# Appendix — California v. Smith

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386013_1836%3A2

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 1998
- **Citation:** 522 U.S. 1147

## Text

5a F a oom

©: __gerige—or THE CLERK

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1997

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, Petitioner,

V.

MARIAFELISSA SMITH, Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
CALIFORNIA COURT OF APPEAL, FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT,
DIVISION TWO

APPENDIX

DANIEL E. LUNGREN
Attorney General
GEORGE WILLIAMSON
Chief Assistant Attorney General
RONALD A. BASS
Senior Assistant Attorney General
RONALD S. MATTHIAS
Supervising Deputy Attorney General
DAVID D. SALMON
Deputy Attorney General
Counsel of Record
50 Fremont St., Room 300
San Francisco, CA 94105
Telephone: (415) 356-6217
Fax: (415) 356-6024
Counsel for Petitioner

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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Opinion of California Court of Appeal
Filed July 3, 1997 1

Order of California Court of Appeal
Denying Rehearing and Modifying Opinion
Filed Aug 4, 1997 35

(he Ne ae ely ARS SONTRN 2 AACE A bor rate

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. A072044

MARIAFELISSA SMITH, (Contra Costa County
Super. Ct. No. 9509894)

Defendant and Appellant

Mariafelissa Smith appeals from a conviction of
second degree murder of her newborn child. She
contends the conviction must be reversed because it was
based upon statements to the police obtained in violation
of her rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S.
436; the jury was not instructed to determine whether the
baby died from methamphetamine poisoning or from
drowning; the jury was not instructed on the lesser
included offense of misdemeanor manslaughter based on
methamphetamine use; and the jury was not instructed
that it had to agree unanimously on the act or omission
that caused the baby’s death.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellant was charged by indictment filed on June 8,
1995, with the murder of her baby on or about April 18,
1995. Jury trial began on September 11, 1995, and
appellant was found guilty of second degree murder on
September 21. On October 20, appellant [2] was
sentenced to a prison term of 15 years to life. She filed
a timely notice of appeal on October 24, 1995.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

At the time of trial, appellant and her husband,
Duane Smith, had been married for seven and a half years
were raising two children, age six years and four years,
and had given a third child up for adoption. Appellant
had also had two abortions and one miscarriage.

On October 21, 1994, appellant told her doctor, who
had diagnosed her with "adjustment disorder" or "mild
depression," that she had had a positive home pregnancy
test and wanted to terminate the pregnancy. When
informed that her medical insurance would not cover the
cost of an abortion unless she was in medical danger,
appellant said she would find a "way to terminate even if
it meant putting herself in danger." On October 26,
appellant was referred to Planned Parenthood.

Flordeliza Bartolo, appellant’s 16-year-old sister,
testified that in the fall of 1994 appellant had asked for a
ride to Oakland to get an abortion; she had agreed to
take appellant but had not in fact done so. Appellant had
said she did not want to have another baby with her
husband; she told her sister she was depressed and was
having marital problems.

Smith testified that appellant became pregnant in the
fall of 1994, but when she had her menstrual period in
November and December of that year, he and appellant
assumed the pregnancy test had been a false positive or
appellant had had a miscarriage.

On April 12, 1995, Dr. Anh Bui examined appellant
at the Antioch Kaiser-Permanente. Appellant was
experiencing pelvic pressure and had noticed enlargement
of her abdomen. She appeared to the doctor to be about
seven or eight months pregnant, although she could also
have had fibroids in her uterus. When Bui discovered a
fetal heartbeat, appellant expressed disbelief, saying she
could not be pregnant because she had been having
periods; she was very upset and cried. Ultrasound

examination revealed the [3] fetus to be approximately 33
and a half weeks, give or take two to three weeks. Bui
told appellant termination of a pregnancy after 24 weeks
was illegal and asked her to consider giving the baby up
for adoption. Although appellant said her period had
ended the day before the examination, Bui did not find
old blood as would be expected in this situation.
Appellant had answered in the negative to a questionnaire
query as to whether she had used drugs during pregnancy;
Bui testified that use of a large amount of
methamphetamine can cause bleeding and premature
labor as well as fetal death.

Two days later, Bui performed another ultrasound to
assess the well-being of the fetus. Based on the results of
this assessment, Bui testified the chance of a stillbirth the
following week would be less than one in a thousand; the
chances for survival of a fetus born at 33 and a half weeks
would be more than 95 percent. Appellant indicated she
was considering adoption. She was scheduled for another
appointment on April 18.

Appellant’s husband testified that although he had
noticed in February 1995, that appellant was starting to
put on weight, in April she was “not even close" to as big
as she had been in previous pregnancies, looking to Smith
at most four months pregnant and still wearing her regular
clothes. When appellant visited Kaiser in April, Smith
assumed she was about three months pregnant; she did
not tell him the doctor informed her she was 33 weeks
pregnant. Appellant’s sister testified she thought
appellant was getting fat because it “runs in our family."
She did not think appellant was pregnant because she had
given appellant sanitary pads to use during her periods.

During the afternoon on Easter Sunday, April 16,
Smith noticed appellant walking in an unusual manner,
"wobbling" and walking like a penguin. She went into the
bathroom but said she was all right. Smith heard her turn
on the water in the sink "once in a while;" when he

opened the door to the bathroom to hand her a cigarette
she had asked for, he saw water all over the floor and a
roll of toilet paper in the water. Smith fell asleep and
when he woke up, appellant was lying with him. She said
she was lightheaded and nauseated. The next day,
appellant wore wrapped up toilet paper in her vaginal
area [4] and looked a "little bit thinner, no stomach."
Smith assumed appellant had had a miscarriage.

Appellant did not show up for her appointment at
Kaiser on April 18. On April 19, nurse Donna Ball called
appellant repeatedly and eventually reached her in the
late afternoon. Appellant said she had a "problem" and
would like to see Dr. Bui, then said she had lost the baby.
Appellant said "Saturday night I was in the shower, and
there was this big gush of blood, and the baby came out.
And it was all blue and white." Appellant said she had
not yet seen a doctor and could not come that afternoon,
but agreed to come the next morning. Appellant sounded
pleasant and cooperative.

After speaking with Ball, Dr. Francis Wright, the
chief of obstetrics-gynecology at the Antioch Kaiser, called
appellant. Appellant told him she had lost the baby the
day before and had given him "a proper burial in the back
yard." She told Wright she had freaked. Wright told
appellant he would have to contact the police.

Pittsburg police officers Kohler, Calia and Beyhan
arrived at appellant’s apartment at about 4:50 p.m. on
April 19; Detective Barbanica arrived about 5:23.
Appellant, appearing nervous and shaken, said she had
been expecting them and told them the baby was in a
plastic garbage bag on the balcony. She said the baby had
been born the previous night. Her young children were
also in the apartment.

After the police found the baby, appellant was taken
to the Pittsburg Police Department. Later that evening
she was transported to the Walnut Creek Kaiser, where
she was examined by Dr. James Ferry. Appellant told

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Ferry her last menstrual period had been approximately
one and a half weeks before and she had given birth on
April 18. She said she had gotten into the shower to
relieve low back pain and had delivered the baby, blue
and not moving, followed after about two minutes by the
placenta. Appellant told the emergency room nurse she
spoke with on April 19 that she had delivered a stillborn
baby the day before and put him in a plastic bag on her
balcony. Appellant appeared to be very calm. The nurse
testified that appellant came to the hospital in the
company of a [5] uniformed police officer, who remained
outside the door of the room in which she was examined.
Analysis of appellant’s blood drawn at Kaiser on April 19
showed .38 micrograms per milliliter of
methamphetamine.

