# Opposition Brief — Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail v. Rouse

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1998
- **Citation:** 524 U.S. 951

## Text

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IN THE apR 6 1998
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
“@FBICE OF THE CLERK

October Term, 1997 rT

NO. 97-1278

INMATES OF THE SUFFOLK COUNTY JAIL, et al.,
Petitioners,

vs.

RICHARD J. ROUSE, SHERIFF OF SUFFOLK COUNTY, et
al.
Respondents.

On Petition for a Wnt of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION
FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

John D. Hanify

Counsel of Record
Robyn J. Bartlett

Owen P. Kane

HANIFY & KING
Professional Corporation
One Federal Street
Boston, MA 02110
(617) 423-0400

Counsel for Respondent

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE
CRRA Sa UEe FEO BED ce conccscienccscncnsnsesensnaces ili
FA FARs RE bosiecsnccccsiancsscnvncssacniens iv
COUNTERSTATEMENT OF THE CASE................ 1
ee NHI iéncteusevinsnendneinntannconnine 2
The Prison Litigation Reform Act .................. 5
TD PURORTIIES BOIOW ooo 0ksciccscssscncssccceccssnes 7
REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT.................. 8

I. The Decision of the First Circuit Court of
Appeals is not in Conflict
with Decisions in other Circuits. ................. 8

II. The PLRA Presents No Constitutional
Difficulties under
Separation of Powers or Due
SE III, Sencdercsstacsessakeninnvassseves 9

A. The PLRA's Provisions for Termination
of Relief Do Not
Violate the Principle of Separation of
AER ARP REESE UTNE BA MTS EP OO 9

1. A Consent Decree is Not
PE FI fo ciccctsciticesesecsais 10

2. The PLRA's Requirement that the
Court Issue Findings
Does Not Strip the Courts of their
Inherent Power and
Duty to Enforce Effective Remedies

in Constitutional Cases. ................. 14
3. The Termination of Relief Provision

Does Not Prescribe a Rule of

IO sco ainissackninnnnlectaatiiianemsieeeasl 16

B. The Application of the PLRA's
Termination of Relief
Provision Does Not Implicate the Due
Process Clause
By Impairing Any Existing Contract. .... 18

Ca iccciek sctieinninccessqnecteisimeinempmanaie 20

1.

Questions Presented
Whether this Court should decline to review the issues in this
case as there appears to be no disagreement among the circuits.
Whether Section 3626(b)(2) of the Prison Litigation Reform
Act presents any constitutional difficulties under separation of

powers or due process principles.

ill

- TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES PAGE

Benjamin v. Jacobson,
935 F. Supp. 332 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) ............. 8,9, 14, 17

Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v.
Waterman S.S. Corp.,

Re TAs Ee RE as dcwanie hensaktcncdasdpsoaediennink 11

Class v. Norton,

ane ae Be Ge GE 0 re xddcicdkccbankcdckcinin 13

Daylo v. Administrator of Veterans' Affairs,

ek Ee ce as SE vc did cn scien weadidiesicsdcacce 13

Dougan v. Singletary,

Ree ee Be OE Oe Ms RF Bk bene saccnesdvndaiesencsieks 8

Gavin v. Branstad,

Rae ee Ae I RED iicdvaccancinacdeawauwicieen: 8

Hadix v. Johnson,

947 F. Supp. 1100 (E.D. Mich. 1996)............c.cecesss. 8

Hanna v. Plumer,

DE BE EE uihiditcnncdehhccecicdasw ccbicibliesonns tous 10

Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt,

SOS FDU Gre GE). BER TG on con scvcisccccnsascencss 2

Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Rufo,

844 F. Supp. 31 (D. Mass. 1994) ............ccccccccccccees 5
‘is

James v. Lash,
965 F. Supp. 1190
UNC i 14, 18, 20

Jensen v. County of Lake,
Te Be SE CRs MN, TOE D ci cenicicinesdiccvexesecs 14

Gilbertson,
Pe GE IE cid dice cigudagduikbanednecuksdoccenceken 11

Lauf v. E.G. Shinner & Co.,
Pe els Seni cacaccucsaek caabobsieieeucaassasecdson 10

