# Amicus Curiae Brief — Gunn v. Department of Agriculture

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386013_1871%3A3

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1998
- **Citation:** 522 U.S. 1111

## Text

Supreme Court, U.S. '
sk & OD .
«) JAN 5 1993
No. 97-959 caren

In the

Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1997

A.
a

CHARLES GUNN,
Petitioner,
y
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND

NATURAL RESOURCES CONSERVATION SERVICE,
Respondents.

A.
—

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

-™
vv

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE
OF PACIFIC LEGAL FOUNDATION
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER

sé.
A

ROBIN L. RIVETI
*M. REED HOPPER

*COUNSEL OF RECORD
Pacific Legal Foundation
2151 River Plaza Drive.

Suite 305

Sacramento, California 95833
Telephone: (916) 641-8888
Facsimile: (916) 920-3444

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae
Pacific Legal Foundation

|

QUESTION PRESENTED

BACKGROUND

The “Swampbuster” provision of the Food Security Act of
1985 provides, “[n]o person shall become ineligible ... for
program loans or payments ... [a]s the result of the production
of an agricultural commodity on ... [a] converted wetland if
the conversion of the wetland was commenced before
December 23, 1985.” 16 U.S.C. § 3822(b)(1 (A).

Under Section 3801(a)(6)( A), a “converted wetland” is a
wetland that is “manipulated ... for the purpose or to have the
effect of making the production of an agricultural commodity
possible.”

QUESTION

Is Chevron deference due an agency regulation imple-
menting a statute where the agency regulation conflicts with the
clear and unambiguous language of the statute and the
regulation redefines the regulatory program, such as in this case
where the agency held a person who commenced the farming of
a wetland on his property for agricultural commodities in 1906
was not eligible for farm program loans and payments because
the wetland had not lost a// its wetland characteristics, and
became a “converted wetland,” until 1992?

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
CURES EOE Pee on re ee. i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED................. Iv
IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF
PR I 8k 8 as 8a PS oe Se BOT ]
STATE Gees Ge BeeC CARE ... 2... ice cece: 2
SUMBGARY OF ARGSUBGENT ..........222.2000005. 4
SE 3 dts a oh pe ewe Oh awd es 6

I. THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT THE WRIT
OF CERTIORARI TO RESOLVE AN
IMPORTANT QUESTION OF LAW
RELATING TO THE GOVERNMENT’S
EXPANSIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE
“SWAMPBUSTER” PROVISION OF THE
FOOD SECURITY ACT OF 1985 .............. 6

A. Congress Has Directly Spoken to the
Precise Issue in This Case and the Intent of
I a en i Scan 7

B. The Agency Did Not Interpret an
Ambiguous Statute; Rather, It “Rewrote”
the Sentutory Seams ....... 2... 10

Il. THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT THE
WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO RECONCILE
INCONSISTENT APPLICATIONS OF THE
CHEVRON TEST AMONG THE CIRCUIT
ere ee eee 12

EE 65-0 oS oie eh ee Ce 16

iil

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

Page
Cases
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities
for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687 (1995) ........--. 2
Bennett v. Spear, 117 S. Ct. 1154 (1997). .......--.--. 2
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources

Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) .... 2,4-10,12-17
Douglas County, Oregon v. Babbitt,

Fn Tn 2
Gunn vy. U.S. Department of Agriculture,

118 F.3d 1233 (8th Cir. 1997)........... 4,8-10,13-15
Hernandez v. Reno, 91 F.3d 776 (Sth Cir. 1996) ..... 14-16
Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974) ............... 9
National Mining Association v. Department of

Imterior, 105 F.3d 691 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ...... 12-13,16
Pacific Legal Foundation v. Andrus,

oS |S i 2
Steel Company v. Citizens for a Better

Environment, U.S. Supreme Court No. 96-643

ESS Sy ree ene 2

Statutes and Legislative Materials
RES Or 3
ee eee eee i,7
MIs ose eee eee 3

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1V

Pape
Pets) MII kk ewig tc pes a a 2 ae 13
ie IIIS “Farmed wetlands” is a wetland classification that does not appear in
“Swampbuster™ but is used by SCS to refer to wetlands that are
sometimes dry enough to farm.