Detective Barbanica interviewed appellant at the
police station for about an hour and a half, beginning
around 12:30 a.m. on Thursday, April 20. Appellant had
at this point been in the "care" of the police department
for more than seven hours, having been taken by the
police from her home to the police station, then to the
Walnut Creek Kaiser, then back to the police station.
Barbanica testified that he conducted the interview in
"subdued" or "gentle" tones, like a "normal conversation."
Appellant told Barbanica she had begun to suspect she
was pregnant in February, but did not tell anyone, and
learned she was in fact pregnant about a week before the
interview. She said she had been told after the birth of
her last son that she was physically incapable of having
any more children and repeatedly said she did not want
any more children.

Appellant initially told the detective she had delivered
the baby, blue and white, in the shower on the Tuesday
before the interview, then placed the baby and placenta
into the garbage can. Appellant said she did not “see
herself" picking up the baby and putting him in the
garbage but realized after the fact that she had done so.

She told her husband she had had a miscarriage and
flushed the baby down the toilet. The next morning, she
moved the baby to the wastebasket in the children’s
bathroom so her husband would not find him, and then to
the balcony.

Barbanica told appellant he did not believe she was
being completely honest, said he knew she wanted to “get
this off [her] chest” and asked her to start over from the
beginning. Appellant told him the birth had occurred on
Easter Sunday and the baby had been born while she was
sitting on the toilet. She said as the baby went into the
toilet she could hear a "gurgling sound as though it was
gasping for its first breath of air." Appellant said the baby
landed head first into the toilet, with his mouth and nose
submerged under the water and feet sticking up. She
closed the lid on the toilet, leaving [6] the baby inside,
and took a shower. After taking her shower, appellant
lifted the toilet lid and poked the baby’s feet, but the baby
did not move. Barbanica suggested that appellant might
have actually put the baby into the toilet, but appellant
insisted she gave birth into the toilet.

Appellant had told Barbanica she had hoped the
baby was going to be born dead because she could not
handle any more children physically, emotionally, or
financially. She had considered adoption but "felt that the
baby would be better off with God than with another
family raising the child that she should be raising." She
said that if she had learned. of the pregnancy earlier, she
would have terminated it, and that she was having
menstrual cycles throughout the pregnancy. Appellant
said that at one point she felt she should be calling 911
and realized, "My God, what am I doing here?” When
asked if she ever thought, "“"I can’t let the baby die. I’ve
got to pick it up[,]""" she said, "Honestly, no." Late in the
interview, appellant was placed under arrest and started
to cry, saying I did not murder the baby. I couldn’t
have.”

Barbanica also interviewed appellant’s husband at the
police station that night. Smith told the detective he
thought appellant was three to four months pregnant.

Dr. Brian Peterson, a forensic pathologist, performed
an autopsy of the baby on the morning of April 20. The
placenta was still attached to the baby’s body, which
weighed a little under five pounds and was about 20
inches long. The baby was full term, with a gestational
age of between 34 and 40 weeks. Peterson found no
evidence of decomposition and estimated the baby had
died within 24 hours of 1 a.m. on April 20, the time at
which the body was refrigerated in the coroner’s Office.

Peterson was certain the baby had been born alive
and testified he had lived only a relatively brief time. He
found no evidence of infection, placental abruption (a
condition that can cause prenatal death), or maceration
(the changes undergone by a baby that dies in the womb).
He did find air in the stomach, which generally can
happen only from swallowing, and pink-tinged foam in the
upper airways, indicating air had been breathed, [7] and
evidence of air in the lungs. He did not determine a
cause of death; he did not find injuries that would
invariably be fatal and did not find evidence of natural
disease that would necessarily have produced death. He
found some "soft signs" of death by asphyxiation, namely
the pink-tinged foam in the airways, but did not find other
signs of asphyxia, such as hemorrhage in the base of the
skull.

Analysis of the baby’s blood revealed
methamphetamine at a level of 1.34 micrograms per
milliliter. Peterson testified that methamphetamine taken
by a pregnant woman will be transferred through the
placenta to the baby at the same level. Analysis of the
drug in the baby’s. blood indicated the mother had
ingested methamphetamine recently before the birth. The
level of methamphetamine found in the baby’s blood was
"significant" for a newborn; a level greater than 2 would

be considered lethal. Peterson felt methamphetamine was
a contributing factor in the death of the baby. He
testified that the amount of methamphetamine involved in
this case could have stopped the baby’s heart and could
have killed the baby but would not necessarily have done
so. Without the methamphetamine if the baby was left in
the toilet, it would have died. Peterson felt a baby born
with this amount of methamphetamine in his system "may
well have survived" if born in a hospital or given
immediate medical attention, and might have survived
even without immediate medical attention. The placenta
remaining attached to the baby could have hastened death
by causing shock more quickly.

Defense

Appellant, age 27 at the time of trial, testified that
she began using methamphetamine occasionally at age 15
and used it most weekends until she entered the military
when she was 18. She started to use the drug again when
she left the military in 1994. During the fall of 1994,
appellant was using about a quarter of a gram of
methamphetamine a day; she continued to use up to a
half gram a day until her arrest.

Appellant and Smith had been having marital
problems since April of 1991 which were getting worse by
the fall of 1994. When appellant learned she was
pregnant in [8] October 1994, she considered having an
abortion, but when she had periods in November and
December, she thought she had had a false pregnancy test
or a miscarriage. In February 1995, appellant again
thought she might be pregnant because she missed her
period but did not go to a doctor because she began to
bleed again in March and April. Appellant did not want
another child. She had been told after the birth of her
third child that it woul€¢ be hard for her to get pregnant,
although she had a miscarriage after being told this.

When she went to the doctor in April, she thought she
had a collapsed uterus. She was not as large as she had
been at eight months in her three full term pregnancies
and was not wearing maternity clothes. Her reaction to
being told she was pregnant was "disbelief;" she was not
happy and cried. Dr. Bui told her the baby was due at
the end of May. Appellant discussed with the nurse
calling the adoption agency she had used before. She did
not tell her husband about the pregnancy because she
expected him to be "outraged."

Appellant said she did not sleep between Friday,
April 14 and Sunday, April 16, and smoked
methamphetamine throughout that time. She never told
a medical professional that she was using drugs. She did
not know methamphetamine could cause bleeding or
premature labor or cause the baby to die.

Appellant did not think she was going to give birth on
April 16, was not trying to cause herself to have the baby,
and did not realize as she sat on the toilet that she was
having contractions. When the baby was born, she heard
a “gurgle" once or twice, looked and saw the baby was not
moving and was blue. She did not pick him up; she "just
couldn’t move at that point" and stood looking at him,
then closed the toilet lid because she "just couldn’t look at
him no more."

