# Reply Brief — Marks v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 852 (1998) (No. 97-652)

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386013_1587%3A3

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Reply Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1998

## Text

Z a a ae ae
S$ 1997
No. 97-652 DEC 25
— CLERK
In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1997
€

LAWRENCE MARKS; SUN BANK/MIAMI, N.A. and
EDWARD A. MOSS, as personal representatives of the
estate of Eugene Marks; MORRIS S. MARLIN, as personal

representative of the estate of Paul Marks;
HERMAN MARKS; IRENE O. MARKS, individually and
as personal representative of the estate of Stanley Marks;

MARKS DEVELOPMENT, INC.; and ISLAND IN THE
SUN CONDOMINIUMS OF KEY WEST FLORIDA, INC.,

Petitioners,

THE UNITED STATES,
Responden t.

*

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari
To The United States Court Of Appeals
For The Federal Circuit
a

REPLY TO BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
*

Jor: D. Eaton
Counsel of Record

Popuurst OrseCK JOSEFSBERG EATON
MeEapow OuIn & Perwin, P.A.

City National Bank Building,
Suite 800

25 West Flagler Street

Miami, Florida 33130-1780

(305) 358-2800

Attorney for Petitioners

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., (800) 225-6964
OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
EE 83s EE EEE ce eh EE 1
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 ey | Sp ]
United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482

Oe Eee Pe PLS oe EEE OP ee ee 2
Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199, 25 A.L.R. Fed. 684 (5th

Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910 2 <9 b ea eee 2
STATUTES
Clean Water Act of 1977 (§ 1, Pub. L. 95-217)........ 2
Rivers & Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, 33

Me NDAs Wines beds 2 Cy ces oie a 1

MISCELLANEOUS

Annotation, Authority of Secretary of Army to Deny
Dredging and Filling Permit for Ecological Reasons
Under § 10 of Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33
U.S.C.S. § 403, 25 A.L.R. Fed. 706 (1975)........... 2

ARGUMENT

1. With respect to the first question presented, the
plaintiffs and the government obviously differ in their
reading of this Court’s decision in Kaiser Aetna v. United
States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979). We will leave a reading of the
decision to the Court, confident that we have accurately
parsed it and that the government has not. We also
remind the Court that, with the singular exception of the
instant case, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
has read Kaiser Aetna exactly as we have read it, so the
government's attempt to distinguish it here is plainly
suspect. We stand by our demonstration of conflict.

The government apparently lacks confidence in its
reading of Kaiser Aetna because it attempts to finesse the
first question presented here with an alternative argu-
ment. It argues that the conflict is irrelevant in any event
because the Corps halted the plaintiffs’ development “in
aid of navigation” rather than “in aid of environmental
protection”:

. the Corps has consistently justified
stopping petitioners’ fill activities due to the
potential for interference with navigation. See
Pet. App. 6a (invoking the Rivers & Harbors
Appropriation Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. 403, not the
Clean Water Act, as the basis for Corps’ cease
and desist orders).

(Brief in Opposition, p. 8). We cannot allow this demon-
strably false statement to go unchallenged.

It is true that the 1973 cease and desist telegram
addressed “fill in the navigable waters of the United

States adjacent to the Riviera Canal” (Pet. App. 5a). How-
ever, the reference to “navigable waters” was simply a
reference to the property below the MHWL, which is the
line by which “navigable waters” is defined; it was not an
assertion of the Corps’ jurisdiction “in aid of navigation.”
The plaintiffs did not place any fill in the Riviera Canal;
the fill was placed on “wetlands,” and boats simply can-
not “navigate” on “wetlands.” Just as importantly, even a
cursory skimming of Judge Aronovitz’s 1982 decision will
reveal that the Corps asserted its jurisdiction over the
plaintiffs’ wetlands for environmental and ecological rea-
sons, and for no other purpose — and most certainly not
“in aid of navigation” or in furtherance of any other form
of interstate commerce which the government's “naviga-
tional servitude” is designed to protect.

