# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Helms v. United States

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386013_1786%3A1

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1998
- **Citation:** 522 U.S. 1051

## Text

Supreme Court, US.
7iit& pb

No. OFFICE OF THE CLERK

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1997

AIRMAN FIRST CLASS SAMUEL T. HELMS II,
PETITIONER

Vv.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, RESPONDENT

Petition For a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Thomas R. Uiselt

Captain, United States Air Force
Appellate Defense Counsel
Counsel of Record

Douglas H. Kohrt

Colonel, United States Air Force
Chief, Appellate Defense Division
Counsel for Petitioner

Air Force Legal Services Agency
Appellate Defense Division

112 Luke Avenue, Suite 343
Bolling AFB, DC 20332-8000
202-767-1562

October 1997 | 4 of
oS

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether Petitioner’s Due Process rights were violated
when he was convicted of larceny of basic allowances for
quarters (BAQ) and overseas housing allowance (OHA)
payments even though he took no affirmative step to take,
obtain or withhold the allowances from the United States.

ili

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTION PRESENTED ...........-cc-cceecee
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.....................
cheer...

REASON FOR GRANTING THE PETITION ......
ee ee Ae re en ree en ber oe rey

APPENDIX A
(Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals

Sor Te Armed TOPCO). cos i kes kee cs beens

APPENDIX B
(Opinion of the United States Air Force

Court of Criminal Anpeeia).... . ... .. «<5 0s 050s

APPENDIX C
United States v. Antonelli, ACM 28856

(AF Ct.Crim.App, 19 January 1996) ..........

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) ............05.- 3
Military Cases:

United States v. Antonelli, ACM 28856

(A.F.C.M.R. 19 April 1991), 35 M.J. 122

(C.M.A. 1992), 37 M.J. 932 (A.F.C.M.R. 1993),

43 M.J. 183 (1995), ACM 28856

(AF Ct.Crim.App, 19 January 1996) ............. 3-9

United States v. Gray , 44 M.J. 585

(NMC Ct.Crim.App, 1996), pet denied,

iin es yh beets Ce deuseses 8,9

United States v. Sundeen, 45 MJ 508

SP ARAMA, 2990) oe eee ce wt ens recce 6,7,9
Federal Statutes:

caved eke akan eked reds s 1

EE on 8) GERAD GN anc ra eg er aaa l

Pte 525, es BO UA FZ) one cence ees 1,6

ee

The petitioner, Airman First Class Samuel T. Helms II,
respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the
order and judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Armed Forces entered in his case on 28 August 1997,

OPINIONS BELOW

The order and judgment of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Armed Forces, reported at United States v.
Helms, 47 M.J. 1 (1997), is located at Appendix A. The
unpublished opinion of the United States Air Force Court of
Criminal Appeals, United States v. Helms, ACM 31250 (A.F.
Ct. Crim. App., 6 June 1996) is located at Appendix B.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Armed Forces was entered on 28 August 1997. The
jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1259(3) (West Supp. 1996) and 10 U.S.C. § 867(a)(3) (West
Supp. 1996).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION INVOLVED

The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States provides, in relevant part:

“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process law .. .”

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On 29-30 March 1994, appellant was tried by a general
court-martial consisting of military judge sitting alone.
Contrary to his pleas, petitioner was convicted of larceny of
about $11,000 of basic allowance for quarters (BAQ) and
overseas housing allowance (OHA) in violation of Article 121

of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. He was acquitted of
dishonorably failing to pay an overpayment of about $11,000
of the same BAQ and OHA.

Appellant was sentenced to a bad conduct discharge, ten
months confinement, reduction to airman basic and a
reprimand. On i July 1994, the convening authority approved
the findings and sentence as adjudged. On 6 June 1996, the
Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. Appendix A.
On 28 August 1997, the Court of Appeals for the Armed
Forces affirmed the decision of the Air Force Court of
Criminal Appeals. Appendix B.

AIC Helms and his wife arrived at Rhein-Main AB,
Germany in the summer of 1992 when he was authorized to
live in off base, ‘economy’ housing and thus receive Basic
Allowance for Quarters (BAQ) and Overseas Housing
Allowance (OHA). He applied for and began receiving BAQ
and OHA in July 1992. Pros Exh 1, para 2. OHA is a military
entitlement as are BAQ and VHA. See Pros Exh 1-S. In
October 1992, A1C Helms applied for government housing
and moved into it at the end of December 1992. This
terminated his eligibility for BAQ and OHA. Pros Exh 1,
6-12. However, AlC Helms’ servicing Accounting and
Finance Office failed to terminate BAQ/VHA payments and
he received them until the time of his out-processing in
October 1993. Pros Exh 1, para 8, Pros Exh 14—15.