Appellant denied doing anything to actively kill the
baby, testifying she never ouce thought the baby was alive
and that it never occurred to her he could drown or she
could save him. She wanted to call 911 but did not do so
because her husband and children were around and she
was afraid people would hate her if they knew what had
happened. [9] She concealed the baby because she did
not want anyone to know what had happened. She
continued to use about a half gram of methamphetamine
a day until] Wednesday, when the police came, and slept
only a few hours during this time. She had last smoked
methamphetamine about a half hour before the police

10

came to the apartment. Appellant admitted she had lied
to others about her drug use and the circumstances and
date of the baby’s birth and death. She told the nurse and
doctor at Kaiser that the baby had been born on April 18
because she was scared and knew she had "disrespected"
his body. She acknowledged the various statements she
had made to Detective Barbanica and testified that when
she told him she could not believe what she did, she was
referring to putting the baby’s body on the balcony.

Dr. Albert Kastl, a psychologist with expertise on
Substance abuse, testified that people using
methamphetamine feel very capable but in fact have a
poor ability to function, often displaying illogical thinking,
difficulty planning behavior, paranoia, impulsiveness and
inability to adhere to conventional morality. They often
show inappropriate affect, displaying emotional reactions
inconsistent with the situation, and have a very poor
understanding of risks.

In response to a hypothetical question assuming the
general circumstances of appellant’s life, daily use of
approximately half a gram of methamphetamine and the
circumstances of appellant’s baby’s birth and death, Kastl
opined that the woman would not be able to make sound
and appropriate judgments or plan her behavior well,
would be likely to act impulsively and have an impaired
ability to appreciate the emotional significance of what
was happening, and would be unable to cope with the
additional stress of a premature, unwanted baby. He
testified the act of putting the dead baby into the
household garbage reflected an inability to plan or
incongruity between the emotions and socially appropriate
behavior and displayed many of the features associated
with acute amphetamine intoxication. With use of a
quarter gram of methamphetamine a week instead of a
half gram a day, the person would have a "serious inability
to. cope with [10] reality;" a single use of
methamphetamine could result in major changes in ability

11

to think and plan in a person not used to the drug. Kastl
did not think it was "psychologically probable" a woman in
appellant’s situation might have taken a large dose of
methamphetamine to allow her the ability to kill her
unwanted child and was not aware of any instance in
which this drug had been used to gain ability to commit an
antisocial act, but acknowledged that such use of the drug
would be possible.

Dr. Paul Hermann, a pathologist, testified that
newborn babies’ bodies decompose more slowly than
others and believed the baby could have died as early as
April 16, although it could also have died later. Hermann
agreed with Peterson’s conclusion that the baby was born
alive. He testified that the pink-tinged foam in the baby’s
windpipe could have been from drowning, although it
could also have been amniotic fluid taken into the lungs
before or during birth. Hermann found "considerable"
infection in the membranes around the baby, although not
in the umbilical cord. Such infection could cause rupture
of the membranes and onset of labor, or could occur if
labor did not begin for some time after rupture of the
membranes. There was no evidence of infection in the
baby.

Hermann testified that a level of .38 micrograms per
milliliter of methamphetamine in an adult women’s blood
was a high amount that would cause most people to show
outward signs of intoxication. The level of 1.34
micrograms per milliliter in the baby’s blood was an
extremely high amount. Hermann doubted the levels of
methamphetamine in the blood of mothers and newborns
would be the same over any period of time, suspected that
methamphetamine taken by a pregnant woman could
accumulate in the baby over time, as is the case with many
drugs, and testified the baby in the present case did not
necessarily receive the level of methamphetamine shown
from a single dose. A newborn could die from
methamphetamine poisoning and Hermann felt it was

12

possible methamphetamine alone could have killed the
baby in this case. At the level found in the baby,
Hermann would expect the child to be very tremulous and
possibly [11] have convulsions, cardiac arrhythmia and
breathing irregularities. Methamphetamine poisoning
could cause a baby to stop breathing.

Rebuttal

A police officer who participated in the search of
appellant’s apartment on April 19 testified that he found
a plastic baggie containing off-white residue that appeared
to be methamphetamine but did not find a pipe or other
instrument indicating methamphetamine use.

Detective Leonard Orman of the Antioch Police
Department, who iestified as an expert on recognizing the
effects of methamphetamine, did not consider a quarter to
a half gram a day of methamphetamine to be a “high
amount." After watching about 20 minutes of the tape of
appellant’s interview with Detective Barbanica, Orman
was of the opinion she was not under the influence of
methamphetamine because she was able to sit still for
long periods of time and concentrate on one subject as
she spoke with the officer did not "ramble on constantly"
and waited for questions to be asked. Orman testified
significant symptoms of methamphetamine use would last
approximately six to seven hours. He further testified that
a woman who took methamphetamine at 4:30 p.m. would
possibly still be exhibiting symptoms at 12:30 a.m. and
opined that appellant probably did not smoke a half gram
of methamphetamine at 4:30 p.m.

DISCUSSION

Appellant contends her conviction must be reversed
because the trial court erred in allowing the prosecution
to introduce evidence of her statements to Detective

13

Barbanica. She claims these statements were elicited in
violation of her rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966)
384 US. 436.

The United States Supreme Court held in Miranda
"that a person questioned bylaw enforcement officers after
being ‘taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way’ must first “be
warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any
statement he does make may be used as evidence against
him, and [12] that he has a right to the presence of an
attorney, either retained or appointed.” (Stansbury v.
California (1994) 511 U.S. 318, 322.) Statements obtained
in violation of this rule may not be used to establish guilt.
(Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 444; People v.
Aguilera (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1151, 1161.)

The obligation to administer Miranda warnings
attaches “only where there has been such a restriction on
a person’s freedom as to render him “in custody.”
(Stansbury v. California, supra, 511 U.S. at p. 322, quoting
Oregon v. Mathiason (1977) 429 U.S. 492, 495.) In the
present case, appellant contends she was in custody during
her entire interview with Detective Barbanica.
Respondent contends she was not in custody until she was
actually placed under arrest. "On appeal, we accept the
trial court’s findings of historical fact if supported by
substantial evidence but independently determine whether
the interrogation was ‘custodial.” (People v. Aguilera,
supra, 51 Cal.App.4th at p. 1161.)

"In determining whether an individual was in custody,
a court must examine all of the circumstances surrounding
the interrogation, but ‘the ultimate inquiry is simply
whether there [was] a “formal arrest or restraint on
freedom of movement of the degree associated with a
formal arrest.” (Stansbury v. California, supra, 511 U.S. at
p. 322, quoting California v. Beheler (1983) 463 US. 1121,
1125.) "Courts have identified a variety of relevant
circumstances. Among them are whether contact with law

14

enforcement was initiated by the police or the person
interrogated, and if by the police, whether the person
voluntarily agreed to an interview; whether the express
purpose of the interview was to question the person as a
witness or a suspect; where the interview took place;
whether police informed the person that he or she was
under arrest or in custody; whether they informed the
person that he or she was free to terminate the interview
and leave at any time and/or whether the person’s conduct
indicated an awareness of such freedom; whether there
were restrictions on the person’s freedom of movement
during the interview; how long the interrogation lasted;
how many police officers participated; [13] whether they
dominated and controlled the course of the interrogation;
whether they manifested a belief that the person was
culpable and they had evidence to prove it; whether the
police were aggressive, confrontational, and/or accusatory;
whether the police used interrogation techniques to
pressure the suspect; and whether the person was arrested
at the end of the interrogation. (See People v. Stansbury
[(1995)] 9 Cal.4th [824,. . .] 831-832; People v. Lopez
(1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 602, 608 . . .; People v. Spears
(1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1, 25 .. .; U.S. v. Griffin (8th Cir.
1990) 922 F.2d 1343, 1348.)" (People v. Aguilera, supra, 51
Cal.App.4th at p. 1162.) A police officer’s subjective view
that the defendant is a suspect is relevant only if it is
communicated or otherwise manifested to the defendant.
(Stansbury v. California, supra, 511 U.S. at p. 324.)
“Where no formal arrest has taken place, the pertinent
question is ‘how a reasonable man in the suspect’s
position would have understood his situation.” (People v.
Esqueda (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 1450, 1481, quoting
Berkemer v. McCarty (1984) 468 U.S. 440.442.)

