# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Stroh Die Casting Co. v. Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari
- **Published:** January 1, 1997
- **Citation:** 522 U.S. 981

## Text

~ Supreme Ler
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97 +479 SEP 15 1997
No. ____ogeice OF THE CLERK

In The
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1996

STROH DIE CASTING CoO.,
Petitioner,
v.

ATLANTIC STATES LEGAL FOUNDATION, INC.,
Respondent.

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari
To The United States Court Of Appeals
For The Seventh Circuit

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Roy E. Wagner

Counsel of Record

Niebler, Pyzyk & Wagner

N95 W16975 Richfield Way
Menomonee Falls, Wisconsin 53051

John H. Niebler

James J. Carrig

Of Counsel for Petitioner

Niebler, Pyzyk & Wagner

N95 W16975 Richfield Way
Menomonee Falls, Wisconsin 53051

inom y \

QUESTION PRESENTED
Does the federal court have jurisdiction over a citizen suit
under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251
et. seq., where the only post-complaint violations are at an outfall
which the citizen-plaintiff never included in a 60-day notice of

intent to sue?

li

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CUS TI PUNE so wis ves 5 een ee i
Zee GE Ae 8 6 ae Rea iv
Ce A ns nv dwn da eee ee 1
i ee yr rem! 2
STATUCIARY COMPU on ce cae he ee eee ee 2
STATEMENT OF THE CAZES .. 2. cece ccc ws cus 2
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION ........ 8
I. The Seventh Circuit’s loose reading of the

Clean Water Act notice requirement
conflicts with the Court’s _ strict
interpretation of the statute in Hallstrom v.
Se, gk a os ae a ee es 8

II. The Seventh Circuit’s failure to recognize
the important policy underlying strict
compliance with the notice provision will
flood the federal courts with Clean Water
ee Pr ere ee ee 13

COURS 58 6a 0s 0 wee ee eee 16

iid oat raed e .

APPENDIX A

APPENDIX B

I EL ee as C-1

iV
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES
Atlantic States Legal Found. v. United
Musical Instruments, 61 F.3d 473,
a Ss. i. 13, 5
Gwaltney v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation,
484 U.S. 49, 108 S.Ct. 376,
Ge Rae CU og cok cc ee sek baweews 3, 14
Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20,
110 S.Ct. 304, 107 L.Ed.2d 237 (1989),
reh’g denied, 493 U.S. 1037,
bk a ee Oe. Se 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14
Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc.
v. Hercules, Inc., 50 F.3d 1239,
ne ee a a chan 8, 12, 13
Washington Trout v. McCain Foods, Inc.,
ee ee. fe . | 8, 12, 13
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS
Be Be te ik kook ck 4WR bw ce bk es 2
a Oe Len sd so a. 6d wee oa er ok ee 3
a ula na a atin eta a 2,3,9
ee pe I eo ok a basa Ake Oe Oe 2, 3,43

No.

In The
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1996

STROH DIE CASTING CO.,

Petitioner,
v.
ATLANTIC STATES LEGAL FOUNDATION, INC.,
Respondent.

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari
To The United States Court Of Appeals
For The Seventh Circuit

Stroh Die Casting Co. ("Stroh") respectfully prays that a
writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment and opinion of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit entered in
this proceeding on June 17, 1997 in which the Court reversed the
decision of the United States District Court Eastern District of

Wisconsin and remanded the case to the district court.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the district court is not officially reported.

it is reproduced as Appendix A, infra. The opinion of the Court

of Appeals is reported as Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v.

Stroh Die Casting Co., 116 F.3d 814 (7th Cir. 1997). It is

reproduced as Appendix B, infra.

ee ee

JURISDICTION

The Court of Appeals entered its judgment on June 17,
1997. (Appendix B, infra). The petitioner invokes the jurisdiction
of this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

—---- =

STATUTORY PROVISIONS

The pertinent provisions of 33 U.S.C. § 1365 and 40
C.F.R. §135.3 are set forth in Appendix C.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is a citizen suit under the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act ("Clean Water Act"). The plaintiff, Atlantic States
Legal Foundation, Inc. ("Atlantic States") seeks civil penalties,
injunctive relief, and attorneys fees from Stroh Die Casting Co.,
Inc. ("Stroh") for alleged post-complaint violations of permit
limitations and federal regulations. The allegations relate to
discharges at an outfall location which Atlantic States never

included in any of its pre-complaint notices to Stroh.

The plaintiff invoked the jurisdiction of the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin under 28
U.S.C. § 1331 and 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a). Under the Clean Water
Act and Gwaltney v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 484 U.S. 49,
62, 108 S.Ct. 376, 384, 98 L.Ed.2d 306 (1987), the citizen-
plaintiff must allege that the defendant is an “ongoing violator" of
the Clean Water Act in order to invoke the subject matter
jurisdiction of the district court. Stroh maintains that because it is
not an "ongoing violator" of the Clean Water Act with respect to
the noticed outfalls, the district court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction to entertain this citizen suit.

In November, 1988, Atlantic States provided Stroh with a
60-day notice of intent to sue pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b).
In this first notice, Atlantic States identified alleged violations at
two of Stroh’s storm sewer outfalls (pipes): WDNR 001 and
WDNR 003. An outfall is a specific pipe location where
wastewater is discharged and test samples can be taken. On
January 23, 1989, Atlantic States filed suit for the alleged
exceedences of discharge standards at these two DNR storm sewer
outfalls.

The district court eventualiy dismissed the suit without
prejudice when Atlantic States failed to respond to Stroh’s motion
to dismiss. Stroh had argued in its motion that it was not a

"continuing violator" of the Clean Water Act, and that the district

court therefore lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case.

In April, 1989 Atlantic States sent a second 60-day notice
of intent to sue to Stroh. This notice alleged that Stroh was
discharging process wastewater to the Milwaukee Metropolitan
Sewage District ("MMSD") without a permit and that Stroh had
exceeded federal "categorical standards" in Noveinber, 1988, at
one outfall, MMSD 3.

In July, 1989, the MMSD issued Stroh an Industrial
Wastewater Discharge Permit which set specific parameters and
required testing and monitoring at the three outfalls from which
Stroh discharged process wastewater: MMSD 1, 3, and 4. In
addition, from late 1989 to early 1990, Stroh was designing and
implementing a new wastewater treatment system at its plant. In
June, 1990, Stroh completed this new treatment system which
combined the process wastewater previously discharged at MMSD
outfalls 1, 3 and 4 into a single stream which is now discharged at
MMSD outfall 4. Stroh no longer discharged industrial process
wastewater to MMSD outfall 3 and it was abandoned. In October,
1990, the MMSD issued Stroh a revised permit which reflected
these changes.

MMSD outfall 4 was the very same pipe from the time the
first permit was issued in 1989 as it is now. Since July, 1989,
MMSD outfall 4 was subject to its own set of effluent standards,

monitoring requirements, and reporting requirements. Its reports

were available to Atlantic States starting in 1989. However,

Atlantic States never provided Stroh with notice of intent to sue for
any MMSD outfall 4 violations.

Atlantic States’ last notice described alleged violations only
in 1988, before the initial permit was issued or the parameters
were set. Atlantic States has never provided Stroh with any notice
that Stroh exceeded the limitations set forth in the permits issued
to Stroh. Now Atlantic States has convinced the Seventh Circuit
that its pre-permit notice was sufficient to cover post-permit
violations of the 1989 permit. That is impossible.

In May, 1990, Atlantic States filed an amended complaint
which repeated the claims of the original suit relating to WDNR
outfalls 001 and 003 and also added claims relating to Stroh’s
discharges to the MMSD. This suit alleged that Stroh was an
"ongoing violator" of the Clean Water Act. However, the last
reported exceedence at MMSD outfall 3, the only MMSD outfall
ever noticed by Atlantic States, occurred in October, 1989, eight
months before the amended complaint. By June, 1990, as part of
the installation of the new treatment system, all process wastewater
was discharged, monitored, and reported at MMSD outfall 4.
Therefore, all post-complaint MMSD exceedences raised by
Atlantic States in its summary judgment motion papers occurred at
MMSD outfall 4, which was never identified in any notice from

Atlantic States.

—

Stroh has never been fined or sanctioned by the federal,
State, or local enforcement agencies having jurisdiction over
Stroh’s discharges.

On July 28, 1992, because Stroh could not be an "ongoing
violator" with respect to any of the noticed outfalls, Stroh moved
for summary judgment and the dismissal of Atlantic States’
complaint. In its March 22, 1996 decision, the district court found
that Atlantic States could only possibly allege post-complaint
violations at MMSD outfall 4 and that Atlantic States had never
provided the requisite 60-day notice for any violations at that
outfall. (Appendix A, A-14) The district court determined that
the alleged MMSD outfall 4 violations were beyond the scope of
the lawsuit, held that Stroh was not an "ongoing violator" at any
of the noticed outfalls, and dismissed Atlantic States’ complaint.
(Appendix A, A-14)

In a split decision, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit reversed the decision of the district court and
remanded the case. (Appendix B, B-14) The Seventh Circuit
recognized that neither of Atlantic States’ notices to Stroh
mentioned violations at MMSD outfall 4. (Appendix B, B-8)
However, the court found that because the April, 1989 notice

“sufficiently informed" Stroh and gave it an opportunity to correct

the problem, this notice satisfied the jurisdictional requirement of

the Clean Water Act. (Appendix B, B-10).

In his dissenting opinion, Circuit Judge Manion agreed

with the district court that Atlantic States’ complaint should be
dismissed. (Appendix B, B-15) Because the notice did not
identify the only outfall at which Atlantic States claimed post-
complaint MMSD violations, the district court lacked jurisdiction
to entertain those claims. (Appendix B, B-17)

The dissent also pointed out that Atlantic States had access
to all of the information it needed to provide Stroh, the EPA and
the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources with notice
regarding alleged exceedences at MMSD outfall 4, but failed to do
so. (Appendix B, B-18) Judge Manion criticized the court’s
“expansive reading" of the notice requirement and stated that any
MMSD outfall 4 violations should be excluded from the suit.
(Appendix B, B-20)

The question presented is whether the federal court has
jurisdiction over a citizen suit under the Clean Water Act, where
the citizen plaintiff seeks penalties for post-complaint exceedences

at an outfall it never included in any notice of intent to sue.

=

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

I. The Seventh Circuit’s loose reading of
the Clean Water Act notice requirement
conflicts with the Court’s _ strict
interpretation of the statute in Hallstrom

v. Tillamook County.

