# Opposition Brief — Taxpayers of King County v. King County > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386013_1737%3A1 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Opposition Brief - **Published:** January 1, 1998 - **Citation:** 522 U.S. 1076 ## Text i & } No. 97-812 VY In The Supreme Court of the Unite October Term, 1997" + TAXPAYERS OF KING COUNTY, Petitioners, KING COUNTY; WASHINGTON STATE MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL STADIUM PUBLIC FACILITIES DISTRICT; THE BASEBALL CLUB OF SEATTLE, LP; THE STATE OF WASHINGTON; JOHN SCANNELL; VINCE KOSKELLA AND FRANK RUANO; WILLIAM C. SEVERSON; CARL NELSON, Respondents. ¢ On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari To The Supreme Court Of Washington ¢ BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS KING COUNTY AND WASHINGTON STATE MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL STADIUM PUBLIC FACILITIES DISTRICT IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI ¢ Preston, Gates & Norm MALEeNG E.uis LLP King County Prosecuting Pau. J. LAwrReNcCE* Attorney Larry CARTER QUENTIN YERXA* 701 Fifth Avenue Sr. Deputy Prosecuting Suite 5000 Attorney Seattle, WA 98104-7078 Civil Division (206) 623-7580 E550 King County Counsel for Respondent Courthouse Washington State Major Seattle, WA 98104 League Baseball Stadium (206) 296-9015 Public Facilities District Counsel for Respondent *Counsel of Record King County *Counsel of Record December 15, 1997 COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., (800) 225-6964 OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831 QUESTION PRESENTED Whether Petitioners’ assertion of a federal due process claim based upon a state court’s rulings on state law issues is without merit when the state courts relied upon existing precedent and Petitioners had an opportunity to be heard in accordance with established state court pro- cedures? il PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING The parties to the proceeding are as listed in the caption, except that the Baseball Club of Seattle, LP, and the State of Washington participated in the state court proceedings in the capacity of amici curiae, and are not listed as parties in the caption of the Washington Supreme Court's decision. Respondents William C. Severson and Carl B. Nelson were intervenors aligned with the Petitioners at the trial court level, but did not participate in the appeal. ' ' ; ' i ' ; : j i ili TABLE OF CONTENTS Page i ie A @ g's 5: 2 Ee renee eas i FARIIES TO THE PROCEEDING. .... 26.6.8 cece cece. ii RARE META TA BEE bs cin inh'c as wince a saben Fe-ve's iv i. SIATEMENT OF THE CASE .................. 1 Il. REASONS WHY THE PETITION SHOULD BE cc EEE ILE Eee ree See oly eat pera rarer 4 A. This Case Raises No Federal Issues....... 4 B. This Case Raises No Legal Issues of PUUNNE GUNONINIE s 5 5. o kck va seevasveness 9 ee NE eras 56s beh kn CE Oe ck bee kas ees 10 iv TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page CASES Bouie v. Columbia, 383 U.S. 347, 84 S. Ct. 1697, 12 LS ee: REE cd bass caee heed abe cceeee es: 8 Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Sav. Co. v. Hill, 281 US. 673, 50 S. Ct. 451, 74 L. Ed. 1107 (1929) ......... 8, 9 Cardinale v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 437, 89 S. Ct. 1161, ee Ris Ss ee Ce knn ck ae ccdkieacenieoseeress 5 CLEAN [Citizens for Leaders with Ethics and Accoun- tability Now!] et al. v. State of Washington et al., 130 Wn.2d 782, 928 P.2d 1054 (1996) ...1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8 Citizens for More Important Things v. King County, 131 Wa.2d 411, S52 P22 TS 997) . 222. cece sees 1, 4 Doe v. Puget Sound Blood Ctr., 117 Wn.2d 772, 819 Ade OE REPU 0 knee aviunnakdnbchakdecubaceeceene> 7 General Telephone v. Bothell, 105 Wn.2d 579, 716 Fe Gre CAO 6 bn ac oadakg eneen yok wae deeinne ves 6 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 78 S. Ct. 1228, 2 L. Sd. SUE Bae ROK 5 6x woe CNG A waned keane seas 6 Herndon v. Georgia, 295 U.S. 441, 55 S. Ct. 794, 79 L. hs Bek. Be Gc hod cca h beh on eR Pamerceen as 8 Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall) 590, Be Rex: Ss SO CRON 6 a5 ian ocean edR i Roe ee thoes 5 Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Watson, 120 Wn.2d EP OO Fee re MASOOD ohne vc ix daecuraseccsusasn 7,8 Northlake Marine