# Opposition Brief — Washington v. Pang

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386013_1620%3A2

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1997
- **Citation:** 522 U.S. 1029

## Text

[Ans
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No. 97-688

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1997

STATE OF WASHINGTON,
Petitioner,

v.
MARTIN SHAW PANG,
Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
Supreme Court of the State of Washington

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

JOHN HENRY BROWNE
RITA JOAN GRIFFITH*
TIMOTHY KARAM DOLE
Browne & Ressler
Exchange Building
Penthouse Suite

821 Second Avenue
Seattle, WA 98104-1540
(206) 624-7364
Attorneys for Respondent

* Counsel of Record

Byron S. Apams - (202) 347-8203 - WasninGron, D.C. 20005

Ee

a

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Fundamental to extradition law and even more basic than
the Rule of Specialty is the principle that if a requested
country expressly denies extradition on a given charge, the
extraditee has standing to object to prosecution on that
charge.

In this case, the United States requested Martin Pang’s
extradition on five counts; Brazil expressly denied
extradition on four of the five counts. In holding that the
State of Washington could not prosecute Martin Pang on
those four counts for which extradition was denied, the
Washington Supreme Court has merely given legal effect to
the conditions of extradition imposed by Brazil. The
questions presented are:

1. Whether a defendant has standing, under an
extradition treaty, to object to prosecution on charges for
which extradition was explicitly denied in the Extradition
Order and for which there was no subsequent, post-
extradition consent to prosecute.

2. Whether United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407
(1886), and basic principles of extradition law would
prohibit the United States from prosecuting an extraditee on
charges for which extradition and permission to prosecute
were expressly requested and repeatedly denied by the
extraditing country.

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ied

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
a I og 6b nb 6A be ee i
UT RUM on ok vn nc cue eke pink Vv
I eS ae 1
UUme: SOUT UE Ge kee cee elk. 2
REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT ............. 5

I. SINCE THE EXTRADITING NATION EXPLICITLY
AND REPEATEDLY DENIED THE UNITED STATES
PERMISSION TO PROSECUTE THE EXTRADITEE ON
THE FOUR CHARGES AT ISSUE, DEFENDANT
CLEARLY HAS STANDING TO OBJECT TO
PROSECUTION ON SAID CHARGES ........... 6

A. U.S. Courts Must Enforce Any Treaty-Based
Conditions Imposed by the Extraditing Nation .. 6

B. The Difficulty in This Case Has Not Been Brazil’s
Failure to Make Its Position Clear, But Refusal by
Uc. Ueercene 06 Accest i .............. 10

C. The Standing-Without-Protest Circuit Split Does Not
Apply to Charges For Which Extradition Was
Expressly Requested and Denied .......... 11

Il. HONORING AN EXTRADITING NATION’S
RESTRICTIONS IS A PRINCIPLE EVEN MORE
FUNDAMENTAL THAN THE RULE OF SPECIALTY
AND ONE WITHOUT WHICH NO EXTRADITION
TREATY WOULD MAKE SENSE ........... 13

EE CRS ek Or ON ee SS ek Saxe ks 15

Vv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases Page

Casey v. Dep’t of State, 980 F.2d 1472 (D.C. Cir. Ee
Fiocconi v. Attorney Gen., 462 F.2d 475 (2nd Cir.), cert.