The Seventh Circuit’s expansive interpretation of the notice
provision significantly conflicts with the Court’s direction to
strictly construe this jurisdictional requirement. Hallstrom v.
Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20, 26, 110 S.Ct. 304, 308-9, 107
L.Ed.2d 237 (1989), reh’g denied, 493 U.S. 1037, 110 S.Ct. 761
(1990). The Seventh Circuit’s decision also conflicts with the
application of Hallstrom by the Sixth Circuit in Atlantic States
Legal Found. v. United Musical Instruments, 61 F.3d 473, 478
(6th Cir. 1995), the Ninth Circuit in Washington Trout v. McCain
Foods, Inc., 45 F.3d 1351, 1354 (9th Cir. 1995), and the Third
Circuit in Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v.
Hercules, Inc., 50 F.3d 1239, 1248-49 (3rd Cir. 1995). This case

gives the Court the opportunity to resolve these conflicts and

provide needed guidance to the lower courts on the appropriate
interpretation of the notice requirement.
The Clean Water Act provides that citizens may act as

"private attorneys general" to enforce the provisions of the Act:

"any citizen may commence a civil action on his own behalf. . .

nant!

against any person . - . who is alleged to be in violation of . . . an

effluent standard or limitation under this Act." 33 U.S.C. §

1365(a)(1).

Before the citizen plaintiff proceeds with a suit, however,
it must provide notice of the alleged violation to three parties: the
alleged violator, the United States Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA"), and the State in which the alleged violations

have occurred:

No action may be commenced -- (1) under
subsection (a)(1) of this section -- (A) prior to
sixty days after the plaintiff has given notice of the
alleged violation (i) to the Administrator, (ii) to
the State in which the alleged violation occurs, and
(iii) to any alleged violator of the standard,
limitation, or order. . . .

33 U.S.C. § 1365(0). The specific contents of the notice are

prescribed by 40 C.F.R. § 135.3(a):

Notice regarding an alleged violation of an effluent
standard or limitation or of an order with respect
thereof, shall include sufficient information to
permit the recipient to ideatify the specific
standard, limitation, or order alleged to have been
violated, the activity alleged to constitute a
violation, the person or persons responsible for the
alleged violation, the location of the alleged
violation, the date or dates of such violation, and
the full name, address, and telephone number of
the person giving notice.

The Court has held that if the citizen plaintiff fails to

strictly adhere to the notice requirements, the citizen suit must be

dismissed. Proper notice, therefore, is a mandatory prerequisite
to suit.

In Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20, 26, 110
S.Ct. 304, 308-9, 107 L.Ed.2d 237 (1989), reh’g denied, 493 U.S.
1037, 110 S.Ct. 761 (1990), the citizen plaintiff failed to strictly
comply with the 60-day notice provision of the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA") and the Court affirmed
the dismissal of the action. In Hallstrom, the citizen plaintiff
provided its notice to the defendant, but not to the EPA or State
authorities. The defect proved fatal to the citizen plaintiff’s suit:

The language of this provision could not be
clearer. A citizen may not commence an action
under RCRA until 60 days after the citizen has
notified the EPA, the State in which the alleged
violation occurred, and the alleged violator. .. .
Under a literal reading of the statute, compliance
with the 60-day notice provision is a mandatory,
not optional, condition precedent for suit.

[T]he notice and 60-day delay requirements are
mandatory conditions precedent to commencing
suit under the RCRA citizen suit provision; a
district court may not disregard these requirements
at its discretion.

Id. at 26, 31. The Court explicitly rejected the citizen plaintiff's
argument that the statute should be given a "flexible or pragmatic
construction.” Id. at 26.

Both the Sixth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit have

recognized that under Hallstrom, the citizen plaintiff must not only

10

2 Ale hE MS

deliver the notice to the correct parties, but the notice must include
the information specified by the statute. In Atlantic States Legal
Foundation v. United Musical Instruments, 61 F.3d 473 (6th Cir.
1995), the Sixth Circuit examined the notice requirements of the
Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act of 1986
("EPCRA"). EPCRA’s notice requirement is substantially the
same as that in the RCRA and the Clean Water Act.

tm United Musical Instruments, Atlantic States provided
notice of its intent to sue for reporting violations for calendar years
1987-1990 and for “violations not yet known to ASLF of other
EPCRA reporting requirements. " Id., at 478. In its suit, Atlantic
States included an alleged violation for calendar year 1991.

The Sixth Circuit, relying upon Hallstrom, held that
Atlantic States’ "catch-all" notice was insufficient to confer
jurisdiction on the district court for the 1991 violation:

As the structure of EPCRA’s notice provision is
substantively identical to the analogous provision
of RCRA, it follows that sufficient notice is also a
mandatory prerequisite to filing an enforcement
action under EPCRA. ASLF does not dispute this
obvious implication of Hallstrom, but contends the
notice of its intention to hold UMI liable for
"violations not yet known" was sufficient to create
jurisdiction over the alleged 1991 violation. We
disagree.

United Musical Instruments, 61 F.3d at 478. Because the 1991

violation was not noticed, Atlantic States could not include it in the

suit.

In Washington Trout v. McCain Foods, Inc., 45 F.3d 1351
(9th Cir. 1995), the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s

ruling that the citizen plaintiff's notice was defective because it
failed to identify the two organizations that eventually became the
only plaintiffs in the case. The court read Hallstrom to require
strict compliance with the Clean Water Act notice requirement:

The issue in Hallstrom was whether the notice was
sufficient under the regulation’s mandate --
whether the notice requirement should be strictly
construed or liberally applied by the district
courts. The Court held that the notice requirement
under the regulations was to be strictly construed.

Washington Trout, 45 F.3d at 1354.

The Third Circuit has read the notice requirement more
broadly than the Sixth and Ninth Circuits. In Public Interest
Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Hercules, Inc., 50 F.3d
1239, 1249 (3rd Cir. 1995), the court allowed a citizen plaintiff to

pursue violations not specifically noticed as long as they were
"interconnected" with noticed violations.

The Third Circuit held that if a citizen-plaintiff has
provided notice for a Clean Water Act "discharge" violation, it
may also sue for subsequent monitoring, reporting, or
recordkeeping violations of the same "type", even if these
violations have not been separately noticed:

[W]e hold that a notice letter which includes a list
of discharge violations, by parameter, provides
sufficient information for the recipients of the
notice to identify violations of the same type (same

12

ape intok,

parameter, same outfall) occurring during and after
the period covered by the notice letter.

Hercules, 50 F.3d at 1250.

These cases demonstrate the significant conflict among the
circuit courts regarding the interpretation of the notice
requirement. The Third Circuit and, in this case, the Seventh
Circuit, have departed from the strict construction mandated by the
Court in Hallstrom and further developed by the Sixth Circuit in
United Musical Instruments and the Ninth Circuit in Washington
Trout.

The Seventh Circuit has approved the blanket, “catch-all”

notice explicitly rejected as insufficient in United Musical

Instruments. In addition, the Seventh Circuit has moved far
beyond the restrictions of Hercules, which still required the notice
to identify the "same parameter, same outfall" to confer
jurisdiction. The Court should grant Stroh’s petition to resolve

this conflict among the circuits.

Il. The Seventh Circuit’s failure to
recognize the important policy
underlying strict compliance with the
notice provision will flood the federal
courts with Clean Water Act citizen
suits.

The Seventh Circuit’s decision ignores the important policy
considerations behind the notice requirement. in Hallstrom, the

Court recognized the two basic goals of the notice:

13

First, notice allows Government agencies to take
responsibility for enforcing environmental
regulations, thus obviating the need for citizen
Suits. . . . Second, notice gives the alleged
violator “an opportunity to bring itself into
complete compliance with the act and thus likewise
render unnecessary a citizen suit."

Hallstrom, 493 U.S. at 29, citing Gwaltney v. Chesapeake Bay
Found., 484 U.S. at 49, 60. Therefore, a proper notice must
inform not only the operator, but also the government entities of
the alleged violations.

The result reached by the Seventh Circuit in this case is
inconsistent with the function of the citizen suit contemplated by
the statute: "the citizen suit is meant to supplement, rather than to

supplant government action." Gwaltney _v. Chesapeake Bay

Found., 484 U.S. at 60. By allowing Atlantic States to proceed
without properly noticing Stroh, the EPA and the State of
Wisconsin, the Seventh Circuit has upset the statute’s deference to
government enforcement before allowing citizen suits.

By finding that the "key to notice is to give the accused
company the opportunity to correct the problem," the Seventh
Circuit has entirely ignored the first important purpose of notice
articulated by the Court in Hallstrom. (Appendix B, B-10) The
"key" is for the citizen plaintiff to notify not only the alleged
violator, but also the EPA and the State. __

A notice, like Atlantic States’, which fails to identify the

"location of the alleged violation" to the operator, the EPA and the

(f

baie Naan SE aah tot 2 ‘

Avia WEARS AY

State frustrates the operation of the statute. 40 C.F.R. § 135.3
This "catch-all" notice provides no real opportunity for potential
enforcement or compromise before suit.

Here, the Seventh Circuit has allowed Atlantic States to sue
for future violations not noticed. This result is 180 degrees

opposite from the policy considerations recognized in United

Musical Instruments and Hallstrom. Before Atlantic States filed its

amended complaint in May, 1990, it easily could have noticed the
violations it now claims -- and Stroh, the EPA, and the DNR could
have addressed them before suit.

It is most significant that none of the government
enforcement agencies ever imposed sanctions against Stroh for the
noticed "violations." Instead, they worked with Stroh to eliminate
the potential problems through the permitting process. This
resulted in Stroh’s new treatment system which eliminated the
earlier problems. As Judge Manion recognized in his dissent, the
only possible objective of this suit is to try to collect attorneys fees
for Atlantic States’ lawyers. (Appendix B, B-24)

In addition to frustrating the purpose of the notice
provision, the Seventh Circuit's approval of Atlantic States’ “catch
all" notice will result in a huge increase of citizen suits. As the
dissent recognized, the Seventh Circuit's "expansive reading” of
the statute may result in “catch-all notices sent to companies
which, if construed as broadly as the court has done here, would

encompass any violation, past or future." (Appendix B, B-20)

15

In this case and in others, the lower federal courts have
expressed divergent views on whether to be lax or strict in
applying the 60-day notice provision in the Clean Water Act. This

Court should provide some much needed guidance.

CONCLUSION
The petitioner, Stroh Die Casting Co., respectfully requests

that the Court grant the writ of certiorari.
Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin this 12th day of

September, 1997.

Roy E. Wagner

Counsel of Record

Niebler, Pyzyk & Wagner

N95 W16975 Richfield Way
Menomonee Falls, Wisconsin 53051

John H. Niebler

James J. Carrig

Of Counsel for Petitioner

Niebler, Pyzyk & Wagner

N95 W16975 Richfield Way
Menomonee Falls, Wisconsin 53051

16

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

ATLANTIC STATES LEGAL FOUNDATION, INC.,
Plaintiff ,

-vS- Case No. 89-C-100

STROH DIE CASTING CO., INC.,

Defendant.