Works v. Seattle, 70 Wn. App. 491, eo Ga. , re euiparern egies Gena acu rere 6 Radio Station WOW, Inc., et al. v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120, 65 5. Ct. 1475, 8 LL. Bd. 2092 (1963) ois cess 6 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued Page CONSTITUTION CP OE, BNE BOs opines coe taeda ek casies tena 4 Waar, Comet. aft. Vit O6 S. 7 isc ceer esse vice teas 2,9 STATUTES 2B USS Aas ik oe secede stews cho esunees see 5 Was: Raw. Coes 0S ii oes AC ede 2 1995 Wash. Laws Ch. 1, 3d Spec. Sess..........00-: : Se RULES A ae Ee ee ons FAK eed sek ee Re a oes kee 7 i Ee es eee ace Ci naa cae ee abe > aa 9 oo tS ce AL. > SPR ar ener very pre AeeaOrran aN Air Roy i 7 eats ee FS 5 vs a Kao Re ee Be eka eee 6 OTHER AUTHORITIES 12 Moore’s Federal Practice, § 57.22[3] (Matthew ee Oe DGS ocak 6 dese dee eee oe 7 BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS KING COUNTY AND WASHINGTON STATE MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL STADIUM PUBLIC FACILITIES DISTRICT IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI Respondents King County (the County) and the Washington State Major League Baseball Stadium Public Facilities District (the District) respectfully request that this Court deny the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, seeking review of the Washington State Supreme Court's opinion in this case, which is reported at 132 Wn.2d 360, 938 P.2d 309 (1997). Neither the underlying case, which was decided purely as a matter of state law, nor the Petition itself, which consists largely of an unsubstanti- ated and affrontive political attack on the integrity of the state judiciary, raises a substantial federal question. Fur- ther, Petitioners have mischaracterized both the decision that they are seeking to have reviewed, and the facts upon which that decision is based. I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE This Petition arises from the third in a series of cases involving challenges to the validity of a Washington State statute (1995 Wash. Laws Ch. 1, 3d Spec. Sess.) authoriz- ing the construction of a new publicly owned baseball stadium, and local measures implementing that statute. In the two prior cases, CLEAN [Citizens for Leaders with Ethics and Accountability Now!], et al. v. State of Washing- ton, et al., 130 Wn.2d 782, 928 P.2d 1054 (1996) and Citizens for More Important Things v. King County, 131 Wn.2d 411, 932 P.2d 135 (1997), the Washington Supreme Court upheld both the statute! and the actions taken by both the County and the District in implementing that statute. The state court action leading to this Petition was brought by the County under a Washington statute authorizing special declaratory judgment actions by local governments to test the validity of municipal bonds. Wasu. Rev. Cove § 7.25. Under that statute, the trial court is required to appoint a “representative taxpayer” who is to represent the interests of all of the taxpayers of the jurisdiction in question. Id. The statute further provides that the attorneys’ fees of the taxpayers representative are to be borne by the governmental entity bringing the action and that the other provisions of Washington law relating to declaratory judgment actions apply to “the action herein provided for.” Id. One of the issues in dispute in the declaratory judg- ment action was whether the lease agreement entered into between the Seattle Mariners Baseball Club (the “Club”) and the District constitutes a gift of public funds in violation of Wash. Const. art. VIIL, §§ 5 and 7. As summarized by the Washington Supreme Court’s major- ity opinion, the lease contains a commitment from the Mariners to: 1) play 90% of their home games in the stadium for the length of the term of the bonds issued to finance the stadium; 2) pay $45 million towards the con- struction of the stadium; and 3) share profits with the District. Pet. App. 14. The lease also obligates the Club to pay $700,000 in rent per year, to pay any construction cost 1 The statute is reprinted in its entirety as an appendix to the opinion in CLEAN v. State, supra, at 928 P.2d 1084-93. 