Layne & Bowler Corp. v. Western Well Works,
Se AN snk bins anacaveksannanysacoieaivastiaes 9

Lewis v. Casey,
Ren es ee OF CI kiccshnta nceurobobnduianieeantondsen 15

McLendon v. Continental Can Co.,
Se ee OEE a Civ hexcssudebedéaccivaravecscsdeus 15

Milliken v. Bradley,
a NE MDT F Bea isvcdcvkinsnsdcccssdacascavsusenawnccie 15

Topeka & Santa Fe R.R. Co.,
Pe EE BEE i nbn cn bes heavesdceassuscncecdesoneses 19, 20

NLRB Pittsburgh S.S. Co.,
SO i 8

Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co.,
FP hs CE EMF GEE CEI) venenccccccccaccenencs S 22. 13

Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. R. A. Gray Co.,
MRE BP FOE CU IID ovina cate ccc cancevebries eke ee 19

Plaut v. Spendthrift,
Rt ._- | REDS CORI eR ees 9, 10, 12

Plyler v. Moore,
pee cae ee ee 8, 14, 18

Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc'y,

I UT UIT hdd vccideasincbhcecikoeseeihsctues es 17

Rufo v. Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail,
PE OT CRM sicko kivi'c saitckssdicic oaslcunsiabn 12, 43

Ruiz v. Estelle,
ee Ws BEE Ce CD, BOUND once oveccan cs. ecnkc cs 15

Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,
US Ee Ae BSC ase ee aa ne mC 16

Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,
ee bee Oe eo 5 | SUREMENTS 7D tare ae Oa RE 15

System Federation No. 91, Railway Employees'

Department,
AFL-CIO v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642 (1961)................ 13

Toussaint v. McCarthy,
Fn Fe WE, FOGG) ois nccccsnicccncesecsacdodia 15

United States v. Klein,
Oe eats Ue I RTE 9,17

Vii

United States v. Swift & Co.,
Be Fh ie SE ED vi wid nddinecsckiiedibmecsceriessasaiunk 13

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

Fae I Ms Bc eg MO ci Sea Cesivastietnaicndeaesouen 10
Sree SR. ORE TER, Gk BAe sch acs in peintescrcdspsacivessanns 10
BOR FOI CORI soos ceiinin secs seckasdacsadsiscctanntt passim
STATUTES

See Sean Oe EOE cabadeucacaidisdesincapaaincinnatiens 6, passim
OTHER AUTHORITIES

H.R. Rep. No. 21, 104th Cong., Ist Sess. 7 (1995) ..... 6

Department of Justice Appropriations Act,
Ss Bs Tak BO AOR ED, Nekannccavcicvancidaehevierkine 16

Vill

COUNTERSTATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Consent Decree at the center of the present dispute has
had a long and contentious history. Entered into by the parties to
this action in 1979, the Consent Decree remained in effect until
terminated by Order of the First Circuit Court of Appeals on
November 7, 1997, pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act of
1996 (the “PLRA”). The decree remained in effect despite
numerous changes in conditions including, most notably, the
construction of a new, state-of-the-art Suffolk County Jail. The
long history of this case illustrates the condition which Congress
sought to remedy by enacting the PLRA.

This action was initiated in the United States District Court
for the District of Massachusetts in 1971, on behalf of the inmates
of the Suffolk County Jail. At that time, the Suffolk County Jail
was located on Charles Street in the City of Boston and was known
as the "Charles Street Jail." By 1971, the Charles Street Jail was an
out-of-date, unfit facility. On June 20, 1973, the District Court
determined that the then existing conditions at the Charles Street

Jail were unconstitutional and permanently enjoined the Sheriff

from, inter alia, “housing at the Charles Street Jail after November

30, 1973, in a cell with another inmate, any inmate who is awaiting

trial." Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp.