A1C Helms followed the standard procedures in
applying for on base housing and filled out all related
paperwork honestly and correctly. It was the duty of the
Wiesbaden Housing Office to prepare and send
documentation of AlC Helms’ change of status to the Lindsey
Air Station Accounting and Finance Office in turn was
required to send it to the Rhein-Main Accounting and Finance
Office which was responsible for terminating the BAQ/OHA
payments to A1C Helms. One of these offices at one of these

facilities failed to carry out their part and the payments were
never stopped. Pros Exh i, para 7, Pros Exh 13. AlC Helms
continued to receive the payments through no fault of his
own. Even if, at some date during the charged period, A1C
Helms or his wife may have suspected that he was being
overpaid, as the government attempted to show at trial and the
Air Force Court assumed in its opinion (Helms, slip. op. at 3),
a’ most, this should have supported a charge of dereliction of
duty—not larceny. See United States v. Antonelli, 37 MJ 932,
938, n. 14 (A.F.C.M.R. 1993).

In any case, the Air Force did not discover this error until
A1C Helms reported to Accounting and Finance at Rhein-
Main as part of out-processing and the clerk, Sgt Enlow,
asked about AIC Helms’ housing status. AlC Helms
answered honestly and told him he was in government
housing. Sgt Enlow saw that AlC Helms had been receiving
BAQ/VHA for the whole period. He terminated payments and
informed A1C Helms that the overpayment would have to be
recouped. By the time of trial, Accounting and Finance had
recouped about $5,200 of the approximately $ 11,000 owed.
Pros Exh 1, para 8.

REASON FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

The test for legal sufficiency of the evidence is “whether,
after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).

Prior to this case, the issue regarding larceny under Article
121 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice most recently
received the attention of the Court of Appeals for the Armed
Forces in United States v. Antonelli, 43 MJ 183 (1995). Senior
Airman Antonelli’s ex-wife, at the time of their divorce in

1975, obtained a child support order for their daughter. Based
upon this, Antonelli qualified for and received Basic Allowance
for Quarters (BAQ) and Variable Housing Allowance (VHA) at
the ‘with dependent’ rate. However, his daughter had received
no money from him since 1977, nor had she ever resided with
him subsequent to the divorce. On 4 November 1987, Antonelli
signed a form recertifying that he was providing support for his
daughter which allowed him to continue to receive BAQ and
VHA at the with dependent rate. An investigation was initiated
in 1989 and Antonelli was charged with false official statement
and larceny of the with dependent rate BAQ and VHA and
convicted of both offenses in 1990. The larceny alleged
included some of the period prior to the false recertification in
1987. The prosecution relied upon the theory of false
withholding for the period leading up to the false recertification
on 4 November 1987. Antonelli, 37 MJ at 933-934.

The Air Force Court overturned the conviction for the
period prior to the false recertification finding that these facts
did not establish wrongful withholding. United States v
Antonelli, ACM 28856, (A.F.C.M.R. 19 April 1991). The
government appealed and the then Court of Military Appeals
remanded the case for the Air Force Court to determine whether
a wrongful withholding might be established from a bailment
or wrongful conversion. United States v. Antonelli, 35 MJ 122
(C.M.A. 1992). The Air Force Court reexamined this area and
again concluded that larceny was not established with these
facts and sent it back to the Court of Military Appeals.
Antonelli, 37 MJ 932 (A.F.C.M.R. 1993). The Court of Military
Appeals, in its subsequent review of the case, found that the Air
Force Court failed to correctly follow its guidance in its earlier
opinion and remanded it yet again. Antonelli, 43 MJ 183. The
Air Force Court finally affirmed Antonelli’s larceny conviction
for the entire period charged, in its last opinion on the case
(unpublished) on 19 January 1996. Appendix C.

In reaching its conclusion in Antonelli, the Court of
Military Appeals required the Air Force Court to make its
legal sufficiency review in the crucial light of Antonelli's false
recertification.