denied, 409 U.S. 1059 (1972) .............. 9, 11, 12
Greene v. United States, 154 F. 401 (Sth Cir.), cert. denied, 492
MO ME RP eg a ok a ee a ee CS 7
Johnson v. Browne, 205 U.S. 309 (1907) ........... 7, 10
McGann v. U.S. Board of Parole, 488 F.2d 39 (3rd Cir. 1973)
2 EVE Eee cle Pee sO ee oO a a ee 7
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, rehg. den., 410 U.S. 959 (1973)
iON eed a ee Wie aa ae eas bw ol os en 14
Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894 (2nd Cir.), cert. dismissed,
EG TEs, DE Ca 8 6 ee as Ce ee 7
United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992)
chad ct Pee CRED EAs be CO es 9, 12
United States v. Andonian, 29 F.3d 1432 (9th Cir. 1994), cert.
Cee, Dae at Be ee ce 8,9
United States v. Cuevas, 847 F.2d 1417 (9th Cir. 1988), cert.
ee ee Ue eee. ca ee ee 8
United States v. Diwan, 864 F.2d 715 (11th Cir.), cert. denied,
Ie Wi ee a rg oe ores es 9
United States v. Kaufman, 858 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1988), reh’g
GUE, TIF Ce Pree os C5 RR OS SS 12
United States v. Khan, 993 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1993) .... 11
United States v. Najohn, 785 F.2d 1420 (9th Cir.) (per curium),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1009 (1986).............. 7, 41
United States v. Puentes, 50 F.3d 1567 (11th Cir.), cert. denied,
ESO Dake WO) CEN a ii Fs 12
United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886) ....... 8-12
United States v. Sensi, 879 F.2d 888 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ..... g
Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517 (1988) ....... 9
Constitutions

Wun SNE AEs V8) Oe Be ce oe Chee ee 8

vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Statutes and Rules

BS US. Ue 6 bn co we WN SER 9,12

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1997

No. 97-688

STATE OF WASHINGTON,
Petitioner,
Vv.
MARTIN SHAW PANG,
Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
Supreme Court of the State of Washington

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

The respondent Martin Shaw Pang respectfully requests that
this Court deny the petition for writ of certiorari seeking
review of the Washington Supreme Court’s opinion in this
case, 132 Wn.2d 852, 940 P.2d 1293 (1997), reproduced in
Petitioner’s Appendix (Pet. App.) l1a-94a, 102a-104a.

TREATY INVOLVED

The petition cites only Article XXI of the Treaty of
Extradition between Brazil and the United States, as though
that were the sole provision relevant to the determination of
what charges Martin Pang can be prosecuted on following
extradition. Article I sets forth the primary conditions under
which the parties have agreed to extradite:

2

Each Contracting State agrees, under the conditions
established by the present Treaty and each in accordance
with the legal formalities in force in its own country, to
deliver up, reciprocally, persons found in its territory
who have been charged with or convicted of any of the
crimes or offenses specified in Article II of the present
Treaty...; provided that such surrender shall take place
only upon such evidence of criminality as, according to
the laws of the place where the fugitive or person so
charged shall be found, would justify his commitment for
trial if the crime or offense had been there committed.

Pet. App. 107a-108a.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Martin Shaw Pang stands accused of setting fire to his
parents’ Seattle warehouse on January 5, 1995. Four
firefighters who had entered the burning building died
combating the fire. On May 8, 1995, the United States sent
a Petition for Extradition to Brazil, where Mr. Pang had
traveled in mid-February 1995. Extradition was requested on
four counts of first-degree felony-murder and one count of
first-degree arson. Pet. App. 6a.

In the extradition proceedings, Mr. Pang argued that the
felony-murder charges were non-extraditable under the terms
of the Treaty, since (a) unintentional homicide is not included
in the agreement’s list of extraditable offenses, and (b) dual
criminality had not been established since the U.S. had
presented no evidence of intent to kill, a prerequisite for
murder charges under Brazilian law. Secondly, Mr. Pang
asked that his extradition be conditioned on a pledge by the
U.S. to honor his right to a sentencing cap of 30 years

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Pry rae ae inal

3

imprisonment, a right guaranteed by Brazil’s 1988
Constitution to all criminal defendants in Brazil.

On December 18, 1995, the Brazilian Supreme Court issued
its Extradition Order to extradite on the arson charge, but to
“exclude from the grant of extradition the charges of murder
in the first degree.” Pet. App. 25a. In a second vote, a
different Court majority declined to impose the 30-year
sentencing limit requested, ruling the U.S. was not bound to
honor a Brazilian constitutional right created decades after the
1960s Treaty was ratified. Rather, U.S. courts could give
Mr. Pang, if convicted of the arson, any sentence up to life
imprisonment.’ Pet. App. 25a.

The U.S. spent the next several months attempting to
persuade different Brazilian officials to void their high court’s
ruling that the four felony-murder charges were not
extraditable offenses. Pet. App. 32a-35a. In each instance,
the U.S. was informed that Executive Branch officials lack
authority under the Brazilian Constitution’s Separation of
Powers to permit the U.S. to disregard the Court Order.