676 (D. Mass. 1973).
The Consent Decree

In 1979, in order to comply with the Court's June 20, 1973
Order, the parties entered into a consent decree (the "Consent
Decree") providing for the construction of a new high-rise jail
adjacent to the Charles Street Jail.

The parties to the Consent Decree explicitly recognized the
prospect of changing conditions and the continuing need to adapt to
conform to current circumstances. The site for the jail was moved
from Charles Street to Nashua Street and changed from a high-rise
to a modern and spacious seven-story structure. The Nashua Street
Jail was completed in May, 1990, at a cost of $54 million. It is one
of the most modern penal facilities in the country, providing more
amenities to inmates than most other state and county facilities.
The Nashua Street Jail includes a variety of functionally distinct
spaces to meet the special needs of inmates. There are 453 cells

and each cell is approximately 70 square feet with 40 square feet of

available floor space. This amount of floor space exceeds the

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American Correctional Association's standard of 35 square feet.
Each housing unit contains two tiers of sixteen to nineteen cells, a
large “day room" where meals are served and detainees may spend
their out-of-cell time, a separate "quiet" or "multi-purpose" room,
counseling, noncontact visiting and attorney-client rooms, a washer
and dryer for personal laundry, a kitchenette for serving meals
prepared in the central kitchen, two televisions, exercise
equipment, telephones for use by detainees and access to an
outdoor recreation deck voor with the adjoining housing unit on
the same floor.

The Nashua Street Jail also offers a contact visiting area,
chapel, general library, classroom space for use by inmates,
access to legal materials and a large central gymnasium complete
with exercise equipment. Because of the modern, expanded
facilities of the new Nashua Street Jail, visiting hours are
permitted seven days a week, including holidays. All areas of the
jail are climate-controlled.

From the very first day the new Nashua Street Jail was

opened, in order to comply with the single bunking provision of

the Consent Decree respecting the old Charles Street Jail, the

Sheriff was required to hold Suffolk County pretrial detainees in
correctional facilities outside of Suffolk County. Every night,
dozens of inmates were transferred to other facilities where they
were double-bunked in conditions vastly inferior to those at the
new Nashua Street Jail. In fact, these other facilities often
exceeded their design capacity by as much as 200%.

A result of this federal court intervention, older and already
overcrowded facilities in seven other counties were required to
house a disproportionately higher number of inmates than the new
Nashua Street Jail. Moreover, the Sheriff was forced to divert
scarce financial and human resources to the transportation of
detainees to facilities outside of Suffolk County each night.

On August 9, 1993, the Sheriff filed a Supplemental
Memorandum in which he proposed double bunking in 161 cells in
the new facility. Without subsidiary findings, the District Court
found that the Sheriff's proposal was not "an appropriately tailored
modification,” but found, also without explanation, that a
modification permitting double-bunking in 100 cells would not

impair the integrity of the Consent Decree. In so doing, the District

Court acknowledged that "[a] federal court . . . should be loathe to

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become entangled in the intricacies of administrative and
institutional decisions.” Inmates of Suffolk n il v. Rufo,
844 F. Supp. 31, 37 (D. Mass. 1994).

On June 14, 1994, the District Court entered a Final Order
which allowed a modification of the Consent Decree to permit 100
cells to be double-bunked. The Court explicitly found that such a
modification "would be adequately tailored to fit the changed
circumstances without reducing the consent decree to or below the
constitutional floor." The Court did not identify the “constitutional
floor" or explain the logic of any limitation of the number of
double-bunked cells in the new facility.

The Nashua Street Jail has received certification from the
Massachusetts State Building Code Appeals Board to hold 653
inmates. However, as a result of the June 14, 1994 District Court's
Order, the Jail's capacity was reduced to 553 inmates.

The Prison Litigation Reform Act
On April 26, 1996, President Clinton signed into law the

Prison Litigation Reform Act (the "PLRA"). The PLRA is

intended to "provid{e] reasonable limits on the remedies available

in" lawsuits concerning prison conditions. See H.R. Rep. No. 21,
104th Cong., Ist Sess. 7 (1995).