DECISION AND ORDER

This is a citizen suit brought by the plaintiff, Atlantic
States Legal Foundation, Inc. ("Atlantic"), under the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act, also known as the Clean Water Act,
33 U.S.C. 1365. Atlantic seeks relief for defendant Stroh Die
Casting Co., Inc.’s ("Stroh") alleged repeated discharges of
pollutants into a tributary of the Menomonee River and into Lake
Michigan via the Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District
("MMSD"), in violation of the National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System ("NPDES") permits issued by the Wisconsin
Department of Natural Resources ("DNR") pursuant to the Act.
An initial action brought by Atlantic was dismissed without
prejudice by Judge Robert W. Warren on the Court’s own motion
on November 14, 1989. On May 7, 1990, Atlantic filed an
amended complaint. Leave to file this amended complaint was
granted by Judge Warren on April 16, 1992. Stroh answered, and
cross-motions for summary judgment were filed.

BACKGROUND

The Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq., establishes
a system for regulating both direct discharges (to surface waters)
and indirect discharges (to municipal sewer systems) of pollutants
into United States waters. Section 505(a) of the Clean Water Act,
33 U.S.C. 1365(a), the citizen suit provision, provides, subject to
certain procedural requirements, that:

[A]ny citizen may commence a civil action on his
own behalf--
(1) against any person. . . who is
alleged to be in violation of (A) an
effluent standard or limitation
under this chapter or (B) an order
issued by the Administrator or a
State with respect to such a
standard or limitation, .

Atlantic sues under this provision.

To establish federal court jurisdiction, citizen plaintiffs,
such as Atlantic, must "allege a state of either continuous or
intermittent violation -- that is, a reasonable likelihood that a past
polluter will continue to pollute in the future." Gwaltney of

Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc., 484 U.S.
49, 57 (1987).

The Fourth Circuit analyzed this Supreme Court decision
as follows:

The Supreme Court held that citizen-plaintiff suits
under § 505 could not be based on wholly past
violations, but carefully distinguished an allegation
of a wholly past violation from allegations of
intermittent or sporadic violations. The Court

A-2

ee OP tA AP a ae ne

Serr Ps

noted legislative history in support of the
proposition that
an intermittent polluter -- one who
violates permit limitations one
month of every three -is just as
much "in violation" of the Act, as
a continuous violator.
108 S.Ct. at 384.

The Supreme Court remanded in light of its
holding that "§ 505 confers jurisdiction over
citizen suits when citizen plaintiffs make a good
faith allegation of continuous or intermittent
violation. . . .” 108 S. Ct. at 385.

Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield.
Ltd., 844 F.2d 170, 171 (4th Cir. 1988). Not only must
allegations of "continuous or intermittent" violations be made in
order to establish the Courts jurisdiction, but a 60-day notice of
those violations must be given to the alleged violator (among
others) before any action can be commenced.

Section 505 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1365(b),
provides:

No action may be commenced --

(1) under subsection (a)(1) of this
section --

(A) prior to sixty days after the
plaintiff has given notice of the
alleged violation (i) to the
Administrator, (ii) to the State in
which the alleged violation occurs,
and (iii) to any alleged violator of
the standard, limitation, or order .

EE

Stroh contends that the aforementioned 60-day notice must
be given as to each offending source of discharge when there is
more than one offending source of discharge within a company.
A general notice that is given or directed to a company that houses
the various sources of discharge is inadequate. Specific notice
must be given to a company as to each offending source of
discharge, what Stroh labels as "point sources" or "“outfalls."
Therefore, the notice to the alleged violator must be on a "point
source-by-point source” basis, that is, the required notice must be
"point source’ specific before the Court has jurisdiction to hear the
alleged violation.

Stroh had three discharge pipes or "point sources" (point
sources/outfalls Nos. 1, 3 and 4) at its plant. According to Stroh,
while Atlantic provided Stroh with proper notice of violations as
to point sources/outfalls Nos. 1 and 3, Atlantic failed to provide
proper notice as to point source/outfall No. 4. As to point sources
Nos. 1 and 3, Stroh submits that it had no violations or
exceedences at those noticed point sources after the time Atlantic
filed its amended complaint on May 7, 1990. These "noticed"
violations thus became, under Gwaltney, "past" violations and not
actionable.

Atlantic argues that, for notification purposes, a “facility
or company can itself be considered a "point source." Atlantic
contends that each point source within a facility does not have to
be addressed by way of notice, pleadings and proof to determine
whether a particular point violation occurred and, therefore,
Stroh’s argument as to point source No. 4 must fail.

The Court accepts Stroh’s "point source-by-point source"
analysis and finds that Atlantic failed to provide the requisite 60-
day notice relative to point source/outfall No. 4. Stroh’s motion
for summary judgment related to point source No. 4 must be
granted. The Court further finds that no reasonable jury could
conclude from the undisputed facts that Stroh was an intermittent
and/or continuous violator relative to Stroh’s “point sources"

A-4

i Sati) ROW abc. RARER oe Nita Etats BAP AAA paced aig evoke

known as pipe outfalls Nos. 1 and 3. Therefore, Stroh’s motion for
summary judgment is granted in all respects and the case is
dismissed.

ANALYSIS

A. *Point Sources’ Nos. 1 and 3.

The discharges occurring at point sources/outfalls Nos. 1,
3, and as we see later, 4, are undisputed. Indeed, they are based
upon reports and records that Stroh was required to submit.

The reports establish two post-amended complaint "events F
at point source/outfall No. 3 which were offered by Atlantic as
“proof” of ongoing or intermittent permit exceedences. Because
the first event concerns PCBs and because Stroh’s permit contains
no daily effluent limitation as to PCBs, (Gene Sewalish Affidavit,
September 17, 1992, at Para. 2), Atlantic is unable to prove an
exceedence of Stroh’s daily effluent limitations relative to that
permit.

The second exceedence at point source/outfall No. 3 is
based on a faulty lab test. A laboratory letter verifying that this
result was due to “error” on the lab’s part is attached to the
supplemental Sewalish affidavit dated September 17, 1992.
Because the PCB annual monitoring result and the result of a faulty
lab test do not meet Atlantic’s burden to show that, Stroh was an
ongoing or intermittent violator at point sources Nos. | and 3 after
May 7, 1990, all of the exceedences noticed and alleged by
Atlantic at these "point sources" are "wholly past" within the
meaning of Gwaltney. Any claim based on these alleged violations
must be dismissed.

B. "Point Source" No. 4.

Both parties argue that the language of the Clean Water
Act, the regulatory structure of the Act, and United States Supreme
Court and other cases defining a "point source" support their
proffered definition of a "point source." Review of these
authorities compels the Court to side with Stroh.

Section 1365(a)(1) authorizes a citizen suit "against any
person . . . who is alleged to be in violation of an effluent standard
or limitation under this chapter . . . ." (Emphasis added.) This
Court accepts as the definition of “violation” in this section that
which is set out by the court in South Carolina Wildlife Federation
v. Alexander, 457 F.Supp 118 (D.S.C. 1978):

[I]n order for an act to be unlawful under s 301, it
must involve (1) the Addition of a Pollutant into
Navigable waters (2) from a Point source (3) by a
Person.

Id. at 125 (emphasis added). This definition coincides with 33
U.S.C. § 1362(11): "The term ’effluent limitation’ means any
restriction established by a State or the Administrator on quantities,
rates, and concentrations of chemical, physical, biological, and
other constituents which are discharged from point sources... .’
(Emphasis added.) Effluent limitations generally are embodied in
permits that regulate discharge sites or point sources at a facility.
Violations of the standards of performance generally occur when
a company or facility exceeds the effluent limitations established
in permits and permit limitations applying to a particular "point
source" within any new source or facility.

This Court adopts the reasoning of Sierra Club v. Shell Oil
Co., 817 F.2d 1169 (Sth Cir. 1987), where that court stated:

A "point source" means the point of discharge of
the pollutant-containing effluent. Effluent

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Bieri ess ideresit

limitations, which were developed for entire
industrial categories OF subcategories, are
transformed into limitations on individual plants
within the category or subcategory by
incorporation into the terms and conditions of
NPDES discharge permits. If a discharger is in
compliance with the effluent limitations contained
in its NPDES permit, it is deemed to be in
compliance with The Clean Water Act.

One industrial facility may have numerous point
sources of discharge. . . . [When determining
whether a permit-holder has violated an effluent
limitation, one must look at each parameter within
each point source independently.

Id., at 1173 (citations omitted)(emphasis added).
. Notice.

In addition to losing the "point source" argument, Atlantic
also loses on “notice,” although this is a close case. It is
undisputed that Atlantic’s two notices to sue of November 8, 1988,
and April 13, 1989, do not specifically mention point
source/outfall No. 4. In the November 8, 1988, notice, reference
is only made to Stroh’s failure to comply with NPDES as it relates
to point sources or outfalls Nos. 1 and 3.

It states in pertinent part:

This lawsuit will allege that the Milwaukee County
plant of Stroh Die Casting Company, Inc., which
discharges into Bluemound Tributary of the
Menomonee River via a storm sewer and is located
in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, has violated and
continues to violate an “effluent standard or
limitation," Section 505(a)(1)(A) of the Clean

A-7

Water Act, by not complying with its NPDES
(Section 402) permits WI 0042285 in the following

=

In addition to referencing violations related to outfall No. 3,
Atlantic’s April 13, 1989, notice states:

This lawsuit will allege that the Milwaukee County
plant of Stroh Die Casting Company, Inc., which
discharges process water into Lake Michigan via
the Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District,
and which is located in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, has
violated and continues to violate an ’effluent
standard or limitation,’ by discharging die casting
process waste-water to MMSD since October 31,
1988, without a pretreatment discharge permit and
in violation of the categorical standards set forth in
40 C.F.R. Chapter 464.

Stroh asserts that this is not enough. While admitting violations at
outfall No. 4, Stroh argues:

[I]t is clear that neither notice provided by Atlantic
included "(1)" sufficient information to permit the
recipient to identify the specific standard,
limitation, or order alleged to have been violated.
[And] Atlantic’s notices, on their face, fail to meet
this element as they apply to either the discharges,
permit, identification or separate permit limitation
of point source/outfall No. 4.

(Stroh Opposition Brief at 16.)

Absent such a notice as to point source/outfall No. 4, the
important policy supported by this prerequisite would be defeated.

A-8

One of the major purposes of the notice provision
is to allow for possible administrative resolution
prior to filing suit. Since the notice is
jurisdictional, such a significant omission divests
this Court of the authority to further proceed with
an adjudication of this matter... .

South Carolina Wildlife Federation, 457 F.Supp. at 124 (D.S.C.
1978)(emphasis added).