4

system by the local drainage district, SCS classified 28.2 acres
of Gunn’s land as wetlands that had not been converted to
agricultural use until 1992, after the 1985 deadline.

Gunn filed suit in district court seeking, among other
things, declaratory judgment that he was entitled to farm this
land without losing benefits. In reliance on Chevron, U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, the
district court ruled that the classification of Gunn’s land as post-
1985 “converted wetlands” was reasonable and denied Gunn’s
request for declaration. Gunn appealed to the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals claiming the government’s interpretation of
the terms “commenced” and “converted wetland” are
inconsistent with the “Swampbuster” statute. Although the
circuit court acknowledged that the words of the statute can
bear the meaning Gunn contends, the court held the SCS
interpretations were “sufficiently plausible to meet the Chevron
test.” Gunn v. U.S. Department of Agriculture, 118 F.3d 1233,
1238 (8th Cir. 1997).

sé.
_

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Chevron deference does not lie where the intent of
Congress is clear from the words of the statute, but only where
a statute is silent or ambiguous. With respect to the definition
of “converted wetland” under “Swampbuster,” Congress was
neither silent nor ambiguous but precisely defined the term. A
wetland is converted when it is “manipulated ... for the purpose
or to have the effect of making the production of an agricultural
commodity possible.” Gunn’s land was manipulated by draining
in 1906 and has been farmed continuously ever since.

5

Under “Swampbuster,” farming “converted wetland” is
exempted from the Act’s restrictions if the conversion was
commenced before December 23, 1985. Gunn’s land met this
statutory definition. But, in contravention of the Act, the
agency “rewrote” the statutory scheme to add that the
manipulation must have been so ccmplete as to eliminate all
wetland characteristics of the land.

Federal agencies should not be allowed to rewrite their
legislative mandate. The agency’s interpretation conflicts with
the plain language of the statute and the legislative history and,
therefore, should not be upheld. Approximately 75% of wet-
lands remaining in the lower 48 states are found on private land,
primarily farmland. By one estimate, up to 60 million acres may
be characterized as “converted wetland.” Against this backdrop,
and over concerns for the plight of farmers, Congress passed the
Food Security Act of 1985 to provide “an economic climate in
which efficient American family farmers can survive.” The
balance Congress sought between wetland protection and
protection of small family farmers took the form of an exception
to “Swampbuster.” Congress expressly “grandfathered”
wetland areas farmed prior to the 1985 deadline. The executive
agency has no authority to reconsider this legislative policy
determination.

Additionally, in analogous situations, other circuit courts of
appeals have applied the Chevron test differently from the
Eighth Circuit in this case. This disparate treatment under the
law has significant ramifications for the economic competi-
tiveness of our Nation’s family farmers. This Court should
review the Eighth Circuit judgment, in light of Fifth and District
of Columbia Circuit decisions, to establish a consistent
application of Chevron.

6
ARGUMENT

THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT THE WRIT
OF CERTIORARI TO RESOLVE AN
IMPORTANT QUESTION OF LAW RELATING
TO THE GOVERNMENT’S EXPANSIVE
INTERPRETATION OF THE “SWAMPBUSTER”
PROVISION OF THE FOOD SECURITY ACT OF 1985

In Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, 467 U.S. 837, this Court set forth a standard for court
review of an agency’s construction of a statute it administers.
First, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to
the precise question at issue. “If the intent of Congress is clear,
that is the end of the matter, for the court, as well as the agency,
must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress.” /d. at 842-43. And second, “if the statute is silent
or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for
the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a
permissible construction of the statute.” /d. at 843.