Section 802 of the Act establishes standards for the entry
and termination of prospective relief in civil actions concerning
conditions in prisons, jails, and juvenile detention facilities. With
regard to the entry of prospective relief, Section 3626(a)(1)(A)
provides:

Prospective relief in any civil action with respect
to prison conditions shall extend no further than
necessary to correct the violation of the Federal
right of a particular plaintiff or petitioners. The
court shall not grant or approve any prospective
relief unless the court finds that such relief is
narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary
to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is
the least intrusive means necessary to correct the
violation of the Federal mght. The court shall give
substantial weight to any adverse impact on public
safety or the operation of a criminal justice system
caused by the relief.

Section 3626(b)(2) provides for the immediate termination of any
prospective relief that was entered without the findings required by
Section 3626(a)(1):

In any civil action with respect to prison
conditions, a defendant or intervener shall be
entitled to the immediate termination of any
prospective relief if the relief was approved or
granted in the absence of a finding by the court
that the relief is narrowly drawn, extends no

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further than necessary to correct the violation of

the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means

necessary to correct the violation of the Federal

nght. |

A court may decline to terminate prospective relief only if
it has found that "prospective relief remains necessary to correct a
current or ongoing violation of the Federal right." 18 U.S.C. §
3626(b)(3). No such finding has ever been made in this case.

The Proceedings Below

Pursuant to Section 3626(b)(2) of the PLRA, the Sheriff
moved the District Court to terminate all prospective relief on the
ground that the District Court had theretofore never made the
required findings to sustain such relief with regard to the new
Nashua Street Jail. In ruling on the Sheriff's motion, the Court
acknowledged that it had "not made and does not now make the
findings required under § 3626(a)(1) or (b)(2) to keep in force
prospective relief, as petitioners have urged."

The District Court terminated the prospective relief
imposed by the Consent Decree insofar as it may be characterized

as a Court Order. Because the Court purported to preserve elements

of the Consent Decree, at least for "contract" purposes, the Court

determined that it did not have to address the constitutionality of

the PLRA's termination provision. All parties appealed the
decision.

The First Circuit modified the judgment to require that the
decree itself, and not simply the prospective relief imposed by the
decree, be terminated. The Court held that the PLRA was
constitutional in all respects and remanded the case to the District
Court for entry of the modified judgment.

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT
I. The Decision Of The First Circuit Court Of Appeals Is

Not In Conflict With Decisions In Other Circuits.

The Petitioners acknowledge that the constitutionality of
the PLRA has been upheld by no fewer than six separate Circuit
Courts.’ It can hardly be said, therefore, that the First Circuit’s
decision below creates a “real and embarrassing conflict of opinion
and authority between the circuit courts of appeal” justifying

review on certioran. NLRB Pittsburgh S.S. Co., 340 U.S. 498, 502

' See Hadix v. Johnson, Nos. 96-2463, 96-2582, 1998 U.S. App. Lexis 387 (6* Cir.
1998), Dougan v. Singletary, 129 F.3d 1424 (11" Cir. 1997), Benjamin v, Jacobson,
124 F.3d 162 (2d Cir. 1997), reh’g en banc granted, 124 F.3d 162 (2d Cir. 1997},
Gavin v. Branstad, 122 F.3d 1081 (8* Cir. 1997); Plyler v. Moore, 100 F.3d 365 (4*
Cir. 1996) cert denied, _U.S.__, 117 S.Ct.2460 (1997).

(1951)(quoting Layne & Bowler Corp. v. Western Well Works,

261 U.S. 387, 393 (1923)).”
The issues of federal law involved in this case have been

settled by historic decisions of this Court confirmed by more recent

precedent. See, e.g. Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bndge

Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421 (1856); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farms, 115

S.Ct. 1147 (1995). The First Circuit’s decision in this case simply
applies the law as expressed in those cases.

Il. The PLRA Presents No Constitutional Difficulties under
Separation of Powers or Due Process Principles.