And while it is also true that the Corps asserted its
jurisdiction under the Rivers and Harbors Act rather than
the Clean Water Act, it is no secret that the Rivers and
Harbors Act was being utilized by the Corps at the time
to extend its tentacles well beyond matters of navigation,
as a tool to promote environmental and ecological con-
cerns.* In addition, of course, the Corps relied upon the
Rivers and Harbors Act to promote its ecological con-
cerns for the plaintiffs’ wetlands, rather than the Clean
Water Act, because the “Clean Water Act of 1977” (§ 1,
Pub. L. 95-217) was not even in existence when the cease

* See, e. g., United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482
(1960); Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199, 25 A.L.R. Fed. 684 (5th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1971). See generally Annotation,
Authority of Secretary of Army to Deny Dredging and Filling Permit
for Ecological Reasons Under § 10 of Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899,
33 U.S.C.S. § 403, 25 A.L.R. Fed. 706 (1975).

and desist telegram was sent four years before its enact-
ment, in 1973. We stand by our initial argument.

2. With respect to the second question presented,
and notwithstanding that the government placed nearly
all of its eggs in this basket below, the government has
now tacitly conceded our point - that the lower courts
erred in concluding that the temporary taking of the
plaintiffs’ property above the MHWL was not compens-
able because the property increased in value during the
period of taking and was sold for a profit after the taking
ceased. The government argues only that the profit was
“relevant in showing that the property had economically
viable uses, as the sale occurred during the period when
petitioners alleged that the government’s regulation
caused a temporary taking” (Brief in Opposition, p. 10).
We must respectfully disagree with this additional
attempt to finesse the now conceded error of the courts
below.

The plaintiffs’ property above the MHWL was ren-
dered undevelopable by the Corps’ actions in 1973. Its
use as developable property was not restored to the
plaintiffs until the federal courts ordered the government
to permit its development as planned, in 1984. The sales
which the government claims are “relevant” occurred in
1986 and 1989 — after the Eleventh Circuit affirmed Judge
Aronovitz’s decision restoring an economically viable use
of the property above the MHWL to the plaintiffs. The
sales may therefore have some bearing on the date the
temporary taking ceased, but they most certainly do not
demonstrate that the property had an economically viable
use from 1972 to 1984, as the lower courts plainly erred in
concluding below.

3. The bulk of the government’s argument is
devoted to distracting the Court from the principal ques-
tions presented. To that end, the government argues that
its favorable summary judgment was essentially a “fact-
bound application of settled law [that] does not warrant
this Court’s review,” and it attempts to justify the ruling
with several miscellaneous “facts” which purportedly
support the judgment despite the errors inherent in it
(Brief in Opposition, p. 9). Given the complexity of the
facts, the government can perhaps be excused for its
misunderstanding of them, but because this Court’s
determination of whether to grant or deny certiorari
should not rest upon a false factual foundation, we are
constrained to set the record straight briefly in conclu-
sion.

First, the government argues that the Corps’ 1973
cease and desist order did not preclude the plaintiffs
from developing the property above the MHWL. This
assertion flies squarely in the face of Judge Aronovitz’s
finding of fact in the underlying litigation that, because
the government had no idea of the location of the MHWL
at the time, “the developers of the project were unable to
proceed with the project for fear that additional imper-
missible filling would take place” (Pet. App. 69a). The
assertion also flies squarely in the face of the conclusion
of law bottomed upon this finding in the underlying
litigation:

... The government has argued that the Defen-
dants were free in January, 1973, to continue
development above the mean high water line
since the cease and desist order only addressed

land below the mean high water line demarca-
tion. Unfortunately, however, the government
was unable to inform the Defendants where that
elusive line might be, so the government was
inviting the Defendants to risk the possibility of
continuing to be in violation of the law. This
court does not believe that this course of action
was a feasible alternative or that any reasonably
prudent businessman weuld gamble on the loss
of additional time, labor and money... .

(Pet. App. 88a).

Most respectfully, the plaintiffs were plainly
deprived of their use of the property above the MHWL
by the Corps’ 1973 cease and desist order. Under settled
principles of the doctrine of “collateral estoppel,” the
government is plainly bound by that fact in this litigation.
And it is that fact to which the “settled law” should have
been applied below in ruling on the government's motion
for summary judgment - not the factual position squarely
rejected by the federal courts in the underlying litigation.