[E]ven if one hypothetically accepts the proposition
that a servicemember who accepts found money and
who does nothing to correct the continued cash flow
is not criminally liable (a proposition that we do not
reach in this appeal, but cf. United States v.
Antonelli, 35 MJ at 130-131 (Crawford, J.
concurring in the result)), any affirmative action
either to ensure the inappropriate continuation of
the elevated allowances or to mislead officials in a
way SO as to co-opt a recoupment has more than
civil-indebtedness ramifications.

Antonelli, 43 MJ at 185 (emphasis in original). The Court of
Military Appeals, in Antonelli, supra, apparently left open the
question of whether an individual who receives BAQ type
payments as a result of some error, not as a result of an
affirmative act on his part, can be found guilty of larceny.

In the appellant’s case, at no time did he falsify any
document or otherwise lie about his status or take any other
affirmative act to ensure that the erroneous payments would
continue. To the contrary, he carried out all actions as directed
and when asked about his housing status, he responded
honestly. It was the failure of one of the offices involved in
this unusually complicated bureaucratic chain (at a time when
at least one of the facilities was in the process of closing
down) that caused the payments to continue, not A1C Helms.

On 6 June 1996, the Air Force Court when next
addressing this issue in the appellant’s case, decided that A1C
Helms was aware of the overpayment and found his failure to
come forward to stop the payments “an affirmative action
designed to ensure the continuation of the allowances which

he was not entitled to receive.” Helms, slip op at 3. They thus
found the facts legally and factually sufficient.

However, both the Navy-Marine Corps and Army Courts
of Criminal Appeals have addressed this issue since Antonelli,
supra, and both have come to different conclusions than that
of the Air Force Court.

The Army Court of Criminal Appeals addressed this
issue in United States v. Sundeen, 45 MJ 508 (Army Ct. Crim
App 1996). Sundeen pled guilty to being absent without
authority and wrongful appropriation of “excess pay.”
Sundeen had pay problems that repeated visits to various
finance offices did not resolve. He set up direct pay deposits
to a local bank (it had been going to another out of state bank)
in an effort to correct these pay errors and was soon receiving
basic pay in both accounts, i.e. basic pay overpayments.
During his plea providency inquiry, Sundeen admitted that he
“suspected” that he was being overpaid but did not know by
how much. However, there was no evidence that Sundeen
“made any affirmative misrepresentations, made untrue
certifications, or took deceptive actions designed to create or
perpetuate the payroll overpayments. In all his dealings with
finance officials, appellant appeared open and forthright about
his situation.” Sundeen, 45 MJ at 510.

The Army Court summarized the relevant case law
governing larceny as follows:

As drafted, Article 121, UCMJ, combined several
property offenses, one of which was embezzlement
(wrongful withholding-type larcenies). “When
testing whether an offense of wrongful withholding
has been . . . providently pleaded to, we search for
two factors . . . (1) a fiduciary relationship; and, (2)
an initial lawful possession.” A fiduciary
relationship exists, and includes the legal duty to
return or deliver to the owner entrusted property,

when such a return or delivery is due or demanded.
(citations omitted.)

As a general rule, no inherent legal duty to account
for erroneously transferred property exits. Even if
the recipient is aware of the error, absent a specific,
identifiable fiduciary relationship, such
circumstances involve no criminality and cannot
support a guilty plea to wrongful appropriation as a
matter of law. (citations omitted.)

An exception to this general rule involves accepting
increased allowances on behalf of one’s dependents.
However, Antonelli specifically distinguishes
allowances from salary, and that precedent does not
extend to erroneous overpayments of basic pay.
(citations omitted.)

Sundeen, 45 MJ at 510-11.

The Army Court, after the above extensive analysis of
the Congressional intent, case law history and resultant
requirements of wrongful withholding, found that there has to
be an underlying fiduciary relationship. The Army Court went
on to interpret the holdings in Antonelli to mean that when the
government pays a member increased allowances for the
benefit of dependents—this creates just such a fiduciary
relationship. Thus, the Army Court found that a member can
be found guilty of wrongful withholding and thus larceny of
funds paid for the support of dependents even if there is no
affirmative act on the part of a member. However, where the
money paid is for the benefit of the member, i.e. here base pay
or as the Navy Court found with housing allowances, there
can be no guilt of larceny without an affirmative act, e.g. a
false recertification.

Prior to the Air Force Court’s decision in the appellant’s
case, but after the Court of Military Appeals’ decision in
Antonelli, supra, the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal

eee ee Se

Appeals reviewed the same fact pattern and came to the
opposite conclusion than that of the Air Force Court in United
States v. Gray, 44 MJ 585 (NMC Ct. Crim App 1996).