4 overruns, to pay deficiencies on certain bonds, to main- tain the stadium, to make major repairs and capital improvements and to provide insurance. Id. While the trial court granted an expedited hearing schedule and limited discovery in accordance with Wash- ington Court Rules, (see argument, Section II A, infra) all of the Petitioners’ arguments regarding the validity of the bonds under Washington law were fully briefed, heard and decided on the merits. An expedited appeal fol- lowed, and after extensive briefing and oral argument, the Washington Supreme Court addressed and decided on the merits all of the issues relating to the validity of the bonds raised by the taxpayers’ representatives and by various intervenors. The Petition contains numerous misstatements of both fact and law including allegations in its “statement of the case” that are wholly unsupported by any refer- ence to the record?. Respondents strongly object to Peti- tioners’ argumentative characterization of the political 2 For example, on page 4 of the Petition, Petitioners assert that “the county would receive nothing on its $336 million contribution” to the funding of the new baseball stadium. This statement completely ignores the Washington Supreme Court’s determination that the public will own the stadium and that the lease agreement contains numerous commitments on the part of the Club, including a commitment to play in the new stadium for the term of the bonds. It also ignores the court’s conclusion in CLEAN uv. State, that the “public provision of a venue for professional sports franchises serves a public purpose [under Washington law] in that the presence in a community of a professional sports franchise provides jobs, recreation for citizens and promotes economic development and tourism.” 130 Wn.2d at 796, 928 P.2d at 1061. process leading to issuance of bonds to build a new publicly owned baseball stadium in Washington. Further, many of the statements made concerning the Washington Supreme Court’s opinion itself are inaccurate*. The legal issues are addressed infra. To the extent that the Court requires a more accurate factual summary of the process leading to the construction of the baseball stadium, respondents respectfully request that the court consider, for the purposes of this Petition, the neutral recitation of relevant facts set forth in the Washington Supreme Court’s majority opinions in this case, and in both CLEAN v. State, supra and Citizens for More Important Things v. King County, supra. II. REASONS THE PETITION SHOULD BE DENIED A. This Case Raises No Federal Issues This Court has long recognized that its jurisdiction over decisions by state courts is limited to cases involving substantial federal questions: The State courts are the appropriate tribunals, as this court has repeatedly held, for the decision of questions arising under their local law, whether statutory or otherwise. And it is not lightly to be presumed that Congress acted upon 3 On page 13 of the Petition, Petitioners assert that the majority opinion did not discuss the factual record in connection with its consideration of the issues relating to “donative intent” and whether there was a “grossly inadequate return” under the lease terms. To the contrary, the opinion specifically detailed the obligations of the Club under the lease, which showed that there was adequate consideration for the lease as a matter of law. See Pet. App. at 14-18. re eens ty amare a principle which implies a distrust of their integrity or their ability to construe those laws correctly. Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall) 590, 630, 22 L. Ed. 429 (1875). This jurisdictional limitation is now formalized in 28 U.S.C. § 1257. See also, Cardinale v. Louisi- ana, 394 U.S. 437, 439, 89 S. Ct. 1161, 22 L. Ed. 2d 398 (1969). The Petition is wholly deficient because it fails to set forth any meaningful theory under which this Court's jurisdiction can or should be exercised under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a). Rather, Petitioners are seeking review of a state court decision that addresses only state law issues and presents absolutely no underlying federal questions or claims. Petitioners essentially assert that this Court should review this case because the state courts are inca- pable of ruling fairly on matters involving professional sports. See Pet. at 18. As summarized above, the case involves a state law cause of action regarding the validity of municipal bonds under state statutory and state constitutional provisions. Petitioners do not assert that any