The issue in this case is whether Gunn commenced the
conversion of wetlands on his property before December 23,
1985. Congress spoke precisely to that question in
“Swampbuster” and stated it intended to “grandfather” farming
operations in wetlands, like Gunn’s, that had begun before the
statutory deadline. 16 U.S.C. § 3822(b)(1)(A). But the court
below allowed the government to sidestep the intent of
Congress, and the judicial standard this Court established in
Chevron, by endorsing the agency’s redefinition of the statutory
scheme for “converted wetlands.” The Eighth Circuit judgment
guts the protections “Swampbuster” provides our Nation’s
farmers—who are already pressed by mounting environmental
regulatory demands—and undermines national agricultural
production. Of the roughly 100 million acres of wetlands
remaining in the lower 48 states, about 75% of these areas are
located on private, primarily agricultural land. Michael S.

7

Naggy, 7he Definition of “Wetlands” Under Section 404 of the
Clean Water Act: Past, Present, and Future, 3 U. Balt. J.
Envtl. L. 92, 101 (1993). By one estimate, up to 60 million
acres may be characterized as “converted wetland.” See
Houston Chron., Sept. 30, 1990, at 2A.

A. Congress Has Directly Spoken to the Precise Issue
in This Case and the Intent of Congress Is Clear

In Chevron, this Court looked both to the statutory
language and the legislative history to determine whether
Congress addressed the issue before the Court. The statutory
language in this case is clear and unambiguous.

Under Section 3822(b) 1 (A) of Title 16, “[n]o person shall
become ineligible ... for program loans or payments ... [a]s the
result of the production of an agricultural commodity on ... [a]
converted wetland if the conversion of the wetland
was commenced before December 23, 1985.”
Section 3801(a)(6)(A) provides:

The term “converted wetland” means wetland
that has been drained, dredged, filled, leveled, or
otherwise manipulated (including any activity that
results in impairing or reducing the flow, circulation,
or reach of water) for the purpose or to have the effect
of making the production of an agricultural
commodity possible if:

(i) such production would not have been
possible but for such action; and

(ii) before such action—
(I) such land was wetland; and

(Il) such land was neither highly erodible
land nor highly erodible cropland.

In 1906, Gunn’s land was drained or otherwise manipulated
both for the purpose and with the effect of making the

8

production of agricultural commodities possible. This
production has continued ever since. This is a matter of record
which the lower court does not dispute. The Eighth Circuit
even begrudgingly admits that a plain reading of the statutory
language supports Gunn’s claim that his property is “converted
wetland” under the Act. Gunn, 118 F.3d at 1238. However, in
putative reliance on Chevron, the court upholds the agency’s
view that “[i]f significant wetland characteristics remain, the
land remains wetland and cannot be converted wetland.” But
this view is not supported by the statutory language. Indeed, it
conflicts with the statutory language.

The definition of “converted wetland” is expressly
conditioned on the manipulation of the wetland for agricultural
production. It does not require or imply that the manipulation
must be so complete that all wetland characteristics disappear.

To the contrary, the definition specifically includes “any
activity that results in impairing or reducing the flow,
circulation, or reach of water” on the wetland. This language
contemplates a partial conversion of wetland features, not a
total elimination of wetland characteristics. This conclusion is
made clearer by two other references.

First, the Act only requires that the conversion of the
wetland “was commenced before December 23, 1985.”
16 U.S.C. § 3822(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added). The term
“commenced” is not ambiguous. It is commonly understood to
mean begin or start. It is not a term in need of definition and
Congress offered none. And second, the legislative history
demonstrates congressional intent to “grandfather” prior farmed
wetland:

Mr. Daschle offered an amendment, to deny
Federal farm program benefits to persons planting
agricultural commodities on converted wetlands for
harvest .... Mr. Daschle noted that while the sodbuster
provisions [prohibiting farming on highly erodible

a ee

9

lands} would be retroactive, the swampbuster
amendment would only be concerned with conversion
of wetlands as of the date of enactment ....

... Mr. Daschle and Mr. Lewis discussed the
question of cropland that has been flooded and later
reclaimed. Mr. Daschle stressed that the amendment
would not affect the use of this land because if
production was underway at any time in the past, the
land would be grandfathered.

H.R. Rep. No. 99-271, pt. 1, at 416, 419, 99th Cong., Ist Sess.
(1985), reprinted in 1985 US.C.C.A.N. 1103, 1520-23
(emphasis added).