- Seaman Recruit Gray, as did AlC Helms, moved his
household and became ineligible to receive further BAQ/VHA
payments. As in A1C Helms’ case, in Gray “the government’s
evidence in the appellant’s case indicates that the housing
office had primary responsibility for reporting the changed
circumstances to the appellant’s command” and that although
Seaman Gray knew about the overpayments and remained
silent while receiving the extra pay he took no affirmative
action “to ensure the inappropriate continuation of the
overpayment or to mislead of officials in a way as to co-opt a
recoupment.” Gray, 44 MJ at 587 (citing Antonelli, supra).
The Navy Court found that “the appellant’s passive conduct,
although it may have ramifications relating to dereliction of a
duty by omission, does not rise to the same level of criminality
as would more affirmative action,” i.e. these facts were not
sufficient to establish guilt of larceny. Gray, 44 MJ at 588.

Obviously, this area of law has proven difficult for the
courts to interpret and thus appellate guidance to trial level
practitioners has not been clear.! In fact, the service courts
have examined the precedent of the Court of Appeals for the
Armed Forces and have arrived at at opposite results.

The Navy and the Army Courts of Criminal Appeals’
decisions are consistent with each other as well as the
precedent of the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces. The

'Judge Crawford suggests that a solution to the time consuming and
apparently confusing historical analysis this issue has generated would
simply be to find that Congress intended military courts to apply the “clear
language” of the statute, i.e. applying the plain meaning of the words
rather than look to the historical context of the decision to generate the
statutory language. See, J. Crawford’s concurrence in the result in
Antonelli, 35 MJ at 130.

‘“Army/Navy Rule’ is that there can be no larceny of
Overpayments of pay or entitlements even where the accused
is aware of overpayment (unless delivered for the benefit of a
dependent and not forwarded to that dependent by the
accused, i.e. Antonelli’s situation) absent some wrongful,
affirmative act. Gray, supra; Sundeen, supra.

To the contrary are the unpublished Helms opinion from
one panel of the Air Force Court and the Court of Appeals for
the Armed Forces’ decision which affirmed the Air Force
Court’s decision. The Air Force Court in this case found that
where an accused knows or suspects there were overpayments
of housing allowances (where no issue regarding support of
dependents is involved), his or her failure to act is “an
affirmative action designed to ensure the continuation of the
allowances which he was not entitled to receive.” Helms, slip
op at 3. Therefore, he can be found guilty of larceny. The
Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces held that “once a
service member realizes that he or she is receiving pay or
allowances and forms the intent to steal that property, the
servicemember has committed larceny.” Helms, slip op at 8.
The Court found that appellant realized he was mistakenly
receiving housing allowances and formed an intent to steal it.

CONCLUSION

The more better reasoned approach to this issue is that
adopted by the Army and Navy Courts: absent a fiduciary
duty such as that created where a member is given payments
provided specifically for the support of dependents (Antonelli,
supra), there is no larceny of overpayments of pay and
allowances absent some affirmative misdeed, e.g. false
recertification, on the part of an accused. This rule does not
prohibit the government from prosecuting, for dereliction of
duty, someone who finds themselves in Gray’s or Helms’
position—in possession of an erroneously produced

10

overpayment windfall, provided the prosecution can prove
knowledge of the overpayment. Nor does it prohibit the
government from prosecuting someone in Gray’s or Helms’
position for dishonorable failure to pay a just debt once the
overpayment is identified and the member is notified of the
debt owed to the United States and given a reasonable
opportunity to repay (as was done in the appellant’s case and
he was acquitted). This rule merely prevents the government
from prosecuting a member under a theory of larceny where
the accused has taken no wrongful affirmative action, but in
spite of this, has come into the possession of a windfall
through no fault of his or her own—but rather to the fault of
the United States.

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,

THOMAS R. UISELT

Captain, United States Air Force
Appellate Defense Counsel
Counsel of Record

DOUGLAS H. KOHRT

Colonel, United States Air Force
Chief, Appellate Defense Division
Counsel for Petitioner

Air Force Legal Services Agency
Appellate Defense Division

112 Luke Avenue, Suite 343

Bolling AFB DC 20332-8000
(202) 767-1562

la

Appendix A

United States, Appellee
v.
Samuel T. HELMS, II, Airman First Class
U. S. Air Force, Appellant
No. 96-1167
Crim. App. No. 31250
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued April 9, 1997
Decided August 28, 1997

Counsel

For Appellant: Major Ormond R. Fodrea (argued); Lieutenant
Colonel Kim L. Sheffield (on brief); Colonel Jay L. Cohen.