Second, the government argues that its favorable
summary judgment is supported by the plaintiffs’ conces-
sion that they did not develop the property due to a lack
of funds. Actually, what the trial court concluded was
that the property had an economically viable use during
the period of the temporary taking because Lawrence
Marks had admitted (in a discovery deposition taken in
the underlying litigation) that, in addition to the Corps’
actions, the property was not filled above the MHWL
after 1973, and before the date of the new wetlands
regulations, because he did not have the money, and
there was no money to proceed because of a recession

from 1973 to 1976 (Pet. App. 51a). Frankly, we fail to see
any connection between this observation and the conclu-
sion that the property had an economically viable use
during the period of temporary taking, but we will
address it nevertheless.

The fact of the matter (as the trial court’s factual
recitation reveals) is that the plaintiffs had entered into a
joint venture agreement with Context Industries in 1972,
and the money to proceed was thereby secured. And, as
Mr. Marks noted on the same page of the discovery
deposition upon which the trial court relied, “when we
first started to fill, we were going to build right away”
(Ct. App. App. 98-100). The Corps then intervened and
stopped development of the property; and because of the
Corps’ intervention, the plaintiffs’ financial backer, Con-
text Industries, successfully sued for rescission of the
joint venture agreement (id. 93-94). It was principally for
that reason, and only incidentally because replacement
financial backing was not readily obtainable because of
the ensuing recession (not to mention the cease and desist
order), that the plaintiffs did not have the money to
proceed.

In any event, this issue was actually litigated
between the parties in the underlying action, and Judge
Aronovitz squarely rejected the government's contention
in this regard — finding as a fact instead that “[h]ad the
Corps not intervened in January, 1973, without locating
the mean high water line[,] the land above the mean high
water line could have been developed, and once done, it
would have been grandfathered and exempt from the Corps’
revised wetlands policy” (Pet. App. 88a; emphasis sup-
plied). Most respectfully, this finding of fact, made after a

full-blown trial, renders any suggestion to the contrary
contained in a mere discovery deposition moot; and
because of the settled doctrine of “collateral estoppel,”
the trial court was not free to find to the contrary in this
case — especially on a motion for summary judgment.

In addition, whether the plaintiffs had the money to
proceed with their proposed development after 1973 is
plainly irrelevant to the question of whether a compens-
able temporary taking occurred. It is irrelevant because,
as Judge Aronovitz also found as a fact, the plaintiffs
could not have proceeded to develop the property in the
face of the Corps’ demands even if the money to do so
had been available. The availability of financial backing
after Context Industries withdrew because of the Corps’
actions may have some relevance to the question of the
amount of the plaintiffs’ damages, but it has no relevance
at all to the question of whether a compensable tempor-
ary taking occurred — and the unavailability of additional
financial backing for a mere three years most certainly
provides no relevant support for a conclusion that the
property had an economically viable use during the more
than a decade in which it remained a breeding ground for
mosquitoes and was rendered entirely useless to the
plaintiffs by the Corps’ actions.

The government’s remaining efforts to finesse the
important questions presented here are adequately
addressed in our petition, so we will not repeat ourselves
in reply. We simply submit once again that, although the
underlying facts are complex enough to confuse even the
most astute of courts (which, we believe, is most likely
what happened below), it should ultimately be as plain as
the nose on the government's face that the plaintiffs did

suffer a compensable temporary taking of their 52-acre
tract for more than a decade, until its use as developable
property was finally restored to them by the federal
courts. The Fifth Amendment requires that they be com-
pensated for that taking, and we respectfully urge the
Court to restore that important constitutional right to the
plaintiffs, and to similarly situated future litigants, by its
proper enforcement in this case.

Respectfully submitted,

Joe. D. Eaton, Esa.

Counsel of Record

PODHURST, ORSECK, JOSEFSBERG,
Eaton, Meapvow, OuIn &
Perwin, P.A.

25 West Flagler Street, Suite 800

Miami, Florida 33130

(305) 358-2800 / Fax (305) 358-2382

Counsel for Petitioners

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386013_1587%3A3. Public record. Not legal advice.