Atlantic argues that, under the facts of this case, the 60-day
notice requirement must be "interpreted flexibly” and must not be
*subject to technical or formalistic" requirements. In support of its
position, Atlantic offers the authority of Proffitt v. Commissioners,
Township of Bristol, 754 F.2d 504 (3rd Cir. 1985). Proffitt
involved allegations of violations of the Water Pollution Prevention
and Control Act at the defendant’s sewerage plant. Proffitt filed
an amended complaint on the same day he sent notice of the
alleged violation to the various defendants, the Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA"), and the Pennsylvania Department of
Environmental Resources ("DER"). Even though Proffitt did not
give 60-day notice prior to filing suit, the court found there was
"notice in fact" or "actual notice" which defeated defendant’s
jurisdictional argument. The court found evidence that all
defendants knew of the violation and had discussed the violations
with Proffitt before he filed his suit and notice.

Proffitt appears to have been overturned by the Supreme
Court in Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20 (1989),
where failure to technically comply with a 60-day notice
requirement under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
("RCRA") (identical to the notice requirement under consideration
here) resulted in dismissal. In Hallstrom, the plaintiff, while
giving the allegedly offending landfill operators the requisite 60-
day notice, failed to notify the State of Oregon or the EPA as
required. The Supreme Court rejected plaintiff's contention that
since the actual offender was placed on proper notice "the 60-day

A-9

notice provision should be subject to equitable modification and
cure." Id. at 27. However, the court determined that the notice
provision was not subject to a "flexible or pragmatic construction."
Id., at 26. To plaintiff's argument that "giving effect to the literal
meaning of the notice provisions would compel ’absurd or futile
results," Id. at 29, and would "defeat Congress’ intent," Id. at 23,
the Hallstrom Court responded:

[R]equiring citizens to comply with the notice and
delay requirements furthers Congress’ goal of
striking a balance between encouraging citizen
suits and avoiding burdening the federal courts
with excessive numbers of such suits, since notice
allows government agencies and alleged violators
to achieve compliance without the need for suit.
Petitioners’ assertion that giving effect to the literal
meaning of the notice provisions would allow
violations to go unchecked during the 60-day
waiting period is not persuasive, since this
problem results from the balance knowingly struck
by Congress in developing the citizen suit
provisions, and since it is likely that compliance
with the notice requirement will trigger appropriate
federal or state enforcement actions to prevent
serious damage.

The Hallstrom Court concluded that the "notice and 60-day
delay requirements are mandatory conditions precedent to
commencing suit under the [] citizen suit provision,” Id. at 31, and
that "[t]he equities do not weigh in favor of modifying statutory
requirements when the procedural default is caused by petitioners’
failure to take the minimal steps necessary’ to preserve their
claims." Id. at 27.

The Hallstrom Court suggests that the minimal effort
required to give proper notice will not thwart the access of citizens
to the courts (particularly sophisticated citizens like Atlantic) and

A-10

is the least costly way to preserve the other important policies
embodied in the statute. These are to encourage possible
administrative resolutions prior to filing suit and to "avoid []
burdening the federal courts with excessive numbers of citizen
suits." Id. at 29. Hallstrom’s strict interpretation of the ‘notice
and delay’ requirements are fatal to Atlantic.

Atlantic cites to National Wildlife Fed’n v. Consumers
Power Co., 657 F.Supp. 989 (W.D. Mich. 1987), as an example
of an actual notice standard that fits the facts of this case. The
court there stated:

This is not a case where the plaintiff either failed
entirely to give notice to the appropriate persons
(Hallstrom) or instituted suit prior to the expiration
of the sixty-day waiting period (Proffitt)... . In
this case, rather, plaintiff gave timely and
substantially complete, if not complete, notice to
the appropriate persons. Since plaintiff has
sufficiently alleged and established the actual
notice that the statute and the regulations require,
the Court will reject this aspect of defendant's
motion.

Id. at 998 (citations omitted)(emphasis added).

Even if the notice was "not complete," Atlantic argues, it
gave actual notice to Stroh of Stroh’s violations. Admitting that it
did not specifically mention point source/outfall No. 4 in either of
its notices, Atlantic asserts that the April 13, 1989, letter was
sufficient because of the context within which the notice occurred.
The second notice letter references discharges of “process water
into Lake Michigan via the Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage
District" and that Atlantic [sic] "has violated and continues to
violate an “effluent standard or limitation" by discharging die
casting process waste-water to MMSD since October 31, 1988,

A-11

without a pretreatment discharge permit and in violation of
categorical standards set forth in 40 C.F.R. Chapter 464."

This information was given to Stroh at a time when Stroh
was correcting its discharge from point sources/outfalls Nos. 1 and
3, which emptied into the Bluemound Tributary of the Menomonee
River, by re-routing these offending discharges to outfall No. 4
which emptied into Lake Michigan via the MMSD’'. Stroh thus

The following is excerpted from the Sewalish deposition of September
9, 1992, pages 52-54:

Q: Now, Mr. Sewalish, is it correct that what you’ve
described to me as a history of Stroh Die Casting in which
some of the wastewater previously discharged via storm water
through outfalls one or three under the Wisconsin DNR
permit were rerouted sometime in 1990 to be discharged to
the Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District via sanitary

sewer?
A: Correct.
Q: Okay. If we look, for example, to outfall three as

defined in your initial MMSD’s permit, wastewater that was
discharged through that outfall under the initial permit has
subsequently been discharged and measured through a
different outfall under your revised permit, --

A: Correct.

Q: -- correct? Okay. It’s the same wastewater mixed
with additional water from other sources, correct?

A: Three waste streams are combined into one, correct.
Q: Okay. You have not ceased discharging the
wastewater which used to be discharged at old outfall three,
correct?

A: Correct.

Q: Okay. You have, as you said, rerouted it and

combined it with the discharge from other waste streams and
now discharge and measure it at outfall four, correct?

A: Going through a waste treatment process prior to
discharge, correct.

(Emphasis added.)

knew, or should have known, that the April 13, 1989, notice
objecting to discharge into Lake Michigan via the MMSD could
become the basis of a legal action and that point source No. 4
would be the subject of that action. Stroh was thus on actual
notice that Atlantic intended to sue for those discharges into the
MMSD even though point source/outfall No. 4 was not directly
named.

Given these facts, it would be umnecessary, argues
Atlantic, to give another 60-day notice by specifically referencing
outfall No. 4 and amending the complaint accordingly. But
Hallstrom, given its vision of the policies embodied in the statutes,
appears to hold otherwise. Hallstrom suggests that this is a
minimal effort to make in light of the policies harmed by a failure
to make it.

As the Sewalish affidavit makes clear, at the time of the
second notice Stroh was attempting to resolve the discharge
problems at point sources Nos. 1 and 3 by redirecting it through
a "waste treatment" system that ultimately discharged into point
source No. 4. (As the record and this decision reflects, Stroh did
resolve its violations at point sources Nos. 1 and 3.) Atlantic lists
a long series of violations since July 1, 1990, at point source No.
4. It highlights a letter dated May 29, 1990, from Stroh’s
manufacturing engineer Eric Silas to the MMSD indicating Stroh’s
failure to meet its deadline for start up of the wastewater treatment
system as evidence of Stroh’s inability to correct what was an
ongoing problem. Stroh concedes these violations in as much as
they are based on its own monitoring reports to the MMSD. All
of this was known to both parties. What is not known is whether
Stroh and the MMSD would have taken additional, different,
and/or quicker steps to resolve these problems at point source No.
4 had point source No. 4 specifically been mentioned in Atlantic’s
earlier notice (as was the case with point sources Nos. 1 and 3) or
in a subsequent notice.

Stroh and the MMSD should have been given that chance.
Atlantic had easy access to all the records of Stroh’s violations.
The imposition on Atlantic to give specific notice as to violations
at another point source and file an amended complaint was minimal
in light of the important goals that may have been achieved by that
notice (i.e., remedy of the violations and avoidance of a lawsuit.)

Like the Hallstrom plaintiff, Atlantic believes that such an
approach would compel "absurd or futile results." The reverse is
true. This approach, according to Hallstrom, strikes the
appropriate balance "between encouraging citizen enforcement of
environmental regulations and avoiding burdening the federal
courts with excessive numbers of citizen suits," Hallstrom, 493
U.S. at 29, since notice allows government agencies and alleged
violators to achieve compliance without the need for suit. Atlantic
could easily have preserved its claims at any time subsequent to the
deficient second notice by simply reviewing Stroh’s records,
putting them on a specific notice as to point source No. 4, and
filing an amended complaint. Because it did not do so, its claim
as to point source/outfall No. 4 cannot be considered by the Court
and must be dismissed.

NOW, THEREFORE, BASED ON THE FOREGOING,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

S Stroh’s motion for summary judgment is
GRANTED.

2. Case No. 89-C-100 is DISMISSED.

Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, this 22nd day of March,
1996.

SO ORDERED,

HON. RUDOLPH T. RANDA
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

A-14

APPENDIX B

IN THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-2063

ATLANTIC STATES LEGAL FOUNDATION, _INC.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

Vv.

STROH DIE CASTING CO.,
Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Wisconsin
No. 89-C-100 -- Rudolph T. Randa, Judge

Argued Oct. 21, 1996.
Decided June 17, 1997.

Before MANION, DIANE P. WOOD, and EVANS, Circuit
Judges.

DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge.

Although this environmental case has been pending since
1989, during most of its life it has languished in the court. In the
meantime, not surprisingly, the conditions about which the citizen
plaintiffs originally complained have changed, perhaps
substantially. It began when the Atlantic States Legal Foundation
filed it as a citizen suit under the Federal Water Pollution Control

B-1

Act (or Clean Water Act), 33 U.S.C. § 1365, seeking relief for
past violations of National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES) permits by the Stroh Die Casting Company in
Milwaukee. Believing the statutory notice that Atlantic provided
to Stroh insufficient to encompass its complaint about the principal
point source at issue here, and further finding that no reasonable
jury could conclude that Stroh was an "intermittent or continuous"
violator with respect to the two other point sources Atlantic
identifies, the district court granted Stroh’s motion for summary
judgment and dismissed Atlantic’s suit. In our view, the district
court read Atlantic’s notice too narrowly. Furthermore, its
conclusion that at the time the suit was filed Stroh was not at least
an intermittent violator for one of the contested outfalls is
inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Gwaltney of
Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 484 U.S. 49, 108
S.Ct. 376, 98 L.Ed.2d 306 (1987). We therefore reverse and
remand.

I

Stroh produces zinc and aluminum castings at its
Milwaukee plant. In the course of its operations, it discharges
industrial wastewater through various outfalls to sanitary or
municipal sewers run by the Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage
District (MMSD), which eventually empty into Lake Michigan.
It also discharges "non-contact cooling water," which is heated tap
water, through storm sewers regulated by the Wisconsin
Department of Natural Resources (WDNR) into the Bluemound
tributary of the Menomonee River. As of November 1988, Stroh
had a WDNR permit that allowed it to discharge the "non-contact
cooling water" into the Bluemound, but it had no permit at all to
discharge zinc- and phenol-contaminated industrial wastewater into
the MMSD sanitary sewerage system.