A. The PLRA's Provisions for Termination Do Not
Violate the Principle of Separation of Powers.

The separation of powers doctrine prohibits Congress from

itself assuming the role assigned by the Constitution to the Judicial

Branch. Congress may not decide cases. United States v. Klein,
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871). It is the role of Congress, however,
to create and structure the inferior courts, and to establish the

confines of the jurisdiction of those courts. See U.S. Const. art. I, §

2 The Second Circuit has found the PLRA to be constitutional but originally
concluded that the residual of any consent decree may be enforced in state court.
Benjamin v. Jacobson, 124 F.3d 162,180 (2d Cir. 1997). The Circuit Court has
recently ordered en banc reconsideration of the matter.

en

8, cl. 9; art. III, §§ 1-2; see also Lauf v. E.G. Shinner & Co., 303
U.S. 323, 330 (1938) ("[t}here can be no question of the power of
Congress thus to define and limit the jurisdiction of the inferior
courts of the United States"). Congress not only establishes the
substantive federal law to be applied by the courts, it has the
constitutional authority to establish the procedural and evidentiary
rules which apply in proceedings before the federal courts. "[T]he
constitutional provision for a federal court system (augmented by
the Necessary and Proper Clause) carries with it congressional
power to make rules governing the practice and pleading in those
courts." Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965).

1. A Consent Decree is Not a Final Judgment.

The petitioners argue that the First Circuit erred in not
holding that Section 3626(b)(2) of the PLRA is unconstitutional
because it mandates the reopening of a "final judgment" by
requiring district courts to terminate consent decrees that were
approved before the passage of the PLRA. In support, the
petitioners rely on Plaut v. Spendthnft, 115 S. Ct. 1447 (1995).

In Plaut, this Court considered legislation that retroactively

allowed petitioners in certain specific securities fraud suits to

10

revive actions that had been previously dismissed as a result of a
statute of limitations rule first announced and applied by the
Supreme Court in Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v.

iIbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991). The Court in Plaut held that this
legislation represented an attempt by Congress to "set aside the
final judgment of an Article III court by retroactive legislation,"
115 S. Ct, at 1458, and thus violated separation of powers
principles. The Court explained that "[j]udgments within the
powers vested in courts by the Judiciary Article of the Constitution
may not lawfully be revised, overturned or refused faith and credit
by another Department of Government." Id. at 1456, quoting

Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc, v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333

U.S. 103, 113 (1948).

Sections 3626(b)(2) and (b)(3) of the PLRA do not violate
the principle announced in Plaut. Plaut involved lawsuits for
monetary damages. In that context, the Court stated that “[hJaving
achieved finality, . . . a judicial decision becomes the last word of
the judicial department with regard to a particular case or
controversy, and Congress may not declare by retroactive

legislation that the law applicable to that very case was something

1]

other than what the courts said it was." Plaut, 115 S. Ct. at 1457. ;
Indeed, the Court in Plaut explained that its ruling was

distinguishable frora decisions approving statutes “that altered the

prospective effect of injunctions entered by Article III courts."’ Id. |

at 1459 (citing Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co.,

59 U.S. (18 How.) 421 (1855)).

The basis for this distinction rests in the longstanding

principles applicable to injunctive relief. Injunctions, in contrast to

——— oe ee ee ee *

monetary judgments, have always been susceptible to modification

as a result of changes in law or fact. Pennsylvania v. Wheeling &
Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421 (1855); Rufo v.

Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 384 (1992). In
Wheeling & Belmont, this Court explained the dichotomy between
the finality of judgments for monetary damages and judgments
providing prospective relief. The Court explained:

[I}f the remedy in this case had been an action at law,

and a judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff for

damages, the right to these would have passed beyond
the reach of the power of congress . . . . But that part of

>The Court noted that “[a}part from the statute we review today, we know of no
instance in which Congress has attempted to set aside the final judgment of an

Article III court by retroactive legislation.” Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 115 S.
Ct. at 1458.

12

the decree, directing the abatement of the obstruction, is
executory, a continuing decree, which requires not only
the removal of the bridge, but enjoins the defendants
against any reconstruction or continuance. . . . If... this
right has been modified by the competent authority, so
that the bridge is no longer an unlawful obstruction, it is
quite plain that the decree of the court cannot be
enforced.