At the suppression hearing in the present case,
Pittsburg police detective Michael Barbanica testified that
when he arrived at appellant’s apartment at 5:23 p.m.,
Officer Beyhan was with her in the dining area and two

15

other officers were also present at the scene. Barbanica
told appellant he was there to investigate the death of her
baby. He asked if she would be more comfortable waiting
in one of the bedrooms while he retrieved the baby from
the garbage bag and she went into a bedroom with
Beyhan. After finding the baby, Barbanica asked
appellant if she would come to the station to discuss what
had happened making it ‘very clear" this was on a
voluntary basis and appellant was not being arrested.
Appellant agreed and was taken to the police station by
Officer Beyhan at about 5:41 p.m. Barbanica told Beyhan
appellant was not under arrest and was being driven to
the police station on a voluntary basis. When Barbanica
arrived at about 6:30, appellant was watching television
with Officer Beyhan in the kitchen area.

[14] Barbanica walked with appellant to an interview
room and they talked about searching appellant’s
apartment; appellant refused consent, expressing concern
about whether this would be bad for her, and Barbanica
told her it was not a problem and explained he was going
to get a search warrant. Barbanica also told appellant he
was concerned that she should see a doctor, her doctor
had arranged for a visit at the Walnut Creek Kaiser, an
officer would give her a ride, but the medical appointment
was voluntary. Appellant said that would be fine and was
taken to an open area at the back of the station where
officers wrote their reports while Barbanica left to write
a search warrant. The search warrant, which included
taking a blood sample from appellant at Kaiser Walnut
Creek, was obtained at about 10 or 11 p.m. A police
officer took appellant to Kaiser, where her blood was
drawn with her consent, and returned her to the police
station.

Barbanica began to interview appellant shortly after
midnight in a small windowless room to which she had
been taken. The interview lasted about an hour and a

16

half. Appellant was placed under arrest more than an
hour into the interview.

Appellant testified that Barbanica told her he felt she
would be more comfortable going to the police station
while he dealt with the baby, informing her it was a "death
investigation" rather than a "criminal" one. Appellant said
she wanted to call her husband but the police told her
they did not want her to call and wanted her to go to the
station. She was told to enter a patrol car with a police
officer and did not feel she had any choice. At the police
station, the officer who waited with her sent a janitor
away, Saying he did not want anyone else in the room. A
“cadet" or "rookie" was assigned to watch her; when she
wanted to go to the bathroom, the cadet waited by the
door. When appellant asked to smoke a cigarette, the
cadet went to ask Barbanica and told appellant Barbanica
wanted her to "stay put." When Barbanica told her he was
concerned that she see a doctor, appellant told him she
had an appointment scheduled the next day at Kaiser in
Antioch but he said he would prefer she go that night and
she felt she had no choice but [15] to comply. At Kaiser,
the officer who had driven appellant waited outside the
room where she was being examined and appellant did
not think she was free to leave. Back at the police
station, when appellant was taken to the interview room,
she did not think she could get up and leave. Appellant
acknowledged that during the interview Barbanica told her
more than once she was not under arrest and was free to
leave, but nevertheless she did not think she was free to
leave. She was not allowed to go anywhere without a
police officer next to her, either at the station or at the
hospital. Appellant was never placed in handcuffs, no one
held a gun on her, she never tried to get out of a room
and found it locked, and she never told a police officer
she did not want to talk and wanted to go home.

The parties stipulated that civilians were not allowed
to wander around the police station without an escort;

17

smoking was not allowed in that building; and cadets were
not allowed to keep custody of prisoners.
The trial court also observed the videotape of
appellant’s interview, which took place in a tiny room,
unfurnished except for the two chairs occupied by
appellant and Barbanica, hers against the wall across from
the door and his between her and the door. Detective
Barbanica began the interview by reminding appellant that
she was not under arrest, did not have to talk to him, was
free to go, and was not being "criminally charged or
investigated." As appellant nodded and indicated she
understood by saying, "um-huh," Barbanica said, "Okay.
I’d like to get to the bottom of this. Okay. I’d like to find
out what happened. Okay. Tell me a little about yourself
first. What’s your name?" He told appellant to put her
purse down and relax; she apologized and said she was
thinking about her kids. Barbanica said, "They're okay.
They’re okay. Yeah. But you understand you're here on
your own free will." Appellant responded, "right," and
Barbanica began to ask questions about appellant’s
children, her husband and their employment. After a
number of such questions. He asked if appellant knew
why she was there, she said because when she "lost" or
"had the baby she should have called 911 and talked about
[16] how she felt "really bad" and "guilty" because she did
not give the baby "any type of respect," and how she had
not known she was pregnant until the week before. In
response to Barbanica’s questions, appellant said she did
not want more children and had been told she could not
have any, and went on to describe delivering the baby,
blue and white, in the shower and then placing his body in
the waste basket.

At this point, moving his chair a little closer to
appellant, Barbanica said, "I want you to know something.
Okay. This is a very, very serious matter. Okay. Now I
want you to think about something. All right. Think

about this really good. This is what I do for a living.

18

Okay. And obviously I do a decent job at it or they
wouldn’t be paying me as much as they do to do this job.
The other officers that work here -- there’s an officer up
at your house right now collecting evidence because we
did find evidence at your house. Appellant asked what
evidence, Barbanica said, "Well, let me get to that," and
the following colloquy ensued:

"BARBANICA: And he’s very good at his job, okay?

"APPELLANT: Um-hm.

"BARBANICA: And tomorrow morning I’m going to
the autopsy of the baby.

"APPELLANT: Um-hm.

"BARBANICA: And the pathologist is very good at
his job.

"APPELLANT: Um-hm.

"BARBANICA: Okay. A lot of times people say
things happen one way because they’re scared. Okay.
You may have made a mistake yesterday in the way you
handled the situation but let’s don’t make it worse now by
not being 100 percent honest. Because if you made a
mistake we can deal with that. Okay. And we will. We'll
deal with that. All right? But let’s, let’s be 100 percent
honest with each other here, okay, um, and I don’t think
you're being 100 percent honest with me right now.
Okay" And I think you know where you’re not being 100
percent honest. Okay.