First, on February 22, 1996, the U.S. formally asked
Brazil’s Ministry of Foreign Relations for permission to
prosecute Mr. Pang on the four felony-murder charges. Pet.
App. 26a. Five days later, the Brazilian Ministry officially
denied the request, attaching a certified copy of the Court’s
Extradition Order and explaining that Brazil’s Executive
“does not have jurisdiction to interpret or establish limits
regarding the scope of the decisions handed down by the
Judicial Branch.” Pet. App. 27a.

' Although the death penalty was never an issue in this case, Article VI of
the Treaty does bar extradition of defendants facing that sentence.

4

On March 1, 1996, the U.S. filed an extraordinary
Embargos de Declaragao motion in the Brazilian Supreme
Court, characterizing the Extradition Order as obscure and
self-contradictory. Pet. App. 27a. On March 27, 1996,
Brazil’s Justices unanimously denied the motion, reasserting
the clarity and finality of its original decision to “exclude
from the grant of extradition the charges of murder in the first
degree.” Pet. App. 29a-32a.

In early March 1996, U.S. Secretary of State Warren
Christopher, traveling in Brazil, “personally ask[{ed] the
Brazilian government to extradite Martin Pang without
restriction.” Pet. App. 33a. In a letter dated May 21, 1996,
President Clinton asked Brazil’s President for leave to
prosecute on the felony-murder charges. Pet. App. 40a.

Meanwhile, U.S. Justice Department officials had contacted
Brazil’s Minister of Justice, Nelson Jobim. On September 26,
1996, Minister Jobim responded to Attorney-General Janet
Reno that Brazil’s Constitution gives its Judiciary “exclusive
jurisdiction” in these matters:

Decisions granting or denying extraditions may not be
appealed, and the Executive Branch may not limit or
make comments of any kind regarding the content or
scope of rulings handed down by that Court, which is the
highest authority of an independent branch of
government. Consequently, any interpretive statement
the Executive Branch might make would be
unenforceable.

Pet. App. 41a (emphasis added).

Then, in a letter dated October 29, 1996, Brazil’s President
responded directly to President Clinton:

5

Despite the personal interest I took in the issue, the
consideration of the alternatives at hand clearly indicated
that room for action by the Executive branch is very
limited, since a decision has already been taken by the
Supreme Court.... | understand [Minister Jobim’s] letter
provides the American government with a broad and
clear picture of the Brazilian legal position on the issue.

Pet. App. 44a (emphasis added).

On February 21, 1997, Mr. Pang’s Brazilian attorneys sent
Minister Jobim a letter, placing him on notice that his letter
to the U.S. Attorney-General had caused an American judge
on November 12, 1996, to conclude that Brazil’s Executive
had implicitly granted the U.S. permission to violate the terms
of the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court’s Extradition Order
and to prosecute Mr. Pang on the four felony-murder charges.
Pet. App. 47a. Five days later, Mr. Jobim responded:

I’d like to inform you that at no time did I provide any
type of interpretation on the content and reach of the
decision passed by the Federal Supreme Court. Thus, I
ratify all the words used in said correspondence, its only
objective being to clarify to Ms. Janet Reno, Attorney-
General of the United States, some aspects of the
Brazilian Constitutional system.

Pet. App. 48a (emphasis added).
REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT
Petitioner’s first query seeks to characterize this case as an
ideal vehicle for the resolution of a split among the federal

circuits over whether an extraditee has standing to object to
prosecution on charges for which extradition was not granted,

6

absent affirmative protest by the extraditing nation. The truth
is that no U.S. federal court has ever denied an extraditee
standing to challenge the prosecution of an offense in a case
such as this, where extradition was specifically petitioned by
the U.S. and then expressly and repeatedly denied by the
extraditing country, both in the Extradition Order and in all
subsequent communications.

Second, Petitioner urges this Court to construe the text of
this particular treaty so as to allow post-extradition
prosecution on any and all charges requested in the
extradition petition—even in cases where the requested nation
has expressly denied extradition on specific charges. Such a
construction is absurd on its face, since it would render
meaningless Brazil’s extradition proceedings and its ruling.