For Appellee: Captain Mitchel Neurock (argued); Colonel
Theodore J. Fink (on brief); Major LeEllen Coacher.

Military Judge: Bruce T. Brown

Opinion of the Court
CRAWFORD, Judge:

A military judge sitting as a general court-martial at
Rhein-Main Air Base, Germany, found appellant guilty of
larceny of military property, in violation of Article 121,
Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 USC § 921. The
convening authority approved the sentence of a bad-conduct
discharge, confinement for 10 months, reduction to the lowest
enlisted grade, and a reprimand. The Court of Criminal

2a

Appeals affirmed the findings and the sentence in an
unpublished opinion.

We granted review of the following issue:

WHETHER THE FACTS ARE LEGALLY
SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A CONVICTION OF
LARCENY OF BAQ AND OHA PAYMENTS.

We hold that the facts are legally sufficient to support
appellant’s larceny conviction under the standard established
in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781,
2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).

FACTS

On assignment in Germany, appellant lived off base and
received a basic allowance for quarters (BAQ) and an
overseas housing allowance (OHA). He subsequently
requested a move into government quarters. Standard
procedure was for the housing representative to process the
paperwork to stop the housing allowances. For some reason,
appellant’s housing allowances did not end when he entered
government housing. Despite his move to on-base housing,
appellant continued to receive both BAQ and OHA for 11
months. He was overpaid more than $11,000.

At trial, Sergeant (Sgt) Sykes, the NCOIC of Customer
Service in the Accounting and Finance Office, testified that
she saw appellant’s wife at a track meet during the summer of
1993 and that appellant’s wife said “her husband felt that they
were being overpaid” for housing. According to Sgt Sykes,
appellant was present during part of this conversation, and she
advised him to stop by her office to find out if he was being
overpaid. She testified as follows:

A. I told Airman Helms that I needed him to come
in so I could verify if he was, in fact, being
overpaid; how much he was being overpaid; and

3a

at that point, | could figure out a repayment
schedule so that it wouldn’t put him into much
of a financial bind.

Q. What, if anything, did he say to you when you
tell [sic] him this?

A. He said, “Okay.”

Did he indicate to you when he would follow up
with repaying these overpayments?

©

A. No. He didn’t indicate when. My statement was
that when we got back, that he should come in
and see me and then we could figure out a way
to repay.

Q. Did either Airman Helms or his wife ever come
in to see you?

A. No.

Appellant’s wife testified that she took over the family
financial matters when they moved into government quarters.
She stated that appellant never saw his leave and carnings
Statements and that she took care of paying ail of the bills.
Mrs. Helms acknowledged that she had a conversation with
Sgt Sykes about a possible overpayment but contended that
appellant was standing about 75 feet away from them during
the conversation. Mrs. Helms testified that she may not have
remembered to tell appellant to go to the finance office as Sgt
Sykes had directed.

Appellant’s continued receipt of housing allowances was
discovered when he began providing information for a
recertification form while preparing to separate from the Air
Force. Appellant informed the separation and retirement
technician, Sgt Enlow, that he was living in government
housing. Sgt Enlow discovered that appellant had been
receiving housing allowances and told appellant that he had

4a

been overpaid and would have to repay the money or put in a
request for a waiver. Appellant did not seem surprised by the
news and made no comment. Sgt Enlow then asked appellant
how he would like to handle the situation, and appellant said
that he had to think about it. Sgt Enlow testified that he told
appellant to let the finance office know as soon as possible,
preferably, that very day.

DISCUSSION

This Court has applied the benchmark test for legal
sufficiency established in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,
319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (197%). “The test
for... [legal sufficiency of the evidence] is whether,
considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, a reasonable factfinder could have found all the
essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States
v. Turner, 25 MJ 324 (CMA 1987), citing Jackson, supra at
319 99 S.Ct. at 2789. Writing in United States v. Harper, 22
MJ 157, 161 (CMA 1986), then-Judge Cox stated, “In this
context, sufficient evidence generally means some legal and
competent evidence from which a court-martial may find or
infer beyond a reasonable doubt those facts required by law
for conviction.” See also United States v. Pritchett, 31 MJ
213, 216 (CMA 1990).