"APPELLANT: Um-hm. [17]

"BARBANICA: I think that, uh, you want to really
tell me what happened. I know you do. I know you want
to get this off your chest. Because I can tell you seem like
a very good person and I know this is really sittin’ on you,
sittin’ on your chest and you want to get it off your chest.
Okay. I know you do. You don’t seem like a mean
person or a vindictive person at all. You seem like a
decent person. Okay. Think about that. I’m gonna know
exactly, exactly what happened to that baby tomorrow
when I go to the autopsy. Anc it wasn’t this. Okay? I’m

19

gonna know exactly. I think we need to sit back for a
second and let’s start talking about this over again and
let’s get to what really happened here. I understand you
didn’t want the baby and you probably didn’t know what
to do. Okay. Tell me what really happened yesterday."
After about a six-second pause, appellant said, "Well. Oh.
I’m gonna be in trouble. And the only thing that’s the
difference of the birth it wasn’t yesterday. ’ Appellant told
Barbanica the birth was on Easter. The interview then

continued:
"BARBANICA: And there’s more that you're not

telling me.
"APPELLANT: And I wasn’t in the shower, I was
sitting on the toilet and the baby came out, but swear to
God, it didn’t cry. It didn’t move. I probably, I heard a
little gurgle and that was it. And then when I looked
down in the toilet again the baby wasn’t moving.
"BARBANICA: And what'd you do?
"APPELLANT: I left it. I was looking at it for a
while until I had enough courage to take it out of the
toilet.
"BARBANICA: Okay.
"APPELLANT: And then I put it in the wastebasket.
"BARBANICA: Babies aren’t born that way.
"APPELLANT: That’s how it came out. I swear.
"BARBANICA: I know that and you know that.
Because you've had kids and I’ve had kids. And babies
aren’t born that way. It doesn’t happen that way. Okay?
But [18] hear me? [As appellant started to say
something] Stop. I’m going to know what the exact cause
of death is tomorrow when I go to that autopsy. That
pathologist is gonna look at that baby and do so many
scientific tests on that baby, he is gonna tell me to the
gnat’s ass what the cause of death on the baby was. He’s
gonna tell me. Okay.
"APPELLANT: Okay.

20

"BARBANICA: All right, and I’m gonna know. But
I want to know you first. I want you to tell me first.
Because you know when you had those three other babies,
[he snaps his finger] babies don’t come out like that.

"APPELLANT: Well, that third one came out in 15
minutes.

"BARBANICA: Okay.

"APPELLANT: And I was like I said I was having
pains, bad back pains, when I was cleaning up my house,
and then when I started feeling --

"BARBANICA: [interrupting] Please. Wait a minute.
Please stop for a minute. Let’s start this like we’re
starting this whole interview over. Okay. Let’s forget
about what you had already told me. Let’s forget about
that. Can we start over? I’m Detective Barbanica with
this police department, you’re here under your own free
will, we're talking about this you don’t have to talk to me.
Okay? Let’s start over. I want to give you another
Opportunity to tell me the actual, the actual story.
Because again we have physical evidence because our
physical evidence person is up there right now taking
evidence. The coroner was just up there and I’m going to
the autopsy tomorrow. Keep in mind this is what I do
every day. This is not the first time I’ve seen this, this is
what I do everyday. Okay? I want you to tell me the
story of what happened, I want to know the real story."

Appellant reiterated her description of delivering the
baby on the toilet and Barbanica questioned her about it,
eliciting from her the information that she heard a
"gurgle" and saw the baby in the toilet, head first, with his
feet up. He continued: [19]

“"BARBANICA: I’m gonna ask you a very important
question. Okay. And I want you to be honest. Because
I think partially you are being honest but I want to know
from you, when you left it in there, were you thinking to
yourself, I can’t afford another kid, just let this, let this
baby pass away easily? Let it die? [pause] Be honest.

21

"APPELLANT: Honestly, I didn’t -- I was hoping the
baby was gonna die stillborn.

"BARBANICA: But obviously it wasn’t. Am I
correct?

"APPELLANT: I guess not. If it gurgled it must have
died right after it gurgled.

"BARBANICA: Did you leave it in the toilet thinking
that, uh, just let this baby die? I just, I can’t afford
another baby right now. We don’t need another baby.
Let’s just let this baby die?

"APPELLANT: No. Not letting the baby die. I was
hoping it was dead.

"BARBANICA: Okay. But you knew it wasn’t. Am
I right? If it was gurgling?

"APPELLANT: Well. it gurgled just once or twice
and that was it. But --

"BARBANICA: [interrupting] Okay. But if it was
gurgling obviously it was alive, am I correct?

"APPELLANT: [sighing] Yeah, I guess.

"BARBANICA: I just want to know honestly from
you. I want to know where your mind was at that time.
Okay. And, I’m not judging you. If that was what you
were thinking. That’s what you were thinking. But I want
to know from you. Is that what you were thinking at the
time?

"APPELLANT: Part of me was and part of me
wasn’t. :

"BARBANICA: Is that why you left it in the toilet?

"APPELLANT: That and plus I just didn’t want to
see it.

"BARBANICA: Did you leave it in there to die?

APPELLANT: No. I just couldn’t have the courage
to get it out. I didn’t leave it in there to die. [20]

"BARBANICA: Did part of you want it to pass away?

"APPELLANT: Yes.

"BARBANICA: And is that why it stayed there?

22

"APPELLANT: I don’t know. Probably. I don’t
know. Barbanica then told appellant to relax, asked if she
wanted a soda, and left her alone for approximately 12
minutes. As he got up to leave, appellant expressed
concern and anxiety about the police telling her husband
what had happened; when Barbanica assured her they
would not tell him, she demonstrated great relief.
Appellant spent most of the time Barbanica was gone
crying quietly. When he returned, the conversation
resumed:

BARBANICA: I want you to understand. I want to
be real clear about this,though. You're not under arrest.
Okay. Alli right. You're free to go at any time. You
don’t have to talk to me. I’m only sitting here, I want to
get to the bottom of this thing. Okay. All right. That’s
the way I’m looking at it, okay? Can we still keep talking
about this? [six-second pause] Because I'd like to get to
the bottom of it. Wouldn’t you? And get this behind
you?

"APPELLANT: Yeah, but, well, what more did you
want me to --

"BARBANICA: [interrupting] I'd like to go over it a
couple more times. That okay? [five-second pause] Is
that okay?

"APPELLANT: Yeah. Fine."

Appellant’s responses did not follow immediately upon
Barbanica’s questions; rather, she hesitated as he
continued to encourage her, with a pause of perhaps 15
seconds from the time he asked if they could keep talking
until she asked what more he wanted, and another pause
before she said "fine" in a resigned tone. Barbanica told
her to relax, asked if she wanted more time or a tissue,
offered to open her soda, and asked appellant to tell him
about her children. Appellant began to speak about her
daughter, telling Barbanica her children were “her life" but
she did not want more and would have terminated the
[21] pregnancy if she had known about it earlier.

Appellant said she could not handle another child
“financially, emotionally or physically;" when she stopped,
Barbanica urged her to go on, tell me some more;"
appellant sighed, paused, and said, "I just can’t believe |
did what I did." Barbanica then questioned appellant
about when she learned of the pregnancy and what she
intended to do at that time, eliciting her comments that
she had hoped the baby would be stillborn, did not want
to go through the adoption process again and felt the baby
would be better off with God thar with another family.
At this, the interview continued:

"BARBANICA: Is that why you did this? To let it go
up with God?

"APPELLANT: [sighs and gestures]

"BARBANICA: Can I tell you something? And I’m
going to be very honest with you. Okay. And keep this
in mind. Okay. Again, this is what Ido. Okay. I know
that when the baby came out and think about this before
you answer me, please. Okay. Because I know in your
mind you’re gonna be saying this guy knows what he’s
talking about, okay. I know that you weren’t sitting on the
toilet when the baby came out, okay. I know that. Is it
possible, okay, and I want you to think about this, okay,
that you helped the baby into the toilet?