Pennsylvania vy. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 US. (18

How.) 421,431-432. See also United States v. Swift & Co., 286

U.S. 106 (1932); System Federation No. 91, Railway Employees’

Department, AFL-CIO v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642 (1961) (Court held

that statutory amendment permitting union shop agreements
required modification of a prior consent decree); Plaut, 115 S.Ct. at
1459 (legislation may affect "the prospective effects of injunctions

entered by Article III courts"), Rufo v. Inmates of the Suffolk

County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 393 (1992) (holding consent decree may

be modified based on significant changes in facts or law); Class v.
Norton, 507 F.2d 1058, 1061 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding that Wheeling
created a "doctrine of judicial deference to legislative revision of a
statute upon which a prospective court order is based"); Daylo v.

Administrator of Veterans’ Affairs, 501 F.2d 811, 817 (D.C. Cir.

1974) (judgment's prospective effects are not final for separation of

power purposes).

13

Indeed, the several courts addressing this issue have
similarly held that the PLRA does not offend separation of powers
principles. Plyler v. Moore, 100 F.3d 365 (4th Cir. 1996); James v.
Lash, 965 F. Supp. 1190, (N.D. Ind., May 15, 1997); Jensen _v.
County of Lake, 958 F. Supp. 397 (N.D. Ind. 1997); Benjamin v.
Jacobson, 935 F. Supp. 332 (S.D.N-Y. 1996).

a The PLRA's Requirement that the Court Issue

Findings Does Not Deprive the Courts of their Inherent

Power and Duty to Enforce Effective Remedies in

Constitutional Cases.

The petitioners contend that the PLRA violates the
separation of powers doctrine by depriving the federal courts of
their essential powers to enter equitable relief to remedy
constitutional violations in a prison setting. The PLRA does no
such thing. The PLRA merely requires that any prospective relief
be accompanied by particularized findings that such relief is
necessary to remedy an existing violation of a federal constitutional
right, thus ensuring that continuing orders comport with current
remedial! standards as articulated by the courts. Milliken v. Bradley,
433 U.S. 267, 280 (1977) (The "remedy must therefore be related
to 'the condition alleged to offend the constitution.""); Swann y.

Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971)

14

TO

—T ee ee ee

("[T]he nature of the violation determines the scope of the
remedy"); see also McLendon v. Continental Can Co., 908 F.2d
1171, 1182 (3d Cir. 1990) ("In granting injunctive relief, the court's
remedy should be no broader than necessary to provide full relief

to the aggrieved plaintiff"); Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1145

(Sth Cir. 1982) ("Reparative injunctive relief must be targeted at
elimination of the unconstitutional conditions . . . Therefore, a
court can order only relief sufficient to correct the violation

found"), vac'd in part on other grounds, 688 F.2d 266 (1982), cert.

denied., 460 U.S. 1042 (1983); Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d

1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 1986) ("our goal is to cure only constitutional

violations"), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1069 (1987).

This Court has held that in a prison setting the remedy

must be tailored to specific constitutional violations. See Lewis Vv.
(Casey, 116 S. Ct. 2174, 2183 (1996) ("[t]}he remedy [imposed]
must of course be limited to the inadequacy that produced the
injury-in-fact that the plaintiff has established."). Id.

The PLRA codifies the standards governing the imposition of

injunctive relief by requiring express findings in accordance with

15

those standards.* The PLRA in no way prevents an inmate from
asserting a constitutional violation. Nor does it deprive a court
from hearing such a claim or affording an appropriate remedy for
any proven violation. In fact, the PLRA expressly requires that
prospective relief be continued if it "remains necessary to correct a
current or ongoing violation of the Federal right . . . " and is
narrowly drawn to remedy that violation. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(3).°

3. The Termination of Relief Provision Does Not
Prescribe a Rule of Decision.

Finally, the petitioners contend that the PLRA
impermissibly prescribes unreasonable outcome-determinative
requirements for prison cases without changing the underlying law,
relying on United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128, 146 (1871) for

support.