It should be clear that Congress spoke to the precise issue
of when “Swampbuster” applies and that Congress intended if
agricultural “production was underway at any time in the past
[before December 23, 1985], the land would be grandfathered.”
Gunn’s land was drained in 1906 and has been farmed ever
since. As the Eighth Circuit correctly noted, but misunderstood:
“Under the statute, conversion occurs when wetland is
manipulated with a certain effect. The [agency] regulation
simply underscores that it is the initial manipulation, not some
subsequent applications of it, that is to be considered for this
purpose.” Gunn, 118 F.3d at 1239 n.3. Under this standard,
Gunn’s land qualifies as “converted wetland.” The agency’s
contrary construction is due no deference under Chevron.
Unlike in the Clean Air Act under review by this Court in
Chevron, Congress left no gap in “Swampbuster” for the agency
to fill. See Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974). “Ifthe
intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter.”
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 855.

10

B. The Agency Did Not Interpret an Ambiguous
Statute; Rather, It “Rewrote” the Statutory Scheme

The Eighth Circuit went awry in this case when it gave
Chevron deference to the agency’s view that if the drainage or |
other manipulation has been sufficient to make crops producible, :
as is the case here, but the land retains wetland characteristics,
the land is best described as “farmed wetland,” as opposed to
“converted wetland.” Gunn, 118 F.3d at 1238. According to
the agency, “farmed wetlands” can be farmed without loss of
benefits only so long as the previously accomplished drainage or
manipulation is not significantly improved. /d. But this is not
a simple interpretation of the statutory language, it is an
excursion and incursion into the legislative realm that amounts
to nothing less than a redefinition of the statutory scheme. The
agency simply did not like the all-or-nothing language of
“Swampbuster,” which “grandfathers” all wetlands put into
agricultural production before December 23, 1985, so the
agency “rewrote” the statute to further restrict land use.

“Farmed wetlands” is a term that does not appear in the
Statute. Rather, it is a term adopted by the agency’s regulations.
Id. Notwithstanding the lack of statutory authority for the
agency’s reclassification of wetlands under “Swampbuster,” the
Eighth Circuit erroneously concluded that this new wetland
classification somehow “accords with the general purpose of the
statute—to preserve those wetland characteristics still in
existence in 1985.” /d. But this misses the point. Chevron
does not give license to the agency to set aside a specific
statutory scheme defined by Congress in favor of the agency’s
view of the statutory purpose.

Moreover, the court cites no authority for its limited
characterization of the purpose of the statute. Indeed, the
statute expressly excepts wetlands put into agricultural
production before enactment of the statute, demonstrating a
clear economic purpose to the “grandfather” clause of the
“Swampbuster” provision. In addition, the Food Security Act

ke maa

1]

of 1985 derived from a large and complex omnibus bill that was
based on a congressional desire to bolster a failing agricultural
economy:

The purpose of this bill is simple. It is to provide, as
far as it can be done in legislation of this kind, the
basis for an economic climate in which efficient
American family farmers can survive the grim squeeze
that has already driven too many of them to or close to
the brink of ruin.

H.R. Rep. No. 99-271, pt. 1, at 8, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. (1985),
reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1103, 1520-23 (emphasis
added).

The drafters felt the need for this bill was obvious to all
who had followed recent developments. /d. They noted that
even if Congress were willing to let important segments of
agriculture collapse, Congress could not afford to do so because
of the dangers this would pose to the entire national economy.
Id.

It was clear to these drafters that what Congress did about
new farm policy must be based on the understanding that
agriculture is our Nation’s largest and most basic industry. /d.
at 1111-12. They believed America’s farmers have given our
people the world’s best diet at costs which—in comparison to
the average consumer’s earnings—really constitute a farmer
subsidy to the general public. /d. at 1112. They also believed
that one of the chief reasons this country has been able to grow
and make progress in many areas has been the increasing
efficiency of its farmers and the other segments of agriculture.
Id. “When agriculture is depressed, the farmer and his family
suffer—but they do not suffer alone.” Jd. They noted with
great concern the distress in the agricultural supply industries,
and in businesses on hundreds of main streets around the
Nation. /d. And in the long run, the drafters conclude, a

12

depressed and demoralized agriculture would be very bad
economic news for the entire Nation. /d.