"APPELLANT: No/ I swear, that I did not do. I was
sitting on the toilet. You would have saw my sheet. my
bed sheet that I had on the floor, because I had to cover
it up. I was sitting like this on the toilet [gestures] and I
was holding my mouth [holds both hand over mouth] and
I pushed down. And the water squirted. It squirted to my
walls. And it squirted to that little cart thing. You
probably seen a little tinge of blood on my cart."

Barbanica asked appellant how she could have heard
the baby gurgle and she said she could hear the sound as
she sat on the toilet. He asked her to describe the sound;
she made a coughing noise; he asked, “Like it was
choking?" and appellant said, "Something like that. It was

24

like that drowning [inaudible] gurgle noise I guess." After
questions [22] about whether it sounded like the baby was
taking in water, Barbanica told appellant if the baby’s
head was submerged in water she would not have heard
any noise and that if she had jumped up as she claimed,
since the placenta was still inside her, the baby would
have been pulled out of the water. Appellant insisted on
her story and Barbanica elicited details, including a
description of the baby’s mouth and nose being under the
water in the toilet. During this part of the interview,
appellant was standing as she tried to demonstrate what
she had been doing. When Barbanica told her to go
ahead and sit, she said, "I did not put it in there. I did not
stick the baby in the toilet like you’re thinking that I did.

Barbanica continued with questions about details of
the delivery and appellant’s actions immediately afterward.
When appellant responded, "I don’t know," to his question
why she left the baby in the toilet, Barbanica said, "I don’t
buy the ‘I don’t know" answer. I really don’t . . . and I'll
tell you why. Because deep down inside, okay, there had
to be a reason. Okay. That’s your child, all right. Deep
down inside there had to be a reason that you closed the
lid on this toilet and walked away. Okay. Was it that you
wanted this baby to live?" Appellant said she did not
want the baby or whole situation to exist. After questions
about appellant’s husband’s knowledge regarding her
pregnancy, Barbanica asked if appellant ever thought she
wanted to pick the baby up and not let it die; crying, she
answered "no." Barbanica continued with more questions
about details of what appellant did after the baby was
delivered. He asked appellant if he was going to find
toilet water in the baby at the autopsy, if the baby really
ended up in the toilet, and if he would find appellant’s
fingerprints on the baby. He asked again if the baby was
alive when he was delivered and if the "gurgle" sounded
like the baby was choking on water. After appellant said
she assumed the baby was alive and guessed he may have

been "trying to gasp for that first air when the baby comes
out," Barbanica again told appellant to relax and left for
about six minutes. [23]

Just before Barbanica reentered the interview room,
appellant could hear voices outside the room saying
something including, "walk her out." As soon as Barbanica
came in, appellant asked, “I'm under arrest now?"
Barbanica said "no" and asked why; she told him what she
had heard. He then continued the interview:

"BARBANICA: No, you're not under arrest. You're
still free to go. We don’t have to talk. You're not under
arrest, Okay? We just want to find out some more things.
A few more things. The first thing I want to find out.
What was the garbage can you placed him in? Or do you
still want to keep talking? Is that okay?"

Appellant said that was "fine" and answered
Barbanica’s questions about the garbage can, and details
including the clothes she was wearing and items that were
in the bathroom. Seven minutes after he had returned to
the interview room, Barbanica told appellant he hoped
she would understand he had to place her under arrest.
Appellant broke down, saying she wanted to go home to
her children and denying she murdered the baby.

The trial court found appellant “could not reasonably
have believed that she was not free to go" because
Barbanica’s tone during the interview was "gentle,"
appellant was never handcuffed, appellant was asked to go
to the police station voluntarily and Barbanica made an
effort to explain to the officer who transported her that
she was not be treated as though in custody, Barbanica
sounded "genuine" when he told appellant she was free to
leave, and when she was finally placed under arrest
appellant became “quite upset," suggesting ‘she had
realized that a line had been crossed." The trial court
referred to this last.as a “minor" point, acknowledging that
appellant’s reaction may have reflected the realization that
she could not go home after having previously thought she

26

was not free to leave during the interview but would be
able to go home afterwards.

The critical question in determining whether
appellant was in "custody" for purposes of Miranda, as we
have stated, is whether a reasonable person in appellant’s
situation would have believed her freedom had been
restrained in a manner equivalent to [24] formal arrest.
In the present case, while appellant was told her
conversations with the Barbanica were voluntary and she
was free to leave, and was initially told the investigation
was not a criminal one, a host of factors contribute to an
overall situation that can only be characterized as
custodial.

Appellant was interviewed at the police station,
beginning at 12:30 a.m. While the fact the interview
occurred at the station would not in itself mean appellant
was in custody (Oregon v. Mathiason, supra, 429 US. at p.
495, California v. Beheler, supra, 463 US. 1121,
1124-1125), this is not a case in which appellant
voluntarily participated in a brief interview at the station
and was then allowed to go her own way. (See, Oregon v.
Mathiason, supra, 429 U.S. at pp. 492, 493-494; California
v. Beheler, supra, 463 U.S. at p. 1122.) From the time four
police officers appeared at appellant’s home at around 5
p-m. on April 19 until the interview began at 12:30 a.m.,
a period of some seven and a half hours, appellant was
never Outside the company of a police officer. She was
accompanied by an officer or cadet at all times within the
police station. While respondent urges this treatment was
not specific to appellant but applied to any civilian inside
the station, there is no reason to believe appellant knew
of this procedure, nor of the fact the police department
does not allow cadets to keep custody of prisoners. From
her point of view. and that of a reasonable person in her
Situation, it would clearly have appeared she was being
kept under police supervision. Indeed, even when
appellant was taken to the doctor in Walnut Creek --

27

where her blood was drawn with her consent, but also
pursuant to the terms of a search warrant -- a police
officer waited outside the door of the room in which she
was examined.

In State of South Dakota v. Long (8th Cir. 1972) 465
F.2d 65, the defendant was stopped by the police and his
car searched, he and his companions were asked to follow
the officers to the sheriff's office. where the car was again
searched, a police officer accompanied the defendant to
have a team photograph taken, and the defendant was
then interviewed in his dormitory room, with the door
closed. The court stated, "from the time [25] they were
stopped in the canyon until the admissions were made
later in the room, Long was continuously accompanied by
or in the presence of the sheriff or one of his deputies or
both. This certainly was a significant deprivation of
Long’s freedom of action. He could have reasonably
believed that he was in custody, particularly when the
sheriff insisted on a deputy accompanying him to have his
picture taken." (Jd., at pp. 69-70.)

In People v. Esqueda, supra, 17 Cal.App.4th 1450, the
defendant drove to a gas station at about 10 p.m. with his
young children and his dying live-in companion in his
truck. The defendant consented to a search of his
apartment and his truck was searched and impounded.
About 1:30 a.m., he was taken to a police station and
interviewed for about 20 minutes, then transported to a
different police station and interviewed for about an hour
in a small room in a secured area. He was guarded while
in the homicide building, had been separated from his
children and had not been allowed to go to the hospital or
given information about his girlfriend as requested. The
court found that the defendant’s having been asked for
the consent, not allowed to go to the hospital, taken to the
police station, asked to go to the interview room reached
only by security measures, accompanied by uniformed
officers to each police station and guarded while in the

28

homicide building “tends to show some indicia of arrest.
A reasonable person could have easily presumed under
such circumstances that he or she was not free to leave."
(Id., at p. 1482.)