This prompted Atlantic, an environmental organization
with Wisconsin members, to send a letter on November 8, 1988
giving Stroh notice of violations of its WDNR discharge permit.

B-2

~s Vey

(Despite the implication from its name that Atlantic had little
connection with the Great Lakes, the complaint alleged that
members of Atlantic resided in Wisconsin, in the vicinity of Lake
Michigan, or they owned property or used Lake Michigan for
recreational purposes, and thus were affected by Stroh’s discharge
of pollutants into the Lake. Stroh did not challenge Atlantic’s
standing to sue in any of its motions for summary judgment.)
Under 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b), Atlantic had to give Stroh notice at
least 60 days prior to suing it for those violations. The November
1988 notice alleged that Stroh had several times exceeded the daily
maximum discharge limits for oil, grease, and biological oxygen
demand 5 (BODS) allowed under the WDNR permit for WONR
outfalls (discharge points) 1 and 3. On January 23, 1989, Atlantic
filed a complaint against Stroh based on the November 1988
notice. Stroh moved shortly thereafter to dismiss Atlantic’s claims
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, claiming that it was not "in
violation" of the statute at the time of suit, because it was neither
a continuous nor an intermittent violator as required by Gwaltney.

Rather than submitting a brief in opposition to Stroh’s
motion to dismiss, Atlantic chose on April 13, 1989, to send Stroh
a second 60-day notice of intent to sue. The April 1989 notice
alleged that Stroh had exceeded its maximums for zinc, phenol, oil
and grease on several occasions at WDNR outfall 3. The April
notice also alleged that Stroh had been discharging die casting
process wastewater to the MMSD sanitary sewers since October
31, 1988, without a pretreatment discharge permit and in violation
of the categorical standards of 40 CFR Chapter 464. It itemized
certain specific violations at MMSD outfall 3 (not to be confused
with the WDNR storm sewer outfall 3 that was the subject of the
first notice) and accused Stroh of a “history of effluent standard
violations." Stroh’s own records, the notice claimed, showed that
its discharges were not in compliance as of January 31, 1989, and
that compliance was not expected until January 10, 1990. It
concluded that "[sJuch violations are known to the Discharger and
may be included in future legal actions by Notifier."

ee

Stroh responded by obtaining an MMSD permit on July
28, 1989, that authorized it to discharge die casting wastewater to
MMSD sewers through Stroh’s Abcor treatment unit. At this
point, the designation of outfalls becomes somewhat confusing,
because the MMSD outfalls defined under the July 1989 permit
were different from the identically numbered outfalls covered by
the WDNR discharge permit described in Atlantic’s November
1988 notice. Stroh’s MMSD permit defined the following outfalls:

MMSD Outfalls 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3: handled discharges
from the parts washer conversion coating, a three-stage
washer that discharged each tank separately

MMSD Outfall 2: handled domestic waste only, unlimit
ed under the MMSD permit

MMSD Outfall 3: handled discharge from the Abcor un
it, which treated waste from die casting, mold cooling
leakage, casting quench, and machining

MMSD Outfalls 4.0, 4.1, and 4.2: 4.0 was the sump pit
through which wastewater from the parts washer and the
deburring operation were directed; 4.1 and 4.2 were the
batch discharges from the two-stage parts washer

MMSD Outfall 5: handled cooling water only, unlimite
d under the MMSD permit

Stroh’s MMSD monitoring summary showed that it was
not able consistently to meet the discharge limitations for zinc that
applied to MMSD outfall 3, as violations occurred in June 1989
and October 1989.

Meanwhile, back in the district court, nothing was
happening with the lawsuit. On the assumption that the case had
been settled, the district court entered an order dismissing
Atlantic’s suit without prejudice on November 14, 1989, noting
that it had not filed a brief responding to Stroh’s motion to dismiss
and had thus waived the right to do so under the court’s local
rules. Six months later, on May 7, 1990, Atlantic filed an amended
complaint, which the district court accepted, reopening the case on

B-4

May 8, 1990. Stroh moved to vacate the order reopening the case
and to dismiss Atlantic’s amended complaint, but the court took no
action on the motion for two years. On April 16, 1992, Judge
Warren, before whom the case had been pending, denied Stroh’s
motions. Later in 1992, both parties filed motions for summary
judgment. Another four years passed, by which time the case had
been transferred to Judge Randa. On March 22, 1996, he granted
Stroh’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the amended
complaint and denied Atlantic’s motion. This time, final judgment
was entered on the order of dismissal on March 26, 1996 and this
appeal followed.

Time was not standing still between 1990 and 1996,
however, even if the case was. On May 29, 1990, shortly after
Atlantic filed its amended complaint, Stroh wrote to the MMSD
explaining why it had failed to meet the April 10, 1990, deadline
for starting up its wastewater treatment system. It conceded that
it was not in compliance with the MMSD permit at that time, but
it expressed the hope that the new system would cure the problem.
Then, on July 1, 1990, something reminiscent of the game of
hiding a pea under one of several cups occurred. On that date,
Stroh abandoned existing MMSD outfall 3 (which was the outfall
mentioned in the April 1989 notice and the MMSD permit) and re-
routed its industrial process wastewater to "outfall 4," necessitating
the issuance of a modified MMSD permit in October 1990 to
reflect the changes. The new outfall 4 was not the same outfall 4
that the July 1989 MMSD permit had described, however. Recall
that the July 1989 MMSD permit labeled “outfalls 4.0, 4.1, and
4.2" as the sump pump from the parts washer and deburring
operations and the batch discharges from the parts washer itself.
By contrast, the October 1990 modified MMSD permit
retroactively relabeled “outfall 4" as the sampling station located
downstream of Stroh’s pretreatment system. The discharge from
the Abcor unit, which had formerly gone through MMSD outfall
3, was rerouted first through the new (but as yet inoperative)
wastewater treatment system, where the zinc and phenols were to

B-5

be removed, and then it was to be piped to the new, single MMSD
outfall 4.

Samples taken from the new outfall 4 in July 1990 showed
continued violations of effluent standards for zinc, lead, and
phenols. MMSD issued notices of noncompliance to Stroh relating
to discharges from the new outfall 4 in October 1990, November
1990, January 1991, and June 1991. MMSD then published a
notice in the Milwaukee Journal on March 29, 1992, which listed
Stroh as one of 15 industrial users that were in significant
noncompliance with applicable effluent discharge standards during
1991.

Last, returning to the WDNR storm sewer system, Atlantic
presented evidence indicating that Stroh continued to discharge
nonprocessed water into the Bluemound tributary in violation of its
WDNR permit. A Discharge Monitoring Report, whose accuracy
Stroh contests, was received by the WDNR on April 16, 1992, in
which Stroh reported discharging 11 milligrams per liter of oil and
grease at WDNR storm sewer outfall 3 on February 6, 1992,
which was | milligram over the per liter daily maximum allowed
under its permit. Based on this contested evidence, Atlantic claims
that the district court should not have dismissed its claims relating
to WDNR outfalls 1 and 3.

II

Although the facts are somewhat complicated (made more
so by the proliferation of outfalls that seem to have the same
number until one takes a more careful look), the legal questions in
this case are fairly straightforward. The first and most important
question is whether Atlantic’s April 1989 notice satisfied the
jurisdictional prerequisite imposed by the Clean Water Act, 33
U.S.C. § 1365(b), for Atlantic’s citizen suit about industrial
discharges into the MMSD system. Within that general issue are
three subsidiary points: first, was Atlantic’s April 1989 notice
specific enough about the alleged violation to encompass its claims

B-6

atk,

eb he eth, nan scetnllly

about what eventually became new outfall 4; second, was Stroh
at the time suit was brought a “continuing or intermittent” violator
of the Act such that Atlantic would then have been entitled to an
injunction; and third, what is the effect, if any, of the long delay
between the November 1989 dismissal without prejudice (on which
no Rule 58 final judgment was ever entered) and the district
court’s discretionary decision to accept the filing of the amended
complaint in May 1990? The final question relates to the district
court’s decision to grant summary judgment on Atlantic’s claims
relating to WDNR outfalls 1 and 3. On these claims, Stroh
concedes that Atlantic’s notice was adequate to confer subject
matter jurisdiction, but it persuaded the district court that Atlantic
had not presented enough evidence of violations to survive

summary judgment.
A. The MMSD Claims

The Clean Water Act allows private citizens to sue any
person “alleged to be in violation" of the conditions of an effluent
standard or limitation under the Act or of an order issued with
respect to such a standard or limitation by the Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) or a state. See 33
U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1). It is unlawful to discharge pollutants without
any permit, see 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a); Rueth v. United States
E.P.A., 13 F.3d 227, 229 (7th Cir. 1993); Hoffman Homes, Inc.
v. Administrator, United States E.P.A., 999 F.2d 256, 260 (7th
Cir. 1993), just as it is unlawful to discharge pollutants in violation
of the terms of an existing NPDES permit, see 33 U.S.C. §
1342(a); see generally Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U-S. 91, 105,
112 S.Ct. 1046, 1056, 117 L.Ed.2d 239 (1992) (outlining federal
and state permitting scheme). Citizens may not bring suit,
however, unless and until they have given 60 days’ notice of their
intent to sue to the alleged violator (as well as to the Administrator
and the state). 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A). The purpose of this
notice requirement, the Supreme Court explained in Gwaltney, "is
to give [the alleged violator] an opportunity to bring itself into
compliance with the Act and thus likewise render unnecessary a

B-7

citizen suit." 484 U.S. at 60, 108 S.Ct. at 383. See also Citizens
for a Better Environment v. Steel Co., 90 F.3d 1237, 1242 (7th
Cir. 1996) (explaining Gwaltney ), cert. granted, --- U.S. ----, 117
S.Ct. 1079, 137 L.Ed.2d 214 (1997). EPA regulations give
further guidance on the contents of the notice, at 40 CFR §
135.3(a):

Notice regarding an alleged violation of an effluent
standard or limitation or of an order with respect thereto
, Shall include sufficient information to permit the recipi
ent to identify the specific standard, limitation, or order
alleged to constitute a violation, the person or persons
responsible for the alleged violation, the date or dates of
such violation, and the full name, address, and telephone
number of the person giving notice.

In practical terms, the notice must be sufficiently specific
to inform the alleged violator about what it is doing wrong, so that
it will know what corrective actions will avert a lawsuit.