federal questions were presented by the representative taxpayers for decision at the trial court level or in the state supreme court on the original appeal of the trial court’s ruling. Clearly no federal question was decided by either the trial court or the state supreme court. The ostensible federal claim advanced by Petitioners (which was raised for the first time in their motion for reconsideration after the Washington Supreme Court’s decision*) is that their due process rights under the 14th Amendment were violated because the “corrupted” state courts showed “favoritism” by expediting the proceed- ings, and departed from prior state constitutional gift analysis and the standard for granting and reviewing summary judgment rulings in deciding this case. Peti- tioners’ underlying theory (which was argued to the state supreme court and decided adversely to Petitioners) is that cases involving “gift of funds” allegations under the Washington constitution can never be decided on sum- mary judgment, in that they involve questions of “dona- tive intent” which are questions of fact. Not only do these assertions fail to state any viable federal claim, they are also wrong as a matter of state law. First, the Washington Supreme Court has affirmed the granting of summary judgment in numerous cases involving alleged violations of the state constitution’s ban on gifts of public funds, including CLEAN v. State, supra, which involved the same stadium funding plan at issue in this case.5 In concluding that the question of whether there was adequate consideration for the stadium lease 4 Raising a federal question for the first time on a petition for rehearing has been ruled untimely when the court does not entertain or decide the question. Radio Station WOW, Inc., et al. v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120, 128, 65 S. Ct. 1475, 89 L. Ed. 2092 (1945); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 243-44, 78 S. Ct. 1228, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1283 (1958). Here, Petitioners’ request for reconsideration was denied; respondents were not even requested to provide a reply under Wasn. R. App. P. 12.4(d). 5 See also, General Telephone v. Bothell, 105 Wn.2d 579, 716 P.2d 879 (1986); Northlake Marine Works v. Seattle, 70 Wn. App. 491, 857 P.2d 283 (1993). ' | : 7 (i.c., whether it constituted a gift) could be decided as a matter of law, the court expressly relied upon its prior holding in Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Watson, 120 Wn.2d 178, 840 P.2d 851 (1992). Petitioners may disagree with the holding of the court, but their argument that it is “without precedent” (Pet. for Writ at 13) is simply wrong. Second, as to Petitioners’ assertions regarding the accelerated schedule ordered by the trial court, Wasu. Civ. R. 57 specifically provides that “The court may order a speedy hearing of an action for a declaratory judgment and may advance it on the calendar.” As one prominent treatise states in connection with an identical provision in Fep. R. Civ. P. 57: The purpose of this provision is to enable a court to adjudicate a declaratory judgment action in a speedy and expeditious manner if the court deems that the issues in the case require early resolution in order to avoid the accrual of damages, harm to a litigant, or otherwise to further the remedial objectives of [Declaratory Judgment} Act. 12 Moore's Federal Practice, § 57.22[3] (Matthew Bender 3d ed.) at 57-95. It was not a violation of the due process rights of Petitioners for the trial court to act in accordance with this Rule. Finally, with regard to the limitation of discovery at the trial court level, it has long been the law in Washing- ton that discovery matters are left to the sound discretion of the trial court judge. See, e.g., Doe v. Puget Sound Blood Ctr., 117 Wn.2d 772, 777, 819 P.2d 370 (1991). Here the trial court correctly concluded under applicable Washing- ton precedent that the gift issues raised by Petitioners could be decided as a matter of law (just as similar issues had been decided on summary judgment in CLEAN v. State, supra), and that they could be decided based upon the “four corners” of the contractual documents at issue, as in Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Watson, supra. It was not an abuse of discretion (and it certainly did not impli- cate