In the present case, after seven and a half hours of
constant police company and surveillance, it can hardly be
supposed appellant felt she was genuinely free to leave at
any time she wished. We are aware of no case involving
a defendant kept under police supervision for more than
eight and a half hours before being placed under arrest
that has found the defendant was not in custody. Rather,
a detention of only a little more than an hour has been
characterized as a “long” one. (People v. Forster (1994) 29
Cal.App.4th 1746, 1753.) [26]

In addition, appellant testified she was not permitted
to call her husband before going to the police station and
ihe videotape of her interview demonstrates she expressed
concern over the well being of her young children, who
had been at home when she left for the police station.
"[S]eparation of the suspect from family or colleagues who
could offer moral support" and “isolation in nonpublic
questioning rooms" are factors tending to support a
finding of custody. (U.S. v. Griffin (JOth Cir. 1993) 7 F.3d
1512, 1519; see People v. Esqueda, supra, 17 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1482 [defendant separated from his children and not
given requested information about condition of live-in
companion he was subsequently charged with murdering].)
In Griffin, the court found the defendant was in custody
where she was separated from the friend with whom she
was traveling and taken, voluntarily, to a small office in
the police restricted area of the airport, in which a police
officer sat at his desk, positioned so that the only means
of exit for the defendant was around him. Similarly, in the
present case, appellant was interviewed in a tiny
windowless room, barren save for the two chairs upon
which she and Barbanica sat, with Barbanica positioned
between appellant and the door. Appellant was clearly

29

subjected to a police dominated atmosphere (U.S. v.
Griffin, supra, 7 F.3d at pp. 1518, quoting Berkemer v.
McCarty, supra, 468 U.S. 420, 439; Miranda v. Arizona,
supra, 384 U.S. at p. 445); "[w]here police are in full
control of the questioning environment, custody is more
easily found. (U.S. v. Griffin, supra, 7 F.3d at pp.
1518-1519.) In Miranda, the Supreme Court noted that
the cases before it involved "incommunicado interrogation
of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere, resulting
in self-incriminating statements without full warnings of
constitutional rights." (384 U.S. at p. 445.) “Because the
court in Miranda expressed concern with the coerciveness
of situations in which the suspect was ‘cut off from the
outside world’ and ‘surrounded by antagonistic forces’ in
a ‘police dominated atmosphere’ and interrogated ‘without
relent,’ circumstances relating to those kinds of concerns
are also relevant to the custody issue. Thus custody is less
likely to be deemed present when the questioning
occurred in the presence of the suspect’s friends or [27]
other third parties, and more likely to be found when the
police have removed the suspect from such individuals."
(LaFave, Criminal Procedure (1984) § 6.6, p. 293.)
Notwithstanding Detective Barbanica’s "gentle" tone
and repeated statements that appellant was free to leave,
the nature of the interrogation also indicates appellant
was in custody. Barbanica relentlessly questioned
appellant in a manner calculated to intimidate her: telling
her how good he and the other officers on the case were
at their jobs, assuring her they would soon know exactly
what had happened, but telling her he wanted to hear it
from her first. In the context of this interview at 12:30
a.m., after appellant had been in the constant company of
the police for some seven and a half hours and had been
precluded from calling her husband or having a cigarette,
the "gentle" tone employed by Detective Barbanica can
only be viewed as a sophisticated tactic designed to create
the impression appellant was free to leave but at the same

30

time effectively induce her to remain subject to his efforts
to elicit incriminating statements. In Esqueda, supra, 17
Cal.App.4th at p. 1482, the court noted, as one of the
factors supporting a finding that the defendant was in
custody, that "the forms of questions asked Esqueda by
[the detective], although not specifically accusatory, were
purposefully stated in a comforting manner by(the
detective] because he knew he would lose Esqueda to
further questioning if he asked questions in an accusatory
fashion." Similarly, in State of South Dakota v. Long,
supra, 465 F.2d at p. 68, the court found a custodial
situation despite the sheriff having questioned the
defendant in a "fatherlike" manner and “gained [his]
friendship."

A reasonable person in appellant’s position could
have had little doubt why she was being questioned at the
police station at 12:30 a.m. This is not a case in which the
defendant was initially questioned as a witness to a crime
and subsequently became a suspect (People v. Stansbury,
supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 828); if the baby was murdered (as
opposed to having been stillborn) appellant, the only
person present at the birth, was the only suspect.
Suspicion understandably focussed upon appellant at the
commencement of the police investigation. Early in the
interview, Barbanica told appellant a search warrant [28]
had been executed at her apartment and the police had
found evidence -- thereby unquestionably communicating
to her that she was a suspect in a murder case. Barbanica
later prompted appellant to acknowledge the baby must
have been alive because of the "gurgling" sound she heard
and made it clear he believed the baby had been
murdered. Once it was clear the detective believed the
baby had been born alive, it was also clear he believed
appellant had murdered the infant. Indeed, Barbanica
said as much, asking appellant during the interview if she
left the baby in the toilet to die and if it was"possible she
had "helped the baby into the toilet." As in Griffin, supra,

31

7 F.3d at pp. 1518-1519, "[t]he questions were case
specific’ and "continued even after it was obvious
defendant was incriminated .... A reasonable person
under the same circumstances would believe she had no
choice but to continue to answer the incriminating
questions."

This conclusion is not altered by the fact that
Barbanica told appellant a number of times she was being
interviewed voluntarily and was free to leave. These
statements were invariably coupled either with pleas to
help him get to the bottom of the case or sympathetic
observations aimed at allaying her anxiety. Knowing
appellant was nervous and distraught (having just given
birth to a child who either died before birth or
immediately after), concerned about her young children,
and undoubtedly exhausted at 12:30 a.m. After seven and
a half hours at the police station or hospital, Barbanica
repeatedly coaxed appellant to "get it off her chest" and
help him learn what had happened, accused her of lying
to him, and constantly asked her to repeat details of the
incident. Indeed, at least after the initial statements with
which he began the interview, Barbanica’s admonitions
that appellant was free to leave were given at times that
make them appear calculated to persuade her to do just
the opposite. Barbanica began the interview by telling
appellant she was not under arrest, did not have to talk to
him and was not being criminally investigated, and that he
wanted to understand what had happened. She agreed,
then very quickly expressed concern about her children.
He told her the children were okay and repeated that she
was there of her own free will, then [29] asked a series of
neutral questions about appellant’s life and family before
delving into the incident under investigation. The primary
function of Barbanica’s statements seemed to be to calm
appellant so she would talk.

Later, after telling appellant he did not believe her
initial story about the baby being born in the shower,

32

hearing the revised description of the birth into the toilet,
expressing his disbelief of this story and reminding
appellant the pathologist was going to find out the cause
of death, Barbanica asked appellant to "start over" and
repeated the introductory portion of the interview in
abbreviated form, "I’m Detective Barbanica . . . you don’t
have to takk to me .... Let’s start over." This
admonition was not aimed at assuring appellant
understood she could terminate the interview, but was
Barbanica’s means of setting the stage to pretend the
interview already long underway was just commencing.