Neither Question Presented raises a genuine question of law
in need of clarification by this Court. Certiorari should
therefore be denied.

I. SINCE THE EXTRADITING NATION EXPLICITLY
AND REPEATEDLY DENIED THE UNITED STATES
PERMISSION TO PROSECUTE THE EXTRADITEE ON
THE FOUR CHARGES AT ISSUE, DEFENDANT
CLEARLY HAS STANDING TO OBJECT TO
PROSECUTION ON SAID CHARGES

A. U.S. Courts Must Enforce Any Treaty-Based
Conditions Imposed by the Extraditing Nation

All the Washington Supreme Court has done in this case is
to uphold one of the most elemental principles of extradition
jurisprudence: that when a requested nation, pursuant to a
treaty provision, refuses to extradite on a particular charge,

7

the requesting country can neither disregard’ nor second-
guess’ that decision. As the Washington Supreme Court
noted:

We conclude without question that under the Treaty,
Brazil, as the requested state, has sole authority to
determine whether a particular offense is extraditable.

Pet. App. 68a.‘

2 See United States v. Najohn, 785 F.2d 1420, 1422 (9th Cir.) (per curium),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1009 (1986) (“Because the surrender of the
defendant requires the cooperation of the surrendering state, preservation
of the institution of extradition requires that the petitioning state live up to
whatever promises it made in order to obtain extradition.”); Shapiro v.
Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 905 (2nd Cir. 1973) (“the principle [of specialty]
has been extended to bar prosecution for crimes listed in the treaty but for
which extradition, for whatever reason, was not granted).

> In Johnson v. Browne, 205 U.S. 309 (1907), this Court ruled that
“{w]hether the crime came within the provision of the treaty was a matter
for the decision of the Dominion authorities, and such decision was final by
the express terms of the treaty itself.” Jd at 316. See also Casey v. Dep't
of State, 980 F.2d 1472, 1477 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (“This deference is
necessary to further international comity—a goal the Supreme Court has
emphasized in a variety of contexts.”); McGann v. U.S. Board of Parole,
488 F.2d 39, 46 (3rd Cir. 1973) (“[Johnson] precludes any review of the
Jamaican court’s decision as to the extraditable nature of the offense”);
Greene v. United States, 154 F. 401, 408 (Sth Cir. 1907), cert. denied, 207
U.S. 596 (“[The treaty provision simply emphasizes] what must, upon
reason and principle, be true as to the whole—that the decision of the
authorities of the government in whose jurisdiction the fugitive shall be
found is necessarily final... [and] the courts of this country cannot review
a decision of foreign authorities against extradition”).

* Article XI of the U.S.-Brazil Extradition Treaty expressly provides that
“(t]he determination that extradition based upon the request therefor shouid
or should not be granted shall be made in accordance with the domestic law
of the requested State.” Pet. App. 1 15a.

8

In the landmark extradition case, United States v. Rauscher,
119 U.S. 407 (1886), this Court made clear that the U.S.
could not reasonably expect its own extradition orders to be
honored abroad unless U.S. courts zealously enforced as the
“supreme law of the land” the extradition orders of its treaty
partners. /d. at 419 (citing U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2).

This axiomatic policy of respect for restrictions imposed by
extraditing countries is rooted in “principles of international
comity: to protect its own citizens in prosecutions abroad, the
United States guarantees that it will honor limitations placed
on prosecutions in the United States”°—whether or not U.S.
courts agree with those limitations. The fact that there are
more extraditions today than four decades ago, see Pet. 9,
simply underscores the importance of Judiciaries everywhere
enforcing good faith compliance with extradition obligations.

The Rule of Specialty is designed to prevent countries from
petitioning extradition on one set of charges and then later, in
bad faith, prosecuting the extraditee on a second set of
charges not raised during the extradition proceedings, as
occurred in Rauscher.© The question of law in this case,

> United States v. Andonian, 29 F.3d 1432, 1435 (9th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 513 U.S. 1128 (1995) (citing United States v. Cuevas, 847 F.2d
1417, 1426 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1012 (1989)).