In this case, Atlantic claims that its April 1989 notice
clearly informed Stroh that it was complaining about Stroh’s
unauthorized discharges of die casting process wastewater to the
MMSD sewers. The fact that Stroh later (1) obtained a permit
covering those discharges from outfall 3, and then (2) re-routed the
discharges to the newly defined outfall 4 after it built its treatment
facility, does not change the adequacy of the original notice.
Indeed, if anything it suggests that Stroh knew exactly what
Atlantic was concerned about and it was actively taking steps to
address the matter. Stroh, for its part, argues that the April 1989
notice specifically mentioned MMSD outfall 3, which had been
closed down by the time the amended complaint (which was the
first one to raise claims about discharges into the MMSD system)
was filed in April 1990. Since Stroh had never received any-notice
mentioning new MMSD outfall 4 as a noncomplying "point
source" for purposes of the Act, it reasons that Atlantic failed to
meet the jurisdictional threshold for a citizen suit.

B-8

The premise of Stroh’s argument is that the §1365(b)(1)(A)
notice must specifically identify the point source from which the
allegedly offending discharge is emerging before the Act’s
jurisdictional requirements will be met. It relies on Hallstrom v.
Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20, 110 S.Ct. 304, 107 L.Ed.2d 237
(1989), for this proposition, which held that compliance with the
60-day notice provision of the Act is a mandatory precondition to
suit that cannot be disregarded by the district court. Hallstrom,
however, said nothing about the content of the notice. It was
undisputed that the plaintiffs there had given no notice at all to
either Oregon’s Department of Environmental Quality or the
Administrator of the EPA, both of whom are clearly entitled to
notice under the statute. Stroh’s claim here is not that Atlantic
failed to send its notice to one of the parties entitled to receive it;
it is instead that the April 1989 notice was not specific enough to
alert it to the claimed violation, and thus for purposes of new
MMSD outfall 4 it was the equivalent of no notice at all.

With respect to content, Stroh argues that nothing less than
a specific identification of the offending outfall would have
sufficed. It finds support for this proposition in the Third Circuit’s
decision in Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. Vv.
Hercules, Inc., 50 F.3d 1239 (3d Cir.1995), which held that a
citizen plaintiff's initial notice of discharge violations was broad
enough to encompass additional discharge violations and
monitoring, reporting and record keeping violations occurring after
the date of the notice letter. The claims, however, would have to
be of the same "type” for this rule to hold, as the court explained:

[W]e hold that a notice letter which includes a list of
discharge violations, by parameter, provides sufficient
information for the recipients of the notice to identify
violations of the same type (same parameter, same outfall)
occurring during and after the period covered by the notice
letter.

B-9

50 F.3d at 1250. The court went on to say that the citizen’s
burden was "to provide sufficient information of a violation, such
as an excessive discharge, so that the permit holder and the agency
can identify it." Id. at 1252. If subsequent investigation reveals
a violation, then the court found that " *complete compliance’
should incorporate the correction of all such interconnected
violations." Id.

We do not read the Third Circuit as establishing an
inflexible rule that would require outfall-by-outfall notice in all
cases. It was not faced with a case where the alleged polluter,
upon receiving a notice about one offending outfall, simply
redirected the stream of contaminated water to another outfall.
The key to notice is to give the accused company the opportunity
to correct the problem. Here, there is no question that Atlantic’s
April 1989 notice sufficiently informed Stroh about Atlantic’s
claim that its handling of the die casting wastewater did not comply
with the statute. Stroh promptly secured a permit that covered
exactly these discharges, under the outfall numbered 3 in the first
MMSD permit. It began construction of a treatment facility,
which it compieted in June of 1990 (at least a month after the
amended complaint was filed). It then re-routed the very same die
casting wastewater to its newly numbered outfall 4. Moreover, it
admitted in its May 29, 1990 letter to the MMSD that it was not
in compliance and attempted to explain why it missed its deadline
for its wastewater treatment system. These are not the actions of
a company that has not received enough information for purposes
of the statutory notice provisions of the Act. Nothing in the statute
says that plaintiffs must refrain from filing suit when the company
is attempting to take corrective action. Even though Atlantic did
not file its amended complaint until well after the expiration of the
minimum 60-day statutory waiting period (and thus eleven months
after it could have sued), we find that the April 1989 notice
satisfied the jurisdictional requirements of the statute.

Even if the notice was broad enough in scope and was
timely, a second requirement for citizen suits is that the defendant

B-10

must be “in violation" of a relevant standard, limitation, or order.
In Gwaltney, the Supreme Court held that "[tJhe most natural
reading of ‘to be in violation’ is a requirement that
citizen-plaintiffs allege a state of either continuous or intermittent
violation-that is, a reasonable likelihood that a past polluter will
continue to violate in the future." 484 U.S. at 57, 108 S.Ct. at
381. The Court held that this language precluded the possibility
of a citizen suit based on a wholly past violation; instead, the
plaintiff must allege that the violations are ongoing at the time suit
is brought. Justice Scalia would have gone further on the latter
point and would have required the plaintiff to substantiate an
allegation of an ongoing violation, if the point was contested. See
Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 69, 108 S.Ct. at 387. He agreed, however,
that "[a] good or lucky day is not a state of compliance. Nor is
the dubious state in which a past effluent problem is not recurring
at the moment but the cause of that problem has not been
completely and clearly eradicated." Id. Furthermore, he noted,
without contradiction from the majority, that "it does not suffice
to defeat subject-matter jurisdiction that the success of the
attempted remedies becomes clear months or even weeks after the
suit is filed." Id.

If the violation is cured at some point while the suit is
pending, which for all we know may have occurred in this case,
the case nevertheless does not become moot. It may be possible
that the citizen plaintiffs would lose their right to an injunction, if,
as the Gwaltney majority put it, "it is ‘absolutely clear’ that the
allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to
recur." (Emphasis in original; quoting from United States v.
Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass’n, 393 U.S. 199, 203, 89
S.Ct. 361, 364, 21 L.Ed.2d 344 (1968).) In addition to injunctive
relief, however, the statute provides for civil penalties under 33
U.S.C. § 1319(d), which would be recoverable for any time period
in which Stroh was found to be in violation. Thus, if Atlantic
adequately alleged that Stroh was either a continuous OF
intermittent violator at the time of suit--which we again take to be
the date of the amended complaint--it has satisfied this prerequisite

B-11

for suit as well. Accord Atlantic States Legal Foundation Inc. v.
Tyson Foods Inc., 897 F.2d 1128, 1135 (11th Cir. 1990).

Looking only at the allegations, which would be pertinent
to a motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), it is easy to conclude
that Atlantic adequately alleged that Stroh was "in violation" of the
Act in the sense that Gwaltney used the term. For purposes of
summary judgment, though, we think that the question whether the
defendant was in violation at the time of the suit is one of fact. In
keeping with the majority’s decision in the Supreme Court to
require the plaintiff only to allege in good faith the present nature
of the violation, the Fifth Circuit has concluded that the burden of
coming forward with evidence to show that the plaintiff's
allegation is false rests on the defendant at the summary judgment
stage. See Carr v. Alta Verde Indus., Inc., 931 F.2d 1055 (Sth
Cir.1991). At the trial, of course, the burden of proving the
ultimate violation rests on the plaintiff, because at that point the
violation is an element of the substantive case rather than a
jurisdictional hurdle.

We think the Fifth Circuit’s approach sensibly
accommodates the Gwaltney holding and the nature of summary
judgment practice. Here, Stroh made no showing that Atlantic’s
allegations of the violations in connection with its discharges of die
casting wastewater were not made in good faith, and it is clear that
if the notice encompasses new outfall 4, the violation had certainly
not ceased by the time the amended complaint was filed.

This leaves only the effect of the various delays in this
proceeding on Atlantic’s ability now to proceed with its suit. As
we noted above, the delay has not made the case moot. Stroh
realizes that the district court had discretion to consider whether to
accept the filing of the amended complaint six months after it had
dismissed the original complaint. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a); Otis
v. City of Chicago, 29 F.3d 1159, 1163 (7th Cir.1994). Bearing
in mind both the breadth of that discretion and the fact that Stroh
itself could have moved at any point after the November 14, 1989,

B-12

order of dismissal for entry of a Rule 58 final judgment (but did
not), we are not inclined to second-guess the district court’s
handling of the case. The greater part of the delay occurred
between the filing of the new motions for summary judgment in
1992 and the new district judge’s ruling in 1996. While this is
certainly regrettable, Atlantic is no more responsible for this
desuetude than Stroh (or the court). We therefore conclude that
Atlantic is entitled to go forward on its claims relating to the
discharges of die casting wastewater into the MMSD sewerage

system.
B. The WDNR Claims

The district court dismissed Atlantic’s claim relating to
discharges at WDNR outfalls 1 and 3 because it found that a
laboratory letter reporting that too much oil and grease had been
discharged at outfall 3 in February 1992 was based on a faulty test.
Stroh alleged that the sample result was in error, claiming that its
Discharge Monitoring Report on which the excess discharge was
reported had also contained the following notation: “Note:
Attached lab report shows lab process error. " No such report was
ever found in WDNR’s files. Stroh then submitted a letter dated
May 13, 1992, from the laboratory that performed the test, which
said:

As part of the method, an oil standard of known
concentration is analyzed along with the samples to
determine the accuracy of the analyses. The standard th
at was run on February 27 had a recovery of 50%. This
is below our acceptance level. This could indicate that
there was a problem with the O & G analyses that day,
meaning that the results for your two samples tested that
day may not be accurate.

Taking both the May letter and the lab report into account,
the district court concluded that Atlantic had not met its summary
judgment burden of coming forward with evidence to show that

Stroh was indeed a continuing or intermittent violator of the
WDNR permit covering WDNR outfalls 1 and 3.

We note initially that the record appears to be devoid of
any evidence from Atlantic that relates to WDNR outfall 1. The
district court therefore correctly dismissed Atlantic’s claims
relating to that outfall from the case. With respect to WDNR
outfall 3, the case is much closer. On the one hand, as Atlantic
points out, the lab letter, taken in the light most favorable to
Atlantic, implies that the flaw in the data led to an under-reporting
of the actual levels of oil and grease, not to an excessive report.
From that perspective, Stroh may have exceeded its permissible
limits by 2 or 3 milligrams, rather than the 1 milligram that the lab
found. On the other hand, Atlantic does not direct us to any other
evidence in the record that suggests either continuous or
intermittent violations at WDNR outfall 3. We must therefore
decide whether the lab report, taken alone, is enough to defeat
Stroh’s motion for summary judgment.

Bearing in mind both the court’s obligation on summary
judgment to view the facts in the light most favorable to the party
opposing the motion, and the legal requirement for the company
to show that it had "clearly achieved the effect of curing all past
violations by the time suit was brought,” Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at
69-70, 108 S.Ct. at 388 (Scalia, J., concurring), we think Atlantic
should have been entitled to proceed on its claims regarding
WDNR outfall 3. If Stroh discharged excess oil and grease into
the Bluemound tributary on one occasion after the date of the suit,
a finder of fact could infer that Stroh had not fully cured all past
violations by the time suit was brought. It is unclear how much
relief this will bring for Atlantic, if the provable violations are so
sparse, but that goes to the merits of the suit, not to the
jurisdictional threshold.