“The imposition of such a procedural mechanism is clearly within Congress's
power to designate alternative mechanisms for the remediation of constitutional
violations. Cf. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 1132-1134
(1996) (Ex parte Young nonstatutory review precluded where Congress established
a statutory scheme for review under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act).

> ‘The statute was recently amended to read “current and ongoing violation.”
Department of Justice Appropriations Act, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-119, §123 (aX2),
111 Stat. 2440, 2470 (1997).

16

"Klein has been interpreted to hold that Congress may not
prescribe a rule of decision for the courts to follow without any
independent exercise of their judicial powers." Benjamin v.
Jacobson, 935 F. Supp. 332, 349 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). Rather, "[t]o
affect the outcome of a pending case, Congress must amend the
applicable law." Id.; Plaut, 115 S.Ct. at 1452 (citation omitted)
("Whatever the precise scope of Klein, . . . later decisions have
made clear that its prohibition does not take hold when Congress
amend[s] applicable law"); see also Robertson v. Seattle Audubon
Soc'y, 503 U.S. 429, 441 (1992) (declining to decide whether an
act of Congress was unconstitutional under Klein because the act

amended applicable law).

Here, contrary to petitioners’ contention, Congress has merely
articulated new remedial standards; it has not imposed an arbitrary
outcome or “rule of decision" for the application of pre-existing
law. As the Fourth Circuit explained, “Congress . . . has
unquestionably amended the law applicable to this case." Plyler v.
Moore, 100 F.3d 365, 372 (4th Cir. 1996). Since the PLRA

“compel[s] changes in law, not findings or results under old law,”

17

Seattle Audubon, 503 U.S. at 438, it does not violate the
separation-of-powers principles established in Klein.
B. The Application of the PLRA's Termination of Relief
Provision Does Not Implicate the Due Process Clause
By Impairing Any Existing Contract.
The petitioners contend that the PLRA's termination
provision would unconstitutionally impair their “contract” with
the defendants. No such contract exists. The Court’s inherent

power to modify or alter a consent decree makes a consent decree

fundamentally different from a private contract.

Even if the Consent Decree could be equated with a
private contract, the petitioners argument would still fail. A
claim that federal legislation impairs existing contracts falls under
the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corp. v. R. A. Gray Co., 467 U.S. 717, 733 (1984).
"The Fifth Amendment is not a complete bar to legislation that
may impair private contracts.” James v. Lash, 965 F. Supp.1190
(N.D. Ind., May 15, 1997). The challenging party must
demonstrate, "first, that the statute alters contractual rights,” and

if so, that the impairment is of “constitutional dimension.”

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R.R. Co., 470 U.S. 451, 472 (1985). The challenging party must
then “overcome a presumption of constitutionality and ‘establish
that the legislature has acted in an arbitrary and irrational way.'"
Id., quoting Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 467 U.S. at 729.
However, “where a private contract is impaired by a federal
statute, judicial scrutiny is ‘quite minimal.'" James v. Lash, 965
F. Supp. 1190 (N.D. Ind., May 15, 1997), quoting National R.R.
Passenger Corp., 470 U.S. at 472.

The Sheriff is required to provide constitutional conditions
at the Nashua Street Jail. This obligation is independent of any
Consent Decree. Accordingly, because the petitioners always
possess the right to seek a remedy for any unconstitutional
condition, any alleged contractual impairment of their nghts under

the Consent Decree could never rise to the level “of constitutional

Santa Fe RR. Co., 470 U.S. 451, 472 (1985); see also James v.
Lash, 965 F. Supp.1190 (N.D. Ind., 1997).

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Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, the petition for a writ of certiorari

should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

John D. Hanify
Robyn J. Bartlett

Owen P. Kane

HANIFY & KING
Professional Corporation
One Federal Street
Boston, MA 02110

(617) 423-0400

Counsel for Respondent

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386013_2165%3A3. Public record. Not legal advice.