* See Rauscher, supra, 119 U.S. at 422 (“{Because] it is for a limited and
defined purpose that the [extradition] transfer is made, it is impossible to
conceive of the exercise of jurisdiction in such as case for any other purpose
than that mentioned in the treaty, and ascertained by the proceedings under
which the party is extradited, without an implication of fraud upon the
rights of the party extradited, and of bad faith to the country which
permitted his extradition. No such view of solemn public treaties between
the great nations of the earth can be sustained by a tribunal called upon to
give judicial construction to them.”).

9

however, is even more basic than that: Can the U.S. request
extradition on one set of charges, have its request flatly
rejected, and then, contrary to the requested country’s wishes,
nevertheless prosecute the extraditee on that same first set of
rejected charges? The answer is obviously no, and no federal
court has ever suggested otherwise.

Indeed, in judging the validity of post-extradition charges,
U.S. case law uniformly sets forth as the “essential” judicial
task “to determine, as best one can, whether the surrendering
state would regard the prosecution as a breach” so as “to
prevent the United States from violating international
obligations.” See Fiocconi v. Attorney Gen., 462 F.2d 475,
480 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1059 (1972).’

If an individual extraditee is deemed to have standing under
the Rule of Specialty® and U.S. domestic law’ to challenge

” See also, e.g., Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 525 (1988)
(“the principle operates to ensure that the receiving state does not abuse the
extradition processes of the extraditing state”); Andonian, 29 F.3d at 1435
(“Our concern is with ensuring that the obligations of the requesting nation
are satisfied.”); United States v. Sensi, 879 F.2d 888, 895 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(holding that “the standard” is “whether the requested state had objected or
would object to prosecution”); United States v. Diwan, 864 F.2d 715, 721
(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 921 (1989) (“the objective of the rule is
to insure that the treaty is faithfully observed by the contracting parties”).

® The Rauscher Court characterized the Rule of Specialty as a “right
conferred upon persons brought from a foreign country into this under
[extradition] proceedings.” 119 U.S. at 424 (emphasis added).

* As Chief Justice Rehnquist recently noted, this Court has ruled that a U.S.
domestic statute, now codified as 18 U.S.C. §3192, imposes the Rule of
Specialty on every extradition treaty to which the U.S. is a party. Alvarez-
Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 660 (1992) (citing Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 423); see
also Fiocconi, supra, 462 F.2d at 482.

10

charges not requested in an international extradition petition,
as this Court found in Rauscher, then, a fortiori, an extraditee
has standing to challenge charges requested and denied by the
requested country. The Court made this very argument in
Johnson v. Browne, 205 U.S. 309 (1907):

While the escape of criminals is, of course, to be very
greatly deprecated, it is still most important that a treaty
of this nature between sovereignties should be construed
in accordance with the highest good faith, and that it
should not be sought by doubtful construction of some of
its provisions to obtain the extradition of a person for one
offense and then punish him for another and different
offense. Especially should this be the case where the
Government surrendering the person has refused to make
the surrender for the other offense on the ground that
such offense was not one covered by the treaty.

Id. at 321 (emphasis added).

B. The Difficulty in This Case Has Not Been Brazil’s
Failure to Make Its Position Clear, But Refusal by
U.S. Officials to Accept It

As the Statement of the Case above makes clear, Brazil has
steadfastly held that the four felony-murder charges are not
extraditable offenses under the terms of the U.S. Brazil
Extradition Treaty. Brazil said no during the extradition
proceedings and post-extradition when the United States
continued efforts to pressure Brazilian officials into granting
permission to prosecute Mr. Pang on these charges."

° To summarize the record, Pet. App. 23a-48a, Brazil has denied the U.S.

request for permission to charge Mr. Pang with the felony-murder charges
at least six times: Brazil’s Supreme Court twice, its Ministry of Foreign

11

Having reviewed the relevant international communications
in this case, the Washington Supreme Court found as follows:

We conclude from the record in this case that Brazil has
not expressly consented to nor implicitly or explicitly
waived objection to the State of Washington charging
[Mr. Pang] with murder in the first degree.