Until now, this Court has reserved the question of
whether “a servicemember who accepts found money and
who does nothing to correct the continued cash flow is not
criminally liable. . . .” United States v. Antonelli, 43 MJ 183,
185 (1995), citing United States v. Antonelli, 35 MJ 122, 130-
31 (CMA 1992) (Crawford, J., concurring in the result).
However, we have made clear that “any affirmative action
either to ensure the inappropriate continuation of the elevated
allowances or to mislead officials in a way so as to co-opt a

Sa

recoupment has more than civil-indebtedness ramifications.”
Antonelli, 43 MJ at 185.

The mistaken delivery of property to an individual who
realizes the mistake and simultaneously forms the intent to
Steal the property at the moment of receipt constitutes larceny
at common law. W. LaFave & A. Scott, 2 Substantive
Criminal Law § 8.2(g) at 342-43 (1986). Furthermore, where
the individual does not realize the mistake at the time of
receipt but realizes it later and then forms the requisite intent,
there is a larceny as well. Para. 46c(1)(f)(i), Part IV, Manual
for Courts-Martial, United States (1995 ed.)(“Although a
person gets property by a taking or obtaining which ... was
without a concurrent intent to steal, a larceny is nevertheless
committed if an intent to steal is formed after the taking or
obtaining and the property is wrongfully withheld with that
intent.”); United States v. Aldridge, 2 USCMA 330, 8 CMR
130, 1953 WL 1645 (1953); United States v. Cox, 37 MJ 543
(NMCMR 1993); see also State v. Langford, 467 So.2d 41
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1985). This latter larceny relies on the
“fictional notion of continuing trespass” to find the concurrent
existence of the taking element and the requisite intent.
LaFave & Scott, supra, § 8.5(f) at 366.

We now hold that once a servicemember realizes that he
or she is erroneously receiving pay or allowances and forms
the intent to steal that property, the servicemember has
committed larceny. Thus, the analysis in this case must focus
on whether the evidence is legally sufficient to establish that
appellant (1) realized he was mistakenly receiving housing
allowances and (2) formed an intent to steal it. Giving proper
deference to the military judge and the Court of Criminal
Appeals, as well as viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the Government, we hold that the evidence is
legally sufficient to support appellant’s conviction for larceny.

6a

Sgt Sykes testified that appellant was present when she
and Mrs. Helms discussed appellant’s possible overpayment.
In fact, she testified that she spoke directly to appellant and
informed him to visit her at the finance office so that they
could straighten the matter out. When Sgt Enlow told
appellant that he had been overpaid, appellant did not appear
surprised. The Court of Criminal Appeals, which has
factfinding authority under Article 66(c), UCMJ, 10 USC
866(c), was “convinced that appellant knew he was receiving
these allowances and was not entitled to them.” Unpub. op. at
3. The lower court also noted that the more than $11,000 in
housing allowances which appellant received amounted to
about 40% of his pay. /d. Viewing this evidence in the light
most favorable to the prosecution, a reasonable factfinder
could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant
realized he was receiving unauthorized housing allowances.

The evidence is also legally sufficient to establish that
appellant formed an intent to steal the housing allowances.
The Court of Criminal Appeals found Sgt Sykes’ testimony
that she advised appellant to stop by the finance office
credible. That court also found that appellant’s failure to
follow Sgt Sykes’ advice was an “affirmative action designed
to ensure the continuation of the allowances which he was not
entitled to receive.” Jd. We agree. A reasonable factfinder
could find that appellant’s inaction, in light of Sgt Sykes’
recommendation, constituted evidence of an “intent
permanently to deprive or defraud another person of the use
and benefit of property or to appropriate it to his own use...,”
which is required for a larceny conviction under Article
121(a)(1).

The decision of the United States Air Force Court of
Criminal Appeals is affirmed.

Chief Judge COX and Judges SULLIVAN, GIERKE,
and EFFRON concur.

7a

Appendix B

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE COURT OF
CRIMINAL APPEALS

UNITED STATES
Vv.

Airman First Class SAMUEL T. HELMS II, FR254~-5998
United States Air Force

ACM 31250
6 June 1996

Sentence adjudged 30 March 1994 by GCM convened at
Rhein-Main Air Base, Germany. Military Judge: Bruce T.
Brown (sitting alone).

Approved sentence: Bad-conduct discharge, confinement for
10 months, reprimand, and reduction to E-1.