We therefore AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of
Atlantic’s claims with respect to WDNR outfall 1, and we
REVERSE and REMAND for further proceedings with respect to

B-14

WDNR outfall 3 and the claims regarding the die casting
wastewater that was routed to new MMSD outfall 4. Each party
is to bear its own costs on appeal.

MANION, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting
in part.

Although I agree that the dismissal of Atlantic’s claims
with respect to WDNR outfall | should be affirmed, I do not
concur with the court’s reversal of the district court’s dismissal of
claims with respect to outfall 3. In my opinion the court reads the
notice and continuing violator requirements of the Clean Water
Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 et seq., too broadly. Accordingly, I would
affirm the district court’s dismissal of Atlantic’s claims in total.

I.

Stroh Die Casting Company manufactures zinc and
aluminum castings in its Milwaukee, Wisconsin plant. The
Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources ("WDNR") has issued

Stroh permits to discharge industrial wastewater through various
outfalls into storm sewers which flow into Lake Michigan.

The Clean Water Act enables citizens to seek injunctive
relief, civil penalties, and forfeitures (as well as attorneys’ fees) if
violations of the Act are proved. Atlantic States Legal Foundation
claims that Stroh violated the Act. Ina November 8, 1988 letter
from its law firm, Atlantic gave Stroh notice of its intent to sue in
60 days for certain purported violations of the Act, as 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365(b) requires Atlantic to do. In that notice, Atlantic alleged
that Stroh had exceeded the daily maximum discharge limits for
oil, grease, and "biological oxygen demand 5" allowed under the
WDNR permit for WDNR outfalls 1 and 3. Nearly 3 months
later, Atlantic filed suit against Stroh based on the notice.
Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ. P. 12(b)(1), Stroh moved to dismiss
Atlantic’s claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing
that Atlantic could not satisfy the requirements for a citizen suit

B-15

under 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) because any violations of the Act
occurred in the past; Atlantic had failed to allege a state of
continuing pollution, an impediment to recovery under the Act

after Gwaltney v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 57,
64, 108 S.Ct. 376, 381, 385, 98 L.Ed.2d 306 (1987).

Rather than opposing Stroh’s motion to dismiss, on April
13, 1989, again in a letter from its law firm, Atlantic sent Stroh a
second 60-day notice of intent to sue. That letter alleged Stroh had
exceeded the maximum allowances for zinc, total phenol, and
again for oil and grease, as well as that Stroh discharged diecasting
wastewater into Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District
("MMSD") sewers without a permit. As a location for this
discharge, the second notice mentions only "outfall 003"; the
parties agree this refers to MMSD outfall 3. Three months later,
the MMSD did issue Stroh an industrial wastewater discharge
permit which defined five separate outfalls and set their effluent
limitations. Under that permit, Stroh continued to discharge its
industrial wastewater through MMSD outfalls 1, 3, and 4. After
July 1989, these outfalls were monitored, tested, and reported to
the MMSD.

Because Atlantic never responded to Stroh’s motion to
dismiss and thus had waived the right to do so, the district court
dismissed Atlantic’s suit without prejudice on November 14, 1989.
Over six months later, on May 7, 1990, Atlantic filed an amended
complaint alleging the same violations noticed in the April 13,
1989 letter. The district court accepted the filing, reopening this
case.

In the meantime, Stroh had been designing and installing
a new wastewater treatment system for its plant. In May 1990,
Stroh wrote the MMSD explaining that it had failed to comply with
an April 10, 1990 deadline for completing the new system because
of a personnel difficulty, late delivery of the new system from the
manufacturer, and installation problems. In June 1990, Stroh
completed the installation of the new system, which combined the

B-16

wastewater previously discharged at MMSD outfalls 1 and 3 with
that discharged at MMSD outfall 4, pumped it through an
ultrafiltration unit to extract all grease and oil, then through a
pretreatment system, and then discharged the water only from
MMSD outfall 4. MMSD outfalls 1 and 3 were later used for
expelling waste and water not limited by the permit.

On October 23, 1990, the MMSD issued Stroh a new
discharge permit which reflected the new outfalls and new
treatment system. The last reported exceedence at WDNR outfall
3 occurred on February 27, 1990, although a February 2, 1992
laboratory test revealed that Stroh had exceeded the 10 milligrams
per liter level for oil and grease at that outfall by 1 milligram.
Stroh challenged the accuracy of that test, submitting a March
1992 letter in which the laboratory admitted that their oil
measurements were off by 50% that day. Atlantic responded that
the lab’s admitted error could only cut in its favor-- that the flaw
in the data would have led to under-, not over-reporting.

When Atlantic filed the amended complaint and the district
court reopened the case, Stroh moved to vacate the court’s ruling
to reopen. The district court denied that motion, and the parties
filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court
granted Stroh’s summary judgment motion, denied Atlantic’s, and
dismissed Atlantic’s amended complaint.

Il.

The court first concludes that the April 1989 (second)
notice to Stroh satisfied the jurisdictional requirements of 33
U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A). I agree with the district court that
Atlantic failed to fulfill the statutory condition precedent by
notifying the proper parties, including Stroh, of any alleged
violations at MMSD outfall 4, and therefore that any such
violations are beyond the scope of this suit.

ere eiaiiiiiiieiiamienaiaan

The court concludes that "there is no question that
Atlantic’s April 1989 notice sufficiently informed Stroh about
Atlantic’s claim that its handling of the die casting wastewater did
not comply with the statute." Ante at p. 820. It so concludes by
examining Stroh’s post-complaint actions: securing a permit that
covered the discharges, constructing a new wastewater treatment
facility, re-routing the diecasting wastewater to newly numbered
outfall 4, and admitting it was not in compliance in its May 1990
letter to the MMSD. Id. The court surmises that "these are not the
actions of a company that has not received enough information for
purposes of the statutory notice provisions of the Act." Ante at p.
820. But "[t]he mere chronological sequence of events does not
establish a causal connection." Brennan v. United Steelworkers of
America, 554 F.2d 586, 614 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).

It is undisputed that Atlantic’s first notice of intent to sue
on November 8, 1988 did not mention discharge into the MMSD,
and that the second notice on April 13, 1989 mentions only
MMSD outfall 3, not MMSD outfall 4. The April 13th letter
refers to discharges of "process water into Lake Michigan via the
[MMSD]" and that Stroh "has violated and continues to violate an
‘effluent standard or limitation’ by discharging die casting process
wastewater to MMSD without a pretreatment discharge permit."
The letter then lists six specific examples of exceedences, each
emitting from what the parties do not dispute is MMSD outfall 3.
But Atlantic notified Stroh of this information when Stroh was
correcting discharges from MMSD outfalls 1 and 3, not MMSD
outfall 4. And Atlantic had easy access to all records of Stroh’s
emissions, but made no mention of MMSD outfall 4 in this second
notice, while specifically mentioning MMSD outfall 3. After
specifically noticing only violations at outfall 3, it is wrong to
include in this suit alleged violations at MMSD outfall 4 without
notice to Stroh.

The Third Circuit more properly handled a situation similar
to this. In Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey v.
Hercules, Inc., 50 F.3d 1239 (3d Cir.1995), citizen plaintiffs sent

B-18

OS CN ae et St

out a notice of an intent to sue listing 68 discharges which
allegedly occurred in violation of Hercules’ permits. Id. at 1243.
As in this case, the district court held that pre- complaint discharge
violations not included in the plaintiffs’ notice letter could not be
included in the suit unless listed in a subsequent notice, and
granted the defendant summary judgment. Id. at 1250. The Third
Circuit reversed this holding, concluding that

a notice letter which includes a list of discharge
violations, by parameter, provides sufficient
information for the recipients of the notice to
identify violations of the same type (same
parameter, same outfall) occurring during and after
the period covered by the notice letter.

Id. (emphasis supplied). The Hercules decision supplies a
workable, bright-line rule to apply in cases such as this: violations
"which are of the same type (same parameter, same outfall) as the
alleged violations included in the plaintiffs’ 60-day notice letter,"
id., should be deemed properly noticed.

In attempting to distinguish Hercules, my colleagues assert
the Third Circuit "was not faced with a case where the alleged
polluter, upon receiving a notice about one offending outfall,
simply redirected the stream of contaminated water to another
outfall." Ante at p. 820. But the record does not support the
metaphor that Stroh played a shell game with the regulatory
authorities (and Atlantic) by constructing the new wastewater
treatment. Although Stroh’s new system was installed in June
1990, three weeks after the amended complaint, it was designed
from late 1989 to early 1990. During that time period only the
original complaint was on file, which had been dismissed for, in
effect, failure to prosecute. That complaint was based on the first
notice to sue, which concerned solely WDNR outfalls 1 and 3.
Further, the April 1989 notice made no mention of MMSD outfall
4. The installation of highly technical wastewater treatment
equipment cost Stroh hundreds of thousands of dollars and was

B-19

implemented on a schedule closely monitored by the MMSD. Its
purpose was to consolidate, update, and improve Stroh’s treatment
of wastewater. Stroh met with sewerage district officials
concerning the two month delay in installing the new system, and
explained the reasons for the delay in writing. To treat all of its
wastewater through the new system, Stroh combined the three
existing streams (which previously had been discharged at MMSD
outfalls 1, 3, and 4) and routed them through its new system, with
the treated water then discharged at new MMSD outfall 4. All of
these facts lead to the conclusion that Stroh methodically and
effectively addressed the problem, not that it hid the pea.

It is undisputed that MMSD outfall 4 was not a new outfall
through which Stroh creatively re-routed wastewater to discharge.
Stroh -had operated MMSD outfall 4 as a separate and distinct
outfall since July 1989, and it had separate effluent limitations
since the original MMSD permit. Because reports from MMSD
outfall 4 were available from July 1989 onward, Atlantic had
access to the information necessary to provide Stroh, the EPA, and
the WDNR with an appropriate notice of intent to sue for any
violations at MMSD outfall 4. Atlantic did not do so. As the
Supreme Court stated in Gwaltney, "the purpose of a notice to the
alleged violator is to give it an opportunity to bring itself into
complete compliance with the Act and thus likewise render
unnecessary a citizen suit." 484 U.S. at 60, 108 S.Ct. at 383.
For a notice to fulfill its function, the violator must be told what
the pollution is and where it occurred. This court should not
rewrite the second notice on Atlantic’s behalf to encompass
information it had the opportunity to but did not include.