Pet. App. 54a-55a.

C. The Standing-Without-Protest Circuit Split Does
Not Apply to Charges For Which Extradition Was
Expressly Requested and Denied

Since Brazil has the right under the Treaty to say no to the
four felony-murder charges requested in the U.S. Extradition
Petition, and has in fact done so, U.S. federal law is
unequivocal that Mr. Pang has standing to object to post-
extradition prosecution on these charges."

Had the facts been different in this case—had Brazil, for
instance, been silent’* or ambiguous’ on whether it deemed
the four felony-murder charges extraditable under the

Affairs once, its Justice Ministry twice, and its President once.

"' See, e.g., Najohn, 785 F.2d at 1422 (“However, the person extradited may
raise whatever objections the rendering country might have.”) (citing
Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 419).

2 See Fiocconi, 462 F.2d at 477 (“no response from the Italian government
has yet been received [regarding the post-extradition New York charges]”).

‘3 See United States v. Khan, 993 F.2d 1368, 1374-75 (9th Cir. 1993)
(reversing and dismissing conviction on one count, because the court
refused to “infer an agreement to extradite from Pakistan's silence”).

12

Treaty—this case might have afforded this Court an
opportunity to expand on its recent comments in United States
v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992), on the standing-
without-protest question.

There, Chief Justice Rehnquist pointed out that the
Rauscher Court assumed an individual extraditee has standing
to challenge U.S. violation of an extradition treaty whether or
not the extraditing country protests: “[N]o importance was
attached to whether or not Great Britain had protested the
prosecution of Rauscher for the crime of cruel and unusual
punishment as opposed to murder.” 504 U.S. at 667."

Still, even if this Court were to reverse its landmark
Rauscher decision on this point, Mr. Pang would nonetheless
have standing to challenge his prosecution on the felony-
murder charges. Brazil has made clear that it considers these
four charges non-extraditable offenses under the Treaty, and
has therefore repeatedly denied the United States permission
to prosecute Mr. Pang on these charges. Cf. Pet. 9-10. Even
circuits such as the Second and Fifth, which have questioned
standing in cases where new charges were added post-
extradition, would by their own reasoning hold that Mr. Pang
has standing to object to the four felony-murder charges at
issue here. The dispositive concern of these circuits is to give
effect to the intent of the extraditing country. Here, Brazil’s
intent is clear.*°

'* The Eleventh Circuit has, based on this, declared the standing-without-
protest question answered. United States v. Puentes, 50 F.3d 1567, 1574-75
(1 lth Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 341 (1995).

'S See, e.g, Fiocconi, 462 F.2d at 482 (2nd Cir.) (“{Under 18 U.S.C.
§3192], a person who has been extradited should not be tried for an offense
which the foreign country would consider to be outside the limits of its act
of extradition”); United States v. Kaufman, 858 F.2d 994, 1009 (Sth Cir.

13

Il. HONORING AN EXTRADITING NATION’S
RESTRICTIONS IS A PRINCIPLE EVEN MORE
FUNDAMENTAL THAN THE RULE OF SPECIALTY
AND ONE WITHOUT WHICH NO EXTRADITION
TREATY WOULD MAKE SENSE

Having first sought to deny Mr. Pang standing to object to
prosecution on the barred charges, Petitioner next seeks to
convince this Court that, despite Brazil’s no, the U.S. is under
no obligation under the terms of this particular Extradition
Treaty to honor Brazil’s express conditions of extradition.

To accomplish this, Petitioner narrowly focuses attention on
the language of Article XXI, which bars prosecution for “any
crime or offense committed prior to the request for his
extradition, other than that which gave rise to the request.”
Petitioner then points to the U.S. request for Mr. Pang’s
extradition, and notes, “The murder charges were listed in
that request.” Pet. 18. Thus, by definition, they “gave rise to
the request.” Then comes Petitioner’s surprising conclusion:
“the State of Washington can prosecute Pang for the four
counts of murder because those offenses were listed in the
extradition request.” Pet. 14 (emphasis added). Petitioner’s
formula thus neatly circumvents the fact that Brazil denied the
request for extradition on those charges.