This legislative history demonstrates that the primary
purpose of the Food Security Act of 1985 was, as the name of |
the Act implies, to protect the Nation’s efficient supply of food |
by providing security to our family farmers. Congress chose to |
balance this effort with a conservation ethic that protects |
wetlands, but not at the expense of prior farming practices.
Congress made a policy decision to “grandfather” prior
“converted wetlands” and established a clear and unambiguous
definition of this term—a definition that would be easy to meet
and which would allow average farming families to anticipate
the effects of their farming practices on farm program benefits.
But the agency has supplanted Congress’ public policy decision.
Rather than accord with the general purpose of the statute, the
agency’s “farmed wetland” classification undermines that

purpose.

When federal agencies can “rewrite” their legislative
mandate and change the expectations of the regulated farming
community at will, this causes unnecessary distrust of the
government and demoralizes the industry. We all lose when that
happens. This Court should not allow the government to rely
on Chevron to circumvent the will of Congress to protect and
promote efficient farm production for the agency’s perceived
“larger goal” of wetland protection.

THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT THE WRIT OF
CERTIORARI TO RECONCILE INCONSISTENT
APPLICATIONS OF THE CHEVRON TEST AMONG
THE CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEALS

In analogous circumstances, other courts of appeals have
applied Chevron differently from the Eighth Circuit in this case.
In National Mining Association v. Department of Interior,
105 F.3d 691 (D.C. Cir. 1997), the District of Columbia Circuit

ee

13

had to consider regulatory implementation of the Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA), 30 U.S.C.
§ 1201, ef seq.

In 1977, Congress enacted SMCRA “to establish a
nationwide program to protect society and the environment
from the adverse effects of surface coal mining operations.”
National Mining Association, 105 F.3d at 693. The Office of
Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement (OSM)
administers and enforces SMCRA. Under SMCRA, no person
may engage in surface coal mining without a permit. At issue
was OSM’s interpretation of the Act’s ownership and control
provision.

Section 510(c) of SMCRA is as clear as “Swampbuster”
and states that when “any surface coal mining operation owned
or controlled by the applicant” is currently in violation of
SMCRA, the permit shall not be issued. However, just as in
Gunn--the present case, the agency expanded the statutory
limitation by adding a new regulatory category. OSM adopted
a rule that the permit shall not issue if an operation owned or
controlled “by either the applicant or by any person who owns
and controls the applicant’ is currently in violation of SMCRA.
National Mining Association, 105 F.3d at 694. This broadening
of the Act to cover the owners of applicants in addition to the
applicants themselves is no more expansive than the agency’s
rule in Gunn. In Gunn, the agency adopted a rule that wetlands
are “converted wetlands” not when they are manipulated for
agricultural production, as “Swampbuster” explicitly states, but
rather when they are manipulated to eliminate permanently all
wetland characteristics.

However, contrary to the deference shown the government
in Gunn, the D.C. Circuit in National Mining Association
applied the first step of Chevron to strike down this construction
of the statute. The court held that the statutory language was
unmistakably clear and that “OSM is attempting to use section

14

510(c) to regulate those not covered by that section.” /d.
at 694-95. The same could be said for the agency’s attempt in
Gunn. The agency is trying to regulate “farmed wetlands” that
are not covered by the “Swampbuster” provision.

Additionally, unlike the court in Gunn, the D.C. Circuit was |
not deterred from applying Chevron to void the agency
regulation even though the general purpose of SMCRA was to
protect the environment. Gunn, it seems, would have fared
differently in the D.C. Circuit where the court’s application of
Chevron accords more with this Court’s holding in that case.
But the D.C. Circuit is not the only Circuit that takes a different
view of Chevron.

In Hernandez v. Reno, 91 F.3d 776 (Sth Cir. 1996), the
plaintiff challenged the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) regulations implementing the Family Unity Provision of
the Immigration Act of 1990. The Family Unity Provision of the
Act provides that an alien who is an eligible immigrant as of
May 5, 1988, among other things, shall be granted authorization
to work in the United States. However, the INS regulations
require that an alien seeking Family Unity status as the spouse
or child of a legalized alien must be such not only on May 5,
1988, but continuously thereafter until permanent residency is

granted.

