) 785-4721
Counsel for Petitioner

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., (800) 225-6964
OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831

9a
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. Does the one year limitation on diversity removal
under the 1988 amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)
absolutely preclude removal in all diversity cases after
the limitation period expires, and if not, does the one
year limitation period on removal only begin to run
from the date when the action stated by the initial
pleading setting forth the claim for relief filed in state
court was served on the diverse state court defendant,
who then filed notice of removal more than two years
beyond the filing of the original action in state court?

2. Does removal of a case by a diverse defendant under
28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) on grounds of fraudulent joinder
based on the bald and frivolous claim that plaintiff
could not possibly prevail in state court under state
law against non-diverse defendants, unconstitutionally
vet the judicial power in the United States courts
beyond Article III, Section 2 of the United States
Constitution when any alleged pleading deficiencies
could have been readily cured by amendment to the
original state court complaint which had not even once
yet been amended in state court?

3. Is a diversity case removable under 28 U.S.C.
§1446(b) on grounds of alleged fraudulent joinder of
nondiverse parties where the district court found, in
the absence of any discovery and in the face of
comprehensive and detailed countervailing declaration,
that the pro se plaintiff could not possible prevail
against a statute of limitations and res judicata defense
for state law common law fraudulent concealment,
deceit and conspiracy by a _ pharmaceutical
manufacturer and its so-called independent FDA

Rite veut

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10a

advisors who allegedly, for payments from Upjohn of
more than $2,000,000 per year, concealed research
from and misled the Food and Drug Administration to
prevent the timely discovery of the cause of injury and
cause of action by the petitioner - even though the
offered new and independent State resident actions
tolled the statutes of limitations under California law
and the state law conspiracy was only discovered by
the plaintiff less than 6 months before the filing of this
action in state court.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386014_0257%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