Appellate Counsel for Appellant: Colonel Jay L Cohen and
Maior Ormond R. Fodrea.

Appellate Counsel for the United States: Colonel! Jeffery T.
Infelise, Colonel Thomas E. Schlegel, and Captain R. Scott
Howard.

Before

DIXON, SCHREIER, and STARR
Appellate Military Judges

OPINION OF THE COURT

SCHREIER Senior Judge:

Contrary to his pleas, a military judge convicted
appellant of stealing Basic Allowance for Quarters (BAQ) and

8a

Overseas Housing Allowance (OHA) totalling about $11,000.
Article 121, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 921. The military judge
acquitted appellant of the dishonorable failure to repay the
stolen allowances. Article 134, UCMJ. The convening
authority approved the adjudged sentence of a bad-conduct
discharge, confinement for 10 months, reduction to E-1, and a
reprimand. Appellant alleges the evidence is factually and
legally insufficient to convict him of larceny. Finding no
error, we affirm.

FACTS

Following assignment to Germany, appellant initially
lived “on the economy” in non-government housing. While
living on the economy, he received both BAQ and OHA.
Military members who are not living in adequate government
quarters receive these allowances. Appellant’s allowances did
not cover all his housing and transportation costs, so, after
several months, he requested a move into government
quarters which was granted in December 1992.

Appellant acknowledged that he was no longer entitled
to BAQ once he moved into government quarters. A housing
office representative testified that their standard procedure
was to process the paperwork to finance to stop the housing
allowances. However, for some unknown reason, this did not
happen and appellant continued to receive the housing
allowances for another 10 months. The error was discovered
in October 1993 during outprocessing when appellant was
separating from the Air Force. The amount of the
overpayment was about $11,000.

Staff Sergeant Sykes, NCOIC of Customer Service in the
Accounting and Finance office, testified that Mrs. Helms,
appellant’s wife, approached her informally during summer
1993 at a track meet. She said that Mrs. Helms indicated that
She and appellant were concerned about a possible
overpayment. Sergeant Sykes stated that appellant was

9a

present during part of this conversation. She advised him to
stop by Finance to find out if he was being overpaid and, if
necessary, to work out a repayment schedule. This
conversation took place about three months before the
overpayment was discovered. There is no indication that
appellant ever followed up on Sergeant Sykes’ advice to stop
by Finance to find out if there was an overpayment.

Mrs. Helms testified that after they moved into
government quarters she assumed responsibility for their
financial matters picking up all mail and paying all bills. She
said that appellant never saw either his Leave and Earnings
statements or any bank statements because she destroyed
them after opening. She claimed that she never used a check
register, but knew how much money they had and told
appellant what was left after the bills were paid. Therefore,
she stated that appellant had no knowledge of their income or
any overpayment.

Mrs. Helms admitted that at some point she thought they
might be overpaid because she realized they were receiving
more money than their neighbors. She also verified the
conversation with Staff Sergeant Sykes. However, she
claimed that appellant was not present and that Sergeant
Sykes told her appellant would have to come to the Finance
office. However, at trial she could not remember if she ever
discussed these matters with her husband.

SUFFICIENCY THE EVIDENCE

Trial defense counsel moved to dismiss the larceny charge
for failure to state an offense, arguing that there is no duty to
report an overpayment before the normal recertification
process. The military judge denied the motion, finding that the
specification stated an offense. Appellant renews his argument
on appeal relying on this Court’s decision in United States v.
Antonelli, 37 M.J. 932 (A.F.C.M..R. 1993).

10a

However, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
overturned this Court’s 1993 decision. United States v.
Antonelli, 43 M.J. 183 (1995); see also United States v.
Bulger, 41 M.J. 194, 196 (C.M.A. 1994). The Court of
Appeals for the Armed Forces restated its position that
allowances paid to a service member for support, but which
are not used for support, remain the lawful property of the
United States.

The Antonelli decision was based on a case where the
accused affirmatively falsified documents showing that he
provided support for his dependents. Therefore, the Court left
open the issue of whether an individual who passively, rather
than actively, receives unauthorized allowances is also
criminally liable for the offense of larceny. See United States
v. Antonelli, 35 M.J. 122, 131 (C.M.A. 1992) (Crawford J.,
concurring in the result).

BAQ and OHA are paid to a member when adequate
government quarters are not available. A member who lives in
government quarters fails to meet the basic qualification for
those allowances. Therefore, the member is not entitled to
those allowances and they remain the property of the United
States. See United States v. Antonelli, 43 M.J. at 184 (citations
omitted); United States v. Stadler, __ M.J. — (A.F. Ct. Crim.
App. 8 May 1996).