This INS interpretation of the Immigration Act
is remarkably similar to the SCS interpretation of “Swamp-
buster.” Under “Swampbuster,” “[n]o person shall become
ineligible ... for program loans or payments ... [a]s the result of
the production of an agricultural commodity on ... [a] converted
wetland if the conversion of the wetland was commenced before
December 23, 1985.” However, the agency interprets this
provision to mean that the farmer not only must have
commenced the conversion before December 23, 1985, but also
must have “actively pursued” the particular conversion until the

15

conversion is complete, that is until the wetiand no longer
demonstrates any wetland characteristics. Gunn, 118 F.3d
at 1237.

The INS interpretation in Hernandez was initially upheld by
the district court which relied on Chevron and ruled that the
INS regulation interpreting the Family Unity Provision requiring
the alien to maintain the same relationship throughout the
pendency of his petition was a permissible construction of the
statute. But the Fifth Circuit overruled the district court
decision:

Chevron deference does not lie where the intent
of Congress is clear from the words of the statute, but
rather where a statute is “silent or ambiguous with
respect to the specific issue ....” The statute requires
that Hernandez be the spouse or unmarried child of a
legalized alien on May 5, 1988. It requires no more.
The INS regulation adding a requirement that the alien
continuously maintain that same relationship is in
conflict with the plain language of the statute. Our
duty is to give effect to the clear, unambiguous intent
of Congress. Whether Hernandez marries after
May 5, 1988 is irrelevant to the inquiry under the
Family Unity Provision of the Immigration Act of
1990.

Id. at 780-81.

Similarly, the Eighth Circuit in Gunn ruled that the
agency’s interpretation of the “Swampbuster” provision was
“sufficiently plausible to meet the Chevron test.” Gunn,
118 F.3d at 1238. However, the intent of Congress in
“Swampbuster” is clear from the words of the statute. The
statute is not silent or ambiguous with respect to what
constitutes a “converted wetland.” The statute requires that
Gunn manipulate a wetland for the purpose or with the effect of

16

making the production of an agricultural commodity possible
before December 23, 1985, which has happened on Gunn’s land
since 1906. The statute requires no more. The agency
regulation requiring Gunn to “actively pursue” the complete
conversion of his land and reclassifying his “converted wetland”
as a so-called “farmed wetland” is in conflict with the plain
language of the statute. The duty of the Court is to give effect
to the clear, unambiguous intent of Congress. Whether Gunn
manipulated his land after December 23, 1985, is irrelevant to
the inquiry under the “Swampbuster” provision of the Food
Security Act of 1985.

The type of disparate treatment under the law demonstrated
by these cases has significant ramifications for the economic
competitiveness of our Nation’s family farmers. This Court
should review the Eighth Circuit decision in light of National
Mining Association and Hernandez to establish a consistent
application of Chevron.

,%
7

CONCLUSION

The Eighth Circuit’s judgment conflicts with the plain
language of the “Swampbuster” provision of the Food Security
Act of 1985. It guts the public policy decision of Congress to
“grandfather” prior farming of wetlands to bolster small family
farms. It also distorts the intent of Chevron, which requires
agencies to defer to the unambiguous intent of Congress as
expressed in a statute. Federal agencies should not be allowed

17

to co-opt the legislative function by “rewriting” the statutory
scheme to achieve their own ends. For these reasons, and to
address conflicting applications of Chevron among the circuits,
this Court should grant the petition for writ of certiorari.

DATED: January, 1998.
Respectfully submitted,

ROBIN L. RIVETT

*M. REED HopPER

*COUNSEL OF RECORD
Pacific Legal Foundation
2151 River Plaza Drive,

Suite 305

Sacramento, California 95833
Telephone: (916) 641-8888
Facsimile: (916) 920-3444

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae
Pacific Legal Foundation

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386013_1871%3A3. Public record. Not legal advice.