After the segment of the interview in which
Barbanica elicited from appellant the admission the baby
must have been alive when it was born and she wanted
him to be dead, he left appellant alone for approximately
12 minutes, most of which time she spent with her head in
her hands or crying. Barbanica returned, repeated that
appellant was free to leave and encouraged her to talk as
she hesitated for about 30 seconds before saying “fine."
Still later in the interview, after appellant had been left
alone for some six minutes and upon hearing another
officer outside the interview room say something about
walking her somewhere, asked Barbanica if she was now
under arrest, Barbanica assured her she was not, discussed
some of the details of the incident, and did not place her
under arrest and advise her of her Miranda rights until
approximately seven minutes later. Again, Barbanica’s
comments about appellant being free to leave come across
primarily as efforts to calm appellant and cause her to
continue the interview.

Barbanica’s statemerts at best gave a double
message, on the surface informing appellant she did not
have to continue the interview but at the same time, more
subtly, telling her she needed to stay. In the context of
the numerous factors in this case that [30] would induce
a reasonable person to believe he or she was effectively in
custody, to allow the "free to leave" admonitions to

33

determine a contrary conclusion would be to allow use of
such admonitions to completely undermine Miranda.
Telling a subject he or she is free to leave and does not
have to talk, of course, does not inform that subject of the
consequences of choosing to stay and talk to the police --
that any incriminating statements made may be used
against him or her. If merely telling a person he or she is
free to leave is sufficient to prove the person is not in
custody, police officers could routinely make such
statements in the hope of eliciting incriminating
admissions without informing the person of his or her
constitutional rights.

We conclude appellant was in custody, for purposes
of Miranda, during her interview by Detective Barbanica.
The trial court thus erred in denying her motion to
suppress the statements made during this interview.
There can be no doubt this error was prejudicial. It was
only in her statements to Barbanica that appellant told the
story of the baby being born into the toilet, damning
herself by her admissions that che heard a gurgle (proving
the baby was alive) yet left the baby with his head
submerged in the toilet. We cannot assume appellant
would have testified if these statements had been
excluded. Without these statements, it could have been
proved the baby was born alive -- both pathologists so
testified -- and appellant disposed of his body in her
garbage and told none for several days, but the
prosecution would have had no direct evidence of what in
fact happened to the baby and no evidence to contradict
appellant’s initial report to the nurse and doctor that she
had delivered the child in the shower and believed it was
dead because it was blue and unmoving. Even if a jury
could have believed appellant caused the baby’s death,
there would have been little or no evidence from which to
find the intent required to prove murder. Clearly,
admission of appellant’s statements to Barbanica was not
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Arizona v.

34

Fulminante (1991) 499 U.S. 279, 285-302, 310; People v.
Esqueda, supre, 17 Cal.App.4th at p. 1487.) [31]

In view of our conclusion that appellant’s conviction
must be reversed, it is not necessary for us to reach
appellant’s additional claims of error.

The judgment is reversed.

Kline, P.J.
We concur:

Haerle, J.
Lambden, J.

ot Bl a KOE 2 Py 6 TRS OR Rr is <1

35

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. A072044

MARIAFELISSA SMITH, (Contra Costa County
Super. Ct. No. 9509894)

Defendant and Appellant

BY THE COURT:
The petition for rehearing is denied.

The written opinion filed on July 3, 1997, is modified
in the following respects:

At page 30, the second full paragraph is deleted and
the following inserted in its place:

"We conclude appellant was in custody, for purposes
of Miranda, during her interview by Detective Barbanica.
The trial court thus erred in denying her motion to
suppress the statements made during this interview.
There can be no doubt this error was prejudicial. Aside
from appellant’s own trial testimony it was only in her
statements to Barbanica that appellant told the story of
the baby being born into the toilet, damning herself by her
admissions that she heard a gurgle (suggesting strongly the
baby was alive) yet left the baby with his head submerged
in the toilet. We cannot assume appellant would have so
testified if these custodial [2] statements had been

36

excluded.” Without these statements, it could have been

1. In its brief, respondent argued appellant was not in
custody when she made her statement to Detective
Barbanica but did not suggest that if she was found to
have been in custody, the error in admitting her statement
could be deemed harmless. Appellant specifically noted
this absence of harmless error in its reply brief and
respondent did not contest the point until after our initial
opinion. In a petition for rehearing, respondent asserts
for the first time the error in admitting appellant’s
statement is harmless because her trial testimony tells the
same story as the extrajudicial statement.

Respondent’s argument is based on the assumption
Oregon v. Elstad (1984) 470 U.S. 298, "implicitly overruled"
Harrison v. United States (1968) 392 U.S. 219. Harrison
held that if introduction of an inadmissible confession
impels a defendant to testify at trial, that testimony may
not be used on retrial. Elstad held that a failure to
comply with Miranda, “unaccompanied by any actual
coercion or other circumstances calculated to undermine
the suspect’s ability to exercise his free will," does not
require suppression of a subsequent extrajudicial
statement given after Miranda warnings. (470 U'S. at p.
309, italics added.) Far from overruling Harrison, Elstad
reaffirmed that "[i]f the prosecution has actually violated
the defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights by introducing an
inadmissible confession at trial, compelling the defendant
to testify in rebuttal, the rule announced in Harrison v.
United States . . . precludes use of the testimony on
retrial." (/d., at pp. 316-317.)

Neither Elstad nor Harrison directly dealt with the
question whether a defendant’s testimony at trial may be
used to find a Miranda violation harmless error.
However, at least in the situation where the defendant’s
statements are not simply obtained without proper

37

proved the baby was born alive -- both pathologists so
testified -- and appellant [3] disposed of his body in her
garbage and told no one for several days, but the
prosecution would have had no direct evidence of what in
fact happened to the baby and no evidence to contradict
appellant’s initial report to the nurse and doctor that she
had delivered the child in the shower and believed it was
dead because it was blue and unmoving. Even if a jury
could have believed appellant caused the baby’s death,
there would have been little or no evidence from which to

warnings but are psychologically coerced or where the
defendant is compelled to testify in response to the
improperly admitted statements, both cases support the
conclusion that the trial testimony may not be so used.
This is consistent with the rule in California -- which has
continued to be applied in cases that post-date Elstad --
that in evaluating whether Miranda error is harmless, it
will not be assumed the defendant would have testified if
the inadmissible statements had been suppressed. (People
v. Boyer (1989) 48 Cal.3d 247, 280; People v. Esqueda,
supra, 17 Cal.App.4th at p. 1487.) In support of its
assertion that Harrison has been overruled by Elstad,
respondent cites Peri v. Director, Department of
Corrections (7th Cir. 1987) 817 F.2d 448, 450, fn. 2. In
that case, the although district court had reached the
conclusion 1espondent advances, the Court of Appeals
declined to decide the issue, as it rejected the defendant’s
contention that his confession was unknowing and
involuntary.

Given the lack of evidence of appellant’s intent apart
from the pretrial statements, there appears to be no
reason appellant would have testified as she did except for
the admission of her pretrial statements. In these
circumstances, Elstad gives no reason for departing from
the rule followed in Boyer and Esqueda.

Le

38

find the intent required to prove murder. Clearly,
admission of appellant’s statements to Barbanica was not
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Arizona v.
Fulminante (1991) 499 U.S. 279, 285-302, 310; People v.

Esqueda, supra, 17 Cal.App.4th at p. 1487.)"

These modifications do not effect a change in the
judgment.

Dated: Aug 4 1997 KLINE, P.J.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386013_1836%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