Furthermore, we are convinced that appellant knew he
was receiving these allowances and was not entitled to them.
We find Mrs. Helms’ statement that appellant had no
knowledge of the overpayment unbelievable. Appellant
received over $11,000 in ten months. This amounted to
approximately 40% of his pay. This is not a case where the
overpayment was insignificant or lasted only a short time.
Additionally, we find Sergeant Sykes’ testimony that she
advised appellant to stop by Finance to determine if there was
an overpayment credible. Appellant’s failure to follow-up on

lla

this advice was an affirmative action designed to ensure the
continuation of allowances which he was not entitled to
receive. We find that the evidence is factually and legally
sufficient to find appellant guilty of larceny. Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979); United States v. Turner, 25
M.J. 324 (C.M.A. 1987).

The findings of guilty and the sentence are correct in law
and fact and, on the basis of the entire record, are

AFFIRMED.

Chief Judge DIXON and Judge STARR concur.

OFFICIAL

ALVIN J. STRIBLING
Technical Sergeant, USAF
Chief Court Administrator

12a

Appendix C

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE COURT OF
CRIMINAL APPEALS

UNITED STATES
v.

Senior Airman ANTHONY M. ANTONELLI, FR532-—54—9447
United States Air Force

ACM 28856 (f rev)
19 January 1996

Sentence adjudged 19 May 1990 by GCM convened at Lowry
Air Force Base, Colorado. Military Judge: Robert E. Sears
and Robert N. Spencer.

Approved sentence: Bad-conduct discharge, confinement for 6
months, a fine of $10,000, and reduction to E-1.

Appellate Counsel for Appellant: Colonel Jay L. Cohen and
Lieutenant Colonel Joseph L. Heimann.

Appellate Counsel for the United States: Colonel Jeffery T.
Infelise, Lieutenant Colonel Michael J. Breslin, and Major
John H. Kongable.

Before

PEARSON, BECKER, and MORGAN
Appellate Military Judges

_—__—_——_-

UPON FURTHER REVIEW
PER CURIAM:

On May 19, 1990, court members convicted appellant of
signing false official documents and stealing more than $100

13a

in military pay allowances from the United States. The court
sentenced him to a bad-conduct discharge, 6 months
confinement, a fine of $10,000, and reduction to E-1, which
the convening authority approved.

On appeal, appellant argued that a portion of the larceny
conviction was not supported by the evidence and he was
prejudiced by evidence of uncharged misconduct improperly
admitted during sentencing. On April 19, 1991, we granted
relief on both issues by modifying the larceny conviction to
shorten the length of the offense and reassessing the sentence
for it and the uncharged misconduct error. Reassessing, we
disapproved the final in total. United States v. Antonelli, ACM
28856 (A.F.C.M.R. Apr. 19, 1991) (unpub.).

The government appealed that portion of our decision
overturning the larceny conviction. On September 14, 1992,
the Court of Military Appeals, now the Court of Appeals for
the Armed Forces, set aside our decision on the larceny
conviction and remanded the case to us for review in light of
their opinion concerning the scope of the military’s larceny
statute. United States v. Antonelli, 35 M.J. 122 (C.M.A. 1992).

Once more, we considered the law and evidence and
once again modified the larceny conviction to shorten the
period of the offense and reassessed the sentence as we did
before. United States v. Antonelli, 37 M.J. 932 (A.F.C.M.R.
1993). Once more, the government appealed. Once more, the
Court of Appeals set aside our decision on the larceny
conviction and remanded. United States v. Antonelli, 43 M.J.
183 (1995).

Today, we affirm the original findings of guilty adjudged
on May 19, 1990, as we find the evidence legally and
factually sufficient in accordance with the Court of Appeals’
decision. See United States v. Turner, 25 M.J. 324 (C.M.A.
1987). We reassess the sentence only for the sentencing error,
a point which the government did not appeal. Reassessing we

14a

disapprove the fine in its entirety. See United States v.
Peoples, 29 M.J. 426 (C.M.A. 1990). The findings of guilty
and sentence, as reassessed, are correct in law and fact, and on
the basis of the entire record, are

AFFIRMED.

OFFICIAL

ALVIN J. STRIBLING
Technical Sergeant, USAF
Chief Court Administrator

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386013_1786%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