Petitioners’ due process rights) for the trial court to conclude that extensive discovery was not called for under these circumstances. In short, all of the state courts’ rulings in this case were based upon well-established state law precedent and did not constitute any violation of Petitioners’ due process rights. Petitioners could not have been “sur- prised” at the result. See Herndon v. Georgia, 295 U.S. 441, 55 S. Ct. 794, 79 L. Ed. 1530 (1935). If a petition for certiorari were to be granted under these circumstances, then virtually every unsuccessful litigant in a state court summary judgment proceeding would have a colorable claim to the jurisdiction of this Court. Petitioners’ reliance on Bouie v. Columbia, 383 U.S. 347, 84S. Ct. 1697, 12 L. Ed. 2d 894 (1964) and Brinkerhoff- Faris Trust & Sav. Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673, 74 L. Ed. 1107 (1929) is misplaced. Bouie was a criminal case involving what amounted to the ex post facto application of a state criminal statute to the defendant. It is not even remotely on point. Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust v. Hill is also inapposite. First, unlike the case at bar, Brinkerhoff-Farris Trust involved an underlying federal claim — an equal protec- tion challenge to a state tax assessment. 281 U.S. at 674. Secondly, the Missouri Supreme Court’s unforeseeable reversal of its prior holding regarding the jurisdiction of the state tax commission to hear such a claim, coupled with its finding that the plaintiff was guilty of laches in failing to bring its claim before the commission, had the effect of denying the plaintiff any forum in which to be heard. Here, by contrast, the Washington Supreme Court relied upon and followed prior Washington precedent in analyzing the proper criteria to apply in determining the validity of the bonds against a claim of an unconstitu- tional gift and in affirming the grant of summary judg- ment to the County. However, even if (as Petitioners assert) the state court modified its analysis of state consti- tutional provisions or the circumstance in which sum- mary judgment may be granted on such issues, it clearly did not do so in a manner that deprived the taxpayers’ representatives of any opportunity to be heard, as in Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust, supra. B. This Case Raises No Legal Issues Of National Importance. The Petition does not even attempt to set forth “com- pelling reasons” for the granting of certiorari as required by Sup. Ct. R. 10. Instead, the Petitioners allege that the case raises issues of “national importance” involving the “monopoly powers” of professional sports. Pet. at 18. Regardless of whether these may be important political issues, the specific legal question raised by the Petition is uniquely a matter of local concern: whether, under Wash- ington law, a claim that a contract violates article VIII sections 5 and 7 of the Washington constitution can be decided as a matter of law from within the “four corners” of the contract document. Under applicable Washington 10 precedent, the Washington Supreme Court correctly con- cluded that the answer is “yes.” Contrary to Petitioners’ argument, this case raises no legal issues of national concern warranting review by this Court. Ill. CONCLUSION The Washington Supreme Court correctly ruled under state law principles that the baseball stadium bonds were valid and binding obligations of the County, and that the trial court had appropriately granted the County summary judgment on all issues. The state courts’ opinions were correctly decided under the laws of Washington, and raise no substantial and important fed- eral questions. The Petition should be denied. Dated this 15 day of December 1997. Respectfully submitted, Preston, Gates & Norm MALENG E.us LLP King County Prosecuting Paut J. LAwRENCE* Attorney LARRY CARTER QUENTIN YERXA* 701 Fifth Avenue Sr. Deputy Prosecuting Suite 5000 Attorney Seattle, WA 98104-7078 Civil Division (206) 623-7580 E550 King County Counsel for Respondent Courthouse Washington State Major Seattle, WA 98104 League Baseball Stadium (206) 296-9015 Public Facilities District Counsel for Respondent *Counsel of Record King County *Counsel of Record --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386013_1737%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.