The consequence of the court’s expansive reading could be
catch-all notices sent to companies which, if construed broadly as
the court has done here, would encompass any violation, past or
future. This, of course, would undermine the dual purposes of the
notice requirement: to provide governmental entities with the
opportunity to begin an enforcement action before the citizen suit
is filed, and to provide the alieged violator with enough

B-20

information to be able to bring itself into compliance. See
Hercules, 50 F.3d at 1249. In Hercules, the Third Circuit judged

the sufficiency of the 60-day notice letter by “whether it
accomplishes these purposes." Id. Because the April 13, 1989
notice letter in this case could not have given the EPA, the
WDNR, or Stroh notice of a lack of compliance at MMSD outfall
4, this court should exclude from this suit any violations Atlantic
alleges occurred there.

Il.

Even if proper notice is given, the Clean Water Act only
permits a citizen to bring a civil action if a person is "in violation"
of a relevant standard, limitation, or order. 33 U.S.C. §
1365(a)(1)(A). If the person charged is not "in violation,” the
plaintiff does not have standing under the Act. In Gwaltney, the
Supreme Court set forth a test for standing under the Act: a
plaintiff must make a "good-faith allegation of continuous or
intermittent violation." 484 U.S. at 64, 108 S.Ct. at 385. This
means that a citizen plaintiff does not have standing to maintain a
suit for civil penalties for wholly past violations of the act.' Thus,
for purposes of federal subject matter jurisdiction, citizen plaintiffs
are required to show “a reasonable likelihood that a past polluter
will continue to pollute in the future." Id. at 57, 108 S.Ct. at 381.
Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Stevens and O’Connor, concurred
in Gwaltney on exactly this issue. Id. at 67, 108 S.Ct. at 386-87.
To them, standing should not turn on the plaintiff's good faith, but
on the objective fact of whether the defendant was "in violation."
Id. at 69, 108 S.Ct. at 387-88.

. This court clearly recognized this in Citizens for a Better Environment
v. Steel Co., 90 F.3d 1237 (7th Cir.1996). That case discussed how the Supreme
Court in Gwaltney interpreted the present tense language of the Clean Water Act
io bar suits for past violations, and how such suits would render the Act’s
statutory notice provision meaningless. Id. at 1242-43.

B-21

On remand in Gwaltney, the Fourth Circuit held that a
citizen plaintiff may prove an ongoing violation in one of two
ways:

either (1) by proving violations that continue on or after
the date the complaint is filed, or (2) by adducing eviden
ce from which a reasonable trier of fact could find a
continuing likelihood of the recurrence in intermittent or
sporadic violations. Intermittent or sporadic violations d
O not cease to be ongoing until the date when there is no
real likelihood of repetition. . . .

890 F.2d 690, 693 (4th Cir.1989). "[E]very court thus far to
consider this question" has adopted this test. Carr v. Alta Verde
Indus., Inc., 931 F.2d 1055, 1062 (Sth Cir.1991).

The court decides that this case presents a fact question as
to whether Stroh was "in violation" at the time of the suit (which
I agree is the date of the amended complaint, May 7, 1990). It
adopts the approach from Carr that "the defendant has the burden
at the summary judgment stage to demonstrate that the plaintiff's
allegations of a continuous or intermittent violation do not raise a
genuine issue of material fact." 931 F.2d at 1062. The court has
inserted a new "fact." Because "the [April 1989] notice
encompasses new outfall 4, the violation had certainly not ceased
by the time the amended complaint was filed." Ante at p. 821.

Because no violations at MMSD outfall 4 were properly
noticed, this court should not conclude that any post-complaint
exceedences at outfall 4 qualify Stroh as a continuing violator.
Further, if Atlantic’s second notice is given its proper scope not to
include any exceedences at MMSD outfall 4, Atlantic does not
have standing to bring this suit.

It is undisputed that the last permit exceedence at WDNR
outfall 1 occurred in November 1986, 3+ years before Atlantic
filed its amended complaint. At MMSD outfall 3, there has not

B-22

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been a permit exceedence since June 1990, and there can be none,
for since that date that outfall has been used to expel _non- contact
cooling water, not wastewater. Stroh’s new wastewater treatment
system has been permanently connected and all industrial process
wastewater previously discharged at MMSD outfall 3 (which was
the subject of Atlantic’s April 13, 1989 notice) is discharged at
MMSD outfall 4.

Atlantic argues that there is one reported exceedence at
WDNR outfall 3 which was based on a faulty lab test, and that this
should preclude summary judgment. Even if Atlantic is correct
that any error in the lab test cuts in its favor, it has not met its
burden to show that Stroh was an "ongoing or intermittent
violator" at WDNR outfall 3. If those terms mean anything, they
require more than the single 1 mg per liter oil exceedence
identified by Atlantic. Only stretching “ongoing” and
"intermittent" beyond their breaking point could a court conclude
from a single, heavily disputed exceedence in February 1992 that
Stroh is currently "in violation" of the Clean Water Act. Cf.
Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey v. Yates Industries,
Inc., 757 F.Supp. 438, 447, modified on other grounds, 790
F.Supp. 511 (D.N.J.1991) (permit holder may avoid liability at
summary judgment if data in laboratory report presents direct
evidence of inaccuracies). Even if Atlantic is correct that there
was an exceedence in February 1992, according to the concurrence
in Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 69, 108 S.Ct. at 387-88, Atlantic must
demonstrate that Stroh is in fact in violation of the Act. It should
take more than an admittedly faulty lab result to satisfy this
burden.

This case presents neither of the circumstances the Fourth
Circuit recognized on remand in Gwaltney would prove an ongoing
violation. It is undisputed that before Atlantic’s notices, there
were exceedences at WDNR outfall 3 and unauthorized discharge
of diecasting wastewater into sewers. Between the second notice
and the amended complaint, Stroh obtained a comprehensive and
demanding MMSD permit concerning its wastewater discharge.

B-23

It also designed and built at its own great expense an entirely new
MMSD wastewater processing facility which was put into place
less than a month after Atlantic filed the amended complaint.
Properly confining our review to noticed outfalls since the date of
the amended complaint, there was a single, disputed exceedence of
1 milligram of oil at one outfall, the finding for which was in an
admittedly erroneous lab report. These facts show Stroh "cleaned
up its act," and is not reasonably likely to pollute in the future.
The court’s expansive reading of the “in violation" requirement
places an unreasonable burden on the company. Under Gwaltney,
Stroh simply does not qualify as an "ongoing violator."

IV.

I concur that the dismissal of Atlantic’s claims with respect
to WDNR outfall 1 should be affirmed, but I would dismiss the
claim with regard to WDNR outfall 3 as well due to Atlantic’s lack
of standing.

For all of these reasons, I would affirm the opinion of the
district court in full.

P As the court recognizes, given that Stroh has had the new wastewater
treatment system in place since June 1990, what truly may be at issue in this case
is substantial attorneys’ fees.

B-24

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APPENDIX C

33 U.S.C. § 1365 provides, in relevant part:

Citizen Suits (a) Authorization; jurisdiction. Except as
provided in subsection (b) of this section and section 309(g)(6),
any citizen may commence a civil action on his own behalf --

(1) against any person (including (i) the United States, and (ii) any
other governmental instrumentality or agency to the extent
permitted by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution) who is
alleged to be in violation of (A) an effluent standard or limitation
under this Act or (B) an order issued by the Administrator or a
State with respect to such a standard or limitation, or

(2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of
the Administrator to perform any act or duty under this Act which
is not discretionary with the Administrator.

The district courts shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the
amount in controversy or the citizenship of the parties, to enforce
such an effluent standard or limitation, or such an order, or to
order the Administrator to perform such act or duty, as the case
may be, and to apply any oppo civil penalties under section
309(d) of this Act.

(b) Notice. No action may be commenced --

(1) under subsection (a)(1) of this section --

(A) prior to sixty days after the plaintiff has given notice of the
alleged violation (i) to the Administrator, (ii) to the State in which
the alleged violation occurs, and (iii) to any alleged violator of the
standard, limitation, or order, or

(B) if the Administrator or State has commenced and is diligently
prosecuting a civil or criminal action in a court of the United
States, or a State to require compliance with the standard,
limitation, or order, but in any such action in a court of the United
States any citizen may intervene as a matter of right.

(2) under subsection (a)(2) of this section prior to sixty days after
the plaintiff has given notice of such action to the Administrator,

C-1

except that such action may be brought immediately after such
notification in the case of an action under this section respecting a
violation of sections 306 and 307(a) of this Act. Notice under this
subsection shall be given in such manner as the Administrator shall
prescribe by regulation.

(d) Litigation costs. The court, in issuing any final order in any
action brought pursuant to this section may award costs of
litigation (including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees) to
any prevailing or substantially prevailing party, whenever the court
determines such award is appropriate. The court may, if a
temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction is sought,
require the filing of a bond or equivalent security in accordance
with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

(f) Effluent standards or limitation. For purposes of this
section, the term "effluent standard or limitation under this Act"
means (1) effective July 1, 1973, an unlawful act under subsection
(a) of section 301 of this Act; (2) an effluent limitation or other
limitation under section 301 or 302 of this Act; (3) standard of
performance under section 306 of this Act; (4) prohibition, effluent
standard or pretreatment standards under section 307 of this Act;
(5) certification under section 401 of this Act; (6) a permit or
condition thereof issued under section 402 of this Act, which is in
effect under this Act (including a requirement applicable by reason
of section 313 of this Act); or (7) a regulation under section 405(d)
of this Act.

(g) Citizen. For the purposes of this section the term "citizen"
means a person or persons having an interest which is or may be
adversely affected.

40 C.F.R. § 135.3 provides:

Contents of notice. (a) Violation of standard, limitation or order.
Notice regarding an alleged violation of an effluent standard or
limitation or of an order with respect thereof, shall include
sufficient information to permit the recipient to identify the specific
standard, limitation, or order alleged to have been violated, the
activity alleged to constitute a violation, the person or persons
responsible for the alleged violation, the location of the alleged
violation, the date or dates of such violation, and the full name,
address, and telephone number of the person giving notice.

(b) Failure to act. Notice regarding an alleged failure of the
Administrator to perform any act or duty under the Act which is
not discretionary with the Administrator shall identify the provision
of the Act which requires such act or creates such duty, shall
describe with reasonable specificity the action taken or not taken
by the Administrator which is alleged to constitute a failure to
perform such act or duty, and shall state the full name, address and
telephone number of the person giving the notice.

(c) Identification of counsel. The notice shall state the name,

address, and telephone number of the legal counsel, if any,
representing the person giving the notice.

C-3

LIST OF PARENT COMPANIES AND SUBSIDIARIES

The petitioner, Stroh Die Casting Co., Inc., pursuant to

Supreme Court Rule 29, states that it has no parent or subsidiary

companies.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40386013_1421%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