Petitioner’s sophistry would not only render meaningless
the extensive extradition proceedings conducted in Brazil’s
highest federal court, but would also void Brazilian officials’
principled subsequent refusals to grant the U.S. what it so
aggressively sought: permission to prosecute Mr. Pang on the

1988), reh'g denied, 874 F.2d 242 (1989) (since there was “no basis to
conclude” that the charges could offend the requested nation, “hence, this
prosecution does not constitute a breach of the treaty provisions.”).

14

four felony-murders that the Brazilian Supreme Court had
ruled were non-extraditable offenses under the Treaty.

By force of logic, Petitioner’s construction would also
allow Brazil to disregard any extradition limitations imposed
by the United States. Suppose, for instance, that Brazil
petitioned the extradition of a physician on several charges,
including four first-trimester abortions allegedly performed in
Rio de Janeiro. Although abortion is an extraditable offense
under Article II of this 1960s Treaty, see Pet. App. 108a, Art.
II, §2, and remains a serious crime in Brazil, it has since been
ruled constitutionally protected behavior in the United States.
See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, rehg. den., 410 U.S.
959 (1973). Were the United States to grant extradition on
the other charges, but to exclude from the grant of extradition
the four abortion counts on grounds that the dual criminality
requirement in Article I of the Treaty had not been satisfied,
the U.S. would surely expect Brazilian courts to uphold its
decision and not allow post-extradition prosecution on the
abortion charges. Under Petitioner’s out-of-context
construction of Article XXI, however, Brazil would be free to
disregard the United States’ Extradition Order.

At the very least it is clear that Brazil, as the other party to
this international agreement, does not share Petitioner’s
views. Brazil’s 1988 Constitution gives its highest judicial
body original and exclusive jurisdiction over all extraditions.
Pet. App. 27a, 41a. Had Brazil’s Justices believed their
determination of the extraditability of each of the five
petitioned charges in this case would have no legal
consequence in the U.S., they need not have wasted their
time. Indeed, if Petitioner’s construction were adopted, what
reason would Brazil’s high court have to review future U.S.
petitions for extradition? More importantly, why would the
Brazilian Justices grant any U.S. extradition petitions,

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knowing that the provisions of the U.S.-Brazil Extradition
Treaty were being openly disregarded in American courts?

The fact is that Article XXI is only one of several
provisions in the U.S.-Brazil Extradition Treaty affording
both parties the right to deny extradition for certain offenses.
Indeed, the Treaty’s first article requires (1) that the principle
of dual criminality be met and (2) that the offense for which
extradition is requested be listed among the extraditable
offenses in Article II. Neither of these two primary Treaty
requirements was satisfied in this case. Brazil was therefore
within its Treaty rights to deny extradition on the four felony-
murder charges, and the U.S. cannot now violate Brazil’s
ruling. In the words of the Washington Supreme Court,

Under all the established facts in this case and the
application of international law, treaty law, United States
law, Washington law, and common logic, we must give
good faith recognition to the lawful determination of the
Federal Supreme Court of Brazil, the highest court of that
sovereign democracy, that Petitioner Martin Shaw Pang
was extradited only for prosecution in the State of
Washington for the crime of arson in the first degree,
resulting in four deaths, but not for prosecution for the
four charges of murder in the first degree.

Pet. App. 71a-72a.
CONCLUSION

The Washington Supreme Court has simply enforced United
States compliance with the provisions of this country’s
decades-old treaty with Latin America’s largest sovereign
democracy. Federal case law is uniform that the United
States must honor whatever restrictions are imposed by an

16

extraditing nation. This principle of extradition law is
axiomatic and should not be called into question by this
Court. Brazil has said no to the four felony-murder charges
requested and certainly has every right to presume that
American courts will give its Treaty-based decision the good
faith recognition it deserves. For these reasons, the petition
for writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

JOHN HENRY BROWNE
RITA JOAN GRIFFITH*
TIMOTHY KARAM DOLE
Browne & Ressler
Exchange Building
Penthouse Suite

821 Second Avenue
Seattle, WA 98104-1540
(206) 624-7364
Attorneys for Respondent

* Counsel of Record

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386013